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New Perspectives on Nationalism in Spain

Edited by

Carsten Jacob Humlebæk and Antonia María Ruiz Jiménez

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About the Editors

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Preface to "New Perspectives on Nationalism in Spain"

Nations and nationalism, as organizational principles of social life, provide individuals with a sense of who they are and where they belong. While nations are not the only form of community to serve humankind in this manner, they remain privileged due to their relationship with the nation-state, the dominant form of political organization. The Spanish nation, however, has been contested almost since its earliest existence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the Spanish nation-state has therefore been involved in almost perpetual conflicts between various nationalisms, particularly between different versions of Spanish nationalism as well as between Spanish majority nationalism and various minority nationalisms. At different times in the past two centuries, the conflicts have been revived and turned into organizing principles of the political communities in Spain, quite often as communities in conflict or contention but, nevertheless, as communities providing the Spaniards with different senses of belonging.

In recent times, both lines of contention have been activated again, both the conflict between left-wing and right-wing nationalisms about the definition of the Spanish nation as well as the majority nationalist vs. minority nationalist conflict. The conflict between left-wing and right-wing interpretations of the Spanish nation, particularly understood through the prism of former losers and winners of the Spanish civil war, has been revived since approximately year 2000 about the contentious issue of reviving or forgetting the so-called 'historical memory'. The other fault line between majority and minority nationalism has been revived even more recently (from approximately 2005) and will be the principal focal point of this volume. The main current issue related to this conflict is the rise of Catalan separatism, but only a few years prior to this, the Basque identities were just as conflictual. In addition, various other territorially-based conflicts loom in the shadow of the Catalan clash and are nourished from the eternal tensions between the demands for symmetry and demands for asymmetry that characterize the decentralized Spanish democratic state.

These Spanish conflicts should be situated in a contemporary European and global context, where anxieties about sovereignty are on the rise, causing the revival of emotional messages and strategies to mobilize the citizenry in favor of particular political communities. Both the state-wide Spanish actors and the sub-state nationalist parties and NGOs try to develop and strengthen feelings of territorial attachments to the Spanish state and political community or to the sub-state political communities, and both use emotions and feelings to ensure support and to assert or claim sovereignty for the political community in question. These questions raise a number of issues that we address in this volume.

In the first section devoted to Spain, Pablo Sánchez León argues for a renovation in the study of nationalism and the related terminology around the concepts of nation and patria by addressing the issue of the rationality underlying the decisions of citizens willing to leave their homelands. Using the example of unforced exiles from the 1939 Republican diaspora (and inner exiles as well), the chapter provides a theory of de-identification from a nation for the sake of civic commitment. Secondly, it focuses on Spanish post-Francoist historiography of the early modern period to show the imbalances of its discourse around patria and nation arguing in favor of that of nation. Subsequently, it provides a comparative overview of the scholarly interest in patriotism in modern history, relating it to the different national trajectories of the respective political cultures. Finally, it claims a methodological reorientation is needed in the study of nationalism and patriotism by

distinguishing between nationand patria as terms, as concepts, and as analytical categories defining distinctive collective identities. In his chapter, Carmelo Moreno aims to analyze which indicators are most efficient for testing how the different actors position themselves facing the phenomenon of the Spanish plurinational labyrinth. He argues that to analyze the Spanish national question, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the idea of the nation and the phenomenon of nationalism on one side, and the question of political plurality on the other. The approval of the Constitutional text more than forty years ago was thus only achieved, according to the author, thanks to a delicate semantic balancing act concerning the concept of nation whose interpretation remains open. The thesis of the chapter is that Spain is a plurinational labyrinth, since there is no consensus, nor are there any discursive strategies that might help in forming an image of the country in national terms. The paradox of this labyrinth is that the political actors have accepted that the question of nationality in Spain is unsolvable without considering the plurinational idea. But, at the same time, plurinationality is not easily assumed in practical terms because the political cost to any actor that openly defends national plurality is very high. For this reason, political discourses in Spain on the national question offer a highly ambiguous scenario, where the actors are reluctant to take risks in order to solve this impasse. The chapter by Enrique Maestu Fonseca focuses on the evolution of Spanish conservative doctrine in the early years of democracy in Spain. By analyzing the concepts of 'state' and 'community' as viewed by Manuel Fraga, the Minister of Information and Tourism under the Franco dictatorship and leader of the Spanish right during the1980s, this chapter explores the manner in which the conservatives sought to "democratize" their doctrine to adapt themselves to the new party system. The study stresses the importance of this conceptual reshaping in establishing the roots of conservative Spanish nationalism. Finally, the study by Robert Gould poses a comparative analysis of the presentation of the national identity of Spain and Germany by the far-right populist parties Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland. He shows how both parties view national identity as being in a serious crisis, arising from the betrayal by old-line parties which has led to the increased influence of the European Union to the detriment of the nation-state, with negative consequences for national sovereignty, national and European culture. The parties repudiate many of the provisions of the EU treaties and are opposed to the presence of Islam in Christian Europe, viewing it as a menace to values shared by all European nations. These analyses lead to an examination of the performance of crisis by means of deliberate provocation and the use of electronic media. It shows how these parties from very different parts of Europe share remarkably close positions and use the technological achievements of the twenty-first century to attack the late-twentieth-century political and social achievements of the European Union in order to replace them with the nineteenth-century idea of the distinct ethnocultural nation fully sovereign in its own nation-state.

A substantial part of this volume is devoted to Catalonia due to the current situation of the secessionist struggle, which is a nationalist conflict by nature. But more than that, issues related to Catalan secessionism are central to current debates on European integration, nationalism, and territorial politics. In their chapter, Thomas Jeffrey Miley and Roberto Garvía follow the approach originally pioneered by Juan Linz for the empirical study of nationalism. They use original survey data to situate the social division that is emerging around the question of independence within a broader context of power relations. Miley and Garvia focus on a variety of demographic, cultural, behavioral and attitudinal indicators with which this division is associated, emphasizing the special salience of language practices and ideologies in conditioning, if not determining, attitudes towards independence. More specifically, they show how the cleavages of language and class are reflected in

and exacerbated by the ongoing political conflict between pro-independence and pro-unionist camps in Catalonia. Now that nearly half the Catalan citizenry has developed a rather intense preference in favor of independence, it becomes difficult for Spanish authorities to enforce the will of the Spanish majority without appearing to tyrannize the Catalan minority. The chapter by Alejandro Quiroga and Fernando Molina explores the transformations of Spanish and Catalan national identities and the growth of the pro-independence movement in Catalonia following the 2008 global recession. It argues that the Great Recession provided a window of opportunity for hot nationalism in which Catalanist narratives of loss and resistance began to ring true to large sectors of Catalan society, whereas the Spanish constitutionalist narratives seemed increasingly outdated. The authors show how the two parallel processes of mass nationalization, by either the Catalan or the Spanish governments, mutually limit each other, leading to a 'crystallization' of an identity-driven political divide between pro and anti-independence supporters which has split Catalan society down the middle and led to a sort of national identity deadlock. Carsten Humlebæk and Mark F. Hau investigate the links between the Catalan independence movement and the large annual demonstrations on the Catalan National Day, the Diada. The chapter represents the first attempt at a thorough empirical investigation of the most important political event in Catalonia using a mixed-methods approach combining historical and ethnographic analysis. The analysis shows that there has been a marked shift in the perception and organization of the Diada in recent years, which seems related to who is organizing the commemoration. When civil society organizations are in charge of the Diada celebration, the result is a more politically charged event that mobilizes a much larger proportion of the population than when politicians and political parties organize the celebration. Further, when political parties are in charge, the Diada not only mobilizes far fewer people, but usually takes on a much more cultural and festive character as compared with the explicitly political Diada demonstrations that have been organized by civil society actors since 2012. Josep M. Oller, Albert Satorra and Adolf Tobeña argue that during the last decade, the Catalonian secessionist challenge has induced a chronic crisis within Spain's politics. The rapidly escalating demands for secession ran almost in parallel with the accentuation of the economic recession that followed the disruption of the world financial system in 2008–2010. The authors refute previous studies that have shown that the impact of economic hardships was not a major factor in explaining the surge in secessionist demands. In this longitudinal analysis of a regular series of official surveys from the period 2006–2019, the authors show that economic factors did play a role in the secessionist wave. The main idiomatic segmentation (Catalan vs. Spanish as family language) interacted with economic segmentations in inducing variations on feelings of national identity that resulted in the erosion of the dual Catalan-Spanish identity. Moreover, the more privileged segments of Catalonian citizenry were those that mostly supported secession, whereas the poorer and unprotected citizenry was clearly against it. Oller, Satorra and Tobeña conclude that all the data points to the conclusion that the secessionist challenge was, in fact, a rebellion of the wealthier and more well-situated people.

Although Spain and Catalonia, and political identities, are the central focus of the book, Andalusia and Galicia are also included as case studies. In her chapter, Nichole Fernández, focuses on issues of transnationalism and homeland tourism to Galicia, an autonomous community and national minority of northern Spain which is often defined by its long history of emigration. The study focuses on migrants from the municipalities of Sada and Bergondo that had uncharacteristically large rates of migration to the United States. These migrants and their children continue to sustain strong ties to the perceived homeland and engage in repeat visits. Theories of transnationalism help to explain the continuity of identity, but the qualitative interviews with homeland tourists show how

it is specifically through frequent visits to the homeland that these Galician-Americans are able to sustain ties to the homeland and create a sense of national belonging. The author shows that the frequent visits make it possible for many to create a strong Galician identity that is both transnational and yet locally situated. By looking at the way these homeland visits construct a Galician identity, the study helps to form a new perspective on Galician nationalism that is reflected in the migrants and defined by mobility.

The chapter by Pablo Ortiz Barquero investigates VOX and focuses on the region of Andalusia. For a long time, Spain was thought of as an outlier because it did not have a significant radical right movement. However, the sudden popularity of VOX among voters, first in Andalusia and then in the rest of Spain, has put an end to so-called "Spanish exceptionalism". According to the author, the rise of this radical right party is important for two reasons: its potential direct impact on the political system and the way in which it will affect other political players. By means of regression analysis, the study explores the factors that have led voters to cast ballots for VOX during the 2018 regional elections in Andalusia in order to test some of the most widely accepted theories about the radical right vote. The results show that VOX's vote is fundamentally dictated by broader sociopolitical factors related to the territorial model, ideological self-identification, and the perception of political leaders. The author thereby refutes the explanations that hold that the vote for the radical right is conditioned by economic or identity-related vulnerability.

The chapter by Daniele Conversi and Matthew Machin-Autenrieth also studies Andalusia albeit from a different angle. The ideals of tolerance and cultural exchange associated with the interfaith past of Muslim Spain (al-Andalus) have become a symbol for Andalusian regionalism and for the integration of Moroccan communities. The chapter examines the interrelationship between music and 'intercultural regionalism', focusing on how music is used by public institutions to ground social integration in the discourse of regionalism. Against a backdrop of rising Islamophobia and the mobilization of right-wing populist and anti-immigration rhetoric, both within Spain and internationally, the authors consider how music can be used to promote social integration, to overcome Islamophobia, and to tackle radicalization. The authors argue that the musical interculturalism promoted by a variety of institutions needs to be understood within the wider project of Andalusian regionalism. The preferential way to achieve this objective is through 'intercultural regionalism', envisioned as the combination of regional identity-building and intercultural interactions between communities that share a common cultural heritage. The study also assesses some of the criticism of the efficacy of al-Andalus as a model for contemporary intercultural exchange. While recognizing the continuing regional and international importance of the 'andalusi' myth, the authors thus question its integrating capacity at a time of radical political, economic, and environmental upheaval.

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Article

The Study of Nation and Patria as Communities of Identity: Theory, Historiography, and Methodology from the Spanish Case

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Abstract: This article argues for a renovation in the study of nationalism by addressing the issue of the rationality underlying the decisions by citizens willing to leave their homelands. From the example of unforced exiles from the 1939 Republican diaspora (and inner exiles as well), the text starts with providing a theory of disidentification from a nation for the sake of civic commitment. Having shown the relevance of jointly studying the language of nation and patria, it focuses on Spanish post-Francoist historiography of the Early modern period for showing its unbalanced account of discourse revolving around patria in favor of that of nation. Thereafter, it provides a comparative overview of the scholarly interest in patriotism in modern history as depending on different national trajectories of political culture. Finally, it claims a methodological reorientation in the study of nationalism and patriotism by distinguishing between nation and patria as terms, as concepts, and as analytical categories defining distinctive collective identities.

Keywords: nation; patria (fatherland); identity; patriotism; nationalism; citizenship; deliberation; self-government; Spain; early modern history; modern history; historiography

To my friend, brother, and American in-sile Miguel Sánchez

1. Exile as Dilemma to National Identity

2019 has commemorated the 80th anniversary of the end of the so-called Civil War extended between July 1936 and March 1939, a transcendental process in Modern History that put an end to the democratic republic established in Spain in 1931. In this occasion celebrations have centered around a dramatic sequel to the suppression of liberties resulting from the war: Exile.[1] The Spanish exile of 1939 was probably unprecedented in its scope and span: Compared to other migrations and forced displacements of populations in its nearest context following World War I, the citizens who abandoned Spain in 1939 were not ethnic or confessional minorities neither belonged to the intellectual elite but actually came from a wide variety of economic, social, and cultural backgrounds (estimates for different national cases from the first third of 20th century in (Kaya 2002, pp. 17–18); on its sociological scope (Caudet 2005, pp. 235–73)). Yet this singular profile only highlights a feature common to political-ideological conflicts in modern societies: That among the consequences of the suppression of liberties one is the decision by average citizens of abandoning a national state.

In effect, a considerable proportion of the people who decide to exile do not flee form the destruction provoked by war and civil confrontation, but rather from its expected political and institutional results. In the particular case of 1939 Spain, it is unquestionable that among those who

[1] Information on the creation of a commission for the commemoration of the Republican exile, in https://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/Portal/es/ministerio/gabinete-comunicacion/noticias-ministerio/comision-interministerial.

left their home-country many were escaping from the duress they foresaw after the victory of Franco's troops; however, the fear of repression does not exhaust motivations for exile: There is evidence of Spanish Republican exiles who considered that, should they stay, their physical and moral integrity or their legal status would not be endangered.[2] By contrast, among the defeated who remained the majority feared they would suffer repression by the authorities of Franco´s regime, which was often the case through harassment, imprisonment, and even execution. Overall, the different courses of action between the two groups do not seem to have depended only on the supply of information, neither can be just pinned on the distribution of resources and opportunities nor were brought about from weighing expectations against risks: In a context of "total war" as the Spanish 1936–39 conflict (Chickering 2008), it was extremely hazardous to anticipate the consequences of decisions.

The phenomenon of exile allows signaling the presence of individuals willing to leave their country because they do not retain a sense of belonging; in other words, they have stopped feeling identified with their community of birth and socialization. The same applies as well to those who do not leave their country but stay in a sort of "inner exile", "a mental rather than material condition" which "alienates some people from others and their ways of living" (Ilie 1981, p. 7), making them carry an existence as foreigners in their own homeland. In the case of Spain after 1939, many of those who had lived under the democratic liberties of the Second Republic experienced an utter disaffection towards the values, symbols, and rituals of the Francoist *Nuevo Estado*: Actually the term "inner exile", also referred to as "in-sile" to define the experiences of exclusion suffered by many citizens (Gómez Bravo 2013), was actually coined during Franco´s protracted regime (Salabert 1988, pp. 9–10).

To my knowledge, implications of these two mutually interrelated phenomena have not been much addressed in studies on national identity and nationalism in general, and particularly by Spanish specialists. This article tries both to question and enrich the scholarly approach to the issue of belonging in modern communities. It does so first, by providing theoretical reflection on the rationality underlying disidentification with a national community to the point of, either willing to leave the country that grants fundamental rights, or staying but feeling a stranger to it. Drawing from psychosocial and historical perspectives on the rise of modern citizenship, I distinguish between nation and patria as communities of identity, and theorize on patriotism as a distinctive kind of political sentiment that overflows the semantics of nationalism. The text then addresses the way Spanish Post-Francoist historiography has been dealing with the study of the terminology and the fields of nationalism and patriotism. I focus on the historiography of the Early modern period to signal the unbalanced treatment of these two terms and go ahead relating the scholarly preferences among historians to the historical trajectories of modern political cultures in different countries. Finally, I offer a methodological critique to conventional hermeneutics on the language of patria and propose an alternative methodology for distinguishing between words, concepts, and categories relevant for the study of patriotism as a collective identity.

2. Disengaging from National Identity Out of Civic Commitment

Among the topics of Spanish post-war culture one that stands out is a polemic on the nature of the Spanish nation engaged by two intellectuals from exile, Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz and Américo Castro (Morales Moya 2013). While the former endorsed an ontological and essentialist conception of national identity, the latter argued that Spanishness was a historical product collectively built through cultural and political processes, a perspective that has eventually become commonsensical in other national historiographies (see for Britain, Colley 1992). In the wake of that debate, Castro published

[2] One relevant example is Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, minister of State under the Second Republic in 1933. He left Spain during the war but argued he did so freely and not out of fear of repression but rather of disillusion with his compatriots, an argument that prompted reaction from the then President of the Republic Manuel Azaña, who tagged him an exile for convenience (Azaña 1978, vol. II, pp. 226–27, 236). Eventually, Sánchez-Albornoz would be appointed President of the Government of the Republic between 1962 and 1971.

the essay *Los españoles: Cómo llegaron a serlo* [Spaniards, how they became] (Castro 1965), from which title a complementary question can be raised: How Spaniards, or members of whatever other nation, have ceased to belong, in the sense of feeling themselves detached from their original nation.

Addressing this issue implies acknowledging that a community may deny recognition to individuals, but its members may as well end up neglecting their community of belonging (Pizzorno 1986). This general statement applies, for example, to dual national identities in stateless nations whenever people start rejecting one at the cost of another (see on the case of current Catalonia, (Oller et al. 2019)). Accounting for national disidentification requires further specification, though, since nations are at once a referent of individual and collective identity and the communitarian foundation of the modern state (Jessop 2011). Accordingly, disidentification with a nation may entail also rejecting the rights derived from naturalization as granted by a state, a sequel deeply affecting the condition of citizenship.

Normally, though, denaturalization takes place as part of a wider process of claiming re-naturalization in another nation state. From a psychosocial perspective, this push-and-pull logic can be formulated arguing that disidentification from a community implies re-identifying with another, otherwise the individual will be exposed to lose an essential emotional attachment and risk falling into anomy (Durkheim 1951; Merton 1938). In the case of transnational migrants and forced exiles, the alternative community is usually a concurring nation, and so naturalization in a different nation state, aside from providing with a sense of belonging, gives access to its appertaining rights. The abovementioned phenomena of unforced exile and of inner exile, however, foreclose reducing the issue to a choice between national communities.

As shown in the case of 1939 Spain, Republican exiles did not leave willing to be naturalized in another nation-state; rather, they flew out as they became aware their citizen rights would not continue to be upheld in their country of origin. Such awareness involves a kind of reflectivity distinctive from the acquisition of another national identity, which is normally the effect of rather unpolitical (Esposito 2011) socialization in cultural habits, symbols, and rituals: Instead, involved in the kind of decision epitomized by exiles there is deliberation about political issues, a procedure inherent to modern citizenship (Mouffe 1999). On the other hand, claiming naturalization in a national state may be neither the cause nor the consequence of developing a sense of belonging: As embodied by Spanish Republican exiled who failed to adapt to the hosting national cultures (Abellán 2001, pp. 85–109), deliberation leading to exile does not necessarily entail re-identifying with another national community; much the same applies to "in-silers" who do not recreate bonds with the national state by which they feel oppressed.

The example of unforced exiles reveals limitations in conventional definitions of nation and national identity. Across the specialized literature there is a contrast between two conceptions of nation, as either founded on cultural, given referents or on political, voluntary traits (Kohn 1946; Smith 1991; critical overviews in Renaut 1991; Brubaker 1999). The experience of exiles calls attention towards allegiance to a community in exchange for commitment to political, but not voluntary referents. Deliberation is certainly involved in the decision of breaking ties with the homeland nation; yet, it only takes place after a process of disengagement or disidentification that cannot be explained in instrumental or strategic terms: As much as inner exile, unforced exile is rather an expressive kind of action (Hargreaves-Heap 2001) through which the citizen conveys the value he/she allocates to referents that provide with an identity beyond gender, class, and race—and beyond the conventional definitions of nation as well. The commitment of willing exiles is towards a distinctively civic community which, by upholding freedom and the exercise of rights, provides with a sense of belonging and well-being; and this sharing in a collective identity is priceless to the point that, under conditions, the commitment may be unlimited.

In the western tradition there is acknowledgment of such community: The fatherland or *patria*, and of its related sentiment—patriotism, as "*primarily* a political passion based on the experience of citizenship, and not on common pre-political elements derived from having been born in the same territory, from belonging to the same race, speaking the same language, worshipping the same deities or having the same customs" (Viroli 2001, p. 7). Although patriotism has been the object of

historical studies and analytical reflections (see readers in (Primoratz 2002); (Bar-Tal and Staub 1999); a philosophical approach in (MacIntyre 1995)), a narrow focus on its demand for sacrifice—as inspired by the expression "To die for the fatherland"—has contributed to discredit this political sentiment as a sort of cultural transfer from ancient times to be blamed for much of the inhuman warfare and the rather lurid cult towards "the fallen" in modern history (Koselleck 2012; Tamir 1997). The example of unforced and inner exiles provides with a different perspective that reinserts patriotism into the sphere of citizenship.

Despite being founded on civic values, however, as collective identity patriotism should not be confused with cosmopolitanism understood as a kind of rational allegiance to unembedded institutions and decontextualized values, no matter how political they may be (Nussbaum 1989, 2019). Much like other citizens exposed to political backlashes in modern nation states, the Spanish exiles and "in-siles" of 1939 were not committed to a supranational ideal of communitarian political life, nor were just moved by universalist mantras: Rather, they were either leaving behind or longing for the formerly free community of the Spanish Republic, to which they felt a subjective attachment and an emotional commitment independent from its foundation in universal and progressive values (see a general statement on this in Taylor 1989).

As embodied by self-persuaded exiles, patriotism is better grasped from a historical perspective as being rooted in "the political institutions and the particular way of life of the republic" (Viroli 1995, p. 37). In this sense, patria stands for an "imagined community" as powerful as the nation, yet one distinctively founded on civic referents the relevance of which marks itself at specific crossroads in the history of citizenship. Under "normal" political conditions, however, patria is a source of identity usually intertwining with nation. It is then no wonder that nationalism and patriotism own a scholarly tradition of being addressed in tandem (Huizinga 1959; Viroli 1995).

3. The Study of Patriotism in Spanish Historiography

It is quite striking that the commemoration of the Spanish exile of 1939 has not fashioned reflection on the disidentification with the national community experienced by citizens who resented from the demise of democracy after the war. Equally eloquent of the state-of-the-art of Spanish post-Francoist intellectual production is the fact that the 2019 Essay Prize [Premio Nacional de Ensayo] has been awarded to a work on Spanish nationalism (see news in Huete 2019, and the essay in Núñez-Seixas 2018). Notwithstanding the relevance of the study, the decision is revealing of scholarly and cultural preferences in Spanish democracy, a profile underwritten by the awards granted also in the years 1998, 2002, and 2008 to essays on Spanish national identity or regional nationalist identities (Juaristi 1997; Álvarez Junco 2001; and Beramendi 2007, respectively) against not a single one devoted to the issues of fatherland, patriotism, or even exile.

True enough, national identity and nationalism are also star topics elsewhere worldwide, but in Spain there are further reasons which help explain such an intensive interest in nation-building, national identities, and the rise of nationalist ideologies: The relevance of national identities of regional scope in post-Francoist democracy. Yet, the influence of nationalist outlooks on the national political agenda should in principle have also stimulated interest in reflecting upon other kinds of bonding and communities of belonging in modern societies in order to meet an extended demand among citizens who feel uneasy with the social and political over-presence of nationalist identities.

This deficit points especially towards historians. The past has transmitted enough traces of political identities primarily built on communitarian referents other than ethnical, confessional, or cultural (Prak 2018). More in particular, the semantics of patria has been sharing in Western history from the acquisition of the language of politics since the Renaissance onwards (Viroli 1992). Increasingly embedded in the juridical language of the Old Regime, in many principalities of Europe the language of patria contributed to uphold political rights, despite their being often recognized not to citizens but to subjects (Lessafer 2001, pp. 200–1). Moreover, partially re-signified from its original meaning in classical Antiquity (Viroli 1995, pp. 18–22), patria conformed one of the nuclear tropes in the tradition of republican Humanism, a discursive repertoire on civic identity as

a moral virtue essential for the maintenance of polities founded on self-government (Pocock 1975). Throughout the Early Modern period, a language of patria provided with interpretive resources for disidentification with communities of belonging, especially to dwellers of self-governed cities whenever these failed to assure them a dignified civic life. In contrast, the hegemonic vision is that nations as communities of adscription do not reckon such prominent pedigree before the 19th century, being rather a modern phenomenon ((Anderson 1991); an overview of debates from the opposite view in (Smith 2000, pp. 27–51)) deeply intertwined with the rise of modern states while not necessarily with the establishment of political rights.

Spanish historiography is not balanced in its approach to this issue, though: Perspectives relating to national identity are overwhelming, even in scholarly studies on the Early modern period. Part of this situation may be justified by the available historical record: Indeed, overarching confessional referents hegemonized the language of republican civic Humanism in the territorial domains of the Habsburg dynasty (Fernández Albaladejo 1997), even reaching into an explicitly anti-republican rhetoric. However, there are other reasons involved, which have to do with the peculiar relations of modern Spanish scholars with the issue of nation and the building of citizenship, to the point that their addressing of these issues reveals an unsolved tension for historizing the nation as community of belonging.

In general, narratives on the national community are founded on a mythification of the nation as an intemporal community or of remote origin, and Spain is no exception (Wulff 2003). What is more specific to modern Spanish historiography is precisely the opposite: A recurrent reference to datable historical events for the establishment of the nation. This epistemological criterion derives in turn from the heritage of a narrative framework mimicking "sacred history": In fact, the two usual historical dates alternatively settled for defining the nation have been the conversion to Christianity by Visigoth king Recaredo in the 6th century AD, and the dynastic unification of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon under kings Isabella and Ferdinand in the wake of the invasion of the Muslim Kingdom of Granada and the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 (Pérez Vejo 2015; Boyd 1997, pp. 99–121). Far from being superseded with the demise of the Old Regime, this shaping of national history through confessional lines ended up framing Liberal historiography, which further conflated dynastic and religious unification with the forging of the nation, a metanarrative that gathered momentum under Franco´s regime when, in spite of their logical contradictions, both essentialist, ahistorical, and chronological tropes tended to be fused in conventional historical accounts.

Certainly, this whole narrative framework was put into question in the wake of the transition to democracy, displaced by a new chronology that traces the starting of the national community to the promulgation of the 1812 Constitution; however, the quest for settling a fully alternative historiography has not been rounded up by Spanish post-Francoist historians. A goal such reaches beyond questioning the mythical foundation of the inherited national history; yet it cannot either reduce itself to agreeing on alternative chronologies: It also demands re-inserting the whole narrative on the national past into a historical frame shaped by the building of citizenship.

This is far from having been achieved. In its place, what we have are usually accounts of the nation as a historical entity along with the persistence of ontological assumptions. In fact, there are readings of the past that, lingering on Francoist ideals of the nation as both diverse and united (Núñez Seixas 2014), still take for granted that Spain is an essentially homogeneous and enduring object of study to be addressed from prehistoric times to the present (García de Cortázar 1994); other post-Francoist specialists have on their part tried to rewrite genealogies of the nation reaching back to the Middle Ages (Valdeón Baruque 1982). True enough, there are approaches much more sensitive to historization and providing with prospective accounts. Among these, there stands out a literature on early modern "nation-ism" (*nacionismo*) defined in contrast to modern nationalism, as a discourse that addressed the nation as community of belonging through the Early modern period. In line with previous trends elsewhere (Armstrong 1982), this literature has aptly contributed to distinguish "the nation before the nation-state" (Fernández Albaladejo 2007) by interpreting the meaningful traces as both a discursive and identity phenomenon prior to the French Revolution of

1789 and the Spanish constitutional crisis of 1808, a period dominated by patrimonial monarchies but also hosting independent republics.

Additionally, yet even this refined thematic line still expresses the priorities among the Spanish historians from the generation who witnessed the establishment of democracy. In general, their interest in studying the rhetoric of nation and nationality before modernity is not matched by a similar attention to the communities of belonging that figured as hegemonic in the context of emergence of "nationist" discourse (see an example in Ballester Rodríguez 2010). Overall, early modern *nacionismo* is not weighed against the contribution of other territorial identities through the Old Regime. In consequence, the approach reproduces the teleology inherent to traditional historiography, somehow projecting that modern nationalism must have come after pre-modern "nationism".

One of the interesting novelties of 2019 is precisely a book that explicitly deals with the way Spanish historiography has been addressing the nation as a topic. The work was first published in English as *Speaking of Spain* (Feros 2017), a title that wanted to convey the relevance of a focus on the intellectual debates around the imagination and lexicon of the nation that pervaded the Early modern period. Instead, the book has been published in Spanish as *Antes de España* (Before Spain (Feros 2019)), an alternative title bearing witness that still in the 21st century critical historiography needs to be militant on the issue of the chronology of the Spanish nation. Other than that, the work exemplifies both the possibilities and the limits of post-Francoist historiography in overcoming stereotypes and mythifications on the issue of nation.

National identity before the establishment of the nation as political community is the topic of a work that plays out as both a monograph, a state-of-the-art, and an essay for the wider public. The book is to begin with remarkable in relating discourse on the political community with that on social groupings and especially on the ethnic and religious minorities that shaped the societies of the Hispanic Old Regime; in effect, in a rather unusual approach, Feros addresses the status of the nation vis-à-vis other infra-national referents of identity. Moreover, by integrating the transatlantic dimension of the Hispanic monarchy, the essay provides with a most uncontroversial conclusion, namely, that the only territory of the empire in which peninsular vassals were known as "Spanish" was the New World. By contrast, in the peninsula a Spanish identity owned very limited cultural status, not to mention any legal relevance—general references to the subjects of the Hispanic monarchy as a whole being normally deployed in discourse elaborated by foreigners.

Throughout the early modern era there was a "nationist" discourse in Hispanic culture, but as shown in Feros´s synthesis elaborated from numbers of critically selected researches, the overarching community of belonging remained that of the so-called Catholic Monarchy and its divine right of kings. According to this author, a Spanish nation cannot be spoken of even for the 18th century; and still then, in spite of the legal and institutional homogeneization following the suppression of the self-governing traditions in Catalonia, the cultural basis for a national community was ultimately constrained by Bourbon dynastic legitimacy. As for the previous centuries, the polycentric matrix of Habsburg rules established different relations with their diverse European and overseas possessions (Cardim et al. 2012), which implied giving recognition to subjects who did not define themselves as "Spanish" but rather primarily as Catalan, Aragonese, Valencian, Navarrean, etc. protected by specific privileged and territorial rights.

Feros´s book is also relevant in addressing the language of patria in the making of peninsular collective identities before modern history, a topic revealing of the current state of scholarly studies. Among post-Francoist historians of the Early modern period there are specialists who have committed themselves to historize the meanings and usages of patria in discourse—some even offering comparative analyses of the semantics of nation and patria in the various peninsular principalities (Gil Pujol 2004). As opposed to studies on "nationism", however, these do not depart from a distinction between early modern and later definitions of patria, assuming rather than probing that the language of patria has not experienced relevant historical changes affecting the meaning of patriotism as a political sentiment of belonging.

On top of this, among younger generations of historians a growing interest on republicanism as a transnational variety of political thought has been developed at the cost of properly specifying the

case for the Iberian peninsula. In spite of its high degree of urbanization throughout the 16th century (Sánchez León 2001, 2002), towns and cities in the Crown of Castile did not provide urban dwellers with a status as citizens with political rights; they were rather defined at once as *vecinos* (neighbours) and subjects to the king (Carzolio 2002; Herzog 2003). At the same time, the division of urban society by estates impeded the definition of a single legal community, while the hegemony of confessional identities constrained the emergence of autonomous political values (Sánchez León 2002, 2007). Overall, the cities of Castile did not result from the fragmentation of sovereignty but rather reflected a hierarchy of jurisdictional powers crowned by the monarch (Fernández Albaladejo 2017, p. 665). In such a context, the development of republican discourse was no indicator of the rise of patriotic identities but rather reflected the transnational profile acquired by Humanist rhetoric.

Urban political culture was certainly different in the Crown of Aragon, a territory hosting several important ports such as Barcelona or Valencia with a tradition of urban self-government and citizenship statuses, a contrast that should have encouraged comparisons between the two kingdoms and other territories in Europe both within and beyond the domains of the Habsburg dynasty. Instead, recent approaches to civic Humanism as offered by Spanish historians have argued for a single frame of republican identities common to the greater cities and towns of the European continent including the Iberian peninsula irrespective of their social, political, and cultural differences (Herrero 2017). Inherent to this trend seems to be a "kind of faked need to convey a republican DNA" to the Southern part of the continent (Fernández Albaladejo 2017, p. 666) that not only degrades the specificity of the republican tradition but also confounds citizenship, *vecindad,* and the more extended condition of subject along the Old Regime; as a result, the complex historical relation between civic culture, patria, and patriotism is taken for granted instead of being problematized.

Summarizing, even when studying the Early modern period Spanish historiography devotes itself to the topic of the nation at the cost of patria and its related sentiment of patriotism. However, this preference in post-Francoist scholarly studies is induced by a deeper deficit in historical narratives on the longer-term building of citizenship.

4. The Ebbs and Tides of Patriotism as Collective Identity in Modern History

It may be argued that Spanish historiography on the nation is not so uncommon: After all, in other academic environments reflection and research on the topic occupies an outstanding place. However, behind formal analogies there are distinctive political cultures that need to be sorted out in order to comparatively understand the changing relations in the semantics of nation and patria, especially when dealing with modern history.

One main difference between Spain and other Western democracies such as Great Britain, France, or the United States is that these latter have not witnessed the suppression of basic constitutional rights upholding the exercise of citizenship. In terms of the example above, these democracies have not exposed their citizens to the dilemma of Spanish Republican exiles. Accordingly, in the political cultures of those well-established democracies discourse on national identity is not originally disengaged from the narrative on citizenship building. This has not prevented these countries from distorting the republican tradition, however, by embarking in imperialist ventures that deeply affected their political cultures. In effect, the rise of imperialism brought about a tension to the inherited language of patria, which was usually reshaped into the semantics of civilization (see Mazlish 2004, pp. 1–48) and often subsumed under a rhetoric of militarism (Koselleck 2012). Accordingly, by the turn of the 19th century, the struggle for hegemony among imperial metropolises eventually had fused nationalism and patriotism in a single discourse (see an insightful analysis written in the context of World War I in Veblen 1917, pp. 31–76, "On the Nature and Uses of Patriotism"), a trend that got embedded during the so-called Second Thirty Year´s War of 1914–18 (Traverso 2016) as modern citizenship was challenged by the expansion of both reactionary nationalist and aggressive militaristic ideologies.

After World War II, the subaltern discursive status of patriotism was sealed in historical narrative. With the rise of "social history" the focus of attention became the classes and other group identities

produced by economic structures (Cabrera 2004), an emphasis placed at the cost of specifying the historical relations between overarching national or civic-patriotic identities. On their part, in Southern European and Latin American countries experiencing a belated or intermittent democratization social history strangled the potential demand for a narrative on the long-term construction of citizenship; and while the nation-state was perceived as the natural type of modern political community, the account of the historical intertwinements of patriotism and nationalism was sidelined.

In this scholarly context, the first wave of studies on the nation and nationalism took place along the fall of Soviet Socialism at the end of the 1980s, a process that was saluted as the ultimate triumph of nationalism as the ideology of modern political communities. Benedict Anderson, in a seminal work greatly inspiring this and subsequent academic fashions on national identity, underlined that "since World War II every successful revolution has defined itself in *national* terms", which he characterized as "a territorial and social space inherited from the prerevolutionary past" (Anderson 1991, p. 2). Anderson questioned the Marxist theory of class struggle as a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of socialist regimes. However, his statement did not result from a comparative study on nationalism and patriotism in the official discourse of Soviet regimes; and yet their self-definition as "popular democracies" strongly suggests that modern social revolutions have also been harbinger for patria as alternative political community to nation.

By the end of the 20th century, with the creation of the European Union and the expansion of globalization, nation-states have been exposed to growing pressure: The rise of nationalist outlooks is recurrently related to the emergence of new supranational entities constraining national sovereignty while increasing transnational exchanges of capital and people (Banks and Gingrich 2006). This trend has subsumed even more the language of patria into that of nation in historical narratives as much as political discourse at large. One example of the trend is the opening of the Olympic Games in London in 2012, designed by film director Daniel Boyle as a series of episodes amounting to a synthesis of the national history of the host country, Great Britain: The scenes in the show stressed that the island was "the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution and the workshop of the world", which made that historical experience certainly "hellish" but also "awesome achievements" have to be acknowledged not only in "engineering and manufacturing" but also in "big steps towards democracy, the collective selfhelp of the labour movement, and the struggle for the emancipations of women and other social revolutions" (Bryant 2015, p. 3). In the proposed narrative, this trajectory gathers momentum in the creation of the National Health Service after World War II; yet, in the guide for the event written by the author, this relevant citizenship conquest features as "the institution which more than any other unites our nation" (Bryant 2015, p. 10). Another example from the side of patriotic discourse has to do with the protectionist policies enacted by President of the United States Donald Trump. These measures have been shaped in an anti-globalization rhetoric in which patriotic identity is openly distorted as neo-imperialist national grandeur (Johnson 2004); as declared by Trump at the United Nations: "Greatness is only realised by the will and devotion of patriots" (Borger 2019).

The examples underwrite that patriotism is recurrently endangered by both nationalist and imperial-militaristic rhetoric, the combination of which makes difficult even to critically isolate it in discourse as a distinctive political identity. On the other hand, however, they also point to the enduring resilience of the language of patria as both a semantic heritage bridging between the evolution of national identities and the dynamics of citizenship, and a substratum resurfacing with variable autonomy depending on circumstances. One such context is the public sphere of early 20th-century Spain, which has witnessed a recovery of the lexicon of patria, staged by the political formation Unidas Podemos (Sola and Rendueles 2018) in the wake of the so-called 15M, the 2011 citizen protest that broadcasted collective consciousness of a crisis in post-Francoist democracy (Fernández Savater 2019).

The entry of patria into discourse in current Spanish political culture has been instrumental in confronting the hegemonic discourse on nation, and especially in opposing nationalist "*españolista*" identities. In turn, its semantics draw from previous developments in Latin American political cultures (Baron and Díaz 2016), where it has been enhanced by two historical discursive veins: An initial

republicanism shaping citizenship building through the process of colonial independence in the early 19th century (Pérez Vejo 2015); and a recurrent anti-imperialist ideology developed already in the 19th century and especially throughout the 20th century (Gobat 2013; Knight 2008; MacPherson 2006). However, their eventual blending into the scheme of "dependency theory" (Cardoso and Faletto 1979), has skewed this dual genealogy of patria towards the latter semantics. This helps explains its appealing to Left-wing Spanish ideological stances sensitive to international threats to sovereign integrity in the wake of Spain´s adjustment to the requirements of balanced budget imposed by the European Union.

The case of early 21st-century Spain confirms that in a world straddled by supranational trends, the discourse of patria is being reduced to the defense of sovereignty, a status that renders it vulnerable to nationalist rhetoric. In the western tradition of political philosophy, however, patriotic identity was reasonably expected not only in response to external attacks on the institutions of self-government by foreign powers, but was also against internal menaces by the enemies of political liberties. This dual dimension was fragmented already during the 18th century, however, following the end of religious wars and in the wake of the political reforms brought about by the Enlightenment. In effect, with the rise of standing, conscript armies, civic commitment to the banner of *Pro patria mori* was put at the service of the building of nation-states (Viroli 1995, pp. 140–60), while the rise of the public sphere disseminated competitive ideologies capable of fueling enthusiasm (Moscoso and León 2017). According to Reinhard Koselleck, patriotism was the first among modern concepts of movement (ending in -ism), coined before those of nationalism or imperialism (Koselleck 2012); however, in entering modern history these latter seem to have recurrently conditioned the integrity of the former. Additionally, yet, as the example of unforced exiles keeps reminding, disengagement from national communities for the sake of a commitment to civic values—patriotism—is no less a recurrent experience of modern citizens.

5. Nationalism and Patriotism in Spanish Modern History: A Methodological Bedrock

The fate of unforced and inner exiles also reveals that the triggering of patriotic attitudes and identities relates closely to contexts of civil war. Recent studies on the history of this concept have extended the scope of civil war to comprise all forms of conflicts, from coup d´états to revolutions, brought about by struggles between defenders and opponents to political freedoms (Armitage 2015, 2017). Moreover, there is a growing understanding of modern history as a succession of states of exception imposed against the will to self-government by deliberative citizens (Agamben 2005). These trends will probably spark interest on the issue of patriotism in the coming future.

So far, modern Spain appears as an outstanding case for addressing the complex relations between the languages of patria/nation and the sentiments of patriotism/nationalism as developed on the background of civil wars. Already as early as in 1808, the response to Napoleonic invasion became at once a crucible of the national community and a source of civic identities both among elites and commoners willing to curtail the unbridled powers of the Old Regime, a process that in its turn fostered a relative interchangeability between nation and patria in discourse (Vilar 1982; Aymes 2004). Interestingly enough, the memory of the so-called War of Independence defined it also as a civil war engaged between defenders and opponents of a constituent proves (Sánchez León 2008), while the return to absolutist rule in 1814 produced the first wave of political exiles in modern Spanish history (Simal 2012), some among which decided to leave the country at free will.[3]

Overall, Spanish Liberalism produced a definition of the nation as sovereign subject (Portillo 2000) that, although actually combining Catholic and republican semantics, eventually affected the status of patria in the repertoire of linguistic resources. To begin with, it allowed for its appropriation by opponents to Liberal Constitutions, who eventually deployed the word for referring to their imagined

[3] One relevant example was the reputed writer and ideologist José Blanco White, who relinquished his nationality out of a deep disenchantment with Spanish traditional culture at large; see a profile following my interpretation on unforced exile in Loureiro (2000, pp. 31–63).

community, alien, and even hostile to citizenship as it was, placing it in their banner "Dios, Patria, Rey" (God, fatherland, King (Canal 2000)). Moreover, the outbreak in 1833 of a military conflict between Liberals and Traditionalists explicitly labeled as a civil war further contributed to identify the nation with modern liberties at the cost of patria (Varela 1994). On their part, the growing role of the military in the resolution of political conflicts contributed to further drain the concept of patria of civic content. On top of this, the repression of anticolonial struggles in the Caribe and later the starting of neo-colonial adventures in Africa insufflated discourse with militaristic rhetoric, a pattern similar to other Western nation-states, with the singularity that in Spain the frontiers between colonies and metropolis was recurrently blurred both in repressive techniques and discourse (an example in (Godicheau 2014); a general overview in comparative perspective in (Fradera 2015)).

In sum, in modern Spanish discourse the terminologies on nation and on patria have tended to be interchangeable; however, both usually refer to the semantic field of the former. Instead of being reflected on, this phenomenon is rather uncritically replicated in historiography. As in the scholarly production on the Early modern period, efforts to approach the two lexicons in comparative perspective are scant (one example is offered in (Fernández Sebastián 2005)). In general, research on modern history not only blatantly focuses on the topic of the nation but also takes for granted the utterances of patria as synonymous, and conflates patriotism with nationalism, a practice that bears consequences on the overall narrative of the period.

As an example relevant for the case, the 1936–39 war has been interpreted as founded in opposing, yet symmetrical nationalist identities on the two sides of combatants (Núñez Seixas 2006). This view fits fairly well for the Francoist side, but not so well for the defenders of Republican legitimacy. This latter certainly defined itself as a nation, and deployed a mobilizing rhetoric in accordance; however, it was also founded on reference to a self-governed political community, a difference that is at the basis of the dilemma that the prospective of a military defeat eventually produced among many citizens: Their allegiance either to the imagined community of the nation or to an alternative civic community that in the tradition received the name of patria.

True enough, Franco´s discourse also spoke of patria, but its meaning related to the tradition of militaristic outlooks, which was not central to the imagined community of exiles and Republicans at large. From a longer-term perspective, Republicans´ patriotism as collective identity alternative to nationalism was not triggered anew in the 1936 context; rather, it went back to the 19th century, when patriotic identities recurrently resurfaced in contexts of political crisis that brought about popular mobilizations against authoritarian or instituted corruption (see an example in the 1854 chronicle of the 1854 Revolution in Un Hijo del Pueblo 2018). On their part, the repression of struggles for extending the franchise resulted in recurring dilemmas between remaining or exiling up to the establishment of the democratic republic in 1931.[4]

This whole state of affairs calls for a methodological reassessment. The problem is not in the terminological interchangeability between nation and patria, or of nationalism and patriotism to be found in the sources: It is rather in the conventional practices of experts. In most of modern discourse *Patria* and *nación* are terms, but not necessarily concepts, a basic analytical distinction for a minimum methodological bedrock (Gadamer 2000). Beyond that, the case of modern Spain shows that the lexicon of patria extended through Spanish 19th-century texts is of scarce relevance for tracing the semantics of patria as a community of civic referents for citizens committed to defend self-government from the hazards of tyranny or corruption. Actually, a focus on the terminology or the semantics of *patria* and *nación* is often misleading for the purpose of accounting for the processes of identification, desidentification, or re-identification with communities of belonging experienced by modern citizens.

[4] One final example of relevance in this context was the decision of reputed intellectual Miguel de Unamuno of remaining outside Spain once allowed to return after being forced to exile in 1924 in the wake of the military coup d´état by general Primo de Rivera (Del Arco López 1986). Unamuno would not leave his unforced exile until the proclamation of the Republic in 1931.

Relying just on what conceptual history offers on this issue (Koselleck 2012) is a self-limiting stake. A distinction between patria or patriotism as terms and as concept is surely mandatory; however, it is also required distinguishing between the wording of patriotism as inserted in the historical record and the category of patriotism as an analytical tool essential for giving meaning to collective identities disengaged from allegiance to modern nations for the sake of civic commitment.

Such methodological reorientation may provide with pathbreaking hypotheses on the rationality of patriotism. From these, the task of the historian is to search for and analyze evidence of such patriotic identity in the historical record. Here, it has been pointed out that the irruption of patriotism strongly relates to contexts that may be defined as a civil war, either by historical actors, the observer, or preferably both. On the other hand, it has also been strongly noted that, paradoxically, discourse revealing patriotic identities may not revolve around the terminology of patria or patriotism. Far from arguing in favor of the imposition of categories from the social sciences on to historical evidence, this methodological stance is committed to recover the experiences of civic subjects at large, and of unforced exiles and in-siles in particular, from current marginalization or misinterpretation.

6. Conclusions: Pro Patria (Ex Natione) in Exsilium Ire

It was not by chance that the Spanish Republican exiles captured by the Nazi in France and sent to the concentration camps of Buchenwald and Mauthausen were stamped a blue badge in their clothes that distinguished them from other ideological inmates as "stateless" people (Pike 2009): They figured as expelled from their countries of origin by the new Francoist authorities, a destiny particularly shameful for the nationalist and militaristic culture of their guards. In Spanish language, however, the term for stateless—*apátrida*, meaning "without a fatherland or country"—, keeps from the original Latin the root patria, signaling the conundrum presented in this text. What Republican exiles had been deprived was actually of a nationality in the legal sense; and yet they were anything but people without patria, in the sense of a community of citizens committed to the reproduction of political virtue: Quite on the contrary, many among them had willingly abandoned their nation of origin precisely for the sake of keeping a sense of belonging to such an imagined community.

Departing from the example of the Spanish Republican exile of 1939, this text has pointed to the limits of the nation as community of belonging and on national identity and nationalism. As much as identity creation, processes of disidentification and re-identification are in themselves political, no matter which referents are involved. However, patriotism stems from processes that are political both in substance and in form. This may be predicated of nationalism as well; however, what is distinctive of patriotism is the relevance of civic consciousness, a moral dimension involved in the experience of disenchantment from national identity as much as in the deliberation for leaving or staying in one´s own country of origin, yet an instance that, in requiring active breeding by individuals, also relays on institutional environments suitable for the recreation of political virtue. In this sense, patria is a political community that concurs and combines with the nation, but under circumstances they may compete as incompatible, opposing, even antagonistic referents of belonging. As a final summary, my point would be that the issue of patriotism, apart from the banner "To die for love of the fatherland", can be addressed from the perspective of "To live without the nation" one does not love anymore.

Scholarly production in general, and Spanish post-Francoist historiography in particular, deserve a historiography capable of accounting for this phenomenon and committed to produce discursive evidence of the kind of political emotion involved. However, the issue has wider implications. Beyond nominalist debates, the perspective here offered may help to gain critical distance from current dichotomies on the relations between nationalism and democracy, to which scholars contribute more than usually acknowledged. Just to put an example, in an interview in the media, award-winner Xosé Manuel Núñez Seixas offered a rather normative statement: "We are all nationalists" (Huete 2019). Such an opinion is probably as radical and biased as the alternative urge for embracing cosmopolitanism. The question this article poses is how many so-called nationalists or self-assured cosmopolitans would be willing to abandon their homeland if

the liberties of their countries happen to be suppressed, or as well how many would remain in their countries but feeling detached from the values of the new anti-democratic legitimacy. For it could be that some among them find out they react like patriots. Better late than never.

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

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The Spanish Plurinational Labyrinth. Practical Reasons for Criticising the Nationalist Bias of Others While Ignoring One's Own Nationalist Position

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Abstract: To analyse the Spanish national question requires considering the relationship between the idea of the nation and the phenomenon of nationalism on one side, and the question of political plurality on the other. The approval of the Constitutional text 40 years ago was achieved thanks to a delicate semantic balancing act concerning the concept of nation, whose interpretation remains open. Academic studies of public opinion, such as the famous Linz-Moreno Question—also known as Moreno Question—that measures the possible mixture of Spanish subjective national identity, are equally the object of wide controversy. The extent to which political plurinationality is a suitable concept for defining the country is not clear because, amongst other reasons, the political consequences that might derive from adopting the concept are unknown. This article sets out the thesis that Spain is a plurinational labyrinth since there is neither consensus nor are there discursive strategies that might help in forming an image of the country in national terms. The paradox of this labyrinth is that, since the approval of the Constitution in 1978, the political actors have accepted that nationality in Spain is insoluble without taking the plurinational idea into account. But, at the same time, it is not easy to assume such plurinationality in practical terms because the political cost to those actors that openly defend national plurality is very high. For this reason, political discourses in Spain on the national question offer a highly ambiguous scenario, where the actors seek windows of opportunity and are reluctant to take risks in order to solve this puzzle situation. The aim of this paper is to analyse which indicators are most efficient for testing how the different actors position themselves facing the phenomenon of the Spanish plurinational labyrinth. The clearest examples are what we refer to here as the concepts of (i) intersubjective national identity and (ii) plurinational governments.

Keywords: plurinationality; spain; nationalism; autonomy; intersubjective national identity

1. Introduction. Is a Labyrinth Neutral?

Historically, the national question in Spain has been a major headache, an issue that has often been seen as posing a real existential problem (Laín Entralgo 2010). In general, the national problem has been explained as the result of a *defect*; that is, an imperfect process of unfinished nation-building. It is thus usually said that the "process of nation-building" in Spain was frustrated at some point in history due to the nonexistence of a truly uniform political project, the absence of a social class that could provide cohesion, and the lack of a strategy aimed at creating a market of common national affects (Ortega y Gasset 2006; Álvarez Junco 2001). Surprisingly, this idea can still be found in numerous works (Bernal 2005; Sotelo 2006; Béjar 2008; Colomer 2018) that, consciously or unconsciously, continue to accept as an almost inevitable phenomenon that modern states are only successful if they end up

constructing, in one way or another, a certain monist idea of a political nation. The nation-building processes in France, Germany, or United States are extolled as "successful" without consideration given to the enormous human costs and the deep ethical-political dilemmas involved in these processes of reducing identitarian diversity.

In reality, instead of being considered a *defect*, the national problem in Spain could be explained as resulting from an *excess*; that is, an imperfect process of national deconstruction that on many occasions has been viewed as an endless phenomenon (Romero 2012). As some historians point out, the idea of the Spanish nation did not emerge in order to configure a liberal state of free and equal citizens, but instead to provide symbolic cover in identitarian terms to a broad political empire that extended over several continents, a fact that makes a concept like "imperial nation" analytically appropriate (Fradera 2016). It is no accident that the first article of the first Spanish Constitution, approved in Cadiz in 1812, should have defined the Spanish nation as "the coming together of the Spaniards of both hemispheres". In this affirmation, one can observe how at the origins of Spanish constitutionalism, an attempt was made to homologise—in terms of collective identity as members of the same national community—the inhabitants of a series of territories that, under the dominion of the kingdom of Spain, shared the same language and certain religious values. The fact is that this idea of an imperial nation (Fradera 2016), in spite of the attempts to achieve communitarian homogeneity, from the outset established an important asymmetry in the citizenship rights of its inhabitants, according to different criteria of ethnic, group, and territorial ascription. Little by little, this idea of an imperial nation was affected by the independence processes of numerous territories in Latin America and Asia over the whole of the nineteenth century, making it necessary to revise the very concept of the Spanish nation, which was reduced to the borders of today's state following the independence of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898.

At the same time that this idea of the Spanish nation encountered difficulties in adjusting to a waning imperial political structure, Spain as a country also found it necessary to rethink itself on discovering that, within the incipient modern liberal-democratic state, political plurality on the national question was beginning to emerge. This situation even led over the course of the XIX century to the emergence of a debate on the need to have a political party clearly labelled as a "national party" (Fernández Torres 2018, pp. 185–95). In short, if the imperial nation had proved excessive when it came to materialising itself within the boundaries of a dwindling imperial power structure, the Spanish nation now also started to be seen as excessive when it came to materialising itself, even within the boundaries of the peninsular state alone. The appearance of the text by Pi i Margall titled *Las nacionalidades* (*The nationalities*) in 1876 was perhaps the first attempt in the modern Spanish state to think the Spanish national question in plural terms. Since then, the idea of the Spanish nation has coexisted with this concept of nationality, which refers to the same semantic field and poses the challenge of the point to which the Spanish political community can or cannot be viewed in terms of plurinationality.

The transition from a singular imperial nation to an idea of a nation that coexists with other national realities, of all of them having a political character, within the same state is not a simple undertaking. This transition is especially difficult in convulsive political contexts, such as occurred in Spain at the start of the twentieth century, or in periods that were directly undemocratic, during the Francoist dictatorship, for example. In the last four decades, however, the Spanish democratic system has been accumulating political capital that has enabled it to provide some answers to this challenge concerning its supposedly plurinational character. Two types of strategies have been developed to address this challenge. On one side, setting underway the debate on the difference between the *civic* character, as opposed to the *ethnic* character, of the different nationalist projects (De Blas Guerrero 1984; Jáuregui 1999; Grad and Rojo 2003; Ruiz Jiménez 2005; Muro and Quiroga 2005). On the other, putting into circulation a strange phenomenon that we will term acceptance of plurinationality without naming it (Nuñez Seixas 2010). This double strategy has been possible thanks to four pairs of especially hazy concepts that organise Spanish political language: (i) The distinction between nations that are

supposedly based on nationalist citizens and nations that appear to exist without nationalists; (ii) the distinction between plurinational territories and non-plurinational territories; (iii) the distinction between the concepts of identity and national identification; and finally, (iv) the distinction between the concept of nested national identity and the concept of overlapping national identity.

It is worth asking about the extent to which these four pairs of concepts serve in explaining the Spanish plurinational labyrinth, in which paradoxically all the political actors employ the same strategy: Criticising the supposed "nationalist biases" in the positions of their political rivals while at the same time savouring the "nationalist bias" in their own position. This strategy is based on two arguments: On one side, criticising the existence of a ethnical nationalism in the eye of the other, without explicitly recognising the existence of a similar ethnic nationalism in one's own eye; on the other side, demanding recognition for plurinationality in the eye of the other, without explicitly recognising the existence of plurinationalism in one's own eye. This strange narrative of accepting plurinationality without naming it has had three considerable effects: At the juridical level, a high degree of legal-constitutional ambiguity when it comes to defining the national question; at the academic level, an enormous difficulty in measuring the national identity of the citizens; at the political level, an apparent absence of political and electoral incentives for reaching consensus on some idea of national pluralism in Spain. The politically relevant question lies in knowing whether, after 40 years of democratic coexistence, this dynamic of monist nationalisms that are prisoners to the dilemma of accepting plurinationality without naming it is the best framework of relationship for the actors of the Spanish political system. The hypothesis of this paper is that some political actors have benefitted more than others from this labyrinth, with the result that the incentives for maintaining it are strongly asymmetrical. In sum, it is worth enquiring into the possible neutrality of this labyrinth on the national question. These questions are especially pertinent, as we will see later, to try to understand the political dynamic that is currently being lived in the Spanish region of Catalonia, popularly known as "el procés" (Cuadras-Morató 2016; Kraus and Vergés 2017): A sequence of political events conducing to a situation of strong challenge to the Spanish political order. This process, to a large extent, might be interpreted as a result of a problem to accommodate the national plurality within the Spanish institutional system.

The text is organised into four parts. The first part is a theoretical consideration of the concept of plurinationality, based on the model for the analysis of political concepts proposed by Reinhart Koselleck. In this part, we will try to detect three types of situations: (a) The difference between the concept of plurinationality and the terms employed in practice to speak about this concept; (b) the importance of the *spaces of experience* and *horizons of expectation* contained in a concept like plurinationality in Spanish political life; and finally, (c) the question of the extralinguistic character of the concept of plurinationality, which enables its politicisation, ideologisation, temporalisation, and democratisation. In the second part of the text, we will briefly review the form in which the concept of plurinationality has been included in the Spanish juridical-constitutional framework, especially the inflated wording on the national phenomenon, which has enabled ambiguous and even conflicting interpretations to be made, while at the same time facilitating the prevalence of some interpretations and hindering the emergence of others. In the third part, we will address the epistemological dilemmas of the famous *Moreno Question* that tries to analytically measure the phenomenon of identity and plurinational identification in Spain, the debates on this question, and the academic shortcomings found in this type of measurements. Finally, in the fourth part, we will deal with the question of the Spanish party system and the logic of the electoral competition based on the nationalist issue. In this section, we will see that national plurality in Spain has been treated as a question of recognition and representation (Alonso 2011, pp. 186–87), but not so much as a problem of governability and, quite specifically, as a question of political alternation (Caron and Laforest 2009). This alternation holds both at the state-wide level and in the regional level, where there are different options for crystallising the national question in their respective governments.

2. Plurinationality: A Slippery Concept

Plurinationality is a term that has had a very brief career in both historical and academic terms in Spain. It is very much used as an adjective to speak, for example, of the difficulty involved in understanding Spain as a "plurinational state", when in any case, it is not specifically recognised as such (Fossas and Requejo 1999; Rodríguez Bereijo 2018, p. 840); also, for speaking of the virtues or difficulties in articulating that nebulous and little defined syntagm "plurinational federalism" (Caminal 2002; Requejo 2003, 2004; Caminal and Requejo 2009). At times, the adjective plurinational has been changed for other apparently proximal terms like "multinational state" (Norman 2006; Jewkes 2015) or "multinational democracy" (Gagnon et al. 2003; Zuber 2011). Nonetheless, a certain vertigo still subsists when it comes to giving substance to the phenomenon. In a certain way, the evolution of the term plurinationality has been contrary to what happened with other terms like Liberalism, for example. Liberalism is viewed as a substantive term that has evolved in such a way that today we only know it through its different "liberal" variants, where the different meanings of the adjective bear a certain family resemblance (Rawls 1996), while in the case of plurinationality, the term has become an adjective without having been properly constituted as a noun; that is, as an object that defines a historical phenomenon. However, and this is a thesis that we shall be setting out here, it is possible to affirm that the phenomenon of plurinationality exists as a concept in spite of the generalised absence of this term as something substantive and singular. The historian Reinhart Koselleck made an important distinction between concepts and words. In his opinion, a linguistic meaning can adhere to a word, but a concept makes it possible to define an historical phenomenon and, at the same time, offers different political-social meanings that are instruments and, simultaneously, vectors for political action and conflict between different options (Koselleck 2012, pp. 27–43). In the case of the term plurinationality that concerns us here, it is legitimate to think that this concept, in a country like Spain, has undergone a process of unstable, precarious, and troubled crystallisation due to the existence of different discursive strategies aimed at hindering its generalised social and political use as a noun. It is worth tracing how this strange process has occurred and, above all, identifying the reasons why such a situation subsists.

It is possible find as many as four different and complementary strategies in this process of indirect conceptual elaboration of plurinationality in the Spanish case. The first strategy was based on the creation of the concept of "nation of nations" (Leguina 1980; Maldonado 1995; Solozábal 2018; Cruz Villalón 2018). This term nests national plurinationality as a type of hierarchical structure of layers, in which each big nation exists insofar as it includes other smaller nations within itself. From the juridical point of view, it is not clear how a single term can signify a whole and a part at the same time, and perhaps for this reason, the difficulties inherent in this strategy mean that it has been employed more in the metaphorical field of political action than in the strictly juridical-constitutional field, where the term is not well received. As the Ruling of the Constitutional Court 21/2010, June 28, notes, "the term nation is extraordinarily protean due to the many contexts in which it is usually involved (. . .) Effectively, one can speak of the nation as a cultural, historical, linguistic, sociological, and even religious reality. However, the nation that is of concern here is exclusively the nation in the juridical-constitutional sense. In this specific sense, the Constitution does not know of any other than the Spanish nation (. . .)". The term *nation of nations* is an updating of the old XIX century ideal, inspired by a famous Spanish writer, Miguel de Unamuno, who tries to reconcile in a single ontological unit an idea of a country that has one history and multiple intrahistories, but this attempt to hierarchise a single concept on two semantic levels has proved highly unsatisfactory.

The second strategy consisted of modelling two distinct theoretical types of nation that can coexist in the same state: The idea of a civic nation facing the idea of an ethnic nation. Based on the classification used to explain the nation-building processes in France (civic nation) and Germany (ethnic nation) in the XIX century, an abundant academic literature has justified this classification to distinguish between political processes that build their idea of the nation on civic elements, such as individual rights or the idea of equality before the law, as against those that build the nation on ethnic

and cultural elements, such as the existence of a language, a religion, or certain values (Ignatieff 1993; Ipperciel 2007). This distinction between civic and ethnic dimensions has, moreover, been accompanied by an evaluative asymmetry according to which the concept of civic nation enjoys more democratic recognition than the idea of ethnic nation. This can reach the point where the struggle between different nations that coexist in a political space, as happens in Spain, is usually and to a great extent an attempt to criminalise the ethnic conception of the opposing nation and, at the same time, an attempt to emphasise the civic vision of one's own nation. Thus, in Spain, the idea of the Spanish nation is usually identified in general with a civic nation, except in the case of the peripheral nationalists that consider it to be an ethnic nation. When it comes to judging the civic or ethnic character of the Basque and Catalan nations, the mainstream opinion in Spain has varied in a way that is certainly significant: Depending on the better or worse relation of the Basque and Catalan nationalists with the Spanish political system, between 1978 and 2019, the Basque nation has gone from being an ethnic nation to being a civic one, while the Catalan nation has gone from being seen as a civic nation to being treated as an ethnic one (Miley 2007; Serrano 1998, 2001; Rubio Caballero 2015). As Ramón Maiz observes, empirical experience shows that the distinction between an idea of a civic nation facing an ethnic nation is an untenable dichotomy. The clearest example is provided by France due to the difficulty in reconciling its self-conception as a civic nation with the Muslim population that live in that country (Maiz 2018, pp. 123–35). Just as an ethnic nation without a civic dimension is not democratically acceptable, a civic nation without an ethnic or cultural dimension is not politically operative (Maiz 2018, pp. 77–142). All nations have civic and ethnic elements and, consequently, although the relationship between these elements is variable, the strategy aimed at distinguishing the two ideal types of nation is of no help in understanding the concept of plurinationality.

The third strategy for tackling the phenomenon of plurinationality without mentioning it as such consisted of saying that there are nations founded on nationalist ideologies and nations whose foundations do not include a nationalist discourse. In this case, the strategy was based on a constant process of demonizing nationalism as an ideological phenomenon, which is supposedly used by some nations but not by all (De Schutter 2007). In few countries can one find as much literature as in Spain that, over the course of time, has criticised political nationalism so reiteratively and so severely, especially when referring to the so-called regional nationalisms. However, the consequences of this process in which many people have only been able to build their national identity through a process of "Spanish nationalist denial" are, on one side, relegating their own national identities to marginal areas (Fusi 2006) or, on the other, adopting attitudes of desertion (Béjar 2008). If we lose sight of the presence of this kind of nationalist self-denial, it will be difficult to understand the nature of the Spanish nationalism and its presence, especially in regions like Basque Country and Catalonia where it competes with other nationalisms.

Finally, the fourth strategy for addressing the phenomenon of plurinationality consisted of an exercise of dividing the noun of the national question by using two terms, nation and nationality, to talk of two experiences with sociological similarities but that in principle have different juridical levels of political articulation. As we will see in the following section, this was the practical option adopted during the juridical-political debate that took place when drafting Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution in 1978 (Solozábal 1980; Corcuera 1993). In Koselleck's terms, the wording of Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution in 1978 can be analysed as a point of encounter between a space of past experience and a horizon of future expectations (Koselleck 1993, pp. 333–57). On the one hand, the space of experience consists in the mutual recognition by all the political actors of the existence in the past of situations of misunderstanding involving the different national realities that must be superseded. On the other hand, the horizon of expectations consists of leaving the door open to a possible coexistence amongst the national political experiences by means of ambiguous and unspecific political formulas, constitutional "silences" (Rodríguez Bereijo 2018, pp. 837–39), "apocryphal compromises" as they were called by Carl Schmitt, that serve for postponing a definitive decision because, in fact, it is thought that only future historical time can give shape to that decision.

This strange process of crystallisation of the concept of plurinationality in Spain, which avoids directly relating the ideas of nation and political plurality by means of this network of elusive terms, complicated strategies, and semantic indeterminacy, has hindered the development of the four dimensions inherent in every political concept described by Koselleck, namely its politicisation, its ideologisation, its temporalisation, and its democratisation (Villacañas and Oncina 1997, p. 23). As we will now proceed to examine, the politicisation of the concept of plurinationality implies the possibility of including an increasingly large number of political situations in Spain that could come under this umbrella term; the ideologisation of the concept implies that plurinationality is not a natural phenomenon that must be accepted without public deliberation, but on the contrary, it can and must be oriented towards disparate ideological positions; the temporalisation of the concept implies that plurinationality is not a static situation, a fixed photo to which a representative channel must be given, but is instead a dynamic experience involving political changes in the exercise of power over time and that it must be analysed through the existence of real political alternatives; the democratisation of the concept implies that plurinationality is not an attribute that can be demanded by one concrete actor alone (in this case, the state or the institutions involved in the territorial organisation of power), but instead it is a quality that can be demanded at all political levels and in all spheres of political action. In practice, it has not been possible to develop any of these four dimensions in Spanish political life.

3. Nation, Nationality, and the Spanish Constitution

It is well-known that the current Spanish Carta Magna, adopted in 1978, makes no specific mention of the idea of plurinationality. However, the fact that it contains a plurality of terms associated with the national question implies that, in practice, an attempt was made to address this phenomenon in some way. If the Spanish constitutional text, as happens in a large part of the fundamental rules in the European sphere, had decided to dispense with any mention of the national question in substantive terms, the question of plurinationality as a political phenomenon would perhaps have ceased to be an option. The problem is that that option became inviable because during the democratic Transition the political actors understood that no Constitution would be legitimate without providing at least a minimal and explicit answer to the question of national plurality. It is well-known that during the debates addressing this issue, the idea of considering the plurinational character of Spain was in circulation, especially amongst the leaders of the Socialist Party (henceforth, PSOE) although it is true that this term was never seriously proposed for inclusion in the constitutional text (San Antón 2018, p. 200). Finally, during the constituent process, an overblown formula concerning the national question was chosen: The use of two terms, *nation* and *nationality* (both contained in Article 2 of the Constitution), as well as a mention of the *Spanish nation* as the repository of sovereignty (Preface) and an allusion to the idea that *national* sovereignty resides in the Spanish people, from whom the powers of the state emanate (Article 1). This conceptual architecture concerning the national question was intended to simultaneously guarantee both the unitary character of the Spanish nation (in Article 2 three different expressions are used to reiterate the same idea that the Spanish nation is "indissoluble, common and indivisible") and the right to an autonomous political power of the so-called nationalities, which are generically named in a different way from the rest of the regions that make up Spain (De Blas Guerrero 2018).

It is important to underline that the chosen option involved a definition of national plurality that was closer to the model that Miller (2001) called "nested nationalities" than to the model we could call "overlapping nationalities". According to the nested nationalities model, different national forms can coexist if a relationship of parallelism is established amongst them, in which each one in fact acts at a different political level. That is, these forms of national expression relate to each other in a model of coexistence with a minimum level of substantive contact, to thus avoid a greater degree of conflict. Hence, in the Spanish case, while there is recognition that the Spanish nation exists politically, so to guarantee the unity of the country in a civic way and without nationalist apriorisms, the existence of the different nationalities, which are not mentioned expressly in the Constitution and whose territorial

delimitations are not established, is accepted in order to develop the maximum possible level of political autonomy in certain territories of the country, with the sole restriction that they should not jeopardise Spanish unity. Similarly, it is spelt out that the degree of political autonomy of the different nationalities and regions is to be an open and asymmetrical process, based on the so-called principe dispositif, since the level of competences is directly chosen by each of the territories. In sum, it is accepted that coexistence between the two levels of the national reality is possible because, in reality, both levels operate on parallel political levels. Therefore, there is no overlap or intersection between the different national realities. Any speculation about what the degree of substantive relationship between the different national realities might be is discarded. Instead, the option chosen is that this relationship between different national realities should be as small as possible, based on a spatial division of slightly interconnected political systems. As we will see, this model of nested nationalisms, which is more defensive than interactive, more formal than substantive, complicates any measurement and interpretation of overlapping national identities, which is what the Moreno Question hypothetically attempts to do.

On balance, this plurinational model of nested and not overlapping national identities has generated three types of problems during the 40 years in which the Constitution has been in effect. The first is related to the comparative and permanent grievance amongst the territories of Spain based on the evidence that the introduction of an asymmetrical autonomous model was open to exploitation by the so-called "differential national realities", which has led to an inflationary argument about the national question in many territories. While during the Spanish democratic Transition, the term nationality was understood in a more restrictive way to refer to territories like Catalonia, the Basque Country, or Galicia, over time this term was adopted in the different Autonomy Statutes of numerous territories, starting with Andalusia (1981) and followed by the Canary Islands (1996), Aragon (2007), Balearic Islands (2007), and the Valencian Community (2019). The project to reform the Autonomy Statute (Estatut) of Catalonia, which included the option of considering that territory as a nation and that was annulled by the sentence of the Constitutional Court STC 31/2010, was inscribed in that same inflationary logic (Rodríguez Bereijo 2018, p. 841). On the other hand, attempts to harmonise the autonomous system as occurred with the approval of the Organic Law on Harmonisation of the Autonomous Process (LOAPA), which was declared to be partially unconstitutional by the STC 76/1983 following an appeal lodged by Basque and Catalan nationalists, demonstrate that with the present constitutional design of nested plurinationality it will be difficult to reform the autonomous system, which was designed in an asymmetrical way that differs greatly from the aims of a federal model (Lluch 2011).

The second problem with this Spanish model of nested and not overlapping national identities is related to the progressive reduction of the perception of national plurality in those territories conceived as *nationalities*, especially the Basque Country and Catalonia. The rejection of the idea that these national realities overlap at the Spanish level has resulted in the non-acceptance of plurinational realities at the regional level. It is no accident that those regions where there are politically strong nationalist parties are the ones where political alternation between parties with different national sensibilities has been less feasible and, above all, more controversial. The examples of the Basque Country in 1986, Catalonia in 2003, and Navarre in 2019 are the best examples of this situation.

In 1986, the exceptional situation in the Basque Country arose in which the two leading parties, the PNV and the PSE-PSOE, formed the first coalition government in Spain, giving shape to the first government that included different national sensibilities in the entire country (Llera 1988); a government that laid the institutional, economic, and political foundations of the Basque Country for the following decades, depriving ETA's terrorist violence of any hint of legitimacy. It was no accident that ETA, by means of a massive terrorist onslought, made 1987 the bloodiest year of both the Transition and its own history: It was without doubt the main actor that wanted to contest the supposedly plurinational character of the new Basque government and its policies. This was especially true of the educational system, which was introduced by politicians chosen by the Socialist Party of the Basque Country

(PSE-PSOE), José Ramón Recalde and Fernando Buesa, both of whom were the target of attacks by this terrorist gang; a coalition government, in short, designed precisely to achieve coexistence between different national sensibilities. Decades later, the reality is that there has been no political alternation in the government of the Basque Country, if we ignore the episode of alternation led by the socialist Patxi López in 2009, made possible by the non-participation of the radical left-wing regional nationalists in that year's election to the regional parliament.

In the case of Catalonia, the election of 2003 in which the Catalan socialist Pasqual Maragall (PSC) was elected president of the regional government (*Generalitat*) was possibly the first opportunity to make a real alternation between the different national sensibilities in this autonomous community. In light of reactions to the speeches and political strategy of Pasqual Maragall, with his aspiration to initiate a reform of the Autonomy Statute (*Estatut*) and even bring about more far reaching change in the way the political relation is established amongst the territories of Spain (Maragall 2005, 2008), it is doubtful that his initiative was applauded as an opportunity for alternation in terms of plurinationality. Quite the opposite, in general Maragall, initiatives were interpreted critically as the victory of the nationalist discourse within the political imaginary of Catalan socialism (De Blas Guerrero 2003; Elorza 2003; Vallés 2005; Peregrín Gutiérrez 2004; Blanco Valdés 2005, pp. 180–81; Madrid Delgado 2005; Espelosín Atienza 2005; Quiroga Fernández de Soto 2008). Perhaps the *Maragall symptom* can be seen as the political experience that has taken questioning of the constitutional design of nested plurinationality to the limit, forcing the great majority of political actors, both Spanish and Catalan, to take up the challenge of plurinationality. In this sense, Maragall's political disavowal following the approval of the reform of the Statute agreed between the Spanish prime minister Zapatero and the leader of CIU, Artur Mas, in January 2006, behind the back of the Catalan plurinational government of the PSC and the left-wing regional nationalists of ERC, can be seen as an alliance of those critical of the idea of *overlapping plurinationality.* That is, as an alliance of those who consider that in the final instance the optimum relation between the "nations" should be one in which the parties that "represent" them do not interfere in their respective spaces of power; i.e., *it is inconceivable for there to be a plurinational government in Spain*. At that time, the idea of overlapping plurinationality underwent one of its most disappointing episodes.

In this sense, the tensions and controversy in the Spanish political debate during 2019 over the formation of a plurinational government in the region of Navarre between the PSOE and some nationalist parties from this territory have followed the same logic: The idea that institutionalised plurinationality in governments can encounter resistance and that opposing it politically can easily bring electoral benefits. As we stated above, our starting hypothesis is that these plurinational government formulas receive asymmetrical answers from the different political actors, but one can wonder whether or not opposition to this government formula has a promising future.

In relation to the above, there is a third problem in this Spanish model of nested and not overlapping nationalisms: The difficult fit involved in accepting possible political interdependencies and, more specifically, the possible support that regional nationalist parties can provide for Spanish governability. In 1993, the PSOE lost its absolute majority for the first time since the restoration of democracy and was forced to seek stable parliamentary support in order to govern. Since then, centre-right nationalist parties like CIU and PNV have been the main options chosen to assist this new multiparty governability, but subsequently, the most recurrent argument in the Spanish public opinion since then has consisted of criticising the excessive influence that these regional nationalist parties have in the general power system in Spain. The underlying idea is that *national* policy undergoes deterioration due to the presence of actors that do not include the search for issues conceived as having a Spanish "national" character amongst their priorities. It is significant that in 40 years, the option of forming a coalition government in Spain from a plurinational perspective has not been seen as desirable, or even possible, although this has happened, albeit with many problems, in the Basque Country, Catalonia, and now in Navarre. Perhaps the negative interpretation of the plurinational experiences in regional governments in Spain, highly visible in the case of Catalonia above all, have for

the time being closed a horizon of expectations favourable to this possibility. While a plural government formula between parties that represent the Spanish nation is not possible in the future, the most usual way of evaluating the policy of alliances of the parties forming the central government has been by measuring their relation of dependence, and therefore possible weakness, facing the regional nationalist parties. It is important to highlight that this argument had always been employed from a single ideological direction, namely from the right-wing party Partido Popular (PP) to criticise the left-wing party (PSOE), and this argument is paradoxically now being used against the right-wing government (PP) by other right-wing parties that have not so far had executive responsibilities, like Ciudadanos and the extreme right-wing party Vox. This situation has taken the argument to the point where, at present, the only available alternatives to the "constitutionalist parties" (with this expression taking for granted that there is only one basic way of interpreting the Constitution amongst "Spanish national" parties) are three in number: (i) Waiting for the formation of a government only by these parties, (ii) fighting against the appearance that governability does not involve making concessions to the regional nationalists parties, or (iii) refusing to make any concessions at the cost of blocking all government activity. This trilemma is the result of a model that holds that Spanish national realities must resist a process of political intersection. The question, as we will see, is knowing what incentives, benefits, and costs the different actors are capable of accepting to maintain or, in its case, change this framework of (badly) nested plurinationality.

4. The Moreno Question: To Be *and* Not to Be

Together with political-constitutional analysis, a productive course for exploring the scope of plurinationality in Spain has been to study opinions on the phenomenon of subjective national identity through questions in surveys. For many decades, in a pioneering way that was later exported to other countries and international contexts (Cussó et al. 2018), a question known as the *Moreno Question* (Moreno 1988, 1995, 2006) was used in Spain. This tries to analyse the degree of ethno-territorial identification of the country's inhabitants in relation to their identification with Spain. It consists of five options that range from 1 to 5 according to whether people consider themselves *only (Spanish identity); more (Spanish identity) than (regional identity); as (Spanish identity) as (regional identity); more (regional identity) than (Spanish Identity); or only (regional identity).* Over time, numerous critical commentaries have pointed out the problems generated by this question: problems deriving from the mere wording of the question to adapt it to different contexts (Ruiz Jiménez 2007); problems about its static character when it comes to capturing the dynamic construction of identities according to different political contexts (Lecours 2004); problems in measuring the intensity and supposed linearity of different identities when these are compared within a single question (Guinjoan and Rodón 2015); and problems on how to measure so-called dual identity in countries like Spain, which contains regions that differ greatly when this question is addressed (Martínez-Herrera 2002; De Nieves and Diz 2019; Molina and Quiroga 2019). Apart from these substantial limitations, perhaps the prior question that must be posed is knowing whether this question really serves for measuring the national question and, once this doubt is resolved, seeing whether the alternatives that have been proposed for solving the *Moreno Question*'s problems contribute to measuring Spanish plurinationality in a more reliable way or, on the contrary, hinder such knowledge.

The most usual interpretations of the *Moreno Question*—not only those that extol its validity but, strangely enough, also those that criticise it—assume that it is possible to establish a certain analogy between the ethno-territorial dimension and the national dimension of political identity. It is well-known that the two dimensions, the ethnic and the national, refer to political phenomena that are close in theory while they can be very different in practice. However, the reason for making this analogy is that the national dimension, as mentioned above, is highly conceptually ambiguous and full of vague theoretical constructions, as occurs in the confused argument over the concepts of civic and ethnic national identity, that not only contaminate the political debate, but academic analysis as well. It is no accident that the *Moreno Question*, which supposedly measures subjective national

identity, has never utilised the term "nation", "national" or "nationalism" in its wording or in the answers offered to the interviewee. Given that the national question can arouse certain suspicions when it comes to recognising it, suspicions that are especially visible in the case of the *Spanish* national question, the ethno-territorial question has been accepted on numerous occasions as an epistemological shortcut for trying to approach an understanding of the national question. As Ramón Maiz points out, every national phenomenon always refers to some ethno-cultural component (Maiz 2018), but the paradoxical thing is that not everyone accepts this proximity between the national and ethno-cultural dimensions in the same way and with the same intensity. In fact, in Spain, there are many people who implicitly accept that the so-called Spanish national question can be understood in civic terms without any need to link it with any ethnic component. This asymmetrically distorts their predispositions on the national question, especially when they perceive the existence of national identities that are in dispute within the same territory. Without any doubt, this situation poses a serious problem when the ethno-territorial dimension is used as a means for measuring national identification approximately, amongst other reasons because ethno-territorial sentiment holds no negative bias (identifying with the territory as such is generally socially accepted). However, that negative bias can exist regarding the nationalist question because identifying with nationalist content might be problematic when territory and national identity do not fully coincide.

The basic reason that the ethno-territorial and the national dimensions are usually seen as analytically distinct is because the ethno-territorial dimension is usually perceived in a positive way inasmuch as it is accepted as a non-political dimension that, in theory, does not necessarily translate into an expression of national or nationalist character. However, the argument that we will be defending here is a very different one: We believe that the entire ethnic dimension is usually translated politically into some type of national expression, although this is not always done in the same way. Or, stated differently, both the Spanish ethno-cultural dimension and the ethno-cultural dimension of each Spanish region are *always* translated into national expressions, but they do not manifest themselves in the same form and they are not perceived as being national in the same way. In the Spanish case, there are regions where the ethno-territorial identifications of some of the inhabitants end up creating a national identity that crystallises in regional nationalist parties of differing political strength (as occurs, in the Spanish case, in territories like Aragon, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre, or the Basque Country); just as ethno-territorial identification is generally low in other regions (as occurs, for example, in Madrid, Valencia, or the two Castiles); or the ethno-territorial identification can be strong or very strong in other regions, but does not crystallise into durable regional nationalist parties (as occurs, for example, in Andalusia, Asturias, Cantabria, or La Rioja). Assuming that in the former cases we are dealing with territories with a single national identity of a regional type, and in the latter cases we are facing regions that lack national identity, or that are "weakly nationalised" (De Nieves and Diz 2019), is tantamount to affirming the absence of a Spanish ethno-cultural national identity in all these territories. This affirmation is the logical consequence of accepting that Spanish national identity is chiefly civic and that only in extreme cases, such as that of a violent Spanish nationalism, does it have an ethnic character. It is perhaps worth imagining a very different affirmation: It is possible that in territories like Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarre, or Galicia, what we are facing is plurinational societies in which, nonetheless, a defective method has been employed for conceptualising and measuring them as such; while in territories like Andalusia or Asturias, we are dealing with communities that, far from being weakly nationalised, are simply less plurinational; that is, these are communities where a dual ethno-cultural identification exists but, nevertheless, this duality is convergent in the national dimension.

In this sense, the use of the so-called *Moreno Question* for measuring the subjective national identity of citizens in plurinational political settings generates many explanatory problems, above all in those answers situated in intermediate mixed categories, where dual identification with Spain and the specific region of each interviewee is possible. In those regions where regional national identity weighs very heavily, as in Catalonia or the Basque Country, the ethno-cultural questions

associated with Spanish national identity are usually very hazy, either for reasons of stigmatisation (Dinas 2012) or due to cognitive weakness when it comes to indicating how those mixed sentiments can be articulated. As Marc Guinjoan and Toni Rodón observe, many citizens of communities with regional national identities who situate themselves in intermediate positions of the *Moreno Question* do so for very different reasons, without it being possible to establish a specific profile in terms of dual identity (Guinjoan and Rodón 2015, p. 137). On occasion, the Spanish ethno-cultural sentiments of these interviewees are *nested* in the sentiment of regional ethno-territorial belonging, in such a way that one sentiment can be articulated in national terms and the other sentiment can be articulated in more administrative terms; on other occasions, on the contrary, the two ethno-cultural sentiments, both Spanish and regional, *overlap* in national-identitarian terms. The problem is that, to date, the most usual alternative that has been suggested for analysing the differences amongst interviewees holding these intermediate positions, between those that give nationally nested answers and those that give nationally overlapping answers, is to compare the position of these interviewees on the two nationalist scales separately (Guinjoan and Rodón 2015, p. 135; De Nieves and Diz 2019, p. 32). That is, measuring state and regional nationalist sentiment using two independent metric variables on the assumption that these two variables are comparable when in fact they measure very different things. The regional nationalist scale usually does fuse the ethnic, territorial, civic, and national dimensions in a fairly balanced way, so that the answers of interviewees can be analysed lineally in identitarian terms. However, on the Spanish nationalist scale, the relationship between the ethnic, civic, and national dimensions has a very high degree of heterogeneity, amongst other reasons because many interviewees simply define themselves as "not nationalist" and this attribution prevents the expression of strong positive sentiments on the Spanish national question. The confusing relation between national question and nationalism when one thinks of Spain, as opposed to the relation between national question and nationalism in regional nationalisms that are less problematic, makes comparison between the two scales very difficult to observe because the linearity of each is sociologically different. Instead of helping to understand the results of the *Moreno Question*, it is possible that they contribute to increasing the complexity of the plurinational labyrinth.

In short, the *Moreno Question* attempted to tackle the issue of "to be *and* not to be" of the Spanish plurinationality in a fairly elaborate way. On one side, it accepts the existence of plurality in terms of ethno-territorial identification but, on the other, it refuses to articulate that plurality in strictly national terms. In this sense, many of the attempts to improve this shortcoming, such as using metric variables that measure the terms "national" or "nationalist" separately to explain subjective national identity at the Spanish level and the regional level, as if they were parallel worlds, are exercises that involve taking a step backwards instead of forwards, insofar as they refuse to directly ask, in a combined manner, about the question of plurinationality. With respect to this resistance, it is very significant to observe how the Spanish people, in different surveys conducted over many years, have been asked to respond to a question about what Spain means to them, by choosing from amongst the following five options: *1 = It's my country; 2 = It's the state of which I am a citizen; 3 = It's a nation of which I feel a member; 4 = Something special, resulting from history, which unites those who live here, and that I wouldn't know how to define; 5 = It's a state formed of several nationalities* (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2016, p. 200). A second alternative to the same question was asked in some regions, whose inhabitants could choose from amongst the following five options to refer to Spain: *1 = It's my country; 2 = It's a nation of which I feel a member; 3 = It's the state of which I am a citizen 4 = It's a state formed of several nationalities and regions; 5 = It's an alien state of which my country does not form part* (Fernández Manjón 2010, p. 124). It is possible that these two questions have come closest to asking the citizens their direct opinion on plurinationality in Spain. However, the problem with these two questions is that they assume that plurinationality (i) solely refers to the sum of the regional nationalities, separated from each other in different territories, but without including Spanish nationality in a clear form; and (ii) refers solely to the Spanish territory as a whole, but not to each of its regions, where it seems it does not even consider that there might be some type of plurinationality. It is not surprising (but, at the same time, it is revealing about the

predominant idea of plurinationality in Spain) that a question like this has never been posed to refer to the autonomous level, not even in those territories like the Basque Country, Navarre, Catalonia, and Galicia, where the plurinational character of their population is quite clear.

5. National Intersubjectivity and Plurinational Governments

Analysis of the plurinational question from the juridical-constitutional perspective or from that of opinion surveys runs the risk of placing excessive emphasis on the "created" (Lecours 2004, p. 82), or better put, "static" elements (Ruiz Jiménez 2007, p. 163) of the different national realities. That is, overvaluing the nested character, at the expense of the overlapping character, of the national identities. These approaches avoid analysing controversial situations deriving from the interrelation between national identities in plural societies, as occurs to a large extent in Spain, at the cost of completely ignoring the essential aspect that defines the plurinational question as such (Stojanovic 2011). Facing this, another perspective is possible that observes the ever-changing dynamics in which the different political actors move and the national preferences of both the political parties and the institutions, or of the citizens themselves, who tend to develop an attitude towards the national question that is more strategic and less essentialist in character. According to this perspective, the national identity of individuals, or better put, the political appearance of that identity, is not so much an objective or subjective question, but a relational one; or as Habermas would put it, an "intersubjective" identity (Habermas 1994, p. 113) that takes shape depending on how the different national identities deliberate with each other in the public sphere. When a political actor in Spain holds a certain position on a national question, their position is not generally related so much to the essentialist content of their identity seen in isolation (subjective national identity) as to the advantages that position brings them in relation to the others (intersubjective national identity). In each political circumstance, a more ethnic or a more civic nationalist position opens up certain opportunities for expression and closes others. Therefore, study of the national identity of the actors, especially the political parties, should be done according to the calculation of the advantages and risks their position involves facing different national offers. In sum, political actors are not so subject to national political identity but are instead agents with strategic and adaptive capacity that use the national question as a tool (Humlebaek and Jiménez 2018) that is articulated in an unstable framework of political negotiation.

In the debate over applying the concepts of recognition and redistribution to plurinational political systems, recognition has been the term most used for explaining how relations amongst the different national realities of a country ought to be (Gagnon and Grégoire 2015, p. 82). Nonetheless, recognition tends to limit the intersubjective character of the national question as it proposes that nations should above all strengthen themselves *inwards* within a certain territorial framework. On the contrary, the concept of redistribution tends to widen the focus *outwards*, towards the space of political action (Shorten 2015) insofar as the actors accept the divisibility and negotiation of so-called national goods. As Christina Zuber notes, the plurinational phenomenon in decentralised political structures with a certain degree of asymmetry is a dynamic game of actors that moves simultaneously in two directions: On one hand, it is a vertical movement that is understood as a political conflict in national terms between the centre and the different peripheries; on the other, it is a horizontal movement that is understood as an intergovernmental political conflict, also in national terms, amongst *all* the different territories that make up a country, given that any territory, and not only those that have regional nationalist parties, end up using the national question to their own benefit (Zuber 2011). The result of this process is a dynamic readjustment, both symbolic and material, of the plurinational question; that is, a permanent de-alignment and realignment of the ethnic and national boundaries of the people and the strategies of the political parties (Serrano and Bonillo 2017; Corujo et al. 2019). From an institutionalist perspective of rational choice, plurinationalism defines an intersubjective network of actors in which the latter relate to each other in a complex manner according to their power of negotiation and their forms of negottiation, on both the vertical and horizontal planes (Petersohn et al. 2015). As different

authors observe, the relation among actors within a plurinational state culminates in one of three scenarios: Secession, autonomy, or federalism (Mcewen and Lecours 2008; Lluch 2014; Basta 2018).

In the Spanish case, lack of recognition of the concept of *plurinationality*—a useful tool in political debate that could favour an intersubjective redistribution of the national question amongst different political parties, governments, and public opinion in general—has provoked two very specific situations. The first is a distortion in the political evaluation of the really existing model of territorial organisation in Spain (the autonomous community model), in comparison with the apparently less plausible model (the secessionist model) and with what appears to be a more favourable alternative (the federal model). As Bossacoma and Sanjaume-Calvet suggest, it is not clear if the Spanish Constitution defended asymmetry in the past but now it seems that "it was a transitory and potential asymmetry more than a permanent and actual asymmetry" (Bossacoma Busquets and Sanjaume-Calvet 2019, p. 457). Confusion in evaluating these three models has meant that in Spain a series of political actions are carried out that, in practice, go against the very idea of political decentralisation of power (Linz 1999; Maiz et al. 2010). Related to this, the second consequence of this lack of acceptance of plurinationality in Spain is the existence of a highly centripetal dynamic in the political relation amongst the political actors, which prefer to maximise the adversarial component ("seeing the speck of sawdust in your brother's eye and paying no attention to the plank in your own eye") instead of exploring the possibilities, which are more costly and have a less certain outcome, of using a political language, a strategy and a framework of alliances that is more consociational and inclusive in national terms.

The system of territorial organisation of political power in Spain shows that it is one of the countries with the highest levels of political decentralisation and intergovernmental asymmetry in the world (Hooghe et al. 2008a, p. 221; 2008b, pp. 137–39). Nonetheless, the idea subsists that its functioning is atypical when compared with other countries where federal principles are operative (Aja 2014; Caamaño 2014; Maiz et al. 2018) and, to a certain point, it is also viewed as incomplete when compared with the asymmetrical federal agreements that characterise a model of *plural federalism* suitable for plurinational societies (Requejo 1999, p. 334). However, it is also true that, to date, no convincing explanation has been given of what a "plurinational federation" would actually consist of, beyond the conceptual tools of territorial federalism (Resnick 1994, 2004; Romero 2013). As Enric Fossas observes, one of the reasons for this distorted view of the decentralising model found in Spain lies in comparing it with egalitarian federalist proposals. In his opinion, symmetrical formulas for the decentralisation of territorial power that organise the power-sharing in terms that are more horizontal than vertical, in a multilateral way amongst the different territories and not in a bilateral way between some territories and the central power, are not the most suitable for the characteristics of the Spanish state (Fossas 1999, p. 279). In fact, in countries where there are sub-state communities with a strong differentiated national identity, reactions against the federal model are very large and make its viability very difficult (Guibernau 2003; Lluch 2011, p. 134). In plurinational societies, the classical federal model does not have suitable tools for accommodating diversity and political asymmetry amongst regions, unlike the autonomous model (Suksi 1998). The latter could, in principle, guarantee the original diversity and political asymmetry amongst the territories according to their different national composition, exactly as occurs in the model of decentralisation created in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. As argued in some works comparing different federalising processes, the final failure of the Autonomous Agreement of 1992 between the two main Spanish parties, PSOE and the Popular Party (PP), which attempted to establish a process of harmonisation of the Spanish territorial system in terms of federal symmetry, explains the difficulties in understanding the dynamic of the Spanish model from a strictly federal logic (Petersohn et al. 2015, p. 640). Perhaps the explanation for the problems of the Spanish territorial model does not lie in an apparent federal shortcoming that must be corrected, given that the initial intention of the Spanish democratic system never was federalism, nor perhaps is it the most appropriate model for the country's characteristics. On the contrary, the explanation lies in the dispute over how to understand the autonomous model of territorial power. In fact, if the concept of plurinational federalism has any practical value, it perhaps lies in associating it not with

the theoretical language of federalism, but instead with the characteristics of the autonomous model, which has its own foundations and its own problems.

The Spanish autonomous model was designed in 1978 to combine the principles of the explicit will of regional self-government, political diversity, territorial asymmetry, and accommodation of differential national realities within the same common institutional political system (Fossas 1999, p. 291). Unlike the federal model, basically conceived for societies with national plurality where the function of coordination amongst territories is directed more towards horizontal than vertical mechanisms in their relation to the state, the autonomous model combines multilateral and bilateral elements in the relation of the territories with the state. Obviously, the autonomous model has its benefit, sbut it is also more problematic, due to its asymmetrical character in trying to respond to heterogeneous national plurality. In the Spanish case, the autonomous model presents four characteristics that make it a peculiar case.

In the first place, it was initially conceived as an open model, through the so-called *principe dispositif*, which has enabled the territories to take the initiative in articulating their framework of competences and elaborating their legal status (Guénette 2016). This open model created the idea that the territories could have *sine die* a type of non-conditional will of self-government in order to redefine their degree of autonomy over time, a conception that is currently under discussion (Fossas 2008, p. 168). In the second place, the Spanish autonomous model is applicable to the whole territory with the result that the entire country, excepting the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, is organised into regions with a certain degree of autonomy. At the bottom, this fact introduces the idea that it is possible to articulate homogenising dynamics or, at least, it accepts that each territory will over time create an autonomous dynamic that will demand respect and a minimum degree of adaptation from the rest. In the third place, the Spanish autonomous model is a deeply asymmetrical one, both at the level of competences assumed by the territories themselves, and, above all, due to the juridical-constitutional articulation of two territories: The Basque Country and Navarre. These have a special status and an especially autonomous economic regime protected by the First Additional Provision and the Second Derogation Provision of the Constitution, while a third territory, the Canary Islands, also has special economic protection contained in the Third Additional Provision. This asymmetry has served as a referent for every type of political discussion on the model for financing the Spanish autonomous system (León 2015) and, above all, it opens up discussion on the advantages of this asymmetry and, where appropriate, the possibility of extending this status to other territories. Finally, the fourth element of the Spanish autonomous model proposes decentralisation with the aim of guaranteeing "the autonomy of the nationalities and regions"; that is, to enable the political development of "those collectives that have a differentiated political identity" (Fossas 1999, p. 289). This final criterion accepts that there are territories that have certain different identitarian features that deserve to be guaranteed because they incorporate national elements that do not appear in other territories. The problem here is that the decentralisation of power in Spain has not been carried out in terms of national groups, but in territorial terms instead. If a national minority coincides with a concrete territory to the point where there is a full symbiosis between national identity and territory, there will certainly be no room for differentiating between territorial and national decentralisation. However, if in those territories where there is a national minority no such fusion exists because that "collective endowed with a differentiated political identity" is in fact a plurinational political community, as indeed occurs in many regions in Spain, then a problem arises when it comes to attributing the concept of autonomy to the national idea instead of associating the idea of autonomy with a territory. Calling a territory a "nationality" or a "nation" is confusing, if in that territory there is, in the final instance, a plurinational society. It is not clear if autonomy is conceived for a part of that collective or for the territory that contains people with different national feelings. On this point, only two solutions are possible: (i) To aim to reduce over time the political distance between the plurinational collective and the territory to the point where the territory becomes a national collective; or (ii) to define the territory from a plurinational perspective as one that in fact exercises its autonomy through a plural and intersubjective national negotiation amongst its inhabitants.

Having reached this point, the relevant question is to identify the dynamic developed by the political actors, especially the political parties through their involvement in the multilevel governance over 40 years of democracy (Fernández-Albertos and Lago 2015; Field and Hamann 2015; Field 2016) to tackle the phenomenon of plurinationality. Or, stated differently, to ask who has benefitted from, or been negatively affected by, denying the existence of plurinationality, both in the country as a whole and in the different territories where there are particular national sentiments. One indicator for testing this question is comparing the amenability of different political parties in Spain to forming plurinational governments, that is, governments formed by parties that respond to different national identities. Tables 1 and 2 refer to this indicator: In the first case, with reference to Spanish governments; in the second case, with reference to autonomous governments.

Table 1. Support received from regional nationalist parties in the investiture processes of governments in Spain, 1993–2018.

Investiture	CIU	PNV	ERC	IA	EA	PAR	CHA	CC	Nca	BNG	NaBai	Comp	Total
1993 (PSOE)	x	x				Abst							2(1)
1996 (PP)	x	x						x					3
2004 (PSOE)	Abst	Abst	x		x		x	x		x			5(2)
2008 (PSOE)	Abst	Abst						Abst		Abst	Abst		(5)
2015 (PP)													0
2016 (PP)								x					1
2018 * (PSOE)	x	x	x	x					x		x	x	7

Source: Elaborated by the author. The table reflects only those investitures in which the winning party did not obtain an absolute majority and need to negotiate support. In the rest of the elections where the wining party get the absolute majority in the Parliament, the support of the regional nationalist parties to the winning party (as CIU and CC towards PP in 2000) did not have great political effects. * In 2018, the investiture resulted from a motion of censorship.

Table 2. Participation of Spanish state-wide parties in the plurinational governance of the Autonomous Communities, 1986–2019.

	PSOE			PP			Plurinational Vote	
Autonomous Community	**Gov.**	**Partn.**	**Invest.**	**Gov.**	**Partn.**	**Invest.**	**Reg Elect 1980–2019**	
País Vasco		14	3				58.3	41.7
Cataluña	7		1			1	48.0	52.0
Canarias	9	8	2		16	4	30.3	69.8
Navarra	3		1				27.6	72.4
Cantabria		13	4	8	4	1	25.2	74.8
Aragón	17			8	8	2	21.1	78.9
Baleares	13			12			17.2	82.8
Galicia	4						16.9	83.1
Com. Valenciana	5						8.5	91.5
Andalucía	4						5.5	94.5
TOTAL	62	35	11	28	28	8	25.9	74.1

Source: Elaborated by the author. The table reflects the participation of the state-wide parties (PSOE, PP) in plurinational autonomous governments at different levels: The column marked *Gov* refers to years of participation as leaders of a regional government; the column marked *Partner* refers to years of participation as partners in a government; finally, the column marked *Invest* refers to the number of times the party voted favourably in the investiture of an autonomous government of a regional nationalist party. The two columns on the right (*Plurinational Vote*) refers to the percentage of votes for regionalist nationalist parties and state-wide nationalist parties in the regional elections (*RegElect*).

In light of the absence of coalition governments in the modern democratic history of Spain, in Table 1 we show one of the highest levels of participation by different regional nationalist parties in Spanish governance: Their vote in the investiture processes in those cases where the party aspiring to govern did not have an absolute majority. It can be seen that there have been significant differences between the PSOE and the PP. In the case of the PSOE all the regional nationalist parties have on some occasion shown their support for the investiture of its three candidates, especially the centre-right nationalist parties (CIU, PNV, and Coalición Canaria) but also the left-wing nationalist parties (ERC,

EA, and BNG, and even the left-wing Basque nationalist party in the motion of censorship in 2018). However, in the case of the PP, it was only in 1996 when it received support from the centre-right nationalist parties, while on the two remaining occasions, it did not receive their support. A small differential strategy can be observed: In the case of the PSOE, its governance has sought to accommodate regional nationalist claims to some extent, while in the case of the PP, there has been much greater resistance to organising its governmental action through agreements with regional nationalist parties. In the exceptional case of the year 1996, the support between the PP and CIU consisted in a reciprocal agreement, the so-called *Majestic Pact*, to enable the formation single-party governments in both Spain and Catalonia.

If we analyse the participation of the PSOE and PP in plurinational governance at the autonomous level, which can be seen in Table 2, the differences between the two parties are even more striking. The PSOE has formed plurinational governments in all the autonomous communities where there are parties with a regional nationalist identity: In eight communities (Catalonia, the Canary Islands, Navarre, Aragon, the Balearic Islands, Galicia, the Valencian Community, and Andalusia), it has formed plurinational governments led by a socialist leader, while in the other two (Basque Country and Cantabria), it has formed plurinational governments as a partner in government. Furthermore, by abstaining in the investiture process, it has made possible the formation of some other regional nationalist governments in Catalonia and Navarre. In the case of the PP, its participation scores much lower in all the indicators: it has only participated in plurinational governments in three communities where the regional nationalist governments have little political weight (Cantabria, Aragon, and the Balearic Islands), and it has only enabled the formation of regional nationalist governments in two other communities (the Canary Islands and Catalonia; in the latter case, through the reciprocal agreement mentioned above). The strategy of the two parties has thus been very different. In the case of the PSOE, its degree of involvement in plurinational governments at the autonomous level has been extensive and covers all types of autonomous community, not only where regional nationalist identity has no dispute with Spanish national identity, but also in those communities where regional and Spanish identities have a higher level of confrontation (the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarre). The involvement of the PSOE has been so extensive that it includes the anomalous situation of its having formed plurinational governments with a centre-right nationalist party, the PNV, in the Basque Country for 14 years in different waves, in spite of the existence of an important left-wing nationalist party in that community. The link between this left-wing Basque nationalist party to the terrorist organisation ETA in the recent past makes reaching any type of plurinational agreement with it very difficult. The PP has employed a very different strategy: Its involvement in plurinational governments at the autonomous level has been quantitatively much less than that of the PSOE and has been concentrated in those regions where regional national identity has no quarrel with Spanish national identity. In those communities where regional national identity is in dispute with Spanish national identity, even where there are ideologically similar nationalist parties with which some type of understanding could be established (especially the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarre), the strategy of the PP has been to avoid such agreements. The exception to this was the case of Catalonia in 1996, mentioned above, which was justified on the grounds of reciprocity and had the aim of supporting two non-plurinational governments, without involving any type of coalition between the parties.

When analysing the position of the regional nationalist parties with respect to the Spanish state-wide parties, it is important to note their different strategies when focusing on the plurinational political question. In the case of the left-wing regional nationalist parties, insofar as their political position is not hegemonic in their respective communities, their strategy has generally oscillated between reproducing the conservative regional nationalism strategy or being open to negotiation with Spanish state-wide parties if this decision gave them an opportunity to enter into regional governments: This was the strategy of the BNG in Galicia (2005), Compromís in the Valencian Community (2015), and above all the strategy of ERC in Catalonia (2004 and 2006) in order to compete with the nationalism of CIU as an alternative in governance. In the case of right-wing regional nationalist parties, insofar

as they have been hegemonic in their respective communities (this is especially clear in the case of the PNV in the Basque Country and CIU in Catalonia), their strategy has in general been aimed at seeking any type of agreement to maintain that dominant position. In the case of the PNV, due to the ostracism of left-wing regional nationalism because of its link to violence, its strategy has consisted of guaranteeing its prevalent position (Zuber and Szocsik 2015) through a plurinational agreement with a left-wing state-wide party, enabling it to consolidate its hegemonic position with reasonable ease (Moreno 2000). In the case of CIU, the existence of a real alternative of a left-wing plurinational government in Catalonia, as occurred between 2004 and 2010, obliged it to reconsider its strategy: To seek a non-plurinational Catalan government or to seek a plurinational government with the PP. Since 2010 CIU opted for the first strategy to recover power: It demanded a greater level of autonomy in Catalonia, as proposed in the reform of the Catalan statute initiated by the left-wing plurinational government, which was rejected by the PP and subsequently by the Constitutional Court in Ruling 31/2010 as well. Since then, reaching any plurinational agreement in Catalonia has become a very difficult undertaking.

The question remains of whether or not the political problem that has opened up with the so-called *procés* in Catalonia marks the high point of a model based on the explicit negation of plurinationality. This is clear in the strategies of the main centre-right nationalist parties in Spain: Above all, the PP and CIU; less so in the case of the PNV. To date, the asymmetrical character of the Spanish autonomous system has enabled some centre-right parties in Spain to maintain a political dialectic involving zero sum nationalist arguments, which has hindered any strategy of plurinationality. In the case of the centre-left Spanish parties, their doubts have lain in knowing which of the following three options is best. The first is a strategy in defence of plurinationality as an alternative model to that of the conservative parties: It is difficult to implement this model and it involves a high probability of electoral defeat. The second option is to succumb to the logic of nationalist confrontation that provides the right-wing parties with such substantial electoral benefits: Pursuing this option has been quite clear in the case of the Basque nationalist left, a little less obvious in the case of the Catalan nationalist left ERC, and much less so in the case of the PSOE. Finally, the third option is to wait until the clash between nationalisms converts the defence of low-profile plurinationality into a winning position: This is the option used by the PSOE, and also by the ERC in Catalonia at certain very specific moments in its recent history, with uneven results and a limited horizon of expectations.

6. Conclusions

If we were to make a semasiological analysis of the concept of plurinationality, as Reinhart Koselleck suggests, we would reach the conclusion that this concept, in the Spanish case at least, has followed a somewhat somnambulistic path, midway between daydream and nightmare. Without any doubt, it is a concept with great potential to explain the national phenomenon in Spain but, at the same time, it has become an extremely controversial term in the political debate. In a pirandellian manner of speaking, it is a *concept* in search of a *term*, a formal expression that is seeking acceptance but not merely in the twilight. The term plurinationality was eluded in the juridical-constitutional debate by using convoluted formulas, and the distinction between the ideas of "nation" and "nationality" is quite possibly Spanish constitutionalism's strange contribution to this question. This acceptance of plurinationality without naming it has enabled some parties (above all, the PP and CIU, and now Ciudadanos and Vox as well) to develop discursive strategies opposing the formation of plurinational governments, especially since the 2000s, as occurred in its day with the plurinational government of the PSOE in Catalonia, or currently with the plurinational national government of the PSOE in Navarre. In the case of those parties that opt for plurinational governments, such as the PSOE, its strategy has solely been aimed at spreading that practice at the regional level, minimising its costs but without assuming the vertigo that extending this formula to the central government would involve.

The term plurinationality has received scant analysis in the Spanish academic literature. Preference has been given to studying the term "subjective national identity" as a static category, instead of

exploring the advantages of what, in this paper, we have called intersubjective national identity, which due to its relational character is of greater value for studying the identitarian question in overlapping plurinational societies. It is significant that in Spain, for example, we do not know the opinion of citizens on the different plurinational governments that have been formed in the country and their suitability in comparison to other government formulas in which national identities are not mixed. It would appear that the term plurinationality floats like a vague idea in the Spanish political debate, without substantive content that might subsequently give rise to a political discussion on its scope and possible benefits. There have been plurinational governments but it seems that nobody wants to recognise them as such: They are seen as exceptional formulas that involve compromise (the PNV-PSE government in the Basque Country fits this idea) or strongly criticised government formulas (the PSC-ERC government in Catalonia is the best example), which makes it difficult to extend this formula, especially to the central government. The enormous pressure against recognising plurinationality as a useful expression, beyond its concrete meaning, make it a very costly term and thus an easy target for stigmatising those who approach it. It is significant that, in general, those who speak of Spain as a "plurinational state" are the ones most reluctant to recognise plurinationality in its regions; just as those who demand respect for national plurality in different communities, as happens in Catalonia with the *procés*, are the ones most reluctant to speak of Spain in plurinational terms. As the saying goes: This is a case of "seeing the speck of sawdust in your brother's eye and paying no attention to the plank in your own eye" (that is, they criticise the nationalist bias of the other while ignoring their own nationalist bias). The question arises whether it will be possible, and desirable, to imagine the term plurinationality having a meaning in Spain in the future that goes beyond the nationalist attitudes that are today dedicated to exchanging vetoes on this issue. It seems, for the time being at least, that it will continue to remain trapped in the labyrinth.

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Article

Spanish Conservatives at the Early Stages of Spanish Democracy: Reshaping the Concepts of State and Community in the Thought of Manuel Fraga

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Abstract: This article focused on the evolution of Spanish conservative doctrine in the early years of democracy in Spain. By analyzing the concepts of 'state' and 'community' in the thought of Manuel Fraga, the Minister of Information and Tourism under the Franco dictatorship and leader of the Spanish right during the 1980s, this article sought to explore: the manner in which the conservatives sought to "democratize" their doctrine to adapt themselves to the new party system and the importance of this conceptual reshaping in establishing the roots of conservative Spanish nationalism.

Keywords: Spanish conservatives; nationalism; authoritarism; regime-changing; political culture; Spanish transition; Alianza Popular; Manuel Fraga

1. Introduction

The changes in political regimes, and in particularly transitions from authoritarian systems into parliamentary democracies, involve a set of agreements in order to establish a shared regulatory framework that sustains the architecture of the new regime, but also a subsequent reshaping of the political landscape and political party legitimation. In the Spanish case, the idea of consensus and agreement during the transitional period has been highlighted in numerous works (Juliá 2019; Tusell 2005). The consensus was forged among the main political forces from the opposition and the "opening sector" (*aperturistas*) of the dictatorship who were willing to prepare the transition towards a pluralistic democratic system band a new constitutional framework. Once *de iure* moment has elapsed, parties had to reshape their programs and approaches in light of this new scenario in regard to changes in the sources of legitimacy, the new political actors, and the functioning of the new institutions.

This is what the conservatives had to do in the early years of democracy. Franco's death in November 1975, and the subsequent political reform that led to opposing political parties, free elections, and finally the proclamation of a constitution was a turbulent process that fragmented both the left and the right within a reconfigured framework. At the end of 1978, hegemony on the left predominantly laid with the *Partido Socialista* (PSOE) and *Partido Comunista* (PCE). On the other side of the spectrum, the right found themselves pushed from the center by the emergence of a big centrist party—*Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD), and fragmented between the those who were resistant to political reform, which became the far-right party Fuerza Nueva (FN), and those who from inside the Francoist regime promoted change and new constitutional rules, which became the *Alianza Popular* (AP). This latter conservative grouping was led by Manuel Fraga.

This article has focused on how the democratic right evolved their doctrine to adapt from Francoism to the new democratic regime. First, we focused on the realignment of the democratic right during the early years of democracy and how Manuel Fraga made innovations within the conservative doctrine. Next, this paper analyzed Fraga's character to better understand his ideological development, both under dictatorship and democracy. Third, we explored how he reshaped the concepts of 'state'

and 'community' in his published work between 1978–1982. Finally, we offered some conclusions about how this reshaping helped ensure the survival of the conservative right under Spanish democracy.

2. The Reorganization of the Democratic Right in the Consolidation of Democracy

With the ratification of the constitution on 6 December 1978, democracy began its consolidation process with the first legislative elections in March 1979. Parties then polarized on the political spectrum, but all were united in accepting 'the transitional democratic outcome'. Scholars like Gunther have pointed out that Spanish democratic consolidation was the product of a profound transformation of Spanish political elites from disunity to political unity (Gunther 1992, p. 40) in defense of the nascent democracy. This agreement regarding the defense of the new regime allowed the main parties to operate with a high level of consensus within the political system, to ensure the consolidation of democracy. During this process, parties coexisted with peripherical actors who rejected the democratic consensus or were excluded from it, either through a "democratic surplus" (Andrade 2012) outside the hegemonic left agenda, or by the survival of an "authoritarian surplus" on the far right who did not accept the legitimacy of the new constitutional order (Gallego 2006, 2008). These 'unsettling factors' potentially included political violence, terrorism, and the threat of military intervention. In this context, conservatives divided between sectors and individual intellectual figures. On the one hand, those who supported the opening of the dictatorship were grouped under the AP, and on the other, there were Christian-democrats who predominantly comprised the center-right of the UCD. As argued by Gunther et al. (1988), in 1979, the AP shifted to a more conservative stance due to their leaders' ideological origins, and the pressure exercised by the UCD to occupy the political center.

However, beyond the parties' varying electoral strategies, the circulation of ideas on the reconstruction of conservatism took place in different spaces, such as political magazines; in newspapers like *ABC* or *Pueblo*; and debate forums, such as club *Siglo XXI*, in which were addressed issues related to the state's territorial organization, the 'problem' of Basque and Catalan nationalism, the defense of the nation, public order, and the country's economic restructuring. Once the transition ended, the political elites had to face the political issues related to the design and implementation of the new structure of the state and economic modernization. This was a field in which many conservative leaders found it difficult to make proposals, and, therefore, they were identified as more likely to act with the same old prescriptions rather than helping make a significant contribution to the new democratic framework.

At this time, Alianza Popular can be considered as 'a convergence platform' for all those who sought opening after the dictatorship (Del Rio Morillas 2016, p. 121); that is, those who were willing to create a centrist political space, and at the same time, remain 'conservative' regarding civil and political liberties and the defense of the nation as a political community. This was a strategy that has been described as "a history of ambitions and failed intentions" (Gunther et al. 1988, p. 91). In 1976, AP was a political coalition that comprised six small parties in a federal structure, formed by ministers or civil governors who had represented different political positions in the dictatorship's last years, but who were united around the idea of limited political reform. Among those were Manuel Fraga and Jose María de Areilza of *Reforma Democrática*, Cruz Martínez Esteruelas' *Unión del Pueblo Español*, Federico Silva Muñoz's *Acción Democrática Española*, Laureano López Rodó's *Acción Regional,* Licinio de la Fuente's *Democracia Social*, and Enrique Thomas de Carranza's *Unión Nacional Española*. In three years (until the III AP congress in December 1979), a coalition under the leadership of Fraga displaced the other initial figures. At this point, the AP heavily relied on its leader (Montero 1987), whose ideological evolution was in some ways parallel to the party's development, and that figured persistent search for an independent ideological and electoral space, which also sought to maximize the attractiveness of the party by building political coalitions.

However, voters broadly rejected AP because they tended to identify it with the dictatorship, its erratic turn to the right in the 1979 legislative elections, and the failure of the centrist strategy after the UCD imploded. In 1979, half of the AP voters identified this force to be at the right, and 35% at the far right, while, among the electorate, 30% identified the party to be at the right and almost 50%

at the far right. Four years later, in 1982, when the political landscape seemed to be established, 64% of AP voters considered the party to be to the right, and 27% to the extreme right. However, among the constituencies, the party continued to be seen as part of the far-right (54%) rather than a mere conservative party (39%)[1] in a period where ideological preferences among voters were characterized by moderation and abhorrence of extremism (Gunther 1992, p. 70).

In this context, Manuel Fraga's 'doctrinal reshaping' of the party did not bring the expected electoral results. The journey of AP is the story of aiming at victory, but only being able to consolidate itself as the conservative opposition until the end of the decade; this was a process that Montero (1987, p. 15) described as 'resistance without triumph'. However, Fraga's work managed to guide the conservatives out of the maze they found themselves in once the constitution was approved. Dependent on Francoist symbolic structures, with little experience of political pluralism and with a lack of clear coordinates for political action, Fraga adapted the doctrine without substantially modifying core authoritarian beliefs about 'order over political and civil liberties', patriotism, and the moral conservative values inherited from the Francoist regime. Fraga never questioned the iusnaturalistic essence of the Spanish nation, but he partially re-imagined the 'political community' (Anderson 2006) and updated it from the Francoist approach where the nation was seen as "unity of destination in the universal" (Primo de Rivera 1933). In doing so, Fraga reorganized Francoist symbols and narratives to adapt them to the new democratic context.

Beyond the narratives of the Spanish transition and democratic consolidation, which present Spanish democracy as a process of 'providential actors helping produce democracy' (Prego 1995; Powell 2001), the analysis of the concepts established by these actors, and their efforts at the time to create a political culture, allowed academics to advance in the study of intergenerational transmissions to other parties and civil society organizations in the following decades. For this reason, we now turned our analysis to Fraga's concepts of 'state' and 'community' as he was the ideologue of the reformist wing within the Franco regime and the 'spiritual father of the right' during democracy. Our work covered the period that ranges from December 1978 to October 1982, from the approval of the constitution to the V Congress of the Alianza Popular. To carry out our analysis, we primarily focused on Fraga's published work in those years, paying particular attention to his perspective of what defines a state, his historical notion of the state in Spain, and how it related to his efforts in constructing a political community in the conservative imagination. Additionally, we also analyzed various interviews published in national newspapers where national political issues were addressed. The sessions recorded in congress were deliberately excluded as we argued that those debates refer to a wide range of topics, and the same arguments could be found in various books published in those years.

Firstly, this paper focused on only 1978 to 1982 because it was in these years when Fraga addressed the doctrinal reshaping of the Spanish right; while the preceding years of intellectual work were dedicated to the political reform, the construction of a party coalition, and the design of the constitutional text. Secondly, this period was crucial for Spain's democratic consolidation as it encompasses a number of key democratic developments (specifically, it includes Adolfo Suarez's victory in the March 1979 legislative elections, the 23 February 1981 failed *coup d'état*, the collapse and almost disintegration of the UCD, and Felipe González's socialist victory in the legislative elections of October 1982). Also, during this period, there were a total of sixteen electoral processes between municipal, regional, general elections, and referendums in which the AP, founded by Fraga in 1976, went from obtaining 8.21% of the votes in the constituent elections of 1977 to become an opposition force in the 1982 elections with 26.36% of the votes against a Socialist Party that came to power by almost doubling their votes.

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[1] *Encuestas Data* for legislative elections survey in 1979 and 1982.

Throughout these four years, the leaders of the dictatorship 'opening sector' managed to re-position themselves within the Spanish political landscape as a second force and laid the foundation for the next three decades of bipartisanship (or two-party dominance). Much of this rise was due to the implosion of Adolfo Suarez's government and the UCD's continual internal crisis that favored the transfer of the electorate to the AP. But it was also due to Fraga's doctrinal reshaping carried out through his books and his work at the Fifth Congress of the Popular Alliance in February 1982, in which he proposed a centrist strategy and threatened to resign from his position if agreements were reached with the unconstitutional far-right. Fraga also proposed approaching the UCD in order to form a "*natural majority*" (García-Atance 1982, p. 178) that would allow the entire center-right to be regrouped inside the constitutional framework.

Between December 1978 and October 1982, Fraga carried out intense intellectual work to reshape the guiding principles of the right within the new democratic framework. Within a context marked by the need to consolidate Spanish democracy, political violence, and pressure from the far right and the military in a country without an advanced democratic culture, Fraga updated the political doctrine of the democratic right by combining the core principles of pre-Francoist Spanish conservatism, adding elements of Margaret Thatcher's 'moral economy', an inspired inclusion of Carl Schmitt's political philosophy regarding 'tacticism within the state', and—no less important—he incorporated traditional core symbols, such as the monarchy, the unity of the nation, the Spanish flag, and the defense of Christian and conservative moral values.

In this context, this is why we used the notion of "reshape" instead of a "refounding" or "transformation" of the Spanish conservative ideology. It is due to several factors, including, on the one hand, Fraga belonging to the reformist wing, which since 1969 had advocated for limited and controlled political reform. Unlike the regime's most extreme conservative sectors, Fraga belonged to a generation that had no direct experience of the Civil War. Fraga's ideas found contestation both on the far-right, which rejected constitutional legitimacy, as well as on the center-right, which included Christian democrats and liberals, during the transition. However, throughout the consolidation of democracy, Fraga remained the symbolic right-wing successor of pre-democratic values. Hence, when he worked on his democratic political program, he reshaped the preceding political principles within the new democratic juncture, including with it the new constitutional framework, but safeguarding the idea of a defending national party and defender of Christian morality. Conservative thinking reshapes its political principles by seeking to offer a synthesis between economic modernization and acceptance of a certain political pluralism while maintaining a distinct and independent nature. Fraga's reformist character is directed in a different direction from the continuation of the consensus of the transition years, as expressed in a 1979 article entitled *Turn to the right*: "For a modern right can only be made from the recognition of the reasons of the left, but without concessions to their reasons and abuses" (Fraga 1979).

Fraga's work did not produce a closed and complete theory for the functioning of the right inside the new regime, but rather a set of principles, metaphors, and shared images that provided a vision of a new country. The act of reshaping sought to cut with the Francoist past while keeping some of its authoritarian and conservative values. Analyzing how Fraga constructed his notion of 'state' and 'community', we could identify two main changes inside conservativism, both during and after the democratic transition. On the one hand, the opening of the state to the electoral competition implies a change in which it is conceived as 'a political and normative command', as its own agency. On the other, the concept of community necessarily refers to the way in which the dictatorship had constructed the Spanish nation and its denial of opposition, condensed in the Francoist update of the old nationalist idea of "*Antiespaña*" (Borras 1954). Also, through this concept, it is possible to understand Fraga's understanding of the essentialist elements of the Francoist regime, with its movement towards a somewhat more pluralistic notion, which admits a greater diversity of approaches, but maintains its firmness about the defense of nation, Christian religion, and morality against the 'catastrophic consequences of the actions of Marxists and Socialists'.

In sum, during this period, Fraga introduced a set of ideas that established a democratic right party inside a polarized pluralist party system (Sartori 2005, p. 172) in a liberal democracy. Fraga was aware that his main obstacle came from the identification of both himself and his party as successors of the dictatorial regime (both among the militants and voters), so he focused his efforts on the creation of a narrative that enabled him to make some significant innovations for the right. By binding the concepts of state and nation to the need for broad economic modernization, he paved the way for a conservative political space that maintained a distance from symbols of the recent past while refusing to enter into debates with far-right political actors who did not accept the constitutional order. The alternative to Fraga's blueprint was to risk becoming a political remnant from the past. As he stated in *España entre dos modelos de sociedad*: "History is also a cemetery of those political systems that didn't know how to incorporate new groups and social concerns" (Fraga 1982a, p. 133).

3. What Did Manuel Fraga Mean for Spanish Politics?

The figure of Manuel Fraga Iribarne (1922–2012) is one of the most complex and polyhedral in the second half of the Spanish twentieth century. Born in Villalba (Lugo), to a Galician father and a Basque-French mother, he studied politics, law, and economics once the war was over. In 1945, he joined the Corp of Lawyers in Parliament, and, in 1947, the Diplomatic School. In 1948, he obtained the Chair of Political Law at the University of Valencia, and, in 1953, the Chair of Theory of State and Constitutional Law at Complutense University. A few years later—in 1953—he was designated secretary of the Education Council by Minister Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez. In 1961, he was appointed Minister of Information and Tourism, a position that served him to promote the famous campaign to attract foreign tourism under the slogan "Spain is different", but also to amend the Press Law that had been in force since 1938. The old law established a system of prior censorship, while the new 1966 law established a system of fines and publications embargo that severely punished moderate opposition publications. He held the post until 1969 when a case of corruption partially affecting the government came to light and led to the entire reformulation of the cabinet. As a result, Franco nominated him to be Ambassador in London, where he maintained cordial relations with various personalities from the 'Tory environment' and the right-wing of the Labor party. He returned to Spain in 1975 to became a member of the government again, holding a delicate but central position as Minister of Home Affairs, at a time characterized by a high level of uncertainty about the future of the regime and increasing internal and external political tension. He held this position until the government's fall in July 1976, when President Arias Navarro found himself incapable of relieving internal tensions and of promoting political reform. The following government led by Adolfo Suarez (1976–1981) marked the beginning of political *aperturism*, and Fraga founded the Alianza Popular party and published *The White Book for Democratic Reform,* in which he outlined his idea for a new political regime and the strategy to accomplish it. Fraga did this in the context of tempestuous relations with the moderate right of the UCD and numerous complaints about the design of the political transition. However, this did not prevent him from being, after the first Constituent Courts, one of the ideologies of the Constitution, and, despite strong disagreements over the final product, he strongly campaigned for and supported the new constitution in parliament. In the following years, he would remain President of the Popular Alliance and Deputy, running for the presidency of the government in the general elections until 1986. In 1996, at the age of 66, he became president of the Galicia Xunta until 2005 and, subsequently, became Senator from 2006 to 2011, a few months before his death in January 2012.

Despite his impressive political career, this does not overshadow his work as a university professor nor as an academic writer and essayist. At the head of the Chair of Political Law during the dictatorship, he was a professor to many students who, at the same time, were part of the political opposition groups to Franco (*Frente de Liberación Popular,* PCE, PSOE). Amongst Fraga's books, there are numerous works dedicated to the study of constitutional texts and forms of government in countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Puerto Rico, in addition to others dedicated to Spanish conservative authors, such as Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and Antonio Maura. Fraga's essays belong

to a second stage, which coincides with the moment when he took over the responsibility to create Alianza Popular. In these latter works, Fraga served as a chronicler of his time and took the opportunity to strengthen the theoretical foundations of the nascent position of post-Franco conservatism in Spanish democracy. He brought together a political doctrine rich in classical philosophy and political references with an in-camera description of the milestones of the political life of the Transition, along with a denunciation of the flaws of the nascent democracy. Works, such as *España entre dos modelos de sociedad*, *El debate nacional*, *Ideas para la reconstrucción de una España con futuro*, and *El cañón giratorio*, express the political foundations of the post-Francoist right, upon which conservativism would be defined for the next decade. Finally, towards the end of his life in the late 1980s, he wrote several memoirs, including his autobiography "*Brief Memories of a Public Servant*".

Fraga evolved from being one of the main promoters of political reform in the late 1960s—as Ferrán Gallego extensively recounts in *El mito de la Transición*—to become the leader of the democratic right in the eighties, one of the fathers of the Constitution, and one of the longest-serving parliamentarians. This is a considerable journey that very few politicians from the diverse groups of Francoism could or ever sought to complete. Strong in character and authoritarian with those who worked with him, he always sought to be knowledgeable over a huge range of topics, which eventually led him to be an avid reader of contemporary authors, from Marx to Hegel, through Carl Schmitt and Alain de Benoist. When asked about how he saw himself, he answered: "*I am a man of the people and from the people [. . .] Lies, doublespeak, cowardness and opportunism bother me*". He would claim that his main concern was work by and for the state: "*My wife lives like a widow*" (Fraga 1982b, p. 143).

Even though he adopted a conciliatory and open to dialogue tone in his works, when it comes to setting out his arguments, including references from his political adversaries, his balance as a politician had some important chiaroscuros. As Minister of Information and Tourism, he was in the Council of Ministers that sentenced Julián Grimau, one of the leaders of the Communist Party in 1963, to death for continued military rebellion. Likewise, while in this same position, he was responsible for the closure, administrative persecution, and embargo of opposition publications through the Press Law of 1966. Also, in 1969, in the context of the murder of anti-Franco student Enrique Ruano, which was covered up as a suicide, Fraga threatened the father of the murdered student. As Fraga confessed years later to Torcuato Luca de Tena, the director of the right-wing ABC newspaper, it mobilized the paper to modify Enrique Ruano's personal diary to detail the reasons for his "suicide". In 1976, as Minister of Home Affairs, he was responsible for the *Sucesos de Vitoria* of March 3rd, in which the police repressed a protest in a church, murdering five workers and injuring more than 150 people, incidents for which neither Fraga nor Rodolfo Martín Villa—Minister of Unions relations at the time—were prosecuted for by the Spanish courts. Months later, Fraga uttered his famous sentence "the street is mine", thus forbidding the opposition to protest on the First of May 1976.

4. The State: From an Authoritarian to a (Limited) Pluralist Construction

While the autocratic regime of the dictator endured, Fraga remained undoubtedly loyal, whether as Minister of Information and Tourism, as Ambassador to London, or in any of the tasks he undertook since his entry into politics during the dictatorship. Within the different factions of the dictatorship, Fraga was one of those who, from 1969, began to work on the hypothesis of a certain democratic openness, but his postulates did not find support in the Caudillo's trusted circles as they were committed to a continuity strategy. The question about succession following the assassination of Carrero Blanco encouraged enmities within the different factions of Francoism during the last governments (Eser and Peters 2016; Gallego 2008) so that the death of the Caudillo found the leaders of the dictatorship without a unified strategy of continuity or reform (Gallego 2008; Juliá 2019; Morán 2016).

Fraga always thought that once the reform process started, he would lead the political transition. Thus, when the development of events positioned Adolfo Suárez as President of the Government, he manifested his anger since he considered Suárez an opportunist who had, in some ways, 'ruined his

destiny'. After the ratification of the 1978 Constitution, Fraga found himself, for the first time since 1953, without a post inside the state.

Fraga did not reflect on the nature of the state in abstract terms but built a system based on theoretical patchwork applied to the functioning of society and the Spanish state. He knew that, even if the main political challenge was to consolidate the new system of government, it was also crucial that the first task of the state was to economically modernize the country, which was far behind Europe. Among the journalists of the transition, it was often said that he was a man "who had the state in his mind". His knowledge of the structures and forms of the functioning of the Francoist state during the period 1953–1975 allowed him a certain advantage over his political competitors in the democratic opposition during the transitional period. Given that his political career was almost as long in a dictatorship as in democracy, it is possible to say that Fraga was a statesman regardless of the form of government in which he worked.

The starting point of Fraga's thinking was the consideration that there are government structures that exist before a form of government is chosen; structures that refer to the very spiritual and customary character of the people. This conception led to specific and original traits for the conservatives. On the one hand, it steered clear from the Francoist construction of the legitimacy of the state, which was largely inspired by the reactionary thinking of the second half of the 19th century. On the other hand, Fraga was capable of incorporating in his thought a close reading of the German jurist Carl Schmitt with a synthesis of the British conservative *tory* thinking. He extracted from Schmitt's philosophy an accurate reading on the sources of power and the law (rights) of a society. He also borrowed the conception of a realistic philosophy of history, even cynical, on the internal progress of societies. Fraga took the idea from the British *tories* of articulating custom as a source for law and their capacity to build a stable political regime. The synthesis of these two traditions resulted in a strain of conservative thought that is based on the coexistence of two principles: the survival of a telluric character in Spanish society and the reformist principle as a solution of continuity, which "synthesizes" in *El debate nacional*:

> *"The conservative principle starts from the assumption that it is better that things are not moved; that social action must be based on experience and that it is not a field for sorcerer's apprentices; that it is better not to shake a society that satisfactorily accomplishes its basic functions; that the deepest parts of the social order are those that benefit the most over the long duration, and those that are most harmed by light and unjustified change"*. (Fraga 1981a, p. 21)

In almost all of Fraga's publications in this period, he referred to the same historical anecdote in which an old Chancellor Metternich explained to the young nineteenth-century conservative intellectual Donoso Cortés the superiority of a system of principles over the rigidity of an abstract ideology, as the first could face any situation, while the other could be quickly involved in contradictions. "*Just as a rotating cannon is preferable to a static one*" added, Fraga. Given the number of times he mentioned this anecdote, it is plausible to think that Fraga worked on the state from the inside and not as a part of society with shared values and attitudes that aspire to govern. In *El debate nacional,* he listed these values, starting from an *iusnaturalist* approach: firstly, he settled on the principle of *unity* as the basis for every society and which must be defended against those who wish to challenge it. Secondly, the principle of *continuity* follows, as a way to "*enhance the legacy of tradition*" (in a mellifluous reference to Francoism), but accompanied by a principle of *reshaping* that allows an organic and orderly evolution of societies; strongly contrasting this with any principle of revolutionary order. Moreover, these considerations were complemented with references to the principle of *freedom* as free will, to an organic principle of solidarity and common defense, and, lastly, to a principle of *transcendence* beyond a particular political regime.

When Fraga chose to define his doctrine as a series of principles and not as an ideological construct, he did not deny the political character but organized them in such a way that facilitated a political shift both to the right and to the center, in the name of the persistence of a group of political principles that ultimately referred to the 'unfathomable essence of Spain'. This approach, although not new,

proved to be exceptionally useful as it was able to evolve towards both right-wing and central political positioning, in a pragmatic approach that Fraga implemented from 1982 to 1989. Likewise, this choice allowed him to perform a theoretical balancing act by finding a solution to the idea of dictatorship figures continuing within the new democratic regime.

This renunciation of a structured political ideology allowed the Spanish right-wing to be able to accommodate problematic decisions without having to resolve 'logical contradictions'. By constructing the origin of legitimacy on an *iusnaturalist* principle, he managed to solve the problem of continuity between dictatorship and democracy and the moral implications involved in moving from one to the other. Regardless of how the transitional period was characterized, either as an agreed rupture (Tusell 2005) or an inter-elite pact to prevent social rupture (Ortí 1989, p. 14), the political consensus forged in the 1978 Constitution laid a *tabula rasa* among political actors but not for society, for whom the figure of Fraga remained linked to Francoism. In 1978, it was a fact that the majority of Alianza Popular leaders had held positions of responsibility in the previous 15 years of the dictatorship. Hence, when Fraga decided to put forward a political agenda for Spain and argued that its doctrine was not based on an ideology but a set of principles, he did not deny a strong position on the political side, but placed the cause of that position in a prior place to any form of state, and at least gave vigor and versatility to those principles. When he claimed that human societies are ruled by principles derived from the human condition itself, prior to the state, to the different forms of government and the modern notion of law, he implicitly developed a connection between conservative Francoism and the nascent democracy. The same moral conservative principles of society, but stripped of the dictatorship's rhetoric and Francoist symbols, are those that operate in a democracy. History, as per Fraga, "*gives us the testimony of which things have worked out well and which have gone wrong. And, in this sense, it shows us also the permanent failure of human nature, both individual and social*" (Fraga 1982b, p. 18). The conservative approach argues that changes in societies must always be for the better, an extremely difficult task in which "*we always have to figure out which part of the former legacy we save*" (Fraga 1982b, p. 18), about which Fraga argued "*I am inclined to save as much as possible, but it is obvious that there are other things that need to be reformed*" (Fraga 1982b, p. 18).

Referring to this previous stratus, it is possible to describe a series of valid political principles, which govern in both forms of government. The conservative principles are equally valid in a dictatorship and in a democracy, as long as they have a place inside them. The new democratic right, under the transition, must be able to develop these principles in the new system. In this way, Fraga viewed History as "*a series of instalments that we must pay to our ancestors*" (Fraga 1982b, p. 15), as a series of commitments or obligations that every generation establishes with the preceding one, which, foremost, have a moral character based on the telluric being of Spanish society.

Once a society confirms the survival of these principles, Fraga argued that it is possible to move forward to political positions by adopting a realistic approach that allows adaption to the correlation of forces of each moment. This can be seen in two clarifying historical fragments. The first can be found in the memories of Felix Santos, director of the *Cuadernos para el diálogo* journal[2], where he shared an anecdote from the ex-Minister of Education Joaquín Ruiz Jiménez during a private discussion about the Press Law he promoted in 1966 with Fraga, when he abruptly concluded: "*There were two topics on which the slightest criticism would not be allowed [. . .] these topics were: the figure of the Head of State—Francisco Franco—and the legitimacy of July 18th*" (Santos 2019, p. 156). This conversation, held sometime in 1966, contrasts with a second one, when 10 years later, Fraga presented his political party Alianza Popular in the newspaper *El País*, expressed as follows:

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[2] *Cuadernos para el diálogo* was a cultural and political journal published in Spain from 1963 until 1978 and was considered one of the meeting points of the democratic opposition to the Franco regime. It aimed at having a 'democratic and consensus spirit', and was a meeting point for Christians democrats and socialists who would play important roles as intellectuals and politicians in the Spanish transition.

> "It is said that we want to perpetuate the Francoist institutions. That is not true. The figure of Franco and his *way* of governing are not repeatable. What we ask for is that instead of blowing things up (*voladura*), reforms should be made, and that, instead of seeking apologies for the past, serious work for the future should be carried out". (Fraga 1977)

From 1980 onwards, Fraga took the issue of the country's future very seriously. In 1980, he published *Ideas for the Reconstruction of a Spain with Future* where he developed two main ideas: on the one hand, he worked on what he considered to be the initial errors of the Spanish democratic system (state mismanagement, territorial organization, and terrorism growth), whereas, on the other, he argued that his party should create an economic program of modernization for the country inspired by the nascent neoliberal doctrines of US President Reagan. If the political work of Fraga was to reconstruct the Spanish right under democracy, his work focused on finding the elements that bring together the democratic, liberal, open-minded sectors of the dictatorship to convert an electoral space identified as an heir to the dictatorship, in a new democratic right. There are four common elements, which he, specifically, defended: Spain's unity and the structure of Autonomous Communities; the fight against terrorism and insecurity; the economic modernization of the country; and Christian moral values. Fraga proposed an 'Order party' with a narrow conception of political pluralism, support for a strong political state, and liberal on economic issues, whose purpose was to be able to highlight and take advantage of the initial problems that Spanish democracy was facing. In Fraga's view, the constitutional change happened at an unfavorable economic juncture that resulted in both "*the disenchantment of large sections of the population and a high degree of uncontrolled violence*" (Fraga 1982a, p. 32).

In 1979, with the AP in fourth place in Parliament after 'disastrous electoral results', Fraga read the situation strategically and perceived that the UCD's weakness and the implementation of the new democratic state opened a new opportunity for him to become the next leader of the Spanish right in a short period of time and, furthermore, to personify himself as the political choice of the right, as an antithesis of Socialist and Communist choices. This would be a movement consisting of two elements: maintaining strong support for the constitution while, at the same time, criticizing the Electoral Law, territorial organization, and economic and education policy. Both in *El debate nacional* (1981) and in *España, entre dos modelos de sociedad* (1982), Fraga focused on the same principle to articulate his political program: nascent Spanish democracy was going through a profound crisis with causes related to the modernization of societies and the "incapacity" of other political forces to provide solutions to this new situation of the state. The rapid political change had established a "*culture of decay*", which is the "*perfect breeding ground for preparing the revolution*" (Fraga 1980, p. 19). In turn, the economic crisis had also led to a youth crisis as the result of high expectations and widespread labor conflict that, eventually, led to a crisis for business and companies—which in Fraga's opinion—could not find an ally in the state. All this led to a state crisis, as it was overwhelmed and unable to face the new changes. The state suffered a legitimacy crisis since, inside the system, there were both those who "*want to bring the revolution inside the Constitution*" and those who, from a federal perspective, threatened Spanish unity. But the state also faced a legal crisis, because in trying to assume more and more functions, it had become incapable of fulfilling its obligations. Fraga presented an image of an incompetent Spanish democracy that was not responding to the challenges of its time. Against this, he presented himself as an alternative to order and modernization for Spanish society.

The role of the state is to provide minimums of security, effectiveness, and justice at a reasonable cost. State crisis could stem from the new ruling elite's lack of preparation but also from the volume of powers that the new state sought to develop. Paraphrasing Reagan, he argued that: "*in the context of the current economic crisis, the public sector is not the solution, it is the problem*" (Fraga 1982a, p. 78). Fraga then added a reference to Spaniards' historic character for whom—in Fraga's opinion—"*the state is not a good word, but the symbol of what intervenes in one's life*" (Fraga 1980, p. 241). Excessive development of the state leads to unsustainable situations and is the product of dissonance between reality and political aspirations. Fraga was building an antagonistic narrative of an incipient democracy, as implemented

by the UCD and PSOE. As both parties were facing difficulties in developing the social and territorial structure of the state, by decentralizing the administration into different levels, Fraga would hold a centralist position, claiming that only a fit state could address the economic difficulties, and only a liberal agenda could modernize the country. This formula was presented as a program to develop Spain over the following two decades from a society in "decay" to a developed and "free" society. In this narrative, the figure of a strong state and economic liberalization are presented as inevitable: "*What freedom does one have who is unemployed or fears the terrorist's machine gun? There is no freedom but within the law or true progress other than within the objective laws of the economy.*" (Fraga 1982a, p. 185). In sum, Fraga sought to approach the conservative continental formulations of the time, with the particularity that, in this case, it was not an evolution of conservative post-war thought but a doctrinal reorganization in search of better democratic accommodation.

Therefore, Fraga—a meticulous reader of Carl Schmitt—sought, in 1982, a return to an antagonist political system in Spain once the transition was concluded. In April 1980, he stated, following a meeting with the King, that "*after a constituent period and a consensus that everybody says needs to be closed, it is time for a division of roles between the government and the opposition, and let everyone take their place*". The Parliament can no longer be "*a chamber of embraces and joys*" (Fraga 1982a, p. 145) but a place where the different or even antagonistic political projects compete electorally. With this request for an allocation of political positions, Fraga concluded the right-wing reorganization exercise for this new era. This was a piece of work that allowed the Spanish right-wing to operate in a democracy without having to criticize the dictatorship or answer for their leaders' prior conduct. By virtue of the *tabula rasa* established by the transition agreements, it became plausible to reorient the doctrine of the Spanish right from *Caudillistic* positions to a conservatism that combined Gaullist elements of the 'party of Order', an *iusnaturalistic* justification of the political principles and a proto-neoliberal economic organization. Once the new coordinates were established, Fraga was in a position to start the struggle to become the referent of the right.

5. Community: From the Francoist Heritage to the "Natural Majority" of Conservative Spaniards

Despite the agreed and consensual nature of the Spanish transition, the arrival of the new democratic system placed the conservatives in a complicated situation regarding political pluralism within their doctrine. Franco's autocratic rule had been built around the denial of half Spain—those defeated in the Civil War—and the recovery and exaltation of the Imperial past embodied in the figure of the dictator. Following the Constitution's approval, the conservatives needed to distinguish themselves from the 'nostalgic far-right', thus developing a differentiated narrative on political community and Spanish identity, which was able to integrate into the new system some of the operating principles of the former structure but accommodated to the new constitutional order.

This circumstance found Fraga in a situation where he had to develop an approach that allowed him to accept political plurality in the government, without renouncing the identarian features of the Spanish right. From this process, which Fraga approached selectively and strategically, we focused only on those elements that involved the reformulation of a conservative democratic political option, without having to directly address the whole symbolic inheritance of the dictatorship. That is why it is necessary to rescue three aspects of this doctrinal reworking to better understand the coordinates in which the Spanish right had to move. The first is the conservative management of the new democratic situation and political pluralism after four decades of dictatorship; the second relates to the defense of the nation and national unity, and, finally, a third aspect searches for historical references of the conservative tradition not linked to the dictatorship.

5.1. A Natural Majority

The approval of the Spanish constitution and the general elections in 1979 left Fraga's party in a critical situation: it lost half a million votes and gained only 6% of the votes in an election that gave Adolfo Suárez the Presidency of the government for the second time, along with an expanded

political center. The first democratic general elections 'penalized' Fraga for being regarded as the heir of Francoism. Facing this adverse situation, Fraga became convinced that he was predominantly responsible for the results and resigned as leader of the AP. His withdrawal from the leadership only lasted a few months, but it was enough time to gain the necessary perspective to observe Spanish society and the new party system dynamics. In these months, Fraga found himself surrounded by a governing party that clustered the Christian Democrats and the liberals around the figure of Adolfo Suárez in the presidency, and to the right, by the nostalgic far-right groups that accused him of being a traitor to Franco's legacy. Fraga considered Suárez and his followers to be opportunists, whereas he saw the latter as being unrealistic reactionaries for placing themselves outside of the constitution. At this strategic crossroad, Fraga became aware of the need to generate a distinct narrative of these two political positions in order to survive. Throughout the 10 books that he published between 1978 and 1982, there are two striking elements in relation to the concept of community or belonging to an identity, which, in this case, is Spanish: firstly, it is striking the lack of references to Spanish History from 1930 to 1975, apart from the scarce occasions in which he mentioned the Civil War (1936–39) as a failure of coexistence, but also his omission of anecdotes and personal encounters during that period, something that is certainly anomalous for someone who had been a diplomat and minister on several occasions. Secondly, in his different books, he built an image of Spain rather than an idea of nationhood.

By drawing on anecdotes statements and pieces of advice from people from throughout Spain on matters that concern Spaniards, Fraga sought to build a 'unanimous account of the country'. An old Galician baker, a *guardia civil* from the Basque Country, or a peasant from the rural region of Extremadura are some of the voices that emerge from his works to create 'a common sense' among Spaniards. Through this resource, Fraga sought to understand the telluric character of Spaniards, which leads them to reach the same conclusions about the development of the country, even though they experience different circumstances. In this way, he built a notion of the community from the discourses and values shared by most Spaniards, instead of operating with a strong and deductive notion of nation and what it means to be Spanish. In the nascent democracy, every attempt to redefine the principle of Spanish nationalism referred directly to the dictatorship years, so Fraga developed his vision of Spanish identity through the constitutional consensus set out in Article 2, thereby creating a 'composite character of Spanish society' that is associated with the development of a realistic and comprehensive perspective of its past history.

Fraga perceived himself as pragmatic, arguing that he assumed "*the whole History of Spain, the one that is liked and the one that is not*" (Fraga 1982a, p. 184), because his intention was to form an idea of Spain through a developmental and modernizing program that, in his words, "*can be used to imagine the Spain of the year 2000*". In this way, he projected an image of a community that has economic modernization as its starting point, without having to settle accounts with the recent dictatorial past. As a result, the reshaping of Spanish conservatism needs to reconnect with the citizens through the creation of common sense, based on the right-wing's discontent with the course of democracy, but without abandoning the constitutional framework.

In this context, during the 5th Congress of the Alianza Popular in 1982, Fraga launched the idea of a "natural majority" of Spaniards, sharing a number of principles and notions of how Spanish society should work. This idea was mentioned for the first time in 1976, but it became central when the UCD began to crumble after Suárez's resignation. Fraga used this idea to make a turn to the center-right in order to include some of the UCD's policies but also to gather a broader electorate capable of competing with the socialists. However, this 'turn to the center' was not performed by the concordance of ideological principles but through the rearrangement of a right-wing block under democracy, which Fraga summed up in his closing speech to the 5th AP congress:

> "the grouping of that vast majority of Spaniards who want peace, law, jobs, social services at a reasonable price, all that by democratic means and with the conviction that there is only

> one way, which is the creation of political majorities that, under its discretion, public opinion and Spanish society produce in that moment". (in García-Atance 1982)

This idea is one of the signs of the conclusion of the transitional period since it somehow comes to express a break with the consensus messages characteristic of the previous years. The idea of a natural majority refers to the existence of an operating block, which, although it may have several electoral expressions, operates under the same logic. The idea that there is a social majority that agrees on fundamental issues is common to every party that tries to reach power. However, in this case, Fraga defined 'natural majority' by referring to the 'double character' of the Spanish people. In a theoretical dimension, it refers to a majority that is not built by simple opposition but is pre-existing to all kinds of government, that professes a series of genuine values and attitudes of the Spanish people, and which Fraga associated with his conservative proposal. Whereas, in a practical dimension, the allusion to a natural majority refers, implicitly, to 'sociological Francoism', that is, to those layers of the Spanish population who, during the dictatorship, supported the regime more or less tacitly. The "natural majority" in 1982 was the emblem of a conservative right that built a political community from a liberal economic modernization program and the prevalence of a Spanish telluric common sense, beyond a closed ideology. Although it would take 15 years more for the Spanish right to reach power, this concept remained at the core of Spanish conservatives' strategy during the following decades as the only way to ever win an election again.

5.2. Indissoluble Unity

Specifically, one of the shared values that Fraga conferred on that natural majority is the will to remain united within the same nation, with a strong and centralized state. In order to achieve this, he depicted the radiography of the country in which he associated "Spanishness" with the defense of conservative values about the territorial organization. Thus, Fraga linked Francoist imaginary in democracy again through a defense of the 'always threatened unity of Spain'. He no longer referred to it as the "unity of destiny in the universal"[3], but framed it as the defense of the "indissoluble unity" of the nation, as expressed in the constitution.

During the development of the constitution, Fraga had been critical of Article 2[4], which talked about the defense of the unity of Spain and the principle of autonomy of the different regions. However, once the text was approved, he adopted the constitutional framework, understanding that the core of the consensus in that article is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation. As Spain's different autonomous communities developed, he remained a centralist, although he did not deny the particularities of the different regions of the country. He claimed that his territorial project would create "*an indestructible Spain, made of also indestructible regions; with real autonomies, from the bottom to the top, but culminating in a strong and effective national state*". According to Fraga, the main problematic issue was that the constitution did not clearly resolve the difference between nation and nationality, which led some political forces to undertake a federalist reading of the constitution, which, once put into practice, would decentralize state functions and, from his point of view, jeopardize the unity of the nation.

Fraga argued that the development of decentralized administrative levels into different regions would generate a weak state with narrower maneuvering space when it came to providing solutions to the climate of crisis and disenchantment that he himself outlined in his books. From this perspective, the development of regional autonomy would endanger the spiritual elements of the Spanish people and lead to the failure of the historical project, as well as weakening democracy. Fraga's main reason

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[3] This formula was commonly used under Franco in reference to the nation. It was first expressed by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founding father of the Falange during the II Republic.

[4] Article 2 states that the "constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and solidarity amongst them all."

was pragmatic: only a strong state would be able to accomplish the economic and social modernization that the country needed in the 1980s. He believed that opportunism and improvisation in the early years of democracy had meant that the idea of the nation as an organic whole was forgotten, which, in turn, led to disenchantment of part of the population and to dramatic situations, such as the failed coup d'état on 23 February 1981. Given this, Fraga understood that the task of his party started from considering that: "the *Alianza Popular [. . .] does not consider Spain as the remains of a shipwreck at the mercy of the waves, but as the basic value of our social life*" (Fraga 1982a, p. 184). Therefore, it is about defending the nation and protecting its symbols and institutions. The flag and monarchy were considered to be the cohesive elements for a Spanish identity, naturally formed as a historical project, and, hence, it was through these that the "natural majority" of Spaniards expressed their adhesion to this political community. This is how the conservative bloc maintained the defense of the nation as its main guarantee for the viability of Spain's project. Defense within the constitution was both against expressions of independence and the terrorist threat, but also against what they consider to be excessive administrative and political decentralization in the regions. Its project is, first and foremost, that of a centralized state, the only guarantor to avoid eventual national failure and the organic dissolution of the political community, something that Fraga sometimes expressed dramatically: "*If we are not Spanish we are nothing, because neither will we become English or Russian.*" (Fraga 1982a, p. 184).

5.3. Recovering the Non-Authoritarian Intellectual Tradition

In this conservative doctrinal reorganization in the incipient years of Spanish democracy, Fraga did not ignore the task of searching for new political and intellectual referents that could be differentiated from those of Franco's regime. In his works from the early 1980s, references from the reactionary thought of the Spanish XIX were scarce, and their doctrine was never summarized. The same occurred with the Falangist intellectuals, such as José Antonio Primo de Rivera or Patricio González de Canales, references to Italian fascism, or to those who built the political and legal structures of Francoism and their apologists. All those figures disappeared in Fraga's work except when he referred to specific historical anecdotes. Instead, he drew on references from the 'new philosophers', such as Alain de Benoist, and sought to accommodate *iusnaturalism* and economic modernization in the same system; Burke, when he needed to address custom and stability in the conservative doctrine, and Joseph de Maistre to combat the horrendous consequences of any revolutionary doctrine put into practice.

Due to this choice, during the exercise of doctrinal reshaping, Fraga needed to find in Spanish history new political referents with whom the Spanish right-wing could identify itself. That is why, in the course of his book *El pensamiento conservador español* (Fraga 1981b), he developed a genealogy inspired by a conservative and reformist character. He rescued from the history of Spain figures like Jovellanos, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio Maura, and Ramiro de Maeztu, in an attempt to reconstruct a historical timeline from the 1876 Restoration to the point of writing, thereby illustrating that a conservative tradition of the Catholic Spanish nation has always existed. But this is also a pragmatic tradition when it comes to undertaking reforms for the modernization of the country. Both Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and Antonio Maura were Presidents of the government during the Bourbon Restoration, skilled parliamentarians within their respective political traditions, and above all, two historical 'Men of state' figures, who Fraga eulogized for their integrity and moral character. They were anti-heroes, far from the epic politics of Francoism, and, on the contrary, emblematic of a conception of parliamentary politics restricted to the parties of order.

A history of conservative thought that sought to continue with the dictatorship would have included the figures that forged the ideological basis for the 1936 *coup d'état* and also those that constituted the intellectuality of the regime and both legally and politically organized the Francoist regime, and of whom Fraga is, to some extent, their natural heir. By removing the Francoist intellectual from this new conservative thought, the philosophy is freed from an ethical and political responsibility that could be developed under democracy without restrictions. There is a 'deliberate silence' over the previous 40 years of a government that allowed Fraga to survive in two very different senses: on the one

hand, in the new democracy, every relevant political actor needed to find non-authoritarian historical references that allowed them to have legitimacy as democratic actors. On the other, this rereading of Spanish conservatives enabled future political generations to develop their political principles without having to be held accountable for their authoritarian past.

6. Conclusions: The New (Old) Coordinates of the Spanish Right

Manuel Fraga's reshaping work from the end of 1978 to 1982 allowed the Spanish right to operate under democracy for a further three decades without excessive dependence on Francoism but also enabled it to remain united as one political bloc from 1982 to 2015. This was an exercise of doctrinal reshaping once the constitutional text came into effect, that is to say, the internal process through which Spanish conservatism built its democratic legitimacy. This does not mean, however, that there was a modernization and profound democratization of Spanish conservatives: the Spanish conservatives did not abandon their position as a Party of Order, a supporter of a strong state, and with certain authoritarian gestures. This is the reason that we defined this process as a reshaping and not as a transformation. Fraga's conservatives did not have to transform themselves into another political expression, but find doctrinal accommodation within the new democratic framework in an adequate manner, in order to group the right together. But this reshaping took place within a democratic framework, which Fraga respected and which he himself contributed to creating, as one of the constitutional *rapporteurs*.

In September 1982—one month before the elections that would give victory to the PSOE—Fraga had already developed in *España, entre dos modelos de sociedad* the strategy towards the consolidation of the blocs' policy, typical of bipartisanship. This conservative project would be consolidated as a center-right opposition to the socialist governments until 1989 when it grouped together the entire democratic right into the Popular Party.

The idea of "natural majority", even though it never led to an electoral majority under Fraga's command at the head of Alianza Popular, was comprehensively incorporated into conservative doctrine in relation to two issues: firstly, it was useful to guide political strategy around specific issues that could unite very diverse electorates under the same electoral option. Lastly, it allowed the coexistence of currents within the same party to be managed. By incorporating the democratic and liberal sectors within the Alianza Popular, Fraga ensured hegemony within the block and established the political positions that would define the development of Spanish democracy for decades to come.

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Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland: Propagating the Crisis of National Identity

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Abstract: This paper contains a comparative analysis of the presentation of the national identity of Spain and Germany by the far-right populist parties Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland. It shows how each party views national identity as being in a serious crisis arising from the betrayal by old-line parties which has led to the increased influence of the EU, the consequent reduction of national sovereignty, a deleterious impact on their own and on European culture, and a harmful influence on the family. The parties repudiate many of the provisions of the EU treaties. They are equally opposed to the presence of Islam in Christian Europe, viewing it as a menace to values shared by all European nations. These analyses lead to an examination of the performance of crisis by means of deliberate provocation and the use of electronic media. It shows how these parties from very different parts of Europe share remarkably close positions and use the technological achievements of the twenty-first century to attack the late-twentieth-century political and social achievements of the European Union in order to replace them with the nineteenth-century idea of the distinct ethno-cultural nation fully sovereign in its own nation-state.

Keywords: Alternative für Deutschland; Vox España; national identity; nationalism; nativism; crisis; Islamophobia; European Union

1. Introduction

The impacts of the turbulent years in European life and politics which began with the Great Recession starting in 2008 have been and are still being felt in many areas of social and political life and in many countries of the European Union. This is the background to this paper which focusses on related questions of national identity in Spain and Germany as defined and propagated by, respectively, Vox España (Vox) and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). It is to be noted from the beginning that each of these new parties contains the name of the respective country (with all the accompanying rational and emotional overtones) plus the suggestion of something new: The first is to be the "voice" of a Spain not otherwise heard, and the second asserted that there did exist an alternative to Angela Merkel's Euro bailout (Jahn 2013); it also continues to assert that there is an alternative to existing policies and practices deemed harmful to national identity. These two parties with strong nationalistic or nativist tendencies emerged in EU member states marked, until recently, by a stable party system in which each existing party broadly viewed national identity similarly (open, liberal, EU-oriented) while differing and competing in the areas of social, European, foreign and economic policies, each proclaiming its link to country. That the positions of the two new parties exercise a noticeable attraction for voters emerges quite clearly from recent election results: In the elections of 2 December 2018 for the parliament of the autonomous community of Andalusia Vox obtained 10.97% of the vote and 12 seats. Subsequently, in the general election of 28 April 2019, it won 10.26% of the votes and 24 seats in the *Congreso de los Diputados*, though none in the Senate. By the date of the Spanish elections AfD was represented in the parliaments of all sixteen states of Germany with support ranging from 5.9%

(Schleswig-Holstein) to 24.3% (Saxony-Anhalt), as well as in the Bundestag, where it had 94 members and nationally achieved 12.6% of the *Zweitstimmen*[1].

In the slightly later Spanish election cycle of 26 May 2019 with elections for all municipal councils, for the parliaments of twelve of the seventeen *comunidades autónomas* and for the two autonomous cities of Melilla and Ceuta on the North-African coast, Vox also presented candidates. It published a separate manifesto for the EP election and a joint one for the elections for the parliaments of the autonomous communities. The party succeeded in electing representatives in seven of the twelve communities where elections were held. It obtained 6.2% of the votes for the European Parliament, which translated into three representatives. Most recently, in the repeat of the national elections on 10 November 2019, Vox obtained 15.1% of the vote (an increase of 50% over the April result) and with 52 seats more than double its representation in the Congreso de los Diputados.

These two parties have irrupted onto the political scene in their respective countries where they are playing a role and have achieved a visibility and audibility beyond what their numbers might suggest. With counterparts in Austria, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, etc., many of which existed years before AfD and Vox, they are part both of a Europe-wide populist, nationalist and nativist phenomenon, representing also a real challenge to the European Union. Given that Vox España has emerged so very recently, and Alternative für Deutschland only a very few years earlier (see below), and that the question of national identity is at the core of their public positions, it is revealing to compare in a detailed manner the parallels between the two parties in this central area. This is being done in order to gain an appreciation of just what they stand for, particularly as there is relatively little in English on AfD[2] and only (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019; Gould 2019) on Vox, both of which limit themselves largely or exclusively to the Andalusian elections of December 2018.

2. Outline and Methodology

For the purposes of this paper and its analyses the definition of national identity to be used is that of the project at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Seville, *Nacionalismo de estado de democracias multinacionales: El impacto de la Gran Recesión sobre la identidad nacional*: "We define national identity as the subjective feeling of belonging to a territorially-defined political community within which the inhabitants feel that they share certain characteristics or common elements"[3].

In undertaking a point-by-point qualitative analysis of official party documents (as well as a reference to an important speech by Vox's leader, Santiago Abascal Conde, at a mass meeting in Madrid), the comparison will show how very different parts of the European continent which achieved stable democratic government after a period of extreme-right/fascist rule have now produced and are propagating very similar right-wing views on national identity—a term which includes among other topics culture, the family, the relationship to Europe, and immigration. In order to gain a full appreciation of the proximity of the two parties it is important to lay out their positions in some detail.

The corpus of material for analysis are publicly available documents of each of the two parties: For Vox the *Manifiesto fundacional* (Vox España 2014) and *100 medidas para una España viva* (Vox España 2018), plus the separate manifestos for the EP elections of 2019, *Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas de 2019* (Vox España EP 2019), and the joint manifesto for those *autonomías* re-electing their parliament in 2019 (Vox España EA 2019). For AfD the manifestos for analysis are those for the important series of elections at the national, regional, and European levels in 2017, 2018, and 2019 (AfD 2017; AfD Bavaria 2018; AfD Hesse 2018; AfD EP 2019). Reference will also be made to the AfD manifestos for state elections in Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, the

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1 Germany's electoral system is characterised by the fact that voters each have two votes: The first is for an individual candidate in the voter's electoral district, and the second, the Zweitstimme, is for a party list in the voter's state.

2 However, for a very detailed analysis of AfD manifestos, see (Gould 2018).

3 Definimos la identidad nacional como el sentimiento subjetivo de pertenencia a una comunidad política, definida territorialmente, con la que uno imagina que comparte algunos rasgos o elementos comunes.

Saarland, and Schleswig Holstein. The importance of these documents is that that they are (a) issued by the parties themselves and thus there can be no claim of misrepresentation by journalists or others, (b) they are definitive, and (c) they stand at the beginning of the important communication chain for both national-level or regional-level communications (radio and television reporting) and electoral-district-level communication (e.g., person-to-person), plus the increasing role of social media communication. As such, these documents are absolutely fundamental. They represent the state of the parties' thinking at the time of the election in question.

Following the critical discourse analysis example of the seminal work *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität* (Wodak et al. 1998), the approach is qualitative, concentrating on identifying what the parties present as fundamental characteristics of their respective nation and how they do it: This includes the linguistic construction of a shared culture (both national and European) linking past, present and future, and also the nature of the national state as the present and future framework within which the nation exists, to which it gives (or should give) form, and which in turn moulds or accepts the nation itself. In this way it will show the pivotal role of language in creating "opaque as well as structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control" (Wodak and Meyer 2009, p. 10). The paper will undertake this investigation of national identity as propagated by what are stipulated to be populist parties (Bebnowski 2015; Turnbull-Dugarte 2019; Häusler 2019).

After background information on the two parties, Sections 3 and 4 will consider the linked views of national identity (including the national state) and crisis which the parties are propagating in the public political sphere in each country. In this respect, the two parties demonstrate a remarkable range of similarities which this paper will explore together. However, there is one significant difference: Their attitude towards the national state as it exists in their respective territory.

In Section 5 the paper will take a further step. It will argue that the parties' presentations are not simply descriptive but are also dynamic and amount to a performance of identity crisis. This paper will point to Vox's and AfD's allegations of the failure of old-line parties to protect national identity, thus in their view engendering a crisis. Following Taggart (2000), Moffitt (2014, 2016) argues for the key role of crisis in understanding contemporary populism. The significance and function of performance of crisis by contemporary populist parties as outlined by Moffitt is that it is an important device employed by them to gain and maintain electoral success. The application of his six-step model of crisis performance will permit the paper to establish a further link between these two comparable parties situated in very distinct countries. At the same time, it will show how a 'problem' area can be transformed into a threatening existential force of long duration.

In the Conclusion the paper will briefly consider the technological and human environments, as well as the constellation of nineteenth-century, twentieth-century, and twenty-first-century forces which have come together in Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland to promote their performance and propagation of crisis.

3. Background

3.1. Vox

Preceded by the short-lived Fuerza Nueva and the equally short-lived and regionally-focused parties Plataforma per Catalunya and Espanya 2000 (Casals 2016), and later supported electorally by such minor right-wing parties as Alternativa Española or Comunión Tradicionalista Carlista, Vox was founded in a rather disorganised manner in December 2013 (Kadner 2014) and became active for the 2014 EP elections (2018)[4]. Until the Andalusia vote in December 2018 (discussed by (Ortiz 2019) in this

[4] The normal practice of the publishing house behind this work, Ikusle, is that it does not provide the names of authors, possibly because it is linked to the Basque nationalist movement Izquierda Abertzale (previously close to ETA). Similarly, it provides no information on the place of publication. I am grateful to Pablo Ortiz Barquero of the Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Seville for this information.

issue) it had been, at best, a marginal force in Spanish politics with just four mayors (two of whom had switched parties) of tiny municipalities and twenty-two municipal councillors. In the 2015 municipal elections it had obtained a total of only slightly over 51,000 votes, i.e., 0.25% of all the votes cast (El Confidencial 2015). The party defines its fundamental positions in two position papers: *Manifiesto fundacional* (Vox España 2014), and *100 medidas para una España viva* (approximately: One Hundred Measures to promote Spanish Life and Values) (Vox España 2018).

Its position on the right of the political spectrum emerges clearly in statements given in *Vox España, la tentación populista española* (2018, passim), and explicitly in the positions outlined by (Piñar Pinedo 2015) in which he categorises Vox as filling the vacuum on the right of Spanish politics and as holding fundamental views characteristic of the Right including sharp criticism of the EU. However, it is to be noted that these ideas and others fundamental for Vox did not emerge with the creation of the party. The book by (Abascal Conde and Sánchez 2008) contains already a great deal of what are now the official positions of Vox.

Given that Vox has emerged so recently as a force in Spanish politics, analyses by scholars are rare. However, those to be found in the webliography of different print and web publications by Casals merit particular attention (Casals 2019)[5]. In light of the fact that it is a truth universally acknowledged, including by Abascal himself (see above and Abascal 2015), that Vox is a party of the right, the questions in the various analyses which exist by other scholars on the nature of Vox have been published in the daily press and so far revolve around the matter of whether it should be categorised as a right-wing party, a far-right party, or as on the radical-right, and also whether its language might be considered (or not) neo-fascist (Anduiza 2018; Acha 2019a, 2019b).

A tremendous opportunity was provided for Vox by the surge in Catalan separatism, which the party seized on. This coincided with the political dissatisfaction caused when the new "Statute of Autonomy" (i.e., the quasi-constitution of Catalonia) which had been accepted by a large majority of Catalans in a referendum in 2006, was challenged in the Constitutional Court by the PP and some autonomous communities. The Court's largely negative judgement, finally released in 2010, unleashed a significant rise in popular support for independence, and the organisation of the independence referendum of 1 October 2017, which was accompanied by civil disturbances (Humlebæk 2015; Lecours 2018).

Since the elections preceding and following the referendum on 1 October 2017 the "Catalan question" was never far from media attention. From 12 February 2019 when it began, i.e., during the pre-campaign and the campaigns for all the elections of April and May 2019, the trial in the *Tribunal Supremo* in Madrid of 12 persons facing various serious criminal charges relating to the planning and holding of the referendum was heavily mediatised. Additionally, in the trial Vox has increased the visibility of itself and its position by becoming a civil party (*acusación popular*) to the indictments. These facts and media attention concord with the starting point of the policy statement *100 medidas para la España viva*, which takes a hard line in order to deal resolutely with the continuing Catalan crisis.

In addition to all the above, the continuing revelations of widespread political and commercial corruption (put by (Gómez Reino and Llamares 2019, p. 296) at nearly 2000 cases by 2014, and certainly higher since that date) suggested that the problem of corruption was far from settled. Vox España is doing the same thing as AfD in Germany: In a moment of political failure and fluidity it has positioned itself as in touch with and expressing the real needs of the Spanish people and both willing and able to dominate and correct the definition of national identity in an unstable world.

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[5] Information received from Pablo Ortiz Barquero of the Universidad Pablo de Olavide is gratefully acknowledged.

3.2. AfD

Founded in 2013, and with members elected to the European Parliament and to the state parliaments of Saxony, Brandenburg, and Thuringia in 2014 (in addition to a number of municipal and *Kreis* councils), the AfD achieved parliamentary representation four years earlier than Vox. This means that (as of 2019) in contrast to Vox there is already a considerable body of scholarly research on AfD. The party's emergence and metamorphosis has been outlined by, for example, (Decker 2016; Lewandowsky 2016; Lehmann and Matthieß 2017; Jesse 2019). The most detailed account is to be found in (Butterwegge et al. 2018, Chapter: "Entstehung und Entwicklung der AfD bis zur Gegenwart") which also provides information on other and earlier populist parties in Europe with very similar discourse strategies and concepts to those to be outlined below for AfD. Within the development process of the party an important factor is the role played by the massive influx of refugees (at least 800,000) in 2015 (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Geiges 2018). The party is also the farthest right of any party on the parliamentary spectrum in Germany, which has naturally given rise to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution's (*Bundesverfassungsschutz*) placing it under observation. Presentations and analyses of its radicalisation and/or positions are to be found in, for example, (Gould 2018[6]; Zick et al. 2019). These considerations inevitably lead to the topic of populism in relation to AfD: See (Lees 2018; Häusler 2019). They equally lead to questions about the party's electorate, particularly as relating to the rejection of refugees (Hambauer and Mays 2018; Lengfeld and Dilger 2018). There is, however, some discussion around the question of whether persons at the lower end of the social scale are more inclined or not to vote for AfD (Lengfeld 2017; Lux 2018) or whether they were drawn from the same classes of voters as the existing parties (Hansen and Olsen 2019).

In the case of AfD, a similar opportunity to that provided to Vox by the surge of regional separatism in Catalonia was the arrival in Germany in 2015 of at least 800,000 refugees from Moslem countries. It accelerated the move by the AfD away from its origins in the financial crisis as an anti-Euro party towards a more nationalist stance more immediately understandable and appreciated by a wider voting public, enabling the party to point to the danger the refugees represented for national identity.

The evidence above that Abascal's positions on fundamental points concerning Spanish identity significantly pre-date the party, plus the information on Islamophobia and anti-Islamic discourses at various levels of German society (see above and Sarrazin 2010) in the 1990s and 2000s, indicate that any 'Bannon effect' arising from his networking in Europe in 2018/2019, much discussed in the press (Die Welt 2019; Junquera 2018; Pérez Oliva 2018), and deliberately provocative interviews (Verdú 2019), is limited to the promotion of well-established and already-existing views on Muslims, immigration, the EU, the nation, etc., and does not involve the creation of these views. (Junquera 2018) and Verdú's interview with Bannon (Verdú 2019) indicate the establishment of contacts between Bannon and Vox; for contacts between Bannon and AfD, see (Serrau 2019).

4. The Nation

4.1. The Nation and Its National State

Each party views Spain or Germany, as the case may be, as the present and future framework for the existence and evolution of its respective nation. Consequently, it is both relevant and important to consider the attitude to the state and the fit (or otherwise) between this essential framework and the nation which inhabits it.

In the case of each country, the fundamental structure of the national state is federal. In Germany this is not contested by any party or at any level. In Spain, on the other hand, the term "federal"

[6] To save space and avoid repetition frequent reference will be made to this long analysis of the AfD election manifestos for the 2107 federal election and for the 2017 state elections in Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, the Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein.

is strictly avoided. However, with significant areas of governmental activity such as health-care, social policy, policing, local government, language, education, some areas of taxation, certain levels of the administration of justice, cultural affairs, agriculture, environment, heritage affairs being the responsibility (though in some cases shared with the central government) of the elected parliament and cabinet of each of the seventeen 'autonomous communities' whose existence is guaranteed in the Constitution (plus also the autonomous cities of Melilla and Ceuta on the North African coast), it is not unreasonable to think of the structure as federal in fact and form, if not in terminology (Baglioni 2013). This federal or quasi-federal political structure is the home to the respective *Volk* and *nación*, each of which is acknowledged to be an ethno-cultural entity (see below). However, it will also be outlined below how Vox consistently attacks the current political form of Spain as fundamentally in contradiction to its conception of the unitary identity of the Spanish nation and consequently as deeply harmful to this unity and to the unity of the state. The two parties differ fundamentally in their attitudes to the political structure of the nation state.

4.2. AfD

In the AfD manifestos for the elections in Germany in 2017 (for the Bundestag and for the state parliaments of Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, the Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein), and then also in 2018 (state elections in Bavaria and Hesse), there is nowhere any indication of tension or contradiction between the federal and state levels of government (Gould 2018). Additionally, regional culture and identity are nested within a shared German identity without there being any contradiction between the two (AfD 2017, 1.1). These positions were maintained in the manifestos for the 2018 state elections in Bavaria (AfD Bavaria 2018) and Hesse (AfD Hesse 2018). The outcomes of these elections led to the AfD being represented in the parliaments of all individual states, in addition to the Bundestag.

The AfD provides no reasons for its total satisfaction with the federal structure of the German national state as outlined in the Constitution. It is not an issue of any sort, and one may conclude that it is not in any contradiction with the party's conception of the nation and national identity. Acknowledged regional differences are unproblematic, accommodated by the federal structure, and, clearly, for the AfD this structure in no way diminishes the feeling of belonging to the national group, summarised in the expression "unity in diversity" (AfD 2017, 1.1), nor does it undermine its notion of popular sovereignty. In addition, for the AfD adherence to, and realisation of, the often-repeated fundamental constitutional concept "*freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung*"/"free and democratic society", are also a characteristic of German identity (Gould 2018).

On the other hand, for AfD the importance of popular sovereignty and the imposition of restrictions on professional politicians are such that the first chapter, "Defence of Democracy in Germany", of the 2017 federal election manifesto (AfD 2017) contains proposals for significant changes in the functioning of the state: Following the Swiss pattern, the voters are to be given the power to amend or repeal acts of the Bundestag, and to propose and pass legislation via the use of referenda. In addition, constitutional changes should be made only with popular support in the form of a referendum; the Chancellor, state premiers, ministers, and *parlamentarische Staatssekretäre* (parliamentary undersecretaries) may no longer be members of the appropriate legislative body; the President should be chosen in a vote of the people; the Chancellor should serve for a maximum of two electoral terms, and members for no more than four.

4.3. Vox

The positions of Vox España on the structure of the Spanish state are outlined in the two source documents mentioned above: *100 medidas para la España viva* (Vox España 2018) and *Manifiesto fundacional* (Vox España 2014). Despite the linguistic and cultural diversity of Spain, this state is the home to the Spanish Nation which is "indissoluble in its unity", and of which the national sovereignty is vested in "the totality of the Spanish people" (Vox España 2014). At the same time, Vox states its awareness of the great human diversity of Spain—"the historical and cultural plurality of our Nation"

(Vox España 2014, p. 5) and "the cultural, linguistic, legal and insular facets and facts characteristic of our country" (Vox España 2014, p. 6).

It is the two factors of the linguistic and cultural diversity on the one hand and the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish people", which, taken together with the desire to abolish the quasi-federal structure of Spain and create a unitary state, make the current and continuing question of Catalan separatism so acute and have led to the opening section of *100 medidas* having the title "Spain, Unity and Sovereignty".

On the failure of the Spanish "State of the Autonomous Communities", the Estado de las Autonomías, Vox states forcefully its rejection of the status quo and the reasons for its rejection in the following terms:

> The Spanish State of Autonomous Communities has not fulfilled the goals for which it was created and its cost has reached alarming proportions. The political decentralisation which has reached extremes scarcely compatible with the Constitution, far from pacifying the national question in Catalonia and the Basque Country, has aggravated the centrifugal tensions and has pushed Spain to the verge of disintegration. (Vox España 2014, p. 3).

Spain is in a crisis situation which can only be solved in the following way:

> Transformation of the Spanish State of Autonomous Communities to a unitary Spanish State founded on the rule of law and promoting equality and solidarity in the place of privileges and division. A single government and a single parliament for the whole of Spain. (Vox España 2018, Item 6).

These are views which are reiterated and emphasised in the manifesto for the elections to the autonomous communities (Vox España EA 2019) where the rejection of the communities is expressed very forcefully. The position in the documents (*100 medidas*, *Manifiesto fundacional*, the *Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas de 2019* (Vox España EP 2019), and the *Vistalegre* speech, which formed an overture to the coming election campaigns of 2019 (Abascal 2018), is that Spain and the Spanish people precede, and possess a separate and well-developed existence from, the state created by the Constitution of 1978: That is, Spanish national identity is, above all, ethno-cultural and pre-constitutional. Consequently, Spanish national identity is distinct also from the *Estado de las Autonomías*. Given the hostility to that particular organisational form, this becomes a loaded and hostile term to the point that it is described as "a slow suicide" and has pushed the country to the verge of disintegration (Vox España 2014, p. 3). For these reasons the political community to which individuals are invited, or expected, to identify is above all a Spain constituted by notions of the Spanish past and its heroes, its high culture and its popular cultures, its unity and territorial integrity, its imperial and European deeds (including saving Europe and European civilisation from Islam: See below), its *dignidad*, *honor*, *valor* handed down from past generations, its *destino*, and its Christianity [i.e., Catholicism] (Abascal 2018). The appeal is to a quasi-sacralised 'Spain' thusly constituted (España is mentioned 69 times) and not to constitutional values: *Constitución* is never mentioned in the *Vistalegre* speech. For Vox the only political community with which to identify and where citizens should feel they belong is Spain as a whole; the autonomous communities diminish or destroy "the subjective feeling of belonging to the political community [of Spain]".

The contrast here is that between the AfD's satisfaction with the federal structure of its political community and Vox's total dissatisfaction with the form of its political community. It is a contrast relating in both cases to an awareness of real sub-national differences and their place within the whole, but to an entirely different attitude towards such differences: After the achievement of a German nation state, whether the unification of 1871 or the unification of 1990 following the forced split into two states after WWII, regional differences are accepted as falling within the broader definition of "German" and are not considered threatening.

In Spain, there is a difficult terrain for the negotiation of a national identity which is purely "Spanish" (and its feeling of belonging to a national territory and state) in addition to a regional identity or a local ethno-cultural-linguistic identity. There are the conflicting forces of the experience of an authoritarian unitary state before 1978, the very much larger language minorities (constitutionally recognised and protected: (Constitución Española 1978, Article 3), past separatism allied to terrorism, current separation attempts using quasi-legal or non-legal political means, and the constitutional recognition of the "peoples" (*pueblos* and *nacionalidades*) of Spain (Constitución Española 1978, Preamble and Article 2) within the imperative of "the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" (Article 2). In addition and as outlined, Vox presents a quasi-sacralised vision of the Spanish nation quite distinct from the constitutional and, as Vox sees it, fundamentally destructive framework of the State. For Vox, there is a total clash and it is this the national vision which must prevail rather than the constitutional form.

4.4. EU-European and Culturally European Perspectives of the Nation

4.4.1. The EU-European Perspective

For both parties there are significant and comparable conflicts between national identity and EU membership. In their most fundamental form these stem from the recognition that EU membership means a curtailment of national sovereignty resulting from the transfer of sole decision-making responsibility in certain areas away from the nation state to the Commission, the European Parliament, and the EU courts. There is also awareness of the transfer of national decision-making in the area of human rights to the Council of Europe's ECHR. Given that for the AfD popular sovereignty is repeatedly defined as the foundation of both democracy and national identity (AfD 2017, Chapter 1), and that the nation state as inseparable from popular sovereignty is part of a shared European norm, the dimensions of the problem become clear.

The manifesto for the 2017 Bundestag elections issued by AfD (AfD 2017), particularly Section 1 "Defence of Democracy", as also its manifesto for the 2019 EP elections (AfD EP 2019), defend the concept of the supremacy of the nation and consequently contain serious reservations about the EU. Similarly, Vox's *100 medidas* (Vox España 2018) expresses reservations about the EU, but in its EP manifesto (Vox España EP 2019) its posture is much more critical and its views broadly but very significantly coincide with those of AfD. The insistence, for example, that sovereignty is vested in the totality of the Spanish people (Vox España 2014, pp. 4, 6; 2019a) and the position of AfD that national/popular sovereignty, *Volkssouveränität*, is the overriding principle of all political organisation, thus depriving the European Union of legitimacy as it possesses no *Staatsvolk* (see Gould 2018), lead to fundamental questioning of the European Union. Consequently, either implicitly or explicitly the parties share the view that the foundational treaties of the EU grant too much power to the Union, and that Brussels is abusing this power. The EU should be a confederation of sovereign nation-states working in partnership. This would preserve the sovereignty and increase the role of the individual nations, which each party considers of paramount importance. This includes their total control, via the intermediary of their state, of movement across their borders and of immigration policy, with Vox demanding also the suspension of the Schengen arrangements. For AfD it implies, and for Vox it is explicit, that each country should be solely responsible for its bilateral relations. Both parties demand restriction of the role of supranational courts. Both parties insist also on restoration of preferential treatment towards their own nationals for employment or any form of social welfare payments; this principal of national preference should apply also to business entities. Each of these proposals is being made in order to restore what the parties see as the diminished power and specificity of their nation as expressed by the general will in its sovereign state. However, it is clear that each of the proposals is incompatible with EU principles.

The claims to re-establish the fundamental legitimacy and the guiding force of the sovereignty of the nation and the concomitant calls for reform of the fundamental structures of the European Union lead logically and explicitly to a possible future consequence if reform efforts should fail. The AfD

explicitly envisions the possible withdrawal of Germany from the EU, or even the orderly dissolution of the Union and the substitution of a European Economic Community. For Vox the eventuality is couched in less specific terms, but it does express "the possibility of leaving supranational organisations which are contrary to the interests of Spain" (Vox España 2018, Item 99).

These positions in defense of the nation/the "sovereign people" against the harmful incursions of Brussels restricting the actions and protections of the Nation through the intermediary of its national state choose to ignore the fact that the preamble of the constitution of each country asserts that it was the will of the nation that the constitution be enacted and that each constitution explicitly authorises transfer of constitutional powers to international organisations (*Grundgesetz* Articles 23 and 24; *Constitución Española* Section 93). For both parties, the insistence on national sovereignty and national specificity override these constitutional provisions. Protection of the Nation is more important than any other consideration.

4.4.2. The European Cultural Perspective

For each of the two parties under discussion national identity is nested within European identity with no conflict between the two. In each case, also, use is made of concepts referring specifically to characteristics deemed to be shared nation-wide: For AfD it is (*deutsche*) *Leitkultur* (defining culture) and *Heimat*; for Vox it is *hispanidad* (Spanishness) and *arraigo* (rootedness) in the Spanish land and practices. Each of these clearly contains an element of nativism or essentialism, each of them also sees identity as anchored in the past and in a given territory. (Eigler and Kugele 2012) remark on the conjunction of memory and space for *Heimat*, but *mutatis mutandis* it is equally the case with *arraigo* and *hispanidad*. They combine elements of social and personal culture together with genetics in that *Heimat* refers to an individual's or group's origins in the people of a given geographical region which can be as small as a village or as large as a country. The term itself is immensely evocative and also problematic (Boa and Palfreyman 2000; Blickle 2002; Gebhart et al. 2007; Costadura and Ries 2016). Additionally, in an era first of unification and then of migration it can take on different configurations (Costadura and Ries 2016; Kronenberg 2018). The "defining culture" expressed by *Leitkultur* contains elements of culture in the sense of a complex of shared values and practices differentiating Germans from Others (particularly non-Europeans), but also linking them with shared Europe-wide practices and with values considered part of a common European heritage. Specifically mentioned are: Humanism, Christianity and its contributions to European civilisation and culture, freedom of religion, separation of religion and reason, separation of religion and the state, German constitutional values, female emancipation, and the German language (Pautz 2005).

Hispanidad, in addition to its geographical component, is explicit in its expression of membership in an ethno-cultural group. It covers many of the same elements of group and personal culture, essentialism and nativism as *Heimat* or *Leitkultur*, though, clearly, the Christian element is restricted to Roman Catholicism. Moreover, it covers practices and values rooted (see: *Arraigo*) in local or rural life. However, in addition it also pertains to the larger context of the Spanish-speaking world (Vox España 2018, Items 66 and 100; Aguirre 2018). Importantly, for Vox *hispanidad* strongly correlates with religion (Zapata-Barrero n.d., p. 150) and can imply or include an element of islamophobia or *maurophobia* (Zapata-Barrero 2006; Aguirre 2018), a phenomenon very evident in Vox's conceptualisation of Spanish identity (Aguirre 2018; Vox España EP 2019).

Importantly, for Vox the insistence on *hispanidad* is both complemented and reinforced by the attention given to European cultural identity in the long and strongly-worded Preamble to its manifesto for the EP elections (Vox España EP 2019). This preamble harshly criticises and opposes all and any EU trends, tendencies and legislation which impinge in any way on the national identity and sovereignty of any European nation. For Vox there is no contrast or contradiction between Spanish and European identity. Furthermore, there is a considerable and important overlap (though not total coincidence) with AfD's views of European identity to be found in its federal manifesto (AfD 2017) and EP manifesto (AfD EP 2019). Both emphasise the imbrication of national cultures in European culture and place

considerable emphasis also on the particular significance of European culture: For Vox it is explicitly *la Civilización por excelencia*, while for AfD it is implicitly, but clearly, so. For both parties this culture is founded above all on Christianity and the heritage of classical thought and values; and anything that the EU might do which would restrict or reduce these features or national specificity is harmful. In the name of its insistence on the Christian foundations of European culture and values, Vox asserts that "political deals" and "ideological prejudices" have contributed to the current crisis and "have built a Europe alienated from its spiritual foundations". More specifically, this is because of the influence of political postulates and practices of the Left and Social Democracy. For AfD the explicit rejection arising from the Christian foundation of the shared European culture is not of the Left, but of Muslim, and therefore Turkish, culture. This is parallel to the implicit element of Islamophobia perceptible in *hispanidad* (see above and Zapata-Barrero 2006; Aguirre 2018) and Vox's explicit rejection of Turkish EU membership (Vox España EP 2019, p. 9).

4.4.3. Social and Familial Relationships as Producers of National Identity

The traditional family is presented as providing a stable foundation for society as a whole and for its ability to prosper. It thus contributes to cohesion and to individuals' and the group's identification with the national territory.

Above all it is to be noted that the views of these relationships are distinctly conservative in nature and in the case of each party appear closely related to a vision of society as it existed before the pressures arising from globalisation and its resultant migrations, the migrations due to war and global inequalities, population movements within the EU, increasing secularisation throughout Europe and the shifts in social values of the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, including those concerning marriage and women's participation in the workforce. Further information on the insecurities resulting from these changes, particularly in respect to the AfD and Germany but also generally, is to be found in (Gould 2018) drawing on (Beck 1997, 2000; Giddens 1991), and also in (Kenny 2017) who outlines the importance of nostalgia in current populist discourse. The parties are thus promoting the reassurance of the familiar, hence the appeal of everything that is implied in deutsche *Leitkultur* or *Heimat* on the one hand, and *hispanidad* or *arraigo* on the other, including the hint of superiority and the importance of Christianity in the first concept of each pair. At the same time, the use of these concepts has the important function of anchoring the individual within the national group and the territory which is the chief expression and locus of all these qualities.

4.4.4. Marriage and the Family

In both countries the family stands under the particular protection of the state (Grundgesetz 2019, Article 6; Constitución Española 1978, Article 39), and while admitting the existence and legitimacy (though grudgingly) of same-sex unions, both AfD and Vox ascribe a particular importance and function to the "classical" or "traditional" family of mother-plus-father-plus-children (AfD 2017, Willkommenskultur für Kinder; Vox España 2018, Section Vida y familia). As will be shown, because of the importance of family within the area of national identity and its position within country and state, it is to be promoted by a range of social and fiscal policies to encourage natality and support larger families (Vox España 2018; Vox España 2019a, Section 'Vida, familia e igualdad'; AfD 2017, chp. 7). For both parties the importance is national as well as social. The national element is paramount because of the concept, prominent in statements by both parties, that sovereignty lies respectively with the German or Spanish nation (AfD 2017, Section 1.1; Vox España 2018, Section 1 'Spain, Unity and Sovereignty'; Vox España 2014, Item 2).

This locus of sovereignty is not a peculiarly German or Spanish phenomenon, but is stated to be Europe-wide and an important positive characteristic of Europe and its culture as a whole, being a *sine qua non* of democracy (AfD 2017, 1.1) or of freedom (Vox España 2018). The weight of this view of the importance of the National is increased given the pragmatic situation in Spain of significantly increased (im)migration resulting from Europeanisation and globalisation, excess of

deaths over births within the population as a whole (sometimes referred to as a "demographic winter": (Vox Andalucía 2019; PP 2019), plus a significant proportion of births being to resident foreign women (INE 2019a, p. 12), together with the fact that the population is rising only because of immigration (INE 2019b). In Germany the pattern is similar (though with a marginally increasing population), with a low birth rate, predominance of immigration over emigration, excess of deaths over births (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018). Inevitably, this results in a reduction of the proportion of the constitutive sovereign nation (*Staatsvolk*) within the population as a whole, presented in the case of AfD as a matter of particular and explicit concern (AfD 2017, 7.1 and 7.7), and in Vox with its "strong support" for large families (Vox España 2018, Item 72) and proposals for family allowances for "Spanish families" with dependent children (Vox España 2018, Item 73) and its insistence on the importance of reducing immigration (Vox España 2018, Section "Inmigración"). This maintenance or increase in what AfD calls "*unsere angestammte Bevölkerung*" (our native population) (AfD 2017, Section 7 "Welcoming Culture for Children, Encouraging Families, and Population Trends) is necessary in order for the constitutive nation, thought of in ethno-cultural terms, to maintain the highest degree of control over both the political process and national culture and values (Gould 2018; AfD 2017, Section 7). With Vox this matter is more implicit, but can be inferred from, for example, the importance attached to the family and the proposed measures to give support particularly to large families outlined earlier, and in the *Manifiesto fundacional* item 10 (Vox España 2014) and the role of folklore and traditions of Spain mentioned above.

4.5. Religion and Language

Within this perspective of social relations, the following subsection will now consider the roles first of religion and then of language.

4.5.1. Religion: Islam versus Christianity

The Christian foundation of the two countries and of Europe as a whole has already been outlined. Both parties see this as fundamental and inseparable from their respective societies and countries. On the other hand, in both Spain and Germany Christian religious observance is dropping noticeably (INE 2019c; Statistisches Bundesamt 2018). Within each country, however, there is the increasing presence of Islam, due principally both to labour-market immigration and to refugee movements (Gould 2018; Merkel 2018)[7]. (Foroutan et al. 2014) have argued that continued migration involves a social structural change. This element is then compounded when Islam is framed as an alien and harmful religion. In the case of Vox the saving of Spain and Europe from the Muslim invasion is viewed as a historic achievement and a mark of Spanish identity never to be forgotten (see above). The task of continuing the protection of Spanish society from the Muslim presence and particularly the Islamist threat has to be maintained (Vox España 2018, Section Defensa, seguridad y fronteras; Vox Andalucía 2019, Item 11). For the AfD, with its strong opposition to Islam arising from its insistence on *deutsche Leitkultur* which is based on the foundations of German culture, Christianity and Enlightenment values, the opposition is absolute and most clearly expressed in the manifesto for the 2017 federal election (AfD 2017; see also AfD EP 2019, Sections 6 and 8):

> Civil Societies in functioning states are called upon to protect and develop their cultures on their own terms. This is naturally true for German cultural identity. The cultural and religious struggle [Kulturkampf] already being fought in Europe and the West between Islam [which is] a doctrine of religious salvation and vector of cultural traditions and legal obligations lying outside any possibility of integration can only be avoided by means of a

[7] Chancellor Merkel to the Bundestag, "Over the last little while Islam has become a part of Germany".

> set of defensive and restrictive measures which prevent further destruction of the European values of peaceful coexistence of enlightened citizens[8].
>
> Section 9.1 "German Defining Culture in the place of Multiculturalism"

In both cases, society and state can be maintained only through citizens' acceptance of a set of values which is, at least, culturally Christian and in opposition to Islam which is viewed as monolithically hostile to fundamental national and European cultural or religious values and traditions.

4.5.2. Language

Mentioned already in connection with the federal or federal-like structure of the national state is the question of subnational minorities. In Germany, which has very small native language minorities, this is not an issue. Danish and Sorbish have some local rights, but this is not felt to be in conflict with German identity. However, for AfD the German language itself holds a central place for identity and identification with country. As outlined in (Gould 2018, 16f) the language and its local variations are marks of German identity to be protected from foreign influences, particularly the use of English in education and administration and the impact of the (for AfD) negatively-connotated "gender ideology" which pushes to remove linguistic forms which mark human gender. The strong resistance to these influences is the result of the conviction that "the national language is the heart of a *Kulturnation*" (AfD 2017, Section 9.2; AfD EP 2019, Section 12.9). *Kulturnation* is a term widely used in German political and other statements to refer, among other things, to the German people's (and state's) possessing a common culture including a widely admired "high culture" of internationally-recognised artistic value.

Fundamentally, Vox shares this same position with respect to Spanish and this creates a very real social problem. For them the importance of Spanish as a unifying factor in the face of "the other Spanish languages" (see below) cannot be overstated. Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution determines that "Castilian is the official Spanish language of the State [i.e., of the country as a whole and of the national government]. All Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it". The same Article then continues, "The other Spanish languages shall also be official in the respective Self-governing Communities in accordance with their Statutes" (Constitución Española 1978, Official English Translation). The Balearic Islands, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre and the Valencian Community have used this article to grant co-official status to their regional language(s) within all or part their territory. The same communities have also used their powers to make their own, differing, arrangements for the use of their language(s) in educational, administrative, and judicial matters.

For Vox, just like the existence of autonomous regions, this situation is incompatible with their vision of national identity and the State: To provide peace, order and good government, and as a sound foundation for community and identity, Spanish society has to have de facto only one language free to be used in all circumstances. In the name of national identity and unity the party wishes (a) to give protection to Spanish, "the shared language of everyone" (*la lengua común de todos*), from denigration or discrimination by any individual or public body, and (b) insists that a knowledge of Spanish alone shall be sufficient to hold any civil service position (Vox España 2018, Item 4). It is important to note that such proposals are tantamount to an attack on local identities above all in the north of Spain, where the three regional languages with co-official status, Galician, Basque, and Catalan, are solely or principally located. At the same time, given that very many schoolteachers are civil servants, if implemented, the measures would undermine the present and future of the languages by weakening their teaching of one or the other of their co-official languages, or their use as vehicular languages of instruction. Along with this, the party insists that throughout the country there be

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[8] For a comment and analysis of this argument see (Gould 2018, p. 36).

created a right to receive schooling in Spanish and that parents alone (rather than legislation by the autonomous communities) have the right to determine the language of education of their children (Vox España 2014, p. 8; Vox España 2018, Item 62; Vox Andalucía 2019, Item 9).

Additionally, just as AfD defines Germany and Germans as a *Kulturnation* as part of definition and identification with territory, so for Vox the cultivation of cultural events, including high culture (Vox España 2018, Item 66; Vox España 2014, p. 1; Vox España EA 2019, Item 35), is a desideratum in the ongoing insistence on the importance and manifestation of national specificity against the current impact of other cultures and the ideas of a multiculturalism which is allegedly bent on robbing Europe of its identity and awareness of its past (Vox España EP 2019, Introduction "En Europa por España"). At the same time, insistence on the Spanish language reinforces the link to a glorious past (see above), *hispanidad*, the role that Spain played in world history, and the desire to extend its contemporary influence in international affairs through connections with the Spanish-speaking world (Vox España 2018, Item 100; Vox España EP 2019).

The following table (Table 1) provides an overview of the parties' positions on their respective nation and its identity:

Table 1. An overview of the parties' positions on their respective nation and its identity.

Alternative für Deutschland	**VOX España**
National Identity Is Threatened	**National Identity Is Threatened**
National identity is: (a) Closely associated with the Constitution, but also cultural (b) closely associated with Europe-wide cultural values, including Christianity (c) contrasted with Islam and strongly rejects Islam (d) closely associated with the traditional family, including for reasons of natality, hence rejection of (feminist) "ideologies" which promote changes in women's position in society (e) expressed by the national language (German), and consequently it must be protected and promoted (f) closely associated with values summarised in *deutsche Leitkultur* and *Heimat* (g) high culture and local culture	National identity is: (a) Above all pre-Constitutional, and also cultural; the Constitution has a fundamental flaw (b) closely associated with Europe-wide cultural values, including Christianity (c) contrasted with Islam and strongly rejects Islam (d) closely associated with the traditional family, including for reasons of natality, hence rejection of (feminist) "ideologies" which promote changes in women's position in society (e) expressed by the national language (Spanish only) and consequently it must be protected and promoted (f) closely associated with values summarised in *hispanidad* and *arraigo* (g) high culture and local culture
Emphasis on unrestricted popular sovereignty of the ethno-cultural nation as the locus of democracy, consequently: (a) Hostility to EU because of limitations resulting from encroachment by the existing treaties (b) call for new treaties which respect national sovereignty; failing that—Dexit (c) national courts to be free of supranational oversight (d) advocates the introduction of important elements of direct democracy at the national level (e) advocates other measures to reduce party control (f) call for total national control of borders and immigration (g) national preferences to be re-introduced in the areas of social and economic policy	Emphasis on unrestricted popular sovereignty of the ethno-cultural nation as the locus of freedom, consequently: (a) Hostility to EU because of limitations resulting from encroachment by the existing treaties (b) call for new treaties which respect national sovereignty; failing that—Spexit (c) national courts to be free of supranational oversight (d) NIL (e) NIL (f) call for total national control of borders and immigration (g) national preferences to be reintroduced in the areas of social and economic policy
All threats and problems outlined above result from the dangerous incompetence and corruption of the old-line parties (including their interactions with the EU and acceptance of EU practices and policies)	All threats and problems outlined above result from the dangerous incompetence and corruption of the old-line parties (including their interactions with the EU and acceptance of EU practices and policies)
	Rejection of regional separatism, and explicitly that of Catalonia
Acceptance of the federal structure of the national state	Total rejection of the quasi-federal structure of the national state: the aim is recentralisation
No position on minority languages recognised at the state level (Danish; Sorbish)	Significant restrictions on the use and position of co-official languages (Basque; Catalan; Galician)
Absence of territorial claims	Call for return of Gibraltar to Spain

5. Performing Crisis

It has long been acknowledged that far-right and far-right-populist discourses of national identity include the assertion that the national group is endangered by a 'crisis' (Laclau 2005; Pirro and Taggart 2018). This may have internal or external origins, be political or economic, social, cultural, linguistic, have a long or short time-horizon, result from one or several 'enemies' including local elites. The revealing part of the crisis presentations of Vox and AfD is that each incorporates several dimensions: The political, the social, the economic, the cultural, the linguistic, the short-term, the long-term. Common to both discourses is the European Union, presented as responsible for restriction of popular and national sovereignty and attacks on revered cultural values including a conservative view of the family and gender identity. Similarly, there is the question of Muslin immigration. Shared responsibility is attributed also to the existing parties which have permitted and even promoted these phenomena. The old-line parties are unfit to govern in the two important senses that they are principally focused on their own advantage: Ensuring their control over the mechanisms of government to maintain themselves and their acolytes with steady and lucrative employment and, as is widely and publicly acknowledged in Spain, outright corruption at all levels including purely personal financial advantage as distinct from the party's financial advantage (Gómez Reino and Llamares 2019; Hawkins et al. 2019). In each case the new right-wing party, unburdened with either legacy policies or any history of political concessions, nor with any past opportunity to become corrupt, presents itself with stern warnings and stern measures as the saviour of country and national unity.

The paper will now turn to the question of the performance of crisis as the central element of each of the parties' communication strategies to transmit their views of national identity. In Section 2, Outline and Methodology, the paper introduced Moffitt's view of the importance of crisis as a fundamental part of populist style and his six-step model as a framework of analysis. This arose in connection with his view of the increasing mediatisation of politics (Moffitt and Tormey 2014) in the modern world. It appears that he and his sources were thinking of media in the more traditional sense of radio, television, and press. However, in addition to these, the expanding range of social media is now being extensively and intensively used for political communication by parties, groups, and individuals. Consequently, this section will also advance the view that rapid technological developments have made possible a more intensive performance of crisis than Moffitt might have envisioned.

The six points of Moffitt's framework are:

1. Identify failure.
2. Elevate the level of crisis by linking into a wider framework and adding a temporal dimension.
3. Frame 'the people' versus those responsible for the crisis.
4. Use media to propagate performance.
5. Present simple solutions and strong leadership.
6. Continue to propagate crisis.

The parties' practices on the fundamental question of national identity are the following:

1. Identify failure.

Both parties insist on their conviction that their nation and country are ill-served by current domestic political and international arrangements. The situation is so dire that the future existence of both nation and country in any way identifiable as wholly "Spanish" or "German" can no longer be presumed to be guaranteed. This represents a broad and monumental failure in multiple areas by the old-line parties of government.

2. Elevate to the level of crisis by linking into a wider framework and adding a temporal dimension:

This situation exists not only on the national dimension but also at the European level. Europe's fundamental political structure of nation states and its Christianity-based social and familial cultures and its sovereign-nation-state-based national identities are equally threatened by the same

political incapacity to deal with recent-past, current, and foreseeable-future threats at the national and Europe-wide levels. The problem is so grave that immediate action is essential; no short-term solution is possible; only concerted and radical action will bring relief and remedy.

3. Frame 'the people' versus those responsible for the crisis:

Both nations are the victims of their professionalised political classes who use their positions of power for selfish ends, rather than listening to the voices of the people. Vox España frames itself as the voice of the overlooked honourable, honest, virtuous common man and woman (Abascal 2018), while (Butterwegge et al. 2018, p. 35) consider the selection of the name Alternative for Germany to be "optimal or even a stroke of genius", appealing to those who feel themselves overlooked and who desire an alternative politics. In addition, the old-line parties have made possible the Muslim presence in each country and in Europe in general, contrary to the wishes and interests of the people and contrary also to fundamental European civilisational values.

4. Use media to propagate performance:

Each of the parties is well aware of the need to use all means of communication as effectively and frequently as possible. This includes the traditional media and social media.

A confidential AfD strategy paper drawn up in preparation for the German state and federal elections in 2017 emphasises that the party "must be consciously, calculatedly and repeatedly politically incorrect" [underlined in the original] "and not be afraid of carefully planned provocation" (AfD 2016, pp. 10–11). It adds "The more they [the old-line parties] attempt to stigmatise the AfD for its provocative words or actions, the better that is for the image of the AfD" [also underlined in the original]. Not only will it distinguish the AfD from old-line parties, but the reactions will get media coverage beyond that accorded to the original AfD activities themselves. The analysis by (Schroeder et al. 2017) of social media accounts of AfD members of state parliaments shows that by the date of the strategy paper just mentioned AfD online activity was already well established. Developing ideas first outlined in 2016, (Vowe 2016, 2017) even concludes not only that the rapid rise of AfD would not have been possible without the existence of social media, but that this party knew better than any other in Germany how to manipulate opinion and determine the topics of talkshows (very popular in Germany) and editorials. He concludes that successful communication via text messages is now essential for the success of a populist party. Citing a range of scholarly sources, (Diehl et al. 2019) draw attention to the extreme activity of AfD on the web, particularly Facebook, and emphasises the influence AfD is able to exercise in this way. (Ruhose 2019, p. 16) concludes that the AfD's behaviour and use of language in its first year in the Bundestag is a "success story" and that they will continue to use "polarising statements, provocation and emotion" as a fundamental strategy. AfD has grasped the value of provocative utterances and actions to continue getting attention in the public at large. Additionally, just as Vox is benefitting from fake Twitter (and other) accounts which it may or may not have promoted (see below), AfD is known to be directly instrumental in the creation of such accounts, postings and re-tweets, etc., in order to promote its views and also individual AfD politicians (Reuter 2017, 2019). In addition, persons with a high profile in the AfD organisation tweet seemingly in their own name and in a more provocative manner than might be possible from the party account. A particular example of this was the case of Beate von Storch's harsh comments about Arab men in 2017. This enabled the party's Islamophobic and xenophobic views to be widely repeated in the traditional media without the party itself being directly accountable (Butterwegge et al. 2018, p. 341).

Vox grasped equally by the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019 the importance of provocation. It is quite clear that a number of the proposals in *100 medidas* are extreme and the proposed abolition of the autonomous communities and transfer of powers to the central government would represent a radical change in the way Spain is governed, so radical in fact that the constitutional changes could not in reality be achieved (Castillo 2019). After the 2 December elections in Andalusia, Vox had the votes the PP needed to form a government. It submitted to the PP a public set of proposals representing their

negotiating position. Many of the radical claims made at the national level, as well as some others, are contained in the document *Propuestas de Vox para la investidura del presidente del gobierno de Andalucía* (Vox Andalucía 2019). They are extreme in the sense that it was known in advance that they could not be realised in the then-current political context (and some of them probably never). In addition to stating the party's views, they are there also to provoke, and to provoke in such a way that they ensure media coverage and thus create free publicity. Particularly the proposals contained in Items (16) to (18) to repeal the Act to prevent Violence against Women (16), the Act to guarantee the Rights of Equality of Treatment and Non-discrimination of LGBTI Persons and their Families (17), and the Act to promote the Equality of the Sexes (18) provoked very large demonstrations throughout both Andalusia and Spain in mid-January 2019 when the new Andalusian Parliament met for the first time, and received significant media coverage (Valdés and Mora 2019).

Although (as yet) there appears to be no scholarly analysis of Vox's continuing use of social media (the ISD report *The Great Replacement* (Davey and Ebner 2019) mentions Vox just five times and deals only with the Andalusia campaign) two things emerge very clearly from investigations and reports in the quality press. Firstly, Vox has used and continues to use social media intensely; secondly it keeps the messaging clear and simple, repeating the fundamentals of its positions: Islamophobia, Catalan separatism, the no doubt Bannon-influenced *España lo primero* (Spain first) or *hacer a España grande otra vez* (Make Spain great again), and opposition to "feminist ideologies" always presented as totally opposed to traditional Spanish values. (Applebaum 2019) comments on the success of the tweets of two leading figures of Vox (Rocío Monasterio and Iván Espinosa) in putting on a show to get attention. However, in this they are repeating the strategy of Abascal himself. His Twitter account, for instance, contains a stream of tweets with images showing him in rooms full of followers (or noting that many people could not get in) in different parts of the country (the locations are always specified) with comments repeating the party's basic positions and/or denigrating political opponents (Abascal 2019). At the same time, (Peinado 2019) cites a report by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue in London that a network of nearly 3000 fake twitter accounts was sending Islamophobic messages and/or messages in support of Vox, particularly during the election campaign in the spring of 2019. Vox cannot be unaware of this, but one can reasonably assume that they are unconcerned. The fact that they are false is not significant; that they perform the crisis defined by Vox is. Cristina Monge of the University of Saragossa has pointed out that by means of such statements, and others, Vox succeeded in largely controlling the online news cycle just as Trump was doing at the same time. She refers to Lakoff's statement, "Trump uses social media as a weapon to control the news cycle. It works like a charm. His tweets are tactical rather than substantive. They mostly fall into one of these four categories": For example, pre-emptive framing, diversion, deflection, trial balloon (Lakoff 2018) (quoted in Rubio Hancock 2019).

The two Avaaz reports published in 2019, *WhatsApp: Social Media's Dark Web* (Avaaz 2019a) covering only Spain, and *Far Right Networks of Deception* (Avaaz 2019b) which analyses far-right Facebook networks in a number of European countries including Spain and Germany, reveal more of the extent of functioning networks not overtly associated with a party but which employ falsified information explicitly or implicitly to support policies or views of Vox or AfD, as the case may be. As noted above, WhatsApp is intensively used in Spain by the vast majority of smartphone subscribers, and the investigation indicated that 26% of persons entitled to vote had received such messages. It was Avaaz and not Vox which persuaded Facebook to take down offending networks five days before the elections on 28 April, arguing that they were contrary to company policy. Such messaging and sharing by individuals or groups in effect become part of the performance of crisis by the party in question: The diffusion and reinforcement of the view that the country is in a state of existential crisis which is threatening values held dear and which consequently endanger national identity.

It is clear that rapid electronic communication via the range of platforms now available is open to all parties without distinction and in ways which Moffitt could hardly envision when writing in 2014 for publication in 2015. However, it is also clear that the existence of instant transmission of text, image

and sound facilitates performance of crises in the way that he conceived it: It enables the cost-free and rapid spread of focused and developing information in the categories mentioned, without the party itself having to be directly involved further. Spain has more mobile phones than inhabitants (Statista 2019b), 90% of whom access WhatsApp from their phone (Statista 2019c). In Germany there are in 2019 61.5 million smartphone users (Statista 2019a). The party has only to provide the information of a particular provocative type around their basic themes which, in the case of both parties, are particularly concerned with the failure of traditional parties to defend and develop national identity. Provocation stimulates traditional media for the sake of circulation and revenue, but provocation by electronic media also stimulates individuals to be better integrated and better regarded by their peers in the communication of their ideas and ideals and feel themselves in touch with, and appreciated by, the party of their liking—without their having taken the formal step of joining (Gutiérrez-Rubí n.d.).

5. Present simple solutions and strong leadership:

With the new party statutes approved (Vox España 2019a) in an online vote before the party congress on 23 February 2019, Vox reinforced the centralisation of its structures conferring significantly more power on the President (Santiago Abascal) and the National Executive (the two are elected together) than under the old statutes (approved 18 October 2015; Vox España 2015). In fact, the candidate for president includes the eleven names of the National Executive in his candidacy (Vox España 2019a, Article 23). The new statutes also restrict voting rights of new members, abolish internal primary elections and provincial committees. This new structure also means that there are no formal structures at the municipal level or that of the autonomous communities. This, apparently, was done as a reaction to the tenfold rise in membership to 36,000 in the preceding year and ensures that Abascal can maintain his centralised control over the party (González 2019). In the same line of thinking, Vox stated that these changes were being made in order to guarantee that its message did not change in the face of changed circumstances (Vox España 2019b).

As already noted above, AfD has been the most successful German party in the use of electronic media for the propagation of its views on the crises of German identity and proposals for solutions. In this it has been helped by the staggered electoral system in Germany, where states hold their elections at different dates. This permits repetition or adjustment of messages, concentration on certain geographical areas as required, and development of communication techniques and strategies. The presence of the party in the EP, in local councils and three state parliaments (Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg) since 2014 and then in other parliaments in the following years until by 2018 the AfD was represented in the Bundestag and all state parliaments, promoted this process. Parliamentary membership and the increased vote also provided significant funding from legitimate public sources. In addition, the elected representatives used the platforms provided to propagate their views on problems and solutions (Butterwegge et al. 2018; Schroeder et al. 2017), frequently in a provocative manner, as laid out in the confidential AfD strategy document for the 2017 election where members are enjoined "to be repeatedly politically incorrect" (AfD 2016, p. 10).

On the other hand, past splits within the party on ideological, personal, and regional lines (Butterwegge et al. 2018) including high-level resignations (Spiegel Online 2017), and the fact that AfD currently has two party chairmen (Alexander Gauland and Jörg Meuthen) undermine any claim that AfD has a single strong leader. In July 2019 Meuthen's criticism of the extreme nationalist position of the regional party president in Thuringia, Jörn Höcke, resulted in the former being rejected by the base in his home county (*Kreis*) as a delegate to the party congress in November 2019 (FAZ 2019). As this indicates, there is no central coordination in AfD's functioning at the local level, nor is there such coordination between state and federal parliamentarians (Butterwegge et al. 2018, p. 95). Notwithstanding that, and the existence of organised units at the state level—*Landesverbände*—(a very different organisational structure from that of Vox), AfD consistently maintains its position on the crisis resulting from the serious harm done to national identity and the need rapidly to repair this harm by redefining the relationship with the EU, reforming the EU, weakening the parties' hold

over the legislatures and shifting more power to the sovereign people by increased use of referenda (see above). Importantly, this question of German identity with its strong nationalist overtones and strong rejection of Islam is the central message which holds the disparate trends and wings in the party together (Butterwegge et al. 2018, p. 64).

The pressures to speak bluntly and provocatively by party officials or ambitious party members on the topic of the nation and its identity emerge from the example cited above of the rejection of one of the party's national co-chairmen by his local party association. In this connection a highly relevant general comment has materialised from within the party. An individual who left the AfD has stated, "The base likes blunt talk as they see it as proof that they [officials and ambitious party members] have not been 'bent out of shape' and 'have remained true to the cause'. This means that that candidate gets elected who has the strongest polarising effect. If you speak moderately you make yourself suspect" (Quoted in Butterwegge et al. 2018, p. 348). Within the party, also, performing crisis pays, thus ensuring the continuation of the practice.

As outlined above, the solutions proposed by Vox to the social and political challenges of modern Spain are very simple, direct, and constantly repeated: They are contained in the first ten items of *100 medidas* (Vox España 2018): (1) Suspension of Catalan autonomy, (2) banning of separatist parties and organisations, (3) providing maximum legal protection to national symbols, (4) no discriminatory measures against the Spanish language, (5) suppression of the police forces of the autonomous communities, (6) abolition of the autonomous communities, (7) increase of diplomatic pressure for the return of Gibraltar to Spain, (8) creation of an integrated plan for making better known the Spanish contributions to world history, (9) repeal of the Act concerning Historical Memory, and (10) abolition of the special financial and fiscal arrangements with the Basque Country and Navarre. Most of these would, in fact, be very hard, if not quite impossible, to achieve (see, for example, (Castillo 2019)). However, nuance is not provocative, does not stimulate media attention, re-tweeting, WhatsApp group conversations, forwards, etc. and the party knows that. By the end of 2018, i.e., at the start of the important series of elections throughout Spain, Vox had become the Spanish party reaching the most people via electronic communication, and using short sharp statements to propagate their fundamental message on Catalonia, Muslims, protection, and love of country (Viejo 2018).

6. Continuing crisis propagation:

This means remaining constantly active, maintaining communication on chosen fundamental themes, remaining provocative, and providing rapid reactions to events of the day. At the current time this implies intense use of social media and exploitation of the traditional media's need to report on political matters. On the supply side, none of the factors underlying the two parties' conservative visions of national identity will disappear in the near future. This, together with the fact that the solutions proposed are largely unrealisable (the lack of success can be blamed on the old-line parties) plus the additional fact that political communication (and particularly that of populist parties) is no longer dependent on print media or broadcasting, which are largely outside the new parties' control, means that the continuing performance of crisis propagation will remain a permanent and important part of the communication by Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland of their views on national identity.

6. Conclusions

The previous sections have outlined the important parallels in the positions on national identity of the two parties under discussion. In an overview of papers presented at a roundtable with the theme "Why has Nationalism not run its Course"? (Harris 2016) speaks of three particular triumphs of the contemporary nation-state: National identity, sovereign statehood, and democracy. It is instructive to consider briefly these three concepts in the light of the positions of AfD and Vox which view all three as being in a situation of crisis. In addition, the three are inseparable from each other, and the parties state that their aim is to preserve them from forces which are equally inseparable from the

contemporary world: Migration (leading to population diversity), supranational political organisations, and economic Europeanisation/globalisation. (Pirro et al. 2018) have spoken of the frames by which populist Eurosceptic parties view and present European crises; this paper has extended this model also to the right-wing Vox in Spain.

The importance given by the parties to notions of language, culture, ancestry, descent (all relating to a mythical or admirable past which is extended into the present) are to be found in *Heimat*, *arraigo*, *hispanidad*, *deutsche Leitkultur* and are fundamental for their view of national identity. They demonstrate the backwards step away from any idea of the nation as a constructed community or community of choice à la Hobsbawm or Anderson. The parties present their *Volk* or *nación* as a homogenous ethno-cultural nation and in dire need of protection. This ethnic participation to the maximum extent possible in political decisions at the nation-state level is the guarantee of democracy. It is also a characteristic Europe-wide phenomenon which functions within a set of European values, one important source of which is Christianity. All these factors mark a fundamental distinction from Islam and its middle-Eastern or African adherents living in Europe or moving towards Europe.

(Harris 2016) also writes that these nineteenth-century ideas of political organisation have created "a set of political references whose meaning is so deeply entrenched in people's consciousness that the absence of an effective alternative creates a near existential anxiety". This view is elaborated on by Hosking in one of the papers given at the roundtable which Harris is summarising (Hosking 2016). It is the absence of "an effective alternative" which is key in the two cases studied. As has been seen, Vox and AfD are at pains to emphasise that the alternative which appears to exist, the EU, is neither effective in its promotion of the wellbeing of the people, nor is it legitimate in its existence. This is because the people are the only legitimate source of sovereignty and there is no European sovereign people. In their eyes the Union's existence and development have weakened national sovereignty and therefore democracy. The EU is also, they argue, attempting to weaken national identity by propagating social values alien to ones anchored in tradition and Christianity, including the relationship of men and women, and the definition of the family.

The situation, then, is the following: In the view of each of the parties, the processes of Europeanisation (allowed and encouraged by incompetent or corrupt politicians) have created a crisis for their view of national identity and the nation state—a crisis which they set out ostensibly to combat, but in fact are exploiting and even extending in order to consolidate and develop their own influence by means of the continuing performance of crisis. Their view is in fundamental opposition to the conviction, developed by European states and by the European Union in the late twentieth century, of the urgent necessity of shared sovereignty and mutual responsibility in order to promote political, social, and economic wellbeing across a fractious and fractured European continent which is now also faced with the economic forces of globalisation. To promote and perform their view of the crisis of national identity the parties are using the technological achievements of the twenty-first century to attack the late-twentieth-century political and social achievements of the European Union in order to replace them with the nineteenth-century concept of the distinct ethno-cultural nation unrestrictedly sovereign in its own nation-state. For the two countries in question which currently define themselves as active and committed members of the European Union, this would mean a radical shift in national identity.

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Article

Conflict in Catalonia: A Sociological Approximation

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Abstract: This article follows the approach originally pioneered by Juan Linz to the empirical study of nationalism. We make use of original survey data to situate the emergent social division around the question of independence within a broader constellation of power relations. We bring into focus a variety of demographic, cultural, behavioral and attitudinal indicators with which this division is associated. We emphasize the special salience of language practices and ideologies in conditioning, if not determining, attitudes towards independence. We stress the continuing legacy of what Linz famously referred to as a "three-cornered conflict" among "regional nationalists, the central government and immigrant workers," which has long conditioned democratic politics in the region. More concretely, we show how the reinforcing cleavages of language and class are reflected in, and indeed have been exacerbated by, the ongoing political conflict between pro-independence and pro-unionist camps in Catalonia. At the same time, we highlight that near half of the Catalan citizenry has come to register a rather intense preference in favor of independence, and we conclude that this sociological reality renders it quite difficult for Spanish authorities to enforce the will of the Spanish majority without appearing to tyrannize the Catalan minority.

Keywords: Catalonia; language; class; identity; three-cornered conflict; independence

1. Introduction

Among the many interpretations that have been advanced to explain the dynamics of the recent wave of contentious mobilization around the cause of self-determination for Catalonia, few have paid sufficiently close attention to the contours and content of the divide between those who support independence and those who oppose it.[1] The drive for secession has certainly triggered a significant degree of controversy and conflict, not only between Catalan and Spanish authorities, but also among Catalans themselves. This article will analyze the emergent social division around the question of independence. We will bring into focus a variety of demographic, cultural, behavioral and attitudinal indicators with which this division is associated, and will emphasize the special salience of language practices and ideologies in conditioning, if not determining, attitudes towards independence. To do this, we will make extensive use of an original survey, named LinPolCat, that we had commissioned in February of 2016 with a representative sample of 2202 respondents, ranging in age between 18 and 95 years (with a mean of 49), and with 48.3% of male respondents.[2]

[1] Our claim is not that the literature is bereft of a significant debate about the social bases of support for independence in Catalonia; such a debate does exist, as we document below. However, in our opinion, this existing debate focuses excessively on the search for causal inferences, and in the process, sacrifices describing with sufficient precision the nature of the region's emergent social division between unionists and independentists.

[2] The survey, "Linguistic Policy in the Catalan School System" (LingPolCat, for short), was conducted in May 2016. The questionnaire was prepared by Roberto Garvía and Thomas Jeffrey Miley. Telephone interviews were conducted with a

Although there have been many surveys conducted relating to the question of independence, our survey is unique, due especially to its very rich battery of questions about linguistic attitudes and practices. The fact that our survey combines such a rich battery about linguistic attitudes and practices with a robust set of questions about attitudes towards independence, including original measures for preference intensity, allows for a detailed and nuanced inquiry into the relationship between linguistic attitudes and practices and the emergent social division between unionists and independentists in Catalonia.

One of the most original aspects of our survey is the close attention it pays to attitudes about language policy. Indeed, the combination of a rich battery of questions about language ideologies, alongside the robust set of questions related to attitudes about independence, allows us to make a distinct contribution that relates with a rather high degree of precision attitudes about language to attitudes about independence. Given the long-standing emphasis in much of the literature on the centrality of language in the Catalan nationalist repertoire, e.g., (Conversi 1997), a close empirical examination of the relation between language ideologies and support for independence seems well-justified.

The article begins with an overview of relevant context and contending interpretations of the dynamics of the recent cycle of Catalan nationalist mobilization. It then turns to hone in on the continuing legacy of what Juan Linz termed a "three-cornered conflict" among "regional nationalists, the central government and immigrant workers" that has long conditioned democratic politics in the region (Linz 1973). The article continues by following the method pioneered by Linz and his collaborators in their classic, *Conflicto en Euskadi* (Linz et al. 1986), to illuminate the nature of the divide in Catalan society over the question of independence through a descriptive analysis of the relation of opinions about independence to a variety of relevant variables.

A close look at the survey data reveals that latent social divisions, associated with the reinforcing cleavages of language and class, are reflected in, and indeed have been exacerbated by, the emergence of a salient political conflict between pro-independence and pro-unionist camps in Catalonia.

The method of descriptive analysis of survey data employed by Linz and his collaborators in *Conflicto en Euskadi* is all too often ignored by social scientists of this generation, who are all too eager to jump to causal inferences about the relative weight of different variables, *ceteris paribus*, and in the process neglect paying sufficient attention to an accurate description of how social divisions are embedded in constellations of material and social relations. Indeed, we would contend that such descriptive analysis helps to reveal the significance of social divisions as they are lived and experienced in society perhaps even better than multi-variable regressions can—simply because, in the social world, all factors are never held constant. Our purpose is thus not to show which variable or variables can be inferred to have the strongest causal impact, when other variables are held constant. Instead, we set out to describe with precision the contours and content of the emergent social division between unionists and independentists in Catalan society. In a word, our research question is not conceived along the lines of "What causes support for or opposition to independence for Catalonia"? Instead, we ask, "Who are the unionists? And conversely, who are the independentists"?

Posing these as the central questions for analysis allows for a better understanding of the nature of this emergent and increasingly salient cleavage in Catalan society. Doing so helps bring into focus the main correlates of different preferences towards secession, thereby allowing us to see how these preferences intersect with other societal cleavages and how they are embedded in and are influenced by, and potentially influence broader constellations of power relations.

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random sample of 2202 subjects, stratified by province. The fieldwork was carried out by the firm *Imop*. Microdata are publicly available at: https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

2. Conflict in Catalonia

The impressive wave of contentious mobilization in favor of independence in Catalonia, which began in 2012, has provoked a constitutional crisis in Spain. It has led to a serious confrontation between Catalan and Spanish authorities, including a brief suspension of regional autonomy, as well as the incarceration and trial, on a variety of charges ranging from rebellion to misuse of public funds, of over a dozen former members of the regional government, of the former head of the regional police force and of prominent public figures involved in organizing the independence drive, not to mention the exile, to Brussels, of the former regional President, Carles Puigdemont.

The challenge to the constitutional order posed by the Catalan authorities' pursuit on two separate occasions, in November of 2014 and again in October of 2017, of unconstitutional, unilateral referendums on independence, has been met with a bout of unflinching repression by the Spanish authorities (Cetrà et al. 2018; Colino and Hombrado 2015). This combination of defiance and repression has called into question the fate and future of the so-called *Estado de las Autonomías*, the quasi-federal set of arrangements for regional autonomy that had been devised and developed in accordance with the constitutional consensus forged at the time of Spain's transition to democracy.

The transition to democracy in Spain was long hailed as exemplary, and the treatment of the *stateness* question was certainly considered central to its success (Linz 1985a; Linz and Stepan 1996). Representatives of the Catalan nationalist movement and the Catalan left participated actively in the constitution-making process, and the constitution was even ratified with slightly higher levels of support in the region than in the rest of the country in the December 1978 referendum on it (Gunther et al. 2004; Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010). This is in no small part because the constitution was seen as delivering on the popular demand for regional autonomy. Indeed, Article 2 of the Constitution had recognized and guaranteed the right to self-government for Spain's "regions" and "nationalities," even if at the same time, it had insisted upon "the indivisible unity of the Spanish nation" (Entrena Cuesta 1985; Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010). A squaring of the circles of sorts, no doubt, but one that was deemed a significant achievement by Catalan nationalists at the time.

One generation's victory can come to be perceived as capitulation by the next. Such is the capriciousness of collective memory, and why Jefferson was perhaps right to indict constitutions for threatening to enshrine the tyranny of the dead over the living (Holmes 1988). These days, the Spanish Constitution has come into considerable disrepute, especially in Catalan nationalist circles, but also beyond. Its once-famous consensus, now reframed by revisionists as but a pact of forgetting, the continuities with the Franco regime, the impunity of its officials, evermore stressed (Antentas 2015; Domènech 2014; Gallego 2008; Navarro 2006; Santamaría 2012; Beneyto 2007).

The connection between legitimacy and legality has been seriously eroded, with broad swathes of the Catalan population coming to reject as but a tyrannical imposition the validity of the constitutional order, much less the enforcement of the rule of law (Miley 2017; Miley 2019). The long-awaited decision by the Constitutional Court in 2010 to strike down a few of the key provisions of the 2006 expansive reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, which had been ratified via referendum by the Catalan demos, marks the moment in which the symbiosis between legitimacy and legality was perhaps definitively torn asunder (Colino and Olmeda 2012; Pi-Sunyer 2013).

The nationalist movement in Catalonia has been in power at the regional level near-continuously, ever since the transition to democracy and the restoration of autonomy. It has used this power to advance a project of national reconstruction, with a particular focus on efforts at linguistic normalization, but also an emphasis on achieving ever higher degrees of regional autonomy (Miley 2006). Especially since the outbreak of the financial crisis, but also before, the movement has stressed the urgent need for higher levels of fiscal autonomy, a campaign which has met considerable resistance on the part of Spanish authorities (Castells 2014; De La Fuente 2014; Morata 2013). It is indeed noteworthy that the failure of efforts by the regional authorities to negotiate a better fiscal deal for Catalonia immediately preceded the conversion to the cause of independence by then-regional President Artur Mas in the

summer of 2012 (Basta 2012; Colomer 2017; Dalle Mulle 2017; Della Porta and O'Connor 2017; Dowling 2014; Miley 2017).

There has been a veritable proliferation of interpretations of the dynamics propelling the impressive wave of contentious mobilization in favor of independence since 2012, with most commentators emphasizing its bottom-up grassroots dimension, e.g., (Della Porta and O'Connor 2017; Dowling 2017; Guibernau 2013, 2014; Micó and Carbonell 2017).[3] Such a popular appeal is undeniable, although the role of the regional authorities and of the regional media has been, of course, pivotal too, both over the longer term, in the waging of what Gramsci called the war of position (i.e., in advancing the Catalan peoplehood project), as well as in the more recent mobilizations in favor of independence (Miley 2005, 2006, 2013, 2014, 2017; Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2018).

Missing from most of these accounts, however, is any attempt to describe with sufficient precision the bases of support for the independence cause, much less the nature of the divide that the conflict between the Catalan and Spanish authorities has caused among Catalans themselves. This article will attempt to do just that. However, before turning to investigate the contours and content of this divide through a close look at the results of our original survey data, let us first situate this piece of research within a broader research agenda, one pioneered by the efforts of the late political sociologist, Juan Linz.[4]

3. Still a Three-Cornered Conflict?

In his classic text, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms against the State: The Case of Spain," first published two years before the death of Franco, in 1973, Juan Linz emphasized the existence of a "three-cornered conflict, among regional nationalists, the central government and immigrant workers" in early twentieth century Catalonia. He argued that "the ethnic cultural conflict" between center and 'periphery' was "overlaid on a bitter class struggle," a struggle in which "much of the working class protest faced by [Catalan employers] was from an immigrant labor force affiliated with Spanish labor movements." Indeed, he insisted, "Catalan politics makes no sense if this variable is not taken into account" (Linz 1973, p. 69).

The existence of this three-cornered conflict, Linz maintained, had served to set definite limits to the appeal of "linguistic, cultural, peripheral oppositions challenging the central power" in Catalonia, as well as in the Basque Country. Its existence, in turn, was a product of the fact that both regions "were fundamentally industrial areas, in fact the most industrialized in the country," a fact which Linz claimed distinguished them from "many other European societies" where linguistic and cultural challenges to the central power emerged instead "in agricultural, economically underdeveloped regions, often from a society based on peasant communalism" (p. 67). In contrast to such underdeveloped regions, in the complex industrial context of Catalonia, in particular, "for most of the working class . . . linguistic rights and administrative autonomy took second place compared to their conflicts with their employers." Nor could such class conflicts be conceived in "primarily ethnic terms," pitting local workers against "foreign" exploiters, simply because the vast majority of "employers were not Castilian but Catalan speaking." And so, to the extent that such class conflicts contained "an ethno-linguistic" dimension, they pit "immigrant laborers" against "the local bourgeoisie" (p. 70).

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[3] For an account that seeks to move beyond the debate about top-down versus bottom-up, emphasizing the movement's "multi-dimensional" nature, see Crameri (2015). Much scholarly debate has focused on the related issue of the determinants of support for Catalan independence. For an account that emphasizes the strategic behavior of political parties, see Elias (2015). For an account that emphasises the significance of economic grievances over the lack of fiscal autonomy in support for independence, see Boylan (2015). For accounts that highlight the role of subjective identity and ethnicity, see Burg (2015) and Chernyha and Burg (2012). See also Serrano (2013), who makes an empirical case for a broad appeal of independence across different segments of Catalan society and Muñoz and Tormos (2015), who highlight the significance of "instrumental" support for independence.

[4] For a volume that covers the bulk of Linz's research agenda on nationalism, see Montero and Miley (2008).

Moreover, according to Linz, this three-cornered conflict had not been overcome in the decades since, despite the radical political, social, and economic transformations that had taken place by the twilight of the Franco regime. The bitterness of the class struggle may have been ameliorated, though never fully effaced; nor, for that matter, had Catalan nationalist sentiment been extirpated, erased, or forgotten. To the contrary, the regime's repressive policies, in combination with the rapid capitalist development of the post-autarchy period and "a new leftist ideology in much of Western Europe," resulted in the survival, indeed even the reinforcement of, Catalan nationalist sentiment across broad segments of Catalan society (Linz 1989, p. 260). But at the same time, the same rapid capitalist development of the post-autarchy period also ensured an even greater influx of Castilian-speaking internal-migrants among the rank and file of the working class in Catalonia's growing urban and industrial centers, which Linz predicted would continue to constitute a serious demographic challenge to the appeal of the Catalan nationalist cause and, by extension, a serious obstacle to effort to accommodate it (Linz 1973, p. 72).

Linz would not ignore the possibility of assimilation of these internal migrants into the Catalan language and identity, both through intermarriage and education; nevertheless, he expected that such assimilation "would be obstructed" by a continuing influx of Castilian-speaking internal migrants, as "required by industrial growth" and "reinforced by a birth rate differential" (Linz 1973, p. 72). This expectation, however, would not come to pass. Instead, the oil crises of the 1970s and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods' system would hit Spain especially hard, leading to an abrupt halt to migration trends. Indeed, not until the end of the 1990s would significant rates of in-migration resume, this time of the international sort, only to dry up again at the end of the new century's first decade, again as a result of the asymmetric exposure to international economic crisis across the Iberian peninsula.

Linz would compare the situation of the internal migrant in Catalonia to that of Spanish guest workers in Switzerland or West Germany, where "second-class citizenship might be tolerable;" by contrast, "in a more or less autonomous Catalonia," Linz predicted, a region the internal migrant is likely to consider "part of Spain, his country," any such second-class status "would probably provoke serious conflicts." And yet, Linz would continue, "any official recognition of the local language as a privileged means of communication . . . inevitably would place" the internal migrant "in a situation of inferiority unless he were willing and able to assimilate." Such willingness and ability on the part of the internal migrant, Linz would add, could certainly be facilitated by "opportunities for rapid social mobility for himself and his children;" even so, the Castilian-speaking internal migrants were unlikely "to split on the issue." Furthermore, Linz warned, "[a]ny effort at rapid and forceful assimilation likely to be advanced by nationalist extremists who want to even the score with the Castilian assimilation policy of past decades would certainly lead to conflicts" (Linz 1973, p. 72).

Thus, not only did Linz expect the Catalan question to continue to be characterized by the existence of a three-cornered conflict, so too did he consider this one of the main factors rendering it "doubtful that any politician of Catalonia could, in a foreseeable future, create sufficient unanimity for a secessionist solution." Not for this reason alone, though, since, according to Linz, "too many Catalans . . . consider themselves Spaniards; the social, economic, historic, emotional, and other ties are too strong;" nevertheless, crucially, he would add, "the immigrants are too large a proportion of the population; the number of those not using the vernacular and uninterested in its preservation is too large" (Linz 1973, p. 106).

A generation later, indeed, forty years after the transition to democracy in Spain and the restitution of Catalan autonomy, how have Linz's expectations and predictions faired? We have already mentioned one important way in which his expectations were not fulfilled: namely, Linz believed that continued economic growth would require a continuing influx of internal migrants into Catalonia to work as manual laborers, especially from the poorer parts of Spain. However, some combination of economic crisis and subsequent pursuit of policies of modernization and industrial re-conversion, alongside democratization, expansion of social rights, decentralization and new patterns of regional investment,

led to an end to mass internal migration within Spain from the poorer to the richer regions—an end that Linz had not foreseen.[5]

With the end of this constant influx, one of the major obstacles mentioned by Linz against the prospects for assimilation of the Castilian-speaking internal migrants and their children was removed. This undoubtedly has facilitated the acceptance and feasibility of the Catalan nation-building project pursued by the Catalan authorities since the restitution of Catalan autonomy, long focused primarily on the promotion of the Catalan language and culture, especially in the school system and the public sphere.[6]

But has the end of internal migration, combined with the pursuit of Catalan nation-building policies, alongside intermarriage and patterns of social mobility, together meant the transcendence of the three-cornered conflict? Such transcendence would certainly help explain the unforeseen irruption of secessionism onto the Catalan political agenda.

However, as we shall see, a close look at the survey data reveals that the three-cornered conflict remains alive and well, that ethno-linguistic divisions within Catalan society continue to condition the dynamics and limit the appeal of the Catalan nationalist cause in general, and of Catalan secession in particular.

Our focus in the rest of this article, based on our original survey, will be limited to exploring the relation between two the three corners in what Linz referred to as the three-cornered conflict. An in-depth analysis of the interaction between domestic Catalan dynamics and the strategies and tactics espoused by the central government in Madrid lies beyond the scope of our inquiry here. However, few would deny the continuing existence of a dialectic between the actions of the central government and dynamics within Catalonia. More controversial is the claim we pursue here that an ethno-linguistic cleavage within Catalonia continues to condition the dynamics and limit the appeal of the Catalan nationalist cause. Our claim is not that nothing has changed in the decades since Linz first diagnosed the three-cornered conflict. Instead, we simply contend that despite the significant changes in context that have occurred, recognition of the continuing existence of a three-cornered conflict proves necessary for understanding nationalist dynamics in the region. The analysis that follows, we insist, provides ample empirical evidence in favor of this crucial point of contention.

To demonstrate this point of contention about the continuing existence of a three-cornered conflict requires that we translate and operationalize the ethno-linguistic dimension of what once was a bitter class conflict pitting immigrant laborers against the local bourgeoisie. By now, over forty years have passed since the end of the last significant wave of internal migration; however, the population can still be divided by language groups and/or ascendancy groups. And indeed, the region's ethno-linguistic diversity is itself largely a product of multiple waves of migration. To the extent that notable differences can be detected in terms of identification and support for independence among different language and/or ascendancy groups, the continuing existence of a three-cornered conflict can be inferred. By contrast, to the extent that such differences cannot be detected, a transcendence of this conflict can instead be inferred.

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[5] For a succinct overview of the development of the Catalan economy from the mid-fifties through the mid-nineties, see Castells and Parellada (1998). For fairly systematic accounts of the trajectory of economic "development" in all of Spain over the past century, see Martín-Aceña (1995) and Lieberman (1995). For an overview that emphasizes the public policy dimension of Spain's political economy over the past several decades, see chapter 7 of Gunther et al. (2004). On the political-economic dimension of the transition to democracy from a social-democratic perspective, see Maravall (1993). On the recent financial-cum-political crisis in Spain, see López and Rodríguez (2011).

[6] For a cursory overview of the history of the phenomenon of internal immigration in Catalonia, written from a decidedly Catalan nationalist perspective, see Termes (1984). The most important sociological treatment of the impact of the phenomenon remains Pinilla De Las Heras (1979). For other important sociological and anthropological contributions, see Solé (1981), Fabregat (1982), and Woolard (1989). For two comprehensive overviews of the debates provoked by this phenomena in Catalan nationalist circles up through the time of the transition, see Colomer (1986, chp. 3) and Hall (1979). For a comparative historical-sociological analysis that emphasizes the importance of immigration for understanding the dynamics of the Catalan nationalist movement, see Shafir (1995).

Likewise, to the extent that pro-unionist and pro-independence factions or camps inside of Catalan society register considerably different linguistic or ascendancy profiles, or, for that matter, different conceptions of group belonging or different language ideologies, a continuing ethno-linguistic dimension to the conflict can be inferred. By contrast, to the extent that no such considerable differences between the two camps can be detected, the transcendence of the "ethno-linguistic dimension" of the conflict can be inferred.

4. Independentists Versus Unionists

Having thus situated our inquiry within Linz's broader research agenda, let us now turn to begin our analysis of our original survey data. We start with a simple description of responses to one crucial question included in our survey, before turning to progressively complexify the picture.

In our survey, just over two in five (40.6%) of Catalans answered yes to the question, "Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state?," compared with just over half (51.1%) who answered no, and 8.3% who either did not know or did not answer.[7]

The term polarization has been used by some analysts to refer to the division between those who support and those who oppose independence, e.g., (Barrio and Field 2018; Barrio and Juan 2017; Bertomeus 2018; Elliott 2018; Llaneras 2017; Oller et al. 2019a). Certainly, evidence of a polarized society would stand in accordance with the hypothesis of the continuing existence of Linz's three-cornered conflict. We would, however, hesitate to use the term polarization to describe this divide, in no small part because the intensity of the preferences between the two camps turns out to be substantially different. In a word, partisans of independence for Catalonia register much higher intensity for their preference than do defenders of union with Spain (see Table 1).[8]

The problem of preference intensity poses a significant dilemma for democratic theory. Indeed, in his *Preface to Democratic Theory*, Robert Dahl would refer to this problem as nothing short of "a modern psychological version of natural rights." Indeed, in his classic formulation of the problem: "[J]ust as Madison believed that government should be constructed so as to prevent majorities from invading the natural rights of minorities, so a modern day Madison might argue that government should be designed to inhibit a relatively apathetic majority from cramming its policy down the throats of a relatively intense minority" (Dahl and Dahl 1956, p. 90).[9] Regardless of one's ethical position towards this question, Dahl would continue, preference intensity can certainly pose a serious challenge for the stability of democratic systems.

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[7] The proportion registering support for independence in our survey is slightly lower than the proportions reported in recent surveys from the Catalan *Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió* (CEO). In multiple surveys conducted over the past few years, the CEO has found the Catalan public to be almost evenly divided between those who support independence and those who oppose it. For the CEO results, consult its series of opinion barometers, available on-line at: http://ceo.gencat.cat/ca/barometre/. This slight discrepancy is due to the systematic over-representation of those whose first language is Catalan in the CEO surveys, and the systematic under-representation of international migrants whose first language is different from either Castilian or Catalan, as compared with the findings of the Catalan government's own most recent linguistic census of Catalonia. Our survey, too, over-represents those whose first language is Catalan; however, we have sought to correct this by weighing the survey results so as to reflect the region's actual linguistic demography, in accordance with the findings of the Generalitat's most recent linguistic census, from 2013. The unweighted results of our survey are in fact very similar to the findings of the CEO, with 44.5% registering support for independence, compared with 47.5% registered opposition, and 8% who either did not answer or did not know. All subsequent tables and figures are based on weighted calculations.

[8] We used slightly different measures for capturing the intensity of pro-independentist and pro-unionist sentiment. For those who registered their support for independence, we asked: "On what point of a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is the lowest and 10 is the highest, would you situate your desire for Catalonia to become an independent state?" We then classified answers of 0 to 2 as very low; 3 to 4 as low; 5 to 6 as medium; 7 to 8 as high; and 9 to 10 as very high. For those who registered their opposition to independence, we asked instead: "Would you say that your rejection of independence is: very low, low, medium, high, or very high?".

[9] Dahl's point about preference intensity is especially relevant for understanding recent developments in the Catalan context. Indeed, as our survey evidence reveals, the nature of the current impasse is better interpreted as a reflection of the particularly intense preferences in favor of independence espoused by a minority of Catalans than it is as a reflection of the will of the majority of Catalans.

Table 1. Polarization over Independence? Differences between pro-union and pro-independence factions with respect to preference intensity, the "right to decide" and subjective identification.

		Pro Union % (95%CI)	Pro Independence % (95%CI)	Overall * % (95%CI)
Intensity of preference for or against independence	Very Low	6.5 (5.0–8.4)	0.2 (0.1–0.8)	NA
	Low	12.3 (10.4–14.6)	0.5 (0.1–2.1)	NA
	Medium	26.2 (23.4–29.2)	4.4 (3.2–5.9)	NA
	High	23.2 (20.4–26.1)	30.4 (27.3–33.7)	NA
	Very High	31.9 (28.9–35.0)	64.2 (60.9–67.5)	NA
	DK/DA	-	0.3 (0.1–0.9)	NA
	Total	100.0	100.0	NA
	N	1046	980	NA
Which 'demos' has the 'right to decide'?	Catalonia	37.6 (34.5–40.8)	91 (88.4–93.1)	61.3 (59.1–63.6)
	All of Spain	58.6 (55.3–61.7)	8.5 (6.5–11.2)	36.0 (33.8–38.3)
	DK/DA	3.8 (2.7–5.3)	0.4 (0.2–1.1)	2.7 (2.0–3.6)
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N	1126	893	2202
Subjective Identification	Spanish	13.1 (11.1–15.3)	1.5 (0.6–3.4)	7.6 (6.5–9.0)
	More Spanish	12.6 (10.5–15.0)	0.6 (0.1–2.1)	6.9 (5.8–8.2)
	Equally Spanish and Catalan	58.5 (55.2–61.7)	11.2 (9.0–13.9)	37.9 (35.7–40.2)
	More Catalan	8.9 (7.3–10.9)	38.7 (35.5–42.0)	22.5 (20.7–24.4)
	Catalan	1.0 (0.6–1.7)	46.7 (43.5–50.1)	20.0 (18.4–21.7)
	DK/DA	5.9 (4.3–8.2)	1.3 (0.7–2.7)	5.0 (3.9–6.5)
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N	1126	893	2202

Note: * Overall figures include 176 number of undecided participants. The overall is non-applicable (NA) for the measurements of preference intensity, since different questions were put to those who registered support or opposition to independence, and undecided participants were not posed any question. 95%CI = 95% confidence interval. DK/DA = Do not know or did not answer. NA = Not applicable. Source: LingPolCat, Catalonia, May 2016. Microdata accessible at https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

Such is the case with what we are witnessing in relation to the cause of secession in Spain: nearly half of the Catalan citizenry has come to register an intense preference in favor of independence. Just over half of the remaining Catalan citizenry registers its opposition to this cause, but not as intensely so. Were the Catalan citizenry more unified in favor of independence, this would render the situation almost impossible for the Spanish authorities to contain. However, even with close to half of the Catalan citizenry registering a rather intense preference in favor of independence, it has proven quite difficult for Spanish authorities to enforce the will of the Spanish majority without appearing to tyrannize the Catalan minority.

Yet, sufficient unanimity among Catalans to force the issue further is clearly lacking, even if it is still perhaps somewhat misleading to speak of polarization inside Catalan society, due especially to the difference in preference intensity registered by partisans and opponents of independence.

Another indicator which makes the term polarization seem somewhat dubious is that of the clear majority of the Catalan population, including a significant minority of the pro-union camp, which registers it support for the so-called "right to decide." Although Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution would appear to rule out such a right, according to our survey, just over 3 in 5 (61.3%) of the Catalan population support the idea that the decision over Catalan independence should depend exclusively on the will of the Catalans. Not surprisingly, among the pro-independence camp, the proportion in favor of the "right to decide" rises to over 9 in 10 (91%). Though the proportion is much lower among the pro-union camp, still, importantly, close to two out of five (37.6%) support such a so-called right (see Table 1).[10]

[10] To measure opinions about which "demos" has the "right to decide," we asked: "With respect to the independence of Catalonia, do you think that the decision about this subject should depend exclusively on the will of Catalans, or should it depend on the entire Spanish population?"

Regardless of whether or not Catalan society can be classified as polarized around the issue of independence, the social division that has emerged is certainly significant, and merits closer investigation. Just who are the independentists, and who are their opponents (whom we call unionists)? What are the demographic, cultural, behavioral, and attitudinal traits distinguishing each of these groups?

5. Identity and Independence

Let us continue by turning to take a look at a third indicator that leads us to hesitate before employing the term "polarization" to describe the relations among pro-independence and pro-union segments of Catalan society: namely, patterns of subjective national identification. A look at these patterns provides grounds for a further nuance to our more general claim about the continuing relevance of Linz's diagnosis of a three-cornered conflict.

The use of the indicator of subjective national identification has a long history in Spain, dating back to the transition to democracy, in the pioneering work on public opinion carried out by Juan Linz and his collaborators (Linz et al. 1981). The indicator has subsequently been dubbed, in the English language at least, as the Linz/Moreno question, due to the influence of its adaption and application in the Scottish context by Luis Moreno (Coller 2006; Moreno 2006; Montero 2018). The indicator allows people to identify themselves on a five-point scale, ranging from "Spanish," to "more Spanish than Catalan," to "equally Spanish and Catalan," to "more Catalan than Spanish," to "Catalan." This indicator has been used in hundreds, if not thousands, of surveys in Spain in recent decades, a fact which greatly facilitates our ability to analyze the evolution of the social bases of support for different national(ist) projects in Spain.

A systematic overview of the evolution of this indicator lies beyond the scope of the present analysis; however, suffice it to say, alongside and in part propelling the recent surge in support for secession in Catalonia, there is considerable evidence of a parallel surge in the proportion of those who identify as predominantly or exclusively Catalan (Oller et al. 2019b).

According to our survey, the Catalan population is currently divided among some 20% who identify as exclusively Catalan, another 22.5% who identify as "more Catalan," another 37.9% who identify as equally Catalan and Spanish, 6.9% who identify as "more Spanish," and 7.6% who identify as exclusively Spanish. Nevertheless, when we compare the identity profiles of the pro-independence and pro-union camps, we find significant, though far from polarized, differences between the two groups (see Table 1).

Even so, in both camps, a majority continues to register some degree of dual identification; and notably, the pro-union camp overwhelmingly registers at least some degree of attachment to a Catalan identity. This fact provides a sociological basis for optimism about the possibility of some kind of compromise between the two camps; or at the very least, recognition of it should serve to qualify any discussion about the levels of polarization that have accompanied the wave of contentious politics that has swept the region over the past few years.

Moreover, in the survey, we allowed people to give reasons why they support independence, in an attempt to shed further light on the relation between identity and support for secession. About 45% of those who support independence pointed to economic reasons, and among these the identity profile was significantly, if not surprisingly, different from the approximately one in three of independence supporters who gave reasons that can be classified as identity-based. Among the former, only 42.4% identify as exclusively Catalan, compared with another 39.7% who identify as more Catalan, and just over 15% who identify as equally or even more Spanish. By contrast, among the latter, 62.3% identify as exclusively Catalan, another 28.9% identify as more Catalan, and only 8.1% identify as equally or more Spanish. This pattern is consistent with the findings of other researchers who have distinguished

between instrumental and identity-based support for independence in the Catalan context (Muñoz and Tormos 2015).[11]

6. Conditions of Belonging and Independence

Another significant finding from our survey is that those belonging to the pro-independence and pro-union camps, respectively, provide different responses to questions about what it takes to qualify as a Catalan. In other words, the two camps disagree about the relevant criteria for membership in the Catalan community. As we shall see, the contours of such disagreement provide grounds for positing the existence of an ethno-linguistic dimension to the emergent conflict in Catalan society, in accordance with Linz's diagnosis of a three-cornered conflict.

Perhaps most dramatically, among independentists, over one in five (22.6%) consider support for independence as essential for qualifying as a Catalan. By contrast, among unionists, fully 63.9% consider such support to be of no importance (see Table 2).[12]

In sum, while over half of those in the pro-independence camp would seem prone to expel those in the pro-union camp from membership in the imagined Catalan community altogether, those in the pro-union camp would seem to espouse a decidedly more inclusive point of view, at least in accordance with this indicator, which we can consider as measuring the existence of an ideological barrier to group belonging.

A useful way to distinguish among peoplehood projects is in accordance with the nature of, and justifications for, its exclusions (Linz 1985b; Miley 2007). It is in this respect noteworthy that the pro-independence camp is inclined to impose definite criteria of ideological militancy for belonging to the Catalan people, criteria which are in turn denied by the pro-union camp. As Linz already mentioned in his by-now classic article, "From Primordialism to Nationalism" (Linz 1985b), to a certain degree such a dynamic is reminiscent of the debate between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks about the requirements for membership in the Social Democratic party, in which the Bolsheviks insisted upon more restrictive, stringent criteria for belonging. Analogously, partisans of independence in contemporary Catalonia prove much more prone to consider there to exist definite ideological prerequisites for group belonging.

As we have already seen, the criterion of supporting independence has by now crystallized into one such prerequisite, at least in the eyes of over half of such supporters. Likewise, with the somewhat more ambiguous criterion of defense of the Catalan nation. Among supporters of independence, just over 1 in 5 (22.3%) consider this criterion essential. Again, the contrast with supporters of union with Spain is quite stark (see Table 2).

This significant level of disagreement between the two camps about the existence of such ideological prerequisites for belonging to the Catalan community in turn contrasts with the high level of consensus when it comes to rejecting purely primordial criteria for group belonging. Indeed, overwhelming majorities in both the pro-independence and the pro-union camps reject the purely primordial criterion of descending from a Catalan family, though the level of rejection is slightly stronger among the pro-union camp (see Table 2).

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[11] For an examination of the contextual influences on support for independence among those with dual identities, see Rodon and Guinjoan (2018).

[12] To measure different conceptions of the conditions for belonging to the Catalan community, we asked the following battery of questions, with possible answers ranging from "essential, very important, somewhat important, of little importance, to not important": "To be Catalan, how important is: (a) feeling Catalan; (b) speaking Catalan fluently; (c) speaking Catalan at home; (d) having been born in Catalonia; (e) descending from a family mostly of Catalan origin; (f) defending the Catalan nation; (g) supporting the independence of Catalonia.

Table 2. Criteria for qualifying as a Catalan among pro-independence and pro-union camps.

	Not Important % (95%CI)	Of Little Importance % (95%CI)	Somewhat Important % (95%CI)	Rather Important % (95%CI)	Essential % (95%CI)	DK/DA % (95%CI)	Total (%)	N
Support for independence								
Pro Union	63.9 (60.7–67.0)	21.8 (19.2–24.6)	7.0 (5.4–9.0)	3.3 (2.3–4.6)	1.5 (0.8–2.6)	2.6 (1.7–3.9)	100.0	1126
Pro Independence	9.8 (8.0–11.9)	12.2 (10.1–14.7)	25.3 (22.5–28.3)	29.6 (26.6–32.9)	22.6 (20.0–25.5)	0.4 (0.2–1.1)	100.0	893
Overall *	38.5 (36.3–40.7)	18.7 (17.0–20.6)	15.8 (14.2–17.5)	14.6 (13.1–16.3)	10.3 (9.0–11.6)	2.1 (1.6–2.9)	100.0	2202
Defence of the Catalan nation								
Pro Union	32.9 (29.8–36.1)	25.9 (23.0–28.8)	23.8 (21.2–26.7)	10.8 (9.0–12.9)	4.3 (3.1–5.8)	2.4 (1.7–3.5)	100.0	1126
Pro Independence	4.9 (3.7–6.5)	9.1 (7.3–11.3)	27.7 (24.8–30.8)	34.8 (31.6–38.1)	22.3 (19.7–25.1)	1.3 (0.5–2.9)	100.0	893
Overall*	19.9 (18.1–21.8)	18.6 (16.8–20.4)	25.7 (23.8–27.7)	21.9 (20.1–23.8)	11.8 (10.5–13.3)	2.1 (1.5–3.0)	100.0	2202
Descending from a Catalan family								
Pro Union	41.7 (38.5–44.9)	28.0 (25.1–31.0)	14.7 (12.5–17.3)	9.7 (7.9–11.9)	3.9 (2.9–5.4)	2.0 (1.3–3.2)	100.0	1126
Pro Independence	34.8 (31.7–38.1)	24.1 (21.4–27.0)	18.1 (15.6–20.9)	16.1 (13.9–18.6)	5.5 (4.1–7.5)	1.3 (0.7–2.6)	100.0	893
Overall*	38.5 (36.3–40.7)	26.1 (24.2–28.2)	16.1 (14.5–17.9)	13.0 (11.5–14.6)	4.6 (3.7–5.7)	1.6 (1.1–2.4)	100.0	2202
Having been born in Catalonia								
Pro Union	30.2 (27.2–33.3)	24.9 (22.2–27.8)	19.3 (16.8–21.9)	13.7 (11.6–16.0)	11.1 (9.1–13.4)	0.9 (0.5–1.7)	100.0	1126
Pro Independence	29.7 (26.7–32.9)	24.3 (21.6–27.2)	17.1 (14.7–19.8)	18.7 (16.2–21.5)	9.9 (8.1–12.1)	0.3 (0.1–0.9)	100.0	893
Overall	30 (27.9–32.1)	24.4 (22.5–26.4)	18.3 (16.6–20.1)	16.1 (14.5–17.9)	10.4 (9.1–11.9)	0.9 (0.5–1.4)	100.0	2202
Speaking fluent Catalan								
Pro Union	16.4 (14.1–19.0)	21.6 (19.0–24.4)	32.0 (29.0–35.1)	21.2 (18.6–24.1)	7.8 (6.2–9.8)	1.0 (0.6–1.8)	100.0	1126
Pro Independence	4.8 (3.6–6.3)	11.4 (9.4–13.7)	28.6 (25.5–31.8)	35.3 (32.2–38.5)	19.6 (17.1–22.5)	0.3 (0.1–1.0)	100.0	893
Overall*	11.1 (9.7–12.6)	17.0 (15.3–18.8)	31.0 (28.9–33.1)	27.5 (25.5–29.5)	12.8 (11.4–14.3)	0.7 (0.4–1.2)	100.0	2202
Speaking Catalan at home								
Pro Union	31.0 (28.1–34.1)	32.6 (29.5–35.8)	19.8 (17.3–22.6)	10.6 (8.7–12.8)	4.7 (3.6–6.2)	1.3 (0.8–2.2)	100.0	1126
Pro Independence	12.1 (10.0–14.4)	19.4 (16.9–22.1)	26.2 (23.4–29.3)	25.1 (22.3–28.2)	16.6 (14.4–19.2)	0.6 (0.1–2.1)	100.0	893
Overall *	22.3 (20.5–24.2)	27.0 (25.1–29.1)	23.0 (21.1–25.0)	17.2 (15.5–18.9)	9.6 (8.5–10.9)	0.9 (0.6–1.5)	100.0	2202

Note: * Overall figures include 176 number of undecided participants. 95%CI = 95% confidence interval. DK/DA = Do not know or did not answer. Source: LingPolCat, Catalonia, May 2016. Microdata accessible at https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

Given the extent of the convergence among both camps in rejecting a purely primordial conception of group belonging, it would seem, then, that we are not here confronted with a Catalan nationalist movement that can be classified as ethnic, at least not in the classic quasi-racial sense of blood lineage or descent. Nor even would a majority of either the pro-independence or the pro-union camps come close to espousing the less restrictive criterion of having been born in Catalonia as a prerequisite for group belonging (see Table 2).

This does not mean, however, that both sides can be said to converge in favor of a purely civic conception of Catalan group belonging.[13] In addition to the ideological exclusions which, as we have seen, partisans of independence are prone to invoke, so too are they even more prone to invoke linguistic requisites for group membership. Partisans of union with Spain are also willing to accept linguistic prerequisites for being Catalan, at least to a significant degree, which reflects in part the continuing centrality of the Catalan language to the Catalan conception of group belonging (see Table 2).

Just as we saw that the pro-unionist camp does not reject espousing a Catalan identity (in combination with a Spanish one), so now we see that a majority of unionists are even willing to assume fluency in Catalan as a criterion for membership in the Catalan community. Such a significant, if partial, convergence between the pro-independence and pro-union camps, however, breaks down when we come to consider a more stringent linguistic criterion for group belonging: namely, the requirement of speaking Catalan at home. Whereas a clear majority of the pro-independence camp registers agreement with such a linguistic criterion, a clear majority of the pro-union camp rejects it (see Table 2).

7. Language and Independence

And so we come to the question of language. We have already seen evidence of the continuing centrality of the Catalan language to conceptions of group belonging. But it should not be forgotten that, due in large part to successive waves of internal migration from Spain's poorer regions, combined with the proscription of the Catalan language during the Franco period, those who speak Catalan as their first language constitute a distinct minority in contemporary Catalonia, despite a generation of efforts at so-called linguistic normalization by the Catalan authorities after the restoration of regional autonomy that came with the transition to democracy.

According to the Catalan government's own most recent linguistic census (Generalitat de Catalunya 2013), some 31.3% reported Catalan to have been the language spoken in their childhood home, compared with fully 55.5% who reported Castilian to have been the language spoken in their childhood home, another 2.4% reporting both languages to have been spoken in their childhood home, and 10.8% reported another language to have been spoken in their childhood home.

When we compare the profiles of the pro-independence and pro-union camps in our survey, we find a significant overrepresentation of those whose first language is Catalan in the former, and a significant underrepresentation of this same group in the latter. The ethno-linguistic cleavage inside of Catalan society diagnosed by Linz in his discussion of the three-cornered conflict thus appears to have survived. Even so, neither group is homogenous in terms of linguistic composition, though the unionists come closer to homogeneity (see Table 3).

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[13] For a recent insightful critique of the ethnic-civic binary, see Tinsley (2018). For a critique of the usefulness of this binary in the context of Catalonia, see Miley (2007). For an account that emphasises the importance of primordial ties in accounting for Catalan nationalist sentiment, see (Álvarez-Gálvez et al. 2018).

Table 3. Linguistic and ascendancy profiles of pro-union and pro-independence camps.

		Pro-Union % (95%CI)	Pro Independence % (95%CI)	Overall * % (95%CI)
Language/s spoken in childhood home	Castilian	73.5 (70.1–76.7)	32.2 (29.1–35.4)	55.4 (53.1–57.7)
	Both Castilian and Catalan	2.4 (1.8–3.2)	2.1 (1.5–2.9)	2.4 (2.0–3.0)
	Catalan	11.4 (9.8–13.3)	58.1 (54.6–61.6)	31.4 (29.5–33.3)
	Other	12.6 (9.7–16.3)	7.6 (5.1–11.2)	10.8 (8.8–13.2)
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ascendancy Group	Immigrant	46.3 (43.0–49.6)	16.5 (13.6–19.9)	33.9 (31.6–36.2)
	First Generation	27.6 (24.8–30.5)	14.6 (12.4–17.2)	21.8 (20.0–23.7)
	One Parent Born in Catalonia	13.3 (11.4–15.4)	15.4 (13.3–17.9)	14.3 (12.9–15.8)
	Both Parents Born in Catalonia	12.9 (11.1–14.9)	53.4 (50.0–56.8)	30.0 (28.2–32.0)
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N	1126	893	2202

Note: * Overall figures include 176 number of undecided participants. 95%CI = 95% confidence interval. Source: LingPolCat, Catalonia, May 2016. Microdata accessible at https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

Moreover, as we mentioned above, in our survey, we asked those who registered support for independence to give reasons for their support. Notably, the linguistic profile of those who provided economic reasons for supporting independence was significantly different, more heterogeneous, than that of those who provided identity-based reasons for supporting independence. To be precise, among those who provided economic reasons for supporting independence, 54.4% report Catalan as their first language, compared with 32.7% who report Castilian as their "mother tongue," 1.8% who report having spoken both Catalan and Castilian equally in their childhood home, and 11.1% who report another language as their first language. By contrast, among those who provided identity-based reasons for supporting independence, fully 68.1% report Catalan as their first language, compared with 23.4% who report Castilian, another 1.5% who report both Catalan and Castilian, and 7% who report another language.

When we turn to look at the numbers another way, to analyse the proportion of support for independence among different linguistic groups, the extent of allegiance among those whose first language or "mother tongue" is Catalan to the secessionist cause comes across very clearly. Linz's three-cornered conflict has not disappeared (see Table 4).

Table 4. Pro-union and pro-independence preferences among different language and ascendancy groups.

		Pro Independence % (95%CI)	Pro Union % (95%CI)	DK/DA % (95%CI)	Total	N
	Overall	40.6 (38.4–42.8)	51.1 (48.8–53.4)	8.3 (7.1–9.7)	100.0	2202
Language/s spoken in childhood home	Castilian	23.5 (21.2–26.1)	67.8 (65.0–70.4)	8.7 (7.2–10.4)	100.0	1221
	Both Castilian and Catalan	35.1 (26.2–45.0)	51.5 (41.7–61.3)	13.4 (7.9–21.7)	100.0	53
	Catalan	75.2 (72.2–78.0)	18.6 (16.2–21.4)	6.1 (4.7–7.9)	100.0	690
	Other	28.6 (19.6–39.6)	59.7 (48.5–70.1)	11.7 (6.2–21.0)	100.0	238
Ascendancy Groups	Immigrant	19.8 (16.2–23.9)	69.9 (65.3–74.0)	10.3 (7.8–13.6)	100.0	745
	First Generation	27.2 (23.2–31.5)	64.6 (60.0–68.9)	8.2 (6.1–11.1)	100.0	480
	One Parent Born in Catalonia	43.7 (38.5–49.1)	47.4 (42.1–52.8)	8.9 (6.3–12.3)	100.0	315
	Both Parents Born in Catalonia	72.2 (69.0–75.2)	22.0 (19.2–25.0)	5.8 (4.4–7.7)	100.0	661

Note: 95%CI = 95% confidence interval. DK/DA = Do not know or did not answer. Source: LingPolCat, Catalonia, May 2016. Microdata accessible at https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

Interestingly, among those who spoke a language other than Castilian or Catalan in their childhood home, the proportions who support independence are quite similar to those registered by Castilian-speakers.

8. Place of Origin of Family and Independence

Since language in Catalonia is closely related to place of origin of family, or ascendancy, this variable merits our attention as well. As we have mentioned, Catalan society has long been characterized, and much influenced, by the presence of migrants from the poorer regions of Spain, and their offspring, and more recently, international immigrants as well. According to our survey, just over 1 in 3 of respondents (33.9%) were born outside of Catalonia, just over 1 in 5 (21.8%) were born in Catalonia but have both parents born outside the region, another 14.3% were born in Catalonia but have one parent born outside the region, and another 30% were born in Catalonia and have both parents born in the region.

Not surprisingly, as we saw with language, the profiles of independentist and unionist camps differ substantially in this regard, with more autochthonous segments of Catalan society overrepresented among the former, and migrants and their offspring overrepresented among the latter. Here, we see strong evidence of the continued existence of Linz's three-cornered conflict. Even so, such patterns of over- and underrepresentation should not be overstated, either (see Table 4).

Interestingly, the profile of those who refused to answer the question was much closer to those who oppose independence than to those who support it, which can be interpreted as an indicator of the social pressure felt by those who oppose independence to hide their opinions, which is compatible with the hypothesis of the existence of a spiral of silence of sorts (Noelle-Neumann 1993).

Despite the patterns of over and underrepresentation of different ascendancy groups in the pro-independence and pro-union camps, the sociological reality that is perhaps most notable is that both groups are diverse, even if in different proportions. Nevertheless, when we look at the proportions the other way around, the three-cornered conflict comes into clear view, as the extent of the divisions between different ascendancy groups in Catalan society come across more starkly (see Table 4).

In sum, the ascendancy group to which one belongs would seem to matter quite a lot in conditioning support or opposition to independence, even if the relation is far from determinative. The long-standing hope among many Catalan nationalists that the children of immigrants could be fully integrated into support for the cause seems not to have been fulfilled—although the fact that close to 1 in 3 of these children have come to embrace the aspiration for independence suggests that such efforts at integration on the part of the Catalan nationalist movement have not been entirely in vain either.

9. Patterns of Integration and Independence

Given the centrality of debates about integration, linked to efforts at linguistic normalization in Catalonia over the past generation, a closer look at patterns of linguistic loyalty and/or conversion, and the political significance of these patterns, seems worthwhile. Among those whose first language is Catalan, a very high degree of linguistic loyalty can be detected, as measured by a variety of indicators. Among those whose first language is Castilian, however, such loyalty is significantly lower, most likely reflecting considerable pressures and/or incentives to integrate into Catalan-speaking linguistic practices and identities (see Table 5).[14]

[14] To measure linguistic loyalty, we combine answers to the question, "Which language/s did you speak in your childhood home?" with answers to the question, "With which language/s do you identify more?"

Table 5. Patterns of linguistic loyalty and conversion.

	"Mother Tongue"			
	Castilian % (95%CI)	**Both Castilian and Catalan % (95%CI)**	**Catalan % (95%CI)**	**Other % (95%CI)**
Identifies with Castilian	67.0 (64.3–69.7)	14.4 (8.7–22.9)	2.7 (1.8–4.0)	48.1 (37.2–59.1)
Identifies with both equally	16.3 (14.3–18.6)	35.1 (26.2–45.0)	5.4 (4.1–7.2)	6.5 (2.7–14.7)
Identifies with Catalan	15.9 (13.9–18.1)	50.5 (40.7–60.3)	91.6 (89.5–93.2)	23.4 (15.2–34.1)
Identifies with other language	0.8 (0.4–1.5)	-	0.3 (0.1–1.1)	22.1 (14.2–32.7)
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1221	53	690	238

Note: 95%CI = 95% confidence interval. Source: LingPolCat, Catalonia, May 2016. Microdata accessible at https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

The political significance of such linguistic conversion could hardly be over-estimated.[15] Among those whose first language is Castilian and who continue to identify themselves as Castilian-speakers, the proportion in favor of independence for Catalonia stands at a mere 10.8%. By contrast, among those who have converted to a bilingual linguistic identity, the proportion in favor of independence rises to 34.7%, while among those who have converted to a Catalan-speaking identity, the proportion sky-rockets to 68%. Notably, however, this proportion remains still significantly lower than the 81.3% support for independence registered among those whose first language is Catalan and who identify themselves as Catalan-speakers.

One of the principle factors conditioning, and arenas of, linguistic loyalty, reproduction, or conversion is kinship or family networks. A high degree of loyalty is again observable among those whose first language is Catalan, in terms of the language they report speaking with their partner. A total of 81.1% of these report speaking exclusively in Catalan with their partner, another 3.4% report speaking mostly in Catalan with their partner; compared with 2.8% who report speaking equally in Catalan and Castilian, 3.2% who report speaking more in Castilian, and 8.7% who report speaking only Castilian. The contrast with those whose first language is Castilian is again significant. In total, 65.2% of these report speaking exclusively in Castilian with their partner, and another 9.6% report speaking mostly in Castilian; compared with 6.9% who report speaking equally in Castilian and Catalan, 3.2% who report speaking more Catalan, and 14.3% who report speaking exclusively in Catalan with their partner.

The political significance of such linguistic practices is again hard to over-estimate. Among those whose first language is Castilian but who speak at least equally in Catalan with their partner, the proportion in favor of independence stands at 56.3%. By contrast, among those whose first language is Castilian and who speak mostly or only in Castilian with their partner, the proportion in support of independence drops rather dramatically to 19.4%. Nevertheless, the 56.3% registering their support for independence among those whose first language is Castilian but who report speaking at least equally in Catalan with their partner is still significantly lower than the proportion of those whose first language is Catalan who report speaking at least equally in Catalan and who register support for independence—which stands at 81.1%. First language still matters, even if linguistic conversion carries with it a very significant political content.

Likewise if we look at the language/s spoken with one's children. Again we witness much higher levels of linguistic loyalty among those whose first language is Catalan. In total, 91.7% of these report speaking exclusively in Catalan with their children, another 3.6% report speaking mostly in Catalan,

[15] By political significance, we do not here intend to advance a surreptitious causal claim. We remain agnostic as to whether linguistic conversion per se causes ideological conversion towards support for independence, or whether both types of conversion are in fact caused by some other unobserved, underlying variable. We use significance not to purport independent causal weight, *ceteris parabus*, but rather, to suggest or convey *meaning*.

a mere 1.9% report speaking both Catalan and Castilian equally, 0.9% report speaking more Castilian, and 1.5% report speaking only Castilian. The contrast with those whose first language is Castilian is here particularly stark. Only 41.9% of these report speaking exclusively in Castilian with their children, another 15.2% report speaking mostly Castilian, compared with 14% who report speaking equally Castilian and Catalan, 5.9% who report speaking mostly Catalan, and fully 22.5% who report speaking exclusively in Catalan with their children.

Yet again reported patterns of linguistic loyalty or conversion come with serious political significance. Not surprisingly, 78.1% of those whose first language is Catalan and who report speaking exclusively in Catalan with their children register their support for independence. By contrast, only 13.6% of those whose first language is Castilian and who report speaking with their children mostly or exclusively in Castilian register their support for independence. The proportion rises to 29% among those whose first language is Castilian who report speaking equally in Castilian and Catalan with their children, to 33.3% among those whose first language is Castilian and who report speaking more in Catalan with their children, and to 61.3% among those whose first language is Castilian and who report speaking exclusively in Catalan with their children.

These patterns are indeed quite stark and reveal much about the linguistic bases of support for the secessionist cause: tell me which language you speak with your children, and there is a good chance I can accurately surmise what you think about independence. The political consequences of the project of linguistic normalization pursued by successive Catalan governments (Garvía and Miley 2013; Levin 2010; Webber and Strubell 1991) thus emerge in full relief.

10. Language Ideologies and Independence

If language practices and patterns of linguistic conversion are closely associated with opinions about independence, so too are language ideologies.[16] Indeed, support for or opposition to a variety of different components of the project of linguistic normalization turns out to be highly correlated with support for or opposition to independence. Take, for example, the question of whether all children in Catalonia should receive all of their primary schooling in Catalan (see Table 6).

We find very similar results with respect to the question of whether everyone who lives in Catalonia should use the Catalan language preferentially (see Table 6).

When it comes to which language or languages should be official in the hypothetical scenario of an independent Catalonia, again, the pro-independence and pro-unionist camps register serious disagreement (see Table 7).

[16] To measure language ideologies, we asked several batteries of questions about language policy and language preferences. These included: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (a) the survival of the Catalan language requires it to have a stronger presence in school; (b) parents should be able to choose the language of schooling of their children; (c) children should begin their schooling in their mother tongue, whether this be Catalan or Castilian; (d) the presence of Castilian represents a threat to the Catalan culture and language; (e) all children should receive their first schooling in Catalan. A second battery of statements which we asked people to agree or disagree with included: "(a) Catalan was persecuted during Franquism, and so it is just to promote it; (b) everyone who lives in Catalonia should use Catalan preferentially; (c) everyone who lives in Catalonia has the right to use the language they want in their daily lives; (d) the public authorities should very much prioritize the use of Catalan; (e) the public authorities should fine people who infringe the language policies of the Generalitat; (f) to have a public sector job which attends to the public it should be necessary to pass an exam demonstrating a high level of proficiency in Catalan; (g) the Generalitat should subsidise media that use Catalan; (h) the Catalan language is a fundamental value for the conservation of the Catalan identity." We also asked: "What would you wish in the future in educational system: (a) only Catalan; (b) more Catalan than Castilian; (c) equally Catalan and Castilian; (d) more Castilian; or (e) only Castilian?" We asked the same for "commerce" and for "public services, including health." Finally, we asked: "With which of these do you agree: In an independent Catalonia, (a) Catalan and Castilian should be official; (b) Catalan and Castilian should be official, but Catalan should be given preference; or (c) only Catalan should be an official language."

Table 6. Language ideologies among pro-union and pro-independence camps.

		Strongly Agree % (95%CI)	Agree % (95%CI)	Neither Agree nor Disagree % (95%CI)	Disagree % (95%CI)	Strongly Disagree % (95%CI)	Total	N
Primary schooling should be in Catalan								
	Pro Union	7.8 (6.3–9.7)	16.6 (14.3–19.1)	2.1 (1.3–3.3)	28.8 (25.8–31.9)	44.8 (41.5–48.0)	100.0	1126
	Pro Independence	45.8 (42.5–49.1)	29.3 (26.4–32.4)	1.2 (0.7–2.1)	16.2 (13.7–19.1)	7.5 (5.9–9.5)	100.0	893
	Overall *	24.9 (23.1–26.8)	22.8 (21.0–24.8)	1.9 (1.4–2.7)	23.0 (21.1–25.1)	27.3 (25.3–29.4)	100.0	2202
Everyone who lives in Catalonia should use Catalan preferentially								
	Pro Union	7.2 (5.8–8.9)	14.8 (12.7–17.1)	1.6 (1.0–2.6)	33.5 (30.4–36.8)	42.9 (39.7–46.2)	100.0	1126
	Pro Independence	41.1 (37.9–44.4)	32.3 (29.2–35.6)	2.0 (1.3–3.1)	17.5 (15.1–20.3)	7.1 (5.5–8.9)	100.0	893
	Overall *	21.8 (20.1–23.6)	23.0 (21.1–25.0)	2.0 (1.5–2.6)	27.0 (25.0–29.1)	26.3 (24.3–28.4)	100.0	2202

Note: * Overall figures include 176 number of undecided participants. 95%CI = 95% confidence interval. Source: LingPolCat, Catalonia, May 2016. Microdata accessible at https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

Table 7. In an independent Catalonia, which language/s should be official?

	Pro Union % (95% CI)	Pro Independence % (95% CI)	Overall * % (95% CI)
Co-official Castilian and Catalan	66.9 (63.7–69.9)	21.5 (18.8–24.5)	46.9 (44.6–49.1)
Preferential status for Catalan	22.2 (19.6–25.0)	51.1 (47.7–54.4)	35.3 (33.2–37.5)
Only Catalan	10.7 (8.8–12.9)	27.5 (24.6–30.5)	17.7 (16.1–19.4)
DK/DA	0.3 (0.1–0.8)	-	0.1 (0.0–0.4)
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1126	893	2202

Note: * Overall figures include 176 number of undecided participants; DK/DA = Do not know or did not answer. 95%CI = 95% confidence interval. DK/DA = Do not know or did not answer. Source: LingPolCat, Catalonia, May 2016. Microdata accessible at https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

The two camps are not, however, so starkly divided over all questions related to linguistic policy. On the one side, even most independentists prove reticent when it comes to the question of fining people who infringe the Catalan authorities' linguistic regulations. To be precise, among the pro-independence camp, only 45.9% agree that those who infringe such linguistic legislation should be fined. This remains nevertheless significantly higher than the 9.5% of unionists who would agree with such fines.

On the other side, even most unionists are willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of a certain degree of protective legislation for the Catalan language. For example, 58.3% of unionists support regulation obliging those working in public institutions dealing with the public to pass an exam proving a high level of competence in Catalan. This remains nevertheless significantly lower than the 91.1% of independentists who support such regulations.

In sum, although there are some areas of linguistic policy in which there is a lower degree of disagreement among the two camps, partisans of independence and of union display very different attitudes about language policy, all of which gives us a clear sense of what language policy in an independent Catalonia would likely look like. Indeed, among the most controversial of the interventions by Spanish authorities in Catalan self-rule over recent years have been judicial measures intended to restrict the scope of Catalan language policy (Garvía and Miley 2013). Among the many advantages of an independent Catalonia, at least in the eyes of its supporters, is that it would put a definitive end to such intrusions. Conversely, prominent among the dangers of an independent Catalonia, at least as perceived by unionists, is that it would mean an end of oversight by Spanish authorities of language policy, which would likely translate into a significant expansion in terms of the scope and ambition of such policy, and which could even entail an infringement upon what are perceived by many Castilian-speakers to be their linguistic rights. Thus are the perceived stakes, and thus the passions surrounding the question of independence and its close relation to language ideologies and language policies in contemporary Catalonia.

11. Class Conflict and Independence

Dynamics of integration in capitalist societies have at least as much to do with patterns of class relations and stratification as they do with cultural and educational policies. Indeed, Linz's reference to the long-standing existence of a three-cornered conflict in Catalan society was not about language or ethnicity alone, conceived as independent variables, but rather, about how these factors overlaid on, and served to reinforce, a bitter class struggle within Catalan society across the first decades of the twentieth century. The bitterness of the class struggle was successively and successfully dissipated, first by brutal defeat and repression in and after the Civil War, subsequently by rapid capitalist development and partial incorporation into the advanced capitalist core in the post-autarchy period of the Franco regime, and finally, by incorporation into the European Union after the transition to democracy. But class contradictions have nonetheless never disappeared, and so the potential for resurgent class struggle

remains. Nonetheless, in contemporary Catalonia, conflict between different nationalist projects seems to have served more to fend off the irruption of class struggle than to reinforce it.[17]

As a way of exploring the intersection of class and nation in contemporary Catalonia, let us begin with another simple question: How do the profiles of the pro-independence and pro-union camps compare in socio-economic terms? Of course, the operationalization of class location can be a controversial and difficult task and admittedly, our measurement is relatively crude; nevertheless, the patterns we find are quite clear. From our survey, we constructed a variable measuring the socio-economic status of respondents based on reported objective indicators, including education, income, and occupation.[18]

According to this indicator, 16.1% of the Catalan population can be classified as belonging to the highest socio-economic status group, another 22.3% belongs to the upper-middle class, 45.7% belongs to the middle class, another 14.6% belongs to the lower-middle class, and only 1.4% belongs to the lower class. When we compare the socio-economic profiles of the pro-independence and pro-union camps, we see that the former is significantly more affluent than the latter (see Table 8).

Table 8. Socio-economic and ideological profiles of pro-union and pro-independence camps.

		Pro Union % (95%CI)	Pro Independence % (95%CI)	Overall * % (95%CI)
Socio-Economic Status	Upper	14.8 (12.6–17.2)	18.4 (16.0–21.2)	16.1 (14.6–17.8)
	Upper Middle	19.2 (16.8–22.0)	26.3 (23.5–29.4)	22.3 (20.5–24.2)
	Middle	47.3 (44.0–50.6)	43.4 (40.1–46.8)	45.7 (43.4–47.9)
	Lower Middle	17.0 (14.6–19.7)	10.6 (8.8–12.8)	14.6 (13.0–16.3)
	Lower	1.7 (1.0–2.6)	1.1 (0.5–2.4)	1.4 (0.9–2.0)
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N	1126	893	2202
Ideological Leaning	Left	12.4 (10.1–15.0)	26.2 (23.4–29.3)	18.4 (16.6–20.3)
	Center-Left	25.5 (22.7–28.6)	36.5 (33.2–39.8)	30.9 (28.8–33.1)
	Center	48.8 (45.3–52.3)	30.3 (27.2–33.6)	40.5 (38.1–42.9)
	Center-Right	10.2 (8.2–12.6)	6.0 (4.6–7.7)	8.1 (6.8–9.5)
	Right	3.2 (2.2–4.5)	1.0 (0.4–2.4)	2.1 (1.5–2.9)
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N	1126	893	2202

Note: * Overall figures include 176 number of undecided participants. 95%CI = 95% confidence interval. Source: LingPolCat, Catalonia, May 2016. Microdata accessible at https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

Another way of approaching the intersection of class and nation in contemporary Catalonia is to look at the numbers the other way, by asking: How do levels of support for secessionism vary across different class segments of Catalan society today? This way of asking the question leads to a clearer result. We find the variation in support for secession across five different socio-economic strata to be substantial, even if not nearly as stark as across different ethno-linguistic categories (see Table 9).

Notably, no such pattern can be found *within* each language group. That is to say, though it is true that the working class in Catalonia is much less likely to support secession than are the upper, upper-middle, and middle classes, working class *Castilian-speakers* are not significantly less likely to support secession than are their upper, upper-middle, and middle class *Castilian-speaking* counterparts. Indeed, there is little variation at all across socio-economic strata within the Castilian-speaking community. Nor, for that matter, does support for secession vary across different socio-economic strata

[17] Relatedly and notably, in recent decades, intergenerational social mobility has been decreasing in Catalonia. Güell et al. (2015) have attributed this to an increase in "assertive matching," which has tended to reinforce the privileged socio-economic position of autochthonous Catalans over internal migrants and their descendants.

[18] We constructed our variable for "socio-economic status" in accordance with the criteria used by the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS).

of the Catalan-speaking community either. To the contrary, among those whose first language/"mother tongue" is Catalan, support for secession remains extremely high and constant, around 3 out of 4, no matter the class location.

Table 9. Attitudes about independence among different socio-economic groups.

Socio-Economic Status	Pro Union % (95%CI)	Pro Independence % (95%CI)	DK/DA	N
Upper	46.8 (41.3–52.4)	46.4 (41.0–51.9)	6.8 (4.2–10.7)	355
Upper Middle	44.2 (39.4–49.0)	47.9 (43.2–52.7)	7.9 (5.7–10.8)	491
Middle	52.9 (49.6–56.3)	38.6 (35.4–41.8)	8.5 (6.7–10.6)	1006
Lower Middle	59.8 (53.9–65.5)	29.6 (24.7–35.1)	10.6 (7.3–15.1)	321
Lower	62.3 (41.2–79.6)	34.2 (17.6–55.9)	3.5 (0.5–21.2)	30
Overall	40.6 (38.4–42.8)	51.1 (48.8–53.4)	8.3 (7.1–9.7)	2202

Note: 95%CI = 95% confidence interval. DK/DA = Do not know or did not answer. Source: LingPolCat, Catalonia, May 2016. Microdata accessible at https://doi.org/10.21950/GFGUGB.

The evidence thus points in the direction of language and/or ethnicity as more powerful than class as *causal* factors for explaining attitudes towards secession. But at the same time, because of the way in which class and language intersect in Catalan society, as a lived reality, support for secession certainly carries a symbolic association with class status nonetheless.

12. Education and Support for Independence

One of the objective indicators used to categorize people into different socio-economic groups is level of education. This category is closely related but not reducible to economic class location. In this regard, recent debates about the social bases of support for Donald Trump in the USA (Galston and Hendrickson 2016) or for Brexit in the UK (Kirk and Dunford 2016) are illustrative. In both cases, educational levels are in fact stronger indicators than income or occupation for predicting support, and in both cases, the relation is linear, and in the same direction: the lower the educational level, the higher the levels of support. Whereas in the case of Trump, the indicators for education and income curiously cut in different directions, with uneducated but relatively wealthy voters being the most likely to vote for Trump, in the case of Brexit, the indicators for education and for class cut in the same direction, with the less educated working class being the most likely to vote for Brexit.

In the case of Catalan secessionism, the indicators for education and for class also cut in the same direction. Though in Catalonia, unlike Brexit, it is the better off in both economic and educational terms who are the most likely to support secession. Indeed, in our survey, among those who report not having finished primary schooling, the proportion who support independence stands at a meagre 29.1%, while among those who report having only finished primary schooling, it rises to 39.1%. By contrast, it rises to 46.9% among those who report having finished secondary schooling and further still, to 50.6%, among those with more than secondary schooling. A very similar trend to the one found across "socio-economic status" groups described above.

Yet, when we look at the numbers the other way around, the extent and basic similarity of educational diversity within both camps comes across. Among the pro-independence camp, only 1.2% report not having finished primary schooling, another 27.2% report having finished primary schooling, another 41.5% report having finished secondary schooling, and another 30% report having more than secondary schooling. By comparison, among the pro-union camp, 2.5% report not having finished primary schooling, another 36.7% report having finished primary schooling, another 37.6% report having finished secondary schooling, and another 23.1% report having more than secondary schooling.

The educational system is both a vehicle for social mobility and a privileged arena for the production and reproduction of dominant social norms, a site where stories of peoplehood are spread. It is thus not surprising that one of the primary demands of the Catalan nationalist movement at the time of the transition to democracy was for control over the educational system, and that ever

since, the schools have been at the very center of efforts to promote the Catalan language and identity (Garvía and Miley 2013). But the double-function of the educational system renders it difficult to gauge the extent to which higher rates of support for secession among more educated strata are evidence of ideological indoctrination, or alternatively, the extent to which it is just another reflection of the way that class and language intersect in Catalonia.

Even so, given the uneven pace by which the school system was Catalanized during the first decade-and-a-half after the restitution of Catalan autonomy, a natural experiment of sorts is available for measuring the effect of the content of the educational system. Years of exposure to the Catalan language as the so-called vehicular language in school can serve as a reliable proxy for a Catalanized content. In our survey, we asked people about the amount of Catalan to which they were exposed during their education. Interestingly, we could not observe any effect of such exposure among either those whose first language/"mother tongue" is Castilian or those whose first language/"mother tongue" is Catalan (Garvía and Santana 2019). Thus, the data suggests that the impact of education on levels of support for secession is better interpreted as a reflection of the way that class and language intersect than as evidence of ideological indoctrination per se.

13. Left-Right Ideology and Independence

Above we noted the symbolic association between the Catalan language and middle-class respectability in Catalan society. Such associations, of course, are never produced or reproduced in an unmediated, spontaneous fashion. Instead, they are susceptible to influence by the educational system, the mass media, and opinion leaders, among other mediations.

In the Catalan context, from the period of opposition to Franco up through to the present, the leaders of left-wing parties have been careful to dismiss as demagogic any appeals that would equate the promotion of the Catalan language and identity with a bourgeois class project (Miley 2013; Miley 2014). Such reluctance is a reflection in part of tactical attempts to build cross-class, catch-all constituencies and coalitions, but it also reflects genuine ideological affinities with the Catalan nationalist movement, forged in the common struggle against Franco, as well as what Linz referred to as the new leftist sympathy towards minority nationalisms more generally, a sympathy widespread across much of the Western European left, dating back to the 1960s (Linz 1989).

These tactical alliances and ideological affinities have no doubt facilitated acquiescence and consent among Castilian-speaking working-class constituencies to the nation-building project that has been advanced by the regional authorities ever since the restitution of Catalan autonomy. Indeed, in terms of political salience, the symbolic association of the Castilian language and Spanish identity with the working class in Catalonia is certainly counterbalanced, if not entirely outweighed, by the symbolic association of Spain with the legacy of the Franco regime, even forty years after its demise.

All this provides grounds for a further caveat to our claim about the continuing existence of a three-cornered conflict in Catalonia. It also helps explain the rather curious disconnect between the class composition of support for secession and the ideological profiles of its supporters. The comparison between pro-independence and pro-union camps reveals a decidedly more leftist orientation among the former than among the latter (see Table 8).[19]

A look at the numbers the other way reinforces this association between the left and independence, allowing us to see that even though, as we have seen, support for secession is disproportionately weak among the working class, it is nevertheless disproportionately strong among people who identify with the left. In fact, the correlation between left-right identification and support for independence is very stark. To be precise, in our survey, support for secession among respondents who situate themselves

[19] To measure left-right ideology, we asked respondents to place themselves on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is "extreme left" and 10 is "extreme right." We then classified those who situate themselves from 0 to 2 as "left;" from 3 to 4 as "center left;" from 5 to 6 as "center;" from 7 to 8 as "center right;" and from 9 to 10 as "right."

on the left stands at 60.7%. Among respondents on the center-left, the proportion is relatively high as well, at 53.1%. By contrast, among respondents who situate themselves in the center and on the center-right of the ideological spectrum, support for secession drops to 36% and 36.7%, respectively and among those who situate themselves on the right, it plummets to a mere 17.5%.

This curious phenomenon of a disconnect between class composition and ideological identification in support for a movement is not unique in Western Europe. Witness the predominately middle-class left-wing base of support for Labour candidate Jeremy Corbyn in Britain (Gray 2017). Or, for that matter, the predominately middle-class left-wing base of support for *Podemos* across Spain (Sola and Rendueles 2018). The working class in Catalonia, as elsewhere, has been de-politicized, de-aligned, defeated. The contradictions of an increasingly unfettered capitalist economy have contributed to destabilization, and indeed, to political turbulence, even a surge of mobilization among those who consider themselves leftists, but these mobilized leftists themselves overwhelmingly belong to the relatively privileged, highly-educated middle classes. The dialectic between labor and capital, for now, remains suspended.

14. Conclusions

Although there has been a proliferation of interpretations of the dynamics driving the recent secessionist surge in Catalonia, few studies have payed sufficient attention to providing an accurate description of the contours of the emergent social division between pro-independentist and pro-unionist factions or camps within Catalan society. Such neglect contributes to a clear tendency within scholarly analysis to reproduce and reify an alleged collective will of the Catalan people. A precise picture of who the independentists are, and who the unionists are—that is, a careful depiction of the main correlates of pro-independentist and pro-unionist sentiment, and a sociological understanding of the way in which this emergent social division is embedded within broader constellations of material and social relations—such a descriptive, empirical approach has been largely missing from much of the scholarly debate.

This article follows the approach originally pioneered by Juan Linz to the empirical study of nationalism by seeking to situate the emergent social division in Catalonia over the question of independence within a broader constellation of power relations.

We make use of original survey data to bring into focus a variety of demographic, cultural, behavioral and attitudinal indicators with which this division is associated. We emphasize the special salience of language practices and ideologies in conditioning, if not determining, attitudes towards independence. More concretely, we demonstrate the continuing legacy of what Linz famously referred to as a three-cornered conflict, among regional nationalists, the central government, and immigrant workers (and now their descendants), which has long conditioned democratic politics in Catalonia.

Linz's diagnosis of the three-cornered conflict provides a necessary historical context for understanding the origin and significance of the ethno-linguistic correlates to the emergent social division between pro-independentist and pro-unionist factions or camps in Catalan society that we document in the article. By demonstrating the continuing relevance of Linz's diagnosis/model, we hope to correct the tendency in much of the scholarship: (1) to reproduce reified notions about the will of the Catalan people, and (2) to neglect careful sociological analysis of the way in which the correlates of secessionist preferences are embedded within constellations of power relations in Catalan society.

Our point is not to claim that nothing has changed since Linz made his diagnosis but rather, to insist that despite all the changes in context that have occurred, it remains impossible to understand the dynamics of the current secessionist surge, and especially the limits to its appeal, without paying close attention to the long latent, now ever more salient, ethno-linguistic cleavage inside Catalan society. Or to put the point somewhat differently: to understand the dynamics of the recent secessionist surge requires a historical understanding of the emergence and subsequent crystallization and freezing of the ethno-linguistic cleavage in Catalan society, and an understanding of how this cleavage continues to intersect with and reinforce other existing cleavages.

In this article, we show how divisions associated with the reinforcing cleavages of language and class are reflected in, and have even been exacerbated by, the still ongoing conflict between pro-independence and pro-unionist camps in the region. Indeed, our fine-grained, descriptive analysis of the survey data allows us to conclude that the three-cornered conflict remains alive and well—that ethno-linguistic divisions within Catalan society continue to condition the dynamics and limit the appeal of the Catalan nationalist cause in general, and of Catalan secession in particular. This stubborn sociological reality renders it very difficult for the Catalan nationalist cause to hope to marshal sufficient unanimity to force the issue of independence.

Even so, close to half of the Catalan citizenry has by now come to register a rather intense preference in favor of independence, and this equally stubborn, if emergent, sociological reality in turn renders it quite difficult for Spanish authorities to enforce the will of the Spanish majority without appearing to tyrannize the Catalan minority. All of this leads us to expect that a considerable degree of social and, above all, political conflict, most likely even a constitutional impasse, over the question of Catalan independence, is here to stay, certainly for the foreseeable future.

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Article

National Deadlock. Hot Nationalism, Dual Identities and Catalan Independence (2008–2019)

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Abstract: The article explores the transformations of Spanish and Catalan national identities and the growth of the pro-independence movement in Catalonia following the 2008 global recession. It argues that the Great Recession provided a new historical context of hot nationalism in which Catalanist narratives of loss and resistance began to ring true to large sectors of Catalan society, whereas the Spanish constitutionalist narratives seemed increasingly outdated. The article also shows the limits of the process of mass nationalization by both the Catalan and the Spanish governments and the eventual 'crystallization' of an identity and political divide between pro and anti-independence supporters which split Catalan society down the middle and led to a sort of national identity deadlock.

Keywords: nationalism; national identity; Catalonia; Spain; independence

1. Introduction

In the evening of 10 October 2017, Catalan President Carles Puigdemont addressed the Parliament of Catalonia. The stakes could not have been much higher, as many expected Puigdemont to proclaim independence. Nine days earlier, Puigdemont's government had organized an independence referendum, which the Spanish Constitutional Court had declared invalid. According to the Catalan authorities, almost 90% of the voters supported an independent Catalonia. The Spanish government dismissed the referendum and accused pro-independence leaders of subversion. In the Catalan parliament, Puigdemont told MPs that the 1 October referendum had proven that the "people's will" was to break away from Madrid. For the Catalan President, the reasons for this desire for independence lay in history. Following the death of dictator Francisco Franco, Catalonia wanted to build a democratic and decentralized Spain, so it took a central role in the establishment of the 1978 constitutional system. Over the years, however, the Spanish governments' persistent attacks on Catalonia and the implementation of "a programme of aggressive and systematic recentralization" had driven the Catalan people towards the "rational conclusion" that the creation of an independent state was the only way to save "our values as a society". On top of this, Puigdemont explained, Spain "forcedly" took 16,000 million Euros from Catalonia on a yearly basis and repressed those Catalans advocating the right of self-determination. Although Puigdemont claimed that the 1 October referendum had given his government a mandate to create a sovereign republic, the Catalan president added that he would not immediately push ahead with independence from Spain. Puigdemont proposed "the suspension of the effects of the declaration of independence for a few weeks, to open a period of dialogue". After all, Catalans had "nothing against Spain or the Spanish".

President Puigdemont's address to the Catalan Parliament epitomized the pro-independence narrative. This discourse presented Catalonia and Spain as two incompatible nations. The former was portrayed as democratic, freedom-loving and tolerant. The latter was often associated with authoritarianism, centralization and economic and political oppression. Fostered by politicians,

journalists and academics, this account of the incompatibility between Catalonia and Spain grew to be dominant in Catalan society in the early 2010s. Nevertheless, as the pro-independence narrative of incompatibility become hegemonic in the public sphere, a majority of Catalans continued to express dual identities, showing affective ties to both Catalonia and Spain.[1] Thus 'mononational' narratives coexisted with forms of dual identification (Catalan and Spanish). This led to a certain contradiction between how most Catalans experienced their dual identities and the dominance achieved by the pro-independence discourse in the public sphere. This article explores the construction of a hegemonic pro-independence discourse and the persistence of dual identities in the period 2008–2019.

The existence of dual identities can be partially explained by looking at the competing nationalization projects undertaken in Catalonia in the last four decades. Since the early 1980s, Catalan and Spanish regional governments promoted a number of opposing national narratives and nationalization policies. Additionally, conflicting nationalization processes took place outside the realm of government. Families, friends, sports clubs, cultural associations and some mass media have acted as alternative institutions to the official ones in a 'bottom-up' nationalization process.

Our analysis is supported by two theoretical propositions. The first is that of the three spheres of nationalization. According to this theory, the processes of nationalization take place in three interconnected spheres. The public sphere is where state and sub-state official institutions operate. The nationalizing agents that operate within the public sphere are the education system, the military and public services, such as the postal service, the legal system and transportation. Private collective institutions, including political parties, trade unions, cultural, religious and sports associations, social movements and non-governmental organizations act in the semi-public sphere. Finally, the private sphere is where individuals socialize with friends and family (Quiroga 2014).

Secondly, we understand national identity as a 'narrative experience', as a story that is told by individual and collective agents, in the above-mentioned spheres (Wodak et al. 2010, pp. 14–15; Archilés 2013). The narrative experience links the individual to the nation. This ultimately involves understanding the historical nature of nationalization processes. Put it in a different manner, national identities are historical products transformed according to changing nationalization contexts.

This article argues that Spanish identity gradually reduced its presence in the public and, to a lesser extent, semi-public spheres in twenty-first century Catalonia. This process was influenced by a series of historical factors, including the growing strength of the Catalanist narratives and the nationalizing weakness of the Spanish state. Both factors were to be exacerbated following the 2008 economic crisis. Within this framework, the growth of the pro-independence movement in the period 2008–2018 can be partially interpreted as the result of a successful mass nationalization process led by the Generalitat, the Catalan government. Still, this article shows the limits of vertical nationalizations as social engineering processes and highlights the importance of the historical context when determining the success of nationalist narratives. In this respect, this research shows that in 'cold nationalism' contexts dual identities thrived relatively unchallenged in Catalonia, whereas mononational identities increased their presence and influence in 'hot nationalism' milieus.[2]

2. Democracy and Nation Building in Catalonia (1980–2008)

In the period 1980–2008, the Catalan autonomous governments propelled a Catalanist-leaning nationalization of the masses. The governing conservative coalition Convergència i Unió (CiU) led the process of nationalization form above in the period from 1980 to 2003. Later, from 2003–2010, the progressive coalition government of Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), Esquerra Rebublicana de Catalunya (ERC) and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds- Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (IC-Verds) conducted the Catalanist nationalization process. This phenomenon of nationalization in pre-economic

[1] Statistic data from the Centre d'Estudis Opinió (CEO) in http://www.ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages.
[2] The concepts of hot and cold nationalism in Billig (1996) and Hutchinson (2006).

crisis Catalonia has been approached from several different angles. We have solid academic studies on the nationalizing role of the Catalan media, institutional collective memory and the so-called "linguistic normalization policies" in the educational system (Lo Cascio 2016; Hierro 2015; Garcia 2013; Castelló 2007; Lacalle 2007; Jones 2007; Clua i Fainé 2017; Molina 2018; Barrio and Barberà 2011). Overall, what this research shows is the Generalitat's strength in its ability to nationalize the Catalan public and the weakness of the Spanish state in this particular process.

Underlying the Catalan governments' policies of nationalization was a double narrative of resistance and loss. The 'resistance' story presented Catalonia as a region that had historically defied the centralising pressure of Spanish governments. This resistance narrative was complemented by a 'story of loss'. Following this nationalist story line, the Catalan people had been historically deprived of their identity (symbolised in their language) and their freedom (through the loss of self-government in the 1641 Reapers' War and, eventually, the 1701–1714 War of Succession). These 'losses' stimulated resistance throughout the centuries and fed the demands for the restoration of 'historical rights' during the transition to democracy in the late 1970s. The 1979 Statute of Autonomy reflected this narrative of 'loss' in its regulation of the Catalan language, which had to be 'normalised' (restored) and of its self-government as a 'historical right' that was being reinstated (restored). In this sense, Catalan nationalists' narrative transformed historical 'loss' into a present day 'debt'. Catalonia was imagined as a national collective that had been dispossessed for centuries, a community to whom Spain owed a debt that needed to be repaid. Devolution was thus presented as a historical pay-back where Spain was merely returning a portion of what it had once 'stolen' (Molina and Quiroga 2019).

Resistance and loss were complementary ideas that gave meaning to the big central plot of the national institutional narrative: dispossession. This narrative figure was at the core of the "national reconstruction" strategy deployed by Catalan governments, reflected in the institutional rhetoric of the "plundering of Catalonia" by the Spaniards (Alonso 2014, pp. 222–25). The narrative of dispossession was widely shared not only by conservative Catalan elites, but also by left-wing parties, from ERC to the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) and the PSC. They all gave their support to the so-called "linguistic normalisation policy", which symbolised an attempt to correct the damage inflicted by centuries of dispossession. They all carried out nationalization policies founded upon the same Catalan nationalist narratives (Miley 2007; Canal 2018, pp. 98–101).

For three decades conservative and progressive Catalan governments ran a series of nationalizing agencies in the shape of schools, public mass media, museums and art centres. In the period 1980–2007, the Generalitat's institutions were strong enough to compete with those of the state in the public sphere and carried out an intense process to nationalize society. As shown in Table 1, dual identities remained the prevalent option, while exclusively Spanish identities fell significantly in this period.

Table 1. National identification in Catalonia 1983–2007. Percentage of answers.

	1983	**1988**	**1993**	**1998**	**2003**	**2007**
Only Spanish	16	11	18	13	10	7
More Spanish than Catalan	8	9	6	8	7	12
As Spanish as Catalan	49	46	35	43	43	38
More Catalan than Spanish	19	21	22	23	25	25
Only Catalan	7	10	15	12	14	15
Doesn't know	1	1	2	-	1	1
No answer	1	2	2	1	1	3
(Number of people asked)	2101	2900	1007	911	3571	1500

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. The percentages have been rounded off.

The figures in Table 1 give us valuable information about top-down nationalization processes. Probably, the new powers in education devolved by the state to the Generalitat did have some influence on the increase in exclusive Catalan identities between 1980 and 2007. Still, the persistence of a majority of dual identities can be partly explained because a significant percentage of the population did not

fully internalise the stories of loss and resistance fostered by the nationalizing agencies of the Catalan government. Surveys in the early 1990s showed that only 15% of Catalans had a correct understanding of the historical significance of 11 September 1714; while only 5% knew who Rafael Casanova was; and just 3% had extensive knowledge of the Reapers' War. In 2001, less than 40% of Catalans considered that Catalonia was a nation (González Calleja 2005, p. 159; Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010, p. 20).

In a way, some Catalans reacted against what they considered excessive 'social engineering' by the regional government. Survey data show an upturn in dual (Spanish and Catalan) identities since the mid-1980s, in what has been interpreted as a reaction by Spanish-speaking Catalans against what they considered to be aggressive education and language policies used by the Catalan government (Martínez-Herrera 2002, p. 443). Thus, the figures in Table 1 demonstrate the limits of the top-down nationalization processes and reinforce research showing that familial identities (particularly that of parents) and the neighbourhood (or the local space that individuals grow up in) are fundamental factors when determining their national ties and loyalties (Hierro 2015, p. 479; Aspachs et al. 2008, pp. 434–44).

Between 1980 and 2007, the private sphere had a significant nationalizing role and moderated the impact of national identity transmission processes in the public sphere. As a matter of fact, dual identities remained hegemonic throughout the entire period. In these years, support for Catalan independence remained between 10% and 15%, roughly the same percentages of Catalans with Catalan-only identities. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, many Catalan youngsters and large sectors of the upper and upper-middle classes began to normalize a Catalan nationalist framework for the political and social interpretation of reality that turned the reference of Catalonia into a national community separate from (and alternative to) Spain (Bartomeus 2017; Burg 2015). Unsurprisingly, it was among these demographic and social sectors where the largest support for Catalan independence was to be found in the 2010s.

3. Nationalizations in Times of Economic Crisis (2008–2019)

The 2008 financial crisis transformed the national debate in Catalonia. Support for independence rose from 17.4% in November 2008 to 36.7% in November 2019, with a peak of secessionist fervour reaching 48.7% during the last months of 2013.[3] How can this spectacular growth in the number of pro-independence citizens be explained? A change in national identity during recent decades has been put forward as a hypothesis. Luis Moreno has suggested that the sociological increase in voters who identify as exclusively Catalan in regular surveys carried out since the end of the last century has necessarily reinforced secessionist demands (Moreno 2014). Moreno compares figures from 1985, when just 9% of the population considered themselves to be only Catalan, to those in 2013, when the number had risen to 29%. Moreno deduces that the growth of an exclusive, mononational Catalan identity has had a direct impact in strengthening secessionism. This theory points to a successful nationalization by regional institutions in their effort to 'make Catalans'. There is no doubt that the increasing support for independence is linked to the rise in Catalan only identities. Yet this premise does not give us the whole picture, as support for independence increased faster than the number of citizens with mononational Catalan identities during the 2010s. If we compare Tables 2 and 3, we can see how the percentages of pro-independence citizens clearly surpass the percentages of those who only identify as Catalan. This means that many Catalans with a bi-national identity chose to support the project of an independent Catalonia. Political options, such as the intention of creating an independent state, are more volatile than national identities themselves.

[3] Data from Centre d'Estudis Opinió in http://www.ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages.

Table 2. National identification in Catalonia 2008–2019. Percentage of answers.

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Only Spanish	4	4	7	5	3	3	5	6	4	5	8	5
More Spanish than Catalan	4	4	4	4	2	3	5	5	5	4	8	5
As Spanish as Catalan	42	44	45	43	42	35	31	39	35	35	41	38
More Catalan than Spanish	28	27	25	27	28	28	26	22	24	22	18	21
Only Catalan	19	18	17	19	21	29	29	25	29	29	22	26
Doesn't know	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	3	1	3
No answer	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	3	3	2	3	3

Source: Barómetre d'Opinió Política. Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió. The percentages have been rounded off.

Table 3. Preferences with respect to the relationship between Catalonia and Spain 2007–2019. Percentage of answers.

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Independent state	15	18	21	19	25	29	46	45	39	42	40	43	37
Federal state inside Spain	35	33	35	30	32	31	22	20	26	21	22	19	22
Autonomous community	37	39	35	38	33	28	21	23	24	27	27	26	28
Region	6	5	4	7	6	5	4	3	3	4	5	7	6
Doesn't know	5	4	3	4	4	5	5	7	5	6	5	3	6
No answer	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2

Source: Barómetre d'Opinió Política. Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió. The percentages have been rounded off.

Recent research has shown that the relationship between identity and support for secession changes according the spatial and social context in which individuals interact. The language and the ideas of the individual's family and friends were key elements when it came to support secession. This was especially the case of dual-identity Catalans as they were particularly affected by their immediate surroundings. Thus, the probability to vote in favour of independence among dual-identity Catalans substantially grew when the percentage of people speaking Catalan in their family and friends' milieus increased. Furthermore, citizens' interaction in like-minded networks modified the relationship between identity and secession. Again, the disparity between national identification and support for independence was stronger among Catalans with dual identities. This group was six times more likely to vote for pro-independence parties when having only pro-secession close contacts, as compared to having none (Rodon and Guinjoan 2018). Diverse social and spatial contexts explain why some Catalans identified with Spain and still wanted an independent Catalonia.

Table 3 also shows that the rapid increase in the support for Catalonia's independence is a phenomenon that took place after 2010. That year, support for the secessionist project was at 19%, rising to 46% in 2013. Such a rapid growth in secessionism over such a short period of time questions the monocausal interpretations that reduce the increase in pro-independence positions to a mere consequence of years of nationalizing policies by the regional Catalan government. This type of mono-linear reading, more political than academic, was defended, among others, by the Minister of Education and Culture of Mariano Rajoy's conservative government, José Ignacio Wert, who blamed the rise of secessionism on 'Catalanisation' policies.[4] However, this interpretation ignores that these same nationalizing policies had been in operation during three decades in which support for independence was always below 20%. When secessionism rose abruptly from 2010 onwards, it did so in all age groups and across the ideological spectrum.

The reasons behind the spectacular growth of secessionism can be found in the particular context created by the 2008 economic crisis. The stories of loss and resistance recited by the institutional nationalist narrative remained unchanged after 2008. The novelty was that the context of crisis favoured its 'verifiability' in the eyes of many Catalans, in particular as the financial crash created a situation of social alarm. ERC's old slogan, *Espanya ens roba* (Spain robs us), became a common theme in the Catalan

[4] *El País*, 02-10-2012.

public debate after 2010. This leitmotif was brought back in 2010 itself, at the start of the economic crisis, by a small pro-independence electoral coalition, Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència and later used by the CiU government itself (Bolaño 2015, p. 84). The slogan not only offered an easy way out for a Catalanist political elite that was involved in many corruption cases and had helped exacerbate the effects of the crisis by implementing austerity policies, but it also provided a simple explanation for a very complex economic and social situation (Vidal-Folch 2013, pp. 139–41).

In the past, the idea that Spain was economically exploiting Catalonia was ignored by most Catalans. At the end of the day, Catalonia was one of Spain's wealthiest autonomous communities. However, the economic crisis facilitated the connection between a taxation system that was portrayed as unfair and the problems derived from the crisis. As the CiU government (2010–2015) implemented a number of cuts on Catalan public services, president Artur Mas demanded the creation of an independent Catalan taxation system in 2012. The Spanish government rejected the proposal and the right-wing Catalanists decided then to join the pro-independence movement. According to CiU, it was time to break with a "subsidised Spain who lived out of productive Catalonia".[5] In 2013, the backing for secession by the Catalan government coincided with a 10-point growth of pro-independence support (Table 3).

In a context of economic crisis, the old Catalanist narrative of dispossession, fitted well with a renewed discourse of political oppression. In 2010, the Constitutional Court of Spain declared the new Catalan statute of autonomy to be partially unconstitutional and invalidated its consideration of Catalonia as a sovereign nation. The new Catalan statute of autonomy had been passed by the Catalan Parliament in September 2005 and by the Spanish Parliament in May 2006. In June 2006, the Catalan people approved the new statute in a referendum, but the Spanish conservative party, Partido Popular (PP) filed an objection of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court. The tribunal's 2010 ruling was followed by large mobilisations, which brought thousands of citizens out on the streets behind the slogan 'We are a nation. We decide'. The Constitutional Court's verdict was interpreted by many Catalans as a setback for their aspirations of self-government and as the last episode in a long history of assaults on their identity (Burg 2015, pp. 290–93). As we can see in Table 3, 2010 was precisely the year when many Catalans started to consider independence as the only feasible political option.

For all the importance of the Constitutional Court's ruling, the key to date and explain the secessionist process lies in the economic crisis, which led to a bailout of the Catalan financial system by the central government in August 2012 and gave new meaning to a discourse of lamentation about the historical and economic mistreatment of Catalonia. In the end, the crisis functioned as a 'late' context of opportunity for the secessionists. By late we mean that between the financial crash of 2008 and the massive celebration of the National Day of Catalonia on 11 September 2012 there was an initial phase in which the economic crisis seems poised to act as a driver for change through the so-called 15-M movement. In 2011, the 15-M anti-austerity movement rallied millions of protesters all over Spain against high unemployment rates, welfare cuts, global capitalism, the bailouts of banks and political corruption (Antentas 2015). In Catalonia, the 14 and 15 June 2011 popular protests in front of the Catalan Parliament were a turning point. The anti-austerity protesters heckled and shoved regional MPs as they entered the Catalan Parliament to vote on new cuts to public funding. The President of Catalonia, Artur Mas, had to access Parliament from a helicopter to avoid demonstrators. These massive protests against cuts to social expenditure lacked any national symbols and prioritised the social agenda over identity and equality over patriotic messages. Following the 15-M protests, Artur Mas's regional government became increasingly radicalized in nationalist terms. In September 2012, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, the bigger partner in the CiU coalition positioned itself as the leader of the secessionist movement (Amat 2015; Barrio et al. 2018). By activating the pro-independence message,

[5] *Naciódigital*, 27-8-2013, https://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/58422/ciu/contra/espanya/subsidiada/viu/catalunya/productiva.

Artur Mas's regional government sought to 'vampirise' the social unrest by using national identity as a counter-mobilisation tactic (Alonso 2015, p. 325).

The conversion of Convergència to secessionism was a textbook case of counter-programming through sublimation: social conflicts were distilled into ethereal, identity-related essences. This explains why, despite being extremely hard-hitting, the Catalan government's neoliberal policies did not elicit the same social backlash as that experienced by other European governments (including the Spanish government), which also implemented considerable cuts to public services. Between 2012 and 2013, support for independence rose from 29% to 46% following Convergència secessionist turn. While in 2001, 40% of the population saw Catalonia as a nation, in 2017 this percentage rose to around 80% (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010, p. 20; Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió 2017).

The rise of the independence movement was not, however, a simple matter of mobilisation orchestrated from above on behalf of Artur Mas's government. In fact, the secessionist mobilisation began years before Convergència's 'conversion' to backing independence and was organised by associations within civil society. After the 2008 crisis, three forms of civil protest and disobedience centred around the independence mobilisation, which ended up converging with the demand for a referendum concerning self-determination. First, the consultations within several municipalities concerning independence put forth from 2009 with the motto "poll the people" made the desire of some sectors of Catalan society to create an independent State visible. In a complementary fashion, the campaign against paying highway tolls in 2012 added a touch of civil disobedience to the independence movement. Third, the electoral growth of Candidature d'Unitat Popular (CUP) demonstrated the promulgation of an anti-establishment nationalism seeking independence in open confrontation with the Spanish constitutional system. Finally, the growing work of the Assemblea Nacional Catalana, nonpartisan and transversal on the left-right ideological axis, served to carry out a very significant mobilisation within Catalan civil society that simultaneously worked to establish connections to link diverse strands of the independence movement (Casals 2013; Downling 2017).

The combination of action from above (institutions) and from below (civil society) in a context of crisis that conferred credibility to the narrative of "dispossession" generated a counter-mobilisation dynamic that favoured the passive assimilation of the pro-independence message printed in the local media, institutional policies and civil society. The accumulation of nationalizing instruments fostered the mobilisation of citizens with a strong sense of Catalan nationalist identity and demobilized Catalans with robust Spanish identities. The institutional control over the public discourse concerning identity and pro-independence social mobilisation managed to turn certain narratives about the Catalan nation into canonical accounts within broad sectors of the population. By 2012, this hegemony of the independence movement's discourse had worked to shape a congruent reality that undermined the visibility of Spanish identities in the Catalan public sphere (Alonso 2016, vol III, pp. 655–86).

The Catalanist nationalizing process facilitated the de-politicisation of some Castilian-speaking collectives of immigrant origin in industrial areas. These groups were placed outside the so-called Catalanist consensus led by the native, urban and semi-urban middle classes, who were the electoral base of CiU and ERC and where much of the ruling elite of the PSC came from (Miley 2006; Garcia 2010; Herrera and Miley 2016, pp. 210–18). In the case of the PSC, although its sociological base was in working class neighbourhoods, its political strategy and discourse, established by its Catalanist-leaning elite, acted as an effective channel to integrate its voters within the Catalan nationalist consensus before the economic crisis of 2008 (Roller and Van Houten 2003). Public opinion surveys have shown the existence of a significant part of society that somehow felt left out of the political debate due to not identifying with Catalan nationalism. It is no coincidence that all surveys published by the Generalitat's Centre d'Estudis de Opinió between 2014 and 2019 revealed linguistic and social inequality in citizens' involvement in the pro-independence movement, as well as a strong correlation between income level

and education, number of Catalan surnames and involvement in the separatist movement.[6] In other words, Catalans with a high income and education and Catalan surnames tended to support secession, whereas poorer, less educated citizens with Castilian surnames were, in the main, against independence.

The rise of the Catalan pro-independence movement has to be understood within its European context. In the past decade, the so-called 'nationalism of the rich' has become a crucial political factor in some Western European countries, including, Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom (Dalle Mulle 2019, pp. 11–14). This nationalism advocated the construction of a prosperous ethnic community that overcame deficiencies of the welfare state in the context of economic crisis. As a secessionist discourse, the nationalism of the rich promoted the existence of a virtuous national community founded on capitalist criteria of excellence in business entrepreneurship and work capacity. In order for the national reconstruction project to come to fruition, guaranteeing the happiness of the virtuous community and its capacity to generate a shared wealth, the nationalism of the rich insisted on the cultural sidelining of those social sectors that did not fit in its model of the nation. For Catalan nationalists, these groups that did not fit in with the myth of the entrepreneurial and working nation were largely lower-income workers and people of immigrant origin with a strong Spanish identity. In a context of austerity with severe cuts in social services and support from an important part of the Catalan middle and upper classes, this nationalism of the rich was articulated politically by ERC and, above all, by Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (Dalle Mulle 2019, pp. 35–39).

4. The Spanish National Identity Crisis

In the first years of the 2010s, there was an ongoing drift of Catalan national identities towards secessionist positions and a sidelining of Spanish national identities to the private sphere. This transformation of identities was partially the result of a gradual conversion of the public and semi-public spheres into 'comfort zones' for the expression of pro-independence sentiments. In a context of 'hot nationalism', everyday life was increasingly permeated by Catalan nationalism, which became the dominant force in politics, society and culture. From football stadiums to local festival parades, together with art exhibitions, folk fairs and institutional events, pro-independence symbols and expressions became increasingly recurrent in the public and semi-public spheres. This signified a profound change in Catalan nationalism. In the 1990s, different forms of 'banal nationalism' were generated by Catalan institutions, in competition with the 'banal nationalism' of the Spanish state. In a context of economic growth and political stability, Catalanism went thought a process of 'cooling' and dual identities remained strong (Crameri 2000). After 2008, in a context of austerity and challenges to the political system, institutional and civil society mobilisation created a new milieu of 'hot nationalism' where demands for independence rapidly expanded and dual identities slowly eroded.

Beginning in 2013, the Convergència governments led pro-independence demonstrations, together with traditionally secessionist parties such as ERC. These mobilisations were carried out with institutional initiatives from above that insisted on Catalonia's right of self-determination and demanded referendum of independence. Adding to these pro-government mobilisations was the repeated occupation of public space by sectors of a new civil society that were clearly in favour of independence. This new civil society had a constant presence in the streets through repeated festive demonstrations in demand of self-determination and the display of independence flags hung from thousands of windows and balconies throughout Catalonia. Indispensably, the Assemblea Nacional de Catalunya and Omnium Cultural, two civil society organizations with close ties to the Generalitat, acted as a link between broad sectors of the Catalan citizenry and political elites to coordinate and channel the independence movement (Kubiaczyk 2018, pp. 247–48; Garcia 2016, pp. 241–44).

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[6] Centre d'Estudis Opinió http://www.ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages; Vidal, Guillem and Gil Hernández, Carlos J., "¿'La pela es la pela'? Renta, clase social y secesionismo", *Agenda Pública - El País*, 22 December (Vidal and Hernández 2019).

The hegemony acquired by the pro-independence movement in the public and semi-public spheres was accompanied by a displacement of Spanish identities to the private sphere. This displacement was closely related to the shortcomings in the building of a Spanish nationalism that could appeal to large sectors of Catalan society. The reinvention of Spanish national identity after the Franco dictatorship was conditioned by the mythification concerning the period of transition to democracy. The new democratic political culture turned the transition period into a sort of "zero hour" in the history of Spain (Archilés 2011, p. 254). Consequently, the period of transition to democracy that began with the death of the dictator in 1975 and closed with the 1978 Constitution was turned into "the Transition", a master narrative that reconfigured itself as the founding myth of the nation. The myth was symbolized with two key concepts: political consensus and national reconciliation. These concepts that articulated a new language of understanding that emerged from the agreement between Francoist reformists and the anti-Franco opposition. The myth, furthermore, required a third underlying concept, that of amnesty, which for many also meant forgetting Franco's crimes (Desfor Edles 1998, pp. 41–62).

The conversion of the "Transition" into "zero hour" blocked any tradition in which the new democratic nation could resort to as a model for a discursive formation. The Second Republic (1931–1936) could not serve as a reference because it was presented as partially responsible for the Civil War, following a twisted logic that distributed blame equally between democrats and Francoists. The new constitutional regime of the late 1970s was thus devoid of a "clear foundational myth" and, for this reason, its political architects improvised its mythification. Connotative figures such King Juan Carlos I and the 1978 Constitution were eventually converted into national symbols. Likewise, all of the events that defined the democratic process were exalted in the course of an epic narrative elaborated in the 1980s and 1990s. This epic narrative contrasted the success of the Transition with the failure of the Franco dictatorship and the Second Republic (Aguilar and Humlebaek 2002, pp. 144–52).

Consensus and reconciliation required forgetting of the recent past, the equation of executioners and their victims during the time of the dictatorship and a reversal of guilt not towards specific individuals, who were still alive and had a public presence, but towards the Spanish people characterized as unique and tragic. Forgetting the dictatorship and the national homogenization practices that it promoted meant ignoring the nation itself in whose name the violence had been practiced, in addition to denying existence of the Republican nation against which the Francoist terror had been directed. In some respects, this is why the reshaped Spanish nation lacked solid channels of explicit diffusion. Neither the political elites nor civil society were inclined to promote the new Spanish nation openly, perhaps with the exception of its banal side in the shape of sports, cinema, television and local fiestas (Archilés 2018, pp. 224–34). At a symbolic level, the Spanish national flag and anthem were not profoundly changed during the transition to democracy. As a result, both the Spanish flag and the national anthem retained strong Francoist connotations in the eyes of large sectors of the population (Moreno and Núñez 2018).

The mythologisation of the transition to democracy as a landmark in the Spanish nation's memory started to be seriously questioned when the economic recession became a social and political crisis. In the early 2010s, PP and PSOE, the main political parties identified with the myth of the exemplary transition, saw themselves affected by numerous corruption cases (Rodríguez 2015). Political and social criticism of the 1978 Constitution thus contributed to the deterioration of the Spanish national imaginary. The Spanish Magna Charta went from being represented as a key element of democracy and modernity to being an empty legal text incapable of protecting the most vulnerable members of society, while condoned a political and economic class extensively involved in corrupt practices. During these years of economic crisis, the Spanish public and semi-public spheres witnessed how the two main foundational myths of the nation, the Transition and the 1978 Constitution, were questioned in films, theatre, literature, mass media and academic studies. (Kornetis 2014, pp. 86–91; Martínez 2012; Gustran and Quiroga 2019).

The narrative of modernity and pro-Europeanism that characterised institutional Spanish nationalism in the 1990s and the early 2000s lacked meaning in a society on the brink of economic collapse and with a major loss of legitimacy of the main institutions (judiciary, political class, business

class and the monarchy) due to the corruption scandals that emerged during the crisis. At the same time, the cuts implemented by an already weak Spanish welfare state affected its nationalizing dimension. As in other European countries, the provision of state welfare served a nation-building purpose, promoting solidarity across social classes as well as across territories in different countries (Dalle Mulle 2019, pp. 170–72; Lepsius 2004; McEwen 2002). Before the 2008 crisis, in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain, many citizens had an emotional attachment to a Spanish nation imagined as a solidarity community, with a powerful public healthcare, education and pensions system (Beramendi and Rivera 2017, pp. 23–24). The austerity policies implemented first by the PSOE and later by the PP were a frontal attack on that Spanish identity created via the welfare state (Ruiz et al. 2015). To put it another way, the imposition of neoliberal policies to tackle the economic crisis ended up seriously eroding a Spanish identity based on a concept of national solidarity created by the welfare state. The economic crisis encouraged an experience of sentimental abandonment of Spain among the working classes by gravely affecting the national narratives that gave them identity, channelled through the myth of the Transition and ideograms such as 'Europe' and 'modernity', and of the perception of the 'imagined community' through the policies of the welfare state.

In Catalonia the attack on the welfare state was twofold. First, the widespread cuts put forth by the central government had an erosion effect on Spanish identity, as in elsewhere in the country. Second, the extensive austerity measures imposed by the regional government in education, health, and social services were presented by President Artur Mas as the inevitable result of an unfair situation in which Catalonia gave the state more than it received. This justification of the cuts on behalf of the Catalan right fed the idea of Spain's economic abuse of Catalonia and, with it, the growing discomfort in large sectors of the Catalan population. This perception of abuse was channelled by the old narrative of 'dispossession' and articulated through the myth of Catalans as working citizens that unproductive Spaniards take advantage of. The motto of one of CiU's 2013 posters, "subsidized Spain lives off productive Catalonia", sums up this idea perfectly. This narrative aimed to erode the idea of solidarity between Spaniards and Catalans, by presenting cuts in social spending not as a political decision of the central and regional governments, but as the result of the attack from one people, the sponger Spaniards, to another, the hard-working Catalans. As in the case of other places with dual identities, such as Belgium and Italy, in Catalonia the issue of fiscal balances and the dismantling of social services were reinterpreted as inter-territorial conflicts, leading to calls for 'social closure', with regard to welfare arrangements, around the national community (Dalle Mulle 2019, p. 172). Consequently, the austerity policies that CiU promoted, supported by ERC on numerous occasions, their narrative justification and the reporting of fiscal imbalances encouraged the growing mismatch between a majority dual national identity in recession and a minority, albeit rising, mononational identity in the early 2010s.

Despite the undeniable success of Catalanist narratives, the context of economic crisis also facilitated the growth of two political parties that articulated anti-separatist alternatives in Catalonia in diverse ways. Created in Barcelona in 2006, Ciudadanos positioned itself since its founding as the bulwark of 'unionism' in Catalonia. The party claimed Spanish national sovereignty and denounced what it considered to be a suffocating social environment created by Catalan nationalism. Although in its beginning the party enjoyed modest results, the rise of the independence movement and the crisis of the Spanish bipartisan model turned Ciudadanos into one of the main parties in Catalonia and Spain from 2015 onward. In the Catalan regional elections of September 2015, Ciudadanos became the second most powerful political force and went on to lead Spanish nationalism in Catalonia. In December 2017, Ciudadanos won the regional elections with 25% of the votes and became the largest party in the Parliament of Catalonia.[7]

[7] In 2015 Ciudadanos obtained 40 MPs in the Spanish general elections. In June 2016 the party led by Albert Rivera got 32 MPs and facilitated the PP-led minority government of Mariano Rajoy. The electoral fortunes of Ciudadanos dramatically changed Spain-wide in 2019. In the April 2019 Spanish elections Ciudadanos got 55 MPs their best result ever. Yet when Spaniards went back to the polls in November 2019 Ciudadanos dramatically dropped to 10 MPs.

While Ciudadanos defended clearly conservative postulates concerning social and economic matters, the rapid growth of the party in Catalonia can be explained in terms of its ability to capture votes to the left and right of the political spectrum. The party's firm anti-Catalan nationalist discourse and their defence of the Spanish nation served to attract part of the traditional PP voters in Catalonia. At the same time, Ciudadanos was able to capitalize on part of PSC's votes beginning in 2015, as some of the Socialists' former followers felt abandoned by the party's lukewarm response to the advancement of the independence movement (Senserrich 2018). In a panorama of political polarization, Ciudadanos knew how to project the party as the primary defender of unionism and politically mobilize sectors of Catalan society that identified fundamentally with Spain (Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio 2015).

The creation of Podemos in 2014 significantly altered the political arena in Spain and Catalonia. Founded at the Universidad Complutense in Madrid by a group of political scientists, the party asserted the legacy of the 15-M movement, demanded the end of austerity measures and defended a Spanish patriotism that extolled social and popular values (Iglesias 2015; Olloqui Redondo 2016). The party's success was almost immediate. Podemos managed to win the Spanish general elections in Catalonia in 2015 and 2016 through their conciliatory discourse with respect to the claims for Catalan sovereignty. In relation to the Catalan independence movement, Podemos proposed a comprehensive reform of the 1978 Constitution, advocating for a new republican and multinational Spain that would keep Catalonia within its borders (Rodríguez Teruel et al. 2018; Pi 2016).

In Catalonia, Podemos ended up situating itself in the constellation of parties grouped together for the electoral coalition En Comú–Podem, which made up a large part of the left in opposition to the independence movement. The party in Catalonia defended a posture of "popular Catalanism" that recognized the national character of Catalonia and the right to call a referendum concerning independence as long as it was previously agreed upon with the State. This positioning with respect to the independence movement left En Comú–Podem in a sort of no man's land where secession was not directly supported nor openly opposed (Domènech 2017). In a society that became increasingly polarized around the issue of independence, in a territory with a high degree of 'hot nationalism', the interest of En Comú–Podem to prioritize the social agenda over the national did not always reap benefits at the polls. In the November 2019 general elections, the coalition became the third force in Catalonia behind ERC and PSC.

As noted above, during the initial years of the 2010s, Catalanist identities became hegemonic in the public sphere. Still, the production and reproduction of Spanish identities in Catalonia did not disappear. They moved to the semi-public and private spheres. These processes of nationalization took place in spaces of leisure and informal sociability and were channelled by different mass media. A reflection of these nationalizations were the massive celebrations of the Spanish national football team's victories during the 2010 World Cup and the 2008 and 2012 Euro Cups. In these contexts of patriotic celebrations, Catalonia witnessed a widespread display of Spanish flags (Quiroga 2013, pp. 152–53). Nevertheless, the absence of a uniform nationalist narrative and ritualised popular celebrations made the experience of 'Spanishness" mostly a private matter, with sporadic public manifestations in Catalonia.

Furthermore, the fact that tabloid talk shows and magazines and trash TV in general were mostly in Castilian had a negative impact on the image of Spain in Catalonia. These types of programmes were active communication channels of a Spanish nation that was presented as lower class, Castilian-speaking and ignorant of the cultural and linguistic diversity of Spain. As in other autonomous regions, tabloid talk shows and trash TV were consumed massively in Catalonia and almost invariably produced by public and private media corporations from Madrid.[8] Thus, in Catalonia this entertainment culture was associated with Spanish culture and with the Castilian-speaking, lower-class social groups which were supposed to consume it (Roman 2014). It is no accident that these Spanish speaking lower classes were

[8] Peris, "La nación española", pp. 239–42.

the social groups least inclined to support the pro-independence movement (Miley and Garvía 2019). In June 2017, a survey of the Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió showed that only 29% of Catalans earning between 900 and 1200 Euros per month wanted an independent Catalonia, whereas support for secession reached 54% among those earning more than 4000 Euros per month (Llanera 2017).

Despite the pro-independence movement hegemonic position, in recent years the Catalan public sphere witnessed increasing demonstrations of Spanish identities. In 2014, Societat Civil Catalana was founded to promote "Catalan culture as an inseparable part of a common Spanish culture".[9] This association sought to mobilise those anti-secessionist sectors of Catalan society who until then had remained quiet on the issue. In this field, Societat Civil Catalana was fairly successful, as it organised massive demonstrations in defence of a "Catalonia integrated into a plural Spain" and the 1978 Constitution.[10] Crucially, these rallies were backed by all non-secessionist parties, with the exception of En Comú–Podem. Ciudadanos, PP and, to a lesser extent, PSC also took part in the celebrations of the Fiesta Nacional de España (12 October) and Constitution Day (6 December), contributing to the active promotion of Spanish identities in the Catalan public sphere.

The symbolic war was waged in balconies and windows too, as thousands of Spanish flags were displayed in opposition to the exhibition of pro-independence emblems in homes all over Catalonia. The political confrontation in the public space increased in 2017 following the celebration of the 1 October referendum and the imprisonment of pro-independence leaders in November. Yellow ribbons were then displayed to demand the release of the prisoners in the facades of official institutions, squares, streets and private houses. Those in favour of the ongoing unity of Spain, in turn, removed them—in some cases in an organised and systematic manner (Kubiaczyk 2018, pp. 250–59). In this dispute over the symbolic control of public space, the Catalan police took legal action against some of the organised groups removing the ribbons, while both Ciudadanos and Societat Civil Catalana accused regional premier Quim Torra of repressing dissent.[11]

Notwithstanding the comeback of Spanish identities to the Catalan public sphere since 2014, the truth of the matter is that Catalanist identities still dominated the scene both in terms of symbols and popular mobilisation. Spanish nationalism in Catalonia was fundamentally rebuilt as a reaction to the secessionist movement, yet it lacked a strong epic narrative and was weakened by the unionist parties' different perceptions of the Spanish nation. Unlike Convergència, ERC and CUP, who shared a number of myths and narratives about the Catalan nation, Podemos, PSC, Ciudadanos and PP have profoundly different concepts of the Spanish nation. Still, the domination of the Catalanist narratives, symbolism and mobilization was not accompanied by a similar supremacy in electoral terms. The pro-independence parties reached a bit less of 50% of the vote in the regional elections of September 2015. Two years later, amid the celebration of the 1 October 2017 independence referendum, Carles Puigdemont's declaration of independence, the Spanish government suspension of Catalan autonomy and the imprisonment of Catalanist politicians, the pro-independence parties obtained very similar results (48% of the vote) in the December 2017 regional elections. In the 10 November 2019 Spanish general election, a month after pro-independence leaders were handed lengthy prison sentences by the Supreme Court and violence erupted in Barcelona for some days, secessionist parties took 43% of the vote in Catalonia.

In the period 2014–2019 Spanish identities found a renewed space in the Catalan public sphere and consolidated their representation in the Catalan Parliament. The creation of Societat Civil Catalana, the celebration of pro-unionist demonstrations, the public display of Spanish flags and the electoral success of Ciudadanos are instances of this revival. Interestingly, very few changes in terms of identities were to be registered in the period 2014–2019 (Table 2). Politically, backing for independence declined

[9] https://www.societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/organization.
[10] https://www.societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/organization.
[11] *El País*, 21-8-2018. https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/08/21/inenglish/1534856546_430723.html.

slightly, from 45% in 2014 to 37% in 2019 (Table 3); but pro-independence parties still got approximately 50% of the vote in the regional elections and a majority of MPs in the Catalan Parliament. For all the political turmoil, identities and political choices seem to have crystallized in the years 2014–2019.

5. Conclusions

Since the early 1980s, Catalan patriots promoted stories of loss and resistance, while Spanish nationalists fostered narratives of modernity and democracy. These patriotic narratives did not change over time, but to a large extent their impact depended on the historical context. Thus the idea that Spain was exploiting the Catalan people had a limited impact before the economic crisis, but this became much more powerful after the year 2008. Likewise, the Spanish national myths of the model transition to democracy and the exemplary 1978 Constitution were fairly successful until 2008, yet their resonance dramatically dropped to the changed political and social scenario produced by the economic crisis. The economic and subsequent political crises led to the emergence of a new context hot nationalism. Confrontation over the nation moved to the front of the political agenda.

Despite the profound political transformations in Catalonia and the surge in secessionism, it is worth noting that Catalans' national identification did not change accordingly over the last decade. Dual identities remained the most widespread option, although exclusive identification with Catalonia increased moderately, yet tellingly, since the start of the economic crisis. This continuity shows us the limits of state and regional institutions in shaping the national identities of their citizens in the public sphere. The education system, the mass media controlled by the Spanish and the Catalan governments and public administrations were fundamental nationalizing institutions, though they were far from being perfect tools of social engineering. Still, the limits of the nationalizations from above were not an obstacle for a historic secessionist surge, which increased during the first years of the crisis far more than the drop in multinational identification (Catalan and Spanish) among Catalans. Many citizens identified with Spain but nonetheless advocated for an independent Catalonia. Catalans with dual identities were more incline to support independence if their first language was Catalan and their family and friends backed secession. Furthermore, support for secession was, generally speaking, greater among high-income earners. Ethnicity and social class pretty much determined Catalans' backing for independence in the new context of hot nationalism.

In the first years of the rise of the pro-independence movement, 2008–2014, the there was a displacement of the spheres of public national affection to private spheres. The private sphere provided a space where dual identities could coexist with certain ease. Spanish identities, in particular, found a comfort zone of sorts within it. Informal nationalization processes related to football, popular music and television fostered affective ties linked to a sporting and folkloric Spain. However, these Spanish nationalization practices lacked a powerful narrative that could challenge that of Catalan nationalism. In addition, this displacement had a strong social class component, as the lowest social classes tended to identify with Spain more than the middle and upper classes.

The hegemonic position of the pro-independence movement was somehow challenged by Spanish nationalists in the period 2014–2018. The creation of unionist associations, the rise of anti-secessionist parties, the public display of Spanish symbols and the direct intervention of the central government were all part of a revival of Spanish nationalism in Catalonia. This nationalism presented itself as the champion of dual identities and criticised the Generalitat's representation of Catalans as mononational individuals. For all its fragmentation and weaknesses, in recent years, the unionist camp gathered the support of roughly 50% of the Catalan population, as opposition to independence remained stable both in opinion polls and the ballot box. Following a period of rapid political changes and increasing support for independence, the situation in Catalonia reached a point of crystallization of national identities and opinions with regards to secession. The context of hot nationalism shaped by the economic and social crises ended up producing a national identity deadlock among Catalans.

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Article

From National Holiday to Independence Day: Changing Perceptions of the "*Diada*"

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Abstract: Issues related to Catalan secessionism are central to current debates on European integration, nationalism, and territorial politics, and the Catalan independence movement has become famous for its large annual demonstrations on Catalan national day, the *Diada*. This paper represents the first attempt at a thorough empirical investigation of the most important political event in Catalonia combining historical and ethnographic analysis that covers the current modern period from 1977 to 2019. This paper uses a mixed-methods approach to study the *Diada* mobilisations with two different main approaches determined principally by the availability of sources. We investigate the recent period of activating the *Diada* since 2012 using qualitative interviews, ethnographic data, and social media analysis. For the more distant periods of the *Diada* celebration, we use a more classical historical approach centred on discourse analysis of print media and public discourses. We find that there has been a marked shift in the perception and organisation of the *Diada* in recent years. We conclude that when civil society organisations are in charge of the *Diada* celebration, the result is a more politically charged event that mobilises a much larger proportion of the population than when politicians and political parties organise the celebration. Further, when political parties are in charge, the *Diada* not only mobilises far fewer people, but usually takes on a much more cultural and festive character compared with the explicitly political *Diada* demonstrations organised by civil society actors since 2012.

Keywords: Catalonia; civil society; memory space; commemorations; mixed methods; nationalism; protest; social media; Spain

1. Introduction

Anniversaries are one of the classical types of *lieux de mémoire* that the French historian Pierre Nora lists in his main work of the same name (Nora 1984–1992). Due to their value as representations of history, the power to define commemorations very directly represents instances of the production of history. They constitute multiple sites to which certain values, meanings, and emotions are attached and around which the struggle to define history takes place[1]. Over the past seven years, the celebration of the National Holiday of Catalonia on September 11, the *Diada*, has grown into a popular mass demonstration that has, once again, become a channel for political demands, as it was in the transition to democracy in the late 1970s after the death of Dictator Franco. During the more than 30 years between these two periods in time, the celebration of the *Diada* was taken over and institutionalised

[1] For discussions of the process of creation of commemorations, see Trouillot (1995) and Zerubavel (2003). For a critical discussion of Nora's concept and of its relation to national master narratives, see Humlebæk (2018).

by the regional Government and the political parties in Catalonia. Thereby, the National Holiday, paradoxically, lost most of the popular support and mobilisation potential it had had just a few years before. The number of participants in the celebrations in Barcelona has thus fluctuated from over a million in 1977, dropping to a few tens of thousands over the period from the early 1980s to 2011, to again exceed one million participants several times since 2012.

In 1976, just over nine months after Franco's death, the *Diada* celebration was activated by a wide range of organisations and still illegal political parties, and it was linked to the central demands of the transition to democracy in the Catalan context, namely democracy and self-government. These thoughts were easily merged into the historical significance that the *Diada* had had since its invention as a memorial day in the late 1800s. Since 2012, the *Diada* has again been activated especially by the civil society organisations that have made secession from Spain their main goal, and the demands associated with the celebration are therefore their political demands for independence. They are thus not completely in line with the predominant interpretations of earlier periods of politicisation of *Diada*, yet the organisers chose this anniversary for their demonstrations of the movement's popular support. Giori argues that this is because civil society organisers did not want the demonstration to be a "reactive" event against any current political issue, but a proactive one that could cover mobilisations on a number of autonomy-related issues (Giori 2017, p. 289).

Now, the *Diada* has been celebrated eight times since its reinvention in 2012, and a certain fatigue seems to be spreading in relation to the mobilisation power because, among other things, the demands around which the celebration has been constructed have not materialised. The question remains how the organisations behind the successful mobilisation will try to maintain the popular mobilisation around the *Diada* or whether the celebration in a kind of bound cyclic movement returns to earlier participation levels. In this article, we will examine the apparent paradox that when civil society organisations are in charge of the *Diada* celebration, the result is a more politically charged event that mobilises a much larger proportion of the population than when politicians and political parties organise the celebration. Further, when political parties are in charge, the *Diada* not only mobilises far fewer people, but usually takes on a much more cultural and festive character compared with the explicitly political *Diada* demonstrations organised by civil society actors since 2012.

We investigate the recent period of activating the *Diada* since 2012 using qualitative interviews and ethnographic data in order to examine how activists and participants perceive the *Diada* and how the present perception is related to their memory of past commemorations. In particular, we want to gauge to what extent civil society organisations or political parties are driving the mobilisation around the *Diada*.

2. State of the Art

Issues related to Catalan secessionism are central to current scholarship on European integration, nationalism, and territorial politics. Moreover, the debate about nationalities and nationalism is directly related to a more general debate about citizenship, diversity, and collective rights. The terminology used, however, is both unclear and heavily politicised, such as the distinction between a "nation" and a "region". Catalonia is thus sometimes described as a "nation without a state" (Keating 2001) and Catalan nationalism as "regional nationalist" (Keating 1988). The most common term in the literature, however, is "minority nationalism" (Lynch 1996; Elias 2009; Keating 2014; Griera 2016). This term works for two reasons. It shows how sub-state polities stand in a relationship to a larger whole, in this case the majority nation, and it tells us that the parties who support this ideology represent, or aim to represent, national collectives who desire statehood. Catalan politics is heavily impacted by Spanish politics; however, many of the Catalan political parties would want it to be otherwise. To some extent, the recognition of such regions as nations is predicated on the larger, majority nations' approval (Guibernau 2013, p. 369). However, as Burchardt notes, the question of who constitutes majority and who constitutes minority is quite ambiguous in stateless nations (Burchardt 2017, p. 699). Although the

people who identify as Catalans are certainly a minority within the Spanish state, they are a majority within their own territory.[2]

In fact, Keating has specifically described the independence movement in Catalonia as one of the "new nationalisms of Western Europe" due to its non-essentialist, inclusive, and staunchly non-ethnic character, clearly distinguishing them from far-right movements or ethno-nationalist politics (Keating 2008, p. 334). He has argued in favour of reconceptualising nationalities as "nonspatial cultural communities and endowed with various forms of nonterritorial rights" (Keating 2004, p. 373). Guibernau has even gone so far as to term the Catalan pro-independence movement "emancipatory nationalism" for its focus on democratic self-determination and progressive politics. Guibernau argues that those Western liberal democracies in which state and nation are not coextensive and where strong minority nationalist movements have emerged, such as Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland, are examples of an emerging type of "deepening of democracy" (Guibernau 2013, p. 327). Although some authors, such as Thomas J. Miley, have argued for seeing Catalan linguistic identity as an ethnic component (Miley 2007), there is a wide consensus in the literature on Catalonia that ethnicity and ancestry have little to do with being Catalan (see for example Brandes 1990; Desfor Edles 1999; McCrone 2007; or Dardanelli and Mitchell 2014). The Catalan language can work both as an ethnolinguistic marker of inclusion or, as others have suggested, as a vehicle for the integration of foreigners and non-nationalists into a wider "Catalan culture" (Conversi 1997, p. 4). The dynamics of this socio-linguistic process are best explored in more specific texts (such as Woolard 2005; Conversi and Jeram 2017; or Wilson-Daily et al. 2018).

Specifically for the *Diada*, very little has been written on and, to our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt at a thorough empirical investigation of the most important political event in Catalonia, combining historical and ethnographic analysis that covers the current modern period. The *Diada* has been mentioned *en passant* in other works (such as Conversi 2002; Llobera 2004; or Crameri 2014, pp. 75–82), and Llobera made an analysis of the *Diada* from the 1970s to the early 1990s (Llobera 1996), but no sustained analysis of the political evolution of the event from its reinvention until the present epoch yet exists. Likewise, Michonneau has written an interesting historical account of the creation of the anniversary and its early celebration, and Anguera has written a couple of extensive accounts of the *Diada* from the origins in 1886, but none of them includes the period beyond the Civil War (Michonneau 2001, pp. 165–77, 229–51; Anguera 2003, 2008).

Nevertheless, Rubio has made an interesting comparative rhetorical-discursive analysis of the official speeches of the regional presidents on the respective national days in the Basque Country and Catalonia and, as such, comes close to our object of inquiry. However, the analysis only covers the period from 1980 to 2004 and thus omits precisely the important changes of the last decade and a half (Rubio 2015). Further, although Pablo Giori argues, as we do, that the *Diadas* since 2011 have clearly been taken over and organised by civil society actors, such as the Catalan National Assembly (ANC) and Òmnium Cultural (Giori 2017, p. 286), his analysis of the *Diada* goes a different route than ours and focuses more on cultural elements such as Catalan human towers or *castellers* during the event. Lastly, Rodon et al. (2018) have performed a novel and illuminating social media analysis using Twitter data from the 2016 *Diada* but did not include a historical analysis of the evolution of the *Diada* or qualitative, ethnographic data on the contemporary understandings of the *Diada*.

Several authors such as Crameri (2015), Dowling (2017), and Della Porta et al. (2017) have noted the contemporary vitality of Catalan pro-independence civil society, although a minority of scholars have labelled the Catalan independence movement elite-driven and populist (Barrio et al. 2018). However, few have developed analyses specifically of the *Diada* and memory spaces. Kathryn Crameri (2015)

[2] According to the Catalan bureau of statistics, *Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió* (CEO), 79.9% of the population of Catalonia identifies as Catalan, with 34.2% also identifying to some degree as Spanish. Exclusive Spanish identities are at only 6.5%. This is in contrast to Spain in general, where 24.7% consider themselves exclusively Spanish (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (CEO) 2019, p. 16).

has thus argued that civil pro-independence associations such as the ANC are playing an increasingly significant role in Catalan politics, effectively putting pressure on the Catalan government (Crameri 2015, p. 104), and Andrew Dowling (2017) notes that the 2012 *Diada* was organised outside the structures of political parties by the ANC. Similarly, social movements scholar Donatella Della Porta has argued that the Catalan independence movement is a "paradigmatic example" of a campaign initiated by civil society, which institutional actors and established politicians have later attempted to co-opt. (Della Porta et al. 2017, p. 31). This analysis corroborates our argument that a range of actors both institutional and coming from civil society are attempting to activate and control the *Diada*. These differing understandings of the purpose of the *Diada* significantly change the nature of the celebration between the more cultural and the more political. Our focus on this interplay between civil society and established politics nuances claims that the Catalan independence movement is either fully elite-driven or fully bottom-up.

Our study thus contributes to the incipient but flourishing study of the Catalan independence movement and to the more established study of commemorations and *lieux de memoire* in Spain, addressing both a methodological lacuna and a thematic one. The combination of historical analysis and ethnographic data provides us with ample data to both trace the evolution of the *Diada* as a cultural and political event, and to perform a thorough and multifaceted analysis of how leaders and activists in the Catalan independence movement perceive it and activate it in contemporary Catalan politics, focusing on the interplay between civil society and more established political actors.

3. Methodology

This paper uses a mixed-methods approach to study the *Diada* mobilisations with two different main approaches determined principally by the availability of sources. For the period since 2011, we have data from ethnographic fieldwork, which we will prioritise in our methodological approach combining the ethnographic approach with social media analysis where possible. For the more distant periods of the *Diada* celebration, we will use a more classical historical approach centred on discourse analysis of print media and public discourses.

3.1. Historical Analysis

The focus in this part of the analysis is on the discourse generated mainly by the social and especially the political elites, specifically on their quality of being those who elaborate the national discourse and decide on issues of commemoration. The aim is to analyse the representation of the *Diada* and the character of the commemoration. The processes on which this part of the study focuses take place particularly in the press and in political discourse. Despite some sceptical voices (Schlesinger 1991, 1993), social scientists have proven that the press is a central actor in the reproduction of national identity (Anderson 1991; Billig 1995; Eder et al. 2002; Roosvall and Salovaara-Moring 2010; Mihelj 2011)[3]. The approach will principally be discursive, analysing above all newspaper articles and the discourse of politicians as referred to in the media. The principal source used for this part of the study is the Catalan-based newspaper *La Vanguardia*, which has a bilingual platform. It has consistently held the largest audience of the Catalan newspapers and can thus be said to represent a socially dominant discourse[4]. Moreover, it maintains a relatively neutral stance concerning secession.

3.2. Ethnography

For the second part of the analysis, this article draws on ethnographic data from more than twenty months of fieldwork from 2011 to 2019. The principal fieldwork periods were fourteen months

[3] For a comprehensive study of the creation of a Catalan public sphere linking nation and media, see Giori (2014).
[4] According to the latest data from 2019, it is the fifth largest Spanish newspaper (or third if sports newspapers are excluded) with 559,000 daily readers. See http://reporting.aimc.es/index.html#/main/diarios (accessed on 6 October 2019).

between 2011–2012[5] and three months in 2016, with many shorter trips in between and after, such as for the Catalan independence referendum on 1 October 2017 and the 2019 *Diada*. The main part of the ethnographic data draws on 23 semi-structured interviews and months of participant observation with Catalan independence supporters in Barcelona, most importantly Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)[6] or the Republican Left of Catalonia party members in the Barcelona neighbourhoods of Eixample and Sant Andreu and pro-independence Catalan politicians from the coalition Junts pel Sí[7]. These politicians included both local councillors or *consellers de districte*, members of the Catalan parliament, senators, and regional government ministers, also known as *consellers*. For a deeper discussion of methodology, see co-author Mark F. Hau's PhD dissertation, 'Negotiating Nationalism[8]' (Hau 2019). When citing these interviews, we have chosen to anonymise activists who appear only with a first name. Professional politicians appear with their full name, as we consider them public figures.

3.3. Social Media Analysis

In order to bolster our data for the *Diada*, we undertook a social media analysis on the pages Reddit and Twitter. We hoped to find respondents online who had a looser affiliation with parties or civil society organisations than our main interviewees did. On Reddit, a social news and discussion website with over 500 million monthly visitors, we invited users in both Spanish-language and Catalan-language fora[9] to present their thoughts on the changing nature of the *Diada*.

Twitter is a microblogging and social networking service with over 321 million monthly active users and is consistently one of the ten most visited websites in the world. We used co-author Mark F. Hau's Twitter profile with over 2000 followers to post the following poll[10]: "What do you think is the primary function of the *Diada*? Commemorating history or mobilising in favour of independence?"[11]

In the end, we deemed the number of respondents on Twitter too small to be of substantial use as data[12]. On Reddit, however, we received several medium-length, public replies, and a long discussion-chain between users who disagreed broke out on one of the boards. In addition to this, we also received a number of private messages from respondents who did not want their responses to be made public. As a qualitative investigation, it was thus a relative success and constituted a very economical form of data gathering. Because all respondents were anonymous, we only have personal details if the particular user volunteered them. We found strikingly similar trends in the statements of interviewees in Mark Hau's 2011–2016 ethnographic fieldwork and from our online investigation and therefore consider the inclusion of social media analysis a useful addition to methodological triangulation with our more substantial ethnographic data and historical sources.

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5 This fieldwork was funded by the University of Copenhagen for Mark F. Hau's MA thesis.

6 ERC, short for Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya or the Republican Left of Catalonia, is a centre-left, pro-independence party that has gone from the fringe of Catalan politics to becoming the most voted party in under ten years. Arguably, it leads the political side of the Catalan independence movement.

7 Junts pel Sí was an erstwhile pro-independence coalition between centre-left ERC and centre-right PDeCat/Convergència, along with several minor parties. It lasted from 2015 to 2017.

8 The PhD was fully funded by Aarhus University with additional fieldwork funding from Augustinus Fonden, Knud Højgaards Fond and Oticon Fonden.

9 Known as "boards". We posted in the boards r/Spain, r/Catalunya, r/Catalonia, and r/Barcelona.

10 Posts on Twitter are limited to 280 characters, which is why we aimed for a simple poll.

11 In Catalan: "*Quina creus que és la funció principal de la #Diada? Commemoració d'història o la mobilització d'independentisme*?"

12 629 people saw the tweet, but only 46 of these interacted with it. The poll was 67% in favour of mobilising politically, and 33% in favour of commemorating history.

4. The History of the *Diada*

4.1. The Diada and the Post-Franco Identitarian Mobilisation in Catalonia

The "*Diada*", which is celebrated each year on the 11th of September, was declared "the National Holiday of Catalonia" by a regional law of June 1980[13] several years before the discussion of a Spanish national holiday was even taken up in the mid-1980s[14]. This difference in time demonstrates that Spanish nationalism and national pride was in trouble during the transition to democracy due to the uncomfortable inheritance from the Francoist dictatorship and the derived difficulties related to constructing a coherent national master narrative. Catalan nationalism, on the contrary, as the former victim of Francoist repression, had no problem in promoting the dominant vision of Catalan national identity and its particular kind of national pride as contained in the celebration of the *Diada*.

The law was actually the first law that came out of the newly constituted autonomous regional parliament, which is telling for the importance given to the issue of national symbols by the regional executive. The first regional elections were celebrated on 20 March 1980, and the Government, headed by Jordi Pujol, was formed on 22 April 1980 and less than two months later the law was voted on in Parliament.

Although Catalonia is not a "nation", according to the Spanish Constitution, because that category is reserved for Spain, and Catalonia thus belongs to the second-best but ambivalent category of "nationality", it was never prohibited for Catalonia to use the adjective "national" and thus establish "national symbols". Maybe one of the reasons is that the corresponding adjective derived from "nationality" does not exist, but in any case, it strengthened the ambivalence of Catalonia's status.

The date—11 September—is the anniversary of the fall of Barcelona to the troops of Felipe V, the Bourbon contender to the Spanish throne, in the War of Succession on 11 September 1714. The defeat meant the end of the relative autonomy that the region as part of the former Kingdom of Aragón had enjoyed within the Spanish kingdom until that date, but the present-day ideas of political autonomy and regions are very different from what was experienced by the Catalan elites in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. It was only when nation-building was booming all over Europe during the late nineteenth century that the memory of the defeat was instrumentalised and the commemoration of it began. Seemingly, the anniversary of the defeat was commemorated for the first time in 1885 in Barcelona. During the first decade, the figure of Rafael Casanova, a political and military leader of Catalonia during the siege who was hurt in the battle of 11 September 1714, became a centrepiece of the commemorative activities. During the 1888 Universal Expo in Barcelona, a statue of Casanova was erected among seven other statues of important figures of Catalan history, and in 1897, a couple of organisations dedicated a floral offering to the monument to Casanova for the first time. In 1914, in the context of the bicentenary of the defeat, the municipality of Barcelona decided to move the statue to the crossroads between Ronda de Sant Pere and Carrer d'Alí Bei, where it is assumed that Casanova was hurt. In that same year, the anniversary became an official celebration sponsored by the then recently created Mancomunidad of Catalonia. In 1939, after the Civil War, the monument was removed into a storage facility, and only in 1977, after the restoration of democracy, was the monument returned to its pre-Francoist location (Crameri 2011; 2015, pp. 75–82).

In the celebration, the 1714 defeat was interpreted not only as an end of the privileges related to the Kingdom of Aragón, but also as a moral rebirth and a new beginning. After becoming an official commemoration in 1914, the celebration was increasingly politicised and used to push political

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[13] Law 1980/21392 of 12 June 1980 "por la que se declara fiesta nacional de Cataluña la jornada del 11 de septiembre", *Boletín Oficial del Estado* (*BOE*), 239/1980, p. 22087.

[14] The discussion was only taken up in the mid-1980s, when the Socialist party had consolidated its power, and nevertheless, the issue was treated with delicacy through express parliamentary treatment of the law seemingly to avoid public disagreements. The law was passed in the autumn of 1987: Law 18/1987 of October 7 "que establece el Día de la Fiesta Nacional de España en el 12 de octubre", *BOE*, 241/1987, p. 30149. For details, see Humlebæk (2004).

demands for autonomy (Michonneau 2001, pp. 165–77, 229–51). The years of World War I and immediately afterwards were troubled and unrestful times in Spain and in Catalonia in particular, and in 1923, the turmoil ended in the military dictatorship of general Miguel Primo de Rivera. He had actually been the head of the military region of Catalonia[15], but despite initial promises of respecting the Catalan incipient autonomy under the Mancomunidad, his dictatorship quickly turned against manifestations of Catalan identity, and he banned the commemoration of the *Diada*. For the next more than five decades, the commemoration would alternate between prohibition during periods of dictatorship and permission during periods of democracy.

When the Second Spanish Republic put an end to the military dictatorship in 1931, the commemoration was thus permitted again, as the Republican regime from the beginning was closely linked to the political current of Catalan nationalism. More than a peaceful coexistence based on common interests, the relationship between the Republican authorities and the Catalan nationalist movements was characterised by a power balance that was constantly tested. During this period, the celebration was thus often accompanied by protests that called for increased autonomy and recognition of Catalan identity, which in turn were repressed by the government authorities. Under the Franco regime, the commemorative acts were banned once again and the monument to Casanova was removed, although its location continued to be the scene of illegal gatherings in memory of the date. The *Diada* thus continued to be celebrated unofficially in a more or less public way, and from the mid-1960s, the number of people participating in these unofficial and illegal celebrations grew noticeably.

4.2. End of Francoism Activates the Diada

After the death of Franco, the commemoration naturally moved into the zone of the permissible again as did other manifestations of Catalan identity. In 1976, however, permission to celebrate the *Diada* only came at the last minute, and furthermore, it was not permitted to celebrate the anniversary in Barcelona, but only in Sant Boi de Llobregat, where Rafael Casanova is buried[16]. Despite the dislocation of the commemoration, between 50,000 and 100,000 people participated in the event. The autumn of 1976 represented uncertain times, and democracy had still not arrived. Under those circumstances, the dominant discourse tended to emphasise the relationship with Spain. An editorial of *La Vanguardia* on the *Diada* thus stated "*una voluntad de ser y estar. De ser Cataluña y de estar en España*", which combines the two different variants of the verb "to be" in Spanish: both the permanent identity-related and the more temporary situational, meaning something like 'to be Catalan and to be situated in Spain'[17].

In 1977, with democracy restored through the June 15 general elections and with the monument to Casanova returned to its pre-Franco location, the *Diada* returned to Barcelona. The commemoration was converted into a huge demonstration of more than one million people defending Catalan identity and asking for a statute of autonomy (Llobera 1996, pp. 196–98). Apart from the foundational myth of loss and the related moral obligation to struggle for regaining the loss, what unified a large part of the Catalans across different political parties during these years was the demand for a statute of autonomy. The commemoration thus mixed Catalan nation-building of a cultural-ethnic character with more politically focused demands aimed at the Spanish government and political establishment. The newly democratised regime was still in flux and the Catalan political establishment unified in an attempt to consolidate the position of the Catalan demands for recognition within Spain. The following years the mass rallies continued but with reduced participation with respect to the 1977–precedent.

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[15] The military regions were a geographically based administrative subdivision of the military forces in Spain that existed from 1705 until 2002.

[16] The organising committee and the government representatives negotiated until the end and only agreed on the celebration in Sant Boi on the eve of September 9. See "La «diada» del 11 de septiembre, autorizada", *La Vanguardia*, 10-IX-1976, p. 21.

[17] "Hoy se celebra «el onze de setembre», voluntad de ser y de estar", *La Vanguardia*, 11-IX-1976, p. 5.

In 1978, newspaper sources thus spoke of between 100,000 and 200,000 participants and in 1979 of some 400,000 participants[18].

Since 1977, and parallel to the official demonstrations, more radical nationalist or separatist groups created their own commemoration, usually in the morning of the *Diada*, around the square Fossar de les Moreres. These manifestations had a clear anti-establishment orientation against both Catalan and Spanish political parties as well as against the Spanish Constitution and were used to congregate between 1000 and 10,000 people[19]. The name of the square alludes to the fact that it used to be a cemetery, and according to the nationalist legend, many of those who died defending Barcelona in September 1714 were buried there. This version of history has been cast in doubt by the historian Jordi Canal[20], but as with the other *lieux de mémoire* related to the *Diada* and the self-conception of Catalan nationalist discourse, what matters is less the historical facts than the interpretation of them as well as the history of commemoration. In the late 1980s, the square was remodelled precisely to strengthen the symbolic content of the place with the then mayor, Pasqual Maragall, inaugurating a monument to "The Martyrs of 1714".

4.3. Self-Government Changes the Commemoration

Just before Christmas 1979, the new Statute of Autonomy was voted on in the Spanish Parliament, and 1980 marked a change in Catalan self-government with the inauguration of a constitutionally backed and democratically elected parliament. Self-government became reality and was institutionalised, and thus one of the central demands that for four years had united Catalans and parties across the political spectrum on September 11 was fulfilled and the commemoration began to change. The very first law, nevertheless, to be passed by the newly elected Catalan executive, as mentioned above, declared September 11, the *Diada*, the National Holiday of Catalonia in the following terms:

> In times of struggle, the Catalan people used to mark a special day, September 11, as the National Day of Catalonia. A special day which, while representing the painful memories of the loss of liberties, on the eleventh of September 1714, and an attitude of struggle and active resistance to oppression, also embodied the hope of total national recuperation. Now that Catalonia is back on its path of freedom, the representatives of the People think that the Legislative House should sanction what the Nation has already unanimously decided.[21]

The law thus took up the cathartic argument of the defeat, combining the "loss of liberties" with "the hope of total national recuperation". There is no contradiction in nationalist celebrations of moments of defeat, as Crameri remarks: "it serves various crucial purposes, such as explaining the decline of the nation while at the same time mobilising its members in a project to produce a better future" (Crameri 2014, p. 76). Adversity in the form of loss of autonomy and oppression was seen to have nourished an increasing awareness of regional identity and hopes for its recuperation.

Since the *Diada*'s institutionalisation in 1980, the elected President of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol, took up the habit of the former political leader Josep Tarradellas to give a speech to the Catalan people.

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[18] See, for example, "«Onze de setembre», una diada en apoyo del Estatut", *La Vanguardia*, 12-IX-1978, p. 1 and "Cinco años a través de un día", *La Vanguardia*, 11-IX-1980, p. 7.

[19] See, for example, "Manifestación de los independentistas catalanes", *La Vanguardia*, 12-IX-1979, p. 6 and "Los independentistas celebraron dos mítines", *La Vanguardia*, 12-IX-1980, p. 6. Besides these organised separatist manifestations, it also became customary for groups of people of separatist or radical nationalist orientation to gather around the perimeter surrounding the monument to Casanovas to be able to yell and boo at the official floral offerings of the other political parties and institutions. For a discussion of the roles of Casanovas and the alternative hero of the pro-independence movement, Josep Moragues, see (Crameri 2011; 2015, pp. 75–82).

[20] Canal questions that it could be the principal burial site of the defenders of Barcelona as well as noting the fact the people buried there during the siege were mainly patriots (Canal 2018).

[21] Law 1/1980, of June 12, "por la que se declara Fiesta Nacional de Cataluña la jornada del 11 de septiembre", *BOE*, 239 (4-X-1980), p. 22087, available at https://www.boe.es/eli/es-ct/l/1980/06/12/1 (accessed on 1 November 2019). The English translation adapted from https://discovercatalonia.wordpress.com/2008/12/05/la-diada/ (accessed on 4 June 2019).

In these speeches during the 1980s and 1990s, Pujol generally interpreted the War of Succession and the defeat in 1714 through the prism of the will of the Catalans to survive as a people. Pujol often went beyond the heroism of the sacrifice to underline the pragmatic, hard-working character of the Catalans, asking rhetorically what happened on 12 September 1714. In his 1985 speech, he said:

> I invite you every year to celebrate September 12, that is to say, the day after the defeat, the people of Catalonia decided to continue forward and reconstruct the country, not with arms, but through their own effort and work[22].

According to Pujol, the Catalans showed a strong self-confidence and determination to maintain their language and culture in the face of adverse conditions. By implicitly counter-posing the 1714 defeat as the "blackest hour" of the Catalan culture and nation and the present, Pujol thus capably mixed an element of victimism with a mobilising emphasis on the strong civic spirit of the Catalans (Llobera 1996, pp. 199–201). If we analyse the way in which Pujol talked about Catalonia, it is clear that he did not openly contest the reservation of the term "nation" to Spain as defined by the Spanish constitution. He did not, however, use the constitutional definition of Catalonia as a "nationality", preferring instead other terms such as "people" [*pueblo*] or "country" [*país*][23]. Both terms are uncontroversial in Spain, but particularly the term "*pueblos*" refers to the vague idea of Spain being composed of a number of "peoples", which is significantly lower than the number of self-governing regions but still imprecise.

The institutionalisation of the holiday and the satisfaction of various central Catalan demands, particularly self-government, deactivated the element of vindication that had figured prominently among the mobilising factors in the origins of the *Diada*. The satisfaction of these mobilising demands caused a relatively steep decline in the number of participants. The melancholic title of the following newspaper article on the *Diada* of 1987, on the 10th anniversary of the 1977 rally, is telling: "We were so many!"[24] The absence of central demands also caused a division between various manifestations as of 1982. The nostalgic memory of the unitary rallies of the late 1970s would thus remain as part of the DNA of the *Diada* as noted by the editorial of *La Vanguardia* on the *Diada* in 1984:

> The memory of the large manifestation of 1977 evokes the unity that existed in Catalonia around demanding an Autonomy Statute[25].

Lastly, the law of 1980 turned the *Diada* into a bank holiday, which also contributed to giving it a more festive and less vindictive character. The last manifestation where all the major political forces concurred in the same rally happened in 1981 and numbered between 70,000 and 100,000 participants. Interestingly, it happened under banners stating "We are a nation" [*Som una nació*], which seems to have been far less problematic than it would be in the future[26].

From 1982 onwards, there would be no unitary manifestation, and instead there were only two or more totalling less than 50,000 participants. On the one hand, the official commemoration of the *Diada* had become more festive, a celebration with an official speech, floral offerings to Casanova, and a cocktail-party with dignitaries. On the other hand, the more political part of the *Diada* had

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[22] Pujol, cited in "Pujol: 'el pueblo de Cataluña debe reaccionar con calma, pero con claridad, ante el Gobierno central'", *La Vanguardia*, 11-IX-1985, p. 16. Original: "Os invito cada año a celebrar el doce de septiembre, es decir, el día siguiente a la derrota, el pueblo catalán decidió ir adelante y reconstruir el país, no a través de las armas, sino a través del propio esfuerzo y trabajo".

[23] In his 1984 and 1985 speeches, he thus used the term "nación" only once, whereas the term "pueblo" was used more than ten times on each occasion and the term "pais" approximately half as many times. See "Para Jórdi Pujol los grandes desafíos actuales son la autonomía la crisis y el cambio profundo", *La Vanguardia*, 12-IX-1984, p. 17, and "Pujol: 'el pueblo de Cataluña debe reaccionar con calma, pero con claridad, ante el Gobierno central'", *La Vanguardia*, 11-IX-1985, p. 16.

[24] "¡Fuimos tantos!", *La Vanguardia*, 11-IX-1987, p. 16.

[25] "Una fiesta", *La Vanguardia*, 11-IX-1984, p. 5. Original: "El recuerdo de la gran manifestación de 1977 evoca la unidad que se produjo en Cataluña a la hora de pedir el estatuto de autonomía".

[26] "«Som una nació», lema de pancartas en la manifestación de la Diada", *La Vanguardia*, 12-IX-1981, p. 17.

been decentralised into various acts in which the political parties and organisations celebrated their own manifestations, with the participation of members and with the population as spectators. This commemorative format with only limited possibilities for popular participation lasted for the entire duration of the governments under Pujol until 2003.

The discourse of Pujol on the occasion of the *Diada* was not secessionist. Generally, he expressed happiness with the decentralised state and the possibilities of self-government that it gave to the Catalan politicians, but at the same time, he was chronically unhappy with the level of self-government and with the pressures that the Catalan autonomy was subjected to within the unstable Spanish system of decentralisation. Between the lines, the evaluation of the self-government was guided by a logic according to which the level of autonomy in Catalonia should always be progressing at a pace slightly greater than that of the rest of the regions in Spain, thus slowly increasing its asymmetrical advantages. Therefore, the speeches of Pujol very often cite tensions with the Spanish government, which to some extent is seen as a threat to the development of self-government, but very often, this discourse is coupled with a strong confidence in the capability of the Catalan executive to overcome these problems and achieve what it wants, one way or another. Generally, the term "nation" [*nación*] is avoided to describe Catalonia, and instead other, more inoffensive terms, such as "country" [*país*] or "people" [*pueblo*] are preferred[27]. Despite the institutional acceptance of Catalonia as an autonomous community within Spain that these speeches transmit, their actual content, however, remains centred on what can only be termed as nation-building, that is on building the community of values and identity markers that characterise the Catalan nation. The messages of his speeches to the Catalans are very often concerned with strengthening the Catalan people as a community with a distinct identity and securing self-government, as in 1987, when he centred half of the speech on the "ambition to proceed"[28]. This nation-building project is not coupled with an exclusive or ethnic conception of being or becoming a member; on the contrary, quite often he explicitly describes the Catalans not only as those who come from Catalonia, but also those who have moved there and made it their home. In 1987, he defined them as "the ones from home and those who have come to incorporate themselves and who are now also from home"[29]. Pujol thus uses the defeat commemorated in the celebration to mobilise the Catalans as suggested above by Crameri to strengthen their sense of community and identity and to warn them against becoming too content with the level of self-government achieved. However, even if the emphasis is clearly on nation-building in a rather traditional sense, the discourse of Pujol never evolves towards secessionism. He summed it up in the institutional message of the 1991 *Diada*:

> Catalonia is a nation and nations have the right to self-determination. The Government of the Generalitat has always defended the right to self-determination within the framework of the Spanish Constitution and, therefore, has not made any secessionist claims.[30]

In sum, the category of nation is thus defended but only rarely used, and autonomy is understood as achieved within Spain. Moreover, this relationship is not questioned as such. The ambivalence regards the exact nature of this relationship and the conception of Spain, a discussion into which Pujol

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[27] The most popular terms to describe Catalonia in the speeches of Pujol on the *Diada* during the decade of the 1980s are "country" (38% of total), "Catalonia" (36%), "people" (23%), "nation" (3%), and "patria" (1%). The only partial exception is in 1987, when even the title of the article insists on the fact that, according to Pujol, Catalonia is a nation, but even then, both "country" and "Catalonia" were used more often than "nation". See "Pujol afirma que es la hora de avanzar y reitera que Cataluña es una nación", *La Vanguardia*, 11-IX-1987, p. 15.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid. Original: "los de casa y (. . .) los que han venido a incorporarse a ella y que ya son también de casa".

[30] "Cuarenta años de catalanismo a través de sus manifestaciones", www.lavanguardia.com, 10-IX-2017, available at https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170910/431129138583/catalanismo-manifestacion-diada-11s.html (accessed on 14 October 2019). Original: "Catalunya es una nación y las naciones tienen derecho a la autodeterminación. El Govern de la Generalitat ha planteado siempre el derecho de autodeterminación dentro del marco de la Constitución española y, por tanto, no ha hecho planteamientos de secesión."

never enters. He concentrates on Catalonia and the above-described nation-building when trying to define how this conception might fit into an overall conception of Spain as a political community.

4.4. Retreat of the Diada: Territorial Claims, Polarisation, and the 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy

The Pujol era gave way to the left-wing Tripartite Government headed by Pasqual Maragall, leader of the Catalan Socialist Party, the PSC, and participated in by the ERC and the left-wing coalition Initiative for Catalonia Greens[31]. The new government introduced a new ceremony to commemorate the *Diada*. As of 2004, the official reception was substituted by a commemorative act, which was open to the public but with no possibility of participation. The event was jointly organised by the Government of the Generalitat and the Parliament of Catalonia in the Ciutadella Park of Barcelona. Apart from a tribute to the official flag of Catalonia, *la Senyera*, and a parade of the regional police force, *los Mossos d'Esquadra*, a concert event was added in the park, which only strengthened the already festive character of the *Diada*[32].

During the coming years, however, the *Diada* as a political event would slowly fade even more into the background and questions related to the Statute of Autonomy would take over centre stage. Helped by the new Spanish Socialist Prime Minister José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero's favourable attitude towards renegotiation of the Statute, a proposal was elaborated during 2004 and 2005 by Maragall's government and the proposal was finally voted on by the Catalan Parliament at the end of September 2005 with an overwhelming majority (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010, p. 26). The self-conception of Catalonia in the new Autonomy Statute was clearly that of a nation, as the term or the derived adjectives were used more than 100 times throughout the text. Right after the preface, the first article thus reads "Catalonia is a nation"[33].

The particular conjuncture of two left-wing governments in both the Spanish and Catalan parliaments, which favoured the passing of such a far-reaching political project as the new *Statut*, did not mean, however, that it was a peaceful period. The conservative People's Party (PP) never accepted losing the elections in March 2004 after its catastrophic handling of the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, and the legislature became marked by a high level of political polarisation. In fact, the PP headed by José María Aznar had been governing in Spain for four years with an absolute majority with a Spanish nationalist project of furthering pride in the Spanish nation and national symbols. In terms of territorial politics, the PP legislatures between 1996 and 2004 had been guided by an agenda of harmonising the self-government arrangements of the decentralised state through a number of statutory reforms of the "second-order" regions. This was accurately perceived in Catalonia as anti-Catalanist politics, which meant that independentist sympathies were awakening already under the second Aznar term, favouring particularly the ERC.

The *Diada* in 2005 coincided in time with the run-up in the negotiations surrounding the Statute reform that was passed in the Catalan parliament less than three weeks later, and the subject dominated all the political discussions on the *Diada*, including the official speech by Maragall on the eve of the *Diada*. Despite planning a Statute, which clearly defined Catalonia as a nation, Maragall still preferred using other terms in his speech such as "country" [*país*] or simply Catalonia very much in line with his predecessor Pujol. He also talked about a fraternal relationship between the "peoples" [*pueblos*] of Spain[34].

Zapatero, on his side, favoured an imprecise idea of a "plural Spain", and the Prime Minister contradictorily maintained that Catalonia was not a nation, which in fact coincided with the conception

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[31] The real name of the coalition was Initiative for Catalonia Greens, United and Alternative Left [Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa] or ICV-EUiA.

[32] See https://web.gencat.cat/es/actualitat/reportatges/diada-nacional-de-catalunya/historia/celebracions-historiques/ (accessed on 13 October 2019).

[33] "Propuesta de reforma del Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña", *Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales*, B210-1/2005, p. 2.

[34] "Maragall confía en la 'generosidad patriótica' de los líderes para aprobar el nuevo Estatut", *La Vanguardia*, 11-IX-2005, p. 20.

contained in the constitutional text, and, at the same time, admitted Catalonia to have a national identity trying to accommodate the Catalan demands partially. After negotiations upon entering the Spanish parliament in November 2005, an agreement was arrived at between the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) of Zapatero and the conservative nationalist party of Catalonia, CiU[35], which had governed the autonomous community for 23 years under Pujol, but which, at the time, was in opposition to the Tripartite Government. The fundamental deal regarded, among other things, the definition of Catalonia in the new Statute, which meant that a number of amendments were made to the original text. In the entire main section of the Statute, the conception of Catalonia was thus changed from what was clearly a nation in the original text to the constitutionally acceptable but also more ambivalent term of "nationality". Only in the Preamble to the Statute was one phrase left that referred explicitly to the conflict between different conceptions of Catalonia. The amended Statute was passed in the Parliament in Madrid in the spring of 2006. As the Constitution prescribes, it was afterwards passed through a regional referendum in Catalonia on 18 June 2006, which meant that the Statute became legally valid[36].

The PP almost immediately filed a cause against the new Statute at the Constitutional Court, arguing that it was a kind of parallel constitution for which there is no legal room in the constitutional set-up of Spain. The recourse was critical of practically the entire Statute. However, PP primarily attacked *asymmetry* as the guiding principle for the relationship between the Spanish regions. The Statute clearly represented such asymmetry, which was in line with all Catalan nationalist claims since the restoration of democracy. The recourse against the Statute from the PP demanded recognition of the principle of symmetry (of rights of all Spaniards, etc.) as a guiding line, thus trying to "regain" territory for Spain.

Despite the fact that the new Statute was successfully negotiated and promulgated, the PP-led campaign against it created a lot of negative tensions in Catalonia, and in fact, the whole reform process and its judicial aftermath ignited the still ongoing conflict on the status of Catalonia within Spain. The period after the referendum on the Statute in 2006 therefore marked a difficult conjuncture in Catalan politics in which the *Diada* of 2006 took place. The Tripartite Government had broken up as a consequence of the amended Statute, new elections were called in November, and Maragall decided to resign, which marked the celebration of the *Diada*. In a different tone but still in the same vein as Pujol, he was "building community" with the Catalans in his good bye to politics. He actually mentioned the Statute as a proof that the Catalans recognised themselves as a nation, which in a way was true although that element was eliminated before the vote by the Spanish parliament[37].

At the regional elections in November 2006, the "Triparty" constellation was able to continue in power, but there was a growing sentiment of distrust and dissatisfaction in Catalonia. The reissue of the "Triparty" government was a big disappointment to the Catalan nationalists of CiU and its leader Artur Mas. CiU had "won" the elections but still did not have enough seats to prevent a left-wing majority and therefore decided to strengthen their own cause through a "refoundation" of Catalanism in the project "The Big House of Catalanism" [*La Casa Gran del Catalanisme*], which was a sort of roadmap in which he suggested that Catalonia should have "the right to decide". This was still not a pro-independence movement as such, and the focus of this right to decide continued to be

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[35] CiU was formed in 1978 by federating the two Catalan nationalist parties: Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya or CDC) of liberal ideological orientation and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya or UDC) of Christian Democratic orientation.

[36] Despite the opposition from the PP and the ERC, it was voted with a comfortable majority: 73.2% voted in favour of the new Statute against 20.6% who voted no with a participation of 48.9%. The ERC had been among the original proponents of the Statute but felt that the result fell short of its aspirations and recommended its supporters to abstain in the referendum. The party also abstained in the final vote of the Senate on the Statute. The level of abstention may thus express some form of opposition, but participation was still significantly higher than in the 2007 referendum on the reformed Andalusian Statute, where it was less than 36%. For a detailed account of the process leading to the approbation of the reformed Catalan Statute, see Martínez-Herrera and Miley (2010), and Humlebæk (2015, pp. 186–91).

[37] "Maragall se despide con el deseo de que del 1-N salga una Catalunya menos victimista", *La Vanguardia*, 11-IX-2006, p. 13.

the administration of infrastructure and other public investments in Catalonia. In any case, as time passed, the scope of this "right to decide" would widen in a continuous movement towards the "right to self-determination" and a referendum on independence.

The trial of the *Estatut* at the Constitutional Court in many ways marked a watershed that was to have profound influence on the entire political landscape of Catalonia. The hitherto predominantly pragmatic nationalism of CiU would slowly but surely evolve in a more uncompromising, secessionist direction, and the balances between the ERC and CiU would begin to shift. The *Diada* as one of the most important political symbols would also be affected. When we turn to the ethnographic evidence of Mark Hau, this change is part of the memory of various interviewees. According to several of them, the shift in support for independence had come about due to the political death of federalism in Spain. The process revolving around the *Estatut* had extinguished the hopes of many Catalans supporting autonomy and turned many towards independence, as retired schoolteacher Enric outlined for Mark F. Hau in 2016:

> In very few years, everything has changed, and why? Because six years ago, people would have agreed to a reform of the Constitution, changing certain things and I don't know what … Now, they've seen that this is impossible, that there is no way, that there are no possibilities for reform, and the blindfold has been taken away from their eyes … I would also have accepted a federal state, six years ago maybe not, but fifteen years, maybe … But with a clearly asymmetric federalism, obviously, not just one more autonomous community, but a clear and bilateral federalism, that is, between Catalonia and Spain. (ERC member Enric 2016)

It is thus reasonable to say that the events surrounding the Catalan Statute of Autonomy marked a turning point and laid the foundation for the mass mobilisations in favour of independence that we see today. This was made visible in spectacular fashion with the massive 2012 *Diada* demonstration, organised by Catalan civil society organisation the Catalan National Assembly, ANC.

Enric traced this evolution, noting how the civil society-organised *Diada* mobilisations had pushed the political establishment to action and prompted radical changes from 2010 to 2012:

> The [*Diada*] demonstration in 2010, the slogan was "We are a nation"[38]. That's not clearly pro-independence. I think it was a demonstration organised by Òmnium Cultural supported by the pro-independence parties, ANC didn't exist yet. But then we had the demonstration in 2012, this mass demonstrations, and the slogan was already "For a new state in Europe". The word "independence" wasn't there, but it was clear nonetheless. Convergència wasn't pro-independence at that point, but the roars from the crowd were clear, they were for independence. (ERC member Enric 2016)

Enric did not even specify that he was talking about the *Diada*, calling it simply "the demonstration", as do many pro-independence activists. There is little doubt about the importance of the September 11 demonstrations, and many independence supporters use this day to gauge the strength of the movement. Enric also outlined several of the key actors in the Catalan independence movement, mentioning the huge civil society organisations Òmnium Cultural and the ANC. The ANC is an organisation of more than 80,000 members, which is officially non-partisan but informally linked to ERC and centre-left pro-independence views. The ANC is generally considered the leading organiser

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[38] Enric may be mixing the relatively uneventful 2010 *Diada* with the large protest demonstration against the verdict of the Spanish Supreme Court on the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in the same year. Here, protesters carried banners with the line "*Som una nació*"—"We are a nation".

Interestingly, the 1981 *Diada* celebrations also used the slogan "we are a nation", "*Som una nació*", but this was apparently not considered either overtly political or controversial at the time and was accepted by both centralist parties such as PSOE and PSC, as well as Catalan parties such CiU and ERC.

of the *Diada* demonstrations, and several of Hau's interviewees argued that they were the civil society organisation in Catalonia with the largest organisational resources that enables them to mobilise large quantities of people for demonstrations and rallies.

The other main pro-independence NGO in Catalonia is Òmnium Cultural, a pre-Transition Catalan cultural organisation. Following the Spanish judiciary's imprisonment of the ANC and Òmnium Cultural's leaders Jordi Sánchez and Jordi Cuixart for rebellion in 2017 under Operation Anubis, Òmnium has grown to become the largest civil society organisation in all of Spain with over 160,000 members.

5. From 2012 and Onwards: How Is the *Diada* Perceived Today?

Since June 2012 and during the summer, the ANC has organised the "March towards Independence" [*Marxa cap a la Independència*] with multiple manifestations all over Catalonia. The march culminated in Barcelona on the Catalan National Holiday, the *Diada*, 11 September 2012, with approximately 1.5 million people gathered under the motto "Catalonia, a new state in Europe" [*Catalunya, nou estat d'Europa*]. The immense success of the demonstration and its peaceful character shook Catalan politics thoroughly, creating a rather distinctive before and after. The power of mobilisation demonstrated by the civil society surprised the established political elites, making them consider a change in their strategy.

A few days later, a handful of representatives of the ANC were received by the president of the regional government, Artur Mas, in his offices, and during that meeting, they suggested to him that the next regional elections should have "plebiscitarian" character and that a proper referendum should be celebrated in 2014. Less than two weeks later, Mas called new elections to the Generalitat to be conducted on 25 November. The argument for calling snap elections—in fact two years early—was precisely that the *Diada* manifestation had changed the political landscape so thoroughly that his mandate could not continue unaltered. He probably also hoped to capitalise on the rise of the pro-independence movement and the demand for a referendum, because those were demands heeded by CiU since 2006. As suggested by the ANC, the elections developed into a quasi-referendum on sovereignty, forcing all the participants to take a stand on the issue.

From interviews and talks with ERC members and independence activists during Mark F. Hau's ethnographic fieldwork from 2011 and onwards, it is clear that the 2012 *Diada* demonstrations were a watershed event for the Catalan independence movement. Many of Hau's interviewees were ERC party veterans who had resigned themselves to a position of political minority, and some had even built their political identities on this position. Now, they expressed both great joy but also a certain feeling of perplexed surprise by the relatively sudden success of their movement and the explosion of pro-independence sentiment in Catalonia since 2011. ERC members were well aware that the independence movement had radically changed, both in terms of the electoral performance of their party and in terms of attendance at pro-independence rallies and demonstrations.

However, as members and politicians sheepishly admitted, they had not actually organised any of the large *Diada* demonstrations. Instead, that had been the role of the civil society group ANC. Although ERC party leaders have been quick to take advantage of the new situation in Catalonia, they were not seen as the architects of it. Rather, activists and politicians alike painted a picture of parties following in the slipstream of civil society groups, trying to keep up.

When Hau first went to Catalonia in 2011, a key informant named Miriea who was a government employee and an ERC member, had stated that ERC's role as a "small or mid-range party" was to influence CiU and to pull other, more powerful parties towards independence:

> Esquerra is, in its best moments, a mid-size party. All we can do is push a bit. (ERC member Mireia 2012)

Certainly, this has changed markedly. ERC has gone from 10 to 31 seats in the Catalan *Parlament*, and in the Spanish general elections of 2019, the party became the most voted for in Catalonia for the first time since its heyday in the early 1930s.

In 2016, when members spoke about the recent surge of support for independence, they often used the increased crowds at demonstrations and rallies, such as the *Diada*, in order to explain the gradual process that has mainstreamed independence in Catalonia, highlighting the event's enormous importance in the independence movement. The fortunes of the independence movement could seemingly be read in the *Diada.* Enric, having been an ERC party member for more than 25 years, explained the shift:

> Well, I've always been pro-independence, but we were around 5–6% and we were 200 people in the demonstrations . . . We were very aware that although we wouldn't call it impossible, [independence] was an almost completely unrealizable dream. (ERC member Enric 2016)

As is clear from the official figures mentioned above as well, members noted the explosion in attendance rate for the *Diada* since 2012, and similar to Enric, they noted their surprise as well. Most of the people interviewed expressed that they had always supported independence but had resigned themselves to be in a minority position, seen as they were by other parties as radicalists on the fringe of Catalan politics.

From Enric's quote, it is clear that the changes in the number of people attending the *Diada* had also affected a deeper, more internal shift in the minds of independence supporters. Before 2012, when support for independence was low in Catalonia and few people turned out at pro-independence events, Enric and his fellow activists saw their political project as an unattainable ideal. Speaking in 2016, however, all of the around 50 independence activists Hau spoke to were convinced of the feasibility of gaining independence and spoke about it as a concrete goal rather than as an "unrealizable dream". The increase in numbers for this single event has thus caused a morale boost and significant changes in the self-perception of Catalan independence supporters, which speaks to the contemporary importance of the *Diada* in Catalonia. For many, the physical manifestation of crowds during the *Diada* naturalised the idea of Catalan independence, effectively pushing for increasing political demands of autonomy. This effect makes the *Diada* celebrations an important aspect of Catalan nation-building, which we elaborate on later in the article.

The *Diada* demonstrations were continually explained in Catalonia as bottom-up expressions of civil society. Speaking with one of the founders of the ANC, Anglo-Catalan university professor Miquell Strubell, he explained that although the ANC had organised the watershed 2012 *Diada*, its success came very suddenly and also caught them by surprise:

> We knew something big was happening, because there was a lack of sufficient coaches in Catalonia to drive all the people to the demonstration. Before that [2012], the *Diada* had been about Lluís Llach[39] concerts and small numbers, nothing massive as this. (ANC co-founder Miquell Strubell 2016)

Several independence activists argued that CiU, traditionally the largest political party in Catalonia, was influenced by the massive crowds of the 2012 *Diada* celebration and had switched from a pro-autonomy position to supporting independence. As Enric stated in his narrative above, "the roars from the crowd were clear!" In the minds of many independence activists, the mass demonstrations in 2012 had pulled politicians along, rather than the other way around. Indeed, several Catalan political parties seem to have been unable to contain the force of this new, more political and civil society-driven *Diada*. The increasing popular demands for independence effectively split CiU down the middle

[39] A Catalan protest singer affectionately known in the independence movements as the "Catalan Bob Dylan". In 2015, he was elected to parliament for the pro-independence Junts pel Sí coalition.

between those in favour of and those against Catalan independence, causing the largest and most powerful Catalan party for three decades to splinter. New leader Carles Puigdemont pulled the new, revamped PDeCat towards the centre and towards staunch independence support, rather than CiU's earlier, pro-autonomy position. Puigdemont became the face of the Catalan independence movement, and after his term as President, when the 2017 referendum on independence was held, he went into self-imposed exile in Brussels to escape the Spanish judiciary and the charge of violent rebellion levelled against him. It is clear that Catalan institutionalised politics have been heavily impacted by the increasing popular demands for independence seen during the *Diada* demonstrations.

5.1. Multidimensional Interplay between Civil Society and Established Politics

Arguably, the 2011 and 2012 *Diada* demonstrations changed the game of Catalan politics and reshaped the whole terrain of pro-independence. Since then, we have seen a much higher degree of civil society activism, and organisations such as the ANC and Òmnium have greatly increased their political influence. Hau's interviewees in Catalonia were tellingly involved in several of these organisations. They had overlapping memberships and similar platforms and shared a common goal of independence. Núria, a veteran member of the ERC helped to start at least two non-partisan, pro-independence organisations, and many other ERC interviewees were paying members of either the ANC, Òmnium, or both.

As Kathryn Crameri (2015) has argued, although civil associations have been the principal protagonists in the contemporary Catalan independence movement, it is not only a bottom-up phenomenon but actually "multidimensional" (Crameri 2015, p. 104). For instance, there has been a great deal of human spillover or personnel transfer from civil society to organised politics. Carme Forcadell is an interesting example of a high-level politician crossing over from civil society activism. She was a founder of the linguistic NGO *Plataforma per la Llengua*, sat on the board of Òmnium, and was President of the ANC until she surprisingly went from no official political affiliation[40] to being Speaker of the Catalan Parliament in less than a year in 2015[41]. More recently, current President of Òmnium, Jordi Cuixart, campaigned for Junts per Catalunya from his jail cell in 2019 to win a seat in the Catalan Parliament along with several other civil society activists. These examples speak to the increasingly porous frontier between civil society and political parties in the Catalan pro-independence movement.

Ferran Civit, MP for Junts pel Sí, is another example of such transfer. Ferran had earlier risen through the ranks of the ANC to become a member of their steering committee. He was instrumental in organising several *Diada* demonstrations, each one more massive than the last, with over 1.5 million people attending each year. During a two-hour interview, Ferran told of wanting to change the traditional way of organising mobilisations and demonstrations in Catalonia. Instead of mobilising *against* Spanish rule, or in opposition to specific linguistic policies marginalising Catalan, he stated that he wanted to focus on empowerment, on having a winning attitude. Ferran started his activist career in the ANC, working to organise a series of unofficial plebiscites, or *consultes*, on Catalan independence from November 2009 to 2011:

> The *consultes*, that was the first great empowerment of Catalonia, especially for the independence movement. People saw they had the future in their hands, that if they related to other people, articulated a shared goal together, they could all work together doing a small part here, a small part there, a small part ... and the result was a big part (...) the goal was to make the people the protagonists. Everyone should feel part of the history of this process and that if something happens, it is their responsibility and, above all, to their credit. (MP Ferran Civit 2016)

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[40] Years earlier, in 2003, Forcadell had been a city councilmember for ERC in Sabadell.

[41] Carme Forcadell is also jailed in pre-trial custody along with almost all of the pro-independence Catalan elite.

Ferran's explicit goal was turning the independence movement completely on its head, empowering the people and creating a bottom-up movement in opposition to established politics. Although linked to ERC, he worked primarily in civil society and spoke of the need to be present on a street level, to manifest a desire for independence physically. This process eventually led to the huge 2012 *Diada* demonstrations:

> In 2012, we said, we have to make a *Diada* that is massive and transversal, to visualise what the surveys [on independence] say, that the majority was already in favour of Independence. We wanted to take it to the street, because if it's not on the street, it's just a piece of paper. It has no political weight, it is as if it were a science fiction or literature or anything else; it has to go out on the street. (MP Ferran Civit 2016)

Just as Enric read the fortunes of the Catalan independence movement through the size of the *Diada* demonstrations, Ferran heavily emphasised *the street* and physical manifestations of bodies when discussing the strength of the independence movement[42]. He was focused on space and on representing the increased support for independence shown in statistics through concrete mobilisations and demonstrations. The *Diada* then became both an important mobilising event and the physical representation of increasing support for independence.

Other progressive popular movements around the world heavily inspired Ferran's focus on civil society mobilisations. He referenced the 1988 national plebiscite in Chile on whether dictator Augusto Pinochet should continue in power. The successful "No" campaign won out, effectively ending the military dictatorship, and had done so by changing the connotations of the word "no" to mean something positive. The campaign song was filled with images of happy people dancing, children playing, and a big rainbow over the words "no". This, Ferran stated, was what he wanted to achieve with the *Diada* demonstrations: A wave of positivity and a desire for change in Catalonia. More practically, he mentioned being inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's Salt March and Martin Luther King's March on Washington during the civil rights movement. It was clear that Ferran was looking to empower grass-roots activism in the Catalan independence movement and to mobilise bottom-up rather than top-down. According to him, this process had been successful in that the massive *Diada* demonstrations had helped to push politicians to action and move electoral results:

> [For the 2012 *Diada*] we managed to get, depending on the source, over one and a half million people on the street, in a population of seven million and a half. You see the percentage of people present . . . From that point on, we could see that the process of change had accelerated. In November of that year, there were elections, and there was already a majority in favour of holding a referendum or a consultation at that time in Parliament. Seeing how it had happened to us in 2012, for the following year in 2013 we were clearly aware that each mobilisation had to have two distinct objectives: on the one hand, it had to have a political purpose. If we organise such a mobilisation, it is not just to go out and then have nothing happen. We went out on the street in 2010, also in 2006 and 2007, and nothing happened. If we get out on the street, it is because we want something to happen later. (MP Ferran Civit 2016)

Ferran, coming as he did from civil society and the ANC organisation, saw the *Diada* demonstrations as providing the necessary bottom-up impetus and direction for institutionalised political actors to follow. He and the other organisers of the *Diada* demonstrations were acutely aware that they were not only organising a celebration of past historic events in Catalan history, but also that they had "a political purpose". They explicitly wanted to influence and guide the established political system and have arguably been successful in doing so. Another aspect important to them was the bottom-up,

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[42] For a more thorough discussion of pro-independence space-making see Hau (2016).

grassroots perspective, where demonstrators were seen as "protagonists of change". Ferran and other civil society actors saw their goal as taking the power from politicians and putting it into the hands of the people, making regular people the agents of change rather than elites or politicians.

Speaking about the 2013 *Diada* demonstrations, Ferran noted that he wanted to push the establishment even further. Drawing inspiration from the German anti-nuclear power movement and the 1989 Baltic Way demonstrations for independence, Ferran Civit was one of the main organisers of the Via Catalana or Catalan Way, a human chain spanning the entire Catalan coast. The Via Catalana took place in 2013 on the *Diada* and mobilised over 1.5 million independence supporters through 30,000 volunteers, each organised into *trams*, or sections. By 2013, there was already a majority in favour of independence in the Catalan parliament, having been elected through the snap elections of 2012. However, many pro-independence activists felt the politicians were too hesitant and slow in setting a specific date and agreeing on a wording for a planned independence referendum, which was to take place in defiance of the Spanish government's veto. In 2013, Ferran and his civil society team was there to push a more radical independence stance to the top of the agenda:

> We said, "Listen, since we already have a parliament that wants to do this, we want a date and a question." But the government and the parliament went, "Oh, I am afraid, I do not know." They had to see the power of the people. (MP Ferran Civit 2016)

Ferran and the rest of the pro-independence civil society have thus spent consecutive *Diada*s organising massively attended demonstrations in order to push established politics towards a more hard-line stance on Catalan independence. As he and other organisers saw it, they were putting ordinary people at the centre of politics by showing elected politicians "the power of the people". The huge demonstrations were spatial manifestations of pro-independence support designed on the one hand to mobilise, but even more so to showcase already existing mobilisation in order to change institutionalised Catalan politics from the outside, bottom-up. Indeed, the bottom-up or popular aspect to the Catalan independence movement was a key point for many ERC members and seen as characteristic of the movement. This was related to civil society, but some, such as ERC *senadora* Ester Capella, went even further, arguing that prior to civil organisations lay a popular movement capable of building these more institutionalised civil society networks. Even someone as involved in institutionalised, pro-independence politics as an ERC senator saw that the initiative and impetus for independence as a political project came from a popular movement, or what she termed "the citizenry":

> And here I believe that it is more bottom-up, that is, it is the society, the citizenry, which empowers its institutions to take steps towards independence. There is a very clear mandate from the citizenry.
>
> *Q: Such as ANC and other associations?*
>
> But it is prior to that, that is, the popular movement has the capacity to form associations[43] and through that create the necessary networks to make things change. (*Senadora* Ester Capella 2016)

For Ester Capella and many other ERC members, the *Diada* demonstrations and the popular movement for independence in general was related to and carried by civil society but drew upon an already existing foundation of networks and penchant for associations inherent in Catalan culture. Pro-independence activists spoke of civil society as a foundation of Catalan culture itself and considered *Diada* demonstrations expressions of this.

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[43] Lit., "to associate with itself".

5.2. Diada as a Nation-Building Exercise

Beyond their value as vehicles for mobilisation and for showing Catalan political elites the strength of the popular support for independence, many ERC members also saw the *Diada* demonstrations as a concrete nation-building exercise. In this, many pro-independence activists consider the *Diada* to have a triple significance: it commemorates important historic events of the Catalan nation, it mobilises people in favour of independence and showcases the popular support for independence, and it helps to further a sense of community, strengthening Catalan identities. In Marshall McLuhan's immortal quote, "the medium is the message".

Quim Sánchez, local *conseller* for the Sant Andreu district of Barcelona spoke of how the *Diada* demonstrations, most notably those organised by Ferran Civit and his team, such as the Catalan Way, were quintessential Catalan projects that were only feasible due to the particular Catalan culture of *associanisme*, or the culture of forming voluntary associations. Just as Ester Capella or Ferran Civit, he emphasised the already existing culture of civil society groups in Catalonia and used the local politics of his own district in northeastern Barcelona as an example.

Quim argued that the *Diada* demonstrations displayed not only a popular demand for independence but particular Catalan cultural traits related to civil society organisation:

> It struck me, for example, when all these demonstrations of September 11th were organised for consecutive five years, one of the things that drew attention was right here in Sant Andreu. You can see that the people who were setting it all up were people who are accustomed to organising things, because they have been in parents' associations or in an excursionist group (. . .) The Catalan Way, ten coaches left from here filled with people, from Torras and Bages, and [the volunteers] had organised it all. Of course, you find yourself in a society that, precisely because it is complex and very socialised and organised, is also very efficient when it comes down to it. Probably this is part of the explanation for the huge [September 11] demonstrations, obviously firstly because people wanted to go out and be part of it, but also because they have always been very well organised. There is one thing that also draws attention: in this country we are perhaps exaggeratedly aesthetic, sometimes with the demonstrations, with the independence process (. . .) we want to be independent but, moreover, we want to do it the right way; truly we want to do it well. (*Conseller de districte* Quim Sánchez 2016)

When Quim spoke about the *Diada* demonstrations, he emphasised what he saw as the particular characteristics of Catalan society that had made it possible: the organisation, the voluntary experience, and the way people were socialised into civil society networks. He considered this part of a pro-independence "aesthetic", affirming that gaining independence was in itself not enough. It had to be done "in the right way", beautifully, democratically, and bottom-up. He hinted that he thought this was both a strength and a weakness, as the insistence on civil society and bottom-up political processes could potentially harm the efficacy of the movement. However, he maintained that, on the one hand, it could be done no other way, as Catalan society was characterised by these traits, and that, on the other, it *should* rightly be done in this way. There was then both a cultural and a normative, moral basis for his understanding of why the Catalan movement was focused on civil society and bottom-up mobilisation. The *Diada* mobilisations were also used to discursively draw boundaries with the rest of Spain, continually emphasising the particular strength of Catalonia's civil society.

Carlos Escuredo, also a local *conseller* for Sant Andreu, highlighted strikingly similar aspects of Catalan civil organisation, tying it to a cultural differentiation with Spain:

> I believe that the movement of Esquerra [ERC] and the independence movement (. . .) is a very structured movement, in a society that is already very structured, because the Catalan society is already very structured. This does not happen in Spain, this type of civil society organisation does not happen in Spain. Here, everyone is part of an association, be it sports,

> cultural, hiking, ecologist, etc. It's more similar to a Northern [European] democracy, where one's activism is not linked to a party, as in Spain, or to a particular movement like the 15M. On the contrary, here it is linked in a parallel line to politics, but in civil society. Activism is channelled through civil society, through for example la Plataforma per la Llengua [Catalan language organisation]. When it comes to language preservation, the gold standard here are not the political parties, it is la plataforma per la llengua, the gold standard in the defence of cultural values is not a party, it is Òmnium Cultural, you know? We organise in civil society; in Spain, that does not happen. (*Conseller de districte* Carlos Escuredo, 2016)

For most ERC members and politicians, civil society takes centre stage in their understanding of Catalan culture and politics. Institutional politics is an important tool, but the true value for ERC members is in civil society activism, which, as Carlos remarked, had been "the gold standard" in Catalan cultural issues such as language preservation. Members highlighted the already existing social networks that enable civil society activism and the penchant for collective action outside institutionalised politics in Catalonia. This was, of course, a way in which ERC members and politicians could emphasise the popular aspect of their movement and discursively align Catalan cultural traits with current political attitudes. This focus on *community* as the enabler of collective political action was also present in Ferran Civit's retelling of the outcome of the *Diada* demonstrations. In another interview, he had referred to the Catalan Way as a "symbolic sardana", referencing a traditional Catalan communitarian circle-dance. In our talk, he dismissed this metaphor as being too essentialist and folksy, but continued to emphasise the bottom-up, collective aspect of his movement's political work:

> When people come to thank you, you say, "No, no, don't thank me for anything, this is a choral work," it is a collective *ouvre*. We may have designed the stage for the ouvre, for the play, but if you do not . . . , if the actors do not come on stage, the actors being the people who have participated in these demonstrations, it would not have served any purpose. We were backstage and we mounted everything and that came out very well, but if the public did not go on stage, nothing would have happened. (MP Ferran Civit 2016)

Ferran kept using performance metaphors but had now shifted from *sardanes* to choirs and stages. As he said, organisers and politicians were backstage, but the true protagonist is the "public on stage". Because the Catalan independence movement seeks to represent a people and a nation, it makes sense that its members would emphasise this aspect of their political mobilisation, connecting organisational and moral considerations. It also means that the *Diada* is increasingly used by politicians and activists alike in the Catalan independence movement to showcase perceived differences between Catalonia and Spain and to present a specific moral vision of the Catalan community as a collective actor. This makes the *Diada* immensely powerful as not only a nation-building event, but as a symbolic and rhetorical tool used to argue in favour of Catalan independence.

5.3. Social Media: From Celebration to Demonstration

The online investigation we undertook for this article corroborates several of the points made by ERC members and pro-independence activists during Hau's fieldwork. Several online users mentioned significant changes to the *Diada* following the Constitutional Court's verdict on the *Estatut* in 2010 and the mass demonstrations on 11 September 2012. User "Erratic85" explained his memories of the *Diada* growing up in a small town in rural Catalonia in the 1980s and 1990s:

> Before the surge of independence as a majority option in 2010, my memory of the *Diada* is that of a holiday like any other, with the difference that people hung senyeres on the balcony (. . .) my parents were leftist progressives, so there was very little or no Catalanism in the nationalist sense in our family. We hung the senyera from the balcony and had some lunch with other relatives. Nothing special, it was celebrated quite indifferently, I suppose like many other national days in other European countries. (Reddit user Erratic85, 2019)

This Reddit user notes a significant change in his perception of the *Diada* and one we might term "from celebration to demonstration". Both elements were present in past and current *Diada* rallies, but the emphasis seems to have shifted significantly towards "demonstration", following the ANC's organisational revamp of the *Diada* from 2011 onwards. The celebratory element in the *Diada* was always somewhat discordant and paradoxical, because the *Diada* essentially commemorates the memory of a defeat. One user, "baez_taez", emphasised both the historical perspective and the negative or victimised element of the *Diada*: "In my village we always celebrated September 11th to remember the rout of 1714 which marks the loss of sovereignty of the Catalan people" (Reddit user baez_taez 2019).

More recently, it would appear that some fractures have appeared in the *Diada* celebrations. Although attendance rates are still very high, they have perhaps dropped from over a million participants to 800,000 in 2019. This is still an impressive mobilisation, but several ERC members and other pro-independence activists mentioned a certain fatigue having to continue these immense mobilisations every year. They also expressed difficulties in maintaining a positive, joyful atmosphere following the police violence during the 1 October Catalan independence referendum and jailing of Catalan political leaders. The positive message that Ferran Civit and others had emphasised was more difficult to transmit following an arguable standstill in the Catalan independence movement. Reddit user Erratic85 spoke of this recent change in the tone of the *Diada*:

> The 1 October and the imprisonment of the political prisoners marked a turning point. Since then, the demonstrations have become more sombre affairs, with people being dismayed and preoccupied, people who only mourn and lament what's happening. All in all it's sad to see how something so beautiful has died so easily. (Reddit user Erratic85, 2019)

Other pro-independence activists also noted this recent change in the affective connotations of the *Diada*. Some articulated that the *Diada* had gone from a sombre commemoration of a painful historical event to a more joyful celebration of political mobilisation. Francesc, a former Barcelona council member with the far-left PSUC[44] in the early 1980s and now member of Òmnium, argued that a return to a less cheerful marking of the *Diada* would be natural, as it was not an unproblematic, joyful occasion, but instead an event that carried historical baggage:

> The *Diada* was never a day of celebration. It is a painful day, it marks a defeat. Even more so, it is the day Allende died[45]. More personally, it is the day my father died as well. We never celebrated. (Òmnium member Francesc 2019)

Several of the people interviewed, both online and in person, articulate a sensation that the independence movement is going through a crisis due to the imprisonment of Catalan political leaders and what they see as an increasingly hard line towards Catalan autonomy in the Spanish government. Activists find it difficult to articulate positive messages and maintain a more cheerful mobilisation for the *Diada* under these changing circumstances, and it may speak to yet another significant shift in the connotations of this important holiday.

6. Conclusions

The *Diada* is an event that has hitherto received little or no scholarly attention. In this article, we have attempted to remedy this with a combined historical and ethnographic analysis of the development of the *Diada* from its modern inception in 1976 until present day, 2019. We have shown

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[44] Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) or Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia was a communist political party active in Catalonia between 1936 and 1997.

[45] Salvador Allende, democratically elected left-wing President of Chile, was killed during Augusto Pinochet's CIA-supported military coup d'état in 1973.

how the connotations, discourses, and values surrounding the event have changed throughout its history. Although the *Diada* perhaps always held a paramount position within the Catalan independence movement, that movement was until recent times a more fringe pursuit. As the movement has grown to a much larger scope, there has been a corresponding change in how the *Diada* is celebrated, organised, and understood by participants. The surge in participation in recent years has largely been orchestrated by civil society actors such as the ANC and Òmnium Cultural, which have taken over the organisation of the *Diada* from the political parties that dominated it between 1980 and 2012. This shift from political parties to civil society has caused significant changes in how the *Diada* is perceived by its participants and by Catalan society at large, as well as in its capacity to mobilise people. Effectively, the *Diada* has gone from a politically controlled, cultural commemoration of history and the national character of the Catalans to a civil society-controlled, explicitly political mobilisation in favour of Catalan independence. This speaks to Kathryn Crameri's categorisation of the Catalan independence movement as a political co-creation that is both antagonistic and cooperative (Crameri 2015, p. 109), with institutional political actors and civil society associations working together yet competing for control.

Although the future of the *Diada* is difficult to predict, it is doubtful that the mass mobilisations in recent years can be sustained in perpetuity. The political crisis in the independence movement following the 2017 referendum has made it more difficult to sustain a positive, mobilising spirit for the *Diada*, and the lack of political gains in regards to further autonomy or indeed in any progress towards independence makes fatigue inevitable among activists. Focusing on demands with popular backing has mobilised and greatly increased participation, but there will have to be a noticeable progress towards the realisation of those demands within a reasonable period if participation is not to suffer. However, we should not be too quick in proclaiming the *Diada*'s demise as a mobilising event, as the number of participants remain well over half a million, making it one of the largest recurrent demonstrations in Europe. While the *Diada* is primarily organised by civil society, it will perhaps be able to maintain much of its vigour and cross-party mobilising force. However, should political actors such as ERC and PDeCat be successful in taming the event and using it for their own political platform, we may see the *Diada* returning to the smaller-scale, more cultural celebrations of Catalan history of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. In any case, the ebbs and flows of the Catalan political-territorial aspirations can be read effectively through the *Diada* celebrations, the number of people mobilised, the themes around which they were mobilised, and the ways in which mobilisation worked, which makes it an important site for the contemporary study of Catalan nationalism, the independence movement, and civil society mobilisations.

An additional important aspect of the evolution of the *Diada* celebrations is its increasingly international character, as actors from both civil society and established politics seek to gain access to foreign media through increasing use of English and inviting international guests. In this article we have focused on the *Diada* as shifting between established politics and civil society and on its recent spectacular growth in popularity within Catalonia with over a million attendees. However, of likewise importance is the attempt to attract new international allies outside Catalonia and Spain, an internationalising strategy that is also radically changing the *Diada*, and where further research would be particularly appropriate.

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Privileged Rebels: A Longitudinal Analysis of Distinctive Economic Traits of Catalonian Secessionism

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Abstract: During the last decade, the Catalonian secessionist challenge induced a chronic crisis within Spain's politics that does not offer hints of a viable arrangement. The rapidly escalating demands for secession ran almost in parallel with the accentuation of the economic recession that followed the disruption of the world financial system in 2008–2010. Such secession claims reached maximums during 2012–2014, attaining support levels of nearly 50% of citizenry in favour of independence. These figures subsequently diminished a bit but remained close to that level until today. Despite the coincident course, previous studies had shown that the impact of economic hardships was not a major factor in explaining the segregation urgencies, connecting them instead to triggers related to internecine political struggles in the region: Harsh litigations that resulted in an abrupt polarization along nationalistic features in wide segments of the population. In this longitudinal analysis based on the responses of 88,538 individuals through a regular series of 45 official surveys, in the period 2006–2019, we show that economic factors did play a role in the secessionist wave. Our findings showed that the main idiomatic segmentation (Catalan vs. Spanish, as family language) interacted with economic segmentations in inducing variations on national identity feelings that resulted in erosions of the dual CatSpanish identity. Moreover, our findings also showed that the more privileged segments of Catalonian citizenry where those that mostly supported secession, whereas poorer and unprotected citizenry was clearly against it. All the data points to the conclusion that the secessionist challenge was, in fact, a rebellion of the wealthier and well-situated people.

Keywords: Catalonia; secessionism; household net income; family/mother language

1. Introduction

Catalonian secessionism acquired relevance in Spanish politics from 2010 onwards. Before that, social activism and political parties pursuing secession were a minor issue. Secessionist forces won three regional elections and sustained governments by tiny majorities in the Autonomous Parliament in this period. Two anomalous consultations about self-determination were organized and around 2 million (38% of population census) supported secession from Spain. An "Independence Declaration" was proclaimed on 27 October 2017, devoid of any legal or practical consequence. Such a move resulted in the full suspension of home rule, sanctioned by Spanish Parliament, that endured until mid-2018.

Secessionist parties renovated their lead at the last regional election (27 December 2017). The Spanish Government decided to advance elections both to defuse the crises and finish the suspension of home rule. The results, however, confirmed the stagnation though the formation of a new Regional

Government had to wait until mid-2018, after several attempts to reinstate in power the rebellious leaders who had fled to exile or been imprisoned. These unsuccessful efforts were blocked by legal provisions dictated by the Spanish High Court. A left-wing government was formed in Spain, in June 2018, which had the initial support from Catalonian and Basque nationalists. This seemed to open an opportunity to explore new arrangements but the talks between the Central Government and the secessionist Catalan government did not lead to any advancement. At Spain's general election of 28 April 2019, left-wing parties renovated their lead, although without reaching a stable majority. The formation of a new government had to wait until January 2020, after a new general election, on November 2019, that finally led to an apparently viable left coalition. On 14 October 2019, the Spanish Supreme Court[1] handed down sentences of several years in prison to nine secessionist leaders, finding them guilty of sedition for their role in the failed 2017 bid for independence.

The surge of pressing demands for independence has thus endured, with minor oscillations, since 2010. Two regional elections (September 2015; December 2017), two illegal referendums of self-determination in which only the secessionists went to the poll stations (9 November 2014; 1 October 2017), and a series of systematic surveys both by CEO (the official survey agency of the Regional Government)[2] and CIS (the official survey agency of the Central Government)[3], showed the existence of a political division in two halves on the issue of secession. Over the last five years the question "Do you want Catalonia to be an independent state?" (CEO series of "political barometers") received 45% to 48% "YES" answers to "NO" answers from 44% to 48%, and 5–10% remnants of "DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER". Results on 21 December 2017 regional elections disclosed an almost perfectly divided society: Turnout reached an historical mark of 79.1%; secessionist parties got 2,079,330 votes (47.33%), whereas non-secessionist parties won 2,227,421 votes (50.71%). A narrow margin of 150,000 votes distanced unionists from secessionists.

Catalan unionists (around three million, from a census of 5.5 million within a population of 7.5 million) did not join the secessionist venture. Most of them have familial, affective and economic links with Spain. They are heterogeneous though they predominate on coastal conurbations around Barcelona and Tarragona, as well as in other medium-sized towns (Lepic 2017; Maza et al. 2019). They remained expectant all along the secessionist surge, but during October 2017, in the weeks preceding the "Independence Declaration", unionist activism increased amid escalating tensions (Barrio and Field 2018; Garcia 2018). They deployed demonstrations in downtown Barcelona that competed with the huge ones that secessionists had mounted repeatedly (Barrio and Field 2018; Coll et al. 2018; Crameri 2014, 2015; Garcia 2018; Tobeña 2017a, 2017b).

The main social consequence of the sustained secessionist campaign has been the excavation of a deep political divide between two large fractions of Catalan citizenry, secessionists and unionists, which was absent before the precipitous demands of segregation from Spain (Amat 2015; Elliott 2018; Ucelay-da Cal 2018). The lack of a social majority behind the vigorous but failed secessionist venture opened apprehensions and frictions that were mostly unknown previously. Neighbours, colleagues and even friends and families who had shared feelings of belonging to both Catalonia and Spain (in different degrees) as a part of their attachments and values, are now divided on the issue of secession and must endure living together amid unsolved tension (Garcia 2018; Morel 2018; Coll et al. 2018; Oller et al. 2019a, 2019b).

The secessionist movement devoted, from the start, big efforts to convincing the world that it was deeply rooted on a spontaneous and widely distributed aspiration to attain sovereignty that came from all corners and social strata within Catalonian citizenry. That is, without distinctions that might suggest the operation of a political agenda biased by economic, territorial or cultural/ascendancy based

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1 In Spain the "Supreme Court" is the highest judiciary level. The "Tribunal Constitucional" (High Spanish Court) is the highest instance for both legislative and judiciary litigations, equivalent to the Supreme Court in other Western countries.
2 CEO (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, http://ceo.gencat.cat/).
3 CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/ES/index.html).

interests. It must be recognized that that kind of discourse obtained a good reception (Crameri 2014, 2015; Minder 2017; Dowling 2018; Cardenal 2020), though there were cautions signalling towards the concomitant influence of top-down mechanisms rooted on a harsh political struggle between secessionist formations to lead the region (Barrio and Field 2018; Elliott 2018).

1.1. Antecedents

While initial interpretations of the upsurge of Catalonian secessionism linked the appearance of the wave of social discontent to resentment over economic grievances against the Spanish state, during the extensive downturn of the 2008–2012 world financial crisis, recent analyses have discarded those interpretation. Applying different statistical methods, both (Bel et al. 2019; Romero-Vidal 2019) established the inability of important contextual factors to explain the surge and maintenance of the Catalonian secessionist push: Neither the impact of the economic crisis in 2008–2013 or the evolution of preferences for governance options within the region, along the whole period 1991–2018, were able to convincingly explain the appearance of intense and sustained demands for full sovereignty. Cohering with that, (Maza et al. 2019) multivariate analysis of voting behaviour at the last regional elections (21 December 2017), showed a clear priority of family ascendancy origins over economic factors to explain the electoral results. The authors (Cuadras-Morató and Rodon 2019) obtained fully concordant findings as well. The authors (Borrell and Llorach 2015) and others (Bosch and Espasa 2014; Sánchez Cartas 2015) had already shown that the attempts to justify the secessionist challenge as a response to the chronic maltreatment by a parasitic Spanish state acting with extractive procedures towards the Catalonian economy were devoid of substance and worked only as propaganda weapons to nourish the conflict.

In a systematic longitudinal analysis, (Oller et al. 2019a, 2019b) showed that family language/ascendancy origins and the biased influence of regional media were crucial and unavoidable factors of the ongoing division between secessionists and unionists. Those two factors influenced important realignments on both national identity feelings and support for secession. The same study offered hints about the potential relevance of economic segmentations as added factors for differential alignments. The relevance of some socioeconomic ingredients on preferences for secession was first highlighted by (Llaneras 2017) using data from CEO surveys near the crucial months of autumn 2017. Secession appealed mostly to native Catalans: It was higher among citizens born in Catalonia and with at least one parent born there, with a maximum (75%) for those with long native ascendancy. For citizens coming from abroad or from other Spanish regions, and for those born in the region from migrant parents, secession was not attractive at all (CEO barometer July 2017). The divide depended also on incomes: Citizens with highest incomes and those who responded "we live comfortably" were the ones that backed secession. On the contrary, people with low salaries and those disclosing "many economic difficulties" were against secession. These previous but partial findings demanded further study that might reveal the influence of economic factors on fragmentation tensions that have appeared, in different parts of Europe, during the last two decades (Sorens 2005, 2008; Serrano 2013; Muñoz and Tormos 2013, 2015; Bourne 2014; Muro and Vlaskamp 2016; Piketty 2019).

1.2. Plan of the Study

Our main aim, in this paper, is to display a series of longitudinal findings that may shed light on the potential relevance that some economic factors played upon the surge of the fissure between Catalonian unionists and secessionists. By building upon the complete series of data from iterated official CEO polls (the Survey Agency of the Regional Government), including 85.538 respondents from 45 surveys, we will show the evolving changes along the period 2006–2019 of national identity feelings and political preferences on the issue of secession.

After displaying the differential geographical distribution of both electoral preferences and the degree of support for secession, we will explore, in detail, the role of various economic and social transitions that might have contributed to establishing the pattern of traits that currently characterize

the division and entrenchment between secessionists and unionists. We will try to explore, afterwards, potential interactions between economic segmentations with variations of national identity feelings in the main two segments of Catalonian citizenry; those whose family language is Catalan vs. those whose family language is Spanish. This is mandatory since previous findings had established the priority of this ethnolinguistic cleavage rooted on ascendancy origins (Oller et al. 2019a, 2019b).

We expect that this longitudinal dissection of the relevance of socioeconomic ingredients upon the secessionist push in Catalonia will contribute to illuminating factors that may help not only to understand its origins and development, but to hopefully contribute as well to attenuating the more worrying consequences of such a crisis.

2. Methods

To display the structure of secessionist vs. unionist preferences among Catalonian citizenry we started by using the official electoral data from the last regional election (21 December 2017). The geographical distribution of the pro-secession vote was examined by adding the results of the three secessionist political parties: JxCat, ERC and CUP. We obtained a map (Figure 1) with 947 current Catalan municipalities coloured in distinctive tones: In red when the sum of the secessionist vote was greater than 50% of the municipal census and in pale pink, otherwise. Secondly, we obtained a map with the 947 current Catalan municipalities coloured in five green hues according to percentages of unionism votes on the electoral census of each municipality (Figure 2). These results are also summarized in Table 1.



Figure 1. Geographic distribution of secessionism at regional elections 21 December 2017. The percentages by municipalities are computed over their corresponding electoral census. Secessionism is majoritarian (in red) at 76% of the municipalities, representing 78% of the surface of the whole region, but only 20% of the electoral census live in this area, while the remaining 80% live in the rest of Catalonia (in rose pale). Secessionism is concentrated at inland counties mainly, whereas unionism predominates on overpopulated coastal areas and in some Pyrenean and peripheral counties as well.



Figure 2. Geographic distribution of non-secessionist vote at regional elections 21 December 2017. The percentages by municipalities are computed over all their corresponding electoral census. The different shades of green correspond to the different percentages of unionist forces at each municipality. Observe the pattern complementary to that observed in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Catalonian municipalities sorted by the value of an index measuring "unionism" degree. This is an index based on a factor analysis over electoral data in the period 2008–2012. For each abscissa point, we show the accumulated electoral census to the left of that point, from 0% to 100% in green. We show also a smoothed average (in red) of the corresponding secessionism at each municipality. Note that the highest values appear at the smallest municipalities, while they progressively fall at the largest municipalities in the Barcelona metropolitan area. The Barcelona municipality had intermediate behavior.

Table 1. Secessionists and non-secessionists in different geographic areas.

	Secessionists	Non-Secessionists
Zone in Red	1.069 M	0.434 M
Zone in Pale Pink	0.996 M	2.829 M
Total	2.065 M	3.263 M

We built then a way to visualize the distribution of the pro-secession vote across municipalities of the region. They were ordered according the ranks of an index obtained considering municipal, regional and general election results in the period 2008–2012 and a factorial analysis. Such an index can be interpreted as a measure of "unionism". Then we plotted simultaneously the cumulative electoral census, from 0% to 100% and a smooth moving average of percentages of secession support at each municipality (Figure 3). The shape of both plots shows the relationship between municipality sizes and support for secession. Further details could be supplied by the authors to any interested reader.

We then proceeded to analyze the evolution of several measures obtained by consecutive CEO barometers (the official survey agency of the Regional Government), during the period 2006–2019, from representative samples of Catalonian citizenry through personal interviews. Sample sizes for each survey oscillated between 2500 and 1500 citizens, with the exception of autumn 2017, which had only 1338 citizens. This longitudinal analysis was based on responses of 88,538 individuals through a regular series of 45 official surveys, in the period 2006–2019. Our variables came from particular questions on these CEO barometers. Specifically, our main economic variable was "household net incomes" for the whole population and its interaction with the main family/mother language segments (Catalan vs. Spanish). We estimated medians of "household net incomes" of segments defined by the second one. We also used a binary variable "household net incomes ≥3000 €/month", with two possible results "Yes" or "No", discarding the relatively few answers "do not know" or "do not answer" ("DK/NA"). We also used the qualitative variables "economic resistance limit in case of economic breakdown" (based on questions asked in two surveys in 2016 and 2017), and "perception of own economy last year", both in combination with support for secession in a (hypothetical) referendum of self-determination (as is specifically asked in these CEO barometers, but only from 2015 onwards).

Longitudinal Variations on National Identity Feelings Depending on "Household Net Incomes" and Linguistic Segments

We focused our analyses on the evolution of national identity (sense of belonging feelings) because these CEO barometers maintained a specific question on this issue, without changes, along the whole period. It had six options: "only Catalan", "more Catalan than Spanish", "as Catalan as Spanish", "more Spanish than Catalan", "only Spanish", and DK/NA. Previous work had established substantial covariation between national identity feelings and preferences in favour of or against secession, despite addressing different features (Oller et al. 2019a, 2019b). We considered the variable family/mother language and the dichotomous variable net income plus. First, we plotted the evolution of the national identity "only Catalan" on the four groups obtained crossing the main two segments of family/mother language (Catalan vs. Spanish) with the dichotomous variable net income plus (with also two levels, according to whether the household net incomes were greater than, equal to, or less than 3000 €/month). The graphics allowed comparisons of different evolution for these groups. Secondly, we obtained the same graphs for the national identity "as Catalan as Spanish" on the same groups, and finally we did the same with the national identity "only Spanish".

We additionally analysed this data, just as an approximation, through the perspective of Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA). For the sake of simplicity, we started with two ordinary univariate analyses and continued with a combination of them in a trivariate version of MANCOVA that we shall describe hereafter. At the start, we considered two factors for both analyses the levels of which were the possible values of the qualitative variable family/mother language (with two levels corresponding to the main linguistic segments, Catalan and Spanish) and the dichotomous variable net income plus (according

to whether the household net income was greater than, equal to, or less than 3000 €/month), using time (from 2006) as a covariate and considering as a dependent variable the percentages of those who self-identified as "only Catalan", for the first analysis, "as Catalan as Spanish", for the second one, and "only Spanish" for the third one. Since the interactions between factors were highly significant, to facilitate the analysis we built a new factor, group, with four levels, combining the two levels of family/mother language factor and both levels of the factor net income plus. We used this factor to replace the previously mentioned original binary factors at the final analysis.

Notice that there were two sources of randomness: One corresponding to the sample procedure and another corresponding to the political and communicative events throughout the period: We used a linear model as a simple way to deal with both sources of variability, just as an approximation, introducing time (in years, from 2006) to try to capture potential trends and checking the global adequacy of this approach examining the standard output supplied by the function lm of R package statistics. We supply also a graphic plot illustrating the dependence of each percentage ("only Catalan" and "as Catalan as Spanish"), with respect to the time covariate, in each one of the four levels determined by both factors.

As a final remark, in most of the plots, we marked relevant historical events that might have been crucial to understanding the evolution of the variables along the period. These events were: The date when a new home rule was approved (New Statute 2006); the resolution of the Spanish High Court (Tribunal Constitutional-TC) that sanctioned 14 articles (over 223) as contrary to the Spanish constitution and restricted the preamble and another 27 articles (June 2010); the peak protests of the social 15M movement (15M Peak Protests, June 2011); the regional elections of 25 November 2012 (25N); the illegal consultation about independence of 9 November 2014 (9N); the regional elections of 27 September 2015, (27S); the illegal referendum about secession, 1 October 2017 (1 Oct) and the regional elections 21 December 2017 (21D).

We were fully aware of the limits and restrictions we adopted in our analyses of an obviously multi-causal phenomenon. We limited ourselves to studying significant stochastic dependencies between variables, a strictly statistical work (descriptive plus correlational), although it is true that, in this context, high stochastic associations might suggest plausible explanations, of at least part of the mechanisms that shaped the observed trends.

3. Results

We started by geographically localizing the relevance of support for secession using the official results of the last regional elections (21 December 2017), and adding the votes obtained by the three main current secessionist parties: JxCat (right), ERC (left) and the CUP (far left). These regional elections are the event where secessionist support is more clearly revealed, as majorities at the Autonomous Parliament and the Government depend on them.

As in Figure 1, when secession support at each municipality was greater than 50% of the electoral census, they were indicated in red. The highest values were found at the smallest municipalities, while they progressively dropped at the largest municipalities of Barcelona and Tarragona conurbations. Barcelona city showed intermediate scores. The main trend is exemplified with the following two results: Santa Cecília de Voltregà: Electoral census 163 citizens, secession support: 89.0%; Badía del Vallés: Electoral census 10,560 citizens, secession support: 14.5%. Figure 2 presents an image complementary to the previous one, showing percentages of support for unionist forces at each municipality with different shades of green.

The summary of the results for Figures 1 and 2 appears in Table 1 (from the electoral data of 21–12–2017, the last regional elections):

Secessionists are majoritarian in three quarters of the territory, but less than 25% of the electoral census live in those parts of the region, while in the remaining part, more than 75% of the census is concentrated.

We developed also an alternative method to visualize the differential distribution of the pro-secession vote, presented in Figure 3. The municipalities are ordered in terms of an index, developed from a factorial analysis obtained from electoral data in general and regional elections throughout the period 2008–2012. This index, which shall be referred to hereafter as the unionism index, measures the degree of support for unionist forces at each municipality, from low to high degrees. The accumulated census and percentages of support for secessionist forces are represented for each municipality. The percentage of secession support is represented through a smooth curve, based on moving averages.

3.1. Longitudinal Changes of Household Net Incomes on the Main Family Language Segments

Based on Household net income levels among citizens with family/mother language Catalan and those with family/mother language Spanish, we estimated the medians of household net incomes for each linguistic segment throughout the period 2006–2019[4]. Citizens with family language Catalan exhibited higher household incomes throughout the entire period compared with citizens with family language Spanish. The trend line suggests that the economic crisis increased the magnitude of such inequality (Figure 4).



Figure 4. Evolution of median estimates of household net incomes among citizens with family/mother language Catalan vs. those with family/mother language Spanish. Observe the differences between these groups and how they increase along the economic crisis. Primary source: CEO barometers 2006–2019. FML: Family/mother language (FML Spanish: 56% of Catalonian citizenry; FML Catalan: 36%; FML both Catalan and Spanish 6%; source: EULP2018-Enquesta Usos lingüístics de la població, Institut Estadístic Catalunya; https://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=eulp).

Figure 5 displays the percentages of "Yes" in a (hypothetical) referendum of self-determination in population segments determined by family/mother language and the binary variable "household net incomes ≥3000 €/month" with two values "high" (greater than 3000 €/month) or "low" (lower than 3000 €/month). The difference between these idiomatic segments was huge throughout the 2015–2019 period. There were also differences depending on income: Wealthier respondents were more in favour

[4] Until summer 2011 the survey question explicitly asked for 'family language', and after that for 'childhood language in the family'. This change resulted in a decrease in the percentage of people who answered 'both languages' and an increase in the Spanish-mother language segment, but it did not significantly affect other variables within the surveys immediately before and after that change.

of secession in both idiomatic segments. Finally, a slight tendency to increase support of secession appeared among Spanish speaking citizens with lower incomes.



Figure 5. Covariation between household net incomes and family/mother language segments on support for secession in a (hypothetical) referendum of self-determination. Attached to each label comes respondent percentages, for each segment, at a July 2019 CEO survey; rests up to 100% were DK/NA responses. 1M = one thousand euros/month. FML: Family/mother language.

3.2. Longitudinal Variations on National Identity Feelings by Household Net Incomes and Family/Mother Language Segments

To obtain a more detailed picture of the potential relevance of economic variables in influencing the division between secessionism and unionism we analysed the evolution of "national identity" feelings in the main two linguistic segments taking into account the variable "household net incomes ≥ 3000 €/month", with two values "high" (greater than 3000 €/months) or "low" (lower than 3000 €/month). First, we directed focus (Figure 6) to the national identity "only Catalan" for Catalan speakers (as defined by family/mother language) and for Spanish speakers (also defined by family/mother language).

In both idiomatic segments, wealthier strata moved towards an increase on the national identity "only Catalan", although the jump was much more substantial on the fraction that had Catalan as family language. Observe the distance between the biggest group, family/mother language Spanish, with household net income not greater than 3000 €/month, in green (38.2% of respondents, at that survey), and the family/mother language Catalan group with household net income greater than 3000 €/month (7.2% of respondents, at that survey), in red. Notice also that trend lines overlap or almost overlap at the beginning of the period and we may conjecture that Catalan subgroups (red and purple) should have had similar figures in the recent past, around the start of the present century. The sizes of the purple and orange subgroups were 20.7% and 6.7%, respectively, at the last survey.



Figure 6. Evolution of "only Catalan" national identity depending on family/mother language and household net income (2006–2019). The size of this identification type went from 14.2% of the entire Catalonian population in a March 2006 survey, up to 23.5% in July 2019. Attached to each label are size percentages, for each group, at a July CEO 2019 survey. FML: Family/mother language.

These abrupt variations on the national identity "only Catalan" were clearly dependent on family language and on household net incomes ≥3000 €/month. Their respective relevance was examined through a standard analysis of covariance. The dependent variables were percentages of "only Catalan" national identity, considering a factor group (four levels), and time (year) as a covariate, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.95282 with a very significant global p-value $< 2.2 \times 10^{-16}$. The group factor and the interactions were highly significant (p-values $< 1.282 \times 10^{-15}$). Furthermore, comparing the slopes of the regression lines, we found that almost all contrasts showed highly significant differences (p-value, obtained by the Tukey method, were equal to 0.0001), with the exception of the slopes among lines within family/mother language Catalan (p-value, 0.8051). Contrasts between lines within family/mother language Spanish groups were slightly significantly different (p-value, 0.0425). Other results from this analysis were also obtained and can be supplied by the authors to the interested readers on demand

We repeated the same approach to the national identity "as Catalan as Spanish" (Figure 7). Variations were smaller and there was a big degree of overlap at the start of the period in Spanish speaking segments. The same analysis of covariance was repeated considering the percentages of the "as Catalan as Spanish" national identity as a dependent variable, with the same factor group and time as covariates, as before, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.9397 with a very significant global p-value $< 2.2 \times 10^{-16}$. The effects of group factor and the interactions were highly significant. Moreover, comparing the slope of the regression lines, only those within family/mother language Spanish were significantly different (p-value obtained by Tukey method were equal to 0.0003). The slopes of household net incomes greater than 3000 €/month segments, comparing family/mother language Catalan versus the corresponding Spanish were also different (p-values obtained by Tukey method, equal to 0.009). Other results from this analysis were also obtained and can be supplied by the authors to interested readers on demand.



Figure 7. Evolution of "as Catalan as Spanish" national identity depending on family/mother language and household net income (2006–2019). The size of this identification type went from 42.5% at a March 2006 survey, to 39.2% in July 2019. Attached to each label are size percentages, for each group, at a July CEO 2019 survey. FML: Family/mother language.

The same analysis of covariance was finally applied to the percentages of "only Spanish" national identity as dependent variable (Figure 8), with the same factor group and time as covariates, as before, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.7906, a worse model fit than the previous cases, but still with a very significant global p-value $<2.2 \times 10^{-16}$. The effects of group factor and the interactions were highly significant. In this case most of the comparisons between the slopes of regression lines were not significantly different, with the exception of the contrast between family language Catalan–household net income greater or equal 3000 €/month compared with family language Spanish–household net income less than 3000 €/month (p-values obtained by Tukey equal to 0.0284). Observe in Figure 8 that wealthier households of Spanish language had less polarized national identity (only Spanish), just the opposite of the wealthier Catalan family language segment. Observe also that scores for national identity "only Spanish" attained total levels that were 15 percent lower than those of national identity "only Catalan". The apparently large oscillations in the figure are due to the tiny sizes of subgroups of "only Spanish" national identity.



Figure 8. Evolution of "only Spanish" national identity depending on family language and Household net income (2006–2019). The size of this identification was pretty stable across the whole period, with levels between 6% and 7%. Attached to each label re size percentages, for each group, at a July 2019 survey. FML: Family/mother language.

To complete the analysis, we considered both dependent variables simultaneously (MANCOVA), obtaining that group factor, the covariate Time and the interactions were highly significant. Again, other standard results for this analysis were obtained and can be supplied by the authors to interested readers on demand.

3.3. Other Economic Measures

Finally, we compared the degree of secession support among different groups obtained considering their reported economic resistance limits (in months), in case of an economic breakdown (Figure 9). Results showed that secessionism significantly increased with higher economic resistance and endurance: People with higher financial resources were much more in favour of secession. A very similar trend appeared when the measure was perception of the own economy during last year. When that perception improved, support for secession was higher as well. In all, these findings consistently indicated that the recent secessionist wave in Catalonia has been sustained by those society segments that enjoy better economic resources and higher well-being.



Figure 9. Support for secession and Economic wellbeing. **Left:** Secession was much more popular among those with higher economic resistance limits (in months), in case of an economic breakdown. Percentages are means from CEO barometers 2016–2017. **Right:** It was also more popular among those with a good perception of the evolution of their economies during the last year. Percentages derived from CEO barometer July 2019.

4. Discussion

The present study adds important findings to the recent longitudinal description of crucial vectors characterizing the division of Catalonian society into two confronted communities, unionists and secessionists, through the eruption of an unexpected and mostly not yet fully explained secession crisis within a rich and advanced region of Southern Europe (Oller et al. 2019a, 2019b).

Figures 1 and 2 offer a useful complement to our main longitudinal portrait by showing maps of the geographical distribution of support to secessionist and unionist forces using recent electoral results. They display that heavily populated coastal areas of Catalonia were less enthusiastic about secession. This was also reflected on the score (y-axis value) of the unionism index (Figure 3), where large municipalities correspond mainly to towns situated on the coastal conurbations of the region. These big conurbations have the highest proportions of citizens from migrant origins, either from other Spanish regions or from abroad (Barceló 2014; Guntermann et al. 2018; Hierro 2015; Lepic 2017; OEC Group 2017; Rodon and Guinjoan 2018).

The economic findings presented here offer a systematic scenario. Figure 4 shows that there was a persistent difference of family incomes between the two main segments of Catalonian citizenry, those whose family language is Catalan vs. those whose family language is Spanish; the former enjoying a higher median income across all the period. The income of both groups fluctuated with the development of the lengthy repercussions of the 2008 financial crises, but the distance of incomes between both groups persisted and even tended to increase throughout the period. Figure 5 shows the evolution of percentages of support for secession in a (hypothetical) referendum of self-determination differentiating two levels of income (above and below 3000 euros) and combining that with family/mother language segmentation, Catalan vs. Spanish. The graph illustrates that, regardless of their level of income, citizenry with family/mother language Catalan gave substantially more support to secession than the

Spanish language segment. The difference was so large that it appears to reveal that the sharp division on the preference for secession depends mainly on an ethnolinguistic cleavage.

Results displayed at Figures 6–8 present longitudinal analyses of variations on different national identity feelings throughout the whole period 2006–2019. Figure 6 focuses on the evolution of national identity feeling "only Catalan" differentiating between the abovementioned two levels of income. The escalation of the identity feeling "only Catalan" was maximum for the wealthier segment of those with family/mother language Catalan. At the start of the period, however, there were no distinctions on that restrictive national identity within such a Catalan speaking citizenry segment. For citizens with family/mother language Spanish, there was also a very slight trend of increasing "only Catalan" identity, and again the wealthier ones taking the same lead, though a bit later. Figure 7 displays the evolution of differences on the national identity "as Catalan as Spanish" using the same type of segmentations. There was an erosion of this dual identity on both citizenry idiomatic segments, with the erosion being higher for the wealthier subgroups. To be noted is that, for the wealthier pertaining to the family/mother language Spanish group, the erosion of this dual identity was more intense, whereas the poorer remained more stable. Figure 8 displays the variations on national identity "only Spanish" within both citizenry lingustic segments differentiating again for levels of income, though these were very thin strata (low percentages) within the population. For the family/mother language Catalan fraction there was no variation at all, as percentages of that identity for this citizenry segment were close to zero. The family/mother language Spanish segment presented large fluctuations which were likely due to the very small sizes.

Finally, Figure 9 introduced two subjective measures of economic resistance/endurance and perception of current personal economic situation. Two findings were relevant: One, that the intensity of support for secession varied significantly with these measures (the degree of secession support aligning positively and strikingly with both measures); and, second, support for secession attained maximums when economic resistance was stronger and economic perception was clearly optimistic. In all, these results cohere with previous (partial) findings reported by other authors on the relation between secession support and economic wellbeing (Llaneras 2017; Coll et al. 2018; Piketty 2019) and extend their relevance by showing consistent differences across the whole period of the secessionist campaign. They also unveiled suggestive co-variations between the main ethno-linguistic cleavage at the region and economic segmentations, but gave more relevance to the idiomatic than to economic distinctions.

Before the dawn of the secessionist surge, (Boylan 2015) had already shown using CEO surveys 2011–2013, that national identity (being Catalan native or assimilated) was a much better predictor of desire for secession, than perceived grievances coming from an unfair fiscal treatment or other economic–political factors. Cohering with that, (Miley 2007) established the operation of divergent modes of national identification across the main segments of Catalonian society that rested on an ethno-cultural gap. Departing from CIS[5] surveys and other social data, he challenged the depiction of Catalonian nationalism as a form of "civic nationalism". He described a cleavage that distinguished the self-identification of two citizenry segments: "Native, Catalan speaking" citizens and their Spanish-speaking neighbours with immigrant origins from other regions of Spain. "Mother tongue" had, in fact, the strongest impact upon identity feelings as predominantly Catalan vs. mostly Spanish or mixed "CatSpanish". In subsequent studies, (Miley 2013) showed that there was also a gap between political preferences of these citizenry segments and those implemented by their representatives in the Regional Parliament: Language and education policies, particularly, were inconsistent with preferences of Spanish-speaking citizens. He identified, moreover, two mechanisms that blocked their representation in the region's institutions: (1) A clear under-representation of those citizens within Parliament; and (2) a partial assimilation of some Spanish-speaking politicians into the attitudes of

[5] CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/ES/index.html).

Catalan-speaking rulers. He concluded that the social bases of support for Catalan nationalism were "overwhelmingly ethnic" and that the movement was an elite-led, "top down" project.

The present findings add likelihood to that depiction, since we were able to show that ethno-linguistic distinctions were more powerful than economic segmentations in describing variations on both national identity feelings and polarized profiles on the issue of secession, across the entire period of the secessionist campaign. In previous though partial and transversal studies, (Barceló 2014) had already shown that idiomatic and neighbourhood contexts were crucial to keeping distinctive national identity boundaries in Catalonia, and (Hierro 2015) showed that both parents' identities and neighbourhood composition were able to counteract the effects of compulsory schooling, mainly or exclusively in Catalan language, at inducing changes in national identities in Catalonia.

The author (Piketty 2019) recently discussed data on Catalonian economic segmentations in relation to preferences in favour of, or against secession, which are also fully coincident with the present longitudinal findings. After contrasting findings obtained from different rent strata or educational levels, he concluded that Catalonian claims for secession should be conceived as a form of "fiscal egoism" born within a rich European region. A phenomenon, by the way, that he and others suggest might appear as well on a variety of segregation tensions that have erupted in other countries, within the European Union (Bourne 2014; Griffiths et al. 2015; Muro and Vlaskamp 2016; Miley and Garvía 2019; Piketty 2019).

5. Conclusions

To recapitulate, our findings show that the more privileged segments of Catalonian citizenry were those that supported secession more consistently, using different economic measures. They also show that these segments abruptly aligned their national identity towards the exclusive feeling "only Catalan", with high intensity and departing from recognizable points during the secessionist push. That trend was particularly important in the citizenry fraction that uses Catalan as their family language. On the other hand, poorer, fragile, and less protected Catalonian citizenry (using Spanish, mainly, as their family language) was mostly against secession. They presented also less polarized profiles or abrupt variations on national identity measures. All the data points to the conclusion that the Catalonian secessionist challenge was, in fact, a rebellion of the rich, well-situated, and predominantly well-protected people.

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Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

Ethical Statements: The data for this research came from the CEO barometers, the official survey agency of the Regional Government. Full legal Spanish requirements and restrictions to conduct studies about voting and political opinion were complied, in accordance also with ESOMAR Int. Code on Market, Opinion and Social Research and Data Analytics. All the statistical analyses fulfilled conditions established by the Ethical Commissions of the University of Barcelona, Pompeu Fabra University and the Autonomous University of Barcelona for treatment of human data, when their source are surveys made by official agencies or private firms under specific external regulations with due guarantees. An ethics approval was not required for this secondary analysis of the data, as per the authors' Institutions and national regulations.

Data Availability: As already stated the primary data is public and easily accesible at CEO web (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, http://ceo.gencat.cat/). In addition to the data provided here, many other analytical and graphic results were obtained for the period 2006–2019. In particular, all series of mosaic plots derived by crossing different pairs of variables. All of them can be supplied by the authors to interested readers on demand.

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Article

Constructing National Identity Through Galician Homeland Tourism †

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Abstract: Galicia, a national minority and autonomous community of northern Spain, is often defined by its long history of emigration. While not the most common destination of Galician migrants, those that emigrated from the municipalities of Sada and Bergondo in Coruña had uncharacteristically large rates of migration to the United States. These migrants and their children continue to sustain strong ties to the perceived homeland and engage in repeat visits. Theories of transnationalism help to explain the continuity of identity, but it is with qualitative interviews with homeland tourists in Galicia that this paper will show how it is specifically through frequent visits to the homeland that these Galician-Americans are able to generationally sustain ties to the homeland and create a sense of national belonging. The frequent visits make it possible for many to create a strong Galician identity that is both transnational and locally situated. Through looking at the way these homeland visits construct a Galician identity, we can begin to form a new perspective on Galician nationalism, one that is reflected in the migrants and defined by mobility.

Keywords: national identity; transnationalism; immigration; emigration; migration; homeland tourism; Spain; Galicia; America

1. Introduction

Galicia is an autonomous region and national minority in northwestern Spain with a long history of emigration. Much of this emigration has been towards Argentina, Cuba, and other Latin American countries; however, this research focuses on the migrants who immigrated to the United States, an area that has been surprisingly understudied. While Galicia may have a long history of emigration, the US has one of immigration, assimilation, and Americanization. Often, immigrants are assumed to incorporate into the host society, melting into the 'melting pot', and becoming 'Americans'. However, scholars have been increasingly arguing that this is not the case, and instead, immigration can be approached as multidirectional, highly mobile, without a finite destination, and creating spaces of transnational social life. Not all immigrants who arrive in America stay and even those who stay often maintain connections to the homeland. These strong connections can even be reflected in second and third generations. Galician[1] migrants to the US and their descendants are an example of sustained ties to the homeland even generations after immigration. However, these Galician-American identities are obtainable through repeated homeland visits within a transnational field of continual mobility.

[1] Those from Galicia are referred to in this paper as Galicians. However, participants will often use the Spanish term Gallegos to refer to individuals from Galicia. Since this is the term participants preferred, it was preserved within the interview transcripts and the quotes presented in this paper.

2. Background

2.1. Constructing Nationalism through Tourism

Nationalism and national identity in this paper will most often be discussed in reference to either Galicia or the United States; however, Galician-Americans construct plural and multilayered identities that often fold in a strong connection to the Spanish state with a cemented notion of a unified Spanish identity. Additionally, participants also identified with America in ways that are highly multifaceted and at times tied to their identity as New Yorkers or other regional identities. Therefore, this paper takes the view that national identity is an active construction, constantly being imagined and reinvented within a collection of ever-changing layered identities. Borrowing from Benedict Anderson's (1991) notion of imagined communities, this paper presents Galician-American national identity not as a static construction but rather actively imagined through transnational practices and in conjunction with complex identity negotiations.

This research takes the approach that there are multiple ways in which Galicia is given meaning, focusing less on uncovering the origins and definition of Galician nationalism and more on the ways in which the nation is constructed or imagined by homeland visitors for purposeful aims. Tim Edensor (2002) sees the nation as performed in the banality of the everyday interconnected with the global and international. National identity in this way is not static or fixed but rather is represented, contested, consumed, and performed in multiple ways and at different moments. This paper also follows Anderson's (1991) view that the nation is an imagined community that is intentionally constructed for purposeful aims. However, it is not the accuracy of the way in which the nation is reproduce that is being explored here, but rather the various ways in which the national community is imagined.

In approaching nationalism as multifaceted both at the level of the banal and the international, it leaves room for an interpretation of how tourism is involved in the process of imagining the nation. The concept of tourism as a whole can itself be viewed as reinforcing Benedict Anderson's (1991) theory of imagined communities, as tourists are actively told how to remember, forget, and imagine the nation. Pretes (2003) builds on Anderson's notion of the census, map, and museum in the establishment of modern nations and argues that these three institutions are all still currently implemented through tourism in order to reinforce the national community and help to produce a national image. Pretes also shows how these institutions intentionally nationalize landscapes and contribute to the imagined community.

Tourism imbues sites with symbolic meaning (MacCannell 1992). These sites are presented to tourists as symbols of the nation that both reflect existing signifiers of the nation and construct new ones (Palmer 1999). Edensor (2002) presents tourism as a performance that is acted out by both the nation and the visitor. This performance of tourism can simultaneously reinforce existing national narratives, construct new competing national narratives, and provide the opportunity for tourists to challenge the performance (ibid). Tourism then performs the nation on multiple levels in a matrix connected to the other matrices of daily life. For example, Spanish tourism, even small-scale regional tourism, performs to tourists within the borders of the nation, but through the performance, this imagining will reify the nation to an international audience in an industry where tourism is also connected to the nation's economic success in the global arena. It is through the interconnected matrices that national identity in the local and everyday sphere is reproduced, which gives the nation its authority and durability in a globalizing context (Edensor 2002).

Through the act of tourism and being a tourist, the national community is reinforced and reimagined by domestic, international, and homeland tourists. Tourism markets and sells the nation both nationally and internationally, reducing national identity to elements of commercial profitability (Aronczyk 2013). This economic nationalism that is produced through tourism informs much of the growing trend of 'commercial nationalism' (Volcic and Andrejevic 2011, 2016) and 'consumer nationalism' (Castelló and Mihelj 2018) in the literature. Commercial nationalism argues that in

an area of globalized neoliberal capitalism, the nation is being sold or being used to sell products while simultaneously, marketing and public relations strategies are being used by the public sector for economic and political aims (Volcic and Andrejevic 2016). In other words, tourism is a main player in commercial nationalism that "involves a simultaneous nationalization of the commercial and commercialization of the national" (Castelló and Mihelj 2018, p. 561).

Tourism acts as an example of the increased mobility and interconnectivity of the globe that eludes to the decreased relevance of the nation (Urry 2007). However, as Edensor (2002, p. 29) states, "Globalisation and national identity should not be conceived in binary terms but as two inextricably linked processes." Theories of commercial nationalism show how tourism plays a large role in making nationalism an element of increasing global capitalism. Nations exist in an international context, where the nation is imagined alongside and in reaction to other nations where "international consciousness is integral to the modern consciousness of nationalism" (Billig 1995, p. 87). In contrast to this globalized view of nationalism, theorists, such as Anthony Giddens (1985, p. 119), have described the nation as a "bordered power-container", where the nation is seen as existing within fixed geographical boundaries. However, in their article criticizing methodological nationalism, Wimmer and Schiller (2002, p. 307) argue that social scientists have incorrectly followed the assumption that the nation (its economy, politics, and society) exists only within its borders, "thus removing trans-border connections and processes from the picture". Wimmer and Glick Schiller therefore make the claim that in order to understand nationalism, we must not separate it from transnationalism.

2.2. Transnationalism, Tourism, and Nationalism

In a lecture given by Benedict Anderson in 1992, he argues that global capitalism is creating a new form of nationalism, that of 'long-distance nationalism'. This nationalism is defined by generations of immigrants who instead of being "turned into Frenchmen, Australians, Germans, and Americans" are continuing a sense of nationhood and political involvement in their ethnic countries of origin (Anderson 1992, p. 12). Long-distance nationalism is seen as a consequence of transnational social networks (Fouron and Nina 2002). Transnationalism allows for the conceptualization of experiences of migrants who sustain transnational networks; have a sense of national belonging to the ethnic homeland regardless of citizenship, home, or country of birth; and that make choices and actions related to these feelings of transnational belonging or long-distance nationalism (ibid.).

American ideology has been largely centered on the notion of America as a 'melting pot', where immigrants blend together to create a "new American type" (Glazer and Moynihan 1996, p. 135). It was believed that immigrants would, in time, break all ties to their homeland, where descendants would eventually become fully incorporated into the new host society (Fouron and Nina 2002; Levitt and Waters 2002). However, the melting pot theory of assimilation fell short. While immigrants have assimilated in some respects, they have also maintained distinct cultural and national identities. Glazer and Moynihan (1996) describe how it was not so much the distinctiveness of the immigrants and their values that prevented them from melting and assimilating into America, but the character of American society that did not view each immigrant group equally. While the civic nationalism of America allows for all the subsequent generations of immigrants to legally become Americans, when one would ask you what you are, American was not the predicted response (Glazer and Moynihan 1996).

While the idea of "straight line assimilation", where the success of new immigrants is considered to be dependent on assimilating to the new society, is still a familiar concept within academia and policy discourse, more and more this traditional form of immigrant assimilation is being replaced by the idea that immigrants maintain certain ties to their homeland (Levitt and Waters 2002). Theories of integration and 'segmented assimilation' allow for explanations of the diverse ways in which migrants incorporate themselves politically, economically, socially, and culturally into the new host nation (Brubaker 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993). Following the point made by Vertovec (2009) that maintaining a cultural or national identification with the homeland does not exclude any successful integration in the host country, this research utilizes the perspective of transnationalism to explain the ways

in which Galician-Americans construct a Galician identity alongside incorporation into the host nation. Levitt and Waters (2002, p. 12) have stated "transnational practices and assimilation are not diametrically opposed to one another". As Robert Courtney Smith (2006) found in his research on Mexican migrants in New York, immigrants themselves engage with assimilation concepts, seeing many of their transnational activities as contrary to the pull of Americanization. In the case studied here, Galician-Americans reflect the inference not to see assimilation as something that happens or does not, but rather something that immigrants actively engage or reject in multiple aspects of their life. Instead of viewing assimilation as the alternative to transnationalism, this research focuses on how identity is maintained and what role the migrants' American lives play in the way they engage with transnational life and construct a Galician identity.

Transnationalism argues that migrants, along with their children, "retain economic, social, and political ties to their homelands, live in transnational communities that simultaneously span two or more nation-states, and develop multiple and diffuse transnational identifications" (Tsuda 2009, p. 8). While there are examples of people moving and living across borders throughout history, it has only been recently that the scale of inter-nationalism has allowed individuals a greater ability to construct transnational lives (Portes et al. 1999). Fouron and Nina (2002, p. 171) use the term transnational migrant to describe migrants "who live their lives across borders". Migrants will listen to music and keep updated on the news from the homeland, and they will continue to eat traditional foods and maintain traditional cultural practices; many migrants will even become involved in political organizations and send money home in support of a cause. However, migrants make active choices that choose transnationalism.

Migrants can be seen as engaging in transnational or national life through their actions and choices. Individuals will 'choose the nation' in daily activities of their life (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). From which products to buy to what church to attend, nationhood exists in the daily and institutionalized decisions that people make. Migrants will consciously, or even unconsciously, choose the nation when they make decisions to send their children to Spanish schools or not to teach their children Spanish, when they insist on speaking Galician at home or decide not to teach their children Galician, and when migrants gain American citizenship or pass their Spanish citizenship along to their children. Choosing the nation occurs when individuals make small choices, such as cooking traditional dishes, or large institutionalized choices, such as voting, education, or country of citizenship. Choices that choose Galicia happen alongside choices that choose Spain and choose America. Each time a national choice is made, it has the possibility to shape a network of national and transnational social relations (ibid.). For example, by choosing to send their children to a Spanish speaking school, an individual may meet other Spanish parents, and by sending their children to the Galician club to learn the traditional dace (*muñeira/muiñeira*), they may meet other Galician parents and their children are likely to make friends in these transnational communities. Therefore, the active choices that migrants and their children make in the banality of everyday life 'choose' a national community, creating different "transnational social fields" and reproducing more national choices (Fouron and Nina 2002).

Transnationalism, therefore, is beyond identity and it is more than simply continuing a connection to the ethnic homeland. Transnationalism is something that is done; it is an active engaged process (Vertovec 2009), and one that affects not only the transnational communities but also affects both the home and host countries. In fact, all nations, not just ones traditionally seen as migrant-receiving nations, are now experiencing an increased "proliferation of subnational and transnational identities" (Cohen 1997, p. 175). In this research, transnationalism is explored as a way of constructing a long-distance national identity, focusing on the transnational activity of repeat homeland visits. While much of the discussion around transnationalism is concerned with how these migrants construct transnational lives in their host society, this research focuses on the construction of identity in the sending nation. Maintaining a physical contact with the homeland through repeat homeland visits is a phenomenon that happens less with migrants that immigrate longer distances, such as Europeans who migrate to the US; therefore, homeland visits, as a recurrent part of transnational life, have been studied

more often between migrants within Europe (Wessendorf [2013] 2016). In studying second-generation Italians living in Switzerland, (Wessendorf [2013] 2016) describes reoccurring visits to the homeland as "concrete transnational involvement" and this level of involvement in the home country was seen as the foundation to maintaining an active transnational life. Smith's (2006) book *Mexican New York* also emphasizes the importance of homeland visits in maintaining a Mexican identity for the migrants. For Smith, the local community in both the home and host countries is essential to the construction of a transnational life, but he also emphasizes the importance of these transnational communities towards the imagined community constructed in the homeland region.

The migrants and their family studied in this research sit between the literature on return migration and diaspora tourism (also called roots tourism (Basu 2007), homesick tourism (Sabine 2015), genealogical tourism (Santos and Yan 2010), and many others). Return migration refers to a permanent return to a homeland from which the individual originated while diaspora tourism often focuses on the once-in-a-lifetime visit, a phenomenon where tourists attempt to connect their roots that have been, until the visit, fairly distant (King and Christou 2011). King and Christou argue for more study into these multiple short-term visits as part of transnational life. However, these forms of more long-term or rare visits still, as Storm, Eric (2019, p. 111) argues, "generally reinforced the regional and national identity of both returnees and hosts". Previous studies have discussed the outcomes of return visits through a diverse range of encounters from disillusionment to self-discovery; cases where the visit reinforced the ethno-national identity of migrants and their children or caused migrants to reaffirm a strengthened identity with the host county. First-generation migrants can often create a static vision of the homeland, imposing a stagnant cultural memory on the following generations (Harper 2005). These static images of the homeland can be inaccurate or become inaccurate over time, making homeland visits unable to measure up to the expectations of the "romantic fantasies of the 'old country'" (Cohen 1997, p. 185). Kim's (2009) research on Korean-American homeland tourists found that Korean-Americans often felt racially foreign in the US; however, after being excluded from the strict definitions of Korean cultural belonging in their homeland visit, they began to redefine their Korean identity. Korea, as a place, began to be defined less in terms of cultural belonging and more through ancestral and racial roots, reinforcing whiteness as a defining characteristic of claims to American identity. Additionally, there are also instances where these positive visits strengthen ethnic and national identity towards the homeland (Tsuda 2009). The role of homeland tourism on the construction or maintenance of a long-distance national identity is not straightforward and dependent on context (King and Christou 2011). However, what remains consistent through the literature on homeland visits is the contrast between mobility and place that individuals negotiate.

The increased mobility of society that has made tourism more accessible and reimagined the nation as consumable, economic, and global has also allowed for a transnational social sphere. However, the idea of homeland tourism is connected to a very static concept of "homecoming, homing, the need to 'belong', the search for 'roots'—all are evocations of the need for grounding, or 'placing'" (King and Christou 2011, p. 461). Duval's (2004) study of repeat visits by Caribbean migrants describes the visit as both a transnational practice and a pathway to permanent return. Ley and Kobayashi (2005), however, found that the frequent mobility of Hong Kong Chinese in Canada made long-term resettlements but with a continual movement back and forth throughout the life course, where Hong Kong and Canada made up one 'life world'. This tension between the fluidity of the transnational and fixed sense of belonging plays out in this research, where the visit connects participants to a fixed place.

The importance and impact of physical location and place on transnational lives is often understated by those studying transnationalism. Levitt and Waters (2002, p. 7) argued about transnationalism that the "ways in which connections to collectivities constituted across space seem to override identities grounded in fixed, bounded locations". This global mobility of transnationalism has also been referred to as solidarity without location, "rendering any strictly bound sense of community or locality obsolete" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, p. 9). Fouron and Nina (2002, p. 196) define second-generation transnational migrants as "bounded not by the territorial limits of a state but by the boundaries of social fields".

This boundless and unfixed definition of transnationalism is reflected in the earlier discussion arguing against the 'container' view of the nation, of which tourism offers an example of nationalism in a globalizing transnational world. Additionally, in order to understand these repetitive return visits by Galician-Americans, it is essential to acknowledge this increase in mobility and internationalization that was not accessible to earlier generations and defines transnationalism (King and Christou 2011). However, while these authors are not wrong to emphasize the important phenomenon of being able to maintain social, economic, and political engagement transnationally, it goes against the findings of this research that emphasizes the experience of visiting the place and location of the nation as essential to the construction of a transnational life.

Though the nation is not conceived as container or existing only in its borders, the construction of national identity continues to be imbedded in symbolic associations to land and place. Rather than transnationalism creating a long-distance form of national identity that is placeless, this research confirms the argument made by Smith (2006) that the local informs a transnational identity:

> "Being a Ticuanense is not a cosmopolitan, placeless identity but rather begins as its opposite, a local, deeply rooted traditional identity that is lived in two countries at once, and evolves into something transnational but still local. Because migrants and their U.S.-born children can return regularly to Ticuani, its traditions and ability to confer authenticity make it important to many second-generation youths for whom being Mexican in New York has negative connotations of victimization and difficulty in school. In this way, assimilation and transnationalization become intimately bound." (Smith 2006, p. 11)

Just as in Smith's study, this paper argues that the visit allows for the construction of transnational identities and social networks, where the nation is embedded in ideologies of belonging to a fixed place. Within this long-distance nationalism, identities are constructed in both the home and host countries, with migrants simultaneously moving between moments of transnationalism and assimilation. These transnational identities are dependent on visiting the homeland while simultaneously impacting the homeland through their visits.

2.3. Galicia: Land of Migration

The homeland tourism that Galician-Americans engage in defies our traditional notions of tourism by blurring the relationship between host/guest and home/away. These homeland tourists in this research are not visiting Galicia for the first time, but rather they visit yearly or with a high frequency. They normally do not stay in hotels, and stay with family or own property. They do not always engage in traditional tourist activities, such as visiting marketed tourist destinations. In this way, Galician homeland tourists can be seen more as travelers, in that they do not often visit the main attractions or spend money on marketed tourist experiences. However, in this paper, I refer to Americans of Galician decent that routinely visit Galicia as homeland tourists, not visitors or travelers. While an argument can be made for referring to this group as travelers, I intentionally use the word tourism here to acknowledge the intentional temporary short nature of the visit and their similarity. Additionally, "Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, there is still a tendency to see tourism as a mindless frivolous activity and of travel as an avenue to great adventure and self improvement" (Chambers 2010, p. 5). In fact, those who define themselves as travelers define tourists as something they are not, but travelers themselves reproduce the social, economic, and environmental issues that they claim distinguishes them from tourists (Week 2012). Tourism has been described from this perspective of mass tourism that is highly commercialized and superficial, focusing on the consumption of tourist activities in contrast to engaging in an "authentic". While that form of tourism does exist, and is particularly evident in other areas of Spain, it is not the only way tourism is experienced. Tourists themselves are diverse, creating numerous ways to be a tourist and experience travel. Within the diverse and practically infinite ways in which to do tourism, MacCannell (1992) argues that the one thing tourists have in common is a search for an imagined "authentic" experience.

However, this search for the authentic is ultimately superficial, steeped in the nostalgia of the rural, and reinforces the exploitative power dynamics ingrained in tourism (ibid). All of the Galician homeland visitors, regardless of whether or not they engage in traditional tourist activities, are still in search of an 'authentic', sometimes nostalgic, Galicia, actively constructing their image of the imagined community through being a tourist.

Tourism in Spain is famously popular. In fact, Spain has been referred to as a success story for tourism and nation branding. Nation brander Wally Olins (2003, p. 162) states that after the civil war and decades of "isolated, autarkic, poverty-stricken, authoritarian anachronism, hardly part of Europe at all", Spain was able to transform into a "modern, well-off, European democracy" after the death of Francisco Franco. The brand started as a widespread tourism campaign that promoted modernized and sunny Spain with a logo designed by the famous Catalan artist, Joan Miró. This tourism logo encapsulated the whole of Spain's new image of European modernity (Aronczyk 2013). Through this image constructed by tourism, Spain "carefully orchestrated and promoted its re-entry into the European family" (Olins 2003, p. 162). While this narrative of the birth of a modern European Spanish image and a new tourist industry is overstated and simply incorrect (Pack 2008), the reality of this representation is that it continues to overemphasize the unity of a single image of the Spanish nation resting on tired stereotypes. Over the decades, tourism in Spain has presented a very narrow image of the nation, reproducing a cliched exotic orientalism invented by outsiders while also catering to the 'sun and sea' demands of the tourist market (Storm 2017). There were and continue to be attempts at promoting regional diversity, but images, such as bullfighting, flamenco, and fiesta, still dominate within much of Spanish tourism, representing a stereotypical version of the nation for mass consumption (Storm 2017).

While Galicia has never become a mass tourist destination as many other areas of Spain, tourism has been important in Galician history, both through building an imagined nation and through building its national identity in relationship to the Spanish state. In their study of the Swedish middle class in the early 1900s, Frykman and Löfgren (1983) describe how national identity became tied to the landscape and presented as inherently political. In a similar way, Santos and Trillo-Santamaría (2017) explain how the pilgrimage tourism of the Way of Saint James (el camino de Santiago) and the representation of landscape tourism created a political stance representing the nation as submissive and as part of a unified Spanish state. Through these tourism offers, Galicia "served to reinforce Spain as a nation-state" and "contribute to the building of and image of Galicia based on rural and social attributes lined to femininity, such as melancholy, which may lead to the rejection of Galicia as a political subject" (Santos and Trillo-Santamaría 2017, p. 104). While Galicia's main tourist attraction has been Santiago and the pilgrimage, it is Santos and Trillo-Santamaría's second point related to the construction of landscape through tourism that is most related to the construction of an imagined landscape within the homeland tourists in this article.

Landscape in general has long been studied as a social construct that is imbued with signifiers of cultural and national meaning (Cosgrove 1984; Schama 1995). Nations are often visualized by idealized landscapes, and landscape is actively constructed as national. Edensor (2002, p. 40) argues that since the rise of modern industrialism and emergence of the modern nation happened simultaneously, nations are "clothed in this rhetoric of the rural, a rural which most frequently encapsulates the genus loci of the nation, the place from which we have sprung, where our essential national spirit resides." Therefore, landscape often serves as an origin story of the nation, the ultimate and most pure form of national description. The rural landscape of Galicia acts in a similar way as an emotive national symbol. Both nationalists and the tourism industry in Galicia have drawn on cliched and exaggerated symbols of landscape in order to convey a Galician identity distinct from that of the rest of Spain (López Silvestre and González 2007). This visualization of Galicia as rural, green forests, mountains, misty weather, and rugged coastlines were used to distinguish Galicia nationally and politically through dualisms of "north versus south, the Atlantic vs. the Mediterranean, damp vs. dry, vitality vs. despair, rural vs. urban, feminine vs. masculine, i.e., Galician vs. Castilian" (López Silvestre

and González 2007, p. 246). Heritage tourism presents landscape as a cultural construction imbued with national meaning and where nostalgia for the past is communicated in order to build a national identity for the present (Palmer 1999). In visiting Galicia and experiencing the landscape, participants are engaged in activities that reproduce and reinforce the nation. Data from 2005 shows landscape and visiting family or relatives as the top two reasons why tourists visit Galicia (López Silvestre and González 2007). Just as Galicia is known for its landscape, it is also known as a land of emigration.

Spain overall has a significant history of emigration, known as one of the largest emigrating countries in Europe until about the 1980s (Gomez 1962; Serra 2003). Of all the autonomous regions in Spain, it is Galicia that was by far the largest emigrating province historically and most Galicians ended up migrating to the Americas (Gomez 1962; Núñez 2002). Data from 2016 showed that Galicia was the largest group of all Spanish citizens registered as living abroad, making up 21.85% of all Spaniards living internationally (Golías 2018). More recently the Galician newspaper, *La Voz de Galicia*, published a finding that Galicians are registered as living in a staggering 70% of the world's countries (Punzón 2019). They attribute this to the economic recession of recent years; however, this more contemporary flow of migrants follows a historical pattern of emigration. Núñez (2002, p. 234) explains that the historically large emigration of Galicians until around the 1950s was not the cause of extreme poverty but rather can be described as a choice that was made by migrants "within a context of limited opportunities" and potential for growth. Furthermore, as Lamela (2018) argues, in the Galician case, there has been a consistent back and forth flow of migrants for generations, something typical of not only the Galician migrant experience but a defining narrative of Galicia.

Galicia as a place of emigration is so cemented in Spanish popular knowledge that there are even common jokes about it, for example: 'What is the largest city in Galicia? Answer: Buenos Aires'. So deep is the impact of emigration that in many South American countries, the term 'Gallego' is used as a synonym for someone from Spain. In Galicia, migrants were part of the national narrative of the nation and considered a part of the imagined community of the nation (Núñez 2002). However, there have been diverse ways in which migration has been constructed in relation to the nation. Migrants have been presented through a narrative of nostalgia and homesickness and also as a people of adventure and success (ibid.). The Galician government itself imagined its nation as transnational, extending beyond its borders to the Galician communities abroad and even funding migrant return visits (ibid.). This impact and narrative of emigration is evidenced even in the Galician language: "The term 'morriña' is defined by the Galician Royal Language Academy as a 'melancholic and depressive feeling and mood, specifically or caused by a nostalgia for the homeland'" (Lamela 2018, p. 1). The impact of migrants on Galicia should not be reduced to simply an inclusion in the national narrative. Migrants were politically involved and set up associations in their home countries that sent back aid and supported causes (Núñez 2016). They were influential in funding and creating tourist infrastructure in Galicia and additionally contributed to creating and reproducing the rural folkloric imagining of the landscape and nation (Santos and Trillo-Santamaría 2017). Galician migrants were and are impactful in the banal imagining of the nation:

> "they continue to be an ever-present element of daily life. Return migrants fill Galician villages every summer, and many restaurants, shops and companies are named after the migration destinations of their owners. Moreover, migration has decisively contributed to reshaping the rural Galician landscape, since return migrants have introduced architectural styles partially transplanted from their host countries." (Núñez 2002, p. 251)

Historically, Galician emigrants to the US have been numerically insignificant compared to other Latin American countries, such as Argentina (Moya 1998), but if examined from the local community level, there were entire Galician municipalities where the majority of the emigrants left for the US, specifically New York. Those from the Galician province of Coruña were especially predominant in the United States (Pérez 2008). In her study on migrants from Galicia to New York, Pérez (2008) determined that since the early 20th century, the sending area of Coruña, with a significant history of migrants going to New York, were from the areas of Bergondo, Oleiros, and Sada (see Figure 1). This research

focuses on the municipalities of Bergondo and Sada, areas in which the majority of migrants went to the US. Looking at Figure 1, there is a clear prominence of emigration towards New York in Sada; however, in Bergondo, while New York is still the most common destination, when looking down at the parish level, certain areas presented much higher numbers of those emigrating to New York (Pérez 2008). While this sort of migration data is very difficult to determine due to the inconsistency in records and the multiple migratory patterns of many Galicians, the data can still show both the importance of social networks in migrant destinations and also the high impact of certain destinations on geographic areas. Initially, many of these migrants were men working in maritime shipping or labor; however, they were eventually followed by women and families, creating communities of Galicians from the same municipality living in close proximity in New York neighborhoods, many in Astoria, Queens, where the migrant association Casa Galicia (Galicia House) is still functioning (ibid.). It is this community of Galician-Americans that originated from Sada and Bergondo that continue to visit Galicia regularly and are the subject of this research. This paper argues that the construction of a transnational social field and a long-distance Galician identity by these migrants is dependent on the ability to return and visit Galicia, constructing a national identity based in both place and migration.



Figure 1. Percentage of migrants and their primary destinations of migration in Bergondo, Oleiros, and Sada from 1917 to 1941 (source: Pérez 2008).

3. Method

The findings of this research are based on semi-structured interviews collected with 21 homeland tourists in Galicia. Participants interviewed were those that self-identified as being of Galician descent (either born in Spain or the US), living in the US permanently, and making return trips back to Galicia. Research was conducted in the areas of Sada and Bergondo, two small adjoining counties in Galicia's Coruña region with a historical impact of emigration to the US. It is often stated by community members that it would be difficult to find a family in the area that has not been impacted by emigration to the US. Since the community is relatively rural, participants were recruited mostly through word of mouth fairly quickly. However, as a Galician-American that visits yearly and with family in this area, I already had a wide network to pass on information about the research and requests for interview participants. Having an understanding of the culture of this area also proved important for this research in acknowledging the intricacies of how these Galician-Americans construct a national identity. The mean age of the interviewees was 61, with ages ranging from 18 to 85. There were 6 males and 15 females interviewed. This research also conducted interviews of multiple "generations" within the same family, demonstrating the movement of Galician identity through a family. However, in doing so, this research acknowledges the difficulty in separating these participants into cohorts by generations.

Through the assimilationist 'melting pot' approach to immigration, migrants were thought to have arrived in the new host country and stay, making grouping into generations for analysis fairly straightforward. The first generation were those who arrived in the new host country, their children would then make up the second generation, and so on. However, this approach is contrary to the reality of the diverse migrant experiences. It ignores important differences in opportunities and language acquisition of those that migrate at different ages along with ignoring the reality of vastly different historical experiences regardless of age, distinct class determinants, inter marriages between generations, and multi-direction and even multiple return migrations (Eckstein 2002). The Galician migrants from the areas studied in this paper would often migrate to other countries, such as Cuba, before reaching the US. Additionally, families were often separated and would migrate at different times, with some members returning and moving back and forth between Galicia and the US (Pérez 2008). If transnationalism argues that the nation now exists beyond borders and migrants create transnational social fields that connect migrants and their host countries, then the traditional generation grouping does not account for the back-and-forth movement of people, ideas, and funds. Generations have therefore been conceived of by transnational scholars as existing on all sides of this transnational field, including those in the homeland (Fouron and Nina 2002).

The messy reality of migration makes it difficult to determine distinct analytical categories for analysis. Someone born in Galicia but moved to the US before they could remember and did not visit throughout their childhood versus someone born in the US to Galician parents but spent every summer of their childhood in Galicia would occupy different analytical groups from the traditionally conceived straight line assimilation categories of the first or second generation. In this research, analytical groups of generations sharing similarities of experience became increasingly difficult to determine and participants themselves were often unsure of how to categorize themselves. Therefore, Table 1 shows the demographic information about each interview that identifies, instead of generations, their country of birth and age at which they immigrated to the US. This, however, still obscures the reality that participants often made multiple migrations either between Galician and the US or other destinations. Some were born in Spain outside of Galicia before they moved to the US. Some were born in the US and to mixed-generation parents and others spent large portions of their childhood in Galicia.

Table 1. Participant information by interview number, including age, gender, birthplace, and age immigrated to the US if applicable.

Interview	Age	Gender	Birthplace	Age Immigrated
001	75	F	Spain	19
002	75	M	Spain	18
003	74	F	US	-
004	34	F	Spain	17
005	73	M	Spain	11
006	82	F	Spain	26
007a	78	F	US	-
007b	68	F	Spain	9
008a	65	F	US	-
008b	85	F	Spain	17
009	18	F	US	-
010	50	M	Spain	6
011	71	F	US	-
012	49	M	US	-
013	60	F	Spain	19
014	64	F	US	-
015	67	M	Spain	25
016	56	F	Spain	5
017	54	F	Spain	3
018	53	F	US	-
019	32	M	US	-

This research also acknowledges the difficulty in determining how representative the sample is of Galician-Americans. There were expectedly a high number of retirees who visited annually due to having the time and disposable income to do so. However, data on the numbers of individuals who identify as Galicians in America is not collected. Looking at census data can give a number of how many registered Galician voters there are in the US (about 9000 from Coruña according to 2019 data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística). However, many of the participants interviewed have either renounced their citizenship or never acquired it in the first place. As Núñez has stated, "It is almost impossible to tally the total amount of Galicians who live outside their mother country nowadays" (Núñez 2002, p. 231). An effort was made to conduct phone interviews with younger Galician-Americans that could not afford the trip the year that the interviews were conducted; however, only one interview materialized from this.

This specific research topic of immigrant identity brought up delicate themes, such as racism and intolerance, issues surrounding the turbulent political history of the area, recollections of poverty, and nostalgia for those left behind. Therefore, the research process took ethical steps by ensuring confidentiality of the data, requiring informed consent from all interviewees before participating in the research, receiving ethical approval through the University of Bristol, giving participants access to their data, providing participants with an in-depth project information sheet, making interviewees aware that they could withdraw from the research at any point, and utilizing a less structured approach to interviewing in order to allow the participant to guide the topic of the interview more than most semi-structured interviews.

The data were analyzed using a thematic analysis. Topics analyzed in this research were coded through ordering and analyzing with reoccurring broad general themes followed by more specific sub-themes. Overall, the research included themes, such as memories of Galicia and times spent there, experiences of being Spanish in America, and the visit itself (reasons for the visit, how they are received, changes to the homeland, downsides of the visit, and reinforcing identity). All coding and analysis were done using Nvivo 9.

This research acknowledges that participants' age, socio economic status, gender, and additional identifiers will influence the way that participants visit Galicia and engage in homeland tourism. While this is not the focus of this research, I acknowledge that all Galician-Americans are not one homogenous group and a few even belong to additional national and ethnic groups. The following discussion presents data on how, through homeland tourism, these participants imagine a Galician identity, not ignoring the diverse identities of the participants but rather the way a Galician identity is managed and layered alongside this diversity.

4. Discussion

4.1. Galicians in America: Transnational Lives

In order to understand why many Galician-Americans of multiple generations make routine and frequent visits to the homeland and how they construct a Galician identity, it is first necessary to understand how they construct transnational lives in the US. Participants reflected on how in the past, there existed very insular communities of Galicians in New York. However, today, Galicians from the areas studied in this paper, while mostly still in New York, are much more widely dispersed and less unified than before. Therefore, transnational life is largely constructed not through a social field but rather through individualized household activities. This includes activities, such as cooking traditional dishes, watching Galician or Spanish television programs, following the news from Galicia, video chats with family and friends back home, celebrating holidays, and of course speaking in or utilizing to some extent both Spanish and Galician languages.

Participants described how, at certain times, they create an inflated focus on their Galician identity in the household environment, but it is not always consistent and definitely not always easy. This obsession to make all things at home Galician often pops up for these participants in

discussions around instilling a Galician identity and knowledge of Galician culture in their children. One participant (011) born in the US, reminisced on this approach of crafting an exaggerated Galician household when her kids were growing up:

> "Oh of course we grew up with [Galician] foods, [. . .] Yeah all these ethnic dishes. They grew up with uh, my son used to say that I was too ethnic, that son over there [. . .] he accused me one day of, 'Mom you're too ethnic'. That's how ethnic I was."

Participants recalled how they were raised with traditional Galician dishes and culture, and therefore worked hard to pass that along to their children. Other participants described how they knew they would create a more Galician household with their children in the future to make sure that their children had as much of the same knowledge of Galicia they grew up with. This cycle of a waxing and waning emphasis on Galician culture in households reflects themes within the literature on transnationalism that argues that assimilation and transnationalism are not always forces acted on migrants but rather are something migrants actively move back and forth between. For Smith (2006), it is not that migrants assimilate in some areas and not in others, but that transnational life can instead be understood in relation to many different factors that are not always consistent and can change throughout the life course. There are times in the banality of daily life when participants actively "choose the nation" and moments when they do not (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008).

Choosing Galicia within the household, however, is not easy. Spanish and Galician television stations often require an extra subscription and can be expensive. Navigating time differences and busy schedules for family conversations through video chats means that interaction with those living in Galicia is not as frequent as many would desire. However, for participants, the most difficult labor involved in constructing transnational households came from maintaining Spanish or Galician languages in the house and also sourcing/consuming authentic ingredients.

While the history of emigration and large number of Galician emigrants has made a significant impact on these communities in Galicia, Galicians in the US are a comparatively very small immigrant group. While there historically used to be more stores to consume products from Galicia and engage in social encounters (Pérez 2008), now participants make do with visiting Spanish, Portuguese, or French stores. One participant whose father is from Galicia and mother is Greek makes the point that in terms of migrants in the US, Spaniards as a whole are not a very large group, making choices to engage with Spanish heritage active and taking some amount of effort:

> "[. . .] there is also a bigger Greek community in New York than there is a Spanish one. Um so while I love my Spanish background as well it's a little harder to be immersed in it than it is in my Greek one." (009)

The small Galician immigrant groups also makes it difficult to create transnational lives outside of the household. However, transnational public spaces and life still occurs, especially in New York. There is a club for Galicians in New York called Casa Galicia (Galicia House), where many social activities, classes, and other functions take place along with having a restaurant that serves Galician food. Some participants in the New York area remember how, for their family, Casa Galicia was the hub of social life growing up. Participants created childhood friends in Casa Galicia that they see both in New York and on visits back to Galicia, and some even met their spouses at Casa Galicia. However, outside Casa Galicia, and specifically for participants not in New York, discussions of transnational life were often dominated by stories of the vast amount of labor involved in needing to explain their heritage to the wider society.

Maintaining the Spanish or Galician language for participants throughout the generations is a topic that also reflects the work and difficult choices in balancing between maintaining Galician ties and 'assimilating' to the US. Many interviewees express being torn between raising their children to speak Spanish and/or Galician or making sure they were prepared when they went to school in English. Interview 004 was one of the only interviewees that did not immigrate to New York at some point in

her migratory trajectory, though she does have family there. She acknowledges feeling alone in the responsibility and difficulty in passing down knowledge of her national heritage to her two-year-old son, lamenting that since they cannot visit yearly, he will not be able to have the same opportunities to develop a Gallego or Spanish identity:

> "I want to but again I don't think that it's possible. Because he's never gonna have the, you know, summers at grandma's house. Um but, you know, I'm hoping that I can keep, keep part of it, part of my Spanish culture, give him that. [. . .] keep speaking to him in Spanish. I think it's a very important thing because he'll keep that a lot, hopefully for many years. Uh bringing him to Spain, I know I can't bring him here every summer but maybe a couple, every couple of years [...]" (004)

She additionally notes that she also aims to "Make him a lot of cocido", a Spanish culinary dish. But even if she maintains speaking to him in Spanish and cooking him food, she acknowledges that without being in Galicia, it will not be the same, "It's my son, he's never gonna know this." Participants acknowledge that the lack of a cohesive transnational social field in the US means that visits to Galicia are essential to instilling an identity in their children.

Outside of their own family or small social circle, it is rare for participants to meet anyone from Galicia. However, they often discuss this inherent feeling of an imagined shared experience with strangers that are also Galician:

> "But it's always very interesting to find a Gallego and when you find those people who have some relation to Galicia, it's amazing how you bond, and you just talk about Galicia. And it's almost like a sisterhood/brotherhood kind of sense. And I probably only see these people once or twice or whatever and it's amazing. [. . .] I think it's a very strong proud culture that people are proud to be Gallegos so when you find a person from Galicia, it just brings everything together you know. [. . .] no matter how little we know of each other, you're a Gallego it's a cultural bond there even though I wasn't born there." (018)

Even with this pride in being from Galicia, in the US, many participants tell people they are Spanish not Galician, because Galicia is a fairly unknown region and national minority. They tend to switch between using both terms in an interview. However, in the US, when they say they are Spanish, they are still often faced with ignorance about Spain and have to navigate complicated situations around what the term Spanish means in a country with a large community of Spanish-speaking immigrants from South and Central America. One participant described the process behind how to answer questions about where he was from:

> "Most of the time I just say Spanish, right? And I've gotten reactions. If you say, 'I'm a Spaniard' and they happen to be Spanish then they think you're snotty and you're trying to say making sure you don't get confused with a South American or Central American. Right? So, so you get like an attitude there whereas it's ok for a Columbian to say he's Columbian I don't see him saying, 'I'm South American', somewhere one of those countries. Right? I don't understand. And then the other thing is you know I've found throughout my life that a lot of people don't even know where Spain is so then it becomes an embarrassing moment. Then I have to explain that it's European and not somewhere south of the border." (010)

Participants are constantly weighing what is easiest to be described as in each situation while also simultaneously navigating America's history of racial classification.

In researching the construction of Galician identity through repetitive homeland visits by Galician-Americans, this research found participants eager to share their experiences of racism in the US as an explanation for the way they experience pride in being Galician both in Galicia and in the US. Participants repeated stories about people thinking Spain was in South America and being told they were not white. One younger participant (019) in his 30s told a story about how his nickname

in school was "The Mexican". Older generations often described being confused for Puerto Rican. However, regardless of age, participants recounted being racially categorized 'incorrectly' and therefore receiving racial slurs and other forms of prejudice. This discussion of racial prejudice was accompanied by two reactions. Firstly, participants used stories of prejudice to describe how proud they were to be from Spain, and even more so from Galicia. One participant recounted how being called a 'spic', an offensive term used in the US towards non-white Hispanics, increased her identification as Spanish.

> "And there was this Irish family the Handleys over there, Julie can tell you, I smacked the hell out of him because he called me a spick and from then on I always said, 'I'm from Spain! I'm from Spain!' I was like so proud to be from Spain."

The prejudice in the US therefore acted as one of the many reasons that participants felt a strong affinity for and the continual need to visit the homeland through multiple generations.

Secondly, participants reacted to racial prejudice and ignorance about Spain through an increased and intensified romanticization of Galicia's Celtic past. Participants do not describe Spain as a European and therefore 'white' country; rather, they explain how the part of Spain they are from is Celtic and therefore more white than people think of when they hear participants are from Spain: "When people usually think Spain they think south. They're used to bull running and stuff and I have to explain that it's not really that" (009). This reductive image of Spain as equivalent to southern Spain or bullfighting falls in line with the literature that identifies these romanticized exotic stereotypes of Spain as being constructed by foreigners but reproduced by the tourism industry (Storm 2017). Participants experience these stereotyped images firsthand and describe having to utilize the Galician landscape to describe the diversity of Spain. It is common for Galician-Americans to compare their country with Ireland instead of the rest of Spain. They cite the green landscape, rocky coasts, rainy weather, and bagpipes: "I always say, 'Can you picture Ireland? The green, the hills, the valleys, lots of lakes? That is Galicia, that is Galicia.' [. . .] There's no difference I said there really is none" (014).

While Galicia is distinct from the rest of Spain and does have a historical Celtic influence, Galicians and even government organizations, such as the tourism board, have engaged in overemphasizing Galicia as a Celtic nation. Many groups ruled Galicia but "none of these groups ever 'mastered' the region"; not even the Celts (Gemie 2006, p. 27). But whether these narratives of a Celtic Galicia are imagined or not, these constructed versions of history "have real, material and symbolic effects" (Hall 1990, p. 226). Just as Anderson (1991) argued, it is not whether these claims to a Galician Celtic nation are factual that is of concern here, it is the way Galicia is imagined as Celtic that is central to the construction of a Galician identity.

Galicia's landscape is often presented for political aims as green, wet, and rural in contrast to the arid Mediterranean south, creating oppositions between the more dominant southern image of Spain and Galicia (López Silvestre and González 2007). Participants use these narratives of landscape and an imagined Celtic past to create these same binaries and separate them from that of the rest of Spain, creating a narrative of national identity for specific aims. They use this representation of Galicia as a reaction to being categorized by the wider society as "not white". It acts as a way that Galicia is constructed as 'whiter' and culturally distinct from the rest of Spain, but also as a nation whose identity is bound as equally to history and culture as it is to landscape and place. Similarly, in their research on second-generation Haitian youth, Fouron and Nina (2002) showed how participants were rejected by American society based on race, creating an increased identification with being Haitian and engagement in the transnational community. While this research does not intend to analyze the American racial system or critique participants for playing into the highly stratified racial society of the US, it does argue that the way participants are consistently defining and legitimizing their national heritage impacts the way in which they use the visit to construct a Galician identity as white and in reaction to being told by American society that they are not white.

4.2. The Visit: Constructing a Galician Identity

These repeat homeland visits that are common among Galician-Americans in this region are an essential activity necessary in order to engage in not only a transnational life, but the construction of a Galician identity. The homeland trip was often viewed by participants as an obligation in order to claim this identity. However, before participants were able to reflect on the necessity of the visit itself, most interviews constructed an image of Galicia as a nation of emigrants. Consistent with the literature on how the Galician government moved between contradictory representations of Galician emigration, participants imagined Galicia as the nostalgic rural, where poverty drove emigration, along with the narrative of Galician inherent qualities of success.

Galicia was described and imagined as the rural idyllic, where the nostalgia of the traditional lived: A place where community still thrived and "everybody knew everybody" (003):

> "[Galicia is] a beautiful country type of environment, you know, where people lived off the land, they did not have a lot of money, they did not have a lot of education. But they basically made the most of what they had and knew, and they did it to their fullest extent. They lived their lives to the fullest extent" (012)

This participant also described this narrative of the rural traditional through the lens of innocence.

> "But I still think in this area they retain a little bit of that innocence as well. So, it hasn't fully gone off the deep end like you would see in Madrid or even more so in Barcelona. Barcelona's way off on the other side. In fact, Barcelona, I think is almost, it's not Spain. Madrid is a lot more like Spain. And then uh and in Galicia still retains I think a little bit of that uh, that innocents". (012)

Barcelona and Madrid represent the urban modernized while Galicia still represents the rural traditional, and therefore innocent. His description of Galicia reflects an identity similar to that of national representations of rural landscape, submissive and traditional while simultaneously nationalizing the landscape as Galician (López Silvestre and González 2007; Santos and Trillo-Santamaría 2017).

This narrative of the rural lifestyle close to nature embedded in national landscape was simultaneously used to construct Galicia as a place of migration. The rural was also associated with poverty and hardships that lead to emigration. It was important for participants to describe how they became a family of immigrants with a dual Galician-American identity in order to explain why it is so important for them to make return visits to the homeland. These family immigration histories highlighted themes of economic struggles, family separation, and the hardships of immigration in the Galician migrant experience that lead to a wider perspective of how these participants understood what it is to be Galician.

Participants recounted their family history of immigration, starting with economic hardships and widespread poverty, and explaining how the rural landscape could not provide opportunities for many in the area and acted as a catalyst for the initial migration process. Families generally did not emigrate all at once; it was a slow process, where in the midst of this poverty, little by little, families would make their way to America:

> "All the families here, every family up and down this road here, and your grandmother, all of them lived the same way. Absent husbands and little, one by one, they would take their children away. There was no life here, there was no way to earn a living except if you, you know, the ground and sometimes the ground didn't produce anything. There was no future for them. The future was in the United States. And it was sad. It was very very sad and very difficult on the families and these women". (011)

It was out of economic necessity that families were driven to immigrate. But this immigration process was painful and emotional. These stories were recounted and felt in many different generations of immigrants; however, they were most emotional and frequently referred to by those who had first-hand experience.

> "007b: I just remember when we left, my mother screaming and crying and because we had left my brother here. He was sick and he couldn't go at the time and my mother screaming. That stays with you that screaming that she did at the time.
>
> 007a: Did your brother, did that brother end up dying here?
>
> 007b: Yes, he did. Yeah, yes yes."

> "The people across the street they were raised in this house and the middle child came out with a box full of money, went like this [shook the money] and said, 'I don't have to go to America'. And I told him, 'You're lucky. You don't know what it is to have to leave your country'". (013)

Participants recounted narratives of immigration demonstrating the sacrifices that were made for their family. Those who lived through the Franco regime added an additional layer of suppression of national identity into their narrative.

Through these migration stories, the Galicia that their families emigrated from was not constructed as the nostalgic rural landscape many had described; it was also presented as the rural impoverished landscape of emigration. However, it also became the starting point for the eventual narrative of success:

> "Before it was like Vietnam and now it's uh now you know basically now basically it's different it's completely different. You know because in those years they were farmers, so they have cows, cows in the house, pigs, chicken". (015)

This participant who left Galicia at the age of 25 in the late 1960s goes on to describe how "everything is better now" and how Galicia has "caught up" with rest of the world and the 21st century. Galicia is therefore constructed as rural nostalgic innocence along with the narratives of both emigration as a consequence of poverty and the success of Galicians. One US-born participant describes seeing the changes throughout time from her first visit in 1978 to now:

> "I mean they sacrificed a lot you know. They went through many many years of not having and now they have everything that we have in the United States. You know they're on par so to speak with you know with the West, with you know United States and England. And you know there's a prosperity here that they never had before. From '78 to the present and they have everything". (011)

Through these stories of sacrifice and success, participants have constructed the Galician character as hard working, a people that have overcome a lot, and are proud of what they achieved. These stories constructed an image of Galicia not as poor with extreme hardships but rather these stories acted to produce an image of Galicia as defined by the strength and hard work involved in overcoming these struggles. For one US-born interviewee, the "one quality that seems to define Gallegos that they're hard workers and that they travel the world to do the best for their families" (014). This participant defines Galicia through narratives of migration and frequent global mobility as hardworking and successful. Additionally, through their continual visits, homeland tourists are simultaneously creating this mobility and narrative of success since through their regular return visits to Galicia, this dual identity emerges as proof of these hardworking qualities. The ability that they can now visit becomes essential to the Galician experience as it demonstrates having what they coded as Galician qualities of sacrifice, a strong work ethic, and success. However central to the way participants both interact with Galicia as a place and the imagined community is the lens of experiencing Galicia through continual visits.

Galician migrants in this study choose to make return visits rather than permanently moving to Galicia. In fact, many are very adamant in their refusal to move to Galicia, because they see themselves as Americans who are Galician not as Galicians. When asked why she came to Galicia every year, one participant who left Galicia when she was nine exclaimed that she comes back "Because I'm a real

Gallega! I mean I love the United States that's my number one. My number two is Galicia, Spain. I'll be honest with you" (007b). Participants were generally very strong in their conviction that they are American first but that being American does not exclude them from also identifying as Galician.

> "I will always be American first and then Spanish. No no. That I'm very certain of, I'm American first always and then Spanish. And I'm very proud of being Spanish, or Spanish ancestry, I should word that right. I am an American of Spanish ancestry and I'm very proud of my Spanish ancestry. And I think I've passed that on to my children. That's why we're here. I'd like to pass that on to my grandchildren". (011)

This interviewee was born in the US but visits regularly because she sees herself as Spanish; she states that she wants to pass her heritage on to her grandchildren as well, and that is why they are visiting. An essential part of identifying as Spanish/Galician is having been there, the visit.

Through these habitual visits, participants were able to experience what they identified as markers of Galician cultural identity and community life that they could not in the US, most of which were centered around food. For example, participants cited visiting Galicia and eating the local barnacles called percebes that are impossible to get back in the US and which were described as tasting like the pure Galician sea (001). They go to the local fairs and festivals in the towns, engaging in a community life in public sphere they do not often experience in the US. They spend time with family who visits or lives there along with friends and other Galician-Americans visiting during the summer. But participants do not come just for the cultural activities that are inaccessible in the US, they come because Galicia for them is an embodied identity, a feeling of home that can only be experienced through the visit. The emotion and feelings of home that participants described by just being in Galicia were what drew them back and what were essential in creating an imagined Galician identity. Going back to Galicia regardless of how much it has changed over the years brought back emotional memories for participants. One participant who left Galicia at the age of six explains: "When I come back now, um. I mean obviously this has changed a lot so it's not exactly what I remember. But I still feel that home feeling" (012). This concept of feeling at home has been described within return visitors as a concept that shifts through the visit (Baldassar 2001). While both the US and Galicia feel like home, it is through continual visits to Galicia that participants are able to feel fully at home in both countries. With very little family left in Galicia, one participant describes what keeps bringing her back every year: "My roots. That's it. And it's hard to pull up from that. It's hard" (001). What brings them back year after year is the emotional connection to the physical place itself, and that experience is an essential component to claiming a Galician identity. The place itself becomes part of their identity. As one US-born participant describes, "There are ties you know there are definitely ties. It becomes part of you. [Galicia] just becomes part of you."

One participant that left Galicia at the age of 19 and, like many others, visits every year and owns property there stated that it is difficult to understand why she and so many others feel obligated to return every year. She couldn't quite put her finger on what it was, but she acknowledges that this mobility back and forth to Galicia has just become part of what Galician-Americans from this area do and it has now become unavoidable:

> "Galicia is in you. You take the Gallego from Galicia, but you never take Galicia from the Gallego, ever. Every Gallego I know, and I know hundreds of them, they come here every summer they go to Casa Galicia, the Gallego clubs in New York, their children marry Gallegos, those children come back, those grandchildren come back. It's something in this place that pulls you back" (013)

While highly sentimental, these frequent trips were also seen by participants as a duty or chore, which they are happy to do but as still something obligatory. The continual visits were necessary, an essential component to be able to claim a Galician identity. Participants describe yearly visits as a "habit" (008a) and even a "punishment" (008b). This description of the visit as something participants

are forced to do refers to how the visit is perceived as essential for identification as a Galician-American; it becomes part of who they are, it is perceived as inescapable. While individuals must partake in this continual mobility between Galicia and America to identify as Galician, Galicia then becomes imagined both as a physical location and an identity defined by constant mobility, rather than emigration.

While some Galician-Americans do return more permanently, often when they retire, those that visit every year choose not to. Even though they choose not to move back, their experience exists intertwined with relatives and friends that have moved back, even family that has moved to other parts of Spain and other countries worldwide. The example of visiting is just one experience that demonstrates the complexity of migratory flows but also demonstrates the mobility at the core Galician identity for these Americans. Many participants had siblings, parents, and other family that did decide to move back permanently, some had family that moved back temporarily, and some had family that lived there for half the year and the US for half the year. But for these participants, their choice not to move back was not seen as a big deal. For participants, being Galician is a transnational activity; some people move there, others visit. Being Galician-American is being involved in multiple return visits surrounded by family that chooses to return permanently or temporarily, and other family that visits the US simultaneously. They choose to live in the US within a transnational social field that is dependent upon the mobility of return visits. Making visits to the place is not only essential to Galician identity but transnationalism, as a defining characteristic in how they experience being Galician. This constant movement between the migration and return or return visits makes migration a continual process rather than a destination. It also breaks down traditional conceptual categories of home vs. away, immigration vs. emigration, and returning vs. migrating.

Galicia, for these participants, exists as a physical place that must be experienced by visiting, it is constructed through images of rural landscape used to evoke romantic notions and innocence, and through a landscape of impoverished hardships that act as the catalyst of emigration imagining Galicia's past through the lens of migration. Through these visits, alongside the reality of the multiple patterns of mobilities experienced by their family and friends, the visit become their transnational social field of constant mobility, where the physical location of Galicia as the foundation of their dual identity still matters and is essential to the construction of a Galician-American identity. It is therefore the visit that bridges the gap between Galicia as a physical and embodied location that is tied to identity and Galicia as experienced through emigration and multiple mobilities.

5. Conclusions

Galician-American homeland tourists studied in this paper view regular visits to Galicia as essential to constructing a Galician identity. Set alongside the difficulty in creating a transnational social network in the US, Galician migrants use the visit to construct an identity that is at its core continually mobile and transnational. Even though the visit forms the core of establishing a Galician identity, it was not removed from the experience of American immigration and the wider society participants experienced. Participants intentionally 'choose the nation' in daily life with varying degrees of involvement at different moments in the life course of the participants. Moving between actions of assimilation and transnationalism breaks down the idea that these two concepts are static or mutually exclusive. The experience of having Galician heritage in the US, a country with a large number of migrants from Latin America, was met with racial assumptions in which participants formed a strong, specifically northern, Spanish identity. Galician-Americans drew on the landscape and imagined history of Galicia to act against a social system that often categorized them as 'not white'. The visit therefore allowed both an identity with a place that had only a very small transnational public sphere in the US and one that could be geographically and culturally constructed as Celtic, northern, and 'white' as a reaction to the stratified racial system in the US.

Galicia was imagined by participants as Celtic, as the rural idyllic, as impoverished, and as a story of success and overcoming hardship. The visit for participants fits an even larger narrative of migration that their families had endured. Family narratives of migration fed into the coded characteristics

of Galicians being hard workers that make sacrifices for their families evidenced in the success of these migrants who are able to afford return trips, financially support community development, and purchase property in Galicia. Participants ultimately viewed the visit as an obligation, something that Galician-Americans must do to be "real" Galicians. Visiting Galicia was essential to an identity of an imagined community embedded in place and defined by migration. Galician identity was described as something embodied, claimed only after having been there. However, it was seen as an identity that is highly mobile within the context of multiple flows back and forth. It is the prominence of the physical place, in needing to visit Galicia to be Galician, for these migrants that places the local at the center of transnational identity, a subject that has been largely approached through the "'invisible hand' of globalization" (Smith 2006, p. 241). This locality in contrast to the placelessness often used to describe transnationalism is important in understanding how nationalism is constructed for migrants but also how the local and transnational are both sustaining elements of these migrants' experiences of being Galician. This transnational identity is built in contrast to transnationalism's claim of subverting the local and in contrast to traditional ideas about unidirectional and permanent flows of migration.

In Galicia, a land often defined by emigration narratives constructed through transnationalism, should not be ignored from the wider conversation on nationalism. National identity, and the imagined national community, is multifaceted and imagined in numerous ways. Galicia, and additionally Spain, is continually imagined and reimagined by flows of migrants and migration, adding new perspectives to the ways in which nations and nationalism in Spain can be understood.

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The Electoral Breakthrough of the Radical Right in Spain: Correlates of Electoral Support for VOX in Andalusia (2018)

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Abstract: For a long time, Spain was thought of as an outlier because it did not have a significant radical right movement. However, the sudden popularity of VOX among voters in Andalusia has put an end to so-called "Spanish exceptionalism". The rise of this radical right party is important for two reasons: its potential direct impact on the political system, and the way in which it will affect other political players. The purpose of this research is to explore the factors that have led voters to cast ballots for VOX during the 2018 regional elections in Andalusia. Regression analysis has been carried out in order to test some of the most widely accepted theories in the literature about the radical right vote. The results show that VOX's vote is fundamentally dictated by broader socio-political factors related to territorial model, ideological self-identification and perception of political leaders. In this sense, two of the most accepted set of explanations—those which consider that the vote for the radical right is conditioned by economic or identity-related vulnerability—are refuted.

Keywords: Spain; radical right; VOX; Andalusia; voting behaviour

1. Introduction

Since the late 1980s, several right-wing parties have been growing in influence in Western Europe, leading to considerable interest from the media and academics. This political phenomenon is closely tied to the "third wave" of extremism in Europe (Acha 2017), as well as the so-called "populist Zeitgeist" (Mudde 2004). The growing importance of the family of far right parties has been spearheaded by the populist radical right, which has been its dominant and most successful expression (but not the only one) (Mudde 2007). While some see this phenomenon as one of the greatest threats to contemporary liberal democracies (Plattner 2010), others claim that it is given a disproportionate amount of academic and media attention, and warn against overestimating its success, since its political influence is limited (Mudde 2014).

While these parties were making significant progress in Europe[1], three countries did not follow this trend: Spain, Portugal[2] and Ireland. Spain in particular has long been considered an outlier as it has had no significant radical right force, despite the presence of circumstances in which these parties were supposed to perform well: economic crisis, immigration, social protests, political discontent, etc., (Alonso and Rovira 2015). Many explanations were offered, from the influence of the legacy of the dictatorship (which would negate any possibility of a rise of the radical right) (González-Enríquez 2017), to the consolidated role of the center-right (Llamazares and Ramiro 2006;

[1] Despite significant individual victories, the true trend that characterizes the far right in Europe is the temporal and geographical variability of its performance over time. Authors such as Acha (2017), Art (2011) or Arzheimer (2009) have pointed out the bias in the literature, which focuses mainly on successful cases and ignores failures (which are more numerous and representative).

[2] In October 2019, the far right party CHEGA won a set in the parliament. However, the far right remains marginal in Portugal.

Llamazares 2012), not to mention the weakness and discredit of Spanish nationalism (Muñoz 2008). As such, a type of prescriptive discourse started to form around what became known as "Spanish exceptionalism", according to which Spain was refractory and immune to this political current.

More recently, VOX's sudden surge in the regional elections in Andalusia in December 2018 and its subsequent introduction to other arenas (at the European, national, regional and municipal level) has completely debunked so-called "Spanish exceptionalism". It is possible to allude to the end of "Spanish exceptionalism" because from the point of view of ideology, VOX shares common elements with other European radical right parties: ultra-nationalism, the idea of a threatened homogeneous national community, authoritarian, anti-immigrant and anti-feminist ideas, amongst others (VOX 2018; Sánchez-Cuenca 2018; Anduiza 2018; Acha 2019a; Gould 2019)[3]. Thus, it is appropriate to place VOX within the current of the radical right, which accepts and operates within the framework of liberal democracy, though it opposes some of its basic principles (such as the rights of minorities) (Mudde 2007).

In a somewhat unusual electoral cycle (in which several elections have taken place in just a few months), VOX has achieved one of the milestones accepted in the literature to qualify as a success: achieving 5% of the vote in two or three consecutive elections (Art 2011) (see Table 1). In particular, the results in last national elections in November 2019 have been really notable: 15% of votes and 52 seats (5% more than its results in national elections of April 2019).

Table 1. VOX's results in elections (2014–2019).

Elections	Votes	% Votes	Seats
European Parliament (May 2014)	246,833	1.57%	0
Parliament of Andalusia (March 2015)	18,017	0.45%	0
Local elections (May 2015)	50,195	0.25%	22
Regional elections (May 2015)[4]	74,531	0.39% (mean)	0
National elections (December 2015)	58,114	0.23%	0
National elections (June 2016)	47,182	0.2%	0
Parliament of Andalusia (December 2018)	395,978	10.97%	12
National elections (April 2019)	2,677173	10.25%	24
Parliament of Valencia (April 2019)	278,947	10.44%	10
Local elections (May 2019)	659,736	2.9%	530
Regional elections[5] (May 2019)	684,312	5.74% (mean)	27
European Parliament (May 2019)	1,388,681	6.2%	3
National elections (November 2019)	3,639,772	15.09%	52

Source: own compilation based on data of the Ministry for Home Affairs (2019).

The trajectory of VOX[6] was erratic until its first great electoral success in Andalusian elections in December 2018. These elections should be understood within the framework of the long hegemony of

[3] However, as noted by Acha (2019a), VOX has two characteristics that set it apart from dominant radical right expression in other European countries: first, the anti-immigrant component is comparatively much weaker (and in any case subject to the main pillar of ultra-nationalism and the defence of Spanish identity); secondly, it is not possible to clearly identify populist elements (people-centrism, anti-elitism or Manicheism, as noted by the ideational perspective (Hawkins and Rovira 2019).

[4] Elections took place in: Aragón, Principado de Asturias, Islas Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y León, Extremadura, Comunidad de Madrid, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, Región de Murcia, La Rioja and Comunidad Valenciana. VOX did not stand for elections in Aragón, Islas Baleares, Comunidad Foral de Navarra and La Rioja.

[5] Elections took place in: Aragón, Principado de Asturias, Islas Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y León, Extremadura, Comunidad de Madrid, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, Región de Murcia y La Rioja. VOX stood for elections in all Autonomous Communities.

[6] From the point of view of its organizational roots, VOX was officially registered as a political party in December 2013, when a small group of individuals with ties to the People's Party (PP) decided to create a new political alternative as a result of their dissatisfaction with what they perceived as the PP drifting to the center. The core of people who started VOX came from the PP's more conservative sectors. They were aligned with the former Prime Minister José María Aznar and the right-wing think-tank so-called Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies (FAES) (Casals 2014; Carmona et al. 2012).

the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), which had governed the Autonomous Community since 1982. The elections were called early by the president of the Community, Susana Díaz, as an attempt to make the most of the positive dynamic surrounding her party nationally (just two months earlier, Pedro Sánchez won the race to be Prime Minister through a vote of no-confidence, replacing Mariano Rajoy).

We have to consider two key facts in the national context that influenced the elections in Andalusia. On one hand, the center-periphery issue, which has historically been a key political issue in Spain (Moreno 1995; Linz and Montero 1999), alongside socio-economic ones, became even more important due to the increased territorial tension. One year before (1 October 2017), the Catalan government, led by pro-independence forces, pushed for an anti-constitutional referendum, and shortly afterwards (27 October) declared the unilateral and short independence of Catalonia (Barrio et al. 2018). As a result, the government of Mariano Rajoy decided to apply article 155 of the Constitution, whereby the autonomous government was shut down and the powers of the administration were transferred to the national government. At the same time, former Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, fled from Spain, while members of his government were detained to be put on trial for crimes of rebellion. On the other hand, in 2018, Spain experienced a rise in immigration, which led to increased politicization of this issue and increased media coverage (Acha 2019b). In this climate of growing tension, it is noted that VOX received more media coverage than other parties with a similar voting intention, approaching that of other consolidated parties (Olalla et al. 2019).

After the elections (see the results in Table 2), Juan Manuel Moreno Bonilla (PP) was appointed president of a PP and Cs coalition government, which was the first ever change in the government in Andalusia. VOX's support was key in the investiture, through an agreement that met several demands of the radical right party (especially, the promise to abolish and cut down on public aid related to gender violence, LGBTQI rights and Historical Memory) (VOX 2019).

Table 2. Results of Andalusian elections (December 2018).

Party	Votes	% Votes	Seats
PSOE-A	1,009,243	27.95%	33
PP	749,275	20.75%	26
Cs	659,631	18.27%	21
AA	584,040	16.18%	17
VOX	395,978	10.97%	12
PACMA	69,660	1.93%	0
AxSÍ	22,017	0.61%	0
EQUO-INICIATIVA	15,009	0.42%	0
Others	48,957	1.37%	0

Source: own compilation based on data from Andalusian Government (2018).

Andalusia would be considered a suitable unit of analysis for studying VOX's electoral breakthrough for several reasons. Authors such as Acha (2017) or Pardos-Prado and Molins (2009) note the benefits of examining the radical right's performance at sub-national levels (regional or local). On one hand, Andalusia is the most populated Autonomous Community and the third in terms of GDP, according to the National Statistics Institute (2019a). At the same time Andalusia is one of the regions with lower GDP per capita: 19,132 € (Spanish mean is 25,854 €). Also, migration flows coming from Africa to Europe are notable in the south of Andalusia. Because of its demographic and economic importance, Andalusia is a crucial region for national governability and its internal dynamics have great implications. Given all this, the findings of this research might not be able to be extrapolated for the whole of Spain (but it is possible that some of these tendencies will have resonance in the national context).

Undoubtedly, VOX's arrival on the political landscape is a very significant event, not only for its potential direct impact, but also because of the way it may affect other political forces. At the same time, the emergence of the radical right party has important implications from the point of view of national

identity, insofar as it is an explicit expression of Spanish nationalism in the political landscape which, though present, had previously been more hidden (Sánchez-Cuenca 2018; Anduiza 2018). Due to its exclusionary nature, VOX introduces problems to democratic life, because, even though it accepts the framework of liberal democracy, it nevertheless opposes the rights of certain minorities. In this sense, it is important to examine in detail the vote for VOX, in order to rigorously understand the nature of this new phenomenon. In the following section some of the most relevant theories about radical right voting will be addressed, together with the research hypotheses for this analysis of VOX's vote in the Andalusian elections of 2018.

2. The State of the Art Regarding Electoral Support for Radical Right Parties

One of the most developed perspectives on the radical right is the view that highlights so-called demand explanations, which explore the attitudes, preferences and orientation of society and the electorate (Rydgren 2007). Great efforts have been made within this prolific line of investigation to analyze the electoral base of the radical right. Below, we will review some of the more established explanations on the matter and introduce the corresponding hypotheses on VOX.

First, one of the most widely recognized theories is the so-called "modernization losers" thesis. Originally put forward by Bell (1964), in its more up-to-date versions it is connected to different modern processes: globalization, risk society, post-Fordism, post-industrial society, etc., (Mudde 2007). This theory states that the least protected sectors (precarious or unskilled workers or the unemployed), who have seen their status and position in society lowered because of capitalist globalization, are attracted by the radical right (Rydgren 2007). This idea blends in with other theories on conflict between groups (Arzheimer 2009) and ethnic rivalry (Rydgren 2007), to the extent that it analyzes how these groups tend to blame minorities (immigrants and other differentiated ethnic groups) for socio-economic adversity and loss of status. The "modernity losers" thesis continues to dominate much of the field of study on the radical right, even though some of its faults have been pointed out: mainly, the difficulty of testing the impact of macro-structural economic factors on the performance of the far right and their inability to explain the variability of their success (Mudde 2007; Schwander and Manow 2017).

Related to this, it is to be noted that Spain—and Andalusia in particular—is one of the countries in Europe wherein the Great Recession has generated more negative consequences. Since 2008, the high levels of unemployment and social inequality have entailed a significant increase of precarious, lower socio-economic status groups (Carabaña 2016; González-Enríquez 2017). Considering the numerical increase of the so-called modernity/globalization losers, we can hypothesize that *those unemployed, with lower socio-economic status (in particular, unskilled workers) and low-incomes have a higher tendency to vote for VOX* (H1).

However, other approaches provide more nuance or minimize the impact of economic modernization and capitalist globalization, transferring the core of the explanation to cultural issues. From this point of view, it is not (or at least not merely) a material issue, but a symbolic one: thus, the radical right is a communitarian, traditionalist and authoritarian reaction to the libertarian, universalist and multi-cultural values of the New Left that arose in the mobilization cycle that started in 1968 (Bornschier 2010). In fact, Ignazi (1992) calls this process the "silent counter-revolution".

The far right is built on identity conflict and so-called ethnicist liberalism, differentialism or ethnocratic liberalism (Taguieff 1990; Griffin 2000). Its logic is based on defending and preserving different national traditions and cultures. Ultimately, it is an attempt to overcome classic racist and supremacist perspectives. Far from rejecting certain cultures and societies that are deemed inferior, it defends the equal value of all national cultural expressions. Nevertheless, differentialism is ultimately based on an exclusive and static idea that more or less openly discriminates and stands in the way of all kinds of cultural exchange. According to this theory, the far right's electoral base is characterized by having conservative, authoritarian and traditional opinions that are opposed to multiculturalism, and in particular the view that immigration is a threat to society and national identity (Rydgren 2007).

With regard to Spain, immigration from outside the EU has been quantitatively significant in certain periods of time: for example, in the 2000s Spain received half of Europe's immigration and foreign population, which rose from 637085 to 5648671 between 1998–2009, according to the National Statistics Institute (2019b). In 2006, 49% of Spaniards perceived immigration as society's biggest problem (Center for Sociological Research 2019a). Notwithstanding, this immigration has played quite a modest role in Spanish electoral behaviour and party competition. Authors such as Rinken (2016) or Ros (2018) show how during the Great Recession anti-immigrant attitudes not only remained stable, but also diminished at certain times. These findings are opposed to established theories about group competition, which predict an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes in economic hardship contexts (Allport 1954).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the period preceding the Andalusian elections of 2018 was marked by a great social attention to immigration issue due the increase of the African immigration in the south Andalusia (González 2018). This does not necessarily mean the increase of total immigration to Spain or Andalusia, but rather the sudden politicization of the immigration issue. Considering this, an increase of anti-immigrant or authoritarian attitudes would have been expected regarding security, conceived of as the most important problem, since immigration used to be perceived as an issue that affects security and public order. In turn, African immigration—which is mainly Islamic—would be perceived as a threat to Catholic tradition. In this regard, Catholicism is a trait that has historically been linked to conservative ideologies in Spain (and to most of the far right family of parties) (Rodríguez 1992). At this point, our prediction about the link between the vote for VOX and Catholicism goes against some general findings, which note that those who are religious are more likely to vote for mainstream parties, instead for radical right parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2009). In short, what will be called the identity vulnerability hypothesis from now on can be stated as follows: *sectors with anti-immigration and authoritarian attitudes and Catholic religiosity are more likely to vote for VOX* (H2).

As an alternative to the two previous theories, we need to understand the impact of contextual socio-political factors (both nationally and in the region of Andalusia). It is necessary to consider the specific characteristics of Spanish electoral competition, not only influenced by the left–right axis, but also by the center–periphery cleavage (Moreno 1995; Linz and Montero 1999). The complexity of Spanish nation-building processes and the existence of several peripheral nationalist movements have led to the crucial importance of center–periphery cleavage. In recent years, tension regarding the political-territorial model has notably increased due to the mobilization of Catalan secessionist parties (the so-called "Procés"). In this regard, secessionist demands would affect those more centralist in Spain, who are also numerous among rightist-oriented citizens. Likewise, the 40 years of hegemony of the PSOE in Andalusia, together with a PSOE national government, would predict the activation of the right-wing vote against leftism. As Mudde (2007) notes, leftism is usually conceived of as an enemy in the radical right's discourse. Considering the above, we should attempt to examine to what extent ideological positions, preferences regarding the territorial model and opinions of leftist political leaders are good predictors of VOX's performance at the polls. According to this hypothesis, we expect that *ideologically conservative right-wing sectors, with centralist tendencies and a negative opinion of the president of the Regional Government of Andalusia and the Spanish Prime Minister, are more likely to vote for VOX* (H3).

In summary, the aim of this paper is to examine VOX's performance in the regional elections in Andalusia in 2018 to test two of the most likely hypotheses that explain the radical right vote: the losers of globalization thesis and the identity vulnerability thesis. In addition, we want to examine a third alternative hypothesis related to contextual socio-political factors. In short, we want to shed light on the factors that explain the sudden rise of the radical right in Spain from the point of view of electoral behaviour.

3. Methodology: Data and Hypotheses Operationalization

In this section we provide information on the data and methods employed for testing hypotheses described above. In addition, we explain the operationalization of hypotheses: what variables are used and what results are expected to validate or reject the hypotheses.

In terms of the data, we used study no. 3236 of the Center for Sociological Research (2019b). This post-election survey, which is the main and best source of data on these elections, was carried out after the regional elections in Andalusia on 2 December 2018 (data collection occurred between 10 December 2018 and 3 January 2019). The survey utilizes random sampling and has N = 2913.

The method used in this study has been logistic regression[7]. The dependent variable in this research has been the share of the vote achieved by VOX (it should be noted that 122 respondents reported voting for VOX). To this end, the voting recall[8] at the regional elections in Andalusia in 2018 was recoded into a binary variable where voting for VOX was "1" and voting for another party or abstaining was "0". Regarding the explanatory variables, we used a total of 14 (see Table A1 in Appendix A), divided into four groups according to socio-economic status, identity dimension, contextual socio-political factors in Spain and, lastly, socio-demographic components. These groups correspond to the four logistic regression models carried out with a view to identifying the determinant factors in the vote for VOX at the regional elections in Andalusia.

Because of missing values of predictors and also to ensure comparability of explanatory power between models, we conducted multiple imputation to "fill in" the missing values using all the other information present in the dataset, increasing efficiency and reducing the bias. Multiple imputation of missing values has been applied with multivariate regression modeling. Models using multiple imputation of missing values are shown in Table 3 (these results are essentially the same as using listwise deletion).

Model 1—used for testing the losers of globalization hypothesis (H1)—contains three variables: socioeconomic status, laboral situation and incomes. These variables are usually utilized in this kind of analysis (for example in Immerzeel and Pickup (2015)). We consider the losers of globalization those who have less economic capital, in other words: unskilled workers, unemployed and low-incomes people. Considering the increase of the losers of globalization in Andalusia before the aforementioned elections, we expect this group will be more likely to vote for VOX.

In turn model 2 examines H2 (identity vulnerability hypothesis) through three dimensions which are especially sensitive for the radical right: immigration, security and religion. In terms of operationalization, the first two variables show if immigration and security are considered to be the most important problem in Spain by respondents[9]. The other variable distinguises Catholic people from people considering themselves to be atheist, agnostic or of any other religion. In this sense, literature links voting for the radical right with anti-immigrant and authoritarian attitudes (Rydgren 2007);

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[7] We conducted some robustness checks in the four regression models: both backwards and forwards introduction of variables. These results are coherent with the "enter method" used in this analysis and are available upon request.

[8] Self-reported vote is commonly used in political research, but is not exempt from biases (social desirability, for example), as noted by Brown-Iannuzzi et al. (2019).

[9] We recognize this is not the best way to measure anti-immigrant or authoritarian attitudes, but it is the only option provided by CIS 3236. We acknowledge this limitation. Undoubtedly, a better option is to measure the respondent's issue position using a 0–10 scale from fully in favour of restrictive policy on immigration to fully opposed to restrictive policy on immigration as does the European Election Studies, for example (see Schmitt et al. 2019).

moreover, the Spanish far right family of parties has historically been linked to Catholicism, so we predict that Catholic people will be more likely to vote for VOX (Rodríguez 1992).

Political contextual variables (preference for territorial model, ideological self-identification, conservative self-identification and evaluation of leaders) are used in the third model for testing H3 (socio-political contextual hypothesis). We decided to use the preference for the territorial model in view of the important role of center–periphery cleaveage in Spanish electoral competition. Moreover, current political and social polarization, because of secessionist demands in Catalonia must be taken into acccount. Also, it is necessary to consider the ideological dimension, so left–right scale and conservative self-identification are used. Evaluation of leftist leaders is used for exploring the possible existence of a kind of reaction against leftism.

Finally, the fourth model contains all the previous variables combined with socio-demographical variables: sex, age and studies. In this sense, previous findings have identified a certain profile of the radical right voter: male, young and with low levels of education (Arzheimer 2017).

4. Discussion of Results

As detailed in the previous methodology section, we have created four logistic regression models (see Table 3) in order to verify the utility of the losers of globalization (H1), identity vulnerability (H2) and contextual socio-political factors (H3) hypotheses to explain the vote for VOX in the 2018 regional elections in Andalusia. In addition, we will introduce a fourth model with all the variables that explains these hypotheses, alongside the social and demographic control variables that tend to be introduced in these types of analyses (Arzheimer 2017).

Table 3. Logistic regression models of VOX's vote in Andalusian elections (2018).

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Socioeconomic status ^				
New middle class	0.385 (0.283)			0.481 (0.395)
Old middle class	0.363 (0.330)			0.389 (0.395)
Skilled worker	0.071 (0.287)			0.730 * (0.355)
Unskilled worker	−0.828 (0.432)			0.012 (0.496)
Laboral situation	−0.403 (0.285)			−0.409 (0.339)
Incomes	0.206 * (0.070)			0.119 (0.078)
Immigration		1.283 *** (0.354)		0.373 (0.510)
Religion		0.728 * (0.273)		0.212 (0.33)
Security		0.833 (0.749)		0.233 (0.850)
Preference relating to territorial model			1.210 *** (0.229)	1.035 *** (0.229)
Ideological self-identification			0.284 *** (0.072)	0.532 *** (0.069)
Evaluation Susana Díaz			−0.064 (0.053)	−0.036 (0.058)
Evaluation Pedro Sánchez			−0.287 *** (0.062)	−0.257 *** (0.066)
Conservative self-identification			1.432 (0.755)	0.745 (0.811)
Sex				−0.257 (0.234)
Age				−0.026 *** (0.008)
Studies				0.056 (0.088)
Constant	−3.778 *** (0.359)	−3.787 *** (0.255)	−4.570 *** (0.524)	−5.659 *** (0.860)
R^2 of Nagelkerke	0.030	0.024	0.236	0.336
Observations	2913	2913	2913	2913

Note: standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. ^ Reference category: upper class/upper middle class. Source: own elaboration based of CIS 3236.

On the one hand, the first regression model has tested hypothesis 1 (H1) according to which it would be expected that the radical right vote would be supported by the most disadvantaged social sectors who have suffered at the hands of globalization and the Great Recession. Not only do the findings not support this hypothesis, but they also seem to suggest the opposite. Thus, there are only significant results in the case of income: the 0.206 coefficient suggest that the higher the income of the electorate, the more likely they are to vote for the radical right party. At the same time, category unskilled worker has a −0.403 coefficient (the orientation expected), while the labor situation (1 = unemployed) shows a negative coefficient (contrary to H1). Clearly, there is empirical evidence to not accept the losers of globalization hypothesis (H1) in the case of VOX's electoral success in Andalusia. Furthermore, the results suggest that the vote for the radical right party is accounted for to a significant extent by a comfortable socio-economic status and, at the same time, it is not attractive to the lower classes. Despite the negative impact of the Great Recession and the increase of the losers of globalization in Spain and Andalusia, these economically precarious groups do not seem to be attracted by this radical right option.

Model 2 has aimed to test hypothesis 2 (H2): *identity vulnerability hypothesis*. Two factors have significant effects that operate as expected: those who see immigration as the most important problem and those who identify as Catholic (compared to those who do not) are more likely to vote for VOX. In particular, immigration issues have had a strong effect on the VOX vote ($p < 0.001$ and coefficient 1.283), in line with the findings of previous literature about radical right voting (Arzheimer 2017). As pointed out previously, both issues—immigration and Catholicism—are important ideological pillars of the radical right party (though compared to other similar parties, anti-immigration ideas are qualitatively and quantitatively less important to VOX) and seem to be important for the electoral base as well. On the other hand, there are no significant effects in relation to security being perceived as society's biggest problem.

The findings regarding the contextual factors hypothesis (H3) are presented in regression model number 3. In the case of the Spanish territorial model, the effect is positive (1.210) and statistically significant in the expected way, which can be interpreted as greater likelihood to vote for VOX as positions are more centralist. This is not surprising if we consider, on the one, hand, the party's emphasis on the territorial issue and its repeated appeals to eliminate the Autonomous Communities, and on the other, the polarized climate about territorial issue because of the Catalonian conflict. The same happens with ideological self-identification, which has a significant effect (0.284 coefficient): those located further to the right on the ideological scale are more likely to vote for VOX. On the other hand, the opinion of voters on Pedro Sánchez—appointed Prime Minister a few months before the elections in Andalusia—is significant (−0.287 coefficient), revealing an inverse correlation with the vote for VOX (that is, the worse the evaluation of Sánchez, the better likelihood to vote for VOX). This, together with the absence of significance of the opinion of voters on Susana Díaz (president of Andalusia), appears to suggest that the vote for VOX should be fundamentally interpreted within a national framework.

In view of all the above, the results are especially interesting in model 4, which incorporates all of the variables from the previous three models, plus some socio-demographic control variables. This model's explanatory power is considerable, accounting for 33.6% of the vote for VOX (R^2). Therefore, it ostensibly improves on the explanatory power of model 3 (R^2 of 23.6%) and is much better than the first two models, which border on being statistically invalid.

First, the statistical significance of incomes disappears in model 4, while surprisingly this variable has little significance in a positive way (0.730 coefficient)[10]. Secondly, it should be noted that the significance of the immigration and religion variables is zero in this fourth model. Furthermore, the significance and effect of the question of the territorial model, ideological self-identification and

[10] It should be noted that the significance disappears when using listwise deletion.

opinion of Pedro Sánchez variables remain and become more important in the hypothesized direction in the case of ideological self-identification. In addition, there is a significant negative effect in VOX voter age (−0.026 coefficient) which coincides with the previous findings which have been identified as the young profile of the radical right's vote. As Arzheimer notes: "many studies demonstrate an effect of age, with younger voters being more likely to vote for the extreme right. Presumably, this age group is less firmly attached to the stablished parties, has a more intensive sense of ethnic competition, is subject to lower levels of social control and more prone to experiment with their vote" (2017, p. 386). The VOX vote appears not to be affected by the sex variable, though in other cases the literature has found a male bias in the vote for these types of parties (Givens 2017). Figure A1 in the Appendix A shows the average marginal effects (AMEs) of independent variables (CI 95%) for model 4. AMEs represent the marginal effect of each covariate on the likelihood of vote for VOX, keeping all other covariates constant.

5. Conclusions

In view of the results, it is possible to identify several issues that have significant implications in terms of orienting not only the research on the radical right in Spain, but also the comparative research agenda on European radical right.

It has been shown how two of the main theories possibly explaining the radical right vote, presented here as the losers of globalization (H1) and identity vulnerability (H2) hypotheses, lack significant explanatory power for VOX's vote in this analysis.

In short, empirical evidence allows us to refute the losers of globalization hypothesis (H1). In fact, the findings appear to indicate the opposite, showing that VOX's vote increases with income and is lower among unqualified workers (even though there is no significance). First, this reinforces the need to avoid mechanical approaches which are so in vogue even in scholarly literature, interpreting the vote for these types of parties as purely the result of social and economic disintegration. In particular, empirical findings lead us to outright rejection of all these interpretations which have uncritically interpreted VOX's electoral surge as a reaction of the disadvantaged and working class against the establishment (Zubero 2019). Even though the proletarianization processes have arisen in other scenarios (Rydgren 2013), this does not appear to be the case for VOX's electoral base in Andalusia, at least for now.

Regarding the identity vulnerability hypothesis (H2), the significance of the immigration and religion variables disappears when it is introduced alongside the contextual variables in model 4, and therefore this hypothesis can also not be deemed reliable. Though it is true that the anti-immigration component is a key pillar for most radical right parties (from the point of view of political offer and demand), we have seen how its explanatory power in VOX's case is limited and in fact disappears completely when we introduce other contextual factors in the regression analysis. The lesser significance of the anti-immigration component in the party's ideological plane (Acha 2019a) is also confirmed by its electoral base. In this case, VOX refutes the so-called "single-issue party thesis": the idea that these parties are being supported predominantly on the basis of the immigration issue (Mudde 1999). This is a significant difference between VOX and other European radical right parties.

The most relevant finding of this research has been to show the predictive capacity of contextual socio-political factors. Specifically, we have shown that the vote for the radical right party is linked to centralist tendencies, right-wing ideological self-identification and a negative opinion of the Prime Minister. Thus, VOX's surge could be understood as primarily the result of socio-political dynamics specific to the Spanish (and Andalusian) context, more than global and wide-reaching structural processes. The growing polarization regarding the territorial issue, added to almost four decades of hegemony of the PSOE in Andalusia, appear to have been key factors when activating this electoral base (a base which, in any case, has been activated thanks to the existence of a sufficiently solid and credible party option). Thus, it appears to confirm the importance of supply-side factors such as the necessary condition to activate demand-side factors, in line with what has been noted by authors such

as Mudde (2007) or Norris (2005). It is important to note that these findings refer only to the Andalusian context and should not be considered as true for the national political context. Nevertheless, it is possible that these explanations for VOX's electoral base would be repeat in other arenas.

VOX's case is perhaps a new type of radical right within the far right family that is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the third wave of extremism in Europe (from the 80s to the 2000s). This fourth wave is ideologically more flexible and has a more diverse electorate, as Mudde (2019) develops elegantly. A radical right which is ultimately an agent (from the point of view of the agency theory) that can guide and strategically emphasize certain issues, even beyond the issue of immigration (De Lange and Art 2011). In the case of the 2018 elections in Andalusia, we saw how the party not only prioritized the territorial issue in its discourse (given the residual nature of the immigration issue for the electorate), but also how its electoral support closely followed this framework. Future lines of research should examine to what extent this electoral base evolves and to what extent the party can successfully activate new electorally profitable dimensions. The medium-long term electoral consolidation of the radical right in Spain will depend on this to a great extent.

To sum up, this research has examined in detail the electoral base of VOX in the Andalusian elections of December 2018. Some notable findings that have characterized the vote for VOX have been pointed out, considering the prolific previous literature about European radical right voting. In this sense, VOX can be interpreted as a good example of the European radical right's evolution. What is clear is that the radical right party will receive close scrutiny and will play an important role in Spanish society and democracy in the future.

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Appendix A

Table A1. Descriptive statistics of independent variables.

Variables	Categories	Mean (SD)	Min–Max.
Socioeconomic status	1 = "High class/high middle class"; 2 = "new middle class"; 3 = "old middle class"; 4 = "skilled worker"; 5 = "unskilled worker"	3.12 (1.4)	1–5
Laboral situation	1 = "working"; 0 = "not working"	0.66	0–1
Incomes	1 = "no income at all"; 2 = "less than 300 Euros"; 3 = "301–600"; 4 = "601–900"; 5 = "901–1.200"; 6 = "1.201–1.800"; 7 = "1.801–2.400"; 8 = "2.041–3.000"; 9 = "3.001–4.500"; 10 = "4.501–6.000"; 11 = "more than 6.000"	3.82 (1.97)	1–11
Immigration as country first problem	1 = "yes"; 0 = "no"	0.02	0–1
Religion	1 = "catholic"; 0 = "not catholic"	0.76	0–1
Security as country first problem	1 = "yes"; 0 = "no"	0.76	0–1
Preference about territorial model	1 = "State with only central government and without Autonomous Communities" or "State with Autonomous Communities with less autonomy tan now"; 0 = "State with Autonomous Communities with more autonomy tan now" or "State what recognises the right to Autonomous Communities to turn into independent states"	0.25	0–1

Table A1. *Cont.*

Variables	Categories	Mean (SD)	Min–Max.
Ideological self-identification	1 ("extreme left")–10 ("extreme right")	4.69	1–10
Evaluation of Susana Díaz	1 ("very bad")–10 ("very good")	3.64	1–10
Evaluation of Pedro Sánchez	1 ("very bad")–10 ("very good")	3.72	1–10
Conservative self-identification	1 = "conservative"; 0 = "others"	0.05	0–1
Sex	1 = "woman"; 0 = "man"	0.51	0–1
Age	Free response	48.8	18–96
Studies level	1 = "without studies"; 2 = "primary studies"; 3 = "secondary studies first level"; 4 = "secondary studies second level"; 5 = "professional formation"; 6 = "university or higher education"	3.71 (1.6)	1–6

Source: own explication based on CIS 3236.



Figure A1. Average marginal effects of explanatory variables (CI 95%) (model 4). Source: own explication based on CIS 3236.

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Article

The Musical Bridge—Intercultural Regionalism and the Immigration Challenge in Contemporary Andalusia

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Abstract: The ideals of tolerance and cultural exchange associated with the interfaith past of Muslim Spain (*al-Andalus*) have become a symbol for Andalusian regionalism and for the integration of Moroccan communities. Nowhere is this more keenly felt than in the context of music. In cities such as Granada, Moroccan and Spanish musicians actively promote the ideals of intercultural dialogue through the performance of repertoires such as flamenco and Arab-Andalusian music that allegedly possess a shared cultural history. In this article, we examine the interrelationship between music and 'intercultural regionalism', focusing on how music is used by public institutions to ground social integration in the discourse of regionalism. Against a backdrop of rising Islamophobia and the mobilization of right-wing populist and anti-immigration rhetoric both within Spain and internationally, the authors consider how music can be used to promote social integration, to overcome Islamophobia and to tackle radicalization. We advance two arguments. First, we argue that the musical interculturalism promoted by a variety of institutions needs to be understood within the wider project of Andalusian regionalism. Here, we note that musical integration of Spain's cultural and historical 'Other' (Moroccans) into Andalusian society is promoted as a model for how Europe can overcome the alleged 'death of multiculturalism'. The preferential way to achieve this objective is through 'intercultural regionalism', envisioned as the combination of regional identity-building and intercultural interactions between communities that share a common cultural heritage. Second, we assess some of the criticism of the efficacy of al-Andalus as a model for contemporary intercultural exchange. Combining approaches in political science and ethnomusicology, we focus on one case study, the *Fundación Tres Culturas* (FTC). Through interviews with figures within the FTC, we examine why this model has become partly insufficient and how it is borne out in the sorts of musical activities programmed by FTC that seek to move beyond the 'andalusí' myth. We conclude by recognizing the continuing regional and international importance of this myth but we question its integrating capacity at a time of radical political, economic and environmental upheaval.

Keywords: nationalism; regionalism; interculturalism; Andalusia; Andalusi music; heritage; migrations; coexistence

1. Introduction

Since its foundation in the 19th and early-20th centuries, Andalusian regionalism (*Andalucismo*) has extolled its complex multifaith and multicultural heritage derived from the encounters of several cultural traditions, encompassing Arab, Berber, Latin/Spanish, Roma/Gypsy, Jewish and other influences. This regionalist tradition has appropriated the memory of a Golden Age preceding the Spanish Reconquest

in 1492 and largely identified with the Caliphate of Córdoba under the Umayyad dynasty (929 to 1031), otherwise known as al-Andalus. In an attempt to distantiate Andalusian history from a broader Spanish, nationalist historiography, a somewhat utopian view of al-Andalus has been developed in popular culture, the media and even in historical scholarship[1]. This view frames al-Andalus (and the Caliphate in particular) as a celebrated era of interfaith encounters between Islam, Judaism and Christianity, and a 'culture of tolerance' (Dodds et al. 2010; Menocal 2012; Menocal et al. 2000). The ideals of tolerance and cultural exchange associated with al-Andalus have become integral both as a symbolic anchor for Andalusian regionalism and as a way of promoting the integration of immigrant communities within the region, even though a number of historians have sought to deconstruct the historical 'myth' of al-Andalus (Akasoy 2010; Catlos 2002; González Alcantud 2011, 2017; Soifer 2009).

In this article, we explore how this historical background is re-imagined through musical performance in the context of new challenges derived from recent migration trends into Andalusia particularly from Morocco. In his analysis of how al-Andalus has been instrumentalized for a variety of contrasting socio-political agendas in Spain (Andalusian regionalism, cultural tourism and Spanish colonialism in Morocco, 1912–1956), Eric Calderwood argues that public cultural organizations in Andalusia draw on the 'fiercely local tradition' of *andalucismo* (Calderwood 2014a, p. 36), a tradition that is based on the premise of cultural mixing in al-Andalus. Calderwood uses as a case study the *Legado Andalusí* institution, which he argues is underpinned by 'the Romantic desire to invent al-Andalus and the andalucista tendency to cast Andalusi culture as, at once, universal and quintessentially local' (Calderwood 2014a, p. 37). In a region that extols its alleged interfaith past, such institutions often promote the integration of Moroccan communities into Andalusian society as proof of the values of tolerance, diversity and intercultural dialogue that lie at the base of the Andalusian regionalist project and, by extension, of European values.

Nowhere is this more keenly felt than in the context of music. Across the region, Moroccan and Spanish musicians actively promote the ideals of intercultural dialogue through the performance of repertoires such as flamenco and Arab-Andalusian music that allegedly possess a shared cultural history (Machin-Autenrieth 2019, 2020). In this article we examine the interrelationship between music and 'intercultural regionalism'—we analyze how music is used by public institutions to ground social integration in the discourse of regionalism and an alleged Andalusian historical sensibility for intercultural dialogue. In particular, this intercultural modality gravitates around the heritage of flamenco and its combination with Moroccan Arab-Andalusian classical music (to be distinguished from regional or folkloric Andalusian music). Such an effort has not been built ex nihilo, but liaises with a pre-existing narrative of common origins and musical encounters between Spanish and Moroccan traditions in pre- and post-Reconquest Andalusia. This narrative continues to be part of a vibrant tradition of artistic creativity associated with the celebration of cultural distinctiveness and the building of musical bridges across the shores of the Mediterranean Sea (Glasser 2016). Combining approaches in political science and ethnomusicology, we focus on one case study, the *Fundación Tres Culturas* (Three Cultures Foundation, FTC), a public institution devoted to cultural diplomacy with the Arab world and in particular with Morocco. The majority of the article draws on theoretical reflections, secondary research and analysis of documentation pertaining to the FTC and related press materials. However, drawing on fieldwork conducted as part of Machin-Autenrieth's wider research project, the empirical basis for this article is supplemented by interviews with staff members from the FTC.

The article advances two main arguments. First, we argue that the musical interculturalism promoted by institutions such as the *Fundación Tres Culturas* needs to be understood within the wider project of Andalusian regionalism. Here, the musical integration of Spain's cultural and historical 'Other' (Moroccans) into Andalusian society is promoted as a model for how Europe can overcome the

[1] While the Andalusi myth is inherent to Spain as a whole, it is most keenly felt in Andalusia because it is in this region where the Muslim past is most intensely experienced.

alleged 'death of multiculturalism' (Modood 2014; Ossewaarde 2014). The preferential way to achieve this objective is through 'interculturalism' and, specifically, a form of 'intercultural nationalism' (or in the Andalusian case, intercultural 'regionalism') envisioned as the combination of regional/national identity-building and intercultural interactions between communities that share a common cultural heritage. Framed by an idealized reading of Andalusia's past and its connections with Morocco, music becomes a symbolic bridge between the two territories marking out a perceived historical continuity from the coexistence of the three religions in al-Andalus to contemporary intercultural exchanges between Andalusians and Moroccans. Second, however, we argue that there has been criticism of the efficacy of al-Andalus as a model for contemporary intercultural exchange. As shown in interviews with figures at the FTC itself, some feel that the use of the past of al-Andalus as a model of tolerance obscures the contemporary realities of migration and social integration. In the final section, we shall briefly assess why this model has become partly insufficient and how it is borne out in the sorts of musical activities programmed by FTC that seek to move beyond the 'andalusí' myth.

2. Historical Introduction: Andalusia and the Three Cultures

Andalusia's Muslim past has become central to Andalusian identity and the region's accompanying political regionalism. Although Andalusian regionalism was conceived in the 19th century, it is most commonly associated with the work of the notary Blas Infante (1885–1936). His research into Andalusian cultural history was essential in shaping the *Andalucista* project, research that still informs a variety of cultural activities and political conceptions. In the book *El Ideal Andaluz* (1915), Infante proclaimed Andalusia's African origins and its Arab influences in opposition to the racial theories prevailing at that time in a war-torn, ultra-nationalist Europe (Infante 1976). More significantly, Infante placed meticulous emphasis on the region's Muslim heritage and the cultural achievements of al-Andalus as a constitutive emblem of what Calderwood calls an Andalusian 'internationalist nationalism […], which [Infante] explicitly set in opposition to the exclusivity of Catalan nationalist thought' (Calderwood 2014a, p. 37; 2014b). Moreover, Infante also emphasized the significant role of music (and specifically flamenco) in the shaping of Andalusian-ness. Indeed, flamenco was, for Infante, a relic of Andalusia's interreligious past—a direct result of the alleged cultural confluences between the different communities that cohabited pre- and post-Reconquest (Christians, Jews, Muslims, Moriscos and Gitanos)[2].

The idea of an interfaith collective identity always refers back to a historical period predating the Reconquest—usually referred to as al-Andalus. The term al-Andalus is often used erroneously to refer to the parts of the peninsula governed by Muslims between 711 and 1492, until the Christian Reconquista was completed in 1492.[3] Many Andalusian regionalists (including Infante) maintain that Andalusia knew its age of splendor not under the Christian kings but under its Muslim predecessors, culminating in the Umayyad dynasty and concluding with the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada (*Reino Nazarí de Granada*) (est. 1230), under whose reign the Nasrid emirs built the Alhambra palace (1250). The Emirate was the last remnant of Muslim Iberia and its annexation during the Reconquest in 1492 sealed the fate of *convivencia* (the alleged peaceful coexistence and exchange between Christians, Jews and Muslims) with the end of interfaith coexistence. But how far was *convivencia* a tangible and clearly identifiable condition and mode of intercultural encounter?

Wolf describes *convivencia* as the 'peaceful coexistence' of the three Abrahamic religions and communities in pre-Conquest Spain and 'by extension the cultural interaction and exchange fostered

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[2] Music is not the only artistic arena where one can find echoes of Andalusia's multicultural heritage. On the visual and architectural legacy of this 'culture of intimacy' forged between the three religions, see the beautifully illustrated book by (Dodds et al. 2010).

[3] More accurately, al-Andalus was the name given to Muslim territories in the Iberian Peninsula under the Umayyad Caliphate based in Córdoba (711–1031), after which point the Peninsula fluctuated between the split rule of different Islamic kingdoms (the *taifas*) and temporary unification under the rule of the Almoravids (1085–1145) and Almohads (1232–1287). Al-Andalus as a term, however, is often used to refer to the entire period between 711 and 1492.

by such proximity' (Wolf 2009, p. 72). 'Cultural interaction' here is central to a common reading of *convivencia* as a sort of historical model for contemporary interculturalism. The Republican historian and philologist Américo Castro (1885–1972) first used the term *convivencia* in 1948 to contest some of the nationalist tropes then prevalent about the primordial origins of Spanish identity, particularly after such tropes were being promoted abroad by the Franco regime (Castro 1948). The book was attacked by the pro-regime's historians as soon as it was published but was generally well received overseas, despite its lack of systematic research and Arabic sources (Wolf 2009). Yet, as Calderwood argues (Calderwood 2014b, 2018), the notion of *convivencia* and a Spanish-Moroccan 'brotherhood' rooted in the history of al-Andalus can also be seen as relics of Spanish colonialism in Morocco (1912–1956). Indeed, in an ironic twist of history, the rhetoric of historical intercultural dialogue that underpinned Infante's *Andalucista* ideology, and that ultimately led to his execution at the hands of Francisco Franco's forces in 1936, was also coopted as a tool by the Franco regime to legitimize Spain's continuing colonial presence in Morocco in the 1940s and 50s. In the lead up to Moroccan independence in 1956, there was increased emphasis on historical and cultural links across the Strait, as a way of consolidating colonial rule (García and de Larramendi 2002). Therefore, to a certain extent we need to question the assertion that al-Andalus and the idea of *convivencia* constitute a *shared* cultural heritage, when in many respects the promotion of interfaith encounters in Morocco can also be linked to a specific period of Spanish colonialism. Having said that, the notion of interfaith dialogue (*convivencia*) in al-Andalus and Arab-Andalusian music as a product of that dialogue, has become an integral part of Morocco's own project of postcolonial nation building. And, as Shannon notes, Arab-Andalusian music 'sonically connects Moroccans to medieval Iberia, echoing shared histories and genealogies that tie them directly to Europe and European culture' (Shannon 2015, p. 87).

Such a postcolonial reading of history is, however, not central to this article. Rather it is important to stress that the narrative of intercultural and interfaith coexistence in al-Andalus has now become an integral part of contemporary Andalusian regionalism.[4] Despite the lack of politically significant linguistic differences (the region does not possess its own distinctive language unlike other Autonomous Communities in Spain), much evidence points to a milder variety of regionalism which is inspired by a strong sense of *el ser andaluz* (Andalusian 'being') rooted in the prominence of a multicultural Golden Age preceding the Reconquest, linguistic and cultural continuity with the region's Islamic heritage and, as we shall see, music as a formidable expression of cultural synthesis. Therefore, the 'myth' of al-Andalus clearly serves a unifying bridge-building purpose, independently from its partly fabricated origins and as a counterpart to the homogenizing Castilian narrative. The next section explores how the narrative of al-Andalus has been put under pressure by the dramatic rise of Moroccan migration into Spain, especially following Spain's accession to the European Economic Community in 1986.

3. Immigration: A Challenge to Regional Identity

The efficacy of al-Andalus as a model for contemporary intercultural tolerance and dialogue has been severely tested by recent immigration, particularly from Morocco. The first violent revolt against immigration in Spain occurred in the El Ejido municipality (part of the Almería province), where the local agribusiness employed immigrant laborers to pick vegetables and fruit. In February 2000, three murders at the hands of Moroccan immigrants unleashed protests with barricades, culminating with street riots, injuries, casualties and material damages to immigrants' dwellings throughout the province. After these events, local authorities and the regional government sought to calm tensions and

[4] At times, Andalusian regionalism is described as a 'nationalism'. For example, the 2007 Statute of Autonomy defines Andalusia as a 'historic nationality' (*nacionalidad histórica*), while the earlier 1981 Autonomy Statute referred to Andalusia as simply a 'nationality' (*nacionalidad*). We should mention that the first Statute was approved through article 151 of the Spanish Constitution a unique process by which the region's autonomy was accelerated via a popular referendum after mass demonstrations leading to the status of 'nationality' shared by a few other Autonomous Communities. For the purposes of this article, we will stick to the term 'regionalism' so as to distinguish from Spanish nationalism more broadly.

reintroduce a degree of greater tolerance. The integration of Moroccan communities into Andalusian society became a new challenge. As a result, the institutional and non-institutional rediscovery of the interfaith past of al-Andalus moved up the political agenda and became a model for the values of tolerance, diversity and intercultural dialogue that lie at the base of the Andalusian regionalist project. Moreover, this past has become a source of inspiration for interculturalism as the preferred framework for the social integration of immigrant communities, most notably Moroccans.

Why is the notion of interculturalism so important in Andalusia? As explored elsewhere in the case of Catalonia and Quebec (Conversi and Jeram 2017), interculturalism has been invoked as a major policy tool to 'integrate' immigrant minorities into a more respectful and dignified environment while, simultaneously encouraging regionally-based populist constituencies into accepting cultural and ethnic diversity as a resource, rather than as a threat. In Andalusia, the shift towards interculturalism-based immigration policies began more recently, marking a divergence from multiculturalism whose Anglo-Saxon roots do not sufficiently resonate with the local public. Interculturalism usually refers to a way of managing cultural diversity that seeks to combine both the recognition of difference and shared cultural values. Moreover, it implies a process of dialogue, exchange and the formation of 'new' identities and cultural practices from the interspace between different communities. Interculturalism has often been employed as an alternative approach to social integration vis-à-vis multiculturalism. As a concept (and an ideology), multiculturalism largely developed in Anglophone Canada (Kymlicka 1996; Kymlicka and Patten 2003; Taylor 1994), Australia (Smolicz 1995), Britain (May et al. 2004; Modood 2005; Parekh 2001) since the 1970s and, later, was used in some member-states of the European Union.[5] In more recent years, the term multiculturalism has been subject to attacks at the international level from the mass media (Modood 2013). Also within academia, multiculturalism has been identified as a 'non–starter' and a 'spent' word (Levrau and Loobuyck 2018). Even though many have gone as far as to declare first 'the retreat' and then the 'death of multiculturalism' (Joppke 2004; Lentin 2014; Lentin and Titley 2011; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), 'to speak of the death of multiculturalism is to ignore the continuation of struggles that have been central to multicultural politics' (Nye 2007, p. 109). Nonetheless, since the 1990s, a 'backlash against multiculturalism' has occurred resulting in its retreat from public policies in various countries and its replacement, in some contexts, by the term 'interculturalism' (Levrau and Loobuyck 2018). Multiculturalism scholars, however, dissent on the degree of conceptual novelty interculturalism is supposed to offer in respect to multiculturalism, or whether it can truly provide a new paradigm. For Tariq Modood, 'interculturalist approaches suffer from an indeterminacy in the use of concepts such as local, place and proximity' (Modood 2018, p. 201). On the other hand, Taylor argues that 'the difference between the two is not so much a matter of the concrete policies but concerns rather the story that we tell about where we are coming from and where we are going' (Taylor 2012, p. 413).[6] However, as we stated elsewhere (Conversi and Jeram 2017), 'interculturalism' assumes radically different meanings whether the term is used in Europe or in Quebec: in the former it has a 'localist' meaning, in the latter it carries a more 'majoritarian-nationalist' meaning, so that actually Modood criticizes the former, whereas Taylor refers to the latter.[7]

In the Andalusian context, the operational flexibility of the term interculturalism lends it a favorable status, as it is deemed to represent the Andalusian project in a more enhanced way, grounding it into a stable territory and connecting it to a past whose achievements have inspired artists and poets throughout the Islamic world (Shamsie 2015). In particular, the term was constitutionally enshrined in the 2007 Statute of Autonomy of Andalusia, where immigration policy is specifically mentioned.

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5 According to Tariq Modood [personal suggestion to Daniele Conversi], no official, legally-binding document embraced the term 'multiculturalism' in the EU, including Britain, although in some countries it was discursively used to uphold possible social policies. Moreover, 'multicultural society', rather than 'multiculturalism', tended to be the preferred term (personal communication).

6 We recognize that, at least in some contexts, the term '*multifaithism*' would be more appropriate in the case of Andalusia, but our article's emphasis is more strictly on cultural encounters and fusion. See (Modood et al. 2010).

7 Personal communication by Tariq Modood.

Article 37 (*Guiding Principles*, 23) states: 'The social, cultural and religious coexistence (*convivencia*) of all people in Andalusia and respect for cultural diversity, beliefs and convictions, fostering intercultural relationships (*relaciones interculturales*) with full respect for constitutional values and principles'.[8] These constitutional shifts need to be framed by the wider political context, given that the Spanish Socialists (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, PSOE) swept to power in Madrid in 2004 but were consequently defeated by a neoliberal government in 2008 led by the People's Party (*Partido Popular*, PP). However, the PSOE's largest regional branch was located in Andalusia, where it uninterruptedly remained the region's ruling party for over 40 years, from 1978 to 2019 under the name of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party of Andalusia (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español de Andalucía*, PSOE–A). This political context provided the background under which the narrative of a tolerant Andalusia was rescued from attacks by the right, while the skeptics dismissed the entire notion of pre-Reconquest tolerance as a mere 'myth'.

In the aftermath of the December 2018 Andalusian regional election, when the far right anti-immigration *Vox* party emerged for the first time on the Spanish political scene, the tolerance narrative was challenged by a more xenophobic and centralist one. Vox gained 12 seats in the Andalusian Parliament and, as a result, won its first ever seat in the Spanish Senate. In the broader context of Vox's anti-immigration rhetoric, it is pertinent to note that the Andalusian areas in which the party gained its highest vote share were those with the largest immigrant communities that provide an invaluable labor force for agricultural regions (such as in Almería). In Seville, PSOE was defeated and a coalition government was formed between the PP and the Citizens' Party (*Ciudadanos*), just as both these parties moved further to the right to capture the ultranationalist electorate that had turned to Vox, which in turn supported the regional, PP-Ciudadanos coalition. However, the 2007 Statute of Autonomy of Andalusia has remained firmly in place ensuring the continuation of previously established cultural activities of institutions like the FTC with their unyielding support for interculturalist policies. Here, the history of al-Andalus still provides a useful model for the intercultural activities of organizations such as the FTC, where artistic phenomena (such as music) are an integral tool. And, it is against this political backdrop of the rise of right-wing populism and anti-immigration rhetoric vis-à-vis the interculturalism of institutions such as the FTC that we place our analysis of music.

We define 'musical interculturalism' as the use of music as an institutional (as well as non-institutional) strategy to promote social integration, to overcome Islamophobia and to tackle radicalization, framed by the ideology of intercultural dialogue. And music is a powerful vehicle for the promotion of what we are calling '*regionalist interculturalism*' (and, interchangeably, '*intercultural regionalism*') as a variety of the 'intercultural nationalism' previously studied in Catalonia and Quebec (Conversi and Jeram 2017). Intercultural nationalism has been defined as 'the core doctrine through which (sub-state) nationalist discourse has been articulated in relation to immigration' (Conversi and Jeram 2017, p. 53). By extension, we use *regionalist interculturalism* (and '*intercultural regionalism*') (RI) to refer to the regionalist-informed social policies adapted in a context where regionalism is more often invoked than nationalism. RI can thus be envisioned as the combination of regional identity-building and intercultural interactions between communities that share a common cultural heritage. In Andalusia, RI shapes the promotion of intercultural dialogue and social integration through a regionalist reading of the past that is rooted in the alleged history of religious and cultural pluralism and exchange in al-Andalus. In this sense, the political project of promoting dialogue through interculturalism is deeply intertwined with, and in many respects inseparable from, the project of Andalusian regionalism.

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[8] https://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/2007/BOE-A-2007-5825-consolidado.pdf.

4. Understanding Musical Interculturalism in Andalusia

By considering the case of the *Fundación Tres Culturas*, we now focus on how public institutions draw on music as a vehicle to shape a form of interculturalism built on the symbolic framework of al-Andalus as a space of intercultural coexistence and exchange. Indeed, as will be developed below, music has become one of the most representative examples of the FTC's cultural activities and is an integral part of the institute's programs aimed at intercultural dialogue and the social integration of Moroccans in Andalusia.

Jonathan Shannon (Shannon 2015) argues that in the post-9/11 context of increased immigration and the 'global war on terror', music has become a prominent vehicle for *convivencia* as a 'good to think' principle. He states: 'Andalusian *convivencia* remains one of the enduring cultural legacies of al-Andalus, relevant not only to narratives of the past but for a variety of contemporary projects of multiculturalism that draw on it—indeed they have helped to construct it as a modern phenomenon' (Shannon 2015, p. 29). In other words, historical narratives, either based on myth or ascertainable fact, function as propulsors of a Good Society and are hence essential to the functioning, cohesion and development of these societies (Armstrong 2004; Smith 2003). Particularly important is the myth of a Golden Age, identifiable as a past society in which the ultimate values were once upon a time embodied in ideal (or idealized) political structures and social practices (Armstrong 2017, 2004; Hutchinson 2015; Smith 2000, 2003). Golden Ages are usually followed by long periods of decadence, and nationalist intellectuals and politicians have set as their major goal the recreation of such a Golden Age within a specific nation or region. In Andalusia, music has become a primary driver in the recreation of al-Andalus as a Golden Age. Before moving to an analysis of musical activities at the *Fundación Tres Culturas*, it is worth briefly contextualizing the musical manifestations of al-Andalus in contemporary Andalusia, as the FTC frequently program performances of Arab-Andalusian music and its derivatives.

Music as a Bridge: Música Andalusí and Flamenco

Arab-Andalusian classical music developed initially in Spain and Portugal during the Muslim occupancy and is today performed throughout the Maghreb, where it was introduced in the 15th and 16th centuries by refugees expelled after the Reconquest. It is important to keep in mind that the generic label Arab-Andalusian music (or *música andalusí* in Spanish) is a European categorization that emerged from the vestiges of colonial rule in North Africa (Fernández Manzano 1993, 2012; García Cortés 1996, 2018; Guettat et al. 1999; Poché 2005). As such, the term refers to a range of discreet and unique genres and repertoires that stretch across the Maghreb and into the Middle East (Nair 2006). For example, the text, musical forms and melodic structures of Arab-Andalusian music in Morocco (known nationally as *al-âla*) differ from the *ma'luf* tradition as performed in Tunisia. Even within national traditions, distinct local schools exist, such as the Fez, Tetouan and Rabat schools in Morocco. What is a general constant, however, is an origins narrative that positions Arab-Andalusian music (in whatever form it might take) as a symbol of interfaith dialogue (in al-Andalus and, subsequently, across the Mediterranean carried by the migration of *moriscos* to North Africa).[9] For Maghrebi practitioners and devotees of Arab-Andalusian music along the Southern Mediterranean coast, the memory of the diasporic origins in pre-1492 al-Andalus/Sefarad is a 'central part of the practice' (Glasser 2015; Guettat et al. 1999; Poché 2005).

In a similar vein, flamenco (Spain's most iconic music and dance tradition) is often linked to Andalusia's historical and cultural past. While flamenco is traditionally associated with Andalusia's deeply-rooted *Gitano* (Gypsy) community, in recent years Andalusian public institutions and the regional government itself have co-opted flamenco as the region's 'core value' and premier identity symbol (Aix Gracia 2014; Conversi 2018; Machin-Autenrieth 2017; Washabaugh 2013). In other words,

[9] For recent scholarship on the different Arab-Andalusian traditions of the Maghreb see: (Chaachoo 2011; Ciantar 2012, 2016; Corfis 2009; Davila 2012, 2013; Glasser 2016; Reynolds 2009a, 2009b; Shannon 2012, 2015).

one can say that flamenco has been chosen as a 'core value' of regional identity on a similar line as the Catalan and Basque languages have been at various times considered pivots of their respective national cultures (Conversi 1997). Yet, at the same time the 2007 Statute of Autonomy mentions 'the recognition and use of the Andalusian language modality, in their different varieties' (Article 213 of the Statute of Autonomy for Andalusia). Additionally, due to their lexicon and phonetics these dialects are popularly attributed to the region's past Islamic heritage and are thus viewed as a sign of historical and cultural continuity.

A large part of flamenco's relevance for Andalusian identity construction is its alleged roots in the region's multicultural past with numerous musicians and scholars espousing influences taken from Muslim and Jewish repertoires. Indeed, Blas Infante himself (the aforementioned 'father' of Andalusian regionalism) developed the idea that flamenco was inherited from al-Andalus as well as intercultural exchanges between *Morisco* and *Gitano* communities following the Reconquest. We should consider here a third ethnic and cultural element, namely the music and musicality of the Gitanos/Gypsy/Roma groups inhabiting the region for several centuries and having become some of the most reliable repositories of this intercultural tradition, an issue that has been explored elsewhere (Conversi 2018; Goldberg 2019; Leblon 2005; Paetzold 2009).

Most salient for this article, is the widespread belief that flamenco shares a number of historical and musical similarities with Arab-Andalusian music (Cruces Roldán 2003)—that they are both cultural by-products of al-Andalus. While it is easy to dismiss this idea as an act of historical fantasy (particularly given the fact that flamenco as a standardized genre only emerged in the 19th century), it is undeniable that there are similarities between the traditions in terms of mode, rhythmic structure and vocal performance. It is these similarities and the symbolic framework of a shared cultural heritage that have given rise to a number of fusion projects between these two traditions. For example, the *Gitano* singer and musician Juan Peña 'El Lebrijano' (1941–2016) collaborated with the Andalusian Orchestra of Tangier in the album *Encuentros* (1985), which stands as a celebration of cultural and religious diversity, as well as a unique fusion between flamenco and classical Arab-Andalusian music. El Lebrijano continued to collaborate with Moroccan musicians for many years with albums like *Casablanca* (1998), *Puertas abiertas* (2005) and *Dos Orillas* (2014, recorded live at the Central Theater of Seville). Fusions between flamenco and Arab-Andalusian music date back even earlier with the production *Macama jonda* (1983), written by the Gypsy poet, playwright, academic and essayist José Heredia Maya (1947–2010), the first Gypsy professor in a Spanish University and a theorist of the alliance between literature, anthropology and theatre (Heredia Maya 2004).[10] A work ahead of its time, *Macama jonda* was the first fusion of flamenco with Arab-Andalusian music (Machin-Autenrieth 2019), portraying the marriage between a Christian Andalusian and a Muslim Moroccan, 'anticipating what, 20 years later, will be called an alliance of civilizations'.[11]

5. Musical Interculturalism at the *Fundación Tres Culturas*

The *Fundación Tres Culturas* (FTC) was founded in 1999 as a joint initiative between the Andalusian and Moroccan governments. Based in the former 'Moroccan Pavilion' originally constructed as part of the Universal Exposition in Seville in 1992, the FTC stands as an emblem of inter-governmental cooperation between Spain and Morocco. At its core, the FTC is a cultural organization, financed through public and private funding and dependent on the Junta de Andalucía, that is engaged in cultural diplomacy between Spain and the Arab world. Its key objectives are the promotion of intercultural dialogue across the Mediterranean generally and between Spain and Morocco specifically, as well as facilitating the social integration of immigrants (particularly Moroccans) within Spanish

[10] https://elpais.com/diario/1983/04/18/cultura/419464816_850215.html.
[11] https://baxtalo.wordpress.com/2010/01/18/se-nos-marcho-jose-heredia-maya/. For an in-depth analysis of this production see (Machin-Autenrieth 2019).

society, above all in Andalusia. Moreover, as its director José Manuel Cervera Gragera has noted in a recently published interview (Matute 2019),[12] the expressed intention of the institution is to valorize and promote the historical relationship between Andalusia and the Arab world, particularly with Morocco. A common assertion is that the institution is unrivalled in Europe for its ability to facilitate intercultural dialogue across territories and between governments. Cervera Gragera states that the FTC is a model in Europe and that there is currently no other institution that has 'one foot in Africa and one in Europe' (Matute 2019). Framed against the wider context of geopolitical conflict, the refugee crisis and threats to democracy across the Mediterranean, the FTC positions itself as a vehicle for social and political change in a region whose history is as much characterized by conflict as it is by confluence. However, according to Cervera Gragera the alleged uniqueness of the FTC in Europe is not just a consequence of good practice but is a direct outcome of the historical conditions afforded to the institution's acts of cultural diplomacy by dint of Andalusia's multicultural past.

How can such a relatively small Andalusian institution help to shape broader Mediterranean geopolitics? In what capacity? In response to such questions, Cervera Gragera replies: 'Andalusia has a unique potential to intervene in these conflicts, which no-one else in Europe has. Our principal capital is the sympathy with which the Arab and Hebrew worlds see us. Keep in mind that for the first [Arabs] we have been *al-Andalus* and for the second [Jews] we have been *Sefarad*. Andalusia, therefore, has never lost this bond with its past and has always maintained dialogue with these cultures' (Matute 2019). Therefore, at the center of the FTC's vision lies a fundamental principle of the Andalusian doctrine of regionalism: the region's multicultural past and its capacity to engender dialogue and exchange between the three major monotheistic religions. And by extension, Cervera Gragera sees the Andalusian region as unique in Europe and thus well positioned to promote peace and dialogue in the Mediterranean region.

As discussed, the andalusí 'myth' with its utopian reading of Andalusia's past has frequently been employed by Andalusian regionalist figures, such as Blas Infante. However, given the devolution of further autonomous powers to the Andalusian Government in the 2000s and, simultaneously, an increase in Moroccan migration into the region, the andalusí 'myth' has become a more fundamental component of how the Andalusian Government constructs a cohesive regional identity, by tackling straightforwardly the intensification of anti-immigration rhetoric. Geopolitically, it also serves the strategy of promoting the region's interests abroad (particularly in the Arab world), while strengthening a regional 'brand' in terms of heritage politics and cultural tourism. In this context, publicly-funded institutions, such as the FTC, are central to the promotion of al-Andalus as 'good to think' (Shannon 2015); as a useful model for contemporary intercultural relations despite its contested historical basis.[13]

Cervera Gragera notes that the institute's main intention is 'to evoke [...] the *spirit* of what once was al-Andalus and Sefarad' (Matute 2019). In this way, the ideals of tolerance, exchange and dialogue that characterize the *spirit* of al-Andalus are stripped of any historical accuracy and upheld as a regionalist model for what positive intercultural exchange could look like. Against this historical background, culture (and particularly music) remains the institution's primary vehicle for facilitating dialogue and diplomacy by harnessing the historical capital of al-Andalus. Cervera Gragera continues: 'Culture allows us to do things that politics would not allow us to do. In recent years, we have organized many cultural encounters between Jews, Muslims and Christians through which success would have been difficult to achieve if they were based on political terms' (Matute 2019). Here, Cervera Gragera alludes to the central role of cultural diplomacy as a way of facilitating dialogue and exchange between groups that may be difficult to achieve politically. As a result, the FTC hosts a range of cultural and

[12] https://www.jotdown.es/2019/04/jose-manuel-cervera-la-extrema-derecha-europea-esta-hoy-disfrazada-de-nacionalismo/. See also (Cruces Roldán 2003), pp. 123–27.

[13] Another public cultural organisation that promotes the history of al-Andalus as a model for intercultural dialogue is the *Legado Andalusí Foundation* (http://www.legadoandalusi.es), as discussed by Calderwood 2014a.

academic activities including cinema showings, conferences, workshops, artistic exhibitions, theatre productions, literary festivals and, of course, concerts and musical workshops.

6. Arab-Andalusian Music and Raising Awareness of the Moroccan 'Other'

At the forefront of the FTC's musical activities are concerts and training courses in musical traditions that can trace their lineage to al-Andalus, particularly Arab-Andalusian music and its Moroccan derivative, *al-âla*. In recent years, there has been increased interest in Spain towards Arab-Andalusian music not simply as a 'foreign' musical form but one that is deeply rooted in the country's own cultural history. And quite predictably, a lot of this increased interest has been focused in Andalusia with cities such as Córdoba, Granada and Seville laying claim to certain strands of the Moroccan Arab-Andalusian repertoire that left with the staggered emigration of Muslims and Jews following the disintegration of the *taifa* kingdoms from around the 12th century and the eventual expulsion of *Moriscos* in the early 17th century. Since its founding, the FTC has been at the forefront of promoting Arab-Andalusian music through its cultural activities and the tradition is viewed by many within the institution as a crucial vehicle for cultural diplomacy between the two shores of the Mediterranean and between Moroccan and Andalusian communities on the Peninsula. In an interview, the strategic planner for the FTC, Antonio Chaves told Machin-Autenrieth: 'we believe that we have to take advantage of Arab-Andalusian music as another component of our work of cultural diplomacy. And that's why I'm saying it is a strategic element. We work in cultural diplomacy and, for us, Arab-Andalusian music is another example of our strategy for cultural cooperation' (4 July 2018).[14]

But in what ways does Arab-Andalusian function as a tool for cultural diplomacy in the context of intercultural relations in southern Spain? To answer this question, it is worth exploring in more detail the sorts of projects in which Arab-Andalusian music appears at the FTC. Rarely does the institute just schedule performances or music courses on their own: normally Arab-Andalusian music is integrated into larger flagship programs and projects run by the institute that have broader geopolitical and intercultural aims. For example, Arab-Andalusian music has featured as a regular part of the *Alcántara* program, a series of projects and events that focus on building 'bridges for dialogue and *convivencia*' between Andalusia and Morocco. The program emerged out of a strategic partnership between the FTC and the Moroccan ministry for Moroccan residents abroad. According to Chaves, the primary objective of this program is 'to work towards improving the image of Morocco in Spain and also to work towards improving the life conditions of Moroccans that live in Spain' (4 July 2018).[15] This is particularly evident in the annual '*Mes de Marruecos'* and '*Ramadán entre Culturas'* events that are held as part of the *Alcántara* program. Both events are scheduled to raise awareness of Moroccan (and by extension Arab and Muslim) culture and customs and to engender points of commonality and dialogue between 'host' and 'guest' communities in Andalusia. These events always feature Arab-Andalusian music of some form or other, and in recent years courses in Arab-Andalusian music theory and appreciation have been led by the Tetuani musician and educator Amin Chaachoo, followed by a concert.

First and foremost, the aim of these concerts and workshops is to improve the image of Moroccan culture within Spain and to provide cultural and institutional space for Moroccans to foreground an important component of their own national cultural identity. Yet more than this, Chaves noted that through these events 'we have to make Arab-Andalusian music known as an element not only unique to Morocco but also an element that is part of a common Andalusian culture' (4 July 2018).[16] It is here that the idealized image of al-Andalus that lays at the root of a broader shared Andalusian-Moroccan

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[14] 'Entendemos que tenemos que aprovechar la música andalusí como un elemento más de nuestra labor de diplomacia cultural. Por eso te digo es un elemento estratégico. Trabajamos en la diplomacia cultural, y para nosotros la música andalusí es una labor más de nuestra estratégica de cooperación cultural'.

[15] 'Trabajar para mejorar la imagen de Marruecos en España y también trabajar para mejorar las condiciones de vida de los marroquíes que residen en España'.

[16] 'Hay que darle conocer la música andalusí como un elemento no solamente propio de Marruecos, sino un elemento también propio de la cultura común andaluza'.

cultural sensibility is foregrounded in how these musical events are promoted. For example, following a course offered by Amin Chaachoo in 2019, there was a concert in which 'the students put into practice the knowledge acquired during the course with a musical show that represents the tolerance that existed in the epoch of al-Andalus in which Jews, Christians and Muslims came together to express the same artistic sentiment'.[17] Here, the notion of tolerance and exchange embodied in the narrative of al-Andalus finds a perfect vehicle in the context of Spaniards learning the music of the Moroccan 'other,' framed by a wider institutional agenda and discursive context that seeks to tackle rising Islamophobia and radicalization. In effect, music is employed by the FTC as a cultural 'space' in which both Spaniards and Moroccan can push back against and even negate these negative social phenomena that have arisen in response to increased Moroccan migration and rising populist nationalism. Indeed, as Chaves pointed out, the main objective of using Arab-Andalusian music in this way is to present this music to Andalusians as their own cultural heritage that can be shared with Moroccans, a key tenant of the philosophy of interculturalism.

A Fusion of Cultures: Musical Interculturalism at Work

Arguably where musical interculturalism at the FTC really comes into its own is in the context of fusions between flamenco and Arab-Andalusian music as touched on above. Such encounters are built on the idea that both traditions can trace their historical lineages to the musical repertoires and practices of al-Andalus and Morisco culture following the reconquest. Some scholars (Karl 2012, pp. 170–230, 2014; Machin-Autenrieth 2020) have examined the relevance of these fusion projects in the context of grassroots interactions between Spanish and Moroccan musicians and how they capitalize on the cultural monopoly of flamenco as a form of social integration. Moreover, this research has revealed some of the ways in which Moroccan musicians might need to exoticize their musical practices—through the use of bell dancing for example see (Karl 2014), thus marking out their difference, despite the underpinning rhetoric of a shared cultural heritage. It is important to recognize, however, that we are primarily concerned with how public institutions (and the FTC in particular) harness musical exchanges of this sort in the promotion of a particular regional reading of history as the basis for interculturalism, rather than the on-the-ground negotiations between musicians. Like Arab-Andalusian music proper, flamenco-andalusí fusions are a relatively regular part of the FTC's programming and feature predominantly as part of wider projects that seek to encourage cultural exchange between communities and improve the social integration of Moroccans. For example, in the 2017 edition of '*Mes de Marruecos*', the Granada-based Moroccan musician Hamid Ajbar performed in a charity concert in solidarity with refugees and for the promotion of cultural dialogue.[18]

When Machin-Autenrieth asked Antonio Chaves the relevance of these fusions for the institute and their capacity for generating dialogue, he maintained a common trope that flamenco and Arab-Andalusian music have a 'common trunk'. He described these fusions as a way of integrating Moroccans into Andalusian society, of facilitating cross-cultural dialogue. In particular he referred to a student concert that was held following the Arab-Andalusian music course as part of the '*Ramadán entre culturas*' (2018) event and that flamenco was, unexpectedly, included as part of the concert. He noted how well it was integrated into the performance and how Moroccan members of the audience clearly identified with flamenco, given its relative popularity in Morocco and the idea that the tradition is linked to Morocco's own musical history. Such fusions also enable Arab-Andalusian music to gain more traction and popularity with Spanish audiences, because a tradition that is largely unknown to the majority of Spaniards is made more accessible and palatable through its fusion with a more familiar and culturally-relatable music—that is, flamenco. Ultimately, for Chaves, such fusions are highly symbolic

[17] http://tresculturas.org/actividad/una-muestra-musical-clausura-el-iv-curso-de-musica-andalusi/. For a full video of the concert following the 2018 courses, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cyrw5Ca0vaY.
[18] http://tresculturas.org/actividad/concierto-solidario-favor-los-refugiados-hamid-ajbar-flamenco-fusion/.

of the broader aims of the FTC: 'it is the perfect excuse, because we can encounter [understand] each other through music—it is possible. If we can encounter [understand] each other in music, why can't we encounter [understand] each other in other types of cultural spaces?' (4 July 2018).[19]

This ability to 'encounter' (or understand) one another and to create a cultural 'space' through flamenco-andalusí fusions, for Chaves, is key to music's efficacy as a tool for interculturalism. Indeed, he argued that 'our institution appeared precisely so that the cultural communities that are here arrive at a moment when they can encounter each other and so that this intercultural interaction exists. In other words, our role as an institution has to be the generation of spaces of encounter for citizens. Music is the tool' (4 July 2018).[20] The underlying presumption here is that music, perhaps more so than any other cultural phenomenon, creates a mutual space of encounter in which those from distinct cultural backgrounds can come into creative dialogue and thus 'understand' each other at an artistic and cultural level, when such understanding might be elusive at a linguistic or social level. This is not an unknown phenomenon and indeed there are innumerable examples around the globe of music being used in the capacity of cross-cultural dialogue, peace-building and conflict resolution. But what is interesting in this case is how an idealized reading of history (that is, tolerance and exchange in al-Andalus) is interwoven into these musical encounters in such a way that the resultant artistic product is viewed as an outcome of history. At another level, this musical metaphor for an alleged shared cultural history between Andalusia and Morocco becomes the basis for a model of regionalist interculturalism, such as that promoted by the FTC, as being unique to the Andalusian region.

7. The Efficacy of the Andalusí Myth and Regionalist Interculturalism

Thus far, we have considered the ways in which the FTC has drawn on Arab-Andalusian music and its fusion with flamenco to promote 'regionalist interculturalism'—that is, intercultural dialogue between host and migrant communities based on an idealized reading of al-Andalus as a Golden Age of interreligious exchange. Moreover, Andalusia is promoted as unique in Europe where the past becomes a model for coexistence and interculturalism in the present. Music, and specifically the musical traditions of al-Andalus, has become a key vehicle in promoting this message. However, the broader efficacy of some of the musical projects put on by the FTC could be questioned, including the claims that such collaborations can help to prevent radicalization and Islamophobia. While it is true that these intercultural initiatives allow intercultural spaces to emerge, mass media and the Internet offer scarce windows for their wider popularization. The recent discovery of false Facebook accounts and radical right social networks with millions of supporters throughout Spain, like the *Unidad Nacional Española (UNE)* with over 1.2 million followers, show how the intercultural narrative has insufficiently suffused and shaped the media or, at least, been unable to stem far-right radicalism.[21] Consequently, the sort of people who are likely to attend FTC events are probably those that are already interested in the cultural history of al-Andalus, as well as those who already have positive attitudes towards Moroccan culture and, possibly, immigration. The sorts of communities most prone to take on board mounting Islamophobia are unlikely to be those interested in Arab-Andalusian music and the past of al-Andalus, however these may be packaged.

Against this backdrop, within the FTC itself there exists a degree of skepticism around the efficacy of the andalusí myth and the wider social relevance (especially for Moroccans and in terms of Spanish perceptions of Moroccan immigration) of Arab-Andalusian music and its fusions with flamenco. When asked about the social significance of the sorts of collaborative projects that the

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[19] For recent scholarship on the different Arab-Andalusian traditions of the Maghreb see: (Chaachoo 2011; Ciantar 2012, 2016; Corfis 2009; Davila 2012, 2013; Glasser 2016; Reynolds 2009a, 2009b; Shannon 2012, 2015).

[20] 'Nuestra institución surge precisamente para que las comunidades culturales [que] estén aquí lleguen a un momento en que se encuentren y exista esta interacción de interculturalidad. Es decir, nuestro papel como institución tiene que ser la generación de espacios de encuentro ciudadanos. La música es la herramienta'.

[21] For some detailed data see 'Far Right Networks of Deception', *Avaaz Report*, 22/05/2019 (https://avaazimages.avaaz.org/Avaaz%20Report%20Network%20Deception%2020190522.pdf).

FTC programs, one informant told Machin-Autenrieth: 'it doesn't mean anything, because it isn't real, it isn't contemporary, because it is much more interesting to sit down and look at what young Moroccans and young Andalusians have in common than to praise Averroes again' (28 April 2015).[22] Therefore, alongside the andalusí-focused cultural activities we have described, the FTC has also branched out into other areas. This was particularly evident in one of the institute's major projects carried out in 2014, with the support of European Regional Development funds, called *CREAMOS, Programa de Creación Artística entre Andalucía y Marruecos con Objectivos Sociales*. Like many of the FTC's projects, *CREAMOS* was based on collaborative encounters, exchanges and exhibitions across a range of cultural activities with events held in both Andalusia and Morocco. However, this time the connection with the historical narratives of al-Andalus and the 'three cultures' narrative were absent.[23] Within the framework of this project, in March and April 2014 an art exhibition called '*Arte Urbano 14*' was held in Tarifa and Seville,[24] which was inaugurated with hip hop performances by Moroccan and Andalusian artists, including Moroccan musicians who have emerged from more socially and economically marginalized communities. Hip hop or rap music is an American genre initially born amongst Afro-Americans in the Bronx neighborhood of New York City in the 1970s, but has since then spread across the globe along with graffiti writing, break dancing and DJing scratching, through policies and practices of socio-cultural Americanization (Bonnett 2006).[25]

In many respects, these sorts of events depart from the discursive and symbolic framing of the FTC (that is, al-Andalus), a framing that might restrict the institute's appeal to a certain social demographic. Indeed, it is important to recognize the broader class implications that arise from the social institutions that underpin both Arab-Andalusian music and flamenco. As Shannon argues, 'in a market saturated with popular music from Europe and the Arab East, many middle-class and elite Moroccans are turning to [Arab]Andalusian music as a way of reinforcing their connections with a Moroccan national "tradition"' (Shannon 2015, p. 107). In line with the work of other scholars (Davila 2013; Karl 2012, 2014), Shannon illustrates how despite being broadly defined as a 'national' music, Arab-Andalusian music is usually associated with elite institutions in Morocco, most notably the monarchy and wealthy families who can trace their lineages to al-Andalus. Therefore, for younger Moroccans and those from working class backgrounds, the tradition may have less social significance than popular genres such as *raï* and hip hop. Moreover, it could also be argued that fusions between flamenco and Arab-Andalusian music present a somewhat peculiar crossing of social and class distinctions, given the former's evolution amongst marginalized Gitano and lower class communities and the latter's ties with the elite and monarchical structures in Morocco. As such, the FTC has sought to broaden its appeal, to intervene in harder-to-reach immigrant communities (for example, in working class or agricultural areas) and to raise awareness of social issues in the Mediterranean such as illegal migration and poverty. In themselves, however, they cannot provide an antidote to existing problems, as anti-Muslim sentiments can, and do, often coexist with cultural initiatives aimed at cultural rapprochement.

Beyond issues of social class and appeal, the desire to broaden the musical activities of the FTC and move beyond Arab-Andalusian music and its flamenco fusions, appears to be linked to a general uneasiness around how al-Andalus is promoted by the FTC. When asked to what extent al-Andalus formed the symbolic basis for the FTC's activities, one interviewee said: 'It isn't the base ... well, at the moment it is probably the *political* base, because that is how Spain sells itself; Spain sells itself as if we are a place of encounter, a place of coexistence [...] and certainly it [the idea of al-Andalus] resonates with lots of people. But it is also true that the same person, my mother

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[22] 'No significa nada, porque no es real, no es contemporáneo, porque es mucho mas interesante sentarse a ver que tienen en común los jóvenes de Marruecos con los jóvenes andaluces que aladar otra vez a Averroes'.

[23] For more information on the *CREAMOS* project's activities and objectives, see: http://tresculturas.org/proyecto-creamos/.

[24] http://tresculturas.org/fundacion/noticia/proyecto-creamos-arte-urbano-raperos-andalucia-marruecos/. Also see: https://www.webislam.com/articulos/93344rap_de_andalucia_y_marruecos_portavoces_de_las_dos_orillas.html.

[25] For a broader and well-known reading of this phenomenon, see (Barber 1995).

could tell you how beautiful al-Andalus was but can't stand having a Muslim neighbor' (28 April 2015).[26] Here, the interviewee recognized that politics in Spain (and Andalusia specifically) is broadly geared towards instrumentalizing the history of al-Andalus to promote the country as a space of tolerance and *convivencia*. However, although the myth is relatively diffused in popular culture, it is precisely here that it is being challenged by a contrasting monocultural Spanish-only narrative and myth. While the FTC seems to epitomize the wider political institutional appropriation of history, there are grounds for questioning the view that people might be generally sympathetic to the *idea* of Andalusia's multicultural history. The success of the far right in Andalusia seems to illustrate this weakness. And this was clearly articulated in how the interviewee referred to the idea that a person might like the *concept* of al-Andalus in the past but dislike the reality of multiculturalism (and in particular Muslims in Spain) in the present.

What appears to be the issue here is a general questioning of the model of regionalist interculturalism and the idea that a positive reading of al-Andalus can (or even should be) a model for contemporary interculturalism. Another member of the FTC related this issue directly to music: 'I prefer to show something contemporary so that the *moor* you have in front of you[27] isn't a *moor* wearing a jellaba, playing old music but is a guy who is like your son [. . .]. This is the problem . . . to feed this myth of al-Andalus, and this crazy type of musical project [*flamenco-andalusí*] feeds this myth that everything was perfect, when it wasn't' (28 April 2015).[28] This quotation illustrates both an anxiety to comply with the dominant Westernizing urge and a certain degree of impatience with the ways in which music is used to paint a utopian view of al-Andalus, which this individual, at least, feels is somewhat outdated. More broadly, both this quotation and the previous one give the sense that, while people may be attracted to the *idea* of al-Andalus as an emblem of tolerance and dialogue, this does not necessarily extend to positive views of Muslim and Moroccan immigrants in Spain today. While these interviews reflect isolated, individual views, they still raise questions around the efficacy of regionalist interculturalism to shape public perceptions at a popular level. Finally, they show that the way popular culture is framed by the media with their pressure to conform to global 'standards' can impinge upon interculturalism and the project of using music as a cultural bridge.

8. Conclusions

By focusing on 'Andalusian' music, particularly Andalusian–Moroccan fusions, this article has explored the use of interculturalism by regional institutional actors as a tool for creating a novel framework of tolerance and coexistence. Myths, whether supported by historical research or not, play a central role in shaping political cultures, social policies and good governance. As recognized across the social sciences, particularly in nationalism studies (Leerssen 2015; Leoussi and Grosby 2006; Martin 2014; Smith 1991, 1998, 1999), myths play a key function in building cohesive societies based on trust and mutual understanding, so that the organization of vital matters that shape the day-to-day life can proceed smoothly. We should also understand that politically successful ideas and policies are generally based on myths and subconscious assumptions (Billig 1995).

According to the al-Andalus and regionalist narrative, music is a 'core value' of regional identity, so that fusions between flamenco and Arab Andalusian music work as a bridge between cultures

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[26] 'No es la base . . . . bueno, la base política seguramente en este momento sería, porque así es como España se vende a si misma, España se vende a si misma como nosotros somos un lugar de encuentro, un lugar de convivencia [. . . .] es cierto que resuena [the idea of al-Andalus] con muchísima gente. Pero también es cierto que la misma persona, mi madre te puede decir qué bonita al-Andalus pero no soporta tener un vecino musulmán'.

[27] The interviewee was using the term *moor*, a pejorative term often used to refer to Muslims or Moroccans, but also to refer to the Arabs and Berbers that conquered Spain in 711AD. Ironically, this is a term that some Spaniards might use when referring to a Moroccan neighbour or colleague.

[28] 'Prefiero enseñar algo contemporáneo para que el moro que tienes adelante, no sea un moro que va con la chilaba, tocando música antigua pero es un tío que ves como tu hijo. [. . .] Es el problema . . . alimentar este mito de al-Andalus y este tipo de proyecto musical descabellado alimenta el mito de que todo era perfecto, pero no era'.

and geopolitical spaces, as well as providing continuity with a usable past and mythical Golden Age. Pre-1492 Andalusia is certainly not unique in being presented as a Golden Age of plural coexistence and interfaith encounter. The pathbreaking work of Mark Mazower (Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950) identifies with outstanding clarity how religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic pluralism was for over five centuries a defining feature of daily life in the region and city of Salonica until the advent of twentieth century homogenizing nationalism (Mazower 2005). Nonetheless, the andalusí narrative carries considerable cultural and political weight in the promotion of intercultural exchange between different communities.

However, we have also explored some of the limits of this narrative: first, its message of tolerance does not always reach areas of the lower-class population in Andalusia and so cannot avert an opposing homogenizing Christian-only narrative and mono-cultural nationalism, as expressed by the rise of far-right populism. Secondly, we have noted the confinement of the myth to specific cultural, institutional and upper class niches, who are already familiar with its message of tolerance. This poses limits to the use of al-Andalus (in the musical domain at least) as a tool for integration.

Thirdly, we need to pose some new questions: How far can the al-Andalus myth provide an ideal framework for integration? Can it withstand the new challenges looming on the horizon? What if migration trends change radically? So far, resettlement pattern from Morocco have been mostly dictated by the original problems of social justice and the distribution of wealth in the places of origin. Thus, migratory movements have been connected to power relations and economic accumulation. However, most recent research on global migration has revealed how asylum applications respond to temperature fluctuations (Missirian and Schlenker 2017). In Morocco, recent climate trends have already forced people to abandon rural areas due to sharp increases in the absolute warmest and coldest temperatures of the year—particularly in the spring and summer seasons (Filahi et al. 2016). Moreover, the 'vertiginous' pace of the climate crisis, largely due to mass consumption and deforestation, could alter the demographic balance leading to a shift from relatively free-to-move economic migrants to displaced climate refugees who have nowhere to go (Fernández et al. 2019)—a phenomenon already identified with a separate term, *climigration* (Ketola 2015). When the numbers become unmanageable, it might be easy for parties like Vox to transform the already perceived threat of demographic invasion into a mobilizing tool for a profoundly alarmed population (Conversi and Moreno 2019; Conversi 2020). Could a multicultural myth like al-Andalus hold on in such a context?

Despite the limitations of both the al-Andalus myth and regionalist interculturalism that is built on that myth, there is space for hope. Ultimately, beyond the rhetoric, bridge-building initiatives that seek to facilitate mutual understanding and intercultural interaction will remain in high demand in these uncertain times. For instance, cross-Mediterranean musical encounters are not simply about displaying otherness but about crafting a space in which Andalusian and Moroccan cultures might interact and converge. Music provides such a space for coming together and a unique point of contact between communities that can rise above perceived cultural or religious incompatibilities. Finally, more research needs to be carried out on strengthening cultural and musical bridges, their relative successes and ultimate consequences. As vast areas of knowledge need to be brought together to address the existential problems of the new millennium, disciplinary bridges need also to be crossed to achieve this vital task.

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