Reshaping the World
Rethinking Borders

Edited by
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About the Editor

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Introduction to "Reshaping the World: Rethinking Borders"

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Abstract: This paper provides some historical context to understand border formations. By comprehending how our present system of borders and exclusions function, we can gain a new appreciation for migration. Moreover, it presents arguments for open borders to counter anti-immigrant policies, includes short summaries of relevant research, as well as for each article included in this Special Issue. Together, these articles show how more welcoming policies towards immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers do not threaten popular sovereignty but, conversely, strengthen both democracy and local rights.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this Special Issue is to provide case studies, contextual information, theoretical arguments, and critical analyses to understand geographical borders and their social implications, as well as the individuals who reside in border areas and those who travel between borders. It purposely takes an interdisciplinary, international, and comparative approach. The authors featured in this Special Issue work at universities in the United States, Mexico, Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, France, Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, South Africa, and Australia. Sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, philosophers, and scholars of international relations, public health, and linguistics are just some of the authors who contributed to *Rethinking Borders*. The contributions range from case studies of migrants' sense of belonging and safety in various places to theoretical discussions of "white diversity" and "necrocapitalism." These works' interdisciplinary makeup and openness to so many schools of thought stand in contrast to the solidifying of stricter borders across the globe. They include theoretical discussions about migration, globalization, anti-immigrant laws, and the benefits of inclusion. The diversity in the authors' disciplines, and the topics they focus on, exemplify the intricacies of borders and how much there is to learn about them.

It is timely to publish this Special Issue in the middle of a pandemic that has affected every single place in the world. Unprecedented border closures and stringent travel restrictions have not been enough to effectively contain the virus. As COVID-19 proves, diseases, ideas, and xenophobic and racist discourses know no borders. While COVID-19's lasting impact on migration and border security is still to be determined, it is apparent that collaborations and plans that transcend borders are vital when dealing with global threats, such as climate change and pandemics.

2. The Resurgence of Border Walls

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent German reunification in 1990 at first seemed to relegate border walls to the distant past of the Hadrian's Wall of 122 in Britain, the Chinese Great Wall, or the medieval walls of Paris (Castañeda 2012a). Nevertheless, the relevance of physical borders is on the rise with, for example, political campaign promises of lengthening the walls between the U.S. and Mexico (Castañeda 2019). As papers in this Special Issue document, skepticism about nation-states'

ability to integrate refugees is gaining popularity, along with increasing demands for stricter border controls and attacks to international law regarding the right to asylum. Some groups in Europe have criticized the European Union's free-movement policies, which were included in some of the talking points of the Brexit campaign. The civil war in Syria revived a public debate about the challenges posed by displaced people and reframed the issue of a large number of people arriving at a border seeking asylum—which we can call group asylum—as constituting a refugee "crisis."

The mainstreaming of xenophobic and anti-immigrant discourses allows politicians to run mainly on an anti-immigrant platform, justify draconian anti-immigrant policies, and become a recruitment tool for white nationalists. The ideas about nation-state, anti-immigrant exclusion, and making the daily life of immigrants' intolerable in order to generate "self-deportation" are recipes for the creation of social boundaries, further exclusion and exploitation, as well as state and citizen-led violence against immigrants and racialized minorities (Castañeda 2019).

The discourse and policies around "border security" and "immigrant cultural and economic threats" that have to be addressed by federal policies started with the Dillingham Commission created by the U.S. Congress in 1907 (Benton-Cohen 2018), and more recently in California with Governor Wilson's Proposition 187 in 1994. These anti-immigrant policies and discourses by politicians have spread around the world, along with the services of consultants on border security technology, weapons, and architecture. These securitarian and xenophobic understandings have also impacted civil liberties and surveillance away from international borders. For example, after 9/11, the Patriot Act was quickly implemented in the United States, allowing the federal government to spy on citizens. Furthermore, the ACLU notes how the Patriot Act prevents individuals who are being targeted by the FBI from telling others about their status, essentially forcing them to obey a "gag order." The Act also gave law enforcement the power to search people's homes and workplaces with a delay in notifying the individual being searched. These infringements on basic rights and privacy were defended in the name of national security, even though only one terror-related conviction came from it, which as the ACLU notes, "would have occurred even without the Patriot Act" (ACLU 2020b). Furthermore, land a hundred miles away from the southern and northern U.S. borders, as well as the coast, have become zones of exception where people can be detained (ACLU 2020a; Misra 2018).

Throughout history, the location and meaning of borders have constantly shifted. The national and international constellations of political powers get naturalized in borderlands, identities are challenged and rebuilt, and multiple distinctions between border inhabitants fade and reemerge. This volume constitutes a multidisciplinary space to critically analyze the political and sociological implications of the increased solidification of national borders that we currently face worldwide.

3. Denaturalizing Borders by Understanding Them Historically

City-states such as Athens or Sparta existed in ancient times. Venice and Florence were powerful and influential city states in the Middle Ages (Hanagan and Tilly 2011). Citizenship was a feature of life in many pre-modern cities and towns (Prak 2018; Tilly 1992). Other historical forms of political organization include monarchies, fiefdoms, and areas controlled by warlords, where who owed tribute and allegiance to whom was largely delimited by the outcomes of the most recent wars, marriages, and pacts. The extreme of this form of government were empires, where a region would have long-distance reach in asking for tribute and regulating trade. Examples include Alexander the Great expanding the influence of Macedonia and Greek culture across 3000 miles of land, or the inhabitants of Rome creating the Roman Empire that, for a thousand years, governed over and granted citizenship to people with different languages, cultures, and religions. The Ottoman Empire was similarly expansive and inclusive, lasting 600 years. In these examples, the borders of the empire were constantly shifting, and taxation and rights were not tied to a common culture.

The legitimacy of borders as markers of cultural and ethnic differences arose and spread with the birth of the nation-state after the Haitian, American, and particularly French Revolutions. Haiti did not claim to be a Black-only nation. The United States was born as a multi-confessional, multi-lingual,

and multi-racial union of states and territories (Atkinson 2020; Manseau 2015; McCullough 2006). The French Republic more wholly equated popular sovereignty with population homogeneity by creating common cultural practices and a common identity for all the people living within its borders and among the elites in its colonial lands (Anderson 2006; Weber 1976). The implications of the ethno-nation with an official language and culture are still felt by contemporary immigrants and minorities living in France (Castañeda 2018a).

Today, most politicians, policymakers, and citizens believe that borders must exist. They imagine borders as part of a natural law separating nations. Nevertheless, nation-states—with governments representing imagined homogenous communities—are not the only way in which humans can organize to manage public affairs and protect a commonwealth. Popular sovereignty in participative democratic regimes is a historical win coming out of popular struggle, but this does not have to be tied to strict international borders.

4. Borders, State-Centered Approaches, and Methodological Nationalism

History tells us that the primary causes of territorial demarcations are the result of warfare, conquests, and invasions (Castañeda and Schneider 2017). However, there have been many unintended consequences as a result of such conquests. Walled castles and cities had both a defensive purpose and a taxing purpose. Taxing incoming trade became possible because passing through city gates allowed to control who left and came and with what. Since then, one of the main purpose of borders and ports of entry has been to raise customs. While many citizens through the decades have come to embrace nationalism and belief in borders and national sovereignty, let us not equivocate; borders and the problematization of immigration are state-centered approaches. The primary framers of migration and diversity as "social problems" are nation-state governments themselves. They can be problems for political elites but not for the population. A national territory is not equivalent to a house or private property. Thus, by reifying borders and national citizenship walls, we engage in what we are here calling epistemological nationalism: failing to think sociohistorically and instead conceiving of national-states as real, natural, and inevitable units (see also Anderson 2019).

While a real challenge when doing empirical work and collecting data, we must avoid methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller 2002) when designing research or analyzing data, i.e., to draw the scope of a problem or population of study along state boundaries, categories, or definitions given by the state. For example, to be considered an unaccompanied alien child (UAC) has important legal consequences, but sociologically speaking, there is not a UAC population to speak of—they are just youth dealing with the punitive arm of the state and its designations. The law may designate this group as such in paper, but their transit experiences are not necessarily different from people traveling with their parents, or immigrant minors traveling alone but entering undocumented rather than asking for asylum (Jenks and Castañeda 2020). While many UAC-designated youths nowadays are from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras, many were from Europe before the legal designation of UAC existed. Furthermore, there are marked categorical and situational differences for youth from each of these countries, and within them, some may have better circumstances than others making it problematic to consider them as one homogenous group. The designation as an alien matters but it does not truly vary from other alien immigrants. The differences, rather, are produced by the legal system at a particular time. For instance, a recent law demands expedited review of cases involving minors which complicates securing legal representation and expedites deportation (Luiselli 2017).

Some of the papers in this volume use theoretical and methodological innovations to transcend methodological and epistemological nationalism. Some papers directly question the design of international and global studies and the theoretical conceptualization of globalization and transnationalism because they all start from the assumption of independent nation-states. However, thinking that "societies" are perfectly bounded by political borders is a "pernicious postulate" (Tilly 1984) since empirically, culturally, and socially it is practically impossible to establish, for example, where American culture ends and starts or what the differences are on either side of the

Pyrenees (Sahlins 1989). Rather than focus on geographic divisions, we should follow links, networks, social relations, and production chains, all of which often cross many international borders (Wolf 1982).

5. Xenophobia and the Construction of the Moral and Racial Boundaries of the Nation

Borders are socially constructed, but once established, they are constitutive. International borders create ethnic differences by contrasting to the ethnicity next door. It is argued that they become a way to produce and maintain inequality and constitute a form of apartheid. They allow for wealth extraction by richer countries—either as cheaper labor abroad who work for offshore companies based in the global north or as labor commodity with few labor rights as immigrants in the global north (Heyman 2017). Though, rather than blaming employers, people often blame foreign workers for stealing jobs (see Castañeda and Shemesh in this Special Issue).

When policymakers call for more stringent borders, they frequently rely on anti-immigrant rhetoric such as blaming migrants for not assimilating, taking jobs away from citizens, and committing crimes. These views are rooted in nationalism, xenophobia, and a fear of "otherness." However, counterarguments from politicians who are open to immigration frequently fail to address the weaknesses in anti-immigrant rhetoric, thus upholding the power and legitimacy of borders.

When politicians spend their efforts defending immigrants by, for example, standing against Trump's border wall or quoting data analyses about how much the migrant labor force supports the U.S. economy, they fail to address the arbitrariness of borders and the dehumanization of migrants. Democrats standing against the border wall are not calling for eradicating borders; in fact, most Democratic 2020 presidential primary candidates supported increased funding for border security, and many were against decriminalizing border crossing outside of custom checkpoints (Washington Post 2020).

There is, of course, a significant difference between leaders who call for the detention of immigrant children in cages and the separation of family members asking for asylum compared to those who denounce such actions. Nevertheless, children end up in cages because of a shared understanding among all political ideologies that there is a need to keep people out of the country to keep citizens safe. These border myths lead to the exclusion of migrants and limit who is accepted as a "citizen."

Democracy depends on extending the franchise of citizenship to all inhabitants in a region (Castañeda and Schneider 2017). Most countries have made substantial improvements in terms of gender, and there is still a struggle in terms of giving full de facto equality along the axes of religion, race, and ethnicity. Nevertheless, most nation-states still resist giving citizenship rights to people born abroad who are non-citizens, thus discriminating based on place of birth. Naturalization is possible but often takes time and is limited to certain categories of individuals, e.g., the highly educated, athletes, inventors, spouses of citizens. Therefore, national citizenship creates categorical inequalities and excludes millions of people from equal rights in many cities and territories (Castañeda 2018b; Castañeda 2019).

6. The Case for Open Borders

Given how accustomed we have become to nation-states, it takes a good amount of imagination to have a conversation about what different systems can look like. This becomes easier once we are cognitively open to discussing different forms of citizenship that are more equitable and less exclusionary, ones that do not rely on surveillance of migrants, mass detentions, deportation, and the violent enforcement of borders.

There are many current states that are multiethnic. Sometimes tensions exist not from practical or urgent problems but from the ideal of one ethnicity, one state. For example, despite a long social movement in favor of Catalan independence (Tilly et al. 2020, pp. 208–19), Catalonia benefits from being part of Spain and vice versa. Despite fears of "cultural threat" (Zamora-Kapoor and Castañeda 2014), the children of immigrants embrace Catalan culture (Castañeda 2018a). Furthermore, Spain and therefore, Catalonia are both part of the European Union.

Current regional agreements bridge the widespread existence of nation-states and other possible future arrangements. Examples partially transcending the nation-state are most explicit in the European Union. The member countries of the European Union have not disappeared and neither have their cultures or languages. The European Union has not threatened, say, French or German culture. People can travel and relocate openly between member states, although most people estimate that only around 4% of European citizens have migrated across country boundaries within the EU (Eurostat 2020; Pew 2017). The European Union decided to create a new common currency, the Euro, and a central bank. Some of the critiques from leftist movements in Greece, Italy, and Spain have originated from this decision, which further decoupled macroeconomic decisions from local voters (Castañeda 2012b; Castañeda 2015). While economic policy is a contested issue in the EU context, this is also the case within many nation-states.

People often forget to think about a region across the Atlantic from the European Union in similar terms. The United States of America is a federation of independent states each with its own jurisdiction, constitution, flag, legislature, governor, armed guard, electoral system, and traditions. Since the creation of the U.S. Treasury by Alexander Hamilton, there is a common centralized currency: the U.S. dollar. However, like in the European Union, there is free migration within the 50 states of the union, the District of Columbia, and territories around the world like Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Over 40% of people in the United States live in a state different from the one they were born in (Florida 2019). Moving across state lines is no real issue. On the contrary, much of the vitality of the U.S. economy and culture comes from this continuous movement of people across the 50 plus states and territories. Additionally, as of 2020, outside of the 50 states and Washington, D.C., the U.S. has 750 military bases around the world (Vine 2020), and military personal, contractors, and civilians come and go between these spaces.

Nowadays, some residents of the border region can live on the side of the border with a lower cost of living and work on the other side with better pay. They can also take advantage of leisure, shopping, education, and healthcare on either side. However, the current border regime requires visas based on guaranteed high incomes and ties to Mexico. Families on the Mexican side of the border can benefit from a binational life, but they expend considerable resources and time to cross back and forth (Chávez 2016).

Sociologist Fabio Rojas states that open borders are beneficial to the U.S., similar to how commuters go into Chicago every day from Indiana and Wisconsin. These daily commuters from the bordering states do not "steal jobs" from Chicagoans, just as Mexicans do not steal jobs from U.S. citizens. Open borders increases most Americans' incomes and expands innovation (Matthews and Pinkerton 2018). Rojas summarizes the argument for open borders into three parts. First, there is a moral argument against closed borders. Second, the argument that immigration is a theoretical problem does not hold up in practice, as most studies show the theoretical weaknesses. Lastly, open borders to trade, human mobility, and immigration align with liberal support for decreasing inequality and conservative support for hard work (Rojas 2013). Open borders underline individual rights over state rights and big government intervention in personal and family decisions.

The argument here is not for the return to an "empire," but to argue how open borders do not have the negative effects that some associate with them. Open borders do not require a world government or the erasure of control over local issues. Again, the U.S. is an excellent example of this. In 1831, De Tocqueville visited America (Tocqueville 1969) and noted that most of the governance, decision-making, and problem-solving, including the provision of education, were done at the local level with the participation of residents. If anything, open international borders would need to be accompanied by reinforcement in the power and importance of the local level and strengthening the urban, municipal, and county levels of government.

7. Rethinking Borders: Reshaping the World

The contributions of this volume are divided into six related themes around international migration and national borders: (I) Migration and Border Myths; (II) Exclusion; (III) Ethical and Philosophical Questions; (IV) Successful Immigration Practices and Cultural Exchange; (V) International Regionalism and Cooperation; (VI) Homelessness Marginality and Mental Health in the US–Mexico Border Region.

7.1. Migration and Border Myths

The first four papers address migration and border myths. Many people have blamed international migration for the negative effects of globalization. In the piece opening this volume, "Overselling Globalization: The Misleading Conflation of Economic Globalization and Immigration, and the Subsequent Backlash," Ernesto Castañeda and Amber Shemesh stress that there was immigration before globalization. The authors trace the use of the term globalization and reveal how it is used to explain disparate phenomena such as migration, cosmopolitanism, the deindustrialization of the Global North, and income inequality, despite the inaccuracy of bundling all these phenomena as one process. For example, while globalization is decried as the cause for mass immigration, there is less attention on the rise of xenophobia and nationalism. Discussing the work on globalization by Tilly, Wallerstein, and Giddens, and comparing them to the more widespread understanding of globalization and especially to the rhetoric used by Reagan, Clinton, and Blair, the authors reveal how globalization-talk created open borders for corporations and capital but not for low-skilled immigrants. The article emphasizes the need to avoid conflating migration and globalization. Without critically thinking about how these phenomena are not solely dependent on each other, politicians and voters will continue to blame migrants for issues that exist irrespective of them, such as increasing socioeconomic inequality.

In "Methodological Nationalism in Global Studies and Beyond," Agnes Katalin Koos and Kenneth Keulman discuss the field of Global Studies at U.S. institutions and how it became influenced by the field of International Relations (IR). They criticize IR's "methodological nationalism," meaning the field assumes the nation-state as necessary and the precise unit of political analysis today. The authors also point out how the three main areas of IR thought (i.e., realism, idealism, and constructivism) were created by people who were U.S. citizens, which inevitably led to bias. They contend that IR has focused too much on state sovereignty, a Western view of nation-states, and neglects cooperation on ecological issues. Therefore, this paper calls into question the normalcy of national borders. It calls for other theories to be advanced to challenge IR's dominance or to, at least, decrease its reification and justification of nationalism.

In "The Ideal and the Real Dimensions of the European Migration Crisis: The Polish Perspective," Barbara Cieślińska and Małgorzata Dziekońska focus on Poland's acceptance of refugees during their influx from the Middle East into Europe in 2015. The country's parliamentary elections took place at the same time, and the parties that did not support accepting migrants had great success. The authors use ideal types to view refugees through different criteria. They describe how the demographics of arriving refugees are not the same as the demographics of the population where they are, yet they are often inconsistent with the refugee "ideal type": a poor uneducated middle-aged man. For example, refugees were not only going to the nearest country after entering the EU from outside. For some, this is seen as a problem since if refugees were in such a desperate situation, they would be happy to go wherever in the world they could get to first. However, the authors posit that longer distance travel is due to already established social networks in particular countries in Western Europe. In contrast, the rise in the number of refugees in Poland was accompanied by a decrease in the number of processed applications. Only 2.8% of applicants were granted refugee status in 2013, 0.87% in 2016, and 2.95% in 2017. The authors then discuss the case of a refugee center, Białystok, on the Eastern edge of Poland and the EU. Armenians and Chechens previously migrated in large numbers through the city. Interestingly, the Chechens received more support from the state than Armenians. The Armenians had to integrate by learning Polish, while Chechens withdrew and were more isolated. The authors find

that offering social assistance at refugee centers does not necessarily create integration in the shortest term. Nevertheless, studies elsewhere show that a welcoming context of reception may have a large positive effect in the long-term (Castañeda 2018a; Portes and Rumbaut 2014). The paper presents an agnostic view in relation to the management and integration of refugees in Poland, a country with a more recent history of emigration rather than immigration (see Goździak and Main 2020).

In "Border Residents' Perceptions of Crime and Security in El Paso, Texas," Ernesto Castañeda and Casey Chiappetta discuss Hispanic residents' sense of safety and wellbeing in El Paso using data from a 2011–2012 survey sponsored by the U.S. National Institutes of Health. Media and political narratives dictate that violence in Mexico would travel into the U.S. with migrants, painting the border region as a dangerous place. However, this paper provides reasons why this is not be the case for El Paso inhabitants. The city is an illuminating location as it shares a border with Ciudad Juárez, which has high levels of violence. El Paso, however, is one of the safest cities in the U.S. Castañeda and Chiappetta discuss the paradox of an increase in crime in Mexico but the lack of spillover into the U.S. The sample studied includes 919 residents of El Paso. While only Hispanics were surveyed, this is a relevant way to study the El Paso population considering that over 83% of El Paso residents are Hispanic. Among the sample, 60% of the respondents were born in the U.S., and nearly 80% were U.S. citizens. Moreover, 96.9% of respondents said that they felt "very safe" or "safe" in El Paso (and 66.3% of these individuals said they felt "very safe"), whereas only 3.1% said they felt "not safe." While the responses show that men were more likely to feel "very safe" than women, and U.S. citizens feel safer than non-U.S. citizens, these findings challenge misconceptions of American border cities being dangerous.

7.2. Exclusions

Four strong theoretical papers delineated the consequences of the exclusions produced by the policing of national borders, including the imprisonment of uninvited arrivals and ethnic minorities within a country—especially one simultaneously espousing racial "colorblindness" and the idea of a homogenous population. At the same time, it claims to sponsor universal values and beliefs, while it discriminates against ethnic, racial, religious, and other minorities.

In "Processes of Sub-Citizenship: Neoliberal Statecrafting 'Citizens,' 'Non-Citizens,' and Detainable 'Others'," Daile Lynn Rung critically analyzes how nation-states create citizens and non-citizens along a continuum of rights. Rung conducts a qualitative analysis of child detention centers in Australia and the United States. Through this, Rung introduces the term "sub-citizenship," a process of subordination that occurs at a hierarchical level. People's experiences accessing social justice and human rights vary based on their social position, including immigration and citizenship status and interactions with international borders. The hierarchical system goes between citizens (1st class), deportable others (2nd class), highly deportable others (3rd class), and detainable others (4th class). While there are far more children in U.S. detention centers (15,000 in 2018) than in Australia (1068 children in 2014), the children detailed similar traumatic experiences. Rung shows how the children's sub-citizenship exposes them to state-led violence.

In "'White Diversity:' Paradoxes of Deracializing Antidiscrimination," Milena Doytcheva analyzes various paradigms of diversity. Superdiversity "is designed to highlight the conjunction of race and ethnicity with a range of discrete categories, such as age, address, legal status, and occupation" (Doytcheva 2020, p. 5). In addition to theoretical discussions of diversity, Doytcheva uses the processes of corporate diversity campaigns and gentrification as examples of how middle- and upper-class residents in France can appear as open-minded. However, the process ultimately benefits Whiteness without actually producing organizational change. Gentrification does not end up contributing to social change that would help residents of color. While there is a push for a race-blind society in France, White diversity determines which minority differences are accepted and which are not. This phenomenon is akin to Foucault's "normalized diversity", in which only forms of difference and otherness that fit the White view of diversity are accepted. Doytcheva shows this practice occurring through discrimination in the job hiring process and beyond.

7.3. Ethical and Philosophical Questions

We then address philosophical discussions and ethical questions about how governments should best address borders, immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Enrique Camacho-Beltrán dissects the meaning of borders within liberal democracies in the paper, "Legitimate Exclusions of Would-Be Immigrants: A View from Global Ethics and the Ethics of International Relations." There is a separation between two camps: the inclusionists (who believe in a need for porous borders, international freedom of movement, and human equality) and the exclusionists (who are focused on a country's internal affairs and where consent is needed before immigrating or migrating to another country). The author explores the concepts of legitimacy (who is entitled to what and to what extent) and justice (the distribution of burdens and benefits), and the unbounded demos thesis, which posits that borders are institutions themselves. This paper shows how inclusionism goes beyond naiveté or leftist posturing but is the most practical, beneficial, and ethical, and how exclusionism is not only faulty logically but also morally.

Many philosophical discussions about migration ethics are based on abstract concepts, stating assumptions, and thought experiments. Some of these arguments are often full of logical fallacies and fall short of empirical facts. Therefore, there is power in combining philosophical discussions, ethical considerations, concrete cases, and critical analyses of theoretical and legal arguments. In their fascinating contribution, "Group Asylum, Sovereignty, and the Ethics of Care," Luis Xavier López-Farjeat and Cecilia Coronado-Angulo dissect the arguments that use the concept of national sovereignty to control borders and people coming in. The "refugee crisis" was created when a visible number of people from a given region of the world arrived at a border checkpoint escaping war, gangs, or political persecution. Thus, individual asylum cases become framed by politicians and the media as unruly groups of people asking for "group asylum" if they can establish supportive precedents in immigration courts. Examples are the boats in the Mediterranean Sea or the Caravans from Central America to the United States. Arguments about the inability of any country to "deal" with these individuals are factually false given that most empirical research shows how immigrants and refugees create economic growth. López-Farjeat and Coronado-Angulo then propose the "ethics of care" as a solution to international mobility because our ethical duties to others supersede state sovereignty.

7.4. Successful Immigration Practices and Cultural Exchange

Not all media coverage and academic research on immigration has to focus on the negative. In "Analyzing Migration Management: On the Recruitment of Nurses to Germany," Jan Kordes, Robert Pütz, and Sigrid Rand analyze Germany's shortage of nurses in elder care institutions and the state's push to recruit nursing staff abroad. This recruitment process, known as migration management, is meant to address half a million nurse shortages in Germany by 2030. Migration management posits that, if done well, migration processes can benefit all groups by fixing a gap in the labor market through hiring qualified nurses from other countries. Germany has encouraged recruitment programs and created legal exemptions to allow for an increase in nurses. In response, the applications for care workers increased from 1500 in 2012 to 11,500 in 2018. Foreign nurses are viewed as "desirable" migrants. Nevertheless, specific credentials and requirements are needed for acceptance, such as German language proficiency. Nurses from other countries face difficulty in having their credentials officially recognized by Germany, causing them to have to obtain more training before being accepted. This disparity reflects how privileges are assigned to certain migrant groups, such as those who speak the host country's language or poses valued skills.

In "Going by an English Name: The Adoption and Use of English Names by Young Taiwanese Adults," Ivona Baresova and Marcel Pikhart study Taiwanese adults using English names. This is a micro-level analysis of what "border-crossing" or cultural globalization may look like in practice. They surveyed 76 Taiwanese adults, 40 of whom were studying abroad at universities in the Czech Republic. All of the respondents were fluent in Mandarin, and English was their first foreign language. Only four of the respondents did not report an English-sounding nickname. More than 50% of participants changed their English name, and almost 40% value their English name as much as

their Chinese name. Reasons for using the English name include allowing for easier communication in multicultural settings and creating familiar identifiers among fellow Taiwanese young adults. The majority of respondents had been studying abroad, so they may be more "global" than other Taiwanese. Moreover, Taiwanese names are more "traditional/historical" than names in other Asian countries; this could create more openness to adopting a more contemporary name while studying abroad. Despite these limitations, the study still reveals how international students and travelers are inclined to change their own identity in favor of the dominant culture.

7.5. International Regionalism and Cooperation

Another reason to think beyond borders is to address environmental issues, pandemics, and public health. Vijay Kumar Chattu and Georgina Chami in their paper, "Global Health Diplomacy Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Strategic Opportunity for Improving Health, Peace, and Well-Being in the CARICOM Region—A Systematic Review," analyze how globalization impacts health by focusing specifically on COVID-19's impact in the Caribbean. The Caribbean Health in All Policies (HiAP) Community, known as CARICOM, was established in 1973 and is comprised of 20 countries. The authors investigated Global Health Diplomacy (GHD), which is when stakeholders work to advance public health, management, law, and global affairs, in these countries during a pandemic. They gathered evidence regarding disease and health security throughout the Caribbean and reviewed 33 articles. The findings show how disease and outbreaks have a significant negative impact on CARICOM's tourism industries, which is why GHD is essential in dealing with COVID-19 and creating ways to ensure health security through partnerships with institutions across CARICOM. Leadership is needed not just in the public health sector but also in diplomacy, so coordination is always happening across political boundaries. The authors offer examples of specific programs that may help deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, such as expanding access to health information through telehealth and creating a regional global health diplomacy center. This article shows the benefits of interregional diplomacy when facing global crises, such as a pandemic.

In another less known example of regional integration, Inocent Moyo's article, "On Decolonizing Borders and Regional Integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region," presents a qualitative analysis of people who travel through the Southern African Development Community. The SADC is a Regional Economic Community in Africa that embraces regional integration through formal institutions. However, there is still tension between the member states' sovereignty and an embrace of full regionalization. The data from 2013–2017 features interviews with individuals traveling predominantly across the Botswana-Zimbabwe and South Africa-Zimbabwe borders. Moyo finds that there is a lack of policies in the countries that focus on the informal economy. With the absence of regulation, transnational economic activities by non-state actors occur often. This article discusses recommendations to decolonize these borders that take into account the already existing informal cross-border networks.

7.6. Homelessness Marginality and Mental Health in the US-Mexico Border

Borders provide brokerage opportunities not only for wealthy entrepreneurs but also for the most vulnerable such as the homeless who may be attracted to the border (Campbell and Lachica 2013; Comar 2011). Border cities are strategic locations to study those living, literally and symbolically, at the margins of a society. In "Sick enough? The severity of mental illness and service eligibility for homeless individuals at the border," Curtis Smith and Ernesto Castañeda study the relationship between mental illness and homelessness in El Paso, Texas. Original data was obtained through a survey of homeless individuals asking them to self-report mental illness.

Contrary to assumptions that homeless individuals have high mental illness rates, the findings show that homeless respondents experiencing "severe mental illness" are only around 2–3% higher than the general population, and "any mental illness" is 1–3% higher than the general population. The findings challenge the stereotypes of homeless individuals experiencing mental illness at far

higher rates than housed individuals. The study also notes the limitations of the Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) "Point In Time" measurement for homeless individuals as the HUD survey only asks respondents one question related to mental illness. The authors' survey offers more accurate results of how many homeless people qualify for subsidized housing based on HUD's policy. It calls for housing assistance for a broader population, not only subsets of people experiencing homelessness.

Gustavo Aviña Cerecer's ethnography of the San Diego-Tijuana corridor applies the theoretical framework of Gilles Deleuze in "The Dispossessed of Necropolitics on the San Diego-Tijuana Border." The study focuses on hard drug users experiencing homelessness, referred to as the "dispossessed." The devaluation of the lives of immigrants and the dispossessed along a militarized border results in politics and economic practices that trade in human lives and cause preventable deaths.

8. Conclusions

This Special Issue considers everyday life in border cities for average citizens who feel safe and the dispossessed who are challenged by hunger and state forces. It looks at successful cases of integration and migration management and more seamless and beneficial regional integration. The images that people who live far from borders have of border regions are distorted by fiction, politicians, and media discourses. Militarized and walled international borders are not a necessary evil to keep a country safe. On the contrary, they are places that justify the negation of human rights for foreigners through practices that later on may affect citizens further inland (Cohen 2020). We would do well to imagine a world without borders, one with more robust policies that take care of all local residents, reduce income inequality, and truly reward merit and effort.

This volume provides new perspectives, research, and theories to take a human-centered approach to world populations where we center human rights and the right of transit and mobility, the right of cultural difference, and freedom of religion. The transition of sovereignty from the crown to the people was a significant step in spreading rights (Castañeda and Schneider 2017; Reed 2020). Nevertheless, the current emphasis on national sovereignty—as limited and defined by artificial and political territorial boxes that we call nation-states or racist understandings of nations as bloodline communities—get in the way of the protection of the 3% of the world population that lives in a country different from the one they were born in. Addressing pandemics, climate change, and just economic exchange requires truly global approaches that do not put national interests over humanity's wellbeing. It is time to reshape the world by rethinking boundaries.

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Article

Overselling Globalization: The Misleading Conflation of Economic Globalization and Immigration, and the Subsequent Backlash

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Abstract: Many think that immigration is something caused by globalization, and some subsequently blame immigrants for the increased inequalities produced by economic globalization. Xenophobic nationalism has gained popularity around the world, further increasing racial tensions but without addressing the underlying causes of growing socioeconomic inequality, which this paper strives to show is caused by economic policies, not immigration. This paper argues that the apparent retreat from globalization arises from the flawed conceptualization of "globalization" as a bundle of different processes. This study analyzes early framings of economic globalization and shows how it has been linked, for political reasons, to increased migration, diversity, and open borders. Coining the term "globalization" was not just naming ongoing social change, but it became part of the branding of an elite ideological policy project. The popular framing of globalization purposely entangled independent phenomena such as free trade policies, the expansion of the internet, cosmopolitan identities, and international migration. These couplings brought together neoliberal conservatives and liberal cosmopolitans. Given the current backlash, it is essential to distinguish migration from policies favoring trade and capital movement across borders. It is noteworthy to remember that immigration is something that preceded globalization. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how migration became entangled with globalization in the popular imagination.

Keywords: anti-immigration; neoliberalism; populism; xenophobia; globalists; borders

1. Introduction

Globalization is a concept that is widely discussed yet hardly defined. No singular, concise definition is agreed upon by all scholars. A consensus, though, is that the term is rooted in changes in economic policy. However, globalization's definition has been increasingly expansive—by, for example, including people and culture in the list of cross-border exchanges. No discipline owns the term or has sole jurisdiction over the study of "the global" (Koos and Keulman 2019). The term has become obfuscated, obscuring rather than clarifying social analyses.

It is common today to use the term "globalization" in everyday language and assume that there is a shared meaning, but the term is polysemic; it means different things to different people. This paper presents a brief analysis of how the academic definitions of globalization have varied through the years, and how those definitions have altered the general public's notion of what the implications of globalization are for them. The paper theorizes about the contemporary political consequences of the most popular framings of the term globalization and especially, its conflation with international migration and cultural homogenization.

The public has been told for decades that there is a direct link between globalization and immigration. This paper analyzes early framings of economic globalization and shows how some social

theorists, politicians, and pundits linked economic liberalization to increased migration, diversity, and open borders. Theorists oversold globalization to draw attention to the magnitude of the changes to come. The popularized framing of globalization entangled independent phenomena such as free trade policies, offshoring, the expansion of the internet, cosmopolitan identities, and international migration into one. This conflation was embraced for political reasons by the left and right alike. Coining the term "globalization" was not just denoting ongoing social change, but it became the branding of a policy project while its consequences were starting to unfold. Like a financial derivative, the concept of globalization packaged together fragments of independent objects and branded them as desirable investments. As with many derivatives after the 2008 recession, the globalization combo seemed less appealing after the shrinking of the middle class.

Research shows that income and wealth inequalities have increased in the last four decades (Case and Deaton 2020; Keister 2014; Killewald et al. 2017; Piketty and Saez 2003; Piketty 2014). In the United States, the 1 percent with the highest earnings received about 20 percent of total income in 2011, up from about 10 percent in the late 1970s (Alvaredo et al. 2013, p. 4), and "since 1981, the incomes of the top 5% of earners have increased faster than the incomes of other families" (Horowitz et al. 2020). However, rather than attacking the fiscal policies and practices causing this growing inequality, "globalization" at large has been blamed. Opportunistic politicians and parts of the population blamed the decrease in wages and employment security brought up by neoliberal economic policies linked to globalization on immigrants and ethnic minorities. In recent years, xenophobia and nationalism have gained popularity around the world, further increasing racial tensions without addressing the causes of growing socioeconomic inequality, creating more space for the radicalization of white nationalists. For example, Donald Trump's first presidential campaign attacked "globalization" for its effects in the domestic job market. He equated globalization with China and immigration with Mexico. He blamed them directly for deindustrialization and a decreasing standard of living among the white working-class. However, he failed to mention the fact that U.S. corporations and shareholders have been some of the largest beneficiaries of access to cheap labor at home and abroad.

While social spending and policies put in place during the New Deal have been rolled back, migration patterns have not changed in terms of relative magnitude. Nonetheless, popular discourses often reproduce this confounding of globalization and migration. It is essential to distinguish between the movement of people and the policies favoring international trade and capital flows. The apparent retreat of globalization arises from the framing of the term "globalization," by epistemological debates and political posturing, rather than by fundamental changes in international trade or population dynamics in the last years. Open borders have never been the explicit goal of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the renegotiated United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). In the cases where opening borders to trade have been linked to the free movement of people, e.g., within the European Union, no migration crises have occurred because only a small percentage of European citizens have migrated within the region (Crouch 2019, p. 23).

The percentage of migrants in the world in 2017 was approximately 3.4 percent of the population (UN 2017), and this is consistent with previous years (Koser 2007). Since 1850, the percentage of the foreign-born in the United States of America has fluctuated between a low of 4.7 percent of the population in 1970 to highs of 14.8 percent in the 1890 and 13.6 in 2017 (Radford 2019). Undocumented immigrants in the United States were approximately 3.2 percent of the U.S. population in 2017 (Radford 2019). Detentions at the U.S. border have gone down since 2000 (Massey 2019). Since 2008, more Mexicans are leaving the U.S. than arriving (Passel et al. 2012). The most significant new sources of immigrants to the United States are El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. However, these countries have a combined total population of 33 million in 2017 versus a U.S. population of 325.7 million, and clearly, not all Central Americans want to leave their homes and move to the U.S.

As of February 1, 2020, the European Union was composed of 28 member countries, including the U.K, with a population of at least 512.4 million people. According to Eurostat, in 2017, 4.4 million people immigrated to one of the then 28 member countries of the European Union, and at least

3.1 million people left a member country. Therefore, net migration was approximately 1.3 million or 0.25 percent of the EU population, a rather negligible percent for labor markets and welfare systems, even more, because most migrants work, pay taxes, and consume goods. In 2018, 22.3 million EU residents were non-EU citizens, that is, 4.4% of the population. Despite completely open internal borders, in 2018, only "1.9 million people previously residing in one EU Member State migrated to another Member State"(Eurostat 2020), which is only 0.37 percent of the population. The civil war in Syria had produced 6.7 million refugees as of 2018 (Todd 2019), and, while tragic, this represents less than 0.1 percent of a global population of 7.53 billion. Each number represents a difficult departure for these individuals. Some countries receive more immigrants and refugees than others. Nevertheless, these numbers show that the vast majority of the world population is not migrating (Koser 2007).

Therefore, numerically and globally speaking, the numbers of international migrants should not be panic-inducing. How did ongoing migration processes become entangled with a series of supposedly novel phenomena? How did a term that was initially understood as a movement of goods become conflated with the movement of people? What is the actual link between globalization and migration? This paper analyzes academic and political discussions around immigration and globalization, but first, the meaning of "globalization" must be considered.

2. What Is Globalization?

Goods and services consumed by people have always come from a combination of local, nearby, and distant sources. The changes in international trade routes, war, technology, and production affect this mix. Thus, American social theorist, Charles Tilly describes globalization as an increase in the proportion and impact of intercontinental over local or regional transactions (Tilly 1995, pp. 1–2). In other words, Tilly means that sometimes people will be more likely to trade and form relationships with people far away (e.g., populations living close to roads leading to Rome during the Roman Empire, or the historical silk route). At other times, economic transactions and local ties will be more local and regional (e.g., during civil wars, sieges, blockades, famines, quarantines, or during the times of import substitution industrialization, the iron wall, or Cuba under embargo). At other times people will be the ones moving (Castañeda 2018a). In Figure 1, it can be seen how Tilly graphs levels of globalization along two axes: The impact (magnitude and social significance) of intercontinental (long-distance, e.g., between America and Europe, or Asia and Africa) transactions (trade, communication, association, contracts, relationships, alliances, marriages, etc.) versus the proportion (number of intercontinental transactions/local transactions) of intercontinental transactions. Some products and services must be local such as haircuts, delivery, garbage collection, dry cleaning, landscaping, restaurants, and other services. In contrast, others can be either local, regional, or international, e.g., food and industrial production.

Tilly sees this as a two-directional process (Figure 1). Quantitatively more intercontinental trade and qualitatively more meaningful exchanges lead to high levels of globalization. The increases in local consumption and decreases in the impact and number of international trade lead to deglobalization or a low level of globalization. Thus, for Tilly, "globalization" is not a thing or era-defining phenomenon but a temporal state of affairs regarding the geographical scale of frequent economic and social relations. Significant changes in the social importance and ratios between local and distant production and consumption have occurred before. The process of globalization in trade has manifested itself various times throughout history. Therefore, historically-minded scholars talk about large waves of globalization in modern times.

Figure 1. The process of globalization and deglobalization (source Castañeda 2007).

3. Waves of Globalization

Many authors agree that economic "globalization" has occurred before. During colonialism and the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century, companies used raw materials from faraway lands and desperately looked for markets abroad. In 1820, "café-goers would sip Chinese tea sweetened with Jamaican sugar" (The Economist 2016). While the term globalization itself may not have been used at the time of the Industrial Revolution, the process of globalization, as defined above, is clear. Though an exact periodization is hard to pin down, globalization happened before.

According to some, there have been two periods of globalization: "One from the end of the Napoleonic Wars [1803–1815] to World War One, and the other from the end of World War Two to the present" (Bardhan et al. 2006, p. 3). Going further back to the 1500s, Charles Tilly argues that globalization has occurred in three waves:

> During the half millennium since 1500, three main waves of globalization have occurred. The first arrived right around 1500. It resulted from the rapidly spreading influence of Europe, growth of the Ottoman Empire, and parallel expansions of Chinese and Arab merchants into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific . . . We can place the second major post-1500 wave of globalization at approximately 1850–1914 . . . During this period, international trade and capital flows reached previously unmatched heights, especially across the Atlantic . . . Migration, trade, and capital flows slowed between the two world wars. But as Europe and Asia recovered from World War II, a third post-1500 surge of globalization began . . . During the early twenty-first century, the third wave of post-1500 globalization was moving ahead with full force (Tilly et al. 2020, pp. 99–100).

Tilly does not mean to say that globalization comes in waves, as the effects of changes in the ocean or as a force of nature producing waves following its own rhythm. Instead, Tilly argues that there have been periods of high globalization even before this term emerged. He also indicates that war and epidemics have caused low levels of globalization in the past (Tilly et al. 2020, Chapter 5).

Some use the term "global" as a western-centric euphemism for imperialism and colonialism (Friedman 2005; Poppi and Cheng 2013, p. ix), with the first wave beginning with Christopher Columbus' trip across the Atlantic Ocean. Friedman uses celebratory and anachronistic language to describe previous waves of globalization. His characterization of the current wave of globalization tends to be too focused on individual agency and technological change. It repeats many of the clichés associated

with the term "globalization," as discussed below. Claims abound that the last wave of globalization has been "powered by individuals, who began to cooperate globally, thanks to the creation and diffusion of a global fiber-optic network all over the world" (Poppi and Cheng 2013, p. ix). The increases in technological advances have indeed created the possibility for faster methods of communication across long distances. However, the widely held assumption that these new technologies caused globalization is wrong. Saying that new technologies cause globalization is what Tilly calls technological determinism, that is, attributing outsized causal power to technology without looking at the social conditions that precipitate the adoption and spread of technology affecting production and consumption. Furthermore, new technologies emerge constantly, and technology does not necessarily disappear in times of deglobalization.

In his 1979 book, *The Capitalist World-Economy*, Immanuel Wallerstein does not use the term globalization. Instead, he discusses the long-distance trade and conceptions of economic growth surrounding the Industrial Revolution. He argues:

> In the mid twentieth century, the dominant theory of development in the core countries of the capitalist world-economy had added little to the theorizing of the nineteenth-century progenitors of this mode of analysis, except to quantify the models and to abstract them still further, by adding on epicyclical codas to the models in order to account for ever further deviations from empirical expectations (Wallerstein 1979, p. 2).

Thus, the answer to what is globalization is not to be found in economics textbooks, but in the historical record and the history of ideas.

4. Coining the Term

The term "globalization" spread relatively quickly from business school discussions to academia, to popular publications read by some aspiring policymakers, and to public policy. *The Economist* is an influential British magazine that has long acted as a proponent of free trade, neoliberal policies, and economic globalization. The magazine's first use of the term "globalization" was in an article in 1961 arguing for economic reform in Spain. Nonetheless, it was not until 1983 when Theodore Levitt became one of the first scholars to define the term. A marketing professor at Harvard Business School, Levitt used "globalization" to "refer to the spread of corporations around the world" and "the more or less simultaneous marketing and sale of identical goods and services around the world" in an article in the Harvard Business Review (The Economist 2009).

Levitt argued that it is beneficial for companies to "globalize," that is, to standardize their products and expand their geographical reach rather than focus on local product specialization. He described this process as a necessary means to improve overall productivity and saw the advancement of technology as a way to achieve this standardization. He then made a forecast:

> The globalization of markets is at hand. With that, the multinational commercial world nears its end, and so does the multinational corporation. The multinational and the global corporation are not the same thing. The multinational corporation operates in a number of countries, and adjusts its products and practices in each—at high relative costs. The global corporation operates with resolute constancy—at low relative cost—as if the entire world (or major regions of it) were a single entity; it sells the same things in the same way everywhere (Levitt 1983).

For a while, it was common for companies such as Colgate-Palmolive to produce different products, for example, making different kinds of toothpaste in Mexico and the United States, with physical factories, workers, media campaigns, and different formulas in each country. Levitt proposed to standardize the product entirely. Levitt's argument in favor of product standardization worldwide has been actualized by corporations standardizing "products, packaging, and communication to achieve a least-common-denominator positioning that would be effective across cultures" (Holt et al. 2004).

Levitt's ideas, in large part, reflected ongoing practices by corporations—such as Coca-Cola—using global brands and marketing campaigns and became adopted by a few others in the 1980s.

Subsequently, McDonald's evolved into both a favorite example and proof of globalization. Soon the implications of product standardization across some countries became increasingly exaggerated and unproven. However, they became a mantra and part of an invisible ideology for generations. Many sociology books included McDonald's in their title and talked about large social change. *Time* writer Randy James writes that McDonald's is "widely seen as one of the true vanguards of peaceful globalization" due to the corporation's 1990 opening in Moscow, which he says is "credited with helping thaw Cold War tensions" (James 2009). James cites the columnist Thomas Friedman, who "has asserted that nations with McDonald's locations do not go to war with each other—the so-called Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention—although that thesis notably collapsed in the case of the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia"(James 2009). Additionally, Friedman wrote:

> The world has become an increasingly interwoven place, and today, whether you are a company or a country, your threats and opportunities increasingly derive from who you are connected to. This globalization system is also characterized by a single word: the *Web*. So in the broadest sense we have gone from a system built around division and walls to a system increasingly built around integration and webs (Friedman 1999, p. 8).

Thus, many of the new words of the late 1990s and early 2000s used to discuss the internet—web, interwoven, connected, integrated—could be put together in one paragraph to describe changes to come in the economy and social relations across long distances. Nonetheless, having people communicate and connect through the internet is not truly equivalent to eliminating tariffs or visas. Furthermore, to whom one is connected to has always had the most significant implications, as argued by sociologists and others using a relational understanding (Bandelj 2012; Castañeda 2018b; Mische 2011; Padgett and Ansell 1993; Simmel 1964; Tilly et al. 1995; Zelizer 2012).

Fast-food franchises require local inputs and personnel. However, when it comes to manufacturing, globalization can lead to the outsourcing of production, increases in imports, and the closing of local factories. Neoliberal economists frame this in terms of national "competitive advantages," which in practice is a way to justify moving factories to countries with cheaper labor and weaker labor laws. Offshoring can increase unemployment and reduce wages for former industrial workers in developed and middle-income countries.

5. The Role of Social Theorists in an Expanding Conception of Globalization

British sociologist Anthony Giddens writes about how globalization brings up issues of scale that go beyond "societies" and national borders. Giddens defines globalization "as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (Giddens 1990, p. 64). Giddens describes globalization as a dialectical process because the global impacts the local and the local becomes part of the global. In the words of Michael Lang, Giddens defines globalization as the "stretching of social connections between the local and the distant so as to create a highly intensified worldwide scale"(Lang 2006, p. 900). According to Giddens, globalization has social implications and broadens the scope of relations among societies and individuals across the world. Giddens sees globalization as a radicalization of the properties of modernity. In the words of Hsu, for Giddens:

> globalization does not wholly supersede previous forms of social organization; globalization is not only associated with the blurring of traditional distinctions such as what is international or domestic, but it is also linked to the reiteration of some of those features . . . Such a nuanced approach is absent from the hyperglobalists and the skeptics, who both tend to approach globalization as an either/or proposition (Hsu 2010, p. 207).

While some authors, such as those presented below, proposed quite nuanced and complicated views of globalization, many citizens were quick to divide into anti- and pro-globalization camps with

corresponding moral attributes. Not only were financiers, tech entrepreneurs, politicians, pundits, journalists, and students enamored by the new term "globalization" and the futurist images it produced, but so were serious social theorists, including critical ones.

Karl Marx wrote explicitly about the global nature of capitalism and how it needed to expand territorially to continue existing. He also wrote about how this would create new dispossessions and systemic crises (Tucker 1978). Nonetheless, social theorists tried to explain the new twists in the global expansion of capitalism happening around them. For instance, being based in the multicultural San Francisco Bay Area in the 1990s, University of California Berkeley sociologist Manuel Castells wrote much about what he called "the networked society" and the "new information economy." His brilliant analysis and observations though conflated changes in the economy, innovation in communication technologies, and migration in his three-volume classic work *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* (Castells 1986, 1987, 1988). Castells writes:

> In the last quarter of this century, a new form of socio-economic organization has emerged . . . it is certainly a capitalist system. Indeed, for the first time in history the entire planet is capitalist, since even the few remaining command economies are surviving or developing through their linkages to global, capitalist markets. Yet this is a brand of capitalism that is at the same time very old and fundamentally new. It is old because it appeals to relentless competition in the pursuit of profit, and individual satisfaction (deferred or immediate) is its driving engine. But it is fundamentally new because it is tooled by new information and communication technologies that are at the roots of new productivity sources, of new organizational forms, and of the formation of a global economy the profile of this new world we are living in is shared by all countries despite the diversity of their cultures and institutions (Castells 1999, p. 2).

Castells' economic analysis, as well as that of political economists, reminds us that for capitalism to continue functioning, it had to create ever-expanding markets and become global. As in the past, new technologies aid in this endeavor. However, his work also has a trace of technological determinism. Immigrant diversity and intercultural communication get celebrated along with the advances of Silicon Valley. Castells was aware that those benefiting the most from new technologies and labor systems were not immigrants assigned to low-skill jobs. Unfortunately, these nuances are lost in the many people who later cite Castells as talking about a trifecta of new technology, global migration, and economic restructuring as an unstoppable trinity.

Castells notes how the "extreme flexibility of the system" allows for more links and networks to connect "everything that is valuable according to dominant values and interests," but that this same network also inherently disconnects "everything that is not valuable, or becomes devalued. This simultaneous capacity to include and exclude people, territories and activities is based upon a capacity to network" (Castells 1999, p. II). The analogy of a network to society is a useful one (King 2020; Salganik 2018; Watts 2003), but society is much more complicated than ICT networks. Social network theory and relational analyses emphasize ties and connections, but these preceded and go beyond IT social network sites or cable, ethernet, or fiber optic communication networks (Tilly 2005).

For David Held and his co-authors, "globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and the world order" (Held et al. 1999, p. 7). They equate globalization to a "force" and use an expansive definition of globalization to explain all contemporary social change.

Postmodern authors embraced the images brought up by globalization. Appadurai (1996) wrote in stimulating ways about global production chains and the social meaning of consumption, but also about ethereal ethnoscapes and ideoscapes. Some authors tried to rein in postmodern claims or tunnel through post-material claims with empirical data or analyses grounded in historical materialism. In *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, neo-Marxist geographer Harvey (1989) writes about the relationship between changes in cultural and economic production.

He describes changes in modes of production going, in his view, from modernism grounded in assembly-line production Fordism and Keynesian economic policies, to postmodernism and its emphasis on "flexible accumulation," with disposable labor as a quick response to changing consumer demands, and the increasing dominance of international financial markets.

Paralleling David Harvey, some authors talk about globalization as the compression of space and time. Papastergiadis (2000) states that globalization has commonly been used since the 1980s to

> represent the perception of the world as an interconnected whole and the consciousness that a growing number of issues can no longer be addressed purely at a local level. Globalization has been predominantly associated with the flexible and spatially extended forms of production, the rapid mobility of capital, information and goods, the denationalizing of capital, the deterritorialization of culture, the interpenetration of local communities by global media networks, and the dispersal of socio-economic power beyond the Euro-American axis . . . In the age of globalization the process of exchange and flow, it appears, is conducted on a series of smooth circuits that link distant places into a single time frame (Papastergiadis 2000, p. 76).

In this rendition, globalization is the sum of a long list of disparate elements. In the popular imagination, the "smooth" movement across space/time becomes almost like a beta version of teletransportation in Star Trek or traveling in hyperspace as in Star Wars:

> The use of new communicational technologies in international financial transactions have given rise to a hyperspace of 'fast capitalism' as the global flow of capital, energy, goods and people speeds up to accompany the proliferation of images, simulations and symbols. These bypass geographical and political boundaries; are beyond the constraints of space and time; and, in this, are post-historical' (Benyon and Dunkerley 2000, p. 33 discussing T.W. Luke and Jean Baudrillard).

Therefore, in some "postmodern" texts, real changes in communication technology and economic transactions suddenly take readers to imagine science fiction utopias. Thinking about other possibilities, including "alter-globalizations" can be useful theoretically. However, the most dangerous theorizing about globalization happened in economics and political life. In the process of popularizing the term, the nuances, complexities, critiques, and new progressive possibilities around this new way to organize the economy were lost. Instead, for proponents of neoliberal globalization and the general public, the descriptions of the changes seen by social theorists became predictions of an unstoppable future. Rather than describe globalization as a set of policy decisions useful to corporations in the global north or as a profitable process, as Levitt (1983) did, many turned to describe globalization as inevitable.

6. Neoliberalism or Inevitable Force?

The 1980s marked a departure from the international economic system established at Bretton Woods. As Strange (1986) describes, state power was used to render states less able to regulate and rein in the national and international financial systems, giving more control to banks and financial traders. The system changed from one averse to crises to one that Susan Strange called "casino capitalism," where private actors pocketed the earnings. However, in cases of massive losses, taxpayers in many countries would foot the bill to save the multinational financial system and would face austerity measures even when they did not engage in any reckless behavior. Producing socialism for corporations and capitalism for the poor (Blyth 2013; Strange 1986).

These changes, and those to come, were due in large part to what many call "neoliberalism." As political economists, economic sociologists, political scientists, and historians have aptly documented—along with fortuitous events, crises, and unintended consequences—libertarians, neoconservatives, ordoliberals, neoliberal economists, anti-Soviet groups, and economic elites came together looking to decrease the size of the welfare state in Western Europe, roll back the policies

of the New Deal in the United States, and create international legal regimes that reduced tariff walls, and protected capital and private property (Babb 2001; Bockman and Eyal 2002; Davies 2017; Harvey 2005; Krippner 2012; Portes 1997; Strange 1986). Neoliberal economic theory, as espoused by Ludwig von Misses, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman—and many others affiliated with the Mont Pèlerin Society, the Geneva School, or the Chicago School—served as an ideological basis for national and international policies that reduced state responsibility for social services and welfare provisions and increased the independence of capital and the world economy (Slobodian 2018).

Neoliberals hijacked the theoretical work on globalization to advance their previous goals of creating an independent world economy free of democratic and populist constraints. Globalization-speech then became a discursive tool to spread neoliberal policies around the world in the form of structural adjustments and opening economies to trade from the U.S. and England. Neoliberalism went from business interests to ideology to state policy, but this spread took decades of lobbying campaigning, and in the process, the content of this ideology changed. An ideology initially advocating for no borders to capital inputs, including labor, became one in favor of lifting barriers to trade but in controlling immigrants and in differentiating between higher and lower cultures. This can be seen in the changing point of view in the work of Hayek himself (Slobodian 2018).

Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan is credited as a "pivotal figure" in the mainstreaming of neoliberalism, with scholars arguing that "his ideology and policies fed, encouraged, and supported the drivers of globalization" (Johns 2015, p. 609). In a 1981 speech Reagan gave to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, he said that the aforementioned institutions:

> have worked tirelessly to preserve the framework for international economic cooperation and to generate confidence and competition in the world economy. They have been inspired by the ideal of a far better world in which economic growth and development would spread to all parts of the globe … These institutions have reflected a shared vision of growth and development through political freedom and economic opportunity. A liberal and open trade and payment system would reconstruct a shattered world and lay the basis for prosperity to help avoid future conflicts. This vision has become reality for many of us. Let us pledge to continue working together to ensure that it becomes reality for all (Reagan 1981).

In another one of his speeches, Reagan spoke about:

> the changing economic realities—in which products are increasingly information and can be transmitted around the world at the speed of light—these new economic realities dictate a world economy. Because of our experience with a continental economy, we are uniquely situated to lead the world into a new era of economic cooperation, to make this "city on a hill" that is America, a global city. The watchword of this new era will be freedom- free enterprise, free trade, freedom to travel, freedom of emigration. Freedom- the emancipation of peoples' creative energies around the world. That's the challenge that has opened up to us in the 1980s (Reagan 1988).

Reagan promoted these policies while in office, especially in the context of the Cold War. This free trade discourse was widely reproduced by officeholders in the U.S., the U.K., Chile, Mexico, and beyond. In the U.S., both Republicans and Democrats openly embraced neoliberal globalization. Former U.S. President Clinton spoke about globalization in a speech in Vietnam:

> Today the United States and Vietnam open a new chapter in our relationship, at a time when people all across the world trade more, travel more, know more about and talk more with each other than ever before. Even as people take pride in their national independence, we know we are becoming more and more interdependent. The movement of people, money, and ideas across borders, frankly, breeds suspicion among many good people in every country. They are worried about globalization because of its unsettling and unpredictable consequences. Yet, globalization is not something we can hold off or turn off. It is the

economic equivalent of a force of nature, like wind or water. We can harness wind to fill a sail. We can use water to generate energy. We can work hard to protect people and property from storms and floods. But there is no point in denying the existence of wind or water, or trying to make them go away. The same is true for globalization. We can work to maximize its benefits and minimize its risks, but we cannot ignore it, and it is not going away … Nations that have opened their economies to the international trading system have grown at least twice as fast as nations with closed economies. Your next job may well depend upon foreign trade and investment (Clinton 2000).

Here, while encouraging Vietnam to open itself to trade with the U.S., Clinton reproduces the mantra that globalization is a natural force that cannot be fought against.

Another public figure who endorsed globalization and popularized the term was Tony Blair, the former United Kingdom Prime Minister. In a 1997 Leader's speech in Brighton, he spoke about his "vision for post-Empire Britain … to make [the] country pivotal, a leader in the world … [because the UK] at times [has] been absolutely critical to the survival of not just Europe but the world." He goes on to say:

We want a people's Europe: free trade, industrial strength, high levels of employment and social justice, democratic. Against that vision is the bureaucrat's Europe: the Europe of thwarting open trade, unnecessary rules and regulations, the Europe of the C.A.P. and the endless committees leading nowhere. But we cannot shape Europe unless we matter in Europe. I know there will be a hard choice to come over a single currency. And our policy, based on the British national interest, remains unchanged. But in or out, we will be affected by it and must remain able to influence the way it works (Blair 1997).

Blair, similarly to Clinton, references the concept of globalization, namely free trade, as an almost inevitable force. Blair says that since the United Kingdom will be affected by this force, the nation must be able to influence it, primarily to retain the state's own power and control. As apparent in this speech, national political and economic elites were not really thinking about globalization as a force for leveling the playing field, universalizing trade, and reducing global inequality. Instead, they wanted to create multi-state trade agreements that would benefit economic superpowers like the United States and Britain, with success to be determined in improvements in GDP and national wealth, rather than in increasing the overall wellbeing of the world's population. The decision of the United Kingdom then to stay in the European Union but not to adopt the Euro is an example of the options that large economies have in the tailoring of trade and monetary policies to fit their interests.

Nonetheless, after de-industrialization widely affected local industrial working classes in the United States and the United Kingdom, this pro-globalization discourse also opened the door for critiques of "globalization" and processes connected to it, such as immigration. This was something that many policy and business elites failed to imagine.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the demise of the USSR, and China's incremental opening to international trade, President Bill Clinton celebrated "The New Economy." The Internet brought with it the potential to connect people across national borders, allowing them to trade goods and ideas faster than ever before. The roaring 1990s saw campaigns around "Globalization," sold as an unstoppable and inevitable natural force. Thomas Friedman celebrated that people around the world were eating at McDonald's, drinking Pepsi, wearing jeans, and listening to Rock n' Roll (Friedman 1999). Capitalism had won the ideological battle (Fukuyama 1992).

Proponents of market solutions gained influence during the administrations of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair in the U.S. and the U.K., respectively. Insider accounts of Clinton's administration discuss the ideological struggles between factions favoring capital over those supporting workers (Reich 1997; Stiglitz 2003b). Rather than pitting conservatism and social democrats, Anthony Giddens advocated a move to the center, triangulation, or a "third way" (Giddens 1999; Giddens 2000). The New Democrats and New Labour gained electoral support. They spun the anti-tax goals of the wealthiest one percent

that had been previously advanced by Reagan and Thatcher (Harvey 2005) into a new narrative that sounded tolerant and internationalist. The amalgamation of different trends of social change into the "globalization" umbrella brought together liberals, conservatives, and cosmopolitans. The Democratic and Labour parties gained electoral success then. Still, this strategy ultimately weakened them because now these parties are not seen as credible when they say that they advance the interests of the workers and the middle class, thus opening space to the populist right, as is discussed later in this paper.

In the late twentieth century, globalization became an "economic buzzword." Think tanks like the Cato Institute, Brookings, and the American Enterprise Institute, newspapers such as *The Wall Street Journal*, and magazines such as *The Economist* advanced the gospel of global free trade and reduced government intervention in economic affairs.

In a meta-review article, *The Economist* traced its use of the term globalization from 1979, around the start of neoliberalism until 2009, after the Great Recession (The Economist 2009). Similarly, the authors compared many articles in the magazine and found a shift in the meaning of "globalization." A piece from *The Economist* from the 1990s reads:

> For good or ill, globalisation has become the economic buzz-word of the 1990s. National economies are undoubtedly becoming steadily more integrated as cross-border flows of trade, investment, and financial capital increase. Consumers are buying more foreign goods, a growing number of firms now operate across national borders, and savers are investing more than ever before in far-flung places (The Economist 1997).

In this context, a more globalized world would equate to a more "globally integrated economy." *The Economist* also argues that the surge of globalization in the 1990s was not something new, and that "The present surge of globalisation is in a way a resumption of that previous trend" (The Economist 1997). While *The Economist* clearly outlines globalization as an economic process, it is interesting to look at the discourse and events surrounding the word's usage in the article. For example, when it outlines that globalization was evident 50 years before World War I, it describes the state of Pre-World War I globalization as "large cross-border flows of goods, capital and people" (The Economist 1997). In this particular context, the flow of people is included in the portrayal of previous waves of globalization.

On a later date, in *The Economist* column Buttonwood's Notebook, John O'Sullivan discusses globalization in association with the free flow of capital, trade, and economic prosperity, in the form of higher GDP per capita. He claims again that as a result of the internet, the movement of ideas is cheaper and faster now, and that globalization has led to more efficient production in industries, making borders largely irrelevant to supply industries, and consequently, trade has become denationalized (O'Sullivan 2016b). However, later O'Sullivan talks about an "inevitable" backlash. He reiterates that globalization is mostly "about the more efficient allocation of resources- labour, capital, even land" (O'Sullivan 2017) but argues about the inevitability of a decrease in globalization like what happened in 1914 and the start of World War I. Therefore, the "inevitability" of globalization asserted by the proponents of economic globalization is now accompanied with the "inevitability" of a backlash. This makes sense in a dialectic framework, but it is a revisionist history and is equivalent to "having your cake and eating it too" for economic forecasters and prognosticators. Throughout *The Economist*'s articles, there is an ideological continuity in how the publication defines and defends globalization, sporadically nudging to events in reality that dampen this globalist discourse, but that cannot be ignored: the 2008 Recession, the election of Trump, the border wall, Brexit, COVID19.

7. Circular Thinking

Economist Richard Baldwin argues that, "The contours of industrial competitiveness are now increasingly defined by the outlines of international production networks rather than the boundaries of nations" (Baldwin 2016, p. 6). Therefore, as a result of this "inevitable" process, the production and distribution of goods cannot be limited by national borders. A suggested way nations can respond

to this development is by removing tariffs and join what is referred to as the "global value chain" (Baldwin 2016). Other scholars have also written about actions, such as the "removal of tariffs," in their discussion of globalization, and list as examples of globalization "the removal of tariffs and tariff barriers to trade, and capital account liberalization (the removal of restrictions on international investment flows)" (Weisbrot et al. 2001). They define globalization as "the increased opening to international trade and financial flows that has occurred in the vast majority of countries in the world" (Weisbrot et al. 2001). According to this definition, "globalization" is an economic model, one of increased free trade and economic interconnectedness.

The circular reasoning of these arguments should be noticed, where one simultaneously defines globalization as including the decrease in tariffs and recommends governments to do so. In other words, globalization has become justified by saying this is how things are, but in fact, you must change your policies to be how it is. Rather than being about the deregulation of the market, neoliberal policies require the reregulation of market relations (Bandelj 2009; Fligstein 2001; Vogel 1996). Neoliberal economics postulates that the markets are self-regulating and autonomous. Nevertheless, neoliberals engaged quite directly in politics and international institutions to create regulations that encased the economy and isolated it from popular politics (Slobodian 2018).

There is a contradiction in the logic that an inevitable global system can only fully materialize after coordinated policy changes worldwide occur. This circular logic escaped many enthusiasts at the time. Its teleological argument helped push for destructive and unpopular policies throughout the developed and developing world. Rather than describing a natural phenomenon, particular actors were, in fact, engineering a world to fit neoliberal theory (see MacKenzie et al. 2007 and the literature on the performativity of economics).

O'Sullivan, a columnist in *The Economist*, describes globalization as an "inevitable" process in which people should function. Still, in a twist contradicting years of advice from the magazine, O'Sullivan writes, "globalisation is an inevitability in a world of modern communications that cannot be uninvented. But it will not be possible to combine globalisation with a small-state approach" (O'Sullivan 2016a). Beyond the popular backlash against globalization, the crises of 2008 and the one created by COVID19, have demanded government intervention in regulating the economy, salvaging industries, protecting citizens, and providing some basic healthcare. Libertarians and pro-market economists can less successfully argue for a small state.

8. Open Borders but Nor for People

Globalization and neoliberal ideology did not end in the pages of *The Economist*. Reagan, Thatcher, Clinton, Blair, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and many others, embraced open borders for their exports, capital, ex-pats, and transnational corporations but not necessarily for low-skilled labor immigrants. Despite the immigration amnesty provided by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) signed reluctantly by Reagan in 1986, the legislation called for a crackdown on unauthorized immigration while still maintaining some regulated immigration. IRCA stated that employers could not knowingly hire undocumented immigrants, and if employers were caught, they would face a severe fine (Maddux 2005). As governor of California, Reagan in 1981 framed immigrants as competitors in the labor market:

> By cracking down on those employers who knowingly engage in the hiring of illegal aliens, this legislation can help to improve job opportunities for thousands of legitimate California residents and is fully consistent with provisions of the state's new welfare reform law which limits welfare benefits to only those aliens who reside in California legally (Reagan 1981 cited in Maddux 2005, p. 204).

Clinton implemented stricter immigration legislation and stated, "We must not—will not—surrender our borders to those who wish to exploit our history of compassion and justice" (McAndrews 2015, p. 106). He signed legislation committing to stricter border control, toughened

penalties for bringing undocumented immigrants across the border, or employing them, as well as denying Social Security and other benefits to immigrants (Van Hook and Bean 2009).

Even though the 1980s and the 1990s saw an increase in support for globalization, they also saw political and legal resistance towards immigrants. Politicians saw an interconnected world by expanding the domain of capital, but simultaneously opposed the opening borders to immigration (McAndrews 2015). Tellingly, the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada (NAFTA) purposely did not include any discussion about the movement of people across the borders of these three countries (Castañeda 2007).

The last two decades of the twentieth century saw a rebirth in the belief in "free markets," the reduction of tariffs, deregulation, and an increase of international trade, as with the simplistic understanding of the liberal economic theory of the nineteenth century, which is why this policy agenda is called neo-liberalism. This was a celebration of the British Empire and its global reach, where many markets were open to international competition. By the late 1990s, this ideology gained such force and quasi-religious zealotry that many authors call the dogmatic belief in the power of free markets: "market fundamentalism" (Block and Somers 2014; Frank 2000; Stiglitz 2003b). Subscribers to the neo-liberal ideology asked governments to refrain from intervening with market forces. Industrial and financial capital was allowed to move freely through most national boundaries.

Why is it that, despite the rise of international discourse in favor of universal human rights, the liberalization of markets, and economic globalization in the last decades, there has not been a decrease in national identifications or an opening of borders besides within the European Union? Migrants serve a positive role in the labor force of their host economies, so why do they face such strong opposition in the broader public discourse? As discussed elsewhere (Castañeda 2019), economic and political liberalism approach migration and the nation-state differently.

Advocates of multilateralism and international law had a significant influence in policy circles in the 1990s. This decade saw a quick rise in international non-governmental organizations and the legitimization of multilateral institutions among cosmopolitan elites and middle classes. Nevertheless, despite all the speeches, advertisements, promises, and utopias about building a Global Village—where the concept of the nation-state would disappear—there are a few indications that the different nation-states are ready to give up their sense of autonomy and reified sovereignty (Feldman 2018). However, the nation-states still matter. Studies are incomplete if nationalism is not included in the analysis of inter-group relations between immigrants and established residents (Castañeda 2019; Jiménez 2017).

Nevertheless, some theorists were too quick to claim the decline of the importance of the nation-state and the convergence of humanity into one economic system and global culture. However, this claim is wrong. There are different varieties of capitalism with strong welfare states in Scandinavian countries and more laissez faire regimes in Latin America, as well as mixed systems, being very successful at developing in Asia (Hall and Soskice 2001). While global trade has increased in relation to the interwar and postwar periods, it was probably proportionately higher at the end of the nineteenth century than at the end of the twentieth (Chatterjee 2004, p. 84). Some goods and capital may move freely across the world, but migration has been deliberately controlled. Except for Europeans traveling within the European Union or the Schengen area (and beyond), most countries still have relatively closed borders. Despite outcries about migration and refugee crises, global migration is not higher than it was in the nineteenth century (Chatterjee 2004, p. 85).

A teleological approach that claims a natural, historical progression or evolution into a world without borders should not be assumed. Nor should a world organized in clearly delineated nation-states be taken as the only option for the future. Instead of taking for granted the right of a national government to dictate migration and population policies, these assumptions should be probed to understand why national identity and borders have kept their strength.

Throughout the 1990s, politicians and the media often conflated globalization with immigration, seeing them as inevitably linked or even synonymous. A *Wall Street Journal* article from 1991 talks about

economic globalization and makes a case for bringing highly skilled workers from abroad. It describes how changes to immigration law "will make it easier for U.S. companies to draw talent from other nations, mostly by tripling to about 140,000 the immigrant visas allotted to managers, professionals and others with skills in demand here. And by improving the U.S. work pool, it eventually should enhance corporate America's competitiveness world-wide, proponents say." It then quotes, "Economist Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute, a Washington think tank, concurs: 'The globalization of the economy has just begun. The demand for this type of (foreign-transfer) visa will just explode in the next 20 years'" (Valeriano and Lublin 1991). Legal skilled migration did increase, but so did undocumented migration. However, in terms of relative magnitude, capital flows across borders and global production chains dwarf migration flows.

9. Migration Wrongly Subsumed under Globalization in Social Theory

Social science and humanities publications on immigration often include in their titles or introductions phrases such as in this "the age of migration," "the era of mass migration," "the migration crisis," and they often claim that globalization has led to increased migration. In their arguments, some authors present international migration as both a cause and effect of globalization. For others, immigration is a crucial element of globalization. Papastergiadis (2000) refers to globalization and migration as "twin processes." He argues that globalization and migration have altered the standard notions of borders and national identities (Papastergiadis 2000). However, neither migration nor long-distance trade are new. Colin Crouch writes that, "Increased trade has also brought strengthening relations of all kinds across much of the world; thus the other side of the coin of cultural challenge represented by immigration (sic)" (Crouch 2019, p. 43). Nonetheless, trade does not necessarily entail mass migrations. The opposite is also true, to cite an extreme example, there is little legal trade between the United States and Cuba, but there has been significant migration from Cuba to the United States. The same could be said about refugees from behind the iron curtain or about people going to Israel from around the world whether those countries have trade agreements with Israel or not. People migrate for political, religious, and economic reasons that have nothing to do with multilateral trade or foreign direct investment (FDI).

It is not uncommon for academic books, articles, and reviews to start with phrases such as this, "Contemporary global migration, probably one of the most visible faces of globalization, has stimulated an interesting and broad theoretical discussion in both academic and political circles" (Hatziprokopiou 2002, p. 429). There have indeed been many theoretical debates about migration and its connection to globalization. Nonetheless, relatively little empirical work has been conducted to test the hypothesis that international migration is "a face of globalization." Migration is included in many definitions of globalization, but its inclusion may be analytically misleading:

> There is growing acknowledgment among scholars and public policy practitioners that globalization is associated with the increasing scale and scope of international migration ... [Yet] The limited scope of previous analyses has left fundamental questions about international migration unanswered: How does globalization influence the prevalence of international migration? (Sanderson and Kentor 2009, pp. 302–3).

A few studies have looked empirically at the claims about an increase of migration caused by globalization. The conclusions point to the role of FDI and development in general in producing urban to rural migration, which often turns into international emigration. Nonetheless, this is not new to globalization (Heyman 2018). Though, the widespread concept of immigrant illegality is a relatively new concept that was absent from previous waves of globalization (Donato and Massey 2016). In the United States, the Chinese Exclusion Act and previous racist and immigrant restrictionism kept some groups at bay (Camacho-Beltrán 2019; Castañeda 2019; Ngai 2004). Nonetheless, the coexistence of a population that is both unsanctioned and active in the labor force without safeguards and vulnerable

to deportation is a new development that goes beyond the United States (Castañeda and Beck 2018; Golash-Boza 2015; Koopmans 2009; Rung 2020).

Vertovec (2007) coined the term "super-diversity" to talk about an increase in immigration from a larger array of countries into Britain. Nevertheless, globalization has not increased the number of countries of emigration, and in the last decades, the places of destination have actually decreased.

> the total volume of international migration has not increased in relative terms, whereas migrants tend to concentrate in a shrinking number of prime destination countries. Also, while the number of empty migration corridors has decreased, migration has tended to concentrate in the larger corridors. This seems to contradict some key hypotheses of the globalization of the migration paradigm (Czaika and Haas 2015, p. 316).

Therefore, not only are migration flows less diverse in terms of destination, the overall percentage of the world population on the move remains rather stable, at between 2 and 3.5% of the total world population (Czaika and Haas 2015, p. 287, Donato and Massey 2016, p. 7, Sanderson and Kentor 2009, p. 301, Zlotnik 1999, p. 42). During the 1870–1914 period, migration rates were much higher than they are currently (O'Sullivan 2017). To say that immigration is larger than ever in terms of raw numbers is nonsensical because the world population is continuously expanding. Furthermore, how the concepts of diversity and super-diversity have been implemented in the business sector and policy world are problematic (see Doytcheva 2020).

Often, the cultural diversity brought about by migration is celebrated and justified in works that study immigrant and transnational communities. This does not mean that every globalization advocate also calls for open borders for people. According to Papastergiadis, globalization exposes nation-states' limitations, and by doing so, undermines their autonomy. He also writes about how an increase in globalization brings about a willingness to implement harsher migration controls:

> Every nation-state is at once seeking to maximize the opportunities from transnational corporations, and yet closing its doors to the forms of migration that these economic shifts stimulate ... As nation-states are losing more and more of their power to regulate activities within their territory, they are becoming increasingly aggressive about the defense of their borders. Tougher laws against asylum-seekers, the rounding up of gypsies (sic) and ruthless eviction of 'economic migrants' are some of the ways in which governments vent their frustration in a world where they have seemingly lost control but dare not admit it (Papastergiadis 2000, pp. 2–3).

Despite evidence of the limits of human mobility, Papastergiadis still connects migration to globalization. Analogies of turbulence, chaos, fluidity, hybridity can be taken too far, "As compelling as they are, the images in this book cast an inaccurate picture" (Fernández-Kelly 2001).

In scholarly works, migration is brought up as a "societal impact" of increased globalization. Other scholars refute the claim that migration is a byproduct of globalization, and instead argue that migration as a process has been occurring even before the current phase of globalization. Saskia Sassen argues that the inclusion of migration into globalization entails

> engaging a vast scholarship that is not particularly focused on globalization ... It entails contesting a very different type of scholarship, as yet minor but growing fast, that seems to assume that we have immigrants because of globalization, an assumption it arrives at not through knowledge about migrations but by projecting standard globalization notions onto migration (Sassen 2007, p. 129).

There are indeed some new aspects of mass immigration:

> Today the sharp growth in the organized export of workers, both legal and illegal, adds another dynamic to the older, long standing ones. Organized exports can create whole new ways of linking emigration and immigration countries, beyond old colonial or new global economic

links. Yet these new developments are also often linked to broader contextual conditions (Sassen 2007, p. 133).

As Sassen explains, globalization is not the leading cause of migration. Still, the new global socio-economic context adds another dimension of understanding how migration operates today and how international foreign investment affects it.

Overbeek makes a similar argument: that in order to gain a better understanding of the "refugee crisis" of the 1990s in Europe, one must look at the economic context, particularly the reorganization of the global economy in the 1970s. He defines globalization as "a process of structural transformation of the global political economy, historically unparalleled and with tremendous impact on the lives of billions of people. This transformation takes place in the sphere of both production and finance, and has far-reaching repercussions for the role of the state" (Overbeek 1995, p. 22).

Many link immigration and globalization. However, there is little empirical evidence actually linking the two. Sassen's earlier work (Sassen 1988) indeed shows a relationship between foreign investment and the increase in migrant labor. *Maquila* work—sweatshops and micromanaged factories often employing women in special development zones in developing countries (Fernández-Kelly 1983; Salzinger 2003; Young 2015)—and export-led development did produce some economic development. By disrupting local socio-economic systems (Sassen 1988), they also caused higher outmigration, internal migration from southern Mexico to border towns, and also to the United States.

Another evident example is the opening of the Mexican market to corn manufactured by large and state-supported agro-business in the United States following NAFTA. This made many small farmers, especially indigenous farmers with smallholdings in the center and south of Mexico, vulnerable to decreasing prices, making it harder for them to support themselves with their land. For a while, this made internal and international migration some of the few avenues for the farmers to support themselves after their agricultural production became untenable beyond self-subsistence (Gálvez 2018; Garip 2017; Jones 2014).

Many countries have intermittently become increasingly selective about immigrant acceptance, open to highly-educated, skilled, and wealthy immigrants (Czaika and Haas 2015; Harpaz 2019), while relatively restrictive in relation to non-white working-class individuals (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014; Zolberg 2006). Countries then marginalize and exploit undocumented and temporary migrants (Castañeda 2019; Donato and Massey 2016; Rung 2020).

Many argue that remittances —the money that immigrants send to their family members in their home country—are evidence of "globalization from below." There is a whole discourse framing remittances as "a development tool." This talk is full of neoliberal assumptions and is detached from grounded evidence. The policy discourse on remittances is so widespread that this is discussed in detail elsewhere (Bakker 2015; Castañeda 2013; Castañeda n.d.; Hernandez and Coutin 2006).

10. Cultural Globalization

Many fear migrants and guest workers because they bring not only their labor force but also their families and culture. Along with claims about the effects of globalization, some talked about the creation of a global culture, e.g., "in terms of sociocultural relations, globalization involves the migration of people and customs" (Laws 1997, p. 91). Another part of the discourse surrounding globalization is that it threatens national cultures. However, for some, globalization merely presents "new cultural symbols and practices through which individuals will understand their position in the world ... the new manifestation [of culture] should not be confused with the death of culture" (Papastergiadis 2000). Several scholars discuss globalization in conjunction with identity politics, multiculturalism, and citizenship. Castles and Davidson (2000) use the term "globalization" almost interchangeably with "cultural diversity," writing that

> Globalization, the increased mobility of people and the burgeoning of new forms of communication make myths of homogeneity unsustainable. Cultural diversity has become a central aspect of virtually all modern societies (Castles and Davidson 2000, p. 127).

They also talk about challenges faced by minorities, such as social exclusion despite legal citizenship, and a wavering sense of belonging. However, these realities can be explained without having to attribute them to globalization (Castañeda 2018c). National myths of homogeneity are indeed empirically unsustainable, but as shown in their own book, diversity and multicultural cohabitation were true of Rome and its Empire, as well as the British Empire and most political bodies in history. War is the number one determinant of national borders rather than bloodlines or common language (Castañeda and Schneider 2017; Crouch 2019, p. 58).

Whether it is spoken about as a catalyst for cultural unity or cultural division, globalization is at the forefront of the contestation of the prospective evolution of culture. In *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, British sociologist Mike Featherstone discusses a "globalization process which points to the extension of global cultural interrelatedness" (Featherstone 1990, p. 6). He makes the ambivalent arguments that cultural exchanges lead to "transnational cultures" and "cultural homogeneity and cultural disorder" (Featherstone 1990, p. 6). Robertson goes further as he defines globalization as "the crystallization of the entire world as a single place" (Robertson 1987a, p. 38) and as the emergence of a "global-human condition" (Robertson 1987b, p. 23). These are overstatements that are difficult to document across the world. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman outlines how globalization is paradoxical, in the sense that it

> divides as it unites—the causes of division being identical with those which promote the uniformity of the globe. Alongside the emerging planetary dimensions of business, finance, trade and information flow, a 'localizing', space-fixing process is set in motion. Between them, the two closely interconnected processes sharply differentiate the existential conditions of whole populations and of various segments of each one of the populations. What appears as globalization for some means localization for others; signaling a new freedom for some, upon many others it descends as an uninvited and cruel fate (Bauman 2010, p. 1).

Bauman depicts globalization as an uncontrollable, disorderly power, and argues that in the "deepest meaning" globalization portrays the existence of an anarchical system, void of a centralized power to control global affairs. These are other examples of the overtheorizing around "globalization" among some social theorists. The authors of this paper argue, originally, that these claims opened the door to many criticisms of globalization—some based on fact and others on myth as is discussed below.

11. Early Critiques

Critiques of economic globalization from the political right are relatively recent. On the other hand, the left had much earlier critiques and more sophisticated analysis, although some critiques also confounded globalization and immigration. For example, an article from 1992 does raise awareness about the inequalities that developing countries faced with international growth taking place, specifying the mechanisms connecting globalization and emigration. The author argues that because globalization leads to unequal development, it, in turn, leads to larger emigration from the Global South (Klare 1992). Others have shown how foreign direct investment (FDI) and local development produce emigration (Sanderson and Kentor 2009; Sassen 1988; van der Waal 2013). However, FDI is not going to every place in the world. Instead, there is a very concentrated set of financial flows. Furthermore, FDI existed before the 1980s.

The neoZapatistas (EZLN) in Chiapas, Mexico were early critiques of neoliberal free trade agreements, taking arms on 1 January 1994, the same day that NAFTA was going into effect. They inspired "anti-globalization" or more aptly anti-neoliberal globalization and "alter-globalization" protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in their meetings in Seattle in 1999 and the G8 meeting in Genoa in 2001 (Della Porta 2006; Wood 2008; Wood 2012). These protesters were

not anti-immigrant, they were against the advantages that large corporations were gaining through international trade agreements.

The critics of neoliberal globalization were skeptical about the inflated claims about global economic development to be produced by these policies. They predicted that the expansion of these policies would increase inequality between rich and poor countries and also increase inequality within countries and favor the rich (Della Porta 2006; Easterly 2006; Rodrik 1997; Rodrik 2007; Sassen 1998; Stiglitz 2003a; Tilly 1995).

One of the most significant counter-arguments for market fundamentalism is that globalization became, to a large degree, about American companies manufacturing their products in China (Karabell 2009). The main increases in development and poverty alleviation have happened in Asia, but particularly in countries that rejected the Washington Consensus and whose governments played an active role in supporting specific industries and setting their own terms for engaging with international markets (Stiglitz 2003a). The role of centralized economies in the world economy is at once a rejection of "globalization's" abstract conceptualization, an integral part of the empirical reality, and a testament to the degree of international interdependence.

12. The Declining Public Interest in Globalization

The Economist (2009) notes that the 2008 recession led to a decrease in the use of the term globalization. As Figure 2 below shows (The Economist 2009), articles about globalization grew in the 1980s and 1990s and decreased after 9/11. They increased again and then dropped with the Great Recession of 2008.

Figure 2. Articles published in The Economist using the word "globalisation" until October 31, 2009. Source: The Economist, 2009. Used for non-commercial purposes under fair use.

According to Google Trends (2020), since January 1, 2004—the earliest date where the information is currently publicly available—the interest in "globalization" as a web search has steadily decreased over time. By November 2017, the search frequency was approximately a quarter of that from March 2004 (yellow line in Figure 3 below). This decrease could be because the term became less "fashionable" or because people had become familiar with the term. The variance of "globalisation" as spelled in the United Kingdom and other countries also follows this trend.

As can be seen in Figure 3, internet searches for "migration" (yellow line) follow a very different pattern from "globalization" (green line). The searches for "migration" are the most common, and they are much higher for "immigration." They decreased in 2010 and 2013 and increased again later. In the

graph below, the blue line represents the search interest on "inequality," which is nearly a mirror image of the search interest in "globalization." While in 2004, searches for globalization were higher than those for inequality in 2013, the interest in inequality is much higher than that in globalization. In a way, popular interest in globalization may have been replaced by a preoccupation with the growing inequality. As a comparison, the search trends for climate change were included, which have increased lately. This chart does not denote any factual correlation. It just denotes trends in what terms people within the United States googled from January 2004 to March 31, 2020 (Google Trends 2020).


Figure 3. Google Search Trends.

13. Opposition to Globalization from the Populist Right

In a 2008 article from *The Economist*, the definition of globalization is retraced, arguing that globalization has changed from once meaning that businesses "expanded from developed to emerging economies" to one flowing in both directions "and increasingly also from one developing economy to another" (The Economist 2008). Globalization, in this context, is associated with fast changes in industries and sectors. Free markets and open borders to trade became an ideological, unquestioned, positive, and hegemonic in relation to capital, but many neoliberals question their application to people moving freely.

Another effect of globalization is that as the market becomes more integrated, "communities from disparate parts of the world" are brought together, particularly around labor, expanding trading networks to "include wider specialisations" (R. 2013). When seen as an economic process involving free trade and open borders, "globalization" can be met with skepticism from the public—mainly because of globalization's association with "foreigners" and the public's fear of job outsourcing:

> More than six out of ten [Americans] are skeptical of free trade. A new poll in Foreign Affairs suggests that almost nine out of ten worry about their jobs going offshore. Congressmen reflect their concerns. Though the economy grows, many have become vociferous protectionists ...
> More likely, the structural changes in America's job market that began in the 1990s are now being reinforced by big changes in the global economy. The integration of China's low-skilled millions and the increased offshoring of services to India and other countries has expanded the global supply of workers. This has reduced the relative price of labour and raised the returns to capital. That reinforces the income concentration at the top, since most stocks and shares are held by richer people. More important, globalisation may further fracture the traditional link between skills and wages (The Economist 2006).

It took the Great Recession, Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump for some to take these drawbacks seriously. In contrast, Trump began talking about trade deficits since the late 1980s, even

before people widely used the term globalization. He went on talk shows, including *Oprah,* and blamed East Asia for stealing industries from the U.S. (McKevitt 2018). Many years later, the fight against free trade to protect the jobs in the United States was a large part of his presidential campaign. Trump began to discredit the Trans-Pacific Partnership and promote the employment of workers in the U.S. against the claims about the plentiful benefits of international trade (Brands 2018). Trump claimed to support the individuals within the United States who have suffered the most from globalization. For example, he tweeted, "Remember, NAFTA was one of the WORST Trade Deals ever made. The U.S. lost thousands of businesses and millions of jobs. We were far better off before NAFTA—should never have been signed" (Bowden 2018). His campaign promised to protect white working-class Americans from the corporate elite. He stated in his Republican Convention speech:

> I have visited the laid-off factory workers, and the communities crushed by our horrible and unfair trade deals. These are the forgotten men and women of our country. And they are forgotten. But they're not going to be forgotten long. These are people who work hard but no longer have a voice. I am your voice (Trump 2016a).

Despite branding himself for decades as a millionaire and a socialite, he suddenly took up the mantle of the national working class with some success. Many of Trump's supporters felt isolated and unheard, but he promised to bring back manufacturing jobs for Americans (Sawhill 2018). Trump was combining the critiques from the left about the adverse effects of corporate globalization on workers, along with racist attacks against immigrants, and people of color, and against foreigners, and Jews, who he framed as the same people profiting from economic globalization. He used the term "globalist," a term frequently used by the alt-right in anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (Castañeda 2019, p. 97).

14. Trump and Economic Globalization

Given these realities, much of the left has consistently shown opposition to economic globalization in the way it had been designed. The 1999 Seattle and 2001 Genoa protests were in opposition to a World Trade Organization summit and G8 summit, respectively; both were demonstrations against neoliberal globalization and not against immigration (Della Porta 2006). However, these protests were seen as radical, fringe, or "anti-systemic" by mainstream media. Later on, the Indignados and Occupy Walls Street movements protested the negative effects of neoliberalism, austerity measures, growing inequality, and the little wiggle room that even center-left governments had to fix issues or rein in financial speculation and debt (Castañeda 2012, 2015; Tilly et al. 2020).

Trump highlighted the disparity between global trade and wealth for the average American in a speech, "Globalization has made the financial elite who donate to politicians very, very wealthy . . . but it has left millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache" (Trump 2016b). Even though many still see globalization as a means to prosperity, Trump reached out to the people who saw globalization as the opposite. Many people have expressed their concerns about globalization on social media.

Globalization has increased the wealth inequalities between the 1% and the 99%. A survey by the Pew Research Center from 2015 found that resentment towards free trade was at approximately 32% among Republican voters; however, its unpopularity increased to 63% by the end of 2016. Approximately 30% of respondents in the U.S. had a negative perspective on free trade in 2015, which increased to 43% in 2016 (Jones 2018). In 2016, approximately 47% of Republicans stated that free trade hurts their community (Blendon et al. 2017). In a 2016 Bloomberg poll, 82% of Americans said they would be willing to pay more for domestically produced goods, and two-thirds of Americans believe there should be restrictions on imported goods to protect American jobs (Ehrenfreund 2016). The sharp increase in frustration illustrates that as Trump grew in popularity in 2016, he either persuaded many Americans to view economic globalization negatively, or that—more likely—he captured the discontent with neoliberalism, underemployment, and underpay (Blendon et al. 2017) in a similar manner that Senator Bernie Sanders did in his primary campaign.

In 2012, approximately 54% of Americans believed that free trade creates job losses (Aguila et al. 2012). In 2018, 58% of Republicans believed in raising tariffs on steel and aluminum (Jones 2018). Many want to increase protectionist policies because of globalization's harmful impacts on some industries and workers. Trump's rhetoric on globalization has itself caused a negative perception of globalization by dividing the American public on free trade while additionally changing the Republican Party's stances on free trade.

Trump has further influenced the perception of immigrants through his platform. He has continually pushed to expand border fences and walls between Mexico and the U.S. Many fear that immigrants and international trade take away resources from them (Hochschild 2016). Trump stated, "Mexico is making a fortune on NAFTA . . . They have very strong border laws—ours are pathetic. With all of the money they make from the U.S., hopefully they will stop people from coming through their country and into ours, at least until Congress changes our immigration laws!" (Trump 2018). This tweet establishes another conflation, Trump mentions NAFTA, a free trade agreement, and border laws and migration in the same tweet, where he directs his anger towards Mexico because of trade and immigration. Even though he is increasingly referring to immigrants from other countries moving through Mexico, Trump blames Mexico for these immigrants coming into the country, whether they are immigrants actually from Mexico or Latin American immigrants. Studies indicate that prejudice against Mexicans is higher than that against other immigrant groups (Castañeda 2019; Flores and Schachter 2018; Short and Magaña 2002). Many wrongly believe that the border region next to Mexico is dangerous (Castañeda and Chiappetta 2020). Much of the prejudice has to do with economic frustrations, and resentment towards Mexico because of NAFTA and U.S. deindustrialization. Fifty-three percent of Republicans believed that Mexico benefits from NAFTA more than the U.S.A. does (Jones 2018).

As President, Trump continued to voice his dissatisfaction with Mexico, stating, "Mexico does nothing for us, they do nothing for us. Mexico talks, but they do nothing for us, especially at the border . . . Certainly don't help us much on trade" (Korte and Gomez 2018). He states that Mexico does "nothing" for the United States. By mentioning immigration and trade in the same speech, Trump has connected economic globalization and migration by toxically conflating the two issues, which in the minds of most, were already entangled. Trump claims to protect white working-class' jobs from outsourcing to Mexico and from Mexican immigrants. Nevertheless, the two economies are deeply integrated; in fact, Mexico is the United States' third largest trade partner, following China and Canada (Felab-Brown 2017).

15. Discussion

Large changes in the labor market have been taking place since the late 1970s, with ever-increasing automation and routinization—producing the Luddite responses we have seen since the Industrial Revolution—and creating more precarious and insecure jobs (Kalleberg 2011). Labor unions started losing members in the United States, resulting in decreasing benefits and labor conditions. The new economy is reducing the income and respect afforded to blue-collar workers but also white-collar professionals (Sennett and Cobb 1993; Sennett 1998; Sennett 2003; Sennett 2006). However, this was produced intentionally by the neoliberal race to the bottom where only by reducing labor costs and taxation could companies compete internationally (Slobodian 2018, p. 43). Sassen (2001) writes persuasively about how globalization puts the interests of certain cities over those of the nation-state, and how these global cities that house the hubs that control the world economy have an hour-glass economy with a disappearing middle class.

Neoliberalism is not new, and its adverse effects in terms of labor markets and inequality have been documented by many. Trade agreements not only remove walls to commerce but also engineer new social and power relations (Chorev 2007; Duina 2006). New work is documenting the impacts of the world economy on the environment and climate change. In his recent book *The Globalization Backlash*, Colin Crouch writes,

This might have happened under any economic regime, but the dominance of neoliberal policies made it difficult for governments in poor countries to protect their economics from fitting in with whatever fate participation in global markets assigned to them. Forests and other natural environments have been destroyed, ecological balance disturbed, and disease spread across the world, as governments have searched to engage their countries in the global economy, and as elites have sought to share in the rich pickings that such engagement brings. Global neoliberal hegemony allowed them to do this without taking social and environmental costs into consideration (Crouch 2019, pp. 42–43)

As Crouch writes, the environment has been another victim of neoliberalism—and industrialization and capitalism in general. Crouch advances an argument parallel to the first part of the argument in this paper,

If concern at the disruption to life caused by neoliberalism can be channeled into blaming ethnic minorities and other potentially unpopular groups, strengthening the increasing xenophobia of conservatism, then neoliberals can be left in peace to intensify a globalizing insecurity that will then be blamed further on the minorities, reinforcing even further the appeal of their incongruous conservative allies (Crouch 2019, p. 9)

This helps explain Brexit, Trump, and many other rightwing electoral successes. However, while useful in the short term, xenophobia itself cannot improve real standards of living and health outcomes. Democratic governments cannot go as far in their attack of minorities as white nationalists would want. Fascism creates its own resistance and cannot last forever. A backlash to the backlash is bound to occur. Nonetheless there is no need for dedemocratization to occur before foreign-born residents are included in local governance.

In his book, Crouch also equates globalization with migration, and sees the latter as somewhat challenging and problematic, and he holds on dearly to the virtues of globalization. Crouch is wrong when he writes that, "Globalization is a major cause of migration; hostility to immigrants is currently threatening the viability of globalization" (Crouch 2019, p. 38). Hostility to immigrants is "threatening" in itself. Fair trade does not have to accompany xenophobia and claims of cultural superiority. Furthermore, this argument is faulty. Migration and ethnic diversity would not go down drastically if tariffs on exports were to increase or if trade agreements were to end, largely because there migration preceded the 1980s.

It neither follows that ethnic diversity leads to a weakening of popular support for the welfare state (Crouch 2019, p. 8). There may appear to be observational correlations of these trends. However, the cause of a weakening of welfare states is more likely to be neoliberalist policies that lower taxes for businesses and, therefore, produce fewer funds to support the welfare state. Stereotypes propagated by neoliberals and conservatives that immigrants abuse the welfare state are but justifications for policy choices that they had already decided to implement.

16. Conclusions

The fact that so many people around the world—who came to favor free trade, individual responsibility, and entrepreneurship (Fridman 2017)—have now turned against free trade agreements is nontrivial. The explanation points to the inequalities exacerbated by the global expansion of neoliberalism. Social groups who lost their livelihood to profit-driven "outsourcing" and other economic changes now mistakenly blame immigration for their plight. No close research or analysis of the working-class' reactions was done here beyond citing opinion polls and secondary sources. However, much of this backlash is orchestrated at the political level by educated elites, some in the left but mainly in the right. For example, Boris Johnson is an expert orator and debater who uses the arguments of his opponents against them for personal gain. During the Brexit campaign, consultants were able to use popular fears and economic struggles to advance particular political agendas (Oliver 2016; Shipman 2016). Public anger is used instrumentally, and the working class is given false promises.

For example, the desire of the Brexit voters "to take back control" as was the slogan of the Leave campaign, "is being interpreted by its main champions as an opportunity to weaken labour rights and food hygiene laws" (Crouch 2019, p. 10).

The argument of this paper is that social theory in the last decades created a logical opening for a backlash against globalization in the way it conflates—wrongly, in our view—economic globalization and immigration. A non-exhaustive set of passages from social theorists and policymakers was used to prove this claim. The conflation of globalization and migration is so hegemonic (or doxic) that to call it into question causes quick discomfort for some.

The career of the concept of "globalization" is an example of how some ivory tower conversations can have significant impacts in the real world, justifying political projects that academics cannot control. In the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, most authors wrote about globalization, migration, and long-distance connections in a positive, celebratory manner. However, a few fore-sought the way in which politicians around the world would use the negative effects of neoliberalism to support xenophobic, nationalistic, and authoritarian governments around the world.

Migration—the movement of people across space—preceded all waves of globalization. International migration, migration across the borders of political units, will continue even in a future period of deglobalization (with a smaller proportion of goods and services coming from great distances). Neoliberal economic policies are not the only causes of migration, but neither is global trade the cause of peaceful dialogue among people born in different parts of the world. Cosmopolitanism—having a global outlook and feeling like a citizen of the world—preceded Reaganomics. Immigrant communities clustered abroad engaged in transnational practices before globalization, the EU, NAFTA, or the spread of the internet (Castañeda 2017). Many of the migration pathways were established by former colonial enterprises and war rather than by the increase in international trade by itself.

Globalization is an example of a theory from the global north that spread around the world framed as a universal phenomenon. It had negative consequences for the working and middle classes in many countries and areas. These consequences and its connection to migration and elite cosmopolitan tastes helped create the allure of Donald Trump and Brexit. Many have written about the rise in xenophobia and right-wing extremism (Castañeda 2019; Miller-Idriss 2017), while others have raised the alarm about equally lopsided economic policies (Sassen 1998; Stiglitz 2003a). There is an ample amount of great empirical work on migration. Social movements have fought against neoliberalism for decades (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Della Porta 2006; Tilly et al. 2020). However, the general public is often not clear about what globalization actually is and what its real effects are. This paper brings together separate academic works from a number of disciplines and subject areas to make sense of the electoral developments at the end of the 2010s.

The term "globalization" is frequently used as encompassing, or even causing, international migration. However, it is important to keep three points in mind: (1) The term was first defined and discussed in a narrow business sense (Levitt 1983). (2) Globalization itself has not made significant changes to migration flows. (3) The expansion of capitalism has always demanded population movement from the countryside to new areas of production, e.g., cities (Castañeda 2018b; Sassen 1988).

Much of the conflation between globalization and immigration is exaggerated and misplaced. Nevertheless, the neoliberal economic policies associated with globalization—which have increased inequality and deindustrialization in the Global North—in the minds of many are associated with an increase in international migration. Therefore, it would seem that a justified way to protest deindustrialization, the precarization of labor, and growing inequality is to oppose or even blame international migration.

The linking of economic globalization and multiculturalism that has been perpetuated by many social theorists, pundits, mainstream media, and elites has helped fuel xenophobic nationalism and enacted the physical and social borders that are increasingly experienced. Therefore, it is also the duty of journalists, social theorists, and public intellectuals to set the record straight. Increasing wealth inequality and economic and public health crises should serve as an excellent reason for the return

of widespread support for social programs and democratic practices that could be linked to place of residence rather than to place of birth (Crouch 2019; Raithelhuber et al. 2018). Citizenship and its benefits, along with empathy and solidarity, do not need to be tied to national citizenship or an assumed cultural homogeneity. In any case, migration should not be used as a valid justification to reduce social programs or people's rights.

The conflation of globalization and migration is factually wrong and politically dangerous because it has been used unethically to exploit xenophobia and economic anxiety for the benefit of opportunistic politicians. Economic policy-making should become open to democratic politics and processes, along with accurate information for voters (Baiocchi 2016; Castañeda 2014). The responses to the COVID19 pandemic show how economic policies that appeared impossible or undesirable before are indeed possible. The pandemic also shows how helping individuals in dire need is beneficial for all. A new world that includes policies that favor people over profits, and borders that are genuinely open and humane, is possible and within reach if people organize and advocate for it.

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Article

Methodological Nationalism in Global Studies and Beyond

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Abstract: Global studies, or the study of globalization, is a diverse field of research, with different disciplinary focuses and with some national versions. Russian Alexander Chumakov constructed it as a philosophical discipline, while in U.S. academia it is considered an empirical inquiry at the intersection of area studies, international studies, and international relations. This paper focuses on American global studies, pointing out the heavy epistemological burden it inherited from the field of knowledge dominated by international relations, which enshrines both methodological and political nationalism. International relations makes claims to be the sole theory originator in this field, but it may be criticized for several methodological and ethical issues (such as unwarranted simplifications that purge empirical contents to the point of unfalsifiability, antiquated epistemic ideals, Western and hegemonic biases, besides methodological nationalism), thus alternate theorizations are highly desirable.

Keywords: methodological nationalism; nation-state; state/anarchy model; globalization; epistemic ideals

1. Introduction

In early 2017, the English-speaking academic world celebrated the publication of a book written by Manfred Steger and Amentahru Wahlrab. Reviewers have emphasized that it is a much-needed foundational text of a new, emerging discipline, at this time unhesitatingly named 'global studies' (GS), after decades of alternating and joint name uses, such as 'globalization studies' and 'global and international studies'. The authors did excellent work in tracking down the intellectual roots of global studies, delimiting its area of study, and discussing its methods, and the book can easily pass all traditional academic scrutiny. Yet the specificity of the subject matter invites one more question: to what extent does the work embody an American (or Western, or Global-Northern) outlook as opposed to a genuinely global (or culturally unbiased) outlook?

To their credit, the authors made efforts to address the Westernist bias of their field, but having some awareness of bias and successfully transcending it are two different realities. The book's bibliography covers English titles only, even if some 'foreign' classics such as Gramsci and Lyotard made their way into it. We particularly miss a reference to Alexander Chumakov, whose selected writings on globalization were published in an English volume in 2010 with the recommendation of Roland Robertson and William Gay, among others. Yet Chumakov's philosophical perspective came obviously at odds with the epistemological genealogy delineated by Steger and Wahlrab, who, following Mittelman (2002), construct GS at the intersection of area studies (AS), international studies (IS), and international relations (IR), as in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The genealogy of global studies in Mittelman (2002); Steger and Wahlrab (2017).

And historically this is quite accurate for the U.S. literature, with quite unfortunate consequences for global studies' ability to transcend certain biases of Western academia. This ancestry tends to confine GS to an 'international' vision. Steger and Wahlrab argue for the merits of 'transdisciplinarity' as opposed to 'interdisciplinarity' and 'multidisciplinarity'. The 'inter'-prefix is believed to reinforce, rather than efface, boundaries. Robertson (2010) also argues that global studies should be transdisciplinary, "or post-disciplinary, anti-disciplinary, cross-disciplinary and, most unfortunate, inter-disciplinary. I reject the latter because it actually has the consequence of consolidating disciplinarity, rather than overcoming it" (pp. 5–8). We would make the case for 'transnational' as opposed to 'international' and 'multinational' ('supranational' would be the most preferred word, had this term not been appropriated by European Union studies). Emerging from three disciplines seriously tinted with methodological nationalism, can we trust global studies to be more than 'international' or 'multinational'?

This paper does not aim at a criticism of Steger and Wahlrab's book, though it will articulate a few ideas about how it could become more global and less American. It aims at an analysis of the knowledge domain in which Steger and Wahlrab placed global studies, configured to capture socio-political thinking on issues transcending the nation-state. At a deeper look, this domain reveals a strong bipolarity. It is clearly dominated by international relations stubbornly promoting the primacy of nation-states, while an antithetical vision and ethos of global connectedness try to gain traction.

The first section of the paper will detail these statements about the state of the field with four disciplines, bringing evidence for the supremacy of international relations in it. The second section will analyze IR's entrenched biases, which were transmitted to the nominally autonomous international studies and area studies. The concluding part will make the case for unifying the field under the primacy of global studies.

2. Mapping the Field

2.1. Theorizing beyond the Nation-State

The first decades of U.S. political science, as constructed by the Chicago School during the Progressive Era, had shown little intellectual interest in international politics. Political science's 'external affairs' branch, international relations, was initiated in the U.K. in 1919, and in the U.S. it established itself as an academic discipline after Hans Morgenthau's (Morgenthau [1948] 1993) joining the University of Chicago, where he co-founded the Committee on International Relations. The work of

this first U.S. graduate institution came to fruition in the 1940s with the publication of Quincy Wright's, "A Study of War" and Morgenthau's "Politics Among Nations".

Yet, beginning with the 1940s, IR's growth became exponential, and it attained a serious influence on other fields and disciplines. Most presidents of the International Studies Association (ISA) thus far have been political scientists working in the IR field. In exact numbers, out of 57 presidents, 53 were political scientists, and 50 were Americans, that is, educated and working in U.S. universities[1]. ISA's flagship journals are monitored for impact as IR journals and have a very good placement on that list. Of 74 ISA partner organizations, 33 are in the field of political science, 18 have 'international studies' in their name (being country-wide or regional IS organizations), and 23 are of another nature, such as specific area studies, social studies, and honor societies. After the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research had changed its name to Toda Peace Institute, none of the partner organizations have 'global' in their names any longer. Faced with this evidence of international studies' dependence on international relations, it is difficult to portray IS other than as a colony of IR. In fact, Steger and Wahlrab also use harsh words to shed light on this dependence: "founded in 1959 largely by disaffected American political scientists, the ISA embraced a methodological nationalism that served the geopolitical strategies and priorities of the First World in general, and U.S. hegemony in particular" (p. 8).

Sadly, similar considerations apply to the field called Area Studies as well. It may also be said to have grown up in a 'national security environment', with funding provided by the U.S. government and private foundations promoting values that make the world more hospitable to Western economic goals. Furthermore, the major change of the Area Studies field, when it made a determined effort to switch from individual country studies towards studies on larger geographical scale and incorporating more 'globalism', came in the 1990s under the push of neoliberal economics' interest in globalization.

In this context, we may wonder to what extent is global studies today independent of IR? The main challenge for GS's independence is not the delimitation of its subject. This has traditionally been globalization, the many ways in which events in one area of the world influence events in other parts of the world. Yet IR's entrenched methodological nationalism, which has deeply penetrated IS and AS, as well, are serious hurdles to a global perspective and methodology to take off. We are much less optimistic about the accomplishments of global studies within U.S. academia than Steger and Wahlrab, for instance.

First of all, the U.S. higher education system does not recognize 'global studies', as such. The College Board's college search system uses a double name: 'international studies/global studies'. As of June 2017, the search engine found 327 such programs, of which 297 were offered by American not-for-profit four-year institutions. Yet at a closer look, some of the programs were actually neither IS nor GS, but 'international business', 'international management', 'international communication', and so on. We did not discard these from the sample, but they occur in the 'none of these' columns of Table 1. Eighteen programs had names different from, but similar to either IS or GS, they also received a separate column[2]. The end result is that programs of IS outnumber programs of GS by almost 2:1. It is only 77 + 5 = 82 four-year programs which endorse the Global Studies nomenclature.

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[1] The exceptions were two British, three Canadians, one German, and one Norwegian.

[2] Here are a few examples for 'similar names': Global Affairs and International Relations, Global Affairs, Global and Cultural Studies, Global Environmental Studies, Global Interdisciplinary Studies, International and Area Studies, International and Intercultural Studies, International Studies and Business.

Table 1. Internation Studies (IS)/Global Studies (GS) bachelor's degree granting programs in the U.S.

Public_Private	Subcategory	Both Programs	Double Name	Global Studies	International Studies	Similar Name	None of These	Total
PU	Regional C/U	0	2	9	23	2	5	41
PU	State University	1	3	9	14	2	5	34
PU	University (flagship system)	1	2	10	21	2	5	41
PR	Nondenominational	1	4	19	12	7	9	52
PR	Anglican	0	1	0	1	0	0	2
PR	Antitrinitarian	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
PR	Catholic	1	1	11	18	4	3	38
PR	Evangelical	0	0	6	7	0	4	17
PR	Inter-denominational	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
PR	Protestant	1	0	12	36	1	13	63
PR	HBCU	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
PR	Hearing impaired	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
PR	Jewish	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
PU/PR	Regional	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PR/PU	Nondenominational	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total		5	14	77	137	18	46	297

Moreover, 82 programs do not mean 82 global studies departments. About half of the 297 programs in the list are run as inter-departmental programs, and many of them are housed in departments such as social sciences, humanities and languages, and education. Based on the institutions' website, we could identify 33 International Studies departments and 23 Global Studies departments.

As for graduate degrees, Table 2 shows that there are 16 U.S. institutions offering degrees higher than bachelor's in either IS or GS, and 14 culminate in Master's. Only two offer a doctorate: UCSB's is a clear-cut global studies PhD, while UMass's is a 'similar name' program, actually rather in political science than in GS.

Table 2. IS/GS graduate degree granting programs in the U.S.

University	Degree	Notes
Brandeis University	MA	Global Studies MA
Central Connecticut State University	MS	International Studies MS
Missouri State University	MA	Global Studies MA
North Carolina State University	MA	International Studies MA
Texas State University	MA	International Studies MA
University of California: Berkeley	MA	Global Studies MA (an Interntl&Area Studies MA was re-named GS MA)
University of California: Santa Barbara	PhD	Global Studies PhD
University of Denver	MA	International Studies MA
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign	BA/MA	Global Studies may be an MA minor or an MA w/ European Union Studies
University of Kansas	MA	Global & International Studies MA
University of Massachusetts Boston	PhD	Global Governance & Human Security PhD
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill	MA	Global Studies MA ("two-year interdisciplinary 'applied research' degree")
University of North Texas	MA	International Studies MA
University of Oklahoma	MA	International Studies MA; plus a joint Juris Doctor and MA in IS
University of Oregon	MA	International Studies MA
University of Wyoming	MA	International Studies MA

These numbers should be interpreted against the background that there are about 3000 public and private non-profit four-year institutions in the U.S., thus it is less than 10% offering any version of a program that may be classified as IS or GS. Further, the four-year IS/GS programs are more likely to occur in private institutions (at the rate of 179 to 116), and private institutions are somewhat more likely to call their program 'global' than public institutions. These asymmetries are important because public institutions tend to be larger than the private non-profits. They educate approximately twice as many students every year. The typical environment for an IS/GS bachelor's program to occur are the small liberal arts colleges. On the positive side, the IS/GS graduate degree granting institutions are, with one exception, all public.

Overall, the U.S. educational landscape does justice to Mittelman's map of GS at the intersection of IR, IS, and AS, even if the whole picture should include the fact that the entire field is clearly dominated

by IR and its worldview. The associational and publishing landscapes, though, suggest a different disciplinary influence, which allows for the hope of a truly global vision. As a matter of fact, there is a Global Studies Association, even if it is much younger, smaller, and less known than the ISA. It was established in 2000 in the UK and continued to remain heavily British, though in 2002 it developed a North American chapter, as well. GSA was established and mainly headed ever since, by sociologists. GSA is involved with three journals:

i   *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs*, a quarterly published by Wiley on behalf of GSA and the Globalization Studies NetF3work.
ii   *Globalizations*, published by Taylor & Francis, sponsored by both ISA and GSA. The journal is ranked both as an IR publication (where it is 32/85) and as a Social Sciences Interdisciplinary publication (33/95). In 2013, *Globalizations* (vol. 10, issues 4 and 6) hosted a high-profile debate on 'what is Global Studies'? with the participation of Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Kevin Archer, Barrie Axford, Mark Juergensmeyer, James Mittelman, Benjamin Nienass, and Manfred Steger.
iii   *International Critical Thought Journal*, published by Taylor & Francis on behalf of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The international editorial board includes GSA's North American chair, Jerry Harris. The board also includes Immanuel Wallerstein and Alexander Buzgalin, a colleague of Chumakov.

The 2000s brought about a number of encyclopaedias on globalization and global studies; we may notice a competition among publishing groups for having the last say in this increasingly fashionable field[3]. Some of them upgraded their first trial to a more prestigious edition a few years later, for instance, the five-volume Wiley *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization* edited by George Ritzer in 2012 was preceded by a *Blackwell Companion to Globalization* edited by him in 2007. Sampling out this volume from the group of publications, we looked at the discipline and nationality of the authors (Table 3). Though the Anglo-Saxon dominance is clear, the authors tend to be sociologists, rather than political scientists.

Table 3. Discipline and nationality of the contributors to the Blackwell Companion to Globalization.

	US	UK/US	UK	Other	Total
sociology	21	1	7	2	31
political science	2	0	1	2	5
philosophy of education	4	0	0	0	4
anthropology	2	0	0	0	2
management	0	0	1	1	2
public health	2	0	0	0	2
education	0	1	0	0	1
geography	0	0	1	0	1
philosophy	1	0	0	0	1
planning	1	0	0	0	1
religious studies	0	0	0	1	1
Total	33	2	10	6	51

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[3]   For instance, Robertson and White: *Globalization: Critical Concepts in Sociology* (Routledge 2003); Mazour, Chumakov, and Gay: *Global Studies Encyclopedia* (Prometheus Books 2005); Robertson and Scholte: *Encyclopedia of Globalization* (Routledge 2006); Anheier and Juergensmeyer: *Encyclopedia of Global Studies* (Sage 2012, vol. 4).

Sociology's predominance in certain associations and publications suggests that other global studies are possible, some of them hopefully liberated from methodological nationalism. There are some promising exceptions in U.S. education, as well, as the sociologist-anthropologist instructors of global studies at UC Santa Barbara, Eve Darian-Smith and Philip McCarty, in their book published six months after the Steger and Wahlrab volume, set out to outline a global transdisciplinary framework explicitly meant to transcend "the dominant state-centered thinking that still prevails in the Euro-American academy" (p. 175). Yet Darian-Smith and McCarty's vision of global studies does not transcend the idea of an empirical study field[4], where the global or transnational perspective is achieved on a casuistic basis, within each study or study-cluster, such as cross-border studies (e.g., Amelina et al. 2012).

As global studies are inherently multi-disciplinary, one may expect methodological fallacies to be unevenly distributed in function of the disciplines involved in the queries.

We think that the most hazardous methodological challenge for a field of study meant to handle global issues is methodological nationalism. Since the 1970s, when the term was coined by Anthony Smith, there has been considerable agreement about the nature and importance of this fallacy. Wimmer and Schiller (2002) defined it as "the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world". Chernilo (2006), who disagrees with them in the operationalization of the concept, still adopts an almost identical definition: "methodological nationalism can be defined as the all-pervasive assumption that the nation-state is the natural and necessary form of society in modernity; the nation-state is taken as the organising principle of modernity". Wimmer and Glick Schiller portray methodological nationalism as a multi-faceted phenomenon, which comes in several variants, such as the national framing of modernity; the naturalization of the nation-state; and the reduction of the analytical focus to the boundaries of the nation-state. All these variants manifest themselves differently in different disciplines, for instance, "international relations assume that nation-states are the adequate entities for studying the international world" (p. 304). Yet thus far it was only sociology making a strong case against methodological nationalism. Not as if sociologists would fully agree about the depth and extent of its impact on social theories, let alone the ways to overcome the fallacy. For instance, Chernilo (2006) takes an issue with Beck's (2007, 2013) project of replacing nation-state centered perspectives with a view called 'cosmopolitan', because Chernilo aims at overcoming methodological nationalism through demonstrating that "in modernity, the nation-state has been historically opaque, sociologically uncertain, and normatively ambivalent". Disciplines outside sociology happen to embrace projects that do not address the problem of methodological nationalism, for instance, *New Global Studies*, a journal founded in 2007 by MIT historian Bruce Mazlish, promises to interpret "globalization with a historical and sociological angle as opposed to history or sociology with a global angle"[5]. This sounds as if, for some scholars involved with this field, global studies are global in virtue of the phenomenon they study, and our vision and methods do not need to follow suit.

The next section will focus on only one discipline, but on one that has influenced global studies through multiple channels. We have to admit that our portrayal of the trans-nation-state field of study, focused on international relations and sociology, does not do justice to several other disciplines contributing to the discipline of global studies. Yet we argue for the importance of theorizations, and of all contributing disciplines, it is IR and sociology that are the most likely theory-builders. We wish there were alternative influential theory-builder schools, such as historical sociology, which, with Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly, and Theda Skocpol, for instance, struck a fine balance between acknowledging a nation-state based world and the impact of processes that go beyond the nation state. They influenced comparative politics, but had no real impact on IR, in which dependency theories and Wallerstein's

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[4]   'That being said, we hesitate to label global studies a new discipline … In our view, it is essential that global studies remain interdisciplinary and that scholars continue to argue and debate what the field is and could be rather than arriving at a definitive answer in an effort to claim the status of being a cohesive subject of study' (Darian-Smith and McCarty 2017, p. 27).
[5]   Quote retrieved 20 August 2017, from the publisher's website: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ngs.

([1974](#)) world systems theory also remained marginalized curiosities. The contention we develop is that methodological nationalism cannot be overcome without allowing for the causal efficacy of factors other than nation-states, and this takes a theory doomed to collide with IR. Our example for such a theory is Chumakov's, which, like the dependency and world system theories, focuses on the economic domain. We are aware that it is unlikely that it will be Chumakov's theory that becomes a challenger of the IR-inspired theorizations in the mainstream global studies field, with its center of gravity still heavily in the U.S., but we do think that similar theorizations should be mainstreamed.

2.2. IR, Where Methodological Nationalism is Rooted in Political Nationalism

Critics of methodological nationalism tend to point towards the occurrence of this fallacy in the field of social theory, in general—missing the point that there is an entire, influential discipline that is almost entirely constructed on the assumption that humanity is inevitably and unchangeably divided into nation-states, and that nation-states are thus the most important and most appropriate forms of organization. International relations, as it emerged around the Second World War, seems to have been locked into this perspective for all of its history, despite past and ongoing paradigmatic foundational debates, which lately shed light on related biases such as Westernism.

In fact, IR's most consequential bias seems to be the over-valuation of nation, nation-state, and national allegiance, because these assumptions are shared by the mainstream scholarship in the field. More exactly, these are the shared assumptions of the three most influential IR paradigms, and they are challenged only by some critical paradigms, which are, almost by definition, at the periphery of the discipline.

Yet IR may be criticized for much more, and several other epistemological and ethical issues may be shown to be related to the basic worldview of the globe as a collection of nation-states. This section will elaborate on tracing back the pervasiveness of methodological nationalism to the predominance of U.S.-based scholars in IR, and will also point out some seemingly related biases, such as the neglect of bridge-laws, which connect between different levels of phenomena, and a penchant towards simplifying explanations, which lead to poor predictions and even in principle unfalsifiability.

2.2.1. International Relations' State and Anarchy Model

IR is a quite typical American product, and all study of its methods should take this into consideration.

First of all, the 'classics', the originators of the three main paradigms—realism, idealism, and constructivism—that always make their way into every IR textbook, were all born as or became U.S. citizens.

Second, the discipline's main cleavages and foundational disputes remained within the confines of U.S. academia, at least up until the 21st century. Most notably, the liberalism versus realism controversy, and constructivism's challenge to both, pitted Americans against Americans, with a few British trying to carve out middle grounds between the parties rather than determinedly siding with any of them (Carr 1939; Bull 1977).

Third, the epistemological ideals of international relations have become unreservedly reflective of the positivist trend conquering the post-World War II social disciplines, even if liberals favored statistical analysis while realists swore by game theoretical modelling. Neither statistics nor game theory is as American as the IR scholars' unwavering support for their rigorous application to historical events, despite the general trend of generations of historians either to compromise with or outright surrender to idiographic methods.

And fourth, both main IR paradigms, with their ramifications, and also most of constructivism, embody a view of the global social world that is deeply rooted in the United States' self-image and is solely compatible with the American national ethos. The briefest summary of this claim is that IR's 'international' relations are, actually, 'inter-state' relations. This is very categorical in realism and less obvious, but fully pervasive in liberalism. Constructivism has developed two main branches, which

may be termed 'statist' (Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein) and 'social' (John Ruggie, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwill, Margaret Keck, Kathryn Sikkink). IR scholars in the social constructivism perspective, like those in other non-orthodox ('critical') perspectives of the field, such as Marxism, feminism, and postmodernism, tend to challenge the dominant paradigms on several issues, but rarely articulate dissent from the basic worldview that states are here to stay, both factually and normatively. Thus far, the postcolonial thinkers have been the most explicit about their not sharing in the 'interstate' vision of realists and liberals.[6]

Since its beginnings around the First World War, and until approximately 1990, international relations evolved as a controversy between liberal and realist perspectives, that is, the state system seen as 'bellum omnium contra omnes' and the same seen as a 'global community'. Surprisingly, it was not the vision of a Hobbesian jungle advocated by cynical practitioners and the belief in cooperation promoted by star-gazing professors. Liberals Wilson and Angell were both practicing politicians; realists Morgenthau and Waltz lived their lives mostly within academia.

Though later the social roles of the paradigm promoters became less differentiated, Morgenthau's and Waltz's status as professors has left a deep impact on realism. First, and most obviously, they articulated some severe norms of methodological rigor, which contributed to realism's seeming to be a coherent paradigm, built on three clear-cut axioms, as compared to the ramifying, messy liberalism, first axiomatized by Moravcsik (1997), but not to the contentment of all liberals. Second, less obviously, but with very serious consequences, Morgenthau made efforts to slice out the domain of IR from the dense texture of global reality, and came up with a definition of its object that later has tacitly been accepted by all realists and affected their opponents in disputes, as well. IR, in his view, is the study of international politics as a struggle for power, and excludes, programmatically and categorically, concerns with "extradition treaties, commerce, providing relief from natural catastrophes, and cultural exchange". This definition confines IR to the study of inter-state relations, rather than of inter-national relations. Nations, as groups of people, are interested in economic relations, culture, and keeping their environments free from pollution and crime. The assumption that their interest in political power allocations trumps or should trump all other interests is in need of supportive arguments. Realism does not fail to provide one, by paraphrasing Hobbes: the weak live dangerous and short lives. Yet realism's actors to 'live or die' are simply the states as institutions, vacated of inherent attributes that would confer value on their maintenance. They are not groups of people, because people are always more interested in butter than in guns; they are not *demoi*, because their strict control by a realistically thinking elite is highly desirable; they are not ethnicities, because their cultural survival does not substitute for the loss of statehood; and empirically, they are very far from the current real-world countries whose population includes, on average, 34% of minority ethnicities, and substantial masses of people who are, legally and/or historically, transnationals.

In the 1990s, the emerging (state)constructivist paradigm highlighted that IR's two central concepts, state and the inter-state anarchy (the constellation defined by power struggle) are mutually constitutive notions. The constructivists used this argument to point out that the world is not necessarily a Hobbesian anarchy, but that it may be a Lockean and even a Kantian anarchy (Wendt 1999). However, the epistemological conclusion to be drawn from this is that a theory with two axioms (as structural realism becomes when two of its three axioms are collapsed into one), has little to no explanatory or predictive power in the real world, and bringing in more empirical content is an epistemological must.

IR liberalism's strongest argument in its dispute with realism has always been its going beyond the conceptualization of the state as a unitary actor in a struggle-for-power game, solely concerned with survival in a Hobbesian world. Yet mainstream IR liberalism backed away from taking a decisive step to break free from the conceptual frames imposed by its opponent. It resisted the conclusion that

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[6]   Earlier versions of postcolonial thinking, the dependency, and Marxist perspectives did not become parts of IR's core "*acquis communautaire*". It was only the economic sub-field (international political economy, IPE) that mentioned them as possible alternative visions.

human interests should be prioritized above state interests. Most international institutions, even their most cherished IR liberal achievement, the United Nations system, are based on the principle of state sovereignty. State sovereignty is encoded in the UN charter while the Declaration of Human Rights comes as a voluntary undertaking of the states.

IR's heavy reliance on enshrining state sovereignty was emphatically pointed out by Walker (1992). He also signaled the ethically problematic consequences of sovereignty, such as the legitimacy to resort to war, versus the illegitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Yet he derived the dominance of sovereignty-ensnared discourse from the stubbornness of an 'exceptionally dense political practice', while we think that there are some ideological causes to be factored in, as well. It was IR as an actual academic discipline that has failed to rid itself of the idolatry of sovereignty, even if there have been thinkers who did not buy into this creed.

First, there have been pacifists who tried to stop wars and limit states' rights to wage wars. Closest to IR's development, the names of Kant, Wilson, and Angell may come to mind, but we should also not forget the resistance to states and state-waged wars that religions have at times offered.

Second, a group of theorists after the Second World War worked out blueprints for peacefully unifying Europe, to the benefit of its peoples, but to the detriment of state sovereignties.

Praxis has yielded to the efforts of both: we have the UN system, various disarmament agreements, declining occurrence of inter-state war, and the European Union. IR, at least its realist version, has not yielded: for several still active scholars, the UN and the EU exist only as façades of the states' power relations.

It seems that the impact of political practice on IR standpoints has been mediated by a cultural context in which war was accounted for as a 'duel', a sense that embodies the worldview of the Borgias and of *'l'état c'est moi'*. IR, as an actual discipline in the 20th century, searched for definitions and explanations of war in the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bismarck, rather than in the work of Gandhi, for instance; and remained unfazed by the UN's voiding the term and replacing it with *aggression*, *self-defense*, and *humanitarian intervention*[7]. Fortunately recently some criticism of the temporal or a-historical bias of IR has been added to the ongoing critiques of the Western bias. McIntosh's (2015) sub-title 'the privileging of time-less theory in international relations' says it all. Winter (2011) sheds light on the attempt of some U.S. legal scholars, such as Michael H. Posner, to morally sanction 'traditional' wars, while throwing excessive blame on guerrilla movements and liberation struggles which involve 'civilian spaces'.

Fixation with sovereignty goes hand in hand with fixation with war because of a second loop of mutually constitutive meanings: a state devoid of its internal functions and of concerns with, for example, "extradition treaties, commerce, providing relief", is reduced to the sole attribute of making war, and war is something that is done by states as unitary actors solely motivated by their own survival. When states are motivated by the correctly perceived well-being of their populace, they avoid aggression and cooperate towards mutual benefits. This is the optimistic creed the IR liberals summed up in the democratic peace proposal, as promoted, for instance, by Doyle (1983), Russett and Oneal (2001). Yet IR resisted innovations both to its vocabulary, such as replacing 'war' with 'aggression', and to its basic worldview, such as of a humanity not compartmentalized into like-units called states. IR liberals aimed at replacing Hobbesian anarchy with inter-state law and institutions, but all did not endorse the agenda of changing the building blocks of the edifice, for instance, allowing for regional integrations maturing into new polities. Liberal intergovernmentalists, such as Moravcsik (1991), denied the possibility of this development while liberal international political economy theorists did not find it desirable. 20th century economic liberalism—the neoliberal, or orthodox, or Washington Consensus doctrine—stood for unrestricted world-wide free trade among

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[7]   Unfortunately, sometimes aggression and humanitarian intervention cannot neatly be distinguished in our complicated world; and this sets limits moral—as different from culturally ingrained—limits on promoting human rights as a principle overriding state sovereignty.

self-contained and responsible (that is, financially accountable) units. From this perspective, OPEC sounded like a trade union, and the EU as the American Association of University Women. By staying with the realist fiction of a globe made up by 'like unit' states, liberals could spare the duty of addressing power structures apart from the military-political; and statist constructivism also tends to share in this fiction.

Other perspectives, the 'newcomer' ones, are concerned with power structures different from the inter-state relations. Feminism with the gender hierarchy, Marxism with the economic hierarchy, and versions of post-colonial thinking with either the economic hierarchy (as in dependency theorists) or the cultural dominance (as in Negritude studies, (Spivak 1988), Bhabha). Postmodern theorists are less specific about their most hated power structure, but they obviously believe in the existence of more than inter-state anarchy alone. The point to be made is that there are inter-state events and developments that cannot be explained without factoring in more than state interests and inter-state power relations. For instance, Cold War behavior, certain voting patterns in the UN, and international terrorism challenge the worldview relying on states as ultimate explanatory principle.

The other concern strangely missing from IR is consideration of intra-state domestic heterogeneity. Its paradigms are predominantly silent about how to manage intra-state diversity, and definitely do not advocate its legitimacy and long-term survival. The unpopular conclusion of realism is that assimilation is desirable, and the unsupported hypothesis of liberalism is that sub-national communal affiliations are on their way to vanishing.

2.2.2. Challenges to the State/Anarchy Model: Sub-National Groups, Supranationality, Alternate Power Structures

The simplifying model of like-unit states, thrown into either Hobbesian or Kantian anarchy, makes so bold abstractions from the real-world complexities surrounding statehood that only very convincing empirical track records could justify the assumption. Unfortunately, the empirical predictive power of IR, and mainly of its realist perspective[8], does not support the value of dropping from analyses so many effects interfering with the military-political power structure. The postcolonial critique of the state system model emphasizes the Western biases of the concept of nation-state[9], and brings in a different vision of the state system, as well. In general, paradigms concerned with power structures above or beyond the military-political, expect alliances along the dominant-dominated fault line, and these ostensibly do occur. For instance, there are undeniable tensions between the developed and developing countries' standpoints on the Palestinian issue, the assessment of U.S. interventions in the Arab world, and the economic policies pushed forward by the IMF and World Bank.

Nationalism is an important ingredient in the vision of a world composed of self-contained and accountable units. It is the link connecting individual and country-level events and also explaining why well-being-oriented individuals would subordinate their lives to the maintenance of a state. As for the details, realists claim that this self-sacrificing behavior may and should be imposed on citizens while liberals just assume that people's ultimate collective identity is their national allegiance.

Empirically, though, 21st-century nationalism in the globe's roughly 200 countries is not the same reality as the nationalism of the European countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Since the 18th century and up to the Second World War, Europe pursued the creation of 'homelands' in which the ethnies were congruent with the state boundaries, and forced assimilation of minority ethnies

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[8] IR realist scholars could not reach consensus on whether a bipolar or a multipolar world was more stable or on the succession of hegemonies. There is no evidence that they foresaw the collapse of the Soviet Union or the magnitude and impacts of international terrorism. The existence of the European Union is a constant challenge to the realist worldview.

[9] IR's like-unit states draw heavily on the image of Europe divided into ethnie-based territorial nation-states, which are meaningless in all other continents where states were created through either immigration or colonial dictates, or both. Westerners also have specific expectations with regard to statehood-related behavior, which are not shared by other cultures. Otherwise, not even the Western concept of state has been so unchanged over centuries as IR normally portrays it. Caporaso's (1996) Westphalian, regulatory, and postmodern state types were all delineated based on Western inputs.

was largely tolerated. The new white immigrant countries (U.S., Australia, Canada) also practiced assimilationist policies, but under the aegis of a civic, rather than an ethnic, type of nationalism. After WWII, two new trends emerged:

-    Experiences with multiculturalism, which allow sub-national groups to define and maintain a communal identity different from the country's majority community identity—as in Canada and India;
-    Experiences with supranationalism, which brings nations closer to each other by working on a superposed higher socio-territorial identity—as in the European Union.

Empirical studies revealed some consequential changes of the individual psyches, such as a general weakening of state-level nationalism as compared to other layers of socio-territorial identities[10]; and the weakening of nationalism as compared to other social identities like political and professional (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Popular moods in Europe have become decidedly pacifist, and in conditions of consolidated democracy, this change has been causally consequential for the probability of war.

In fact, there have been several historical events that evidenced that people think and act in ways unexpected by IR realism, and sometimes, unexpected by IR liberalism, as well. The list of human actions that do not share in IR's molds of state-rational behavior, but turned out to be highly consequential in the real world includes: passive resistance, guerrilla movements (both positive and negative, with either liberation or 'drug wars' and state failure as a consequence), maturing regional integrations, obeying international contracts and law, transnationalism (like workforce migration and terrorism), and ravaging civil wars. Some of these have taken by surprise well-intentioned liberals, as well, who could not see any complication in helping the opposition of some autocratic rulers to oust them from power, and found themselves in the midst of bloody communal wars such as in Syria and Ukraine. In general, the very palpable, large-scale consequences of political action initiated and carried out by entities other than sovereign states have ostensibly resulted in re-shaping the state system through secession, liberation, state failure, and pooling sovereignty.

Yet the explanation that IR's state system yields to bottom-to-top effects, thus it can be shaped by individuals, is not theoretically appealing. Individuals' idiosyncratic wants are unlikely to be the prime movers in the political universe. Non-random, thus cumulative and socially consequential human behavior, is a social fact, which, as Durkheim maintained, needs a social fact to explain. The nation-state system, as postulated by IR theorists, does not contain any developmental trend or dynamics of its own. It is static and timeless by default. If there is change in the state system, its source is to be retrieved either on a lower level[11] or as a power structure above and beyond the military-political structure. There are a few candidates for this latter role, primarily the global economy, which has a differential impact on wealthy and poor states, and weakens the competences of all of them. Religions have been pinpointed as pitting groups of countries against each other (Huntington 1998) and as fueling international terrorism. Ideologies had their moment of fame during the Cold War, and since the 1980s, there has been a thriving literature dedicated to environmental movements.

We may wonder which of these alternate power structures is really strong enough to score a significant effect in accounts of global evolution. Unfortunately for the analysis, none of them is fully

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[10]   See, e.g., Sutherland (2012) on the impact of globalization and regionalization on nationalisms. International surveys such as Eurobarometer reveal that in general, people feel attached to their locality and region to almost the same extent that they feel attached to their country. This creates the possibility of developing one more layer of loyalty towards the European Union (Keulman and Koos 2014), but on the other hand, it means that strong regional movements may jeopardize the territorial integrity of current states (Italy's Lombardia, the Czech Republic's Moravia, and France's Occitan regions come to mind).

[11]   IR liberals' solution is allowing for the impact of lower levels on anarchy, as in the theory of two-level games (Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993). Hovi et al. (2012) studied the applicability of this theory to the case of Kyoto Protocol ratification and concluded that 'the two-level game theory should be interpreted and used only with care'. One big challenge to these explanations is to construct the domestic players in conflict. (E.g., Hovi et al. focus on an Administration *versus* Senate schism, while further evolution of the problem evidences an underlying Democrat *versus* Republican cleavage.)

independent of the military hierarchy, and complicated interactions may emerge among the alternate power structures, as well. For instance, Islamic terrorism is likely to be motivated by the Islamic states' economic disadvantage as compared to developed states with other dominant religions. Strong ethnic secessionist movements typically occur in the case of regions wealthier (Catalonia, Lombardy) or poorer (South Sudan) than the rest of the country. Here lies the U.S.'s striking departure from a series of values endorsed by most of the international community, routinely explained by IR with 'conflicting state interests'. For instance, the U.S. did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, left the Paris agreement, and opposed the establishment of the International Criminal Court (see Fehl 2012 for a longer list). Betti (2016) points out two important facts: (i) opinion polls show that a majority of Americans have supported these international solutions; (ii) typically, Democrats were willing to go with them while Republicans were vehemently opposing them. This suggests that Republican policy-makers managed to subdue both Democratic policy-makers and the wider public opinion in the domestic-level contest for defining the country's national interest. Trump's 'make America great again' tapped deeply and successfully in the investors' drive to bust governments that are slow in opening their markets to U.S. businesses, or ask for concessions in exchange, like NAFTA partners. Overall, some economic special interests are being served by fueling the belief in American exceptionalism and bullying other countries ('making Mexico pay for the wall')—and we may wonder how to conceptualize this: as the impact of the domestic ideologies on inter-state anarchy, or the impact of the inter-state economics on domestic politics?

Sadly, the dense and complicated causal structure of the social world—e.g., multi-causality and proliferation of feedback-loops—resists the simple and elegant explanations so much prized in IR; and it seems that the preference for simple and elegant explanations is but an aspect of buttressing the core vision of like-unit states. That is, a number of further epistemological challenges faced by IR are related to its promotion of the inter-state vision.

2.2.3. Some Related Epistemological Issues within IR

Level-of-analysis concerns have been at the core of IR's epistemological awareness since its inceptions, but Waltz's (1959) articulation of the issue made them a cornerstone topic of evaluation of scholarly performance in the domain. We concur with Waltz's basic claim that higher-level systems constrain and shape the behavior of the components, and the behavior of the components cannot be fully explained without accounting for effects that from their perspective are environmental impacts. As already mentioned, one issue with this vision is that the country's environment cannot be reduced to a military power structure since it is much richer in power hierarchies.

But there are other issues with the three-level vision of Waltz. The causal primacy of a system above its components does not mean either causal exclusivity or existential and chronological primacy. Most of the time we have a co-evolving relationship between the whole and the part, which justifies the search for part-to-whole influences, and actually, makes it necessary. As a further illustration of the mutual constitutiveness of state and anarchy, the like-unit conception of states makes the causal exclusivity of the system versus components a more plausible narrative. Yet in virtue of this narrative, a useful tool in the researchers' toolbox, Nagel's (1961) 'bridge laws', were completely rejected by IR realists, and not well developed by liberals. Furthermore, the narrative also prohibited epistemic reflection on a second plague striking social sciences, besides complexity. In social science, the delimitation of the analysis levels is much more arbitrary than in natural sciences. Social disciplines and sub-disciplines constitute their levels of interest in various ways. Social psychology in the Tajfel tradition sees individuals and groups; sociology in the Weberian tradition sees individuals and institutions; Marxian sociology sees individuals, classes, and modes of production, while the Durkheimian version of sociology tries to eliminate individuals as explanatory principles at all. Political science, and most specifically its IR domain, focuses on the state and defines other levels in function of this, but as a difference from other social disciplines, it makes the claim that this delimitation of the levels of analysis deserves an exceptional status among alternate conceptualizations of the social world. Mainstream IR, as

fashioned in the U.S. in the second half of the past century, promotes the belief that foreign affairs do, or should determine domestic affairs, with the most obvious implication that militarization becomes an imperative.

Sifting through the epistemological and methodological claims most authoritatively promoted within IR, we may be surprised by the dearth of concerns with adequacy, accuracy, precision, and practical value. Most typically, Waltz (1979) stated that theories should be logical, coherent, and plausible (Chapter 1) and further, possessing explanatory power, predictive power, and elegance, which means that "explanations and predictions will be general" (Chapter 4). This is congenial with Olson's (1982) epistemological ideals, celebrating power (when a large number of phenomena are explained), persuasiveness, and parsimony. Theorists working in the rational choice tradition definitely have a tendency to revere generality and simplicity to the detriment of empirical content and practicality, and besides economics, IR is the domain in which RCT has achieved the most dominant position[12]. Coherence and generality (or scope, or power) of explanations are really justifiable ideals. Yet parsimony does not stand scrutiny as a goal to pursue in science, and in many disciplines, it has categorically been dropped following mature epistemological reflection. In empirical sciences, generality does not actualize as a small number of axioms underlying all manifestations of a reality domain. Instead, generality actualizes as completeness, as a grand theory composed of sub-fields addressing different levels, aspects, and domains of the phenomena studied. Think about the Bohr model of the atom: it was logical, coherent, plausible, and parsimonious. Yet contemporary science constructs atoms out of quarks, leptons, and bosons, let alone further divisions into up and down quark, gluon, photon, and neutrino.

RCT, or formal modelling in IR, is mostly domain-specific, tied to concerns about anarchy, but by the nature of the paradigmatic divisions in the field, it has mainly been promoted by realists. Liberals' most typical empirical endeavors were centered on the 'epidemiologic' methodology with which they hoped to reveal the causes of wars. This method is better synchronized with what other empirical sciences discovered to be useful, but contentment with probabilistic techniques involves a compromise with imprecision. As applied in IR, probabilistic modelling promotes the much-needed ideal of testability, yet it remains prey to an unjustified craving for generalization. For instance, all wars are believed to have the same causes, independently of their historic era, regional location, a disparity between the belligerents, and a number of other features.

Constructivism, institutionalism, and postmodernism articulated their opposition to the pre-existing IR corpus from methodological standpoints. In Marxism and feminism, the alternate existential claims are also very emphatic. Today we cannot help imagining IR as a methodologically pluralist discipline, and yet the long realist-liberal dominance of the field has left some very persistent legacies. For decades, parties in the methodological disputes defined and defended their position in function of levels or "images" (Gourevitch 1978; Grieco 1988). Even the newest generations of IR students are trained to think in terms of the three analysis levels and focus their research on one of them. Emergence and reduction, bridge laws, intermediate levels and alternate power structures are not part of the standard epistemological discourse in IR.

3. Discussion: Beyond Four Disciplines, beyond Nationalism, or beyond the North–South Divide?

The foregoing analyses were geared towards showing that international relations, as we know it, is quite vulnerable to both axiological and epistemological criticisms. Three of the often criticized axiology issues are: enshrining state sovereignty (de facto, even if not in principle, to the detriment of human rights and towards legitimization of war); promoting the Western-envisioned nation-state versus

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[12] This is obviously related to the modeling of states as like units. For instance, (Gilpin 1981) authorized two methodologies in IR: 'sociological' and 'economic' (rational choice theory, RCT). He thought that inter-state level phenomena should be explained with rational choice theory models.

multicultural states, tribal societies and regional integrations; and neglect of the necessity of ecological cooperation. A newly strengthening critical concern highlights IR's difficulty to conceptualize global poverty as a predicament to be dealt with (Blunt 2015). All these are neatly aligned with the American core of IR. The creed in like-unit individual states having equal opportunities to flourish when thrown in a competitive marketplace echoes the beliefs in the Protestant work ethic and the Invisible Hand, which made the U.S. the only developed country where life expectancy and the middle class have been shrinking since the Reagan era. In fact, there is a striking similarity between IR's claim that states' pursuit of survival is beyond ethical judgment, and neoliberal economics' idolatry of businesses, which allows corporations to disregard humanitarian considerations in pursuit of thicker bottom lines, if not tacitly encouraging unethical behavior in the pursuit of the same goal.

Finally, the vindication of a special status for IR among other social sciences, as originated by IR realism, is also heavily biased. It supports practices such as lack of transparency regarding military expenses, including, for instance, the neglect of auditing the Pentagon.

Axiological biases are not exogenous to research: they tend to direct and confine analyses and marginalize divergent interest and opinions, often in quite imperceptible ways.

We made the statement that methodological nationalism is related to political nationalism; yet we do not claim that all researchers working within the fields of IR, IS, AS, and GS, who show some degree of methodological nationalism, are political nationalists themselves. We tried to survey the epistemological contexts within which methodological nationalism transmits and may affect even people with a sincere aspiration towards global inclusiveness. Methodological nationalism became deeply entrenched in IR, which is also penetrated by political nationalism, and which has constituted itself in ways that glorify both political and methodological nationalism. IR has had a major role in the evolution of IS and AS, yet in these disciplines (plus in GS) we may witness more tolerance towards methodological pluralism and less effort towards synchronizing basic worldview and basic methodology. Scholars in the field of IS and AS are, by the logic of the facts, much more diverse than IR's classics; and both disciplines were born as empirical research fields, which allowed for some methodological independence from their IR midwife. Even more methodological independence can be attributed to the programmatic interdisciplinarity of these disciplines. Mainly sociology may be credited with bringing in worldviews not dominated by nation-states, and a methodological consciousness superior to that of IR.

As discussed in the first section of the paper, the Global Studies Association, and some basic publications in the field of global studies, are dominated by sociologists fascinated by globalization and global networks. Sociology managed to go beyond the imagery of nation-states much before the birth of the GSA. None of the Founding Fathers of sociology (Marx, Weber, Durkheim) thought of nation-states as either historically long-term frames of human existence or a sensible tool for analysis. Today's sociologists are vocal supporters of transcending state-centered ways of thinking, as well as Westernist biases, yet the calls for theory-building are less intense than in the 19th century, for instance. The field including global studies is badly in need of theories that hammer out notions of global structures, and posit causal directions in-between and within them. Thus far only one stream of sociological scholarship came close to be acknowledged as part of IR, the world systems theory, and its presence remained confined to the international political economy subfield of IR.

World systems theory is a paradigm that radically collides with the nation-state/anarchy model in several respects: it postulates alternate power structures (the economic), it reveals a basic fracture within nation-states (the class issue), and is critical of the whole value structure promoted by IR (such as sovereignty, the right to war, the business model of human affairs). It is a version of global thinking, but it is not routinely incorporated into global studies, at least not in the U.S.

As a counterpoint, Chumakov heavily relies on the Marxist historiography underlying the world systems theory. He constructs globalization as an aspect of the emergence of capitalism and its

expansion around the globe. 'Globalization[13] is a necessary result of the historical process and an essential feature of social development from the moment of the emergence of capitalist relations' (Chumakov 2010, p. 36). Furthermore, Chumakov's description of increasing awareness about globalization includes Marx and Engels as the first thinkers to point out the impending political and economic closing of the world. Chumakov has introduced the powerful notion of 'closing' (or 'closed-ness')—in fact, this taps on the essence of globalization, the dense interconnectedness, when events in one part of the world affect events in other parts of it. He also set up a chronology of reaching closed-ness in different domains, in a sequence of political, economic, ecological, informational, and impending civilizational.

Yet there is some issue with identifying globalization as a capitalist epiphenomenon, logically speaking, there is an 'after this, therefore because of this' challenge here. Humanity inhabiting the planet has always been destined to 'grow together', that is, the ecological and epidemiologic closing was built into the fate of the species. From this perspective, it is accidental that the political and economic closing was reached when the West attained the capitalist phase. Had the globe been smaller, this could have happened under Alexander the Great or under Charlemagne, and then we would have had a slaveholder or a feudal globalization. Thus, while the capitalist economy's expansive dynamics were very correctly described by Marx and Engels, the previous social formations also had strong expansive tendencies built in, which failed to engulf the globe because of a combination of population density and technical might.

Looked at from this perspective, globalization is an 'actually existing globalization', a quasi-contingent outcome of the planet's size and humanity's speed of evolution. This 'actual globalization' incorporates striking capitalist features along with characteristics that express a deeper interconnectedness than dictated by the capitalist world economy and its most comfortable political mold. For instance, the ecological, epidemiological, and informational interconnectedness seem to go beyond or beneath the capitalist economy and the U.S. dominated state system. Recognizing this duality inherent in globalization is as important to theorists as to 'anti-globalization' activists. As for the latter, the duality indicates that only 'anti-capitalist-globalization' or 'alter-globalization' movements (or "universalist protectionist" movements, using the term of Steger 2007) have reasonable chances of success; and these obviously rely on informational globalization and use ecological and epidemiological globalist arguments. As for the theory, we may wonder whether it was time for the U.S. version of global studies to come up with some pillars that codify a truly global outlook into globalization. For instance, Babones (2007) would prescribe the involvement of a global level of analysis. We would suggest an analytical framework that highlights which features of our global interconnectedness are shaped by unbridled capitalism and which are here to stay even in conditions of Polanyi's (1944) 'embedded markets'. It should also involve a study of the role or function of nation-states, and whether our world is doomed to be 'inter-state', rather than 'global'. As of today, the informational closing of the world makes possible that non-Western views on globalization are heard, such as dependency theory, world-systems theory, Pope Francis' Catholicism, and postcolonialist thinking in several disciplines; yet none of these managed to make a serious impact on current globalization, which keeps working along a neoliberal economic logic. The way of ideologies to influence economy runs through the state, and here the anti-actual-globalization ideals are caught in a catch 22. What are the chances of the citizenry of a small and weak state to push through a global Tobin tax, for instance? The most reasonable scenario for a citizenry preponderantly committed to combatting poverty is to establish redistributive policies within the state and protect the national economy by setting limits on foreign trade and investments—that is, through strengthening the nation-state. Since lately the wealthiest nation on the earth has also played this protectionist-nationalist card (yet against redistribution), we

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[13] Chumakov's full definition of globalization is 'a multi-aspect natural historical process leading to the emergence of planetary holistic structures and connections. Globalization is immanent to the world community and covers all basic spheres of human life'.

have to conclude that gatekeeper conservatism and action-oriented opposition to it are both likely to rely on nation-states in their pursuits and keep referring to beyond-the-border concerns as 'globaloney'.

In fact, within the U.S., global studies have eked out a narrow plot for themselves mostly in small private liberal arts colleges, which are usually taken for fostering l'art pour l'art hermeneutic preoccupations. By 2017, only 37 public institutions managed to channel tax money in research expressly called global studies, out of the approximately 700 public 4 year colleges and universities. Actually, the statistics do not look better in any country: Russia, Japan, the UK, and Australia all seem to have only one academic center dedicated to global studies. While the researchers have grown increasingly fascinated with globalization over the last three decades, governments have shown little interest in supporting this type of inquiry. There are government advisors on immigration, foreign trade, and foreign affairs—but not on 'global policies', and not even on 'globalization policies' (and the advisors on immigration, foreign trade, and foreign affairs are unlikely to have other vision than IR's inter-state worldview).

The U.S. institutions that run global studies programs try to brand them as a useful major with good job prospects, but these latter are practically identical with the job prospects for the international studies, both further overlapping with those of area studies and international relations. Both from the perspective of institutional history and labor market shares, the four areas look like subfields of the same discipline, rather than distinct social fields. Currently, in the U.S. and in most of English language scholarship, IR is the 'theory-generating' area, while the other three exist as empirical studies. The major challenge to global studies is to become a theory generating field at parity with, and hopefully overcoming, IR's established paradigms. For instance, it could offer a coherent view of global society that puts nation-states and nationalisms in their place, establish causal connections among meaningfully outlined components of the global system, and make predictions about the evolution of globalization. Humanity badly needs such a discipline, both for descriptive and normative purposes. For instance, the United Nations delegitimized wars by switching to a terminology that replaces 'war' with 'aggression', 'self-defense', and 'humanitarian intervention'. Yet some scholars, mainly in the U.S., still find theoretical justifications for wars, including the hegemonic 'pre-emptive' wars.

The challenges to unifying the four areas under a powerful global-outlook theory (or even under several competing global-outlook paradigms) are not trivial. Within the academic world, the inertia of the entrenched institutions and the resistance of methodological nationalism are overwhelming on their own. Yet the larger social context within which the academic venture unfolds also favors the maintenance or frequent recurrence of political nationalism in several countries and for various reasons. In the developed world, right-wing populist nationalism has become a successful electoral platform over recent decades. In the developing countries, anti-capitalist/anti-Western nationalism is more frequent, though more variegated, ranging, for instance, from the Muslim Brotherhood through some East European autocracies to the Latin-American experiments with socialism (which are, otherwise, highly supportive of the World Social Forum-type alter-globalization). The leading theme of right-wing populist nationalism is anti-immigrationism, that is, it protects the Westerners' privileges against individual challengers to it, but nationalist extremists are more and more open about their willingness to use force to impose certain economic rapports on other countries. On the developing side, economic arguments are often mixed with cultural ones, but there is a considerable consensus among all types of underdeveloped-country nationalisms, that unbridled global markets only benefit the giant transnational companies whose profits go to their first-world owners. The north–south divide seems to beget nationalisms day by day, and the widening gap exacerbates this effect. The relationship between inequality and proneness to extremism, including right-wing extremism with its usual nationalist and racist overtones, has already been studied, but it is time to take the studies to the next level by factoring in the impact of global inequality, as well.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine a global theory without an emphatic economic component. The study of globalization started with economic aspects; and even IR, which places the nation-state in the center of the socio-political universe, has developed a political economy branch. When starting from

the perspective of culture, the single most important cultural shock of the 21st century is the unfolding of 'casino capitalism'. Furthermore, the field of economic thinking is as polarized as that of the politics beyond the nation-state. There is, on the one hand, neoliberal economics so warmly welcoming economic globalization but without any propensity to move beyond the idea of a globe segmented in nation-states, as stable states are the utmost guarantee of collecting debts from impoverished debtors. There exists, on the other hand, the world systems theory of Wallerstein, with its Marxist origins and deep similarities with the Latin-American dependency theories. These are exactly the same poles we see in domestic politics, as well. Why not think about the globe as one complex society where boundaries are contingent and fluid, and states are Janus-faced institutions exploitable both as well-intended regulators to make life more humane and as fortresses defending the privileges of some fortunate human groups?

4. Materials and Methods

All data supporting the fact statements made in the article come from publicly available sources, such as the collegeboard.org for U.S. education data, and isanet.org for the International Studies Association's history and presidency, as well as some publishers' websites. The collected material, compiled in one Excel file with several tabs, is attached as a Supplementary Materials File.

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The Ideal and the Real Dimensions of the European Migration Crisis. The Polish Perspective

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Abstract: In the article the so-called European migrant crisis of 2015 is presented from the perspective of Polish society. First, we consider criteria for distinguishing refugees from other types of immigrants. Second, we examine the characteristics of the 2015 inflow which contribute to its perception in terms of crisis. The third issue is Polish society's reactions to the phenomenon of migration. On the one hand, the results of nationwide polls are presented. On the other hand, the perspective of a provincial city is introduced. In the city an active refugee center has been operating for almost three decades and major importance has been attached to the idea of a multicultural society. The analysis of these issues indicates that the inflow related to the migration crisis does not coincide with the current patterns of refugee migration and is not consistent with the celebrated vision of a multicultural society.

Keywords: migration crisis; ideal type; refugees; immigrants; migration policy

1. Introduction

The unexpected, large-scale inflow of non-European citizens on the territory of the European Union (EU) during several months in the years 2015–2016 has been called the "migration crisis" and a "humanitarian crisis" (Martin 2016; Baldwin-Edwards et al. 2018; Dunes et al. 2018). The data and analyses of International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) were alarming (see Figure 1). It was pointed out that "post-war Europe did not know this phenomenon" (Cianciara 2015, p. 430). The migration crisis has become one of the most important subject matters capturing public attention for many months. In this context, two faces of the movement of immigrants and refugees have been presented. The first portrays the mass inflow of people from outside Europe, mainly men, and has been discussed a lot in the media, such that it finally also caught Polish public attention, despite the fact that Poland has not experienced immigration of this kind on such a large scale. The second is related to the actual cases of migration to Poland during the migration crisis, which were in line with earlier patterns of refugee arrivals to Poland and had different characteristics than the discussed "crisis". It seems that these arrivals do not arouse controversy in Poland and are beyond public debate. What focused Poles' attention was the refugee inflow to other EU countries, and this is what became the "carrier" of the idea of "migration crisis" to Poland. This is also why the words "the so-called" sometimes precede "migration crisis" in this text.

Information about tragic accidents and human drama of immigrants and refugees arriving in Europe through the Mediterranean Sea has aroused social emotions and has not allowed people to remain indifferent to these events. The IOM, which began to collect and publish data on the number of deaths and drownings during these crossings, demonstrates large numbers which significantly exceed 1000 people per year, namely: 3317, 3416 and 5096 casualties in years 2014–2016, respectively (Fargues 2017, p. 13). Such information, being disseminated and visualized against the background of

arriving people, mostly young men, resulted in polarization of social attitudes towards the current policy of admitting immigrants and refugees. Some expected that a strict immigration policy would be adopted in order to prevent such situations from recurring. Others demanded that the policy be softened and greater openness should be shown to those who take trouble and risk their lives to reach safe countries.

Figure 1. Number of detections of illegal border crossings to European Union per month. Source: own calculations based on official data (Frontex 2019).

In Poland, the migration crisis became a media event since the beginning. At its peak, neither the increase in the number of refugees nor the phenomenon of large and uncontrolled inflow of foreigners from outside Europe were noticed. According to the data from the Office for Foreigners, the number of persons who applied for refugee status even decreased slightly (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców 2015). Still, a very critical attitude of Poles towards refugees can be observed, although they have little experience of hosting them in Poland (Łaciak and Frelak 2018). By disseminating information, films and photos showing different faces of the migration crisis, electronic and traditional mass media have contributed to this effect. The nature of the media message is that it says whatever attracts attention, according to the old journalistic principle: *bad news is good news*. As a result, the message about the migration crisis was dominated almost exclusively by negative content. Besides, the very concept of "the migration crisis" is not neutral in itself. Polish society has already experienced many political and economic crises and is not willing to face another. All the more so that in the neighboring Germany, a richer and better organized country, with a long tradition of hosting migrants (Stokes 2019), this major increase in the number of refugees and immigrants caused a lot of confusion, growing concerns about security in public spaces (Stecker and Debus 2019) and "the crisis has also heightened anti-foreigner racism, prejudice and marginality for existing immigrant communities" (Sadeghi 2019, p. 1625). The peak of media and society's interest in the so called migration crisis in Poland coincided with the campaign for the parliamentary elections in Poland in 2015, and debates on the character of the Polish State's policy, including the policy towards migration. Concepts such as *refugees*, *immigrants*

or *migrants*, frequently used in public debates, became popular expressions, used intuitively and ambiguously. They played an important role as a catalyst of division. Two groups emerged: the opponents and the supporters of the "open door" policy. This dichotomous, and thus simplified way of practicing migration policy fit well into the election campaign, because it made it easy to distinguish between these two groups of politicians. However, it is known that migration policies are much more complex and ambiguous in practice. The dichotomous approach to this matter reflects different visions of Poland's future: multi-ethnic and multicultural or national and with little cultural and ethnic diversity. We point out that after the peak of the migration crisis the migration issues ceased to be central to mass media and their role in political campaigns became less significant (see the end of Section 4).

The manifestations of society's interest in the so-called migration crisis took various forms: from street marches (in 2015 they were organized in the largest Polish cities) through public debates (including broadcasts on nationwide and regional radio and television stations) to publications of statements released by various organizations and opinion-forming circles (including, for example, the Polish Sociological Association or the Committee on Migration Research of Polish Academy of Science). At the same time, while street marches attracted mainly the opponents of immigrants' and refugees' admission to Poland, the debates were attended by people who worked with refugees and experts. The issuing of statements was a typical form of expression for the supporters of the "open door" policy. However, the parliamentary elections in October 2015 were successful for the parties declaring the "defense" of Poland against the mass arrival of immigrants and refugees.

Poles' attitudes towards the immigration to Poland in the context of the European migration crisis have already been discussed in various aspects by many Polish scholars and experts in the field of migration and refugee studies. The themes explored concerned mainly such problems as: the need for a more balanced and reliable vision of immigration and refugee issues in public discussion (Goździak and Márton 2018), the Catholic Church, the State and civil society's reactions to the idea of possibly receiving refugees in Poland (Narkowicz 2018), or the Islamophobia in Polish society and ambiguities of opinions towards Muslims and Islam (Pędziwiatr 2018). A lot of space was devoted to the general discussion of the arguments presented by the supporters and opponents of receiving migrants in Poland, as well as the factors that determined shaping Polish society's perception towards immigrants (Hodór and Kosińska 2016). In this article, Poles' attitudes are also presented, however, the text hopes to bring a new perspective to the ongoing discussion on the current migration issues by addressing specific problems. First, there is the question about the characteristics of the latest wave of immigrants arriving in European Union countries and whether these features distinguish it from the waves preceding the migration crisis; if there are such differences, what are they? The second purpose of the analysis is to present the reaction of Polish society to the EU policy on the relocation of refugees, and an attempt to explain this reaction. The third is the issue of the possible impact of the migration crisis on the course and outcome of parliamentary elections in Poland in October 2015. The text is divided according to the following issues. First, the sociological concept of the ideal type is used to frame the data and the analysis of the features of refugee migration in times of the migration crisis (there is a synonymous term—*refugeeness* (Malkki 1996). Second, the scale and specificity of taking refuge in Poland is presented. Third, social reactions to relocation plans for refugees in Poland are explored, including popular opinions about migrants' health condition. Fourth, the experiences of hosting and integrating refugees into the society of a Polish city, by an active refugee center, are discussed. In the last section, public opinion on the relocation of refugees is introduced and, finally, conclusions are drawn.

2. Asylum Seekers Ideal Type versus Actual Characteristics

The so called European migration crisis has highlighted the difficulties associated with the classification of incoming people. For years, there have been problems with distinguishing refugees

from other categories of migrants (Hein 1993). Under the Geneva Convention of 1951, a refugee is a person who:

> owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Geneva Convention 1951)

The key phrase in this definition is "fear of being persecuted" and various sources of persecution are mentioned. The decision about granting the refugee status is motivated by the assessment of the concerns of the person seeking protection and whether they are justified. The refugee status is, therefore, not automatically obtained after submitting the application. In Poland, the application is submitted through the Border Guard. In practice, the processing of each application often takes many months. Scherschel (2011), referring to the situation in Germany, notes that administrative procedures strongly affect the experiences of refugees in the host society. Throughout this time the situation of such people remains unclear and the problem of migrants with an undefined social status is growing.

The ideal type, a tool used by sociologists to describe and classify the studied phenomena, allows for viewing the refugee situation in such a way as to take into account different criteria. Although the legal aspect of the refugee experience, being a formal criterion, has significant practical meaning (people recognized as refugees gain a number of rights in the host society), it is not sufficient enough to capture the essence of this experience in the sociological sense.

The legal criterion allows classification of refugees as legal migrants i.e., registered migration. This means that the newcomers are required to register, and the state authorities are required to register them. Registration is the step towards state control over the inflow, and, at the same time, provides refugee candidates with the sense of security, including social security. The migration crisis did not introduce any significant changes in this respect, but it proved that it is easy to disturb the balance of the flow control system and make it ineffective. A good example of an effect of this kind is the famous statement of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel at a press conference in Berlin on 31 August 2015 (Sakson 2016). The Chancellor emboldened the individuals arriving from outside Europe to bypass the EU border crossing procedures. Several days earlier Germany suspended the 1990 Dublin protocol which forces refugees to seek asylum in the first European country in which they set foot (Hall and Lichfield 2015). This led to conflicts within the member states of the European Union. The Polish government, elected in the 2015 general election, consistently opposed both the weakening of control over migration movements and the obligatory relocation of refugees. Soon, by the end of 2015, also the public acceptance of immigrants in Germany decreased significantly (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017).

The criterion of voluntariness is an important distinguishing feature in the classification of migration inflow. Refugee migration (exile) is forced migration (Kawczyńska-Butrym 2009, pp. 16–17). In addition to seeking asylum there are also other types of involuntary migration, such as displacement, resettlement, or deportation. In case of seeking refuge, the involuntariness results from the necessity of escape from the country of origin and the need to stay abroad as long as it is required, regardless of individual preferences and plans. A refugee, unlike an economic immigrant (Cieślińska 2014), cannot visit his/her country of origin during the period of his/her refuge. Also, he/she cannot plan the date of his/her return, and, by the same token, the length of his/her stay in the country in which he/she found refuge. An additional feature of seeking asylum as forced migration is the individualized nature of this migration: "refugee migration (. . .) is not a mass migration, or migration organized by the units which do not participate in it" (Okólski and Fihel 2012, p. 214). To some extent, for this reason, refugees are easier to control, as each case requires separate consideration. The important feature of the European migration crisis is the mass inflow of individuals and organized character of the trips.

In the search for features of the ideal type of refugee migration, it is worth paying attention to the criterion of the duration of stay. Empirical studies show that refugees' stay in the host country is temporary (Malkki 1996). Refugees stay in the country that gives them a safe refuge; the stay should end with their return to the country of origin or return "to the national order of things" (Malkki 1995b; Pluta 2008). This includes methods of refugee settlement applied by UNHCR like repatriation, integration with the host society or resettlement to a third country (Pluta 2008, p. 36). However, it is becoming clear that this is not a generally applicable rule. An example may be the refugee experience of Poles who were in refugee camps in Italy in the 1980s. After the political changes in Poland, in 1989, only a few of them decided to return home (Kaczyński 2016, p. 112). The phenomenon of non-return has a wider dimension and is quite widespread. Castles and Miller (2011) point out that these are the shortages of economic resources, and lack of guarantees for the preservation of human rights in the weak countries, run by despotic rulers, that often stand in the refugees' ways to solving the problems which had resulted in seeking refuge and making the decision not to return home. Lack of such returns may also result from the motivation behind the migration, which is "often a part of the migration strategy aimed at facilitating a migrant's ability to reach the destination country, or a legal stay in this country, and does not necessarily reflect the real motive of the journey" (Okólski and Fihel 2012, p. 215). Host countries try to counteract such strategies, including organized deportations (Sieniow 2016). The practice of avoiding or refraining from return to home countries can also be seen as the result of effective integration and refugees' attachment to the country which gives them shelter. Integration policy, resulting from the need to ensure social cohesion and order in the host country, is also aimed at protecting newcomers from exclusion and marginalization. Effective integration policy, however, will hinder the tendency of newcomers to return to the countries they came from. This, in turn, changes the essence of seeking safe haven towards settlement immigration. In the situation of demographic decline in the host countries, this effect would be desirable, especially if it really resulted from an effective integration policy. The experience and practice of host countries show, however, that integration policy rarely brings the intended results. The real effect of the inflow of people from other countries is the growth in the size of immigrant communities, who live in their own, parallel worlds. There is a danger that ethnic enclaves will become ghettos isolated from the dominant society. In extreme cases this may lead to open expression of contempt and hostility towards the host country and its inhabitants (Joahny 2016). Publicizing these phenomena in the era of the migration crisis shows that the reception of immigrants and refugees is increasingly accompanied by the atmosphere of uncertainty and fear (Chodubski 2017, p. 14).

The demographic criterion refers to the composition and demographic structure by age and sex of the arriving individuals. Migrants are usually young people, whereas a refugee be anyone who makes a successful attempt to escape in the event of a life threat in their own country. Therefore, the demographic structure of refugees should reflect the demographic structure of the population of the country from which the refugees arrive. In migration policy, this assumption manifests itself in taking into account the need for selective assistance, in order to first take care of the weakest among those who arrive. In the course of proceedings on granting refugee status, special protection covers the following groups of foreigners: minors staying within the territory of the Republic of Poland without legal or customary representative (unattended minors), victims of violence and the disabled, persons in an advanced age, pregnant women, single parents, victim of human trade, and sick persons.

One of the features of the mass migrant inflow of 2015 is the disturbance of demographic proportions. Among the people arriving in great numbers, the majority are young men (Connor 2016, p. 12; Hudson 2016; Newsham and Rowe 2017). There were few women, children and elderly people. Some experts say, that "this is typical for migratory movements that the strongest people go first and 'pave the way'. Women and children follow them later. It is normal, that even 75% of people on this refugee-migration route are men. Women with children remained in camps in Turkey or Lebanon. This is not an anomaly" (Pędziwiatr 2015). However, this is not a typical situation. "The visual prominence of women and children as embodiments of refugeeness has to do not just with the fact that most

refugees are women and children, but with the institutional, international expectation of a certain kind of helplessness as a refugee characteristic" (Malkki 1995a, p. 11; Malkki 1996, p. 388). The same aspect is underlined by Barry Stein (Stein 1981). Current UNHCR data on the demographic structure of refugees, for example from Burundi, South Sudan or Myanmar, confirm that women are usually the majority (UNHCR 2019). "Refugee migrations are more frequently composed of families, while immigrant migrations are more often composed of individuals" (Hein 1993, p. 50). The fact that the demographic structure of those who arrive (by age and sex) does not reflect the demographic structure of the countries from which they arrive shows that we are dealing with an inflow that is not consistent with the ideal type of the refugee migration but it is closer to pioneer migration pattern.

Generally, refugees are expected to need help, because this stems from the basic tenets of refugee migration policy i.e., that they ought to be helped. In practice, however, refugees can also come from privileged groups and layers of their own societies, i.e., there can be wealthy and educated people among those who seek safe haven (this was the case during the revolution in Russia or France or during the expansion of Nazism in Germany, and in all cases of the typical exile (Malkki 1995b). In the wave of refugees there can also be people who are physically and mentally strong enough to escape from the danger in their own country, and reach a safe country on their own. The only help such people need is to enable them to stay in a safe place (or country of their choice) as they are able to provide for themselves as long as they feel safe. They do not need to prove and manifest that they are helpless—because they are not. Policy towards refugees, however, seems to favor the development of the "learned helplessness" syndrome.

The information from refugee registration points is that the arriving refugees are well aware of the host countries' preferences, and some of them want to receive help easily, by trying to pass as minors. "Three-quarters of age-tested asylum seekers who told Danish authorities they were children have been found to be older than 18" (Sharman 2016). A Swedish pediatrician said that "he has examined several people that the migration agency has classed as children but that, according to his own professional opinion, almost 40% of them are in fact between 20 and 25 years old, and some of them even near their forties" (The Local 2016). On the one hand, such events indicate the desperation of those who arrive, but on the other hand, they reflect the pressure exerted on organizations and institutions managing this migration, including the necessity to verify information on those applying for refugee status (BBC News 2017). The described situations signal the difficulties, even when it comes to such basic data as the refugees' age. It seems that the context of the migration crisis increases the despair of those arriving, who by all means try to enhance their chances of getting help.

Another element which allows to distinguish the refugee migration from other forms of migration is the neighborhood criterion. Moving to the nearest safe country, in the situation of security threat, is one of the typical features of refugee movements. Taking refuge in a neighboring or geographically close country allows for quick escape, but also for a quick return when the danger is over (Malkki 1996). Searching for shelter in the neighboring country thus strengthens the trait of the ideal type of the refugee flow, such as the temporary nature of the stay. However, in the era of the present migration crisis, seeking refuge in neighboring countries ceased to be a common practice and rule. This is a very meaningful fact, that the essence of the migration crisis is the inflow of non-European individuals to Europe. These people do not escape to the country on the same continent, but choose the option of a further journey. Increasingly, the direction of these movements is determined by other than geographical factors, e.g., by socio-cultural links and networks.

3. The Scale and Specificity of the Refugee Inflow to Poland

The arrival of asylum seekers in Poland is a relatively small-scale phenomenon. As calculated by experts from the Migration Research Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences, since the signing of the Geneva Convention by Poland, in September 1991, by the year 2016 more than 135,000 foreigners had applied for refugee status, "of whom only approx. 4.5 thousand (3.5%) gained the opportunity to settle in Poland, and about 15,000 were granted temporary protection or temporary permit for

tolerated stay. It is estimated that a significant proportion of people entitled to stay in our country left its territory" (KBnM 2016). However, in each subsequent decade, an increase in the number of those applying for protection in Poland, and the number of those who are granted such protection as refugees, can be noticed (Kosowicz and Maciejko 2007). For example, in 1993 applications for refugee status were submitted by 822 people (61 people were granted the status), in 2003 6906 people applied for refugee status (245 people were granted the status), in 2013 there were 15,253 people who applied for refugee status, and it was granted to 427 people. The growing number of refugees is accompanied by a drop in the percentage of positively processed applications: in 1993, refugee status was granted to 7.4% of the refugees, in 2003 to 3.5%, and in 2013 to 2.8% of those who applied. This means that obtaining refugee status in Poland is becoming more difficult. At the height of the European migration crisis, there was no rapid increase in the inflow of refugees to Poland. According to the Office for Foreigners, in 2015 applications for the refugee status were filed by 12,325 people (the status was granted to 348 people, i.e., 2.8%), in 2016, 4502 applications were submitted by 12,321 persons, of which only 108 people were granted the refugee status (i.e., 0.87 %); in 2017, 2226 applications were submitted by 5078 persons (the status was granted to 150 people, i.e., 2.95%). The immigrants from countries involved in the European migration crisis were not represented in large numbers in Poland. Refugees from Syria accounted for only 2.4% (295 people) of all new arrivals, while at the same time in EU countries, refugees from Syria accounted for 30% of the asylum seekers (Martin 2016, p. 309). However, the likelihood of obtaining refugee status in Poland was greater in case of people from Syria than in the case of foreigners from other countries. In 2016, out of the total 108 positive decisions issued, 40 decisions (37%) concerned people from Syria. In 2017, this percentage dropped to 11%. Official data on refugees in Poland show that refugees representing the wave of "migration crisis" (e.g., from Syria) were granted refugee status in Poland much more often than refugees from other countries. Therefore, it can be said that, regardless of the politicians' declarations, Poland was open to receiving refugees who came with the wave of the "migration crisis", although they did not come in great numbers.

The gender structure of the people applying for refugee status in Poland does not show strong masculinization. In 2015, refugees from 53 countries (4636 women and 4280 men) filed applications for refugee status in Poland. Out of the 53 countries, there were 41 countries in case of which the applications were filed more often by men, including Ukraine (1248 men and 1057 women), Syria (190 men and 105 women), Georgia (201 men and 193 women) and Armenia (98 men and 97 women). The prevalence of women among refugee applicants concerned only 9 countries, including Russia (4143 women and 3846 men), Tajikistan (287 women and 254 men) and Kyrgyzstan (80 women and 67 men).

The characteristic feature of the refugee inflow to Poland in the peak period of the migration crisis is that it consisted mainly of people from neighboring countries. In 2015, the majority of those applying for refugee status came from the Russian Federation—7989 (64.8%) and Ukraine 2305 (18.7%). Migration from Russia, which has been at a high level for many years, concerns the Chechen population, who do not live in the immediate vicinity of Poland. For Chechens, however, Poland is the first safe country to which lead already paved paths. What is significant about this nation is that they often treat Poland as a transit country (Cieślińska 2005), migrating sooner or later to Germany or other richer countries. This natural phenomenon to some extent explains the reluctance of Polish authorities with respect to the idea of relocation of refugees.

4. Social Reactions to Relocation Plans for Refugees in Poland

Sociological studies devoted to refugees in Poland began to appear at the end of the 1990s (Grzymała-Moszczyńska and Nowicka 1998). There have not be too many of such studies and they have been mostly concerned with the years preceding the migration crisis (Hryniewicz 2005; Nowicka and Cieślińska 2006; Czapka 2006; Firlit-Fesnak and Potocki 2007; Lalak 2007; Ząbek and Łodziński 2008 and more). These studies include "various environments and research sites: refugees staying in the refugee centers, refugees living outside the refugee centers, communities and people having daily

or professional contact with refugees, and the Polish society (research on attitudes towards refugees)"
(Main 2008, p. 25).

The European migration crisis has revealed a dichotomous and, in practice, even a conflict-generating division within Polish society, into those who support the idea of accepting refugees in Poland and those who oppose it. Surveys, which have been conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) since May 2015 indicate polarization of public opinion on this point. At the same time, there has been a systematic decrease in the percentage of respondents who have no opinion on this subject, in favor of the rise in the proportion of opponents of accepting refugees in Poland. In May 2015, the "difficult to say", answer was given by 14% of the respondents, whereas a year later it was 7% of the respondents, and in 2017 it was only 5%. The opponents of accepting refugees initially (May 2015) constituted 53% of the surveyed people, and the supporters constituted about 33%. Two years later (April 2017), the opponents constituted 74% of the respondents, and the supporters only 22% (CBOS 2017, p. 2; Bachman 2016).

The respondents' views regarding the admission of refugees were significantly related to their political preferences. Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Platform]—the ruling party in 2007–2015—had the highest percentage of supporters for the "open door" policy. However, many respondents voting for this party were against the relocation of refugees. There were almost as many supporters as opponents of welcoming refugees in Poland. Respondents voting for the ruling party—Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [Law and Justice]—were almost unanimous in their reluctance to accept refugees arriving in Europe (see Table 1).

Table 1. The distribution of answers to the question (posed in April 2017): "Due to the large scale inflow of refugees from the Middle East and Africa to some countries of the European Union, these countries are not able to cope with this problem. In your opinion, should Poland accept some of the refugees arriving in Europe?" Source: (CBOS 2017, p. 3).

Potential Electorate	Agree	Disagree	Difficult to Say
PiS (*Law and Justice*)	9%	88%	3%
PO (*Civic Platform*)	49%	49%	2%

Other differences between supporters and opponents of receiving refugees in Poland were related to their place of residence, education level and income: "In favor of the admission of refugees, relatively most often, are: the inhabitants of biggest cities (39%), people who have higher education (33%), and people with the highest per capita income (29%). The opponents of relocation are most often: the youngest respondents (87% of the opponents among people aged 18–24) and people who participate in religious practices every week (77%) or more often (86%)" (CBOS 2017, p. 3).

It seems that the opponents of the "open door" policy belong to the more excluded rather than to the privileged groups in the Polish society. The negative attitude towards refugees may, therefore, arise from fears of their situation, social security and life prospects portrayed as getting even worse when the help and attention of the Polish State is directed at newcomers who need support. In Poland, social reactions to refugees can be considered as a manifestation of "moral panic" (Cohen 1972), like in Hungary (Sik and Simonovits 2019). Actually, the case of Poland is even more related to the moral panic phenomenon because Poles learned about the European migration crisis mainly through mass media and then began to fear the perceived consequences of accepting immigrants and refugees of a different religion and culture. It should be noted, however, that the concerns and fear of newcomers were, to some extent, intertwined with compassion and attempts to understand this situation (Cieślińska 2017; Jaskułowski 2019). The 2015 parliamentary elections were won by the parties who declared they would protect Poland from the migration crisis and the inflow of immigrants and refugees. Three years later, in local elections, migration issues turned out to be much less important. In all major Polish cities (including Warszawa, Lublin and Białystok, where refugee centers were located) the winning

presidential candidates supported the "open door" policy, although they usually did not emphasize this in their campaigns (Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 2018).

5. Refugees and Health Issues

In the course of the election campaign, one of the arguments used by the opponents of the "open door" policy was the refugees' health condition and possible epidemiological threat. It needs to be said here that this fear of health problems stems from the very fact that many people arrive in one place and live together sharing a relatively small space, which increases the disease risk. In addition to that, the pre-migration situation, difficult journey, separation from family, stress and often trauma of staying in a new place, accompanied by hostility, detention and an uncertain future may affect not only the infectious, communicable, non-communicable or chronic diseases but also the mental health of these people (Hunter 2016; Fotaki 2019) and especially the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Baranowska 2016). The symptoms of health problems may also appear in future, adding another serious issue to the system of medical care in the country of their settlement (Hunter 2016). Therefore, the host countries should adopt certain courses of action to take care of refugees' mental and physical condition (Perna 2018). One idea is to have special interdisciplinary teams, sensitive to cultural diversity (Pavli and Maltezou 2017) to consult and control refugees' health and, at the same time, facilitate their integration.

In 2015, the leader of the PiS party, Jarosław Kaczyński, drew attention to this problem by recalling examples of countries in which: "there are already signs of emergence of diseases that are highly dangerous and have not been seen in Europe for a long time: cholera on the Greek islands, dysentery in Vienna (. . .) various parasites, protozoans, which are not dangerous in the bodies of these people, but can be dangerous here. This does not mean discriminating against anyone (. . .) but it needs to be checked, said Kaczyński" (Pilonis 2015). Polish media raised the subject, contributing to even greater polarization of society. Apart from the campaign and political preferences in this discussion, Poles represented two extreme attitudes: one of approval for multiculturalism, tolerance and openness, and the other full of fears concerning the general health security of the country. The first group quoted the examples of Poles who, as tourists, visit exotic countries and are not subjected to health checks on crossing the border; no additional vaccinations are required. The same people argued that refugees who are used to contact with diseases are already immune, so the threat is not big. In their rhetoric they even resorted to comparing the denial of entry to Poland, on the basis of the likelihood of spreading diseases, to the Western states' closing to the Jewish community on the eve of the outbreak of the World War II, indicating the tragic consequences of this attitude. The second group was dominated by fears caused by the cases of these diseases known in other European countries. Great attention is paid to one of the most serious infectious diseases of the 21st century—AIDS, as the proportion of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-positive migrants reflects the epidemiological pattern of their country of origin (Castelli and Sulis 2017). In Poland there was the case of a Cameroonian, Simon Mol, who was granted refugee status in Poland long before the onset of the migration crisis. He received the financial, medical and social support he needed. In 2007, the media reported that this man intentionally infected Polish women with HIV (Gietka 2018). This event, an example of cynicism and superstition, stirred up the public opinion and, along with the rhetorics of the politicians, it significantly poisoned the atmosphere around the issues of reception of refugees and health security of Polish citizens.

6. Refugee Center in Białystok

With nearly 300,000 inhabitants, the capital of the Podlaskie Voivodeship, known for its ethnic and religious diversity, belongs to a few Polish cities (besides Lublin and Warszawa, and earlier also Łomża) where refugee centers were located (Łaciak and Frelak 2018). The city was selected for the analysis because of its almost three decades of experience with hosting refugees and adapting multicultural policy in different spheres of the city's life. In Bialystok, cultural and ethnic diversity is a currently experienced fact. Apart from Poles, the largest ethnic and religious group is of Belarusians, and the

second religious group after Roman Catholics are Orthodox Christians (Sadowski 2006). There is also a refugee center in Białystok, which welcomes refugees, who are mostly followers of Islam. Białystok is located in the proximity of the eastern border of the European Union, and by the same token, it is the most exposed city as far as the inflow of refugees from non-EU countries is concerned. The first wave of refugees reached Białystok in the early 1990s, before the refugee center was established. At that time, most of them were Armenians who came to Poland with entire families. The Armenians fled their country from the effects of the war against Azerbaijan, the destruction caused by the earthquake, and from unemployment and poverty. In Bialystok, they rented, at their own expense, cheap rooms to live in, and found gainful employment, mainly in trade. They were struggling with a number of problems resulting from illegal business activity (lack of work permits) and problems with the legality of the residency. Applying for refugee status was an opportunity for them to settle their matters right (Cieślińska 1998). However, the likelihood of them obtaining refugee status was close to none. The data show that in the years 1992–2008 there were 5321 decisions issued on granting refugee status to Armenians but only 13 decisions (i.e., 0.24%) were positive and 4415 (i.e., 83%) negative; 883 cases (i.e., 16.6%) were discontinued and 10 decisions (0.2%) were related to tolerated stay (Marciniak and Potoniec 2008, p. 115). This shows that gaining protections in Poland was extremely unlikely for Armenians. Some of them sought other ways to legalize their stay in Poland (e.g., by entering into marriages with Poles).

Another group of foreigners, who (similarly to the Armenians) came from the Caucasus region, with entire families, were the Chechens. Their arrival to Białystok was associated with obtaining accommodation in the refugee center launched in October 2000. It was the same hotel that had previously rented rooms to the Armenians. The situation of the Chechen population in Bialystok was diametrically opposed to the situation of the Armenians. They came to a hotel—a refugee center—where they had their means of livelihood guaranteed. Despite these more favorable conditions, as compared to the situation of the Armenians, the Chechens experienced a number of deficiencies and inconveniences in that place (Cieślińska 2005). In 2001, one more hotel, of a slightly higher standard, was rented to refugees (e.g., with bathrooms in their rooms), which became the main and, with time, the only place where persons awaiting the decision on refugee status stayed. The deserted building of the first refugee center was adapted to social housing for the evicted residents of Białystok. According to the CBOS survey, the respondents with the lowest income and social position are also the chief opponents of receiving refugees (CBOS 2016a, 2016b). Perhaps they can see, as in Białystok, that refugees are provided with better conditions of living than the impoverished, native people of Białystok, who are also in an extremely difficult situation.

Social assistance of the country which hosts refugees is of great importance not only for the foreigners seeking protection, but also for the receiving community. In Białystok, owing to the fact that the basic needs of the people who stay in the refugee center are provided for, the economic and social security increases. However, this solution does not favor integration with the local community. The example of the Armenians, who were not provided with financial help, shows that this fact motivated their integration with Polish society: they learned Polish, they sent their children to Polish schools on their own initiative, they undertook service activity (mainly in trade) and established personal contacts with the local people. At the same time, the Chechens, taking advantage of the support of the Polish state, tended to isolate and withdraw more often. Scientists who work on security issues have serious objections regarding maintenance of refugee centers during the European migration crisis: "These centers do not help at all, at least not in Białystok, and Białystok centers are reported to have detained the supporters of the so called Islamic state. These centers help nobody. They actually isolate those people from the local community and lead to trouble and difficulties with people who cannot find a place for themselves" (Boćkowski 2015).

When the refugees' stay in the centers is prolonged for years, lack of integration may result in the creation of an isolated ghetto. In Białystok, the city authorities officially support financially the projects and campaigns that promote integration, multiculturalism, and tolerance towards migrants

and refugees. Originators and implementers of these initiatives are usually active, non-governmental organizations in the city (Wciseł 2015). Admittedly, one can get the impression that these initiatives do not bring any visible results, but they constitute some form of the process of familiarizing the city's inhabitants with the idea of a multicultural society whose characteristic feature is the presence of immigrants and refugees.

7. Shaping Public Opinion on the Relocation of Refugees

The so called migration crisis was caused by the arrival of refugees from Syria and North Africa reaching Europe. The intensification of persecution of Christians in these regions, was frequently signaled by Aid to the Church in Need (ACN) organization in biannual reports *Persecuted and Forgotten?* (Pontifex and Newton 2011), but this voice was hardly heard. The fact that the mass media gave spectacular examples of difficult situations of numerous refugees reaching Europe (Park 2015) influenced the change in previously indifferent attitudes towards these problems.

According to the UNHCR recommendations, a fair share of responsibility is the key to controlling the migration movements, and EU countries will have to develop a system that will oblige individual EU countries to take in a certain percentage of people in the refugee procedure.

The subject of relocation became an element of public debate also at the local level. Białystok Local Television, in a popular program *Bez kantów* (presented on 14.IX.2015) issued a special edition devoted to the European migration crisis (TVP Białystok 2015). Experts and social commentators were invited to the studio. The recordings of the opinions of the leaders of the main political parties in the Podlaskie Voivodeship were included. Their statements reflected differences among local political parties on this matter. Below are the selected, most characteristic fragments of opinions presented to the viewers of Białystok local television in the order in which they were broadcasted:

"Since 1990 Poland has received over 90,000 refugees from Chechnya and we managed, there were no problems. (. . .) It is enough to want to do it (. . .) we are obliged to show solidarity with Europe, the key to success is the cooperation between the government, self-government and organizations. (PO, Robert Tyszkiewicz)

Not giving in to blackmail of other states (. . .) we should take care of our citizens' security (. . .) Of course, we cannot avoid helping the persecuted Christians, but we must consider it in reference to providing adequate conditions for residence and work, and support them as much as possible. (PiS, Krzysztof Jurgiel)

We should have something to say about refugees. (. . .) The European Union will make the selection—but on what basis? Scientists, teachers will go to England, France and Germany, and who will come to us? You need to look at this aspect. (. . .) (PSL, Mieczysław Baszko)

The most important thing is to stabilize the situation in North Africa. (. . .) Every day shows that the problem of migrants is growing, this river of migrants is growing wider and will flow for long, long years. This is not a matter of 500,000 or 1 million of people. This could potentially be 15 million in the coming years. (Zjednoczona Lewica, Krzysztof Bil-Jaruzelski)

(. . .) women and children stay where the war is. However, adults, strong men escape (. . .). We should not succumb to any blackmail and tell the West directly that if the West caused instability in the North African region, then the West must bear the cost of these actions and introduce a strategy of helping these people where they are, in their home countries. However, we should not take everyone in, because it simply threatens the whole of Europe, including Poland. (KWW Kukiz'15, Adam Andruszkiewicz)

(. . .) this is the result of a wrong and disastrous EU policy. (. . .). These are not refugees but ordinary social immigrants. (. . .) if 70% of them are men in their prime—you cannot talk

about refugees. Young people in their prime will settle down in a country, e.g., in Germany or Austria, they will be trying to bring their families from there, or maybe even will not, because, as you know, the Islamic state has announced that it will put terrorists among 500,000 of those who sail to Europe on boats. (KORWiN, Szczepan Barszczewski)

The quoted words not only reflect but also shape atmosphere around the migration issues and the anticipated increase in the number of refugees. Some of the local politicians tried to convince the public that the reception of refugees would be as smooth as it has been so far (i.e., almost unnoticeable). Others saw a need for intervention in the countries of origin of the refugees. Still, others suggested the need to adopt the "delaying tactic" and selective reception of refugees ("the persecuted Christians only"). In some of the statements there were fears about the perceived inflow of uneducated and unprofessional people. There were also voices presenting a clearly negative attitude towards the possible reception of the fleeing people."

8. Conclusions

From a sociological perspective, the discussion about the migration crisis would not be complete if no attempt to determine the features of the "ideal type of asylum seekers inflow" was made. The ideal type, as understood by Max Weber, does not appear as pure phenomenon, but it is a useful tool for studying real phenomena. In the case of the inflow of refugees, the application of the "ideal type", developed on the basis of existing practices, allows to perceive and analyze these inflow features which are incompatible with the ideal type. The year 2015 showed that when such incompatibilities appear, they quickly become grounds for a situation of crisis. Therefore, a series of phenomena and events that occurred in that period is referred to as the migration crisis or refugee crisis. At the same time, it is worth remembering that changes in the characteristics of the inflow have further consequences, including a change in the meaning and role of immigrants and refugees in the host society (Newsham and Rowe 2017).

Secondly, the analysis showed that the reactions of Polish society to EU policy on the relocation of refugees are divided but they represent certain patterns: they may be classified according to political preference—the right-wing electorate is usually against receiving refugees—but also the demographic features, such as: place of residence, education and income. Generally, though, the apprehension may stem from fears of Poles' own situation—social security and life prospects—being endangered by the newcomers. The presented analysis of the ongoing discussion in the public media space shows that the issue has been still evoking strong emotions in the Polish society.

Thirdly, the migration crisis led to the attitude towards the reception of refugees in Poland becoming an important part of the election campaign for the Polish parliament in 2015. The successes of political parties whose representatives showed their reluctance towards accepting refugees and immigrants showed that Polish society, despite the rich experience of multiculturalism (historical and referring to emigration), is afraid of the arrival of non-European citizens. This is confirmed by the results of public opinion polls, see, e.g., (CBOS 2017). We point out that many Poles went to work abroad and know what it means to live in a foreign country but it is difficult for them to accept refugees who do not undertake paid work and expect material and financial support from their host society. In addition, the recent Polish migration experience of living and working in multicultural and multi-ethnic countries of the European Union, like the United Kingdom, could have negatively affected the perception of refugees and immigration: "In Lublin and Białystok, the interviewees often referred to the opinions of their acquaintances or relatives working abroad who have contact with representatives of different nations, including refugees from the Middle East, and emphasized their negative attitudes to accepting such refugees in Poland or, generally speaking, in Europe" (Łaciak and Frelak 2018, p. 21).

On the other hand, the policy of openness to welcoming people from other countries rarely is an altruistic activity. Most often the reasons are related to the implementation of the host countries' explicit or hidden interests (Michalska 2016, p. 65). For example, the current migration crisis coincides

with the demographic crisis in Western countries. Starting the inflow of young people (immigrants and refugees are usually young) may moderate and slow down unfavorable demographic processes which would lead to the depopulation of Europe (Park 2015, p. 6).

The "open door" policy seems to be consistent with the idea of a multicultural society. In practice, however, the experience of multiculturalism is difficult. The case of Białystok also shows that providing social assistance to refugees (including placing them in refugee centers) is not conducive to their integration with the host society. At present, no negative effects of non-integration are observed, as the scale of the inflow is still relatively small and the phenomenon is characterized by relatively high compliance with the ideal type of the refugee inflow.

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Border Residents' Perceptions of Crime and Security in El Paso, Texas

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Abstract: Research has continued to show the overall safety of the U.S. border region contrary to the widespread belief about the insecurity of the U.S.-Mexico border and frequent claims for the need to secure the border in order to prevent the spread of violence into the rest of the country. Rarely do we ask how border residents feel about safety and crime, which could shed significant light on the claims that the border is an insecure warzone posing a threat to the entire country. While calls to secure national borders are common, outsiders' perceptions of an unsafe border are not supported by official crime rates and statistics, Border Patrol apprehensions, or the everyday experiences of people in American cities along the U.S.-Mexico border. This paper investigates the perception of crime and security, as expressed by the residents of El Paso, Texas, a large city located along the U.S.-Mexico border and directly across from Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Data come from a National Institutes of Health (NIH) funded survey that asked 919 residents about their perceptions of crime, sense of security and safety in their neighborhood and the city in general. The results show that the overwhelming majority of border city residents feel safe and that those who are undocumented and raised in El Paso are the most likely to report feeling safe or very safe. We also find that the foreign-born population had a statistically significant lower felony conviction rate than those who were U.S.-born, an important qualifier in discussions over immigration and its connection with violence and crime. Contrary to sensationalized claims about border violence, residents of El Paso do not display any of the sense of insecurity experienced in neighboring Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. We present hypotheses about possible causes for these low levels of violence in the U.S.-side of the border and discuss the dissonance between the reality on the border and perception outside of the border region.

Keywords: migration and crime; human security; border wall; safest American city; Latinos

1. Introduction

Anti-immigrant rhetoric seems to be at an all-time high, with the current administration and its depictions of the border as insecure, violent, and chaotic. Donald Trump spoke of the 'migrant caravan' during the 2018 elections and threatened to go as far as to close the entire southern border (Blitzer 2018). He engaged in a government shutdown over disagreements with the Democratic Party around immigration, demanded funds for a wall in his State of the Union addresses, and declared a national emergency at the southern border in a speech to the nation on February 15, 2019. However, this perception of an unsafe border is not supported by official crime statistics (Martinez and Stowell 2012), Border Patrol apprehensions, and—perhaps most importantly—-it contradicts the everyday experiences of residents living in cities along the U.S.-Mexico border, as this paper demonstrates.

This phenomenon predates Trump, however. Politicians and the media portray the southwest border as insecure, out of control, and crime-ridden. To mention but a few examples, former Arizona

Senator John McCain said, "[T]he border is not only unsafe, but it is also being patrolled in an ineffective manner" (Goff and Sáenz 2014). A piece published in *Foreign Policy Magazine* placed the binational U.S.-Mexico border region amongst the most dangerous in the world (Walker 2011). News stories claim that border cities provide a haven for Mexico's drug violence (Gillum et al. 2011). Influential right-wing commentator Ann Coulter writes that immigrants cost taxpayers money in terms of "the number of police, missing persons operators, hospital emergency room doctors, surgeons, prosecutors, judges, court clerks, prison guards, and rape counselors made necessary by criminal aliens" (Coulter 2015, chp. 7). Like other commentators, Coulter invokes images of the sexual predator, child abductor, and criminal. As Beinart (2016) writes, "As antiblack racists have for centuries, today's anti-Latino commentators depict their targets as a sexual threat." This stems from a long-held stereotype of Latin people as hypersexual. This is implied in the racist term *macho* as used in conversations in English to convey hegemonic masculinity as standard for all Latinos.

President Trump's discourse reproduces racist anti-Mexican rhetoric (Castañeda 2019) and further amplifies and legitimizes the wrongful confounding of migration and crime. This process is what some scholars have termed crimmigration, and results in racial profiling as well as the incarceration of minorities for not being able to obtain immigration papers, rather than committing any crime (Armenta 2017). Trump's announcement of his presidential campaign included the now-infamous statement:

> When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. (Press Conference, Trump Tower, New York City, 16 June 2015)

Trump's claim about Mexican rapists and criminals coming through the border is an example of the wide-diffusion and purchase of this border myth, necessary to Trump's political rally cry of building a wall (Castañeda 2019). Amidst a continuous push for a border wall under the pretense of widespread lawlessness and crime, attention has turned to El Paso, Texas. Nevertheless, its low crime rates seem to contradict this narrative. When Trump tried to rally support for his border wall plans in El Paso in 2019, Beto O'Rourke, a former Congressman from El Paso, brought together El Paso residents in a large town hall meeting to challenge this fear-based immigration rhetoric (Landler and Romero 2019). Many residents spoke out about how safe their community was, due to the residents themselves and their tight-knit communities, with over 83 percent of El Paso residents being Latin people or immigrants from Mexico. Residents did not consider the wall between El Paso and Juarez as contributing to this sense of safety.

Despite attention to El Paso in the news, there has been relatively little research done about how residents living in the U.S.-Mexico border perceive crime. Asking the border residents—those who experience the reality of living in the borderlands—how they perceive the safety of their neighborhoods allows for a more authentic interpretation of border security. Compared to the robust findings on the links between immigration and crime based on crime statistics, the existing research on how residents living in mixed communities perceive crime is lacking. This paper responds to this gap, directly addressing how border residents in El Paso perceive crime in their community and neighborhoods.

2. Empirical Links between Immigration and Crime

While many urban residents outside of the border region may equate increased immigrant presence with dangerous neighborhoods (Castañeda 2012), this perception may indeed be unfounded as research has continuously shown that when the number of immigrants increases in a neighborhood, crime decreases (Miller and Peguero 2018). As long as fears about immigration have been around, empirical research has questioned and challenged this link (Hourwich 1912). The literature on immigration and crime shows similar or lower crime rates for the foreign-born as compared to the

US-born (Ceobanu 2011; Davies and Fagan 2012; Kubrin 2007; Lee and Martinez 2009; Martinez and Stowell 2012; Stansfield 2014; Stowell et al. 2009; Wadsworth 2010).

Immigration has been shown to reduce violent crime. This challenges old functionalist theories about the disorganizing nature of immigration in local communities. Martinez et al. (2016) investigated the relationship between homicides and immigration in San Diego, an immigrant gateway similar to El Paso, between 1960 and 2010. They found that when San Diego neighborhoods experienced an influx of immigrants, there were fewer homicides. Similarly, Ferraro (2016) conducted fixed effects regression analyses of data from 1252 cities and towns between 2000 to 2007, which included 194 new destinations (areas with populations over 1000 and where immigration increased by at least 150 percent within the last ten years). Ferraro (2016) found that new immigration destinations experienced greater decreases in crime in comparison to other areas.

Martinez et al. (2004) examined whether immigrant enclaves and ethnic and racial composition affect drug homicides in San Diego. They found that the economic deprivation and concentration of skilled workers were significant predictors of drug homicides in San Diego, not the number of immigrants, showing that crime rates are a class issue, not a racial one. Martinez and Stowell (2012) also analyzed the relationship between homicides and immigration in Miami and San Antonio in the 1980s and 1990s. They found that immigration had no effect on homicide, even when they controlled for Latino regional concentration and homicide motivations. As today, in the 1990s there was also fear of violent and drug-related crime, sometimes along the border, and it was also encouraged by the executive branch's policy agenda and discourses about being tough on crime.

This finding has been shown to hold outside of immigrant gateways. Ousey and Kubrin (2009) conducted a longitudinal analysis over 20 years across 159 U.S. cities, looking at how the violent crime rate is affected by the percentage of foreign-born individuals and the percentage of individuals who do not speak English. They found that immigration decreases felony homicides and drug-related homicides, but increases gang-related homicides (which may be because police categorize homicides within immigrant communities as gang-related), all at statistically significant rates. Using data from the Uniform Crime Reports and the Current Population Surveys, Butcher and Piehl (1998) found that foreign-born youth engage in less crime than U.S.-born youth. Similarly, Reid et al. (2005) used data from the 2000 U.S. Census and the 2000 Uniform Crime Report to investigate the relationship between immigration and crime at the macro-level in and across a random sample of 150 metropolitan areas. They found that immigration does not increase crime rates and that it may decrease crime.

In studies that found that crime increased, this increase was mediated not by increases in immigration but by a different variable—such as reduced labor market opportunities or family structure—and differences in incarceration rates due to pre-detention practices and racial profiling (Hagan and Palloni 1999). Spenkuch (2013) finds that immigration is correlated with an increase in financial-related crime, such as theft, but only when increased immigration is coupled with poor labor market opportunities.

However, something else, such as underreporting, may be behind low crime rates in El Paso and among immigrant communities in general. Zatz and Smith (2012) write that while research has typically focused on the relationship between immigrants and crime in neighborhoods in general, little research has been done to investigate the relationship between immigrants and their communities. Immigrants are particularly vulnerable to victimization and are often not protected by the criminal justice system because they are "afraid to call the police or otherwise draw attention to themselves" (p. 147). Immigrants are more likely to be robbed and extorted but are less likely to report it to the police (McDonald and Erez 2007; Nuño 2013).

Nevertheless, the analysis of data from the San Diego Police Department from 1980–2000 shows that immigrants are not more likely to be victims of homicide than those who are native-born (Martinez et al. 2010). Besides homicides, this possible under-reporting bias can be overcome by asking immigrants directly whether they have been victims of crime. Barranco and Shihadeh (2015) write that undocumented Latino immigrants are particularly vulnerable for victimization as they often carry

cash and their legal status can make them reluctant to report crimes to the police. They found that an area with many undocumented immigrants can lead to a "spillover" victimization, where attackers cannot differentiate between new immigrants and the rest of the community. Crime increases because attackers wish to attack those undocumented and cannot differentiate between them and others. Some question the widespread nature of this "walking ATM" stereotype. Nonetheless, some can confirm through interviews with street offenders, the targeting of caramel skin people because of this stereotype (Caraballo 2017).

One reason why we see a decrease in crime in response to an increase in immigration is that immigrants seek to improve their circumstances in the long-term and are thus not drawn to crime (Tonry 1997). Tonry (1997) also theorizes that the second generation of immigrants might be more likely to engage in crime because of "social strain," and discusses how minorities in many countries are overpoliced and because of this disproportionately likely to be arrested, convicted, and imprisoned for crimes. Another theory is that in response to an influx of new immigrants, residents will put pressure on officials to police more, leading to a decrease in crime overall (Ousey and Kubrin 2009). A third reason is that ethnic networks have substantial social control mechanisms (Zhou and Bankston 1998). Immigrants living in neighborhoods with other co-ethnics are more likely to know neighbors and thus, indirectly may keep others in check.

New immigrants often move into low-income neighborhoods with high levels of crime because rent is lower than other areas or because this is where they can find housing. The immigrant revitalization theory argues that neighborhoods with high immigrant populations experience a reduction in violent crime (Martinez et al. 2010). Vélez (2009) finds that the arrival of new immigrants in an area with concentrated disadvantage reduces the number of homicides in those areas. Vélez analyzed data from 786 census tracts in Chicago that covered homicides and recent immigrant concentrations from 1993–1995 and found that immigrants revitalize neighborhoods by developing strong ties to families, clergy, social service providers, and officials, allowing them to generate social control. They help "reinvigorate an ethnic enclave economy" (p. 327), providing social capital for the residents through creating businesses. Immigration, "reinvigorates local economic opportunity structures and social networks" and revitalizes the neighborhood (p. 325). Third, they strengthen community institutions. There may be a Latino paradox, which Sampson (2006) defines as "Hispanic Americans doing better on a range of social indicators, including propensity to violence."

Does the immigrant revitalization theory hold for border communities and immigrant gateways? At one point, increases in border immigration enforcement measured through reported apprehensions by the border patrol and person-hours spent watching the border were correlated with a decrease in crime in urban areas (Coronado and Orrenius 2007). However, the causal relation still remains unclear. Little research addresses crime in U.S. border urban areas using original data.

3. Perceptions of Crime and Fear of Crime

Particularly as it relates to immigrant communities, perceptions of crime and security are central to understanding how outsiders and residents understand safety and security in their communities. With anti-immigrant rhetoric at an all-time high, a discussion of how perceptions crime and safety are tied to immigration is key. While immigration has been shown to either decrease or not increase crime, Nunziata (2015), using data from Western European counties, found that when immigration increased, fear of crime and negative attitudes towards immigrants increased even though crime did not increase. Fear of crime, particularly that attributed to immigrants, has been shown to encourage voting for anti-immigrant politicians. Some have found that an influx of immigration into a country or local area has been correlated with higher votes for anti-immigration politicians (Golder 2003, Knigge 1998), while others have found the opposite or no change (Van Der Brug et al. 2005). Dinas and van Spanje (2011) found that there is not a link between immigration and anti-immigrant party popularity; but rather, when crime rates are attributed to immigrants either by the media, politicians, or both, these parties gain popularity and legitimation whether or not their charges are based on fact.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric has affected policies and created exclusion. Provine and Doty (2011) find that policy responses "reinforce racialized anxieties" (p. 261). They argue that three federal responses—building up the border, increased partnerships with police, and increased reliance on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—have resulted in a racialized language regarding how the U.S. handles immigration. They and many others argue that immigration has been criminalized and that the law has sustained racial inequalities (Armenta 2017, Dowling and Inda 2013, Golash-Boza 2015). As immigrants are more likely to be the victims of crime, rather than the perpetrators, this rhetoric can intensify their vulnerability and provide cover for exploiters and human traffickers (Zatz and Smith 2012).

Anti-immigrant rhetoric or policies that might result in the social and political exclusion of immigrants may increase crime. Lyons et al. (2013) propose that the link between immigration and the decrease in crime found in neighborhoods is mediated by increased social and political participation. Using data from the National Neighborhood Crime Study, they found that when immigrants have access to elected offices, there is a decrease in violence in those neighborhoods.

4. U.S.-Mexico Border and Crime

Mexico has experienced high levels of violence in the last several years, yet it seemingly has not spilled over into the United States. Ciudad Juárez was considered one of the most dangerous cities in the world, with 282.7 homicides per 100,000 residents. Located directly across Ciudad Juárez, El Paso, Texas, has been ranked for a while as the safest U.S. city with a population of over 500,000 inhabitants (CQ Press 2013). Despite the proximity, border cities like El Paso are among the safest in the country (Lee et al. 2001). Violent crime rates in three Texan U.S. border cities–Laredo, Brownsville, and McAllen—decreased from 2006 to 2010 during the peak of drug war violence in northern Mexico (Correa-Cabrera 2013). If the national crime rates paralleled the rates along the US-Mexico border, there "would have been 5720 fewer homicides, 159,036 fewer property crimes, and 99,205 fewer violent crimes" (Nowrasteh 2019).

However, as shown in an FBI informative video, the rhetoric of danger does not necessarily reflect reality. The narrator starts, "Drug trafficking. Human smuggling. Extortion. Murder. Corrupt public officials. All these crimes represent a multi-billion-dollar industry, and they pose a threat not only to communities on both sides of the border but to our national security as well" (FBI n.d.). The Assistant Director of the FBI's Criminal Investigative Division, Kevin Perkins, said, "What we do have on the U.S. side of the border are kidnappings, corruption issues, and the illegal drug trade that goes through. The cash that's flowing south, the weapons that are flowing south, and the drugs that are flowing north."

Crime and immigration statistics are also exaggerated. In January 2019, President Donald Trump said that border agents "apprehended, last year, 17,000 criminals trying to get across the border" (Trump 2019). Sixty-three percent of the 16,831 "criminal aliens" were individuals who failed routine checks at legal entry points (Woolf 2019). The other 37 percent had criminal records, but 47 percent of these records were for illegally entering or re-entering the U.S., 14 percent were for DUIs, and 13 percent were for a violent conviction.

5. Methods and Data

Data were collected through in-person confidential interviews conducted between 2011 and 2012 in El Paso, Texas. El Paso is the second largest border metropolitan area after the San Diego metropolitan area, and the second in terms of border crossings in the U.S. The data collection followed a purposive maximum variation sampling technique to show the heterogeneity of Latin people. Participants were reached out to by bilingual university students, often with immigrant backgrounds themselves. These students were IRB certified and received training for six weeks in methodology and sensitivity to minorities and vulnerable populations. The survey and sampling frame were modeled on a similar study conducted by Hector Balcazar, Joe Heyman, and colleagues (Lisa et al. 2012). No identifying information was collected to protect participants. The University of Texas at the El Paso Institutional

Review Board and the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities approved the study. The study was funded through a larger National Institutes of Health grant.

The social survey included questions regarding border residents' perceptions of security. The sample analyzed consists of 919 housed Hispanic residents of El Paso. A limitation of this paper is that it only includes the views of Hispanics, and this is partly because Hispanics comprise 83 percent of total residents in El Paso (US Census 2019). However, this is not a significant limitation—much of the border is majority Hispanic, especially in Texas, so the people who live on the border would be the ones that experience the reality and can know whether or not there is a violent crisis with the potential to "spillover." Ethnographic data also tell us that these perceptions of safety are also true for other ethno-racial groups living in the city. The data from this survey were analyzed using IBM SPSS 25 statistical software. Demographics, perceptions of safety, description of neighborhood, and criminal conduct are reported. If an individual chose not to respond to a question, they are not included in the reported results. Felony convictions between foreign-born and US-born respondents were compared using binomial logistic regression. We also conducted a multinomial logistic regression to investigate how demographic variables affected the perception of safety.

The security of a city or neighborhood is often measured by the change in the volume of crime from one period to the next or by comparing the crime rate in one jurisdiction with another one. In contrast, we rely on the subjective feeling of security that residents have (which matches the low crime rate of El Paso), and self-reported felony convictions, which are rarely asked about in large surveys. We contribute to the literature by pointing out, in novel ways, the discrepancy between the perception of safety at the border and anti-immigrant rhetoric that associates immigration with an increase in crime and a border region that is plagued by crime.

6. Demographics

The sample has a larger percentage of female respondents (55.8 percent) than male respondents (44.2 percent). Table 1 shows the demographic data of respondents. The median age of those surveyed is 29 years old. Over 60 percent were born in the United States, while 39.7 percent are foreign-born. The highest percentage of respondents are second-generation immigrants born in the U.S. to at least one foreign-born parent (35.5 percent). The families of many respondents have been in the U.S. for many generations. In terms of citizenship, 79.7 percent of respondents are U.S. citizens, and only 3.5 percent of respondents identified as undocumented residents of El Paso.

Table 1. Demographic data of respondents.

	Percentage
Gender	
Male	44.2
Female	55.8
Age (median)	29
Immigrant Generation	
First	24.2
1.5	15.6
Second	35.5
Third	15
>Third	9.8
Citizenship	
Citizen	79.7
Resident	14.5
Undocumented	3.5
Legal Visa	2.4

7. Perceptions of Safety

Survey respondents were asked how safe they felt living in El Paso. Respondents chose from the following options; "very safe," "safe," or "not safe." Table 2 identifies that 96.9 percent of respondents reported feeling either "very safe" or "safe." The majority of those individuals described feeling "very safe." Only a small percentage reported feeling "not safe." We then compared citizenship status with perceptions of safety and found that undocumented residents reported the highest percentage for feeling "not safe." The valid percentages are presented regarding the percentages from those responding.

Table 2. How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?

	Valid Percentage Hispanic
	(n = 906) (%)
Perceptions of Safety	
Very Safe	66.3
Safe	30.6
Not Safe	3.1

8. Neighborhood Descriptions

By design, respondents were selected from neighborhoods across El Paso. Respondents were asked how they described their neighborhood. The question was open-ended. In order to avoid priming or biasing the answers, the survey did not list any descriptions for the respondents to choose from. Though respondents provided a variety of answers, they were easily categorized. While some of the descriptions can be used somewhat interchangeably, we kept "calm" separate from "good" or "safe" to keep some of the nuances reported. Table 3 illustrates that the majority of respondents (43.2 percent) described their neighborhood as "calm," followed closely by "good" and "safe." The vast majority used terms that characterize their neighborhood in a positive light. Only 3.2 percent of individuals described their neighborhood as having a "bad reputation." Even then, saying that a neighborhood has a bad reputation does not mean that the respondent agrees, but it could mean an acknowledgment that others perceived it as dangerous. Again, El Paso residents demonstrate feeling safe in their neighborhoods and talk about them mainly in positive terms.

Table 3. How do you describe your neighborhood?

Description	Valid Percentage Hispanic
	(n = 907) (%)
Calm	43.2
Good	19.8
Safe	16.1
Other	7.8
Middle Class	7.2
Bad Reputation	3.2
Low Income	1.5
Highly Mexican	1.1

9. Felony Conviction

In response to the question, "Have you encountered any problems with the law [criminal, civil, immigration court]?", 17.3 percent of those born in the U.S. answered in the affirmative while a lower percentage (9.5 percent) of those foreign-born reported any problems with the law.

When asked whether respondents have ever been convicted of a felony, our study found that 97.5 percent reported never being convicted of a felony. Only 2.5 percent of respondents reported

having a felony conviction. We compared foreign-born populations with criminal conduct using binomial logistic regression. The foreign-born population had a statistically significantly lower felony conviction (at 1.1 percent) than those who were U.S.-born (3.5 percent, $p < 0.05$). A little over 10 percent overall reported having "been unjustly detained by the police," 12.9 percent of the U.S.-born Hispanics surveyed said so, while only 6.2 percent of foreign-born Hispanics reported having been detained unjustly by the police. As anti-immigrant rhetoric often points to the increased criminality of immigrants, these figures may tell a different story—lower felony conviction rates and experiencing unjust detention by the police instead allude to overpolicing and detention, not increased criminality.

10. Results

In this analysis, our dependent variable is safety, whether residents felt "very safe," "safe," or "not safe." This response comes directly from the survey and is thus self-reported and subjective, as is often the case in public opinion surveys. Independent variables were: gender, years spent living in El Paso, whether they were raised in El Paso, if they were foreign-born, the number of years of education they had, and their immigration status (if they were a U.S. citizen, resident, temporary resident, had a work visa, had a student visa, or were undocumented). All nominal variables were recoded as dummy variables. The variables included in this model were chosen because they were identified as predictors of crime in areas with high immigration, as discussed in the literature review.

We used a listwise or case deletion of missing data, the most frequently used approach, to run a multinomial logistic regression analysis using SPSS Version 25. Due to the fact that the missing data do fulfill the requirements of missing completely at random, as there is a large enough sample and power is not an issue, we can use listwise or case deletion (Kang 2013). After the listwise deletion, the breakdown of perceptions of safety paralleled the pre-listwise deletion, where 61.6 percent reported feeling very safe, 35.8 percent reported feeling safe, and 2.6 percent reported feeling unsafe.

In Table 4, the reference category is feeling unsafe in El Paso. Except for Migrant generation, years of education, and years living in El Paso, all variables are coded as dummy variables. Each of the variables in Table 4 is in reference to their opposite attribute (i.e., "male" is in comparison to female, "not raised in El Paso" is compared to those raised in El Paso, "Not a U.S. citizen" is compared to being a U.S. citizen).

Table 4. Multinomial logistic regression results.

Variable	Very Safe		Safe	
	B (SE)	OR	B (SE)	OR
Male	1.876 * (1.104)	6.525	2.094 * (1.111)	8.115
Migrant generation	−0.008 (0.510)	0.992	0.087 (0.516)	1.091
Years of education	0.001 (0.099)	1.001	−0.058 (0.100)	0.944
Not raised in El Paso	0.453 (0.952)	1.573	0.732 (0.973)	2.078
Years living in El Paso	−0.036 (0.030)	0.965	−0.043 (0.030)	0.958
Not a U.S. citizen	−2.370 (1.525)	0.094	−2.657 * (1.579)	0.070
Not a permanent resident	−1.980 1.426)	0.138	−2.052 (1.485)	0.129
Does not have work visa	−13.556 **** (0.980)	1.279×10^{-6}	−14.612 (0.000)	4.507×10^{-6}
Is not undocumented	−0.135 (1.413)	0.874	−0.197 (1.482)	0.821

* Significant at 0.10 level **** at 0.001 level.

Only gender, U.S. citizenship status, and having a work visa are significant ($p < 0.10$). Our results show that men are 6.525 times as likely as women to feel very safe as opposed to not safe and 8.115 times as likely to feel safe as opposed to not safe ($p < 0.10$). Our results also show that individuals who do not have a work visa are much more likely to feel unsafe than very safe in comparison to those who hold work visas ($p < 0.001$). Finally, those who are not U.S. citizens are 0.070 times as likely to report feeling safe when compared to those who are U.S. citizens ($p < 0.10$).

While not statistically significant, it is notable that those who are undocumented are more likely to perceive El Paso as very safe or safe in comparison to those who are not undocumented. Another notable finding, albeit not statistically significant, is that those not raised in El Paso are more likely to perceive the city as very safe or safe. This may be because many of those not raised in El Paso are immigrants, and their referents for safety are more unsafe than El Paso. The homeless respondents, which are not included in the sample used for this paper, are less likely to feel safe than their counterparts.

These results may have one main limitation. Some have suggested that there need be at least ten events to run a logistic regression analysis (Peduzzi et al. 1996). After performing the listwise case deletion, only nine individuals reported feeling unsafe. Because there are only nine cases, the regression coefficients can be biased, the confidence intervals can have improper coverage, and the Wald statistic can be conservative. However, later studies have questioned the minimum of ten events rule (Vittinghoff and McCulloch 2006). One study showed that "the worse instances of each problem were not severe with 5–9 EPV (events per variable) and usually comparable to those with 10–16 EPV" (p. 717). Because the issues described earlier are seen more frequently with Cox regressions than logistic regressions, and because the frequencies in the tables parallel those seen in the total sample pre-deletion, we can still perform the logistic regression and are confident in the results.

11. Discussion

A clear way of determining how safe the southwest border is can be established through the perceptions of border residents. This is a relatively novel methodological approach and a contribution to the literature. In this paper, we dispel misconceptions about high levels of crime in a border city with data provided by border residents themselves, which parallel papers analyzing crime rates (Ferraro 2016; Lyons et al. 2013; Martinez et al. 2004; Martinez et al. 2016; Ousey and Kubrin 2009). Based on our research, residents of El Paso, Texas, feel safe living next to the border with Mexico. We also found that U.S. citizens are more likely to feel safe than non-U.S. citizens, and the fear of non-citizens may be more related to ICE and deportation than violence and crime. These findings support other studies that find that women are more likely to report a higher fear of crime than their male counterparts (Scott 2003). In summary, these findings parallel other empirical data that find border cities are safer than the media suggests and safer than cities of equivalent size far from the border (Castañeda and Heyman 2012).

Similar to this paper, the Border Network for Human Rights (2010) surveyed 1222 residents from ten major border cities from California to Texas, and found that 67.1 percent of respondents reported feeling safe living in a border community, 69.7 percent felt their border neighborhood is as safe as most U.S. neighborhoods, 51.8 percent felt safe allowing their child to play in a neighborhood park, and 87.5 percent said they felt safe walking or driving in their neighborhood. A survey for Cronkite News, Univision, and Dallas Morning News across cities on both sides of the border found that 92 percent of respondents in the U.S. border felt safe in their neighborhood at night, compared with 54 percent on the Mexican side. Furthermore, only 14 percent of border residents in the U.S. said that the U.S. should definitively build a border wall (Bilker 2016; López 2016).

12. Border Crime Paradox

Mexico has indeed suffered an increase in violence due to an armed war on drugs. While drug trafficking, supply, demand, and business connections are transnational, drug war violence in Northern

Mexico has not spilled over to the U.S.-side of the border. Many questions remain unanswered and contradictory claims about the U.S.-Mexican border make it hard to decipher fact from myth.

Despite claims of violence spilling over from Mexico, surveyed El Paso residents do not report a sense of insecurity. These results add to the existing body of evidence that cities with high immigrant populations display a lower crime rate (Martinez et al. 2010) and that residents perceive this to be the case. Research has also found that recent immigrants are less likely to use illicit drugs (Loza et al. 2017). There is no empirical evidence that supports the claim that an influx of immigrants is a disorganizing force in communities. On the contrary, research suggests that "crime and violence are down, cities are growing in population, poor urban neighborhoods are being economically revitalized, and immigrants are renewing small towns on the verge of withering away" (MacDonald and Sampson 2012). The question remains as to why this occurs.

One hypothesis is that immigrants want to keep a low profile and avoid criminal activity due to a fear of deportation—regardless of whether they are legal permanent residents, visa holders, or undocumented. A second, a non-mutually exclusive hypothesis would be that immigrants come to work hard, save, and provide a better future for their children. The reference group of first-generation immigrants is their former community of origin, which frequently is poorer and more insecure, especially if affected by the violent drug conflict. This hypothesis might explain why undocumented immigrants are likely to perceive El Paso as safe or very safe. Immigrants aspire to achieve social mobility through hard work, which is aided by the relative ease with which Latinos find employment in the United States (Castañeda 2018). A counterargument would be that criminal immigrants get deported, yet a study using immigration statistics from the Department of Homeland Security shows that out of the 393,000 immigrants removed, more than half of them (67.3 percent) had no prior criminal offense (Parrado 2012). Other research has also shown how most deportees had no other crimes beyond the fact of not being granted immigration papers (Golash-Boza 2015).

A third hypothesis is the heavy presence of law enforcement. El Paso has a high number of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies as compared to other cities, which may deter criminal activity. The federal agencies located in El Paso metropolitan area include U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives; Federal Protective Service; El Paso Emergency Management; U.S. Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Border Patrol, Customs; U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration; El Paso County Sheriff's Office; El Paso Police Headquarters; University of Texas-El Paso police; El Paso Independent School District Police; Canutillo Independent School District Police; Ysleta Independent School District Police; Socorro School District Independent Police; Sunland Park Police Force; Federal Police; occasional National Guards; and an important presence of CIA and The Federal Bureau of Investigation; as well as Fort Bliss, one of the largest military bases in the U.S. There is also a significant military presence in El Paso given that Fort Bliss, White Sands Missile Range, and other federal military installations are located in this area. So, on a given street in some middle-class neighborhoods of El Paso, there may be few residents not working in the security and law enforcement sector.

These security and law enforcement organizations counter crime even within their own agencies. An effective way of combating crime starts within an agency and extends outward. Strict measures are in place to intimidate authorities from corrupt practices. High fines and federal imprisonment are measures put in place to dissuade local law enforcement from engaging in corruption and facilitating the illicit trade of narcotics. The authorities have placed rigorous punishments on those found guilty of corruption. For example, in 2008, a customs agent was charged ten years to life in prison for conspiracy to smuggle narcotics and illegal immigrants (Licón 2009). Border Patrol agents can make a considerable salary, incentivizing agents to keep their jobs and avoid risking them for collaborating with cartels and transnational organized crime. The starting salary for a new border agent varies from $38,619 to $49,029, depending on education and experience. With satisfactory service over three years, Border Patrol Agents can earn up to $93,470 a year, plus benefits and overtime (Arbuckle 2016). These salaries

are very competitive in the area and incentivize organizations to work against crime and corruption in their own organizations, potentially building a culture of accountability in El Paso.

A fourth hypothesis would be that even while the drug trade is transnational, the social costs of enforcing the war on drugs have been disproportionately placed on Mexico (Dear 2013). Given the lower rate of criminal prosecution and higher impunity in Mexico, it may be more convenient for criminal organizations to engage in competition, violent enforcement, and intimidation in the Mexican-side of the border, while benefiting all parts of the distribution and consumption networks.

A fifth hypothesis would be that the policing of the line (Dunn 2009), the militarization of the border area (Dunn 1996), and the construction of walls and fences (Castañeda 2019), resulted in a decline in crime. While hard to completely dismiss, this hypothesis is not the most likely answer because crime rates were already low before these policies took place. Studies have not proven a direct connection between increased border enforcement and a decrease in crime in U.S. cities.

Another issue at question is whether Latino and immigrant communities are policed more and cited more often than others. For example, Prieto (2018) shows how police in Central California targets immigrants for car impoundment.

The aim of this paper is not to test all of the previously discussed hypotheses. Nevertheless, the data presented show that residents feel safe and live in a context of low crime. Future research should venture into trying to explain this paradox in crime differences across borders within the same illicit industry. A limitation of this paper is that it relies on self-reported feelings about neighborhood safety, crimes, and felonies committed, thus socially desired answers may have caused under-reported of criminal activities, yet triangulation of data on education, legal status, housing situation, and drug use and well as research design lead us to think that the vast majority of respondents were truthful. The reliance on self-reporting and subjective understandings is also a strength since the perception of safety relies upon cultural expectations and the general social context. This paper adds evidence from a large community sample about the lack of affinity between crime and immigrant concentration (Martinez and Stowell 2012). Further research should study how perceptions of crime compare in white and mixed neighborhoods and how they vary by political affiliation.

13. Conclusions

Little research has been conducted on the perceptions of crime along the U.S.-Mexican border. It is essential to understand the perspectives of border residents. This information allows for an authentic interpretation of border security. Based on the results of our study, El Paso residents do not display any sense of danger living within proximity to the border of Mexico. The high concentration of federal law enforcement agencies helps deter criminal activity, but so do the increasing job opportunities in the U.S. and hopes of social mobility for the children of immigrants.

Further, studies have shown that the border fence has not deterred immigration, but it has increased deaths in the desert and extended the time that undocumented workers pass in the U.S. (De León 2015; Massey et al. 2002). The proposals to build border walls should be reconsidered because they incur high symbolic and economic costs with little returns to security. There is not a border security crisis but a humanitarian crisis caused by violence abroad, family separation, and the encampment of asylum seekers in and outside the U.S.

14. Coda

On 3 August 2019, an armed man shot and killed 22 people and physically injured dozens of others in a Walmart in one of the commercial hearts of the El Paso/Ciudad Juarez metropolitan region. In a letter that he published before driving the long distance between Dallas to El Paso, he explicitly stated his hatred of Hispanics and what he, echoing others, saw as "the invasion of America" by immigrants from Latin America. Thus, this individual not only left people dead and injured, but it also left sense of terror for brown people who fear that they could be the next targets whether they are US-born, naturalized citizens, or undocumented. This event alone put to the test the sense of safety

that most El Paso residents have. Unfortunately, these mass shootings are not unique to El Paso. White nationalism and racial terrorism are new sources of fear for Latin people in El Paso and all over the United States (Romero et al. 2019). Nevertheless, El Paso came together as a community to remember those attacked and to celebrate this border community, as residents have expressed the city is a resilient one, and El Paso will come back up, further strengthened by the reminder about the strong social ties of families, neighbors, and community members across the city and the region (Pérez 2019).

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Article

Processes of Sub-Citizenship: Neoliberal Statecrafting 'Citizens,' 'Non-Citizens,' and Detainable 'Others'

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Abstract: Increasingly, scholars are exploring the politics of migration and the shifting terrain of citizenship from a critical mobilities perspective. To contribute to these discussions, in this paper, I explore how processes of sub-citizenship occur as nation-states craft immigration, citizenship, and border securitization policies and practices. I argue that complex and shifting processes of sub-citizenship largely occur through the nation-state's production of 'insiders' ('citizens') and 'outsiders' ('non-citizens'). As a nascent attempt to introduce sub-citizenship, I draw upon recent high-profile cases of family separation, abuse, and neglect experienced by children with 'illegal migrant' status in the United States and Australia. Under the international nation-state system and the neoliberal globalization paradigm, the border policing powers of nation-states are primed to expand and intensify processes of sub-citizenship. Those at lower levels of the sub-citizen hierarchy are at risk of experiencing various forms of state-led violence, including deportation, detention, and torture.

Keywords: human mobility; citizenship; children in detention; nation-state; border policing; illegalization; neoliberalism; USA; Australia; immigration detention

1. Introduction

> It is not always the case that the governing political philosophy is spoken by everybody as if they're already inside it. It is when it becomes 'just how things are' that it wins consent and enters common sense. And at that point the political regime or philosophy has achieved a more settled, long-term deeper form of control ... a level of unconsciousness where people aren't even aware they're speaking ideology at all. The ideology has become 'naturalised,' simply part of nature. (Hall and Massey 2010, p. 59)

There is little doubt that the international system of nation-states and the closely related concept of citizenship form the governing political philosophy of the modern era. The hegemony of nationalist thought and institutions is evidenced by how the international system of nation-states is popularly regarded as being common sense and the natural order of things. Rather than passively accepting the international system of nation-states and the closely connected migration, citizenship, and border regimes as 'just how things are,' there is a pressing need for research to (1) examine how nation-states' policies, practices and discourses relating to immigration, citizenship, and border securitization actually affect the everyday lives of people around the world; (2) interrogate and historicize these ideological constructs; and (3) imagine alternatives to the current globalized system of international nation-states, securitized citizenship, and militarized border regimes.

This article is my first attempt to develop a new theoretical concept I call 'processes of sub-citizenship.' I define processes of sub-citizenship as various forms of social, political, economic, and

territorial expulsion[1] that create 'sliding scales of subordination' for people with different citizenship and migrant statuses (Sparke 2016). Sub-citizenship is produced by unequal relations between people construed by nation-states as belonging to one of two constructed binaries: 'citizens' and 'non-citizens.'[2] It is a relational process that creates and justifies social boundaries between people with 'citizen' and 'non-citizen' statuses in evolving and complex ways. Those with 'illegalized'[3] migrant and citizen statuses are particularly affected by these processes that create and reproduce social boundaries and inequality. My intention for this article is to apply sub-citizenship as a heuristic device to understand how translocal processes of subordination create various hierarchical conditions of precarity and dehumanization for different groups of people based upon, but not wholly determined by, migration and citizenship status.

This theoretically-oriented paper has two main objectives. First, it offers a new way to understand the ordering of populations and the violence that is often connected to categorizations of personhood along neoliberal lines. Second, it draws upon recent high-profile cases of children in immigration detention in Australia and America to explore how processes of sub-citizenship may affect the lives of people located at the lower levels of the hierarchy. To explore processes of sub-citizenship, I employ a qualitative method of online content analysis of relevant immigration detention practices in Australia and the United States. To identify and contextualize the human costs associated with processes of sub-citizenship in these two countries, I include relevant gray literature with reports and newspaper articles relevant to children's experiences in immigration detention.

I put forth the following thesis: the logic of neoliberal reengineering, which is chiefly carried out by territorially bounded nation-states located within the international nation-state system, produces conditions of sub-citizenship for most people regardless of their citizenship status. The institutional machinery involved in producing and categorizing insiders ('citizens') and outsiders ('non-citizens') is structurally connected to processes of sub-citizenship for all. However, people construed by nation-states as being 'illegal migrants' status are particularly vulnerable to processes of sub-citizenship.

The neoliberal market paradigm is the driving force behind process of sub-citizenship. As the nation-state assumes its role as the core agency that redraws the tenor of citizenship (Wacquant 2012), processes of sub-citizenship increasingly affect those who are internationally mobile, but also affect those who are not. To be clear, migrating across borders does not produce sub-citizenship. Rather, processes of sub-citizenship are intimately linked to "the state and social inequality in the bloom of neoliberalism" (Wacquant 2012). Sub-citizenship is largely produced through the categorization, or the potential categorization, of less secure citizen and migrant statuses, such as 'non-citizen,' 'temporary migrant,' and 'unlawful non-citizen.' Processes of sub-citizenship are highly differentiated among 'citizens' and 'non-citizens.' However, it must be understood that sub-citizenship occurs through the autonomy of the neoliberal state, where increasingly even the most basic services, safety nets, and human rights can only be accessed by those who are considered 'deserving' based their ability to work and/or have access to capital (Brodie 1997; Grace et al. 2017; Sagy 2013; Somers 2008).

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[1]   I use the term 'expulsion' to refer to a qualitative "deprivation of status" (Nail 2016). It can take many forms, including removing social, political, juridical, economic, and territorial status from a person or a group of people. For example, certain groups of people with legalized 'non-citizen' status, such as 'temporary migrants' and 'permanent residents,' often do not have (or have limited access to) voting rights, welfare provisions, public education, work rights, and so on. People with illegalized 'non-citizen' status are at risk of experiencing more severe forms of social, political, juridical, economic, and territorial expulsion, including deportation and detention.

[2]   The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights defines a 'non-citizen' as a person who has not been recognised as having "effective links to the country where he or she is located" (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2006, p. 5). In the United States, 'alien,' is the more commonly used term to refer to people without citizenship status. (Immigration and Nationality Act 1952). In the interest of consistency, this paper will use the term 'non-citizen.'

[3]   The term 'illegalized' is used to convey "that states of illegality are not in any way natural, but are deliberately constructed through law and practice" (Weber 2013).

To examine the politics of human mobility and the human costs of managerialist approaches to migration, we must take on a more critical, interrogative stance with respect to migration and citizenship statuses that are applied to different groups of people. In this article, I put the person before the migration and/or citizenship status or put the designated status in scare quotes. My intention is to disrupt and denaturalize migration and/or citizenship statuses that place people into different legal and social classes. In practice, this entails describing people not as being illegal migrants, citizens, non-citizens, and so forth who experience X, Y, and Z. Rather than taking migration and citizenship statuses as though they are natural, obvious, or inherent characteristics of people, we can talk in terms of people who are construed, or imagined, as being members of various groups. By focusing on the current power dynamics operating within a nation-state we can observe the processes by which certain people are categorized into legal statuses including 'the citizen,' 'the non-citizen,' 'the permanent resident,' 'the temporary migrant,' 'the illegal migrant,' and so on. Exploring the political crafting of citizenship and migrant statuses through an historical lens allows us to piece together how these statues situate people to have diverse, and highly uneven, experiences accessing human mobility and human rights. This is an important analytic and discursive tactic for elucidating the politics underpinning migration and the selective processes that nation-states and other actors have in allocating access to mobility and human rights among different segments of the population. Focusing on the political organization and historical evolution structuring migrant and citizenship status opens analytic and methodological spaces to explore and map the processes underpinning how it has come to be that certain people experience different levels of subordination and dehumanization and what role citizenship and migration statuses play in these historically, politically and socially constructed dynamics.

When 'migrant' and related terms[4] appear in this paper, they are used to refer to people who move and resettle transnationally (that is, across international borders). Migrants include people whose movement across borders occur on a spectrum with various degrees of choice, and whose movement or presence is interpellated by the nation-state as being 'legal' or 'illegal.' All migrants, at least for a time, acquire the status of 'non-citizen.' However, moving across international borders is not the only way for people to acquire 'non-citizen' status.[5] At times, I purposefully select the term 'non-citizen' to draw attention to people's citizenship status within the nation-state. Highlighting legal status is important for investigating how different institutionalized categories affect the everyday lives of people with different legal citizenship and migrant statuses regardless of how long they may have physically lived within the state's territorial borders.

Research in the new mobilities approach explores how human life is organized and shaped dynamically across local and national boundaries. The new mobilities paradigm views all social phenomena, including human mobility, through a 'mobile sociology' (Sheller 2011) that rejects a 'sedentarist metaphysics' (Malkki 1992) in favor of a 'nomadic' one (Cresswell 2006). This paper draws upon the analytical and methodological toolkits offered by a mobilities approach along with the insights of No Borders Studies. A No Borders perspective asserts that people should not be sorted, labeled and categorized through inherently exclusionary state forms of identification such as 'migrant' and 'citizen' (Baines and Sharma 2002; Raithelhuber et al. 2018). This paper applies sub-citizenship as a new theoretical lens to exploration how human life is organized within contemporary neoliberal processes.

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4   In this paper, I use the term 'migrant' to denote a person who has moved across international borders. Terms related to 'migrant' include 'forced migrant' (including 'refugee' and 'asylum seeker'), 'illegal migrant,' 'undocumented migrant,' 'voluntary migrant,' 'temporary migrant,' 'economic migrant,' 'internal migrant,' and so on. These terms either represent legal statuses or are terms of rhetoric. For instance, 'illegal migrant' is a form of rhetoric denoting people who do not have the nation-state's authorization to be within its territorial borders. At times, 'illegal migrants' are referred to as 'undocumented migrants,' which highlights that they do not have the nation-state's permission to move.

5   The other ways that people can become 'non-citizens' include being born in a country without citizenship status, opting to be denaturalized, or having one's citizenship stripped. It is beyond the scope of the present article to explore the various ways that people may acquire 'non-citizen' status and their operant effects.

I draw upon recent high-profile cases of children in immigration detention to illustrate the human cost of processes of sub-citizenship among those located at the bottom of the sub-citizen hierarchy.

The structure of the article is as follows. First, I briefly discuss of how citizenship is reengineered through "neoliberal statecraft" (Wacquant 2010, 2012). Second, I introduce processes of sub-citizenship as a new theoretical construct for exploring the structural and ideological conditions shaping people's experiences with (im)mobility and access to human rights. Third, to illustrate how processes of sub-citizenship may affect the everyday lives of certain groups of people, I draw upon examples of contemporary human rights abuses experienced by children who are construed as having 'illegal migrant' status in Australia and the United States. Fourth, I take a step back from the present to historicize and denaturalize the ideological construct of the international nation-state system itself. Finally, I offer a brief preliminary sketch of how adopting a sub-citizenship lens to investigate human (im)mobilities, human rights abuses, and the more diverse and subtle forms of precarity experienced by people with different citizenship and migrant statuses offers the potential to mobilize radical new forms of solidarity that could lead to entirely new mobility futures.

2. 'Reengineering' Citizenship

Citizenship is not static; rather, it is a dynamic and socially determined process. Because it is socially determined and because, in practice, "one has to be a citizen of a state that is willing and able to protect her rights in order to have human rights" (Sagy 2013, p. 232), citizenship is also a highly contested status (Lister 2007). Modern citizenship is a contract-like arrangement that gives rise to social boundaries (Tilly 2005). There has been a long history of struggle over the policies and practices used to decide the line between citizenship and various lesser statuses (De Genova 2007; Hindess 2000; Isin 2002; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013; Tilly 2005; Turner 2007). Formations of citizenship are the result of social struggles and bargaining negotiations that rarely take place between equals (Tilly 2005). Citizenship has been described as a 'momentum concept' that must be continuously revisited, reworked, and refined to realize more of its egalitarian and anti-hierarchical potential (Lister 2007).

In early and in later phases of nation building nation-states created insider ('citizen') and outsider ('non-citizen') identities. To acquire things like political power, military might, and human capital nation-states bargained citizenship to populations (Tilly 2005). In the modern era citizenship and migrant statuses continue to be bargained to certain populations. However, modern-day citizenship has shifted towards 'neoliberal citizenship' (Ong 2007; Petcu 2015; Sparke 2004, 2016; van Houdt et al. 2011; Wacquant 2010, 2012), where citizenship has been reframed in an increasingly contractual and contingent manner. The shift towards neoliberal citizenship has gone hand and hand with 'market citizenship' (Brodie 1997; Grace et al. 2017), where the allocation of citizenship rights is increasingly based on an individual's economic power and participation in the labor market.

In more recent years, neoliberal capitalist economies have evolved to "become structurally dependent on the availability and continual supply of migrants' labor" (Bauder 2008, p. 316). However, nation-states, particularly those in the more affluent West, tend to gloss over their structural dependency on cheap, exploitable migrant labor and the various revenue streams associated with migration. Thomas Nail's notion of the "indefinite labor circuit" (Nail 2015, p. 32) elaborates how capitalist expansion relies upon the ability to "indefinitely extend the extraction of movement from the migrant flow and harness it into the many junctions of the economy" (p. 32). Mobility controls regulating and policing people's movements within and between nation-states reproduce a global economy of "disempowered migrant labor that props up the empowered labor and wages of citizens" (p. 32). In recent years, migration is increasingly framed in term of 'crisis' with nation-states enacting ever more militarized control methods, which are increasingly privatized and profitable (Castles 2010; McNevin 2007; Weber 2013).

It is the infrastructures and concentrations of mobile capital that "at one and the same time enhance the potential mobility for some, while detracting the potential mobility . . . of others by leaving them in a relatively slower or *intentionally disconnected* position" (Sheller 2011, p. 4; my emphasis).

Intentionally manipulating human flows to accelerate, decelerate, connect, and disconnect people from accessing mobility are 'spatial fixes' (Harvey 2001) and 'spatio-temporal fixes' (Jessop 2006). By putting in place various forms of mobility controls, nation-states participate in "capitalism's insatiable drive to resolve its inner crises tendencies by geographical expansion and geographical restructuring" (Harvey 2001, p. 24).

Neoliberal statecraft, which has come to prominence since the 1980s, has recast citizenship in such a manner that it is no longer regarded as "a prima facie right but as a prized possession that is to be earned and can be lost if not properly cultivated" (van Houdt et al. 2011, p. 408). Neoliberal statecraft has a distinct and recognizable institutional core that "consists of an *articulation of state, market and citizenship* that harnesses the first to impost the stamp of the second onto the third" (Wacquant 2012, p. 71). While 'neoliberalism has always been an open-ended, plural and adaptable project" (Peck 2008), scholarship that claims 'there is no such thing as neoliberalism' (Barnett 2005) or conceptualises it as a 'necessary illusion' (Castree 2006) fails to link local expressions of violence to larger scale political and economic processes. By theorizing neoliberalism as an 'actually existing circumstance' (Brenner and Theodore 2002), this paper contributes to identifying and understanding the nonillusory effects of neoliberalism (Springer 2008).

Loïc Wacquant's "'thick' sociological conception" of neoliberalism centered on the state is helpful to understand how citizenship is linked to the four key elements of "neoliberal reengineering" (Wacquant 2010, 2012), which includes the expansion of (1) commodification; (2) disciplinary social policy; (3) penal policy; and (4) the troupe of individual responsibility. These four elements specify "the institutional machinery involved in the establishment of market dominance and its operant impact on effective social membership" (Wacquant 2012, p. 71). Focusing on the internal logic by which the state acts "as the core agency that sets the rules and fabricates the subjectivities, social relations and collective representations" (Wacquant 2012, p. 66) of membership is useful when exploring how immigration, citizenship, and border regimes are crafted to further the goals of the neoliberal worldview and the supremacy of 'market forces.'

The ideology of market expansion has become naturalized with respect to all human activity, including mobility. Reflecting upon how the notion of 'market forces' has come ideologically dominant in our thinking, Stuart Hall maintains

> 'Market forces' was a brilliant linguistic substitute for 'the capitalist system,' because it erased so much, and, since we all use the market every day, it suggests that we all somehow already have a vested interest in conceding everything to it. It conscripted us . . . constantly associating 'the market' with things like freedom, choice—and thus the necessity of a privatised economy; that's the logic. (Hall and Massey 2010, p. 59)

Under the international logic of 'market forces' (that is, the neoliberal capitalist system), the state, then, assumes a role as the core agency that "redraws the boundaries and tenor of citizenship through its market conforming policies" (Wacquant 2012, p. 71). The state does not deregulate; it actively re-regulates the economy in favor of corporations (Vogel 1996). Jones and Novak (1999) referred to this as "retooling the state" in ways that best conform to capital's current interests. Rather than retreating, the state is afforded a key role as the primary "gatekeeper of entrance to and membership of the state" (Robertson and Runganaikaloo 2013, p. 212). As explained above, spatial and spatio-temporal fixes are largely carried out by nation-states through their immigration, citizenship, and border policing regimes. To further neoliberal capitalist expansion, more affluent nation-states are increasingly contracting privatized corporations to run for-profit immigration detention centers and courting poorer nation-states to enter into 'regional agreements' (Golash-Boza 2009; Pearson 2019; Pickering and Weber 2014). These border policing practices effectively privatize human mobility and push the border beyond the territorial borders of the nation state.

As nation-states "politically and legislatively constructed 'the non-citizen' as a counterpart to 'the citizen'" (Wicker 2010, p. 225), they have assumed "deportation power" (Anderson et al.

2011, p. 548) through a range of practices aimed at the expulsion (or potential expulsion) of 'non-citizens' (Anderson et al. 2011; De Genova 2007; De Genova and Peutz 2010; Nail 2015, 2016). Modern nation-states, particularly in the West, have taken what has been called a "deportation turn" (Gibney 2008) in their dealings with unwanted 'non-citizens.' Deportation and detainment powers are key features to understand how the political organization of citizenship and migrant statuses relate to human mobility. Modern nation-states' legal authority to deport and detain without trial only applies to people with 'non-citizen' status. 'Deportability' (De Genova 2002) and 'detainability' (De Genova 2007) denote the ever-present possibility of deportation and "selectively targeted *indefinite* and *protracted* ... susceptibility for detention" (De Genova 2007, p. 434), which shape the lives of all 'non-citizens,' whether or not they ever experience being deported or detained. Being perpetually subjected to the possibility of deportation and detention makes 'non-citizens' into a group of people who are "deemed to belong to suspect social categories" (Shamir 2005, p. 197). In reference to deportability, "freedom from deportation power—the right to *genuinely* permanent residence—can be seen as one of the few remaining privileges which separates citizens from settled non-citizens in contemporary liberal states" (Anderson et al. 2011, p. 548).

To "understand the pervasive modern division between the citizen and the foreigner" (Hindess 2000, p. 1491), one has to realize how citizenship acts as a "marker of identification" (Hindess 2000, p. 1487). While most discussions of citizenship take place from an 'internalist view,' which is based on Marshall (1950) classic account of "the civil, political, and social aspects of citizenship in the societies of the modern West" (Hindess 2000, p. 1486), it is perhaps more revealing to explore modern citizenship's external, or international, dimensions. When viewed from a broader, externalist perspective, citizenship is best conceptualized as a "dividing practice" (Dean 1999, p. 133) or a technique of "governing a global population of thousands of millions by dividing it into the small subpopulations of particular states" (Hindess 2000, p. 1487). On a global scale modern-day citizenship functions as both a marker of status and a powerful tool for nation-states to enact—and enforce—an "international regime of population management" (Hindess 2000, p. 1496).

Over time, nation-states have appropriated "a certain 'indefinite' power to suspend the law and to fabricate the law" (Butler 2006, p. xvi). As the international system of nation-states construct and normalize a "state of emergency" (Agamben 1998), they create laws that criminalize those who cannot obtain and/or maintain permission to move into and remain within the territorial nation-state. While immigration detention represents the most extreme end of sub-citizenship for people who are construed as 'unlawful non-citizens,' the never-ending 'War on Terror' can be viewed as a normalized and persistent "state of emergency" (Agamben 1998), which justifies the indefinite containment, or detention, of anyone deemed to be a potential threat (Agamben 1998; Butler 2006; Turner 2007).

3. Processes of Sub-Citizenship

Current understandings about and practices associated with citizenship and migrant status construct multiple and compounded barriers for certain people to access mobility, human rights, and social justice. Deciding who belongs; who does not belong; who is tolerated, but only for specific purposes and/or periods of time; and who is 'deserving' of citizenship entitlements is carried out through the ways in which powerful social actors construct nationalist identities and nation-states legislate rules governing human mobility and citizenship.

I draw upon the notion of 'sub-citizenship' from recent literature on 'biological sub-citizenship,' which is a new and largely unexplored concept that refers to how neoliberal processes result in people unevenly embodying ill health (Sparke 2016). While Sparke's notion of biological sub-citizenship focused on the health outcomes of people most adversely affected by austerity, the notion of sub-citizenship itself offers a useful way "to elucidate power relations and processes of subordination that simple binary accounts of citizenship" (Sparke 2016, p. 1) tend to obscure. A sub-citizenship lens provides an open-ended, relational approach for exploring how it is that certain people come to

experience different kinds of human rights abuses, dehumanization, and exploitative treatment that is largely, but not entirely, based upon citizenship and migrant status.

As alluded to in the introduction, processes of sub-citizenship apply to everyone, but tend to be more pronounced among those with precarious (and especially illegalized) citizenship and migrant statuses. Experiences of sub-citizenship are not limited to people who move and resettle across international borders under various degrees of choice. Rather, sub-citizenship coordinates the experiences of those with insider ('citizen') and outsider ('non-citizen') statuses. However, those with illegalized migrant and citizenship statuses are particularly vulnerable to most extreme forms of sub-citizenship.

In this article, I explore how processes of sub-citizenship impact upon people positioned near the bottom of the sub-citizenship hierarchy. I focus on children who are categorized as 'illegal migrants' because of what it reveals about the experiences of people positioned at the lower levels of the sub-citizen hierarchy.

I define sub-citizenship as translocal processes of subordination that create various hierarchal conditions of precarity and dehumanization for different groups of people primarily based upon, but not wholly determined by, migration and citizenship status. The sub-citizen thesis maintains that all people are coordinated by powerful, large-scale forces into having certain experiences accessing social justice and human rights due to their historical, social, and legal positioning within transnational regimes of social motion[6], which shape immigration, citizenship, and bordering policies and practices within individual nation-states.

Sub-citizenship is structurally linked to global capitalist expansion and carried out through the international system of nation-states. With "the unceasing drive of capital accumulation" (Heyman 2017, p. 47), nation-states play a key role in determining insiders and outsiders. Nation-states assume the role of the core agency that sets the rules and determines the conditions under which certain groups of people can and cannot access various rights and protections, such as working rights, welfare entitlements, residency rights, and political representation.

Sub-citizenship is produced primarily by nation-states as they enact spatial temporal fixes (Jessop 2006) in response to the pressures asserted by neoliberal globalization. This is accomplished by nation-states' engaging in the following activities: manufacturing citizenship and migrant statuses; reengineering the pathways for people to access mobility; setting the rules to become rights-bearing members of society (i.e., 'citizens'); determining what behaviors are necessary for people to gain and maintain citizenship and other lesser statuses; and containing (and often extracting profits from) populations deemed undesirable.[7]

Sub-citizenship is a new theoretical tool for understanding the ordering of populations along contemporary, neoliberal lines. Applying a sub-citizenship lens offers a critical way to explore how the nation-state manufactures and reengineers citizenship and migrant statuses to further the goals of market expansion. Sub-citizenship may be more appropriate than traditional citizenship or migration perspectives for critically exploring people's experiences with various forms of violence and expulsion, and what role neoliberal globalization has in producing these outcomes.

To understand processes of sub-citizenship we must thoroughly analyze and explore the role that nation-states play in organizing society. In the 1990s, some globalization theorists predicted the decline of the nation-state. However, in recent years, it has become clear that nation-states have assumed

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6 Following Thomas Nail's political theory of movement, Kinopolitics, regimes of social motion are metastable social flows that cannot be mapped out in their entirety because they are constantly in motion. As society is always moving within regimes of social motion, borders are not fixed, spatial or even temporal entities. Rather, borders act to "introduce a division or bifurcation of some sort in the world" (Nail 2016, p. 2). Bordering practices direct people to move through regimes of social motion in particular ways.

7 It is worth noting that among 'citizens' and 'non-citizens' with legal status containment often takes the form of the penal system, while in the case of 'non-citizens' with illegal migrant status containment often takes the form of detention and deportation.

a powerful role particularly with respect to how people can or cannot access mobility, power, and resources. The nation-state's "the modern nation-state is founded on the claim of a homogenous set of citizens whose duty is to protect their common welfare; this necessarily requires the exclusion of others despite liberalism's claims of universalism and equality" (Castañeda 2019, p. 33). To manufacture the appearance of a homogenous set of citizens, nation-states coordinate various forms of social, political, juridical, and territorial expulsion among people who are construed as 'illegal migrants.' Current trends in territorial expulsion are characterized by deportation and arbitrary, prolonged, and, in some instances, indefinite detainment for people with illegalized citizenship and migrant status.

Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013 describe citizenship as the "toll of sovereign governance that regulates the balance between rights and representation and renders certain populations as legitimate bearers of rights while other populations are marked as non-existent" (p. 182). While those who have citizenship status in their country of residence are legally recognized as rights-bearing members, 'citizens' are not immune from process of sub-citizenship. It is important to understand that those who have (or had) more secure levels of migrant and citizenship status may also experience certain levels of sub-citizenship.[8]

Processes of sub-citizenship coordinate the everyday worlds of people according to where they are hierarchically positioned and their access to resources and protection from various forms of expulsion, such as deportation and detention. Applying a sub-citizen lens helps to systematically unpack the material conditions that structure and shape people's experiences accessing mobility, political representation, and other human rights that tend to be associated with citizenship protections. Through this approach we can see that different degrees of subordination experienced by people are not random, chaotic, or accidental. Rather these conditions are deliberately state crafted through the allocation of citizen and migrant status, which allows or denies access to resources, power, and security.[9]

Figure 1 below is an illustration of how sub-citizenship hierarchically organizes people into different legal statuses. It was specifically designed with the current citizenship and immigration categorizations and rules in the Australian context. Applying Figure 1 to the US context only requires two linguistic substitutions to accurately portray the current citizenship and immigration statuses in the United States. The first is replacing 'non-citizen' with 'alien.' The second is replacing 'unlawful non-citizen' with either 'unauthorized alien' or 'illegal alien.'[10] However, as Australia and most countries in the world use the terms 'citizen'/'non-citizen', Figure 1 uses these terms to illustrate the sliding scales of subordination primarily based upon citizenship and migrant status. Processes of sub-citizenship are not about absolute citizenship and migration categorizations. Rather, the figure directs attention to the unequal relations and social boundaries that are created between groups based on statecrafting citizenship and immigration statuses.

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[8] For example, in some nation-states, politicians are deliberating on or enacting legislation that can make it easier to strip citizenship. Creating legislation to strip citizenship status is a technology that extends processes sub-citizenship among those with more secure levels of 'citizen' status.

[9] This is not to imply that all 'citizens' and 'non-citizens' are treated the same nor do they have the same access to resources, power, and security. This paper is concerned with exploring how citizenship and migrant statuses act as a series of gates that categorically allow or deny access formal rights and protections. Those with citizenship status have more security in terms of residency and other rights, while those with 'non-citizen' status are more vulnerable to all forms of social expulsion, especially territorial expulsion.

[10] The Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States provides no consistent or overarching definition of the term 'illegal alien,' although the term is used in several provisions under title 8. Conversely, several provisions use the term 'unauthorized alien.'

Figure 1. Representation of Sub-citizenship hierarchy of statuses.

Figure 1 shows that all people, 'citizens' and 'non-citizens' alike, are hierarchically positioned within processes of sub-citizenship. This figure emphasizes the legal ordering of people that places them into different categories with different degrees of precarity. The nation-state's power to craft legal status serves as the justification to treat people differently depending on their citizenship category. Categorizing hierarchies of people makes it possible for nation-states to enact various forms of exclusion and violence, which are often defended as being necessary to achieve border protection and economic growth. For instance, those who are categorized 'unlawful non-citizens' or 'temporary migrants' face various forms of economic exclusion, such as having no (or limited) legal work options, and social exclusion, as these classes of people are often are ineligible for public services, such as education and health care.

On-the-ground experiences with sub-citizenship can and do vary dramatically between and amongst different groups of people. Processes of exclusion and disadvantage associated with citizenship status can be multiple and compounded for people on the basis of their socio-economic status, race, gender, sexuality, religion, ability, and so on. Those with more secure levels of citizenship status, particularly if they come from dominant social groups, may never think of themselves as being affected by the methods used to determine who belongs to the nation-state as designated by their citizenship status in society. There are many citizens who occupy subordinate positions in society due to poverty, racism, and other forms of discrimination and disadvantage. Certain groups of citizens, such as Indigenous Australians, Native Americans, and black Americans, experience subordinate social, economic, and political statuses regardless of having formal citizenship rights. However, processes of sub-citizenship construct a large social boundary between those with and without citizenship status. In particular, 'citizens' are more secure from the state's use of some kinds of containment technologies, including deportation and immigration detention.

Attaining the legal status of citizenship is often a non-linear and contested journey due to the complex kinds of infrastructure that increasingly produce a 'two-step' or 'staggered' migration process (Hawthorne 2010, Mares 2016) characterized by "non-linear trajectories across multiple statuses and

protracted periods of temporariness" (Robertson 2015). With respect to 'acts of citizenship' and feelings of belonging "citizenship should not be viewed as a linear, but a circular and contested journey" (Mansouri and Mikola 2014). People can move up and down the citizenship ladder because the gradations of sub-citizenship are not stationary, or fixed. Rather, sub-citizenship is a dynamic and fluid process that functions as "sliding scales of subordination" (Sparke 2016, p. 10). The rules for moving up or down the sub-citizenship scale are set by the nation-state and people with different statuses have do display certain desirable characteristics and certain things to maintain or acquire more secure levels of sub-citizenship. For example, children born in Australia whose parents do not have citizenship or permanent residency status are legally classified as 'non-citizens' in their country of birth. If a family living in Australia with 'temporary migrant' status wants to acquire a more secure migrant status (permanent residency) for themselves and their child, one of the things required by the nation-state is for the family members to prove they are healthy. This requires a 'health test' by immigration certified doctors.[11] If the child is found to have a medical condition or a disability, such as autism, it is likely that the family's application for permanent residency would be denied (Soldatic et al. 2012). At this point, the family would slide down the sub-citizenship ladder. If the family does not 'voluntarily' leave the country, then they would be territorially expelled by the nation-state using the technologies of detention and/or deportation.

Referring to Figure 1, those who enter the country with a permanent visa (that is, through the humanitarian or the migration program) are positioned in Australia and America as 'second class non-citizens.' People who hold permanent visas are the most secure group of 'non-citizens.' This group of people have obtained a certain degree of protection from territorial expulsion because they have the nation-state's permission to stay indefinitely under certain conditions. They also have a certain degree of protection from economic expulsion, as they have been authorized with unrestricted work rights by the nation-state. Although in some cases, permanent residents must work in their nominated skilled occupation and in specific geographic locations. Oftentimes, this group experiences expulsion from social welfare provisions as well as political expulsion, as they cannot vote or run for office. This group may go on to become 'first class citizens' by naturalization, but the rules and processes determining the pathways toward citizenship in many countries are increasingly becoming longer, more difficult, expensive, and contingent on behavior (Anderson et al. 2011; Hugo 2014; Mares 2016).

Non-citizens who are construed as 'unlawful' (often called 'illegal migrants') become detainable and deportable Others. It is possible for people to be detained for short periods of time and then either be deported or allowed to stay. However, I position detainability at the bottom of the sub-citizenship ladder, as being detained—especially indefinitely detained—puts people 'outside the pale of the law' (Arendt 1951). Without the protections of the law, detainable Others are increasingly torturable Others. Detainment without the right to a trial or appeal is the most precarious, uncertain, and arguably, the most dangerous form of territorial expulsion there is.

While citizenship delivers certain benefits to those who are citizens of the state in which they live, it "also has a variety of other, less obviously benign consequences" (Hindess 2000, p. 1495). Here, Hindess alludes to an externalist view of citizenship where citizenship status acts as a marker of difference that enables the nations-state system to manage the flow of international populations. However, when viewing citizenship internally (that is, within the nation-state), we can also clearly see that having citizenship status is not the panacea for people to access human rights and social justice, as many other factors including racial or ethnic discrimination, poverty, and the particular economic and human security conditions of the nation-state in question place limits on the advantages of having citizenship status. Along with citizenship and migrant status, other factors that influence individual experiences

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[11] The Health Requirement began with the inception of Australia's *Immigration Restriction Act* (1901). Since 1901, potential all migrants to Australia, including those with refugee status who come through the Humanitarian Program, are required to undergo a cost-benefit assessment of health. Under this neoliberal approach to migration, people who have a disease or disability are actively excluded from the Australian migration process.

with sub-citizenship include historical time, physical location, and the individual circumstances of people. It should be noted that those who are highly-skilled and/or have access to support, in particular financial assets and capital, have a clear advantage in accessing mobility and human rights in a global capitalist system that has increasingly commodified mobility and reengineered immigration and citizenship pathways to expand economies.

As capitalist expansion is structurally compelled to place controls on the mobility of labor (Mezzadra and Neilson 2017; Nail 2015, 2016; Neilson and Rossiter 2005; Sheller 2011), processes of sub-citizenship function on a global scale. Most of the world's population are structurally bound to experience different degrees of (im)mobility, dehumanization, extraction, and exploitation in response to and to further the goals of capital accumulation and expansion[12]. People who live in countries where they have citizenship status are usually afforded certain rights and protections from the state's power to deport and detain. Those who live in countries with more privileged migrant statuses, such as 'permanent residents,' also have certain rights and protections, although to a far lesser degree than 'citizens.' However, as "those who are excluded from the human rights framework are the same persons who are excluded from the citizenship-rights framework" (Sagy 2013, p. 231), people who live in counties where they are not formal members (i.e., 'citizens') are more likely to experience precarity and lack of access to human rights. 'Non-citizens' are considerably more at risk of experiencing various forms of (im)mobility, dehumanization, extraction, and exploitation because they occupy subordinate social and legal positions. People who live in a nation-state and are not considered 'citizens' of that state face compounded barriers to accessing human rights and social justice, and are largely unprotected from arbitrary state-led violence. This is particularly the case when one's mobility across or presence within the nation-state is interpellated as being 'illegal' by the current immigration, citizenship, and border regimes of the nation-state.

In the next section, I apply a sub-citizen lens to explore the experiences of children with 'illegal migrant' status in the USA and Australia. To illustrate processes of sub-citizenship among those are lower levels of the sub-citizen hierarchy, I draw upon the immigration detention policies in Australia and the United States because they are arguably among the most extreme examples in the contemporary world. Drawing upon the words and pictures of children in detention, I link their experiences with sub-citizenship to the "territorial solutions" (Cornelisse 2010) used to fix the 'problem' of people who attempt to move without the nation-state's authorization. The experiences of detained children are drawn upon to explore how processes of sub-citizenship are connected to violence. Understanding how people at the lower levels of the sub-citizen hierarchy are affected by the nation-state's deportation and detention powers is particularly relevant and timely, as many countries around the world are increasing their powers to banish, exile, and torture people who are perceived as risky, threatening, or needy.

4. Children in Immigration Detention

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that 50 million children had migrated across international borders or were forcibly displaced in 2016. Twenty-eight million (1 in every 80) children migrated due to conditions of violence and insecurity (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 2016). In many countries, such as the United States, immigration detention statistics are not readily available, resulting in a widespread lack of transparency that makes genuinely informed public and policy debate nearly impossible. Globally, there is no validated data detailing the number of children held in immigration detention; however, the number is estimated to be in the millions (Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) to End Child Immigration Detention 2016).

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[12] While all people are positioned somewhere on the citizenship's spectrum, economics elites, certainly those of the billionaire class, cannot be said to experience human (im)mobility, dehumanization, extraction, and exploitation.

Beginning the 1980s, all major Western states practice what they call 'civil' or 'administrative' immigration detention (Skodo 2017). This means that nation-states classify immigration detention as an administrative policy, rather than a punitive one. However, despite being characterized as civil confinement, a closer look at the immigration detention regimes around the world reveals that this form of forced enclosure and confinement carried out against undocumented migrants is often many degrees harsher than criminal detention. In addition, people facing immigration detention lack access to the same constitutional protections as those facing criminal incarceration (Groves 2004). Australia and the United States also follow this trend of considering their immigration detention policies as being 'administrative.' For example, the Australian Border Forces website states: "In Australia, immigration detention *is administrative* not punitive. It helps us manage our temporary entry and permanent migration programs" (Australian Border Force (ABF) 2019). This statement issued by the Australian government also illustrates the textual mediation of the social relations coordinating the nation-state's immigration detention regime.

The practice of mandatory detention of people with 'unlawful non-citizen'[13] status is a relatively new invention of neoliberal statecraft in both countries. Mandatory detention began in the United States in 1988 under the Reagan government and in Australia in 1992 under the Keating government. Currently, both countries practice mandatory detention to hold adults and children in immigration detention centers[14] if they are construed as being 'illegal migrants.' While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to review in detail the similarities and differences between the two countries' approaches to mandatory detention, it should be noted that with regards to children in detention:

(1)   The US detains far more children than Australia.
(2)   The US lacks transparency regarding the number of children in detention.
(3)   The US is the only country in the world that systematically separates and detains immigrant families en masse (Wood 2018). Australia is the only country in the world with a policy of mandatory detention and offshore processing of people seeking asylum who arrive without a valid visa (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) n.d.).[15]
(4)   The average length of time children are held in immigration detention is believed to be roughly similar: 3.5–7.9 months in the USA and 7.5 months in Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014).
(5)   Both countries have been condemned by the United Nations and other human rights organizations for breaching international human rights law, including the Rights of the Child (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014; Amnesty International 2013, 2015, 2015; Nethery and Holman 2016; United Nations News 2018).

Regarding publicly available data on the numbers, locations, and durations of children held in immigration detention centers, the United States is far less transparent than Australia. It is not known how many children are held in US detention centers because the Office of Homeland Security does not issue these figures. It is estimated that there were 15,000 children detained in over 100 immigration detention centers in the USA in 2018. In Australia in 2014 there were 1068 children held in immigration

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13   'Unlawful non-citizen' designates a legal status. People with this status are often referred to as 'illegal migrants' in popular discourses, including politics and media.

14   In this article, I use the term 'immigration detention center' to ensure consistency when discussing immigration detention in Australia and the United States. However, the term most often used by the United States government is 'Customs and Border Protection facility' (CBP), while the Australian government's preferred term is 'offshore processing center.' Additionally, in the interest of consistency, this article uses the American spelling of 'center' for both US and Australian immigration centers, noting that the Australian spelling of the word is 'centre.'

15   In July 2019, US President Trump enacted the "third party asylum rule". Under this rule the US government plans to ban asylum seekers form making a claim and send them to offshore detention in another country, such as Guatemala or Mexico (Pearson 2019). This approach was first trialed in Australia and referred to as 'offshore detention.' It extends border enforcement beyond the nation-state's territorial border and into the borders of other neighboring nation-states.

detention centers in three locations: mainland Australia (584 children), Christmas Island (305 children), and Nauru (179 children) (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014).

Over the past several years, fewer children are being held in Australian detention centers. By 2018, less than 10 children were being held in Australian offshore and onshore immigration detention centers (Department of Home Affairs 2018). In February 2019, the Department of Home Affairs announced that the final four children on Nauru were flown to the US for resettlement with their families.[16] Several hundred people were resettled in the US as part of the US refugee deal. In August 2019, Australia reopened the Christmas Island Detention Center to detain one Tamil asylum seeker family of four from Sri Lanka whose two young daughters were born in Australia. This case has resulted in a large public outcry to return the family to their home in Biloela, Queensland (Doherty 2019).

There are numerous reasons why there are currently less children being held in offshore Australian detention centers. No asylum seeker boats have reached Australia since 2013, when the 'Operation Sovereign Borders' began the practice of naval turn backs. This practice means that when people traveling by boat do not have authorization (visas) to travel to Australia, their boat is turned back. The awareness raising work of the Australian Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, researchers, journalists, and advocates have influenced public opinion and pressured the government to get children out of offshore detention. However, in most cases, asylum seekers and refugees have been shuffled into other forms of detention, such as community detention. Others are living in Australia with visas that assign them highly precarious, 'non-citizen' statuses with little access to welfare benefits and no pathways available to gain citizenship rights and protections.[17]

The increased use of immigration detention in many countries around the world has raised significant human rights concerns in recent years. In 2019, the UN Human Rights Chief stated that she was "deeply shocked that children are forced to sleep on the floor in overcrowded facilities without access to adequate healthcare or food, and with poor sanitation conditions" (United Nations News 2019). The UN Chief stated that immigration detention is never in the best interests of a child and urged the authorities to find non-custodial alternatives for migrants and refugee children and adults. The Australian Human Rights Commission has repeatedly warned that Australia's practice of mandatory has led to numerous breaches of human rights, particularly among children. The Commission found that mandatory and prolonged immigration detention of children is in clear violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014). Amnesty International has issued numerous reports concluding that the United States and Australia's immigration detention systems are in breach of international human rights obligations (2011, 2013, 2015, 2016).

Although there is overwhelming evidence that holding people in immigration detention is physically and mentally harmful to adults and children (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014; Amnesty International 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016; Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) to End Child Immigration Detention 2016; Keller et al. 2017; Mares et al. 2002; Moss 2015; Wood 2018), the US and Australia are among over 100 countries worldwide that are known to detain children for migration-related reasons (Wood 2018).

The following sections draw upon major reports and media coverage detailing the experiences of children held in immigration detention centers in Australia under the 'Operation Sovereign Borders' policy and the United States under the 'Zero Tolerance' policy.

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[16] In 2017, the US agreed to consider resettling refugees held in Australia's offshore detention centers on Nauru and Manus Island, as well as those who have been transferred back to Australia for medical reasons. Often referred as the 'US refugee deal,' this arrangement has resulted in 619 refugees being resettled in the US (Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law 2019).

[17] There are approximately 30,000 asylum seekers living in Australia who were formally held in offshore detention and have been granted visas allowing them to live in Australia without access to pathways citizenship. This group have become known in public policy as the 'legacy caseload.' Most of these people were held in offshore detention since 2013.

4.1. Experiences of Children Held in Australia's Immigration Detention Centers

In 2014, the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) released a report entitled *The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention.* The report concluded that "immigration detention is a dangerous place for children" (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014, p. 10). Drawing upon the stories of people in detention; professional evaluations of psychologists, doctors, and teachers working with them; and artefacts, such as pictures drawn by the children and adults held in detention, the report conveys the dangerous environment of detention centers and provides compelling first-hand evidence of the impact prolonged immigration detention has on the mental and physical health of children and adults.

During a 15-month period, from January 2013 to March 2014, the AHRC collected the following statistics of violence occurring at Australian detention centers:

- 57 serious assaults.
- 233 assaults involving children.
- 207 incidents of actual self-harm.
- 436 incidents of threatened self-harm.
- 33 incidents of reported sexual assault (the majority involving children).
- 183 incidents of voluntary starvation/hunger strikes (with a further 27 involving children) (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014, p. 62).

These statists indicate that children and adults held in Australia's immigration detention centers are subjected to high rates of violence and abuse in detention centers.

Overwhelmingly, the children interviewed by the AHRC described their experiences living in immigration detention in a highly negative light. The children, some as young as pre-school age, used terms including 'jail,' prison-like,' 'depressing,' 'die,' 'no hope,' and 'crazy-making' to describe immigration detention. Below are examples of statements made by children held in immigration detention interviewed by the AHRC (2014):

My hope is finished now. I don't have any hope. I feel I will die in detention.

17-year-old child, gender redacted, held at Phosphate Hill

Detention Center on Christmas Island

My country and my religion is a target for Taliban. There were bomb blasts and always big wars and terrible attacks. Shia people have arms, legs, noses hacked off, necks slashed, plus there is rocket fire and missiles. This is because I am Shia. All this means no one is safe and how because I escaped. I am in detention.

Child, age and gender redacted, held at Nauru Regional

Processing Center

I feel like I'm in jail, no one here to help us. It's just me and God.

17-year-old child, gender redacted, held at Christmas

Island detention Center

These statements capture the severity of hopelessness, isolation, depression, and ongoing trauma experienced by children held in Australian immigration detention centers. As people who sought asylum, many of the children had direct experiences with trauma as they and their families fled conditions of war and conflict. In other cases, children explained that their families attempted to move to Australia to get away from oppressive regimes. One child held at Nauru Regional Processing Center articulated (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014):

> I am a thirteen years old boy that came to Australia with my parents and my eight-year-old brother for better and brighter future. We took the risk of this dangerous way because we had no other option. I heard Australian politicians say Iranian people come to Australia because of their economic problems. But we weren't poor in my country. We weren't hungry, homeless, jobless, and illiterate. We immigrate because we had no freedom, no free speech, and we had [a] dictatorship.

Whether the children and families moved to escape from war, conflict, dictatorships, economic and safety insecurities, or, in many cases, a combination of factors, the children describe ongoing and compounded trauma from their experiences of being held against their will in Australian detention centers.

The Australian government responded to the allegations of abuse in the AHRC's report by conducting an internal investigation called the Moss Review. Confirming the AHRC's findings, the Moss Review found that there were both reported and unreported allegations of sexual and other physical assaults inflicted on children in detention. The report calculated that between October 2013 and October 2014, 17 minors in detention engaged in self-harm (including one attempted hanging). The youngest child involved in self-harm was 11 years old (Moss 2015).

In 2016, Amnesty International released a report entitled *Island of Despair: Australia's "Processing" of Refugees on Nauru*. The report provides detailed evidence from hundreds of interviews among people in detention, their family members and service providers on Nauru showing that people held in detention are subjected to a "regime of abuse and neglect (that) does not even spare children" (p. 18). The report strongly condemns Australia's current immigration policies and its practice of mandatory detention, stating:

> the Government of Australia has made a calculation in which intolerable cruelty and the destruction of the physical and mental integrity of hundreds of children, men and women, have been chosen as a tool of government policy. In doing so the Government of Australia is in breach of international human rights law and international refugee law. The conditions on Nauru—refugees' severe mental anguish, the intentional nature of the system, and the fact that the goal of offshore processing is to intimidate or coerce people to achieve a specific outcome—*amounts to torture*. (p. 7, my emphasis)

These reports establish a strong link between the mental and physical deterioration of people "trapped in limbo" facing "debilitating uncertainty about their future" (p. 22) while living in conditions of indefinite immigration detention. Children held in immigration detention were found to have significantly higher rates of mental disorders than other children in Australia (AHRC n.d.). A pediatric and child health expert in assisting the national inquiry into children in immigration detention stated:

> I was particularly distressed by the utter despair of the unaccompanied boys I spoke with on Christmas Island—despair underpinned by past, present and anticipatory trauma. Young men, in the prime of their lives, who face the intolerable realization that any hope of a better life had almost evaporated. (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014, p. 150)

Since Operation Sovereign Borders commenced in 2013, health professionals, including child psychologists, have repeatedly raised concerns regarding the physical and mental effect that prolonged detention was having upon children. Media has reported that young children held in detention were expressing the desire to no longer live. Some stopped eating, drinking, and talking. Others were self-harming. In 2018, a 12-year-old boy, who had been held in immigration detention in Nauru since he was 8 years-old, was evacuated after refusing to eat for 20 days. The Australian Border Force repeatedly tried to block his medical evacuation (Doherty 2018).

Figures 2–4 below are reprinted from the Australian Human Rights Commission's *Forgotten Children* Report. These drawings provide another window into the extreme levels of psychological

stress experienced by preschool, primary, and secondary school-aged children held in Australian immigration detention centers (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2014).

Figure 2. Drawing by preschool school-age girl, held at Christmas Island Detention Center. © *Australian Human Rights Commission 2014. The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention 2014.*

Figure 3. Drawing by primary school-age child, gender redacted, held at Christmas Island Detention Center. © *Australian Human Rights Commission 2014. The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention 2014.*

Figure 4. Drawing by secondary school-age child, gender redacted, held at Darwin Detention Center. © *Australian Human Rights Commission 2014. The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention 2014.*

Detained children as young as pre-school age have communicated clear signs of trauma, depression, and despair by drawing pictures of being trapped in cages and crying. Other children in Australian detention have tried to make sense of what they were experiencing by drawing pictures of blood, weapons, and barbed wire. As will become evident in following section, children held in US detention centers have communicated similar feelings of despair, depression, and trauma though their words and drawings.

4.2. Experiences of Children Held in US Immigration Detention Centers

In the United States, there has not been the same level of independent investigation detailing the conditions of children held detention centers as has been done in Australia by the Australian Human Rights Commission, the Moss Review, and Amnesty International. This again reveals that immigration detention and the details surrounding the treatment of children in detention is far less transparent and more secretive in the United States than in Australia.

However, after a flu outbreak that sent five infants held in US immigration detention to hospital, lawyers from the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law and a border certified physician were granted access to the Ursula Detention Center in McAllen, Texas, which is the largest immigration detention center in the United States. In June 2019, the team was briefly allowed into the detention center to monitor government compliance with the Flores settlement, a 1997 agreement that requires the government to keep children in 'safe and sanitary' conditions while being held in immigration detention. More than 1000 children were being held at the detention center with the team interviewing and clinically examining as many children as they could. However, the team was not permitted to enter the area where many of the sickest kids were being held in cages (Raff 2019).

The voices of three children held in detention who were interviewed by the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law provide a glimpse into the conditions faced by an unknown number of infants, children, and teenagers currently held in US detention centers (McLaughlin 2019).

I'm in a room with dozens of other boys. Some have been as young as 3 or 4 years old. Some cry. Right now there is a 12-year old-boy who cries a lot. Others try to comfort him. One of the officers makes fun of those who cry.

17-year-old boy, currently held in US immigration

detention center in Clint, Texas

A Border Patrol agent came into our room with a 2-year-old boy and asked us, "Who wants to take care of this little boy?" Another girl said she would take care of him but lost interest after a few hours and so I started taking care of him ... I feed the boy, change his diaper, and play with him. He is sick. He has a cough and a runny nose and scabs on his lips.

15-year-old child, gender and detention center location

redacted

I have been here without bathing for 21 days. I have seen that when we try to complain about the conditions the (officers) want to know what we said. Then they start yelling at us, saying things like, 'You don't belong here,' 'Go back to where you came from,' 'You are pigs,' 'You came here to ruin my country.' They try to intimidate us. I have seen officers hit other detainees in the stomach.

Age redacted, young mother held at the Ursula detention

center in McAllen, Texas

The children interviewed described horrific conditions of being separated from their parents and warehoused in detention centers where they are subjected to psychological abuse, mistreatment, and child neglect. More specifically, the children's voices above explain that they have been held in overcrowded rooms for extended periods of time, subjected to verbal harassment, intimidation and physical abuse by detention officers, older children are caring for younger children, and sick children are not being properly treated.

Since the 'Zero-Tolerance' policy began in 2018, at least seven children have died in US custody. Between 2014–2018, the Office of Refugee Resettlement received 4556 complaints, including allegations of sexual abuse or sexual harassment of migrant children. There have been numerous reports of severe overcrowding, unsafe, unsanitary, and inhumane conditions in US detention facilities housing an estimated 15,000 children with 'illegal' status in the United States (Chalabi 2018). According to the Office of Inspector General (2019) report, at least four immigration detention centers were found to pose "immediate risks or egregious violations of detention standards ... including nooses in detainee cells ... and significant food safety issues" (p. 3).

After assessing 39 children under the age of 18 held at the Ursula facility, Lucio Sevier, a board-certified physician stated in an interview:

the conditions within which they are held could be compared to torture facilities. That is, extreme cold temperatures, lights on 24 h a day, no access to medical care, basic sanitation, water or adequate food ... every single person I spoke to [was] denied access to hand-washing even after bathroom use. (Novack 2019)

Doctor Sevier concluded that the unhygienic conditions in which the children were being held is "tantamount to intentionally causing the spread of disease" (2019). The Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law report cited that babies were being cared for by other children and that children over 6 months were not provided age-appropriate meal or clean bottles. According to Doctor Sevier, "to deny parents the ability to wash their infant's bottles is unconscionable and could be considered intentional mental and emotional abuse" (Marshall et al. 2019).

The report uncovered that children did not have access to soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, and many children were forced to sleep in freezing conditions on concrete floors while held in the Ursula detention center for extended lengths of time. While these facilities are only legally permitted to hold children up to 72 h, many of children reported being detained for nearly a month in unsafe and unsanitary conditions that are in breach of the Flores Settlement.

In July 2019, three children who were held in detention centers and separated from their families and relocated to a respite center were asked to draw pictures about their time in detention. Figures 5–7

below are the children's pictures representing their memories and impressions of the time they spent in immigration detention.

Figure 5. Drawing by primary school age boy held in an unspecified US detention Center, 2019. Courtesy of American Academy of Pediatrics.

Figure 6. Drawing by primary school age child, gender redacted, held in an unspecified US detention Center, 2019. Courtesy of American Academy of Pediatrics.

Figure 7. Drawing by primary school age child, gender redacted, held in an unspecified US detention Center, 2019. Courtesy of American Academy of Pediatrics.

The pictures in Figures 5–7 were released by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) in July 2019. It is not known which facilities the children who drew the pictures were held in nor how long they spent in detention, however, it is possible they were held in the Ursula center before moving on to the Respite Center. The words and drawings of the children held in U.S. immigration detention centers are strikingly similar to that of the children held in Australian immigration detention centers. In both Australia and the U.S. contexts, children expressed their experiences with trauma, fear, and sadness though their drawings of people trapped in cages, sad faces, and tears. In Figure 6, a primary school age child drew people sleeping in a concentration camp like setting. This drawing poignantly depicts the harsh, overcrowded, and inhumane conditions a child experienced while held in a U.S. immigration detention center.

Having established some of the ways nation-states enact violence upon children construed as 'illegal migrants,' the next section takes a step back to denaturalize the often taken for granted concepts of the nation-state, citizenship, and borders regimes. As nation-states create various categories of human though hierarchies of personhood (citizenship), people's experiences with violence, abuse, torture, and suffering are rendered as merely the collateral damage of border protection.

5. Denaturalizing the Nation-State, Citizenship, and Borders

Ideological constructs work "hard to make certain things 'obvious,' and the more we find these things obvious, self-evident and unquestionable, the more successfully the ideology has done its job" (Zupancic 2011). Grand concepts such as the international system of nation-states and supporting concepts such as citizenship, border protection, and 'illegal migration' are often presented as being neutral, empirical 'facts' devoid of any ideology. As 'facts,' nation-states, citizenship, borders, and migrant status structure the limits and set the frameworks within which we think about, discuss, value, and treat people. These constructs yield enormous power because they shape social understandings, public discourses, policies, and practices that determine which groups of people are permitted and welcomed to physically occupy certain spaces and have access to various rights in society. Nation statehood, accompanied by citizenship, and more recently, border policing, have largely become taken-for-granted as obvious and unquestionable necessities for organizing society.

Applying a historical lens to the contemporary system of nation-states and border regimes and problematizing traditional migration and citizenship perspectives allows us to denaturalize the

contemporary nation-state ideology and the notions of citizenship and border policing that sustain this grand narrative.

5.1. Historizing the Nation-State

When research leaves uninterrogated the assumption that human mobility ought to be governed by the container-like logic of the international system of nation-states, it produces, perpetuates, and naturalizes a host of unspoken, but implicit, power dynamics. As explained above, traditional migration and citizenship perspectives necessarily frame border-crossing mobile people as risky, deviant figures who lack permanence within the international nation-state system (Bauder 2013; Nail 2015; Turner 2007). However, the historical record clearly shows that humans were geographically mobile long before invention of modern-day nation-states. The social, political and historical conditions coordinating people's experiences with movement created nation-states themselves (Nail 2015, 2016).

When thinking about contemporary issues related to human (im)mobility and border securitization regimes, it is worthwhile to conceptually step back from the present and remember that in historical terms, the international system of nation-states and the notion of citizenship are relatively new concepts. The world-wide nation-state building project started in earnest between World Wars One and Two, making this the globalized form of social and political organization just over one hundred years old. Rather than limiting migration research to the terms and political boundaries determined by nation-states, we must materially explore people's on-the-ground conditions with (im)mobility in the context of the historical conditions giving rise to nation-states (Tilly 2005).

From its conception, modern statehood has been primarily concerned with the construction of 'nations,' a task which it continues to use to justify its own existence (Anderson 1983). As exclusive 'national' societies were being formed, the newly emerged nation-states began to regulate social mobilities of people within their territories, primarily through the creation of policies affecting people's access to education, employment, housing, welfare, health care, and so on. At the same time, nation-states began to restrict the mobilities of people moving across their borders (Raithelhuber et al. 2018). As the international system of nation-states took shape, sovereign, territorially bounded nation-states formed and were solidified through the creation of nationalities and national identities.

Human migration across and through nationalized spaces became regarded as a problem only recently in history (Sharma 2006). The invention of citizenship was a technology that helped to solidify the state's monopoly on the freedom of movement (Torpey 2000). Through the construction of citizenship and immigration regimes, nation-states set the rules by which certain people are construed as formally 'belonging' to or being 'members' of a nation-state. Statecrafting of citizenship and migration legislation was aided by the invention of passports and visas, which were—and continue to be—key technologies used by nation-states to set the rules of belonging and people's access to mobility (Torpey 2000). As states began to spatially regulate people's physical movements across and within international borders, they decreased various forms of security for people who were construed as 'non-citizens' (Raithelhuber et al. 2018). At the same time, some states (particularly the more affluent West) began to nationalize welfarism for those construed as 'citizens.' In recent years advances in surveillance technologies, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV), biometrics, and trusted traveler databases, have enabled nation-states and other mobility gatekeepers, such as airports, to more closely monitor and police human mobility (Adey 2004, 2006; Sheller 2016; Weber 2011).

Since the post-World-War-Two era, the global pattern of distinctive, sovereign nation-states has framed nearly every aspect of social, political, and economic life for people around the world. As we are "dominated by an image of the world in which the most basic patterns of social relationships take place within distinct, sovereign nation states" (Raithelhuber et al. 2018, p. 1), these social constructions shape how we view human mobility and social belonging. Living in a world that has been divided into territorially defined nation-states has great influence upon our conventional understandings of

migration and citizenship, both of which are "firmly entrenched in the concept of the nation-state" (Bauder 2013, p. 56).

Migration and citizenship studies have not been immune from the ideological influence and global dominance of nation statehood. The unquestioning adherence to nationalist thought and institutions is most evident in the state-centered approach taken by mainstream studies on citizenship, migration, forced migration, demography, and human geography. Scholarship that takes the national partitioning and ordering of the world as natural is deeply entrenched in 'methodological nationalism' (Agnew 1994; Bauder 2013; Beck 2007, 2009; Wimmer and Schiller 2002; Amelina et al. 2012). When migration research fails to critique the nation-state scale it falls into an "epistemological trap" (Agnew 1994) of leaving uninterrogated the social, historical and political power dynamics shaping people's experiences with human (im)mobility and belonging.

Although it is "difficult to escape from the categories we inherit" (Isin and Nyers 2014, p. 6), it is incumbent upon researchers to denaturalize, deconstruct, and interrogate the institutional machinery underpinning the international system of nation-states. To disrupt the international system of nation-states and the rise of militarized bordering practices, it is necessary to explicate the links between the intensification of national borders with the development of late, or neoliberal, capitalism (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, 2017; Stratton 2009; Nail 2015, 2016; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013; Shachar 2009).

At this historical juncture characterized by the intensification of border policing regimes and the related human rights violations experienced by increasingly numbers of people deemed as 'undesirable' migrants or as citizens, critical research and analysis is desperately needed to explicate the heightened policing powers of nation-states and interrogate notions of membership and rights allocation based on the shifting rules pertaining to citizenship status. Migration research must depart from one-dimensional, state-centric, institutionalized, and policy-oriented knowledge that produces both the national ordering of the world and the very categories of 'citizen' and 'non-citizen' themselves (Raithelhuber et al. 2018).

5.2. Problematizing Traditional Migration and Citizenship Perspectives

It is fundamental to recognize that human mobility is not unique to contemporary times. Research in the new mobilities paradigm "starts from the premise that people have always been on the move, but that human mobilities have been variously valued and interpreted through time and within as well as across cultures and societies" (Salazar 2016, p. 6). By focusing attention on the historical constancy of movement, new mobilities research considers "mobility as a natural tendency in society" (p. 3), thereby naturalizing human movement "as a fact of life and as a general principle that rarely needs further justification" (p. 3).

Bauman (1998), Sheller (2011), and others have noted that the forces of neoliberal globalization have transformed the ways in which people migrate and move. While more people are on the move, "the world is arguably moving differently, and in more dynamic, complex and trackable ways than ever before" (Sheller 2011, p. 1). In this age of migration unprecedented numbers of people are "facing more challenges of forced mobility and uneven mobility" (p.1), whereby access to mobility has become "the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor" (Bauman 1998, p. 2) among people in the modern world.

Traditionally, migration and citizenship perspectives are applied when thinking about people moving across international borders, resettling, and acquiring certain rights, such as access to free public education, work rights, welfare provisions, residency rights, voting rights, and political protection and representation under the law. Mainstream migration and citizenship perspectives assume place-bound membership as primary, and movement between social points as secondary. Under this logic, people who move—and attempt to move—across international borders are perceived by nation-states and associated guardians of mobility as "secondary or derivative figures with respect to place-bound social membership" (Nail 2015, p. 3). When research uncritically accepts the premise that human mobility is an activity that is naturally subject to the authority of nation-states and their associated border and

citizenship regimes, the findings produced naturalize the nation-state as being the legitimate agent of inclusion and exclusion, while leaving unexamined the power dynamics involved in producing these highly uneven and often contested relationships.

When conceptualizing human mobility through a traditional migration and citizenship lens, static place (the nation-state) and membership (citizenship) are theorized first, followed by the 'migrant', who is conceptualized as lacking both stasis and membership. Under this logic, border crossing mobile people are perceived to be questionable, or risky, at best and threatening, or potential terrorists, at worst. People with 'illegal migrant' status are imagined as lacking not only status and membership, but also lacking the 'legitimate' right to be physically present in a nation-state. As De Genova (2007) rightly observes, "migrant 'illegality,' however, like citizenship itself, is a juridical status. It signifies a social relation to the state; as such migrant 'illegality' entails the production of a pre-eminently *political* identity" (p. 425).

Leaning upon the nation-state construct, people are sorted and classified into various migrant and citizenship statuses, including 'skilled migrant,' 'temporary migrant,' 'permanent resident,' 'refugee,' 'asylum seeker,' 'citizen,' 'non-citizen,' and so on. As these categories are applied to people, they become constructed into various imagined groups, whose statuses are often codified into citizenship and migration legislation. The result is to naturalize legal statuses onto the bodies of people by referring to them as 'citizens,' 'non-citizens,' and so on whose corresponding rights and responsibilities to the nation-state are based upon their citizenship and migration status. In other words, the nation-state is taken as the obvious guardian of who shall (and who shall not) traverse its borders and access various social, economic, and human rights within its borders and citizenship and migrant status are naturalized as the obvious conditions upon which certain people have rights (and certain others do not). Through this widespread nation-state ideology, which is largely perceived as non-ideological, a "ubiquitous division [is] enacted between the more or less 'rightful' members (citizens) and the relatively rightless non-members (aliens)" (De Genova and Peutz 2010, p. 7), or 'non-citizens.' Across many nation-states, immigration authorities have devised more complex bureaucratic and administrative instruments to determine who has the 'legitimate' right to enter a nation-state's territory and what criteria 'non-citizens' must satisfy to access migration and citizenship pathways that allow them to continue to reside, work, and become eligible for welfare and voting rights.

Citizenship is itself an "idea of inclusion [that] relentlessly produces exclusion" (Isin 2005, p. 381). Most migration-oriented research "is still characterized by an underlying assumption that everyone should somehow 'have' citizenship in order to be 'social' and thus receive social/state security' (Raithelhuber et al. 2018, p. 7). Migration scholars, including Raithelhuber et al. (2018) and Bauder (2013), have suggested that even the more critical contributions to migration, citizenship, and border studies are often ideologically contained within a perspective that continues to embrace citizenship. Critical citizenship scholarship often explores how "understandings of citizenship are forged and struggles for full citizenship are waged" (Lister 2007) by excluded groups in various contexts. These studies often attempt to extend the category of citizenship, such as through notions of "inclusive citizenship" (Lister 2007; Kebeer 2005). Certainly, this literature makes valuable contributions by casting a more critical eye on dominant understandings of citizenship and providing tools for marginalized groups to access greater social justice within the confines of the current hegemonic system of nation statehood, citizenship, and border regimes. However, these studies often continue to remain institutionally captured within these dominant paradigms and unwittingly continue to leave the hegemony of international system of nation-states uninterrogated.

The value of being categorized as 'a citizen' rather than 'a non-citizen' is that "the exercise of virtually all rights depends on territorial presence within the state, and only citizens have an unqualified right to enter and remain on state territory" (Macklin and Bauböck 2015, p. 2). At best, 'non-citizens' are treated as 'eternal guests' (Kanstroom 2007) of the nation-state, whose "residence is contingent on a certain standard of behavior and/or adherence to immigration laws" (Anderson et al. 2011, p. 549).

In recent years some nation-states have, or are considering, legislating considerable changes to their immigration and citizenship laws, policies, and practices. Increasingly, these changes to immigration, citizenship, and border protection are portrayed as being 'hard-line' or tough on migrants. As nation-states increasingly adopt hard-line approaches towards those perceived as outsiders, immigration and citizenship policies and practices are reengineered ways that increase the potential for people to become 'non-citizens' and be subjected to deportation and detention powers. To illustrate this point, in 2015 Australia passed legislation that made it possible for nearly half of all Australians to lose their citizenship if they act "inconsistently with their allegiance to Australia" (Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 2015). This broadly-worded legislation has the potential to affect more than 10 million people in the country who have dual citizenship or are 'foreign nationals,' i.e., people with citizenship status who were born overseas.

6. Pressing for Sub-Citizen Solidarity

This paper has explored the experiences of children held in immigration detention in Australia and the United States. However, it should be reiterated that sub-citizenship does not only apply to those in immigration detention. As all people live within the international nation-state system and market fundamentalism continues to expand and intensify, it follows that processes of sub-citizenship affect 'citizens' and 'non-citizens' around the world, but in highly uneven ways. Since the neoliberal globalization paradigm began in the 1980s, nation-states regularly reengineer citizenship, immigration, and border regimes in ways that align with capital accumulation. The result is that 'citizens,' and especially 'non-citizens,' tend to experience these restructures through increased levels of precarity and subordination with respect to nearly all aspects of life, including safety, education, employment, political representation, welfare entitlements, residency, and personal liberty.

As discussed above, neoliberal statecraft works by harnessing the state to reengineer the pathways leading toward citizenship as well as the conditions and tenor of citizenship status to further the goals of market expansion and capital accumulation. On the ground this means all people, regardless of their citizenship status, are increasingly positioned to 'feel the pinch' of market citizenship. Neoliberal statecraft works against the mobility, security, and human rights of people as it reengineers citizenship and migration labels and rules to serve the interest of capital accumulation and market expansion. With respect to people attempting to move away from conditions of human and economic insecurity, statecrafting immigration and border regimes involves intentionally slowing down and disconnecting the movement of people with 'illegal migrant' status. As nation-states harness people into the privatized immigration detention industry capital accumulates, markets expand and violence is directed at children and adults construed as 'illegal.'

Going forward, I suggest that a citizenship/sub-citizen lens could further the goals of migration and mobilities researchers who are interested to investigate how it has come to be that certain groups of people experience various kinds of (im)mobilities and differential access to employment, education, safety, and human rights. More generally, I suggest that the notion of sub-citizenship can be used to bring forth and explicate the connections between neoliberal governance and the political crafting of various kinds of precarity and social inequalities, such as Sparke has shown by demonstrating the link between austerity and people's experiences of ill-health.

Processes of sub-citizenship are primed to expand and intensify with neoliberal reengineering of all aspects of life. As sub-citizenship expands, more people will experience heighted precarity and some will experience extreme forms of dehumanization characterized by various kinds of human rights violations. In many Western states, we can clearly see the intensification of sub-citizenship happening as immigration pathways are increasingly 'skills based' and commodified; citizenship pathways are becoming longer and more contingent on certain codes of behavior; and border regimes are becoming more militarized, privatized, profitable, expansive, and abusive to people deemed to be deportable, detainable, and, increasingly, torturable by the nation-state. These developments should

not be considered as isolated events. Rather, they are structurally linked to the internal neoliberal globalization and the mantra of indefinitely expanding markets.

If there is any hope of slowing down or reversing processes of sub-citizenship, I think it must lie in the recognition that, under the neoliberal globalization paradigm, the state will continue to redraw the tenor of citizenship in ways that align with markets but often work against human mobility and human rights. If this trend continues unabated, sub-citizenship is likely to intensify, expand, and produce greater violence and precarity for 'non-citizens' and for those with more secure 'citizen' status. This article has drawn upon contemporary high-profile cases of children in immigration detention to illustrate what sub-citizenship can look like for those positioned on lower rungs of the sub-citizen hierarchy. Future research is needed to explore people's diverse and localized experiences with processes of sub-citizenship. This scholarship will build greater understandings of what sub-citizenship looks and feels like for diverse groups of people with different citizenship and migrant statuses in various historical and temporal locations. There is much work for future research to explore and map out multiscalar processes of sub-citizenship that cut across and impact upon people through a range of intersections including citizenship and migrant status, socio-economic status, race, religion, gender, sexuality, age, ability, and other markers of difference.

Developing a greater understanding of what sub-citizenship is and how it shapes the everyday worlds of people around the world has the potential to raise radical new forms of solidarity. The concept of sub-citizenship can act as a powerful aid for reimagining entirely new possibilities for human mobility and access to social, economic, juridical, and political rights regardless of status. As we gain more knowledge about how people's lives are actually affected through processes of sub-citizenship, we can build recognition of how sub-citizenship operates and forge a kind of sub-citizen solidarity between 'citizens' and 'non-citizens' alike, regardless of their legal status. Perhaps with increased recognition and knowledge of how sub-citizenship functions to consolidate power and capital for the few at the cost of the many, the world's sub-citizens may begin to collectively call for genuine and universal access to mobility rights, an end to all forms of arbitrary detainment, and ultimately demand 'status for all.'

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Article

"White Diversity": Paradoxes of Deracializing Antidiscrimination

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Abstract: This article questions, at its starting point, the theoretical and epistemic assumptions around the emergence of the concept of (super)diversity, hailed in a growing body of academic literature as marking a "diversity turn". In the second part, it highlights the issues raised by the organizational applications of the diversity paradigm in three main policy domains: migration, urban planning, and antidiscrimination. Finally, emphasizing the development of white-centered diversity conceptions, particularly in the European and French contexts, it invites a closer look at the intertwining of scholarly and practical elaborations of the diversity frame by considering knowledge as practice.

Keywords: diversity; superdiversity; multiculture; critical diversity studies; racism; discrimination; diversity policies

1. Introduction

Among academic circles, interest in the idea of diversity has recently propelled the social sciences to consider a real "diversity turn" in the study of race, ethnicity, pluralistic societies, cultural heterogeneity, and multiculturality. This article shall critically examine these developments by comparing the construction of a "generic diversity" norm (Doytcheva 2008; Clarke 2011; Cooper 2004)—in scholarly debates and throughout politics and public policy—with its specific uses and appropriation by social actors and organizations. To do so, I rely on an extensive literature review that brings together findings from multiple fields of research and analysis within a "globally comparative" approach (Wimmer 2006), and, secondarily, on a longitudinal empirical analysis of European and French policies on diversity and non-discrimination (Doytcheva 2008, 2015), particularly in the workplace. One of the main objectives of this paper will thus be to compare the ideational and conceptual assumptions which underpin the academic "normalization" (Wessendorf 2014) of the diversity paradigm, on the one hand, with some of its major organizational applications on the other. As such, it falls within the scope of *critical diversity studies*, a bourgeoning field that has emerged from the mid-1990s and onwards in reaction to the appropriation of equal opportunities by businesses (Zanoni et al. 2010).

I argue from this position that the organizational applications of the diversity paradigm are marked by a twofold trend: first, an instrumental view of differences (Zanoni et al. 2010), an issue now documented in a growing body of research; second, the trend towards universalization of patterns of prejudice and discrimination, and the rise of "generic diversity" concepts. However, while in theory advocating a more fluid and inclusive society, these concepts and their implementation have turned out to be increasingly prescriptive in practice, as they are wielded by socially powerful groups to the disadvantage of marginalized, mostly racialized communities (Berrey 2005; Mayorga-Gallo 2014).

This is what I refer to in this article as *white diversity*, lending to this notion a dual sense that is, first and foremost, grounded in the progressive elision of race and ethnicity from the space of diversity politics, as it has been notably documented in the case of France (Doytcheva 2008, 2015);

then, the mainstreaming of diversity ideals into a majority-centered discourse about a diversity that is "beneficial to all", with both eventually concurring to reshape, rather than mitigate, raced power structures and boundaries within the very procedures designed to pursue equality.

As such, *white diversity* should not be equated solely with "raceless" diversity, or diversity "without race"—although the mere possibility of the latter deserves particular attention (Doytcheva 2015). It should be linked to other "epistemic maneuvers" (Mueller 2017) by hegemonic whiteness to produce everyday organizational, and structural dominance, based, for instance, on colorblindness and "epistemologies of ignorance" (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Mueller 2017), as well as the enduring institutionalization of racial order by organizations (Ray 2019; see also Seamster and Ray 2018).

Indeed, since its origin in the U.S. Supreme Court decision on affirmative action in university admissions in the late 1970s,[1] which emerged as pivotal in reframing affirmative action, the diversity rationale saw its popularity grow quickly beyond strictly antidiscrimination issues and policies. The term became synonymous with a wider vision of a better society, where no cultural reference is prioritized over another, and where national identity originates from a complicated interweaving of themes from around the world—thus, providing a vehicle for an original and unprecedented articulation of concerns for racial equality, on the one hand, and cultural pluralism, on the other (Hollinger 1995).

From my perspective here, three strands of research have contributed, in recent academic debates, to engage with the diversity frame:[2] first of all, these come from studies in law and society and/or the sociology of organizations, exploring the implementation of policies for equal opportunities (Kelly and Dobbin 1998; Edelman et al. 2001; Edelman 2016; Kalev et al. 2006; Dobbin 2009), whose analyses have converged in highlighting the "managerialization" of antidiscrimination law. Second, work stemming from urban studies of gentrification, which has placed emphasis on the construction and appropriation of social "mixing" practices and norms (Berrey 2005, 2015; Tissot 2011, 2015; Mayorga-Gallo 2019). Finally, a third body of research, focused on the hypothesis of "post-multiculturalism", builds on categories such as *superdiversity* and *multiculture* (Vertovec 2007; Faist 2008; Kymlicka 2015), which I am particularly interested in here.

Although each of these perspectives and bodies of research have specific space and time locations, my approach will be to place them in conversation, at an analytical level, so as to critically engage with some of the theoretical and epistemic assumptions behind the "diversity turn", as well as to give account of the increasingly global mobilities and "circulations" (McCann 2011) of these cognitive and policy frames. By doing so, I make a rather methodological and epistemic use of the global and transnational lens aimed at "adopt[ing] a deliberately de-nationalized perspective, and the methodologies that accompany it, in order to explore and theorize social phenomena across borders, involving non-state actors in a privileged way"(Dahinden 2017, p. 1483; see also Doytcheva 2019).

Within this global perspective, the rather consensual reception of the diversity argument at the beginning of the 2000s in France by actors across the political spectrum was, in the opinion of many analysts, the first point for interrogation (Wieviorka 2008, p. 23). Before this, the language used with regard to these issues (e.g., race and ethnicity) had been more critical or uneasy, while with diversity, it was framed as "neatly positive". The term itself made it possible to think of minorities—whose existence is otherwise denied from a so-called republican stance—in a new "euphemistic, toned-down, and moderate way". (ibid.) Within the French context, the framework of diversity, therefore,

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1. *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978). Considered as the founding act of diversity policies, the *Bakke* case also laid the foundation for a productive vision of diversity that "benefits all", and of race as a "plus-factor".
2. However, this outlook does not have the ambition of being exhaustive. Many other disciplinary applications could be mentioned, ranging from microeconomics to biology (with the notion of biodiversity, for example) or geography and linguistics, around work on multilingualism. Here, I focus on those that, in the field of social sciences, most directly address issues of citizenship and inequality. For more on this point, see also Doytcheva (2017).

did introduce some changes in policy, as in debate (Doytcheva 2010; Helly and Doytcheva 2011; Senac-Slawinski 2012).

On the one hand, its semantic plasticity, due to a kind of indeterminacy in the targeted markers of differentiation—race, gender, age, disability, but also "parentality" or education—has made it into consensual and fostered dissemination, whereas arguments over "the right to be different" in the 1980s, and multiculturalism in the 1990s, have been construed as a national threat. On the other hand, the disposition to individuate differences by referring to individuals rather than groups triggered a less contentious vision on society, giving precedence to romanticized narratives about the "diversification of diversity" (Makoni 2012; Venegas and Lozano 2013; Aptekar 2019; Faist 2008). The emphasis has been placed on the individual with regard to merit, productivity, creativity, but also a kind of labor "flexibility" in terms of remuneration, organization, or leave (Bender 2004).

In the first section of this paper, I shall thus revisit some of the theoretical and methodological arguments that have fueled recent academic interest in the diversity framework and even more so in the neologism of *superdiversity*. From my position here, although superdiversity explicitly relates primarily to the specific topic of 21st century migrations to Europe, it could also be used as a comprehensive analytical tool, aimed at investigating some foundational epistemic changes conveyed by the "diversity turn" (Section 2).

Indeed, as some of its proponents and closest advocates assert, the concept of superdiversity "normalizes" (Wessendorf 2014), within academic arenas, the ever-growing interest in "global diversities". Thus, what are the patterns of novelty it reveals or grasps on issues of migration, integration, belonging, and citizenship? Insofar as its relevance takes shape at the crossroads of social, political, and academic fields, to what extent does it embody not only a new and heuristic analytical tool, but also a successful public policy strategy to deal with these questions? I shall thus, in a second step, supplement the analytical approach to the concept with other sources of critical examination, based, for instance, on empirical scrutiny and public policy analysis that focusses on interventions labeled in diversity terms (Section 3).

Overall, one of the paper's main objectives is to invite a closer look at the intertwining of scholarly and practical, political, or organizational applications of the diversity paradigm. Making use of Foucauldian (Foucault 1980, 2004a, 2004b) conceptualizations of knowledge as practice, it brings together ideational, social, and technical aspects, often siloed in academic discussions, by considering diversity as a *dispositif*—that is, "the system of relations" between "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical and moral propositions" (Foucault 1980, p. 194; see also Matejskova and Antonsich 2015). In what follows, first, I engage the ideational aspects through a conceptual inquiry, based on a cartographic approach. Next, I turn to the actual social aspects of organizational appropriation in three main policy domains. I discuss in the concluding section the technologies of normalization and how they apply to manage and reshape the boundaries of race difference, defining who is worthy of inclusion and who is not.

2. A Diversity Turn in Academia?

When I first engaged in scholarly debates on diversity, my fundamental questions were empirical, focused in particular on the (mis)appropriation of the concept by the corporate world and the top business sector (Doytcheva 2008, 2010). Although the international literature on this topic proved very useful in shedding light on the new and swiftly evolving French and European situations, I felt challenged in my efforts to address these processes by the absence of what would be an articulated, critical social theory—and this, particularly in the light of other parallel or competing frames, which are extensively substantiated, be it normatively or positively, in literature.[3]

3　Such as "recognition", "multiculturalism", "intersectionality", to mention a few.

Thus, it came as a surprise when, a few years later, I was able to pinpoint, if not a comprehensive social theory of diversity, then at least a cluster of theoretical and methodological innovations reflected in the neologisms of superdiversity, multiculture, and post-race. While the first is most directly related to the overall purpose of this paper, there are also important analytical connections and common assumptions between them, which I will expand upon in this section.

By mapping out the field's analytical landscape, I argue how, besides the opportunity to reconfigure debates surrounding multiculturalism, these new conceptualizations concur on a twofold hypothesis around, on the one hand, the individuation and equating of differences, regardless of real group disadvantages; and a universalization of the logic of harm and prejudice—and therefore the need for acknowledgment and protection—on the other, beyond the scope of historically disenfranchised and marginalized communities, to an ever-growing number of scattered-diversity situations.

2.1. Superdiversity and Twenty-First Century Global Migrations

Coined by Vertovec in 2007, the concept of *superdiversity*, despite its heralded novelty, was also construed as part of a broader movement across social sciences. Encompassing facts, narratives, and sets of policies (Berg and Sigona 2013; Faist 2008), it has been increasingly referred to as a diversity "turn" (see also Ahmed and Swan 2006). Mapping the historical and intellectual background of Vertovec's (2007) "new theoretical framework", I first discuss in this section how ideas of fragmentation and increasing individualization within processes of social and cultural differentiation had already been the focus of attention in scholarly debates, particularly in the UK, under the theme of *multiculture* (Back 1994; Hall 1999; Gilroy 2004; James 2015)[4].

According to Hall's (1991, 1999) inaugural writings, a "multicultural drift" became increasingly visible across British society at the end of the 1990s "as a natural and inevitable part of the scene" (Hall 1999, p. 188). Resulting not from some deliberate or planned policy, it took shape in cities and urban areas in particular, where processes of rapid differentiation definitively undermined the "tired notion" of minority, that is, a group of people thought of as homogenously characterized by their "otherness", and opposed to a white, equally homogeneous, majority:

> [The first factor is] rapid differentiation which has been taking place amongst the so-called ethnic minorities, undermining the tired notion of an undifferentiated block of 'ethnic minority' people, homogenously characterised by their 'otherness' (Them), versus an equally homogeneous white 'majority' (Us) [. . .] These fundamentally binary terms in which British race relations have been mapped have essentially collapsed. (Hall 1999, p. 191)

Multiculture, which should not be confused with multiculturalism, applies strongly to these new, multiple social configurations and shifting relations between class, culture, and race or ethnicity (James 2015, p. 18)[5]. It is a process to be negotiated, rather than an outcome expressed in either a collection of statistics or a particular policy (Neal et al. 2017). Borrowing inspiration from Hall's thesis on "new ethnicities", other British scholars committed to anti-essentialism have increasingly argued how, in liberal democracies, multiculturalism is allegedly less and less a matter of groups,

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4   Rather than a sociological specificity—an issue that should not be dismissed but remains outside the scope of this article—I stress here an intellectual and scholarly environment that might have emerged as conducive to the institutionalization of the superdiversity framework; despite or because of the rather "global" proper objectives of the latter from the start. In addition, the important UK scholarship on theories and practices of multiculturalism—although partly skeptical, see Meer and Modood in this section—has offered another important asset for the scholarly reception and acclimatization of these new ideas and debates.

5   Following the definition by James, "This notion of multiculture is conditioned by, but not fixed to, national boundaries and racialised kinship groups. It attends to the global flows of culture and people that have connected the social life of Newham to the rest of the world. This is multiculture in the context of diaspora [. . .] It attends to the performance and citation of diasporic flows in specific locations. It is concerned with how young people's performance of culture today is different from, but related to, what came before" (James 2015, p. 18).

"communities", or minorities, and more about individuals who are scattered and like detached from the usual ontological distinctions along lines of race, gender, age, and ethnicity.

"Reconciled to multiplicity as an end to itself" (Meer and Modood 2009, p. 488), the multiculture perspective encompasses, on the other hand, consumption and lifestyle-based identities. Adopted in an atmosphere of "conviviality" (Gilroy 2004), these do not extend either to the state. In this context of secular multiculturalism, "without groups" (Brubaker 2002), the concept of superdiversity emerges to initially pinpoint the phenomenon referred to as the "new migration", reaching the UK since the early 1990s.

Based on the assessment of a "level" and "kind" of heterogeneity and complexity in migration of an unprecedented scope, superdiversity characterizes the new situation by the dynamic interplay between a large number of "new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified" migrations (Vertovec 2007, p. 1024):

> Britain can now be characterized by 'super-diversity,' a notion intended to underline a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything the country has previously experienced. Such a condition is distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants who have arrived over the last decade.

As noted by Meissner and Vertovec (2015) in a subsequent publication intended to broaden the reach of the concept, although the initial data came from the London area, superdiversity was designed to be definitely multisite in scope. The reason lies first with the processes of global migrations—in the past, migrations involved a large number of people, leaving from and going to just a few countries; nowadays, while the flows are said to have reduced overall, they have, however, much more various origins and destinations. This "diversification of diversity", yielding superdiversity, is not only seen as the result of a larger number of significant variables to be considered—it also implies their dynamic interplay, thus raising unprecedented challenges for both policy and research (Vertovec 2007; Meissner and Vertovec 2015).

Superdiversity is designed to highlight the conjunction of race and ethnicity with a range of discrete categories, such as age, address, legal status, and occupation. These variables are not, of course, new in the studies of migration, nor are many of their correlations. Again, "it is the emergence of their scale, historical and policy-produced multiple configuration" (Vertovec 2007, p. 1026) that calls for conceptual and methodological innovation, namely a multidimensional approach, which moves "beyond the ethnic group" as "unit of analysis" (Glick Schiller et al. 2006, p. 613, quoted in Berg and Sigona 2013).

From this perspective, shifting the analytical lens "from studies of group X in place Y", to studies of locally grounded forms of diversity, enables scholars to acknowledge a "wider range of differences and similarities" between and within groups than conceptual predecessors, such as ethnicity and race did (Berg and Sigona 2013). According to the evocative title of a think-tank report cited to herald these transformations: "You can't put me in a box: Super-diversity and the end of identity politics in Britain" (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah 2010). A (super)diversity-focused approach is therefore hailed in academia as a way to put an end to identarian perspectives and politics, meant to have prevailed before, blaming them for having essentialized subjects and identities, while confining belonging to reified categories.[6]

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[6] It should be noted, however, how this position disregards the work carried out on ethnicity and categorical distinctions from a relational and subjectivist perspective that draws upon the pioneering work by Fredrik Barth (1969) and the important developments it generated on both sides of the Atlantic (Poutignat et al. 2008). For other relational approaches to categorical inequalities, elaborating in particular on Charles Tilly's work—see Castañeda (2017, chp. 1).

2.2. (Super)diversity and Post-Multiculturalism

In fact, the observation, or rather, the intuition of individualized and scattered diversity cannot be said to be entirely new. Throughout the 1990s, and even before, it has been possible to find analyses that grasp the specificity of contemporary situations of multiculturality as "deeply individualized" and "radically decentralized", thus informing "the most intensive" regime of heterogeneity that human societies have "widely experienced" (Walzer 1997; quoted in Doytcheva 2011, p. 12)[7]. Central to social theories of recognition (Taylor 1992; Honneth 2000) is the idea of its profound entrenchment in modern individualism, since struggles for recognition are based on ideals of authenticity and personal achievement, which are specific to modern individuals.

By the end of the 2000s, the framework of superdiversity, along with other efforts to conceptual innovation, could be said to systematize such a view and analysis. As titled by the aforementioned report heralding "the end of identity politics", its invention also enables a timely and appropriate response to the backlash against multicultural policies that had been orchestrated throughout the decade (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

Although the premises of a multicultural backlash have become clear since the late 1990s, initially articulated in the terms women's rights and the defense of "minorities within minorities",[8] the trend indisputably peaked in the repressive and security-focused environment following 11 September 2001. While identifying Muslim communities as a specific threat, many political leaders, including in countries that had never implemented such policies, such as France or Germany,[9] showed themselves eager to declare the "failure" and "end" of liberal multiculturalism (Lentin and Titley 2011; May 2016). Nonetheless, opinions diverged in other national debates, as in the UK, between condemning multiculturalism as an institutional program and acknowledging it as a de facto characteristic of society. As outlined above, everyday processes of cohabitation and interaction had arguably made multiculture an ordinary feature of social life in urban areas and global postcolonial cities around the world, hoping, as Gilroy puts it, that "an interest in the workings of conviviality will take off from the point where 'multiculturalism' broke down" (Gilroy 2004, p. xi).

(Super)diversity also embodies this view. It should be noticed that in a significant part of the literature, both terms—diversity and superdiversity—are used synonymously. Elaborating on superdiversity as the conceptual and sociological category, provided with stronger "analytical power", legitimates this interchangeable use. In the literature, the superdiversity frame has even been construed as an effort towards "normalization", through knowledgeable academic conceptualization, of "commonplace global diversities" (Wessendorf 2014).

The convergence with the concept of multiculture, particularly in urban studies, is explicit, since both make it possible to move beyond the "crisis of multiculturalism".[10] Inherent is the idea that the failure of official multiculturalism has paved the way for a larger expression and recognition of "different types of differences" that structure society. Fluidity, hybridity, and cross-fertilization are keywords to capture these new patterns, combining them with those articulated previously or in parallel in terms of transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and globalization (Faist 2008).

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[7] In U.S. scholarship, in addition to Walzer's reflection on "dispersed diversity", the notion of "diversification of diversity", in its positive acceptance, is to be found notably in Hollinger's (1995) work, although with far fewer ramifications. According to Vertovec (2019) himself, the U.S. forms an exception in the global dynamic of diffusion and enthusiastic reception of the superdiversity concept, which he mainly associates with a stronger "institutionalization" of inter-racial relations.

[8] That is, children, LGBT people, dissidents of all kinds, subordinated to the patriarchal law and the authority of the community embodied by elder men, *cf.* Okin (1999).

[9] See in particular the statements of Nicolas Sarkozy in France: http://www.liberation.fr/france/2011/02/11/sarkozy-estime-que-le-multiculturalisme-est-un-echec_714298; Angela Merkel in Germany: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-germany-multiculturalism-failures; David Cameron in Great Britain: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference (accessed on 30 October 2018).

[10] For an illustration, see the session organized in 2013 at the annual conference of the Association of American Geographers: "Superdiversity and urban multiculture"; see also Aptekar (2019); Back and Sinha (2016); Hall (2017); Neal et al. (2017). For a critical approach: Sealy (2018).

From this perspective, traditional divisions along the lines of race and ethnicity no longer provide a suitable analytical tool to understand urban multiculturality. The turn to diversity is said to entail a change from focusing on "entities", to focusing on "relations". Hence, within migration studies, diversity would hold the potential to do what intersectionality has done within feminist scholarship, that is, conceptualizing the relationships between multiple processes of categorization (Berg and Sigona 2013, p. 349).

2.3. Superdiversity and Intersectionality

Indeed, unlike a multiculturalist analytical framework focusing on "only cultural differences", new conceptualizations of diversity should allow for the integration of other variables, such as class and location, as well as the interest in majorities. Three arguments are roughly outlined to highlight the ways in which the two issues share common concerns (Humphris 2015)—both intersectionality and superdiversity target the interaction between different types of inequality and processes of categorization, in a desire to link the everyday with macro global changes; the political aspect also seems a common pivotal concern, with regard to both power and public policy; finally, when analyzing the conjunction of diverse variables in a particular place, both intersectionality and superdiversity make room for a plurality of strategies for research, without methodological dogma.

Work in critical feminist and intersectionalist scholarship, however, has critically assessed the recent alignment between the two frames. According to Bilge (2013, 2015), a Canadian intersectionalist feminist scholar, what current interest in diversity has conveyed within academic debates is, above all, a logic of depoliticizing intersectionality, and more so its paradoxical academic "normalization". As Bilge writes,

> The mutations of intersectionality and its depoliticizing rest not merely on the economic logics of neoliberalism, but also on its cultural logics, particularly the ability of neoliberalism to speak a complex language of diversity. (2013, p. 408)

This process occurred through the gradual erasure of minority and counter-hegemonic voices that articulated local thinking and activism on intersectionality, long before it was encountered by "disciplinary feminism". The author suggests that the institutional trajectory of intersectionality, particularly in academia, embodies a path similar to that of other concepts originating in the radical feminism of the 1970s. This path of "disciplinary normalization" has stripped the initial political thinking of its impetus and radical vision. Based on the analyses by McRobbie (2009), Bilge claims that post-feminism, which has been dominant since the 1990s, is quite different from the anti-feminism in the 1980s in that it smartly incorporates some elements of feminism, but only to declare it obsolete, and "to be set aside for something better":

> Post-feminism positively draws on and invokes feminism as that which can be taken into account, to suggest that equality is achieved, in order to install a whole repertoire of new meanings which emphasize that it is no longer needed, it is a spent force. (McRobbie 2009, p. 12; quoted in Bilge 2013, p. 407)

As radical feminism has been rendered ineffective and declared out of date, some of its ideas were mainstreamed, such as those that are the most likely to receive strong market value: choice, empowerment, sexual freedom, and self-care. Intersectionality is now undergoing a similar "double entanglement", as certain lines of debate both "hail" and "fail" it (as post-feminism did feminism). According to Bilge, this double entanglement serves important purposes for the circulation of diversity narratives—across the academe, in social movements, and non-profit and corporate organizations. It is in this context that diversity is being compared to, and events conflated with intersectionality, as both are caught in contemporary logics of "branding".

By becoming part of mass culture, both concepts have been hyper-individualized, converted into as many "lifestyles" as "forms of consumption", in tune with surrounding ideologies of neoliberalism.

The aspiration towards universality or generality embodies another critical trend here. In both cases, we face reasoning that tends to retrieve categories built in and by practice, or within specific areas, in order to generalize them and create a "new paradigm". These tendencies are clearly at work in contemporary French and European, but also global definitions of diversity, perhaps in an even more significant way than how they played out for intersectionality. However, the problem with aspiring to generality is its strong racializing burden. The general/specific distinction, argues Bilge, is a racialized one. The assertion that knowledge should move beyond its "particularistic content" to become a general paradigm reproduces this racialization, since it is often only on the basis of the experiences of the majority that we recognize such a capacity to build general knowledge (Bilge 2015, p. 23, see also Ndhlovu 2016). Defined above all as praxis and the "analytic of power", intersectionality, in her view, has little in common with diversity, which has instead been celebrated as "happy talk" (Bell and Hartmann 2007) about a society "without oppression" (Andersen 1999).

However, as I hypothesize here, the historical perspective put forward for the concept of intersectionality could also apply to that of diversity, and even more so to its recent epistemological refinements into super- or hyper-diversity. While heralding significant theoretical and methodological changes, the latter may also appear as concealing a retreat from stronger conceptions of justice. As Will Kymlicka ironically states on the subject, it may seem difficult to imagine "what would be the source of solidarity in such a world of liquid mobility" (Kymlicka 2015, p. 13)[11]. Hence, along with Bilge's "whitening of intersectionality", should we not consider the even more paradoxical whitening of diversity?

3. Diversity Policies: Education, Immigration, Corporations

Pioneering research in urban scholarship gives us some initial thoughts in this direction. By exploring the construction and appropriations of diversity, and before *mixité* (mixing), rationales in gentrified neighborhoods of Paris and Boston, Tissot (2011, 2015) shows how these are used primarily by wealthy households as an object of distinction, in a Bourdieusian sense (Bourdieu 1979), thus enabling the incorporation of some types of otherness, yet not all of them, in a logic of stratification and recomposition of the elites. Indeed, the "ethos of diversity" poorly hides the repulsion that some minorities face. Black and Latinx people, particularly, continue to be stigmatized, since their greater visibility in the city still triggers fear and anxiety. Although there is nothing new about this "racial fear", unprecedented means have been invented in "mixed" neighborhoods to deal with it—gentrifying diversity shapes classed and classifying practices that powerfully organize and redesign boundaries between groups. As also shown by Berrey's (2005, 2015) work in Chicago, the diversity trope, while less useful for low-income minorities, is strongly embraced by middle- and upper-class majorities that wield it at the expense of marginalized groups. By allowing them to construct a positive identity as open-minded and accepting of difference—or organizations as innovative and cutting-edge—it may help "maintain the social and legal benefits of Whiteness" (Mayorga-Gallo 2019), in the absence of commitment to stronger organizational change.

This brief overview of urban research—where diversity is not only a matter of ideology, but also a practical fact—allows us to move into the second, more empirical part of this study, aimed at questioning the social and political practices that align with efforts to terminological innovation. Indeed, another way of putting concepts under scrutiny is to compare them with policies they have informed. In this section, I outline two analytically distinctive sets of concerns that have been leveled against organizational applications of the diversity paradigm in a growing body of academic literature,

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[11] "Some people believe that the very distinction between permanent and temporary migration is breaking down and that we will soon be living in a world of "superdiversity" with a multitude of legal statuses that are neither wholly temporary nor wholly permanent, but rather have varying degrees and levels of conditionality and precariousness (. . .) I am far from sure that such a world is desirable. I am even less sure what would be the source of solidarity in such a world of liquid mobility". (ibid.)

to which I add a third one, stemming from my own work on corporate diversity procedures and stressing the notion of "white diversity". Although these strands of criticisms can be associated with three main policy domains—that is, education, immigration, and employment—as I will propose for the sake of clarity, they should also be construed across these areas, in an ideal-typical way. In addition, I suggest a temporal or analytical gradation between them, arguing that, while some arguments are better known and well-documented, others have been less systematically addressed. Thus, such are the intended contributions of my inquiry, stressing in particular the notion of "white diversity", and drawing, in addition to the extensive literature review, on a comprehensive qualitative dataset that I have collected between 2006 and 2016, mainly but not exclusively on French and EU corporate policies.[12]

3.1. Diversity as Liberal Meritocracy

Unlike other approaches to inequalities that resonate more in terms of collective regulation—such as gender equality or parity measures in France, minority or space-based affirmative action—diversity would be a primarily liberal and individualistic philosophy (Bender 2004). Emphasizing merit, productivity, and individual potentialities, it downplays more collective and structural sources of inequality and subordination. Instead of correcting injustices or redressing wrongs, diversity is about supporting those who contribute to the performance of the organization—with shared benefits for *all*, as under Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in the landmark *Bakke* case.[13]

In the opinion of many analysts, the diversity debate is therefore in line with the political agenda and a certain neoliberal "condition", that can be described, following the analyses by Feher (2007, 2018), as the aspiration for everything to "gain in value" and "appreciate". While the figure of the "free worker" was regarded as the main *dispositif* of subjectivity in the capitalist era, "human capital" (Becker 1964) constitutes its counterpart for neoliberalism, wherein individuals are primarily construed as a "stock of competencies", aspiring to appreciate. In this rationality of "self-capitalization" (Feher 2007)—ubiquitous today not only in work and marketplaces, but also in education and culture at universities—the diversity doctrine espouses a pacified and productive vision of a society that is built in terms of merit, performance, excellence, or exemplarity. To sum it up in a deliberately oriented way, it is "an inclusion [by the market] without solidarity" (Kymlicka 2015). While the whiteness of liberal meritocracy and its involvement with the justification of social and racial hierarchies are increasingly debunked (Kehal 2019; Littler 2018).

By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the next decade, the analysis of this instrumental rationale of diversity as excellence, collective merit, and enrichment has been predominantly articulated in terms of "old wine in new bottles" (Kelly and Dobbin 1998; Dobbin 2009; Oudghiri and Sabbagh 1999). Pioneering research from U.S. scholars of organizations highlighted that the new rationale for equal opportunity had not disrupted academic and corporate practices towards women and minorities—practices that were shaped by the antidiscrimination legislation of the 1960s and the case law of the 1970s. The interest in diversity takes part above all in this context of a logic of strategic concealment, that allows organizations to create room for maneuvering vis-à-vis the judiciary and the federal administration, especially as, since the 1980s, they have been increasingly anxious to liberalize a system perceived as too rigid.

However, in recent work, a change appears to be taking place within these grids of interpretation. It goes towards a better understanding of what would be the alienating and dehumanizing nature

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[12] This includes a comprehensive dataset of more than 80 in-depth sociological interviews (N = 86) conducted with public officials, political and civil society leaders and organizations, professional associations, activist networks; backed with ethnographic work and biographical accounts by minority students and job candidates mentored through diversity schemes.

[13] Considered as the founding act of diversity policies, U.S. Supreme Court *Bakke* decision (1978) has been also foundational for a productive and instrumental vision of differences that "benefit all", as well as of race as a "plus-factor". This perspective since is upheld in *Grutter v. Bollinger* (2003).

for minorities of this solely meritocratic and instrumentalistic vision, as well as the risk of additional marginalization it may entail for them (Alon 2015; Berrey 2015; Warikoo 2016). Hence, the criticism here no longer focuses on diversity as a norm or political category, but rather questions the effect that the arguments mobilized in its defense have on the people these policies should benefit, in theory.

To put it briefly, while resting on an instrumental rationale of "gaining value" and excellence through collective merit and enrichment, we are witnessing attempts to transition from an effort to measure "the benefits of diversity" to that of quantifying "the cost of discrimination".[14] The fiction of collective enrichment indeed poorly conceals its differential appropriation within organizations: does the added value that elite universities gain from their diversity policies not return overwhelmingly to their white majority students? Moreover, as highlighted by a recent wave of campus protests that have marked the news in the U.S., but also in Great Britain—underscoring remaining barriers to the recruitment of both racialized students and faculty—besides a backlash against persistent discrimination, there is also a "long-lasting frustration" with these problems not being acknowledged and addressed appropriately in the public sphere.[15] Indeed, the enrichment of white students as main rationale for enrolling minorities contributes to greatly undermining the foundational principles of justice of those policies.

In France, according to Anne Revillard, who analyzes a recent government campaign aimed at promoting "universal accessibility", the praise of accessibility which is "beneficial to everyone" (i.e., deliberately framed from the point of view of the able-bodied majorities) leads to additional risks of marginalization and exclusion for those with disabilities. Their experience is thus once again being denied, as their voices are diminished or erased. This is especially the case as the awareness campaign, launched in autumn 2016, marks a "sad anniversary"—that of a retreat from the "right to accessibility" instated by the French law of 11 February 2005. From "collective responsibility" and "democratic imperative", the aim of universal accessibility has been transformed into "utility" for a public that it does not primarily target. However, writes the sociologist, "what is at stake here is not the comfort of the able-bodied, but first and foremost the citizenship of people with disabilities".[16]

Highlighted in these few examples, we see the significance of one of the facets that I associate with the notion of *white diversity*, namely the progressive embedding of these ideals into a majority-centered discourse; granting advantage, under the guise of generic rights and universality, to those whose lives are patterned in the mold of the privileged groups (Clarke 2011). As a result, I will argue in the next sections, the cursor seems to be sliding today within public policy analysis, from the critique of the status quo towards a more thorough understanding of the perverse and counterproductive effects fostered by means of commodification of these concerns. It is no longer merely the neoliberal doxa and its depoliticizing effects that are pointed out, but the very real risks of corrupting these frames of action to the direct disadvantage of groups and communities they are supposed to protect from the start (*cf.* Section 3.3 below).

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[14] As it has been also recently the case in France with the report by *France Stratégie* (2016), a public agency under the authority of the Prime Minister, which has been charged to assess "the economic cost of discrimination": http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/cout-economique-discriminations (accessed on 15 October 2019). See also upstream the survey carried out by the Think-Tank Different with public funding: Virginie Martin, Marie-Cécile Naves. 2015. *Talents gâchés* [Spoiled talents]. Editions de l'Aube: 2015.

[15] Sigal Alon, "How Diversity Destroyed Affirmative Action", *The Nation*, 16 December 2016. The column follows the debates around *Fisher v. University of Texas*, which goes back to the Supreme Court for the second time in three years to establish the constitutionality of diversity policies in university admissions. As reflected in debates relayed by the press on this occasion: "If diversity is the only justification for affirmative action programs at university, what is the justification for diversity?" The latter seems to have changed considerably since the Bakke's Supreme Court decision in 1978, considered as the founding act of these policies (Alon 2016).

[16] Revillard (2015), "Plus belle la vie pour les personnes handicapées?" *AlterEco*, 4 November 2015.

3.2. Diversity as Immigration Governmentality

The case becomes all the more clearer with the second series of criticisms that coalesce with those exposed above to underline how these developments blend into a parallel, yet related, trend towards reinforcing color-blindness, the refusal to take specific actions targeted at marginalized and racialized communities, within a new global era showily declared "post-racial" (Goldberg 2015). Hence, while its contribution to a non-essentialist approach of intercultural and intergroup relations remains to be assessed so far, the turn to diversity seems indeed to strongly resonate with a particular, ideologically marked, context of reinforced colorblind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2003); translating into both an increased stigmatization and mistrust against groups assigned by religion, skin color, or origin—such as Muslims, migrants, Roma, among others—and the denial or downplaying of racism and race in everyday life and structural inequalities, as well.

In France, recent events have revived the idea of removing the term "race" from the Constitution. Honoring its promise of the 2012 electoral campaign, president Hollande stood by a law that was approved by the French parliament in the first reading, without successfully completing the whole legislative process. The legislative erasure of race thus intervened more recently, in 2018, within a bill to reform the Constitution.[17] Elsewhere, the period following the beginning of the 2000s saw a backward surge, by different means, of multicultural and differentialist ideologies to the benefit of an announced "return of assimilation" (Brubaker 2001), "the end of race" (Gilroy 2000), then the triumph, although short-lived, of post-racialism (Goldberg 2015).

Innovatively, sociological analyses concentrated throughout the decade of the 2000s on how central democratic values of "respect", "tolerance", or gender equality[18] have been recast into a *civilizational discourse*—thus, reintroducing with force, through a racialized rhetoric of otherness, the boundaries they were supposed to fight (Brown 2008; Fassin 2010). According to Brown, the resurgence of tolerance at the end of the 20th century—in late liberal, multicultural democracies—provides a blatant example of this. In an ever more culturally and economically integrated Euro-Atlantic world, the term has been uncritically promulgated by actors across the political spectrum and prescribed as the "appropriate bearing" towards a variety of communities (immigrants, Roma, LGBT) and concerns. From a means of protecting civil peace in the time of the Reformation, it has translated into a generalized metaphor for "the good society yet to come". (Brown 2008, pp. 5–6).

However, above all, in the aftermath of 9/11, tolerance as a domestic governmentality producing and regulating ethnic, religious, racial, and sexual subjects has been supplemented as a civilizational discourse, distinguishing Occident from Orient, liberal from non-liberal regimes, "free" from "unfree" peoples, "the tolerant, and the civilized on one side, and the fundamentalist, the intolerant, and the barbaric on the other":

> [These new meanings of tolerance] include the legitimation of a new form of imperial state action in the twenty-first century, a legitimation tethered to a constructed opposition between a cosmopolitan West and its putatively fundamentalist Other. Tolerance thus emerges as part of a civilizational discourse that identifies both tolerance and the tolerable with the West, marking nonliberal societies and practices as candidates for an intolerable barbarism. (ibid, p. 6)

Consistent with these analyses, an emerging body of research in the early 2000s stressed the risks for diversity policies of being caught within the same racialized rhetoric of otherness, drawing on the strong parallel observed between the spread of these concerns, in Europe and France, and the upfolding of highly repressive policies on migration and "security" (Fassin 2008; Bernardot and Doytcheva 2010;

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[17] Although the debate sparked in France as early as the beginning of the 1990s: see the special issue by the journal *Mots*, "Without distinction of ... race", no. 33, December 1992.
[18] On the language of "gender equality" and "sexual democracy" as a means of Western immigration and integration governmentality (Fassin 2010).

Lentin and Titley 2011). While the creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and National Identity by President Sarkozy in 2007 was the cornerstone and flagship of this development in France, it has in fact translated into a multitude of security and freedom-curtailing measures, which, first aimed at immigrants, were commonly construed as "state xenophobia".[19] Yet, the goals of diversity and those of strict control over immigration and "security" can only draw a salient contradiction, and even ground the legitimate suspicion of a reciprocal instrumentalization. In words borrowed from interviews that I conducted with institutional and political leaders in the same period, valuing the diversity of French society would also be a means of protecting it against the economic necessity of new immigration, and the risks that it supposedly entails (Doytcheva 2015; see also Hall 2017).

A more explicit articulation of this nexus may be found in Hall's (Hall 2017, p. 1562) recent critical address of the superdiversity concept,[20] which she argues should be moored more strongly to a "brutal migration milieu" and the "liberal paradox", understood as the profound discrepancy of how "Western capitalism both refutes and requires migration". These politics of contradiction and ethos of subordination are invested in the fortification of the contemporary European "punitive border complex". Thus, the processes of diversity-making must be reconnected to its effects—by relying heavily on discrimination, before and after the border complex, the liberal paradox is said to actively produce the "diversification" of people across space.

In France, tracing the genealogy of diversity policies based on a media analysis, Mattelart and Hargreaves (2014) show how these policies focus not only on the integration of minorities, but also, and no less importantly, on the "protection of security". The authors trace the origin of this ambivalence back to the early 1970s, and the policies then grounded in interculturality, aimed at contributing to the social promotion of immigrants, on the one hand, while maintaining them "in the knowledge of their culture of origin with a view to a possible return", on the other. In my work on French corporate policies (see point 3 below), I have highlighted the tendency by social actors to construe diversity selectively, importantly dismissing race and ethnicity, but also migration, to the advantage of other, perceived as more socially meaningful status category—such as sex, disability, and age. "Diversity is not for strangers and even less for illegal aliens; hardly it is for immigrants, nor even for their children who, just like veiled women, often tend to get excluded from it" (Doytcheva 2015, p. 178).

The relation to religion and particularly to Islam offers here another immediate illustration and a very compelling case. While the "traditions" of social Catholicism do indeed irrigate certain networks supportive of the corporate diversity agenda in France (Helly and Doytcheva 2011), diversity of religious beliefs is hardly targeted by organizations, neither is it fully accepted, or only on the condition of being rendered invisible through job segregation or technology.[21] The discourse by diversity actors, therefore, showcases huge ambivalences. While displaying in theory liberal stances on economic and managerial issues, their attitude turns out to be far more conservative, if not assimilationist and restrictive, when it comes to political ones—such as those relating for instance to immigration, religion, or *laïcité* (secularism).

3.3. Corporate Diversity at the Risk of Its Ideological Reversal

As evidenced by the last few examples, there is a palpable risk, attested by empirical evidence, of prescriptive and injunctive diversity conceptions, whereby the *praise for diversity* becomes the praise for "good diversity", which importantly allows to distance all others—race or faith diversity,

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[19] See for example Olivier (2008), "Xénophobie d'Etat", *L'Humanité*, 24 January 2008.
[20] Part of an "anniversary issue", intended to place "classical papers in context".
[21] The most blatant example here is provided by fieldwork with a call centre (Doytcheva 2018b). While employers in the sector use the argument of "some kind of tolerance" (e.g., towards the wearing of the veil) as an employees' retention scheme within a tight job market, at the same time, they have the usual practice of asking employees to change names—from Fatima to Marie—so as not to shock "clients' sensibilities". See also, Léa Balage, "La fin des discriminations au travail, c'est pour quand?" [When will the end of discrimination at work be achieved?], https://blogs.mediapart.fr/edition/les-invites-de-mediapart/article/170516/la-fin-des-discriminations-au-travail-c-est-pour-quand (accessed on 15 October 2019).

migration. The shift from presumably comprehensive, or "generic diversity" (Caradec and Doytcheva 2008) categorizations towards normative injunctions to "good diversity", on a case-by-case basis and depending on the context, has indeed proven to be particularly relevant in France, where nation-building processes have been long grounded in the refusal of minorities and ethnic differentiation (Castañeda 2018, 2019).

Since the early 2000s and under the aegis of new EU legislation, France has gradually built up a legal and policy antidiscrimination framework, with companies being among the very first actors to translate these new legal provisions into categories of organizational change. In a gesture of "mimetic isomorphism" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) with procedures set up by the world's leading actors, they embraced the diversity rationale, and in particular that of the "business case", in a seemingly autonomous way, through a wide range of voluntary commitments, materializing in measures such as charters, policy statements, trophies, and quality marks.

However, as I have shown elsewhere (Doytcheva 2009, 2010), although initially centering issues of race and ethnic discrimination, corporate initiatives were marked from the outset by a twofold trend. On the one hand, it stemmed from a rationale of *decategorization*, thus following the path set by EU and French legislations to enact the "legal universality" of non-discrimination, with no less than 25 protected classes under current French law.[22] On the other hand, in this context of swift and almost unlimited expansion of the concept, "tactical choices" were discretionarily endorsed by organizations, as to the ways of categorizing diversity and discrimination.[23]

Official discourses around a "global" or "generic diversity" norm have thus been effectively coupled with informal practices, based on local arrangements and the statement of "priorities" by each organization. Although highly selective, these tactics nevertheless converged to de facto dismiss issues of race and racism from the space of diversity politics, as those concerns were commonly construed as a matter of "lower priority", or that which must be "pushed" and "should follow"—thus giving direct advantage to other, perceived as more socially meaningful status categories, namely sex, disability, and age.

Over time, however, and drawing on a longitudinal analysis, these variable-geometry commitments and diversity *à la carte* tactics—initially thought of as transitional and temporary due to the novelty of these concerns—eventually solidified into more binding visions about "good" and "bad" diversities, with the latter—such as faith diversity along with that of race—being definitively banned from corporate plans (Doytcheva 2015, 2018b).

This shift from *comprehensive* to *selective* and ultimately *normative* diversity concepts, yielding the specter of threatening and undesirable otherness, has thus effectively contributed to reinscribe racist structures and boundaries at the heart of procedures heralding diversity. Unlike colorblindness, *white diversity* reinscribes discrimination within purportedly race-conscious frames and policies, designed precisely to right its wrongs. Yet, expanding on Streiff-Fénart's (2013) analysis, these procedures seem to have become increasingly divisive, drawing a line between minorities perceived as "assimilable", and other, often racialized, communities who continue to be construed as a "threat". As also pointed out by Lentin and Titley (2011), against the backdrop of consolidated

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[22] This increase is also manifest at the EU level. From six categories initially provided for in Article 13 of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which is the founding act of EU legal and policy framework against discrimination (i.e. "racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation"), the protected classes rose to 17 only a few years later in the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

[23] Exploring the procedures of their justification, I have shown three main rationales used by companies to selectively categorise diversity: a tactical reasoning, first, predicated on the "most numerous" categories (e.g. sex and age), which are expected to "trigger" the diversity action plans; a participatory approach, second, based on democratic legitimacy and, according to which, since these commitments are voluntary they should "speak to the employees", perhaps even "touch their heartstrings" (which benefits disability); finally, expertise, which is often self-expertise (based on brainstorming, internal polls), and actually allows for the dismissal of racism, commonly construed as a matter of "lower priority", or which needs to be "pushed" and ultimately "should follow".

neoliberal capitalism, where market-based rationales have been given unprecedented legitimacy, the distinction between "good" and "bad diversity" recovers the very expression of racism.

To what extent then, and how does the new frame of diversity, and more specifically in France, where one should not lose sight of the relative novelty and fragility of these concerns, fit in these trends? Or, can the generic and euphemistic dispositions that characterize it be apprehended as a positive qualification strategy, due to its implicit nature, since particularistic designations often trigger the harmful risk of backlash and resentment, or that of becoming in their turn a source of additional stigmatization?

While it is obviously difficult to unequivocally answer such general questions, empirical approaches have the clear advantage of uncovering the blind spots and contradictions triggered by processes of an extreme differentiation across diversity politics (Cooper 2004). Paired with what legal scholars have termed "the universal turn in protections" (Clarke 2011), these processes entail the risk of not only watering down protections, but also of conveying patterns of discriminatory inclusion, likely to privilege those whose lives somehow "approximate the dominant norm".

This is what I have termed in regard to French settings and borrowing from Michel Foucault's words, a *normalized diversity* (Doytcheva 2018a), or *diversity through normalization* (Alaktiff and Doytcheva 2018), namely one which is willing to "domesticate" and "naturalize" some forms of difference and otherness, but not all of them, at the risk of reinforcing mechanisms that perpetuate, rather than mitigate, bias and discrimination.

Beyond the case of France, however—which could be a "textbook" one—recent international research in law and society and sociology of organizations displays convergent results (Kirby et al. 2015; Krieger et al. 2015; Berrey et al. 2017). By considering the U.S. situation, the authors show how corporate diversity procedures can prove to be not only more or less (in)effective to combat discrimination, but are now being hijacked and subverted to the very disadvantage of the groups they were perceived as valuing. Relying on communication and other "soft-law" instruments—quality certifications, trophies, and awards—they are used by employers as a means of legitimizing unfair procedures at work (Kirby et al. 2015). In court, judges, who are increasingly deferring to managerial authority, consider the simple existence of an institutionalized organizational structure to infer non-discrimination: "good practices", "diversity committees" or diversity officers afford organizations with greater legitimacy, and are even taken as evidence for fairness and equity (Krieger et al. 2015; Berrey et al. 2017). In an unprecedented way, when cases are brought before the courts, these policies turn against the employees, by substantially reducing their chances of succeeding in litigation, while making employers more likely to prevail. Similar to what I have observed in fieldwork with French corporations, procedures put in place against discrimination can even overlap with situations of direct discrimination, under the guise of preventing or correcting them.

Emphasizing the standardization of HR procedures, French professional pro-diversity initiatives similarly appear to conceal the reproduction of patterns of systemic and, not rarely, direct discrimination. This mostly occurs in the handling of variables deemed "operational", "only technical", and therefore "neutral", such as *employabilité* (employability), *competence* (competency), *savoir-être* (which could be imperfectly translated into soft skills), and even that of *personalité* (personality). While proving hugely racialized (Ray 2019), these are nonetheless given center stage today in corporate efforts towards diversity, while also infusing more broadly the "competency management" that accompanies the French neoliberal rearticulation of *salariat* (Bouteiller and Gilbert 2005). Such practical categories, however, and the efforts they imply towards standardization, poorly hide and cannot exhaust the primarily social, relational, and power-laden dimensions in the valuation of individual skills. While the figure of the "responsible employee", an actor of his own "employability", is spreading, if this employee is in a strong position in the labor market, their job security seems to be assured; and if, by contrast, they are in a vulnerable one, they would instead very quickly become marginalized or excluded.

Ironically though, routine HR selection devices and tools are now being rebranded in diversity terms, without any reflexivity by professional actors to critically unpack their own positionality.

In French skill management styles, in particular, the instrumental and individualistic conception attached to *employabilité*—which experts trace back to the late 1980s—has begun to spoil and corrode the diversity standards and practices that were moored to it, thus re-encoding social inequality within *dispositifs* designed for making fair categorical decisions about individuals. Yet, as legal scholar Lochak (2003) puts it, once the practical impossibility of eradicating discrimination through market-oriented categories and interventions is assessed, there is no alternative but to avert and break free from them, whenever market rationales hinder that of equality.

4. Conclusions

In one of his first lectures at the *Collège de France*, in 1978–1979, Foucault (2004a, 2007) made an important distinction between two different forms of *normalization*—one of a set of techniques to exert power and control that are core to modern governmentality. Incidentally, he coined a new term to highlight the distinctions between two competing notions, namely *normation,* as opposed to *normalization*. Indeed, how does one normalize, he asked, in different societies and regimes? In disciplinary rationality—based on the repression of any deviation from the norm—normalization should be understood as the search for an "optimum". "Disciplinary normalization", he explains, consists in first positing a model considered as optimal in terms of a certain result, and then trying to get people, movements, and actions to conform with it. In this regime, the norm comes first, with "the normal being precisely that which can conform to the norm":

> In the disciplines, one started from a norm, and it was in relation to the training (*dressage*) carried out in reference to the norm that the normal could be distinguished from the abnormal […] The normal being precisely that which can conform to the norm (ibid., p. 62) Here, instead, we have a plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves of normality, and the operation of normalization consists in establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality and [in] acting to bring the most unfavourable in line with those that are more favourable […] The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it. (ibid., p. 63)

That is why disciplinary normalization is better understood as "normation"—the process of setting up a norm intended to be replicated—in order to underline the primary and fundamental character of the norm. But in (neo)liberal governmentality, centered on "apparatus of security", how does normalization work? In this governmentality regime, argues Foucault, normalization is far less about issuing and imposing a general norm; instead, it will primarily consist in plotting the normal and the abnormal on the basis of an empirical "study of normalities", where certain distributions are considered to be, "if you like, more normal than others". These distributions will serve as the norm. By bringing into play "different distributions of normality" in relation to each other, the operation of normalization will consist in realigning the less unfavorable with those perceived as more favorable. In this regime, the detection of the normal comes first, and "the norm is deduced from it". As Foucault further differentiates:

> There is and should not fail to be a fundamental relationship between the norm and the law, and that every system of law is related to a system of norms […] but this normativity intrinsic to the law should not be confused with normalization […] Techniques of normalization develop from and below a system of law, in its margins and maybe even against the law. (ibid., p. 57)

Ironically though, the normalization of diversity in neoliberal times does not rhyme with its imposition as a general norm (or not only), but equally with what would be its internal transformation towards "good" or "normal diversity", that is, perceived as socially meaningful, desirable, acceptable, suitable, or favorable. This ultimately meant, in the case of France but also beyond, in the context of recent EU policy initiatives on antidiscrimination, diversity without race, or what I have termed here "white diversity".

Recent theoretical advocacy of the frame of (super)diversity, intended to mark the epistemic and political "normalization" (Wessendorf 2014) of the global diversity doctrine thus appears to have importantly neglected the historical basis, severity, and foundations of racism and the pervasiveness of power structures and hierarchies of whiteness. These have translated into the capacity of majorities to invade and appropriate these normative spaces by speaking a complex language of inclusion and vulnerability. Borrowing from Foucault's words, within neoliberal governmentality, whereby an "average normality" is brought into play by presenting it precisely as normal or favorable, this has led to the definition, as in the case of France, of what is, in my sense, a normalized diversity, characterized by both the timely circumvention of antidiscrimination law and the downplaying of certain patterns of prejudice, particularly along lines of race, faith, and ethnicity. In order to give a theoretical account of these phenomena, it would be interesting to link their analysis to classical sociological theories on inequality reproduction, particularly when it occurs within institutions that are considered as paradigmatically meritocratic and egalitarian (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970). Although the classist biases of notions of liberal meritocracy as a technology to manage and selectively include differences have been importantly uncovered and deconstructed, this work is still to be done with respect to race and ethnicity, and even more so in presumably universalistic and colorblind contexts, such as France and the corporate world.

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Article

Legitimate Exclusion of Would-Be Immigrants: A View from Global Ethics and the Ethics of International Relations

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Abstract: The debate about justice in immigration seems somehow stagnated given that it seems justice requires both further exclusion and more porous borders. In the face of this, I propose to take a step back and to realize that the general problem of borders—to determine what kind of borders liberal democracies ought to have—gives rise to two particular problems: first, to justify exclusive control over the administration of borders (the problem of legitimacy of borders) and, second, to specify how this control ought to be exercised (the problem of justice of borders). The literature has explored the second but ignored the first. Therefore, I propose a different approach to the ethics of immigration by focusing on concerns of legitimacy in a three-step framework: first, identifying the kind of authority or power that immigration controls exercise; second, redefining borders as international and domestic institutions that issue that kind of power; and finally, considering supranational institutions that redistribute the right to exclude among legitimate borders.

1. Introduction

For some exclusionist liberal political theorists, the conception of social justice among residents and citizens provides reasons for excluding would-be immigrants, so borders should remain closed until we have enough reason to admit someone (Miller 2016; Wellman and Cole 2011). However, some other inclusionist theorists believe that justice requires just the opposite: porous borders that remain open until we have sufficiently strong reason to exclude someone (Carens 2013; Kukathas 2005; Wellman and Cole 2011). This seems insufficient if we have to believe that social justice may require both inclusion and exclusion at the same time.

In spite of this, I propose to take a step back to the domain of global ethics and the ethics of international relations. From there, if distributive justice matters, then maybe the permission to exclude would-be immigrants should be distributed, not from the point of social justice alone but from the holistic view of global ethics. However, I arrive there following three steps of analysis. In the first stage, instead of asking what justice requires from our border institutions, I suggest asking first a logically prior question: At the level of our most basic moral principles, what kind of authority is it permissible that borders exercise? This, I believe, is the question of legitimacy. Secondly, we realize that borders are not only lines in the ground or the limits of our institutions but also institutions themselves. Borders are the institutions which carry out the authority of border controls over would-be immigrants. These sui generis institutions are not only domestic and, therefore, subject to standards of distributive justice for residents and citizens but also international and subject to standards of international legitimacy that should take the interest of outsiders into account. This account of borders allows to weigh together

social justice and global ethics, so it may show us under what conditions it will be morally permissible for borders to prioritize the interest of residents and citizens over the interest of would-be immigrants. Thirdly, once we draw the contours of the legitimate use of border authority, we can again ask whether it is appropriate to distribute the right to exclude immigrants according to standards of distributive international justice by means of an international border institution.

This approach has the potential to deflate the tension between inclusionists and exclusionists because the three stages may identify the kind of stances of border authority we typically use to protect relationships of justice between citizens and residents that are nonetheless morally impermissible from the point of view of international legitimacy and that, therefore, should be avoided. Here, I do not provide a substantive answer to the problem of what morality, all-things-considered, requires from immigration controls. Neither will I make a substantive case for exclusion or inclusion. Instead, I merely outline the contours of an alternative way to frame the problem by assembling three somewhat different approaches. I identify the problem by means of a critical interpretation: the conflation of concerns of justice and concerns of legitimacy may hinder the incorporation of the interest and rights of potential immigrants in the justification of immigration controls. This interpretative thesis is supported by evidence gathered by a conceptual analysis of the conceptions of legitimacy and justice. Finally, my three-step approach employs the deontological approach of applied ethics, global ethics, or the ethics of international relations.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I will explain how the literature about justice in immigration has reached an impasse by distinguishing between exclusionist and inclusionist accounts of immigration policy and the conflictive requirements of justice in each case. In Section 3, I will distinguish legitimacy and justice as two different virtues or evaluations of political institutions and how they are intermingled in what we call political justice in the postrawlsean literature. Section 3, in turn, shows how political justice is embedded in the conventional view of the ethics of immigration. This is important because, while contemporary political theory often takes them as the same evaluation, there is a marked tendency in the exclusionist literature of justice in immigration to insist that what justice for citizens and residents requires from our border controls is also a legitimate use of power over outsiders. I also try to explain how this is wrong in the sense that exclusionist justifications of immigration controls normally beg the question by assuming that borders are legitimate and that states have a legitimate claim over their territories. In Section 4, I lay down my three-step approach to problems of the ethics of immigration. I explain how a political conception of legitimacy may be applied to the authority that borders typically exercise. I also scratch my conception of borders and the different sources from where border institutions may draw legitimacy from. Hopefully, my "alternative new normative start" provides a more coherent view of what morality requires from our border institutions. Finally, in Section 5, I deal with two possible objections to my three-step approach.

From the outset, some clarifications are needed. Firstly, I am only concerned with borders of liberal democracies. This is because the institutions of these kind of states are permeable to moral principles such as human rights, equal citizenship, and some form of equality of opportunity. Elsewhere, I have argued how the moral character of liberal democracies implies that borders, too. should be understood as institutions permeable to these kind of principles (Camacho 2016). There is, of course, a more general narrative that tells us about how states and borders came about (Castañeda and Schneider 2017), but there is also a narrative that tells us how states and borders may change. This paper is about the second kind of narratives and issues as we may find them in the liberal ethics of international relations.

Secondly, among would-be immigrants, there are several categories with different needs and dissimilarities (Miller 2016). For example, most exclusionist writers believe that refugees have a very strong moral claim to be admitted, grounded in their most basic needs (Miller 2016; Carens 2013; Wellman and Cole 2011). Presumably, each case may offer its own reasons to limit or expand the right to exclude. However, I worry that, in difficult cases, most of the normative work is performed by the vulnerability and urgency of the case and not by the relationship between citizens, residents, land, institutions, and potential immigrants. It seems to me that a good approach to the ethics of immigration

needs to first make an account of that complex relationship between those elements above and, after that, to work out the difficult cases. Therefore, by holding constant further complicating factors, I wish to isolate the normative core of claims to exclude (Fine and Sangiovanni 2015). In order to do that, I will focus only on the claim to admission and the interest of exclusion that is typically recognized as the weakest: would-be immigrants who wish to be admitted because they want different opportunities to work, to acquire skills, or to engage in forms of culture or religion or ways of caring about others that are not available in their countries of origin, etc. They are not refugees, they are not seeking to reunite with family members, and they are not suffering severe economic or other deprivation or, indeed, suffering any substantive and systematic violation of rights where they live. They could very well remain home, but they simply wish to improve their expectations, experiences, and options. Similarly, I assume that the right of exclusion is not the result of a state of crisis from the part of receiving states (Camacho 2017). They are not suffering from a financial crash or debt burdens, their labour markets are not overflowing, they are not flawed states without political order and just institutions, they are not facing terrorist threats or another sort of security crisis, and so on. They simply wish to secure the protection of their citizens' wellbeing, particularly of the worst-off or the more vulnerable (Macedo 2018). I will call this "the core case". Proceeding in this way may be problematic, but I focus on this group mainly because the aim of the paper is to establish some guidelines to frame questions of immigration; therefore, taking up the weakest case for inclusion/exclusion and to determine under what conditions, if any, states/would-be immigrants even have a *pro tanto* right to exclude/being included should be helpful for drawing an approach that could later consider the possibility of whether states or would-be immigrants may have an *all-things-considered case* (Fine and Sangiovanni 2015, p. 194). If my three-step approach here is sound, then later, each step needs to be developed further. Most obviously, my account of borders and the legitimate claims over the land need to be given substantive content. However, future work will develop this.

2. The Conventional View about Immigration: A Critical View

Consider first the *pro tanto* case for exclusion as a requirement of justice. Roughly, many liberals endorse the version that follows:

> **Exclusionism:** *Justice not only permits but even requires exclusionary borders with the pro tanto right to exclude would-be immigrants because citizens have a legitimate claim over the almost exclusive enjoyment of their opportunities and advantages grounded in a strong case of political self-determination.*

A people or a group of citizens gain or lose rights of political self-determination in virtue of how they stand together in a special, intrinsically valuable relationship to one another provided that, together, they have developed institutional devices for protecting their own rights and freedoms and effective forms of mutual care. According to exclusionists, these relationships of justice among members may be jeopardized if outsiders are let in because outsiders are not entitled to the benefits and opportunities created by these relationships of justice across generations.[1] This provides states

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[1] For instance, in the Law of Peoples, Rawls stated that it is not permitted to migrate into other people's territory without consent and that the state is the agent qualified to enforce this: "an important role of government, however arbitrary a society's boundaries may appear from a historical point of view, is to be the representative and effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and its environmental integrity, as well as for the size of their population." (Rawls 2001a, p. 38). This intuition is supported by the justness of private property: "Unless a definite agent is given responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the responsibility and loss for not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate. On my account the role of the institution of property is to prevent this deterioration from occurring. In the present case, the asset is the people's territory and its potential capacity to support them in perpetuity and the agent is the people itself as politically organized. The perpetuity condition is crucial. People must recognize that they cannot make up for failing to regulate their numbers or to care for their land by conquest in war, or by migrating into another people's territory without their consent." (Rawls 2001a, p. 8).

with a good case for *restricting immigration*.[2] Roughly, David Miller and Christopher Heath Wellman, among others, endorse this view.[3] The problem with exclusionism is that some other liberals extract different conclusions from standards of political justice. Consider the following position:

> **Inclusionists**: *Justice requires vastly porous borders because all humanity has a legitimate claim over certain forms of international freedom of movement and association or certain forms of global equality of opportunities. As a result, the relevant set of individuals where relationships of justice must be established is in principle unbounded or is global in scope.*

Under inclusionism, duties between citizens and their case of self-determination do not have to necessarily outweigh their general duties to would-be immigrants provided that they also stand in a special relationship with all other human beings. Joseph Carens, Chandra Kukathas, Philip Cole, and Matthias Risse are the central proponents of this view. Both sides are vulnerable to many objections, which will be discussed later in Section 4. For now, notice that, from these positions, immigration poses the following contradiction: there are, on both sides of the border, individuals with basic interests and powerful reasons for exclusion or inclusion, so it is not clear what justice requires from immigration restrictions.[4] Do citizens of affluent states have the right to benefit from the status quo at the cost of immigrants? Do immigrants have the right to participate in the institutions and benefits that distant others have created over generations? What can we make of this contradiction? One possible critical interpretation is that considerations of justice are not very good by themselves in adjudicating controversies about immigration policies. By means of conceptual analysis, I will try to support this interpretation and argue that the contradiction above is in part the result of the conflation between evaluations of justice and evaluations of legitimacy even though this conflation is pervasive on contemporary political theory.

Even though philosophers still disagree greatly about the conceptual distinction, they agree that, as a concept, justice is concerned with *what we owe to whom*. They also agree that the other central question of politics often identified with legitimacy is to discern *when political power is justified* in order to be seen as authoritative and bonding in a way compatible with basic freedoms.[5] To sum up, we can make the following distinction: an institution has the following political virtues:

> **legitimacy** *when it takes decisions in the name of others and uses coercive power to enforce those decisions, providing reasons that bind those subjected to those decisions. This entails that those subjected to the institutional decisions would be wrong to resist those decisions.* (Williams 2005)

> **justice** *when it gives to everyone involved in the institutional framework and scope of action what they are entitled to. Typically, this means that it distributes the burdens and advantages of cooperation within the institutional scope.* (Barry 1991)

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2   Exclusion of outsiders is conditional to considerations of human rights. This means that exclusion needs to give equal concern to the demands and needs of outsiders, so the putative right to exclude has many qualifications, that is why it is a *pro tanto* right. Justice has many currencies. From *the point of view of exclusionists*, distributive justice is the standard appropriate for treating citizens, but equal concern only demands the respect for human rights regarding international relations. See (Cohen 2004; Beitz 2011) for discussion.

3   They, of course, have different and opposing views about what considerations of justice count. Miller is largely concerned with cultural justice or associative obligations between members of the same cultural nation, while Wellman is concerned with rights of association. However, despite their different starting points, both share the view that the value of political self-determination and the interest that members have with it is such that it trumps the interest of outsiders to a certain extent.

4   This way of distinguishing theories of immigration may be controversial. One reason is that a given account may not fit perfectly into my two simplifications. However, for the purpose of this paper, these simplifications help us to focus in the standards we use to assess immigration restrictions. Later, I will come back to my simplifications and explain how they are related to the debate of immigration in the broader field of global ethics.

5   For instance, Hobbes and Locke were more interested in reconciling authority with human liberty by means of justification than in the secondary (for them) problem of the moral quality of coercive power (Hobbes 1968, pp. 161, 183, 126, 190; Locke [1689] 1988, pp. 210, 280, 293). Kant, on the other hand, believed that the problem of justifying political authority was not different from the problem of its quality because the function of the state was, in the end, to protect our rights in the sense of creating and sustaining just institutions (Kant [1781] 1991). Therefore, in a sense for Kant, the state's legitimacy was grounded in its ability to bring about justice (Kant [1781] 1991, pp. 408–10; MM Ak 6, pp. 255–56).

These very general concepts of justice and legitimacy may be narrowed down for the specific moral character of liberal democracies (Scanlon 1998; Barry 1991; Rawls 2001b). Legitimacy concerns *who is entitled* (and to what extent) to take decisions in the name and interest of others, and justice concerns *the distribution of burdens and benefits* from social cooperation (Valentini 2012; Quong 2011; Rawls 2001b). Now, notice that, under this distinction, the basic structure of liberal societies is one familiar case where both standards may be conceptually co-extensional in the sense of applying greatly to the same object (Sleat 2015; Rossi 2014; Song 2012; Peter 2009; Simmons 2001).[6] As a result, it is not at all surprising that most philosophers have regarded standards of legitimacy and justice as the same evaluation (Valentini 2012; Simmons 1999). For instance, according to Valentini, *political justice* collapses the underlining concerns of legitimacy and justice by indicating the different requirements of equal concern under different circumstances: Legitimacy tells us when institutions may permissibly coerce us, while justice determines what institutions owe to those coerced (Valentini 2012, pp. 97, 594). For simplicity, I will call *political justice* the view that collapses justice and legitimacy as the same evaluation.

Now after this conceptual refinement, we can restate the question of the last section: What does political justice—legitimacy and justice together—demand from our border institutions? Does political justice require harder borders or rather more porous ones? I will argue that this tension between conflicting claims of justice coming from exclusionism and inclusionism are in part the result of the overlapping of concerns of justice and concerns of legitimacy. I will argue as well that this flaw in the approach may be overcome by my three-step approach.

3. Residents, Citizens, and Land

We often believe unreflectively that the interest and rights of valuable political communities involve analytically controlling the land. In order words, we believe that what justifies the state justifies its authority over its borders and the territory within. In this section, I will show that the conventional account of justice in immigration—exclusionists and inclusionists—fail to offer a principled connection between political communities and land. On one hand, exclusionism takes into account the interest of residents and citizens but begs the question of the grounds of an immigration policy. Inclusionism, on the other hand, takes into account the relationship between borders and land but fails to give right weight to the claims and concerns of would-be immigrants and political communities here and now. From this, I hope I can show what I suggested in Section 2: that the requirements of political justice are ill-conceived to deal only by themselves with problems of the morality of immigration because they tend to beg the question of legitimacy. I will not attempt, however, to provide a full account for the ethics of exclusion. To be excluded from the land and to be excluded from the group have very different meanings and normative consequences. It is worth noting that exclusion is not one thing but many. For instance, it may not be equally harmful to exclude low-skilled would-be immigrants from the land and to exclude highly qualified immigrants from well-paid jobs. These cases and many others need to be carefully surveyed and catalogued. Many of them will fit into the core case, but I will not engage in that discussion here. For my purposes here, it is enough to show that the conventional view neglects to take into account the exclusion from the land as a resource needed for participating in valuable legitimate institutional relations.[7]

Consider first one central example of exclusionism that I will call *rights-statism*. According to the view defended by Christopher H. Wellman, citizens and residents have a *pro tanto* right for

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6 Famously, Rawls, after *A Theory of Justice*, eventually came to believe that it is not possible to argue for justice as fairness in terms of the goodness of justice without making it unacceptable for the citizens of a pluralistic society since citizens have different and irreconcilable ideas about what is good and just (Song 2012, pp. 153–61). The Rawlsean problem of justification of a theory of justice shifts then from an argument of the justness undertaken by a comprehensive theory of morality (Rawls 1971, p. 4) to an argument of the legitimacy of justice as fairness capable to elucidate: "in the light of what reasons and values—of what kind of a conception of justice—can citizens legitimately exercise that coercive power over one another?" (Rawls 2001b, p. 41). That is why, for that specific problem as framed by Rawls, justice and legitimacy overlap.

7 Many thanks to an anonymous reader for raising this problem to me.

political self-determination (Wellman 2008). This kind of control that communities of residents and citizens exercise in their self-regarding affairs must entail political rights of association, which in turn also entail analytically a *legitimate* right to be free from unwanted associations, such as those with unwanted would-be migrants. As an exclusionist view, *rights-statism* does not deny stringent duties of global justice.

There are many reasons to resist Wellman's argument (Van der Vossen 2015; Hidalgo 2012; Fine 2010). For one, political self-determination does not necessarily entail permissibility of any particular policy, including policy about immigration controls (Hidalgo 2012, p. 16). Therefore, the putative analytical connection between rights of political self-determination and rights of exclusion is not obtained. Furthermore, *rights-statism* does not establish any kind of position of dominion over the land from which defenders of exclusionism wish to exclude nonmembers. Here is the flaw: we can accept that there is a *pro tanto* case for exclusion from the group without accepting the further claim that there is a *pro tanto* case for exclusion from the land or the territory (Carens 1987; Simmons 2001; Fine 2010). This means that the proper ground to assess immigration policy should begin with a resource-based justification of their claims for exclusion from the homeland. Without it, the option to dismiss the basic interest in immigrating would-be migrants may be at least questionable because those enforcing exclusion will not have a privileged position of dominion over the homeland.

However, this is too quick because these objections only show that rights-statism is inconclusive. The possibility to supplement forms of exclusionism may come from associative obligations. Some of the relationships we establish with each other are special in the sense that, without actually providing our consent, we engage in reiterative valuable interactions that are instrumentally valuable. If the history of these interactions becomes more intimate and creates trust, cooperation, and interdependence, then these relationships may become intrinsically valuable as well, so typically, we find we have reasons to feel obligated when we play certain roles such as that of a friend or a citizen even if we have never provided our consent (Scheffler 2002). Accordingly, a state is legitimate when it protects the nation and the special bond members share associative obligations. To threaten the production of these goods seems also deeply unjust. Therefore, from the view of associative obligations, exclusionist immigration policy is legitimate, grounded in reasons of justice. (Miller 2016, p. 27). This view that I call *obligations-statism*, has been pursued mostly by liberal nationalists (Tamir 1993; Miller 1995; Gans 1998).

Miller's interpretation of *obligations-statism* is attractive because it supplements the case for rights of associative obligations with a resource-based account of border control of land. According to Miller, the unique way that a nation develops politically, economically, and socially has a territorial dimension because culture amalgamates with the land in a way that will be extremely harmful to members of the nation to be deprived from the space where their own culture is *territorially incarnated*. Therefore, it is not the fact of individual ownership that grounds territorial rights; rather, it is the fact that a community mixes its own culture with the soil in a way that it is not detachable without causing an enormous collective harm (Miller 2007, p. 218).[8]

There are many challenges raised against obligation-statist arguments for immigration control. For instance, it seems that nationalist protection of culture by means of state institutions seems to accomplish just the opposite: the coercive imposition of a form of unauthentic official culture devised by state officials instead of organically conducted by members of the cultural group (Camacho 2017). However, the main problem with the nationalist account of territorial control is that the deontic force of a state's claims is grounded on the idea that cultural self-determination may be necessarily

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8   According to Locke, a state's dominion over territory is a consequence or derives from member's prior ownership rights. Members with private property transfer certain property-powers to the state in exchange, at least, for the protection of their property by the state. In this way, owners cease to have absolute dominion over their property and states end up with certain dominion over a territory, establishing a group or an association of co-owners (Locke [1689] 1988, pp. 288–348; Simmons 2001). The main problem with this account is its historic implausibility. It seems descriptively false that acquisition, property, and transaction could fulfil appropriate criteria of justice that could preserve, in turn, a deontic ground for a state's dominion (Blake and Mathias 2008, p. 8).

connected with land but it is not obvious that the connection between labour-culture mix with collective jurisdictional rights is necessary or sufficient to ground authority over the land, at least not the kind of authority that allows immigration exclusion (Stilz 2011, p. 577). A nation may have rights over their social construction of territory, but they attempt to exclude would-be immigrants from the land and not from their imagined or socially constructed heartland. This means we can find the same flaw again. An account of associative obligations that explains how inclusion may be unjust for residents and citizens simply assumes that immigration controls are legitimately imposed over potential immigrants. However, even if we grant that the interest of citizens and residents in their territorially located culture could provide reasons to take control over the process of change of their culture, this hardly will provide reasons to justify the administration of immigration. Certainly, it does not necessarily provide reasons for an exclusionist immigration policy (Miller 2005, p. 200).

I will come back to the distinction between territory and land later. For now, let us take a look at inclusionist arguments. One interpretation of these arguments begins precisely with the intuition that exclusionists have not sufficiently justified the act of enclosing borders around territories and later exclude outsiders from those territories. Arash Abizadeh defends what he calls the unbounded *demos* thesis: the idea that the bounded demos—the *group salienf for exclusionists*—has a pre-political origin in a larger *demos* that encompasses humanity as a whole (2008, p. 45). The act of constituting civic borders—giving raise to groups of residents and citizens—is coercive because borders fragment the original demos invading, in a pervasive and significant way, the autonomy of would-be migrants (Abizadeh 2008, p. 37). According to liberal and democratic principles, this kind of coercion must either be removed or justified (Abizadeh 2012, p. 878). Thus, it seems that immigration controls need to be democratically justified to the very same people they intend to exclude (2008, p. 45).[9] This is an attractive interpretation of inclusionism for many reasons. First, it captures a cosmopolitan challenge to exclusionism by questioning the assumption of group membership as the locus of the ethics of immigration (Carens 2013). Secondly, it binds together the interest of members and the interest of outsiders, so consideration of distributive justice among members will not outcast substantive claims of justice from nonmembers. Finally, it establishes the requirements of democratic legitimacy—a paradigmatic form of political justice—over immigration policy.

The most evident problem with Abizade's instantiation of inclusionism is its implausibility. The unbounded-demos thesis seems to require that we deem all boundaries illegitimate and that we start redrawing them from scratch. In turn, however, Abizadeh fails to provide a procedural criterion for a democratic redrawing of boundaries (Moore 2015, p. 115). This, of course, does not show that the argument is wrong in itself, but we might want to supplement this account with some idea about how to think about borders in the world that we live in. In order to face that objection, we could suggest a softer version of the unbounded-demos thesis. On this version, we waive the requirement of redrawing boundaries for the more modest indication of shifting the burden of the proof. What the soft unbounded-demos thesis points out is that exclusion is not analytically justified by popular sovereignty (a self-determining group) or by jurisdiction (an effective reasonably just state). Any exclusion should be justified by an independent argument that explains its democratic legitimacy. A corollary of this perhaps is that border policies should not be unilateral; they must give equal consideration to the interest of outsiders (Miller 2016, pp. 24–33).

Even this softer interpretation of the inbounded-demos thesis seems deeply problematic. It rests on a misleading account of coercion. What borders do to outsiders may not require democratic justification because a single action of coercion by itself is not enough to trigger demands of self-rule and distributive justice (Blake 2001; Nagel 2005; Cohen and Sabel 2006; Julius 2003; Buchanan 2002). It is necessary to be involuntarily subjected to a body of pervasive institutional coercion, such as a

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9   Note that even open borders structure political jurisdictions, thereby exercising power over both insiders and outsiders by establishing different jurisdictions, for instance, in the form of their exclusive forms (policies) of regulating property and transactions.

system of comprehensive societal norms, in order to give rise to certain relationships, such as the one established by citizenship. In contrast, what the erection of borders does to nonmembers is precisely to remove those conditions from them (Miller 2010, pp. 112–17). This conclusion may seem disappointing, but it is worth noting that something of substantive importance has been gained with the soft unbounded-demos thesis. What it establishes regarding border control is the *normative requirement of justification*. This means that maybe democratic legitimacy is too substantive for the case of border institutions, but this does not preclude the need for other kinds of legitimation. My three-step approach may show the path to look for that justification.

Now, recall my interpretative critical thesis about the flaws of these accounts. In Section 2, I suggested that the contradiction between requirements of justice between exclusionists and inclusionists is in part the result of the conflation between evaluations of justice and evaluations of legitimacy. Now, we can see more clearly that these approaches—rights-statism, obligations-statism, and unbounded-demos thesis—all fail to offer a justification of immigration controls grounded in an explanatory and justificatory argument that shows the normative connection between groups of citizens and residents with the land they occupy. These accounts are all inconclusive because they all fail to consider the diverse ways in which individuals and states establish associations and become associatively obligated across the land. As we will see, associations and associative obligations can be established internationally. For one, states are not only atomic associations as Wellman seems to think or isolated ethical communities as Miller thinks but also territorial entities which have seized land and which are engaged in complex relations abroad. The hope is that my three-step approach can separate these different requirements, so we can properly put the interest of members and immigrants in the same balance.[10]

4. An Alternative Approach

So far, I have focused solely on criticizing one leading approach to justice in immigration. In this section, I explain a different way of approaching the issue by reordering some of the preceding arguments to outline and motivate support for my proposal. My proposal consists of three steps. In the first stage, instead of asking what justice requires from our border institutions, I would first ask a logically prior question: what kind of border controls are legitimate; that is, at the level of our most basic moral principles, what kind of authority is permissible that borders exercise? Secondly, I ask about the nature of borders. Once we ask about legitimacy of immigration controls. it is easy to realize that borders are not only lines in the ground or the limits of our institutions but also institutions themselves. These *sui generis* institutions are not only domestic and, therefore, subject to standards of distributive justice for residents and citizens but also international and subject to standards of international legitimacy that should take the interest of outsiders into account. This account of borders allows to weigh together social justice and global ethics, so it may show us under what conditions it will be morally permissible for borders to prioritize the interest of residents and citizens over the interest of would-be immigrants. Thirdly, once we draw the contours of the legitimate use of border authority,

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10   Note that, for exclusionists, the legitimate claim over the land is grounded in claims of distributive justice for residents and members and, even if domestic justice is a legitimate use of the land as the soft-unbounded demos thesis shows, use of land needs to be justified to outsiders. However, the unbounded demos thesis fails to provide a procedural criterion to connect political communities and land. Both accounts of exclusionism and inclusionism conflate claims of justice among members of a group—the citizenry or humanity—with legitimate claims over the land. As a result, in each case—for exclusionism and inclusionism—the focus on claims of justice is misplaced. On the one hand, inclusionism may be right when it stresses the need of justification of borders but conflates the just distribution of land with the legitimacy of democratic requirements. As a result, it also fails to engage in the discussion about the nature of borders and what is the proper relationship between borders around land, political communities, and immigrants. On the other, without an account that explains the claim that citizens and residents may have over the land and an account that analyses the nature of borders, it may be difficult to determine the limits of the priority that borders may grant to residents and citizens over the interest of potential immigrants. Exclusionism captures one important sense in which the idea of groups that protect justice is valuable: states, nations, or peoples entail value as an expression of our legitimate basic rights and as the reflection of the relations of justice we establish.

we can again ask whether it is appropriate to distribute the right to exclude immigrants according to standards of distributive international justice by means of an international border institution.

4.1. Step 1: The Normative Prior Question of Borders

To analyse what would be a fair consideration of just claims of inclusion or exclusion, one has to start at the level of our most fundamental moral principles by asking what does morality require of border policy? When is it acceptable to favour the interest either of residents and citizens on one side or would-be immigrants on the other? This prior question, I believe, is the question of the legitimacy of immigration control.

Step 1 follows from a number of arguments and ideas I invoked before. Rights-statism and obligations-statism showed us that political communities have a right to control and administrate admissions even though that right does not translate into a right for exclusion. Soft unbounded-demos thesis stressed that that kind of control needs to be nonetheless justified. Now, we can ask the following: When does the case of borders require evaluations of legitimacy rather than evaluations of justice? Under what criteria do certain circumstances require the virtue of legitimacy? An influential account of legitimacy is offered by Bernard Williams. This account begins with the assumption that de facto effective power is not enough to justify authority. To ask about the moral quality of authority is to assess if those who claim authority are in some way justified to do so. Do their claims of authority make any sense to those subjected to it? Will I be morally wrong if I choose to challenge that authority? How could authority ever make sense if authority clashes with everyone's nature as free and equal individuals? The answer to this kind of questions lies in the establishment of a regime that secures the stability of some order for protection, safety, trust, and cooperation (Williams 2005, p. 3). Authority is justified or legitimate when it makes sense as a sort of plausible and credible solution to this problem of politics.

Now, according to Williams, we can distinguish meeting this requirement for justification from meeting other political virtues such as distributive justice or political justice even if sometimes these requirements overlap with each other (Williams 2005, p. 4). For instance, it is of course possible, as in the case of the domestic basic structure of a liberal society that the most plausible way of meeting the demands of justification, is to appeal to political justice, fairness, or distributive justice. However, the same circumstances arise in which the only way to justify political power is to avoid reference to liberal political virtues or at least a justification could be coherently articulated in an attractive way without reference to such virtues. For instance, when a social group has been historically discriminated against and excluded from wealth and opportunities, it may be deeply unjust for applicants for a job with merits to be dismissed in favour of reparative quotas. However, the legitimacy of social and political institutions needs to be re-established for members of the discriminated social group if social institutions are to exercise political power over them without harming their dignity even if this means to unjustly deprive some applicants from the dominant group from opportunities they deserve. If instead we avoid reference to standards of legitimacy, we have to face the unpalatable conclusion that giving the job to any of them is both just and unjust at the same time.

To be sure, the connection between authority and legitimacy is often posed too as a dilemma of justification. Legitimate authority is the best chance human beings have for the protection of their most basic rights, but at the same time and almost for the very same reasons, the establishment of authority is the worst threat to the protection of those rights (Williams 2005; Dworkin 2013). This means that legitimacy is not a closed evaluation or adjudication. Instead, we need to continuously assess the legitimacy of institutions because the very same institutions that, at some point, are part of the solution (of a given institutional problem) may easily turn into part of the problem they are supposed to fix in the first place. All things being equal, it is claimed that the authority that immigration controls exercise is needed to protect the basic rights of residents and citizens, but at the same time, immigration controls could easily threaten those very same rights. For instance, immigrants may deprecate government services without proportionate contribution in taxes (Freiman and Hidalgo 2016, p. 12), but at the same

time, immigration controls may illegitimately curtail the freedom of association of citizens who want to share the house with foreign nationals (Steiner 2018, p. 140).

Now, we may raise an alternative normative start: We beguine by distinguishing concerns of legitimacy and concerns of justice. If the general problem of borders is to determine what kind of borders liberal democracies ought to have or, rather, what morality requires from border controls, then this raises two particular problems: first, to justify the exclusive control over the administration of borders (the problem of legitimacy of borders) and, second, to specify how this control ought to be exercised (the problem of justice of borders). Once we divide these levels of analysis like this, we may see how it makes sense to understand borders as *sui generis* institutions domestic and international: we can distinguish between the institutional entitlement to exercise dominion over borders internationally from the way this entitlement is exercised here at home. In general, while an illegitimate state is not entitled to exercise any border control, a legitimate state may exercise many kinds of border control that we can assess according to justice.[11] However, how do we know that, for the case of immigration controls, the requirements for justification are different from the requirements of other political virtues such as justice? In order to determine, that we must turn to the nature of borders.

4.2. Step 2: A New Normative Conception of Borders

Political theory often misrepresents international borders because it takes them into account merely as lines on the ground or as the outer limit of domestic institutions marking out jurisdictional boundaries. This certainly makes sense from the point of view of exclusionism and political justice because borders will serve only the purpose to contain the inner institutions and to keep everything else out as the state or the community sees it fit. However, as we saw following soft unbounded-demos thesis, immigration controls are an exercise of power that needs to be justified and borders are institutions that carry on that exercise. If this is true, then borders are not jurisdictional limits but institutions themselves. Therefore, we can ask about the institutional requisite function of borders and pick up from there what borders should be according to those requisite functions. The requisite function of borders is conventionally to administer the flow of people and goods from one state to the other (Barry and Goodin 1992, p. 6), but for the case of complex liberal democracies, this entails not only customs and immigration offices but also airports, sea ports, mail offices, embassies, consulates, international affairs bureaus, etc.[12] This means that, in order to fulfil their requisite functions, borders have become over the past 100 years a highly complex and specialized set of institutions devoted precisely to administering the territorial, institutional, and populational limits between states (Camacho 2016).

However, this is not enough to understand the nature of borders. A good description about international relations should tell us not only something about the institutional nature of states as units but also something else about the institutional nature of the international system as a whole (Waltz [1979] 2010). This means that, from an institutional and international perspective, borders are not only institutions of the state but also *international institutions*. We can in fact distinguish borders from the rest of the institutions of the state because borders, as opposed to basic institutions—such as the executive or the judiciary—are the kind of institutions that exercise political power systematically over both insiders and outsiders. As such, borders are *sui generis* institutions because they are at the same time domestic, for instance, when they issue passports or let in imports, and international, for instance, in the case of consulates and embassies, when they administrate the relationships between neighbouring countries. Note that this would mean that borders not only administrate the flow of people but also administrate other aspects of international relations such as the flow of commodities, currencies, and services and perhaps also cultures, languages, influence, and other intangible goods.

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[11] Legitimacy is a piecemeal evaluation. Once this account develops further, it should take into account matters of degree, but for simplicity, I focus in the general case.

[12] See (Valenzuela and Camacho).

From a systematic institutional perspective, in order to perform their requisite functions, borders of one country should interact with the borders of other countries, in fact intertwining in a net or system of border institutions regionally and, in the case of affluent liberal democracies, even globally. The more exchange and flow border institutions need to administrate, the more globally interconnected borders are with border institutions of other countries. This kind of complexity also implies that borders are not a unique institution. Not even international border tolls are part of the same institution. Different border institutions are created depending on with what country a relationship has been established. For instance, Spanish border institutions with Morocco are different from Spanish border institutions with France precisely because border institutions with Morocco reflect the uniqueness of the relationship with these two countries. This also means that two countries do not need to be neighbours to have a border. When I board a plane and descend in Frankfurt, I am subjected to the immigration considerations Germany has established for Mexicans, and this amounts to being subjected to the authority of the German–Mexican border institution even if this border is somehow virtual.

The last century has seen a fast development of border institutions, turning them into a well-established global set of rules and offices that have established a basic institutional structure all around the globe. The exact character of this system though is unclear. It obviously is not analogous to the domestic basic structure of liberal democracies, but we know that at least this system makes international cooperation possible and that sometimes it is permeable to moral reasons such as those contained in the doctrine of human rights. In fact, there is a chance that just and legitimate borders administrate a great deal of what we call international relations. Under my account, perhaps even public affairs bureaus may be considered part of border institutions. I will say a bit more about the normative nature of borders in the next section. For now, it is important to come back to the problem of legitimacy.

According to this account, borders are a system of international complex pluralistic institutions that acquire their special identity from the specific relationship they embody. There are at least two sources of legitimacy coherent with this account: the relationship that gives them identity and the claims over the land they enclose. First, borders are legitimate when they perform their requisite functions, and under this account, that means that a specific border (between two given countries) is legitimate when its policy (including but not limited to immigration policy) reflects the actual relationship between these two given countries. For instance, this means that, if these two countries have an intensive relationship in terms of cultural, commercial, and diplomatic exchange and one of the two countries excludes citizens and residents of the other in a way that does not make sense according to that relationship, then the exclusionary policy is illegitimate in a way that devaluates the legitimacy of the border institution that sustains it.

Second, as we saw in Section 3, exclusionary policy needs to be grounded in a legitimate claim over the land. If a country does not have a legitimate claim over the land it occupies, then it is difficult to see how or to what extent their borders can be legitimate. In order to perform the exclusion of would-be immigrants legitimately, borders must logically presuppose a previous source of legitimacy: the legitimate authority, legitimate dominion, or monopolistic control over the land in a way that both jurisdiction and dominion coincide with the borders. Rights to establish borders need to include the right to establish a jurisdiction and the right to occupy that land for the purpose of establishing political communities with the power to exclude would-be immigrants. Jurisdiction alone cannot justify exclusionary rights. Many accounts argue since Kant that a political community gains rights over the territory as it manages to create and sustain legitimate and just institutions (Moore 2015; Ypi 2013; Stilz 2011; Simmons 2001). However, what is under review is the right of that community to establish those institutions there in the first place. I will also come back to this problem in the last section.

4.3. Step 3: Just Exclusions

Once we make sure borders may exercise their immigration authority legitimately, we need to assess their policies according to standards of justice. As we saw in the last section, this assessment cannot be constructed only from the point of view of domestic social justice. Of course, borders protect the interests and rights of citizens and residents, but as my analysis of exclusionist accounts reveal, evaluations of domestic social justice do not exhaust the morality of borders and immigration controls. One suggestion to balance claims of global justice with claims of domestic social justice within international legitimacy is the creation of an institution capable of distributing rights of exclusion for local border institutions.

Javier Hidalgo notes that states' decisions regarding immigration restrictions may be morally questionable (Hidalgo 2013) and sometimes harmful (Hidalgo 2016, pp. 153–54). If this is true, Hidalgo argues that states may have moral reasons to transfer at least some of their decision-making authority over immigration to international immigration institutions. States should join a world migration organization that establishes an institutional multilateral framework for negotiating migration flows between states (Hidalgo 2016; Bhagwati 2003). Note that the existence of such a World Migration Organization transforms again the problem of exclusion of would-be immigrants into a distributive problem. Is this sound?

Hidalgo's proposal is problematic in terms of international legitimacy as there are very weak incentives for the creation and continuation of an organization of this kind (Hidalgo 2016, pp. 148–50). One reason is that policy makers have negative incentives coming from local voters. Often, it is easier for irresponsible or short-sighted politicians to blame last comers about social problems, and at the same time, voters often prefer to form false beliefs and to blame immigrants for social problems even if in both cases they lack any convincing evidence to do so.[13] Secondly, the benefits from relaxing immigration controls tend to favour worse-off countries instead of rich ones, at least in the short term.

Note that, under my normative account, borders are understood already as a system of domestic and international institutions. Once border institutions fulfill not only the demands of domestic social justice but also those of international legitimacy, the states with legitimate borders may find reason to establish institutional forms of international cooperation regarding borders and immigration policy. To be sure, the requisite function of border institutions—here and now—already is to administrate and control the flow of people and goods and, in doing so, to a great extent to administrate the relationship between countries. When one country establishes trade, diplomatic, or other kind of relations with others, it means (i) that their societies acquire certain moral obligations determined by the strength of the relationship and (ii) that these obligations may give rise to special institutional requirements by means of consent in the form of agreements or treaties between these two countries. Therefore, border institutions gain legitimacy when they reflect the particular relationship between countries in terms of consented duties, associative duties, and the character of the relationship as a whole. However, border policy unfolds not only in bilateral forms. When states need to administrate the border institutions and immigration controls of a group of countries in cooperative terms, it will make sense to coordinate that effort in an institutional fashion.

Suppose a cluster of liberal democracies establish a legitimate system of borders that reflects accurately their consented and associative obligations. Then, it may be plausible that they decide to disincentivize defectors by organizing their system of borders under a centralized institution such as the one described by Hidalgo. This, of course, changes the nature of the problem of immigration controls back to the kind of problem that can be assessed by a conception of distributive justice, but it does this in a way that the distribution of exclusionary rights may be just because it is the result of a

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[13] For the claim that majorities often blame immigrants for social problems without empirical evidence, see (Miller 2009, p. 36). For the claim that blaming immigrants for social problems is often wrong, see (Fromentin 2013). Cited in (Hidalgo 2016, p. 149).

legitimate use of institutional authority when this authority comes from a legitimate system of borders. The problem arises because, in reality, we know that, seldom, immigration restrictions embody the associative obligations established by the actual interaction between two countries.[14] For instance, in North America, Canada, the USA, and México have been engaged in deep trade and cultural and diplomatic relations, yet immigration restrictions do not necessarily reflect the level of engagement, cooperation, and interdependence between these three states.

5. International Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Borders

These sections complete my outline. The account here does, of course, need to be developed further. Most obviously, as I said in the introduction, my account of borders and the legitimate claims over the land needs to be given substantive content. As a result, steps 2 and 3 can only be endorsed in a provisional sense. When applying the approach outlined above, one must be careful to not simply move from the fact that borders already exercise power in certain ways to the conclusion that those instances of international power are justified. However, despite this, there are two important objections to my approach. First, it could be argued that the distinction between justice and legitimacy is trivial or at least not informative. What I call legitimacy can be properly described as a form of justice. Second, international legitimacy of borders has little or nothing to do with immigration policy. Typically, we do not assess the legitimacy of borders of other states based on the immigration policy as a criterion.[15]

Let us consider first the conceptual analysis objection. It could be argued that the distributive claims of international ethics (claims between states) may be reducible to the distributive claim of global justice (claims between all individuals), making my account trivial.[16] Sometimes, the distinction between different things we call justice may be a mere linguistic or terminological disagreement between a core understanding of justice and some penumbra controversial cases in very much the same way that astronomers discuss whether it is appropriate to use the concept of planet for the case of Pluto (Dworkin 2013, p. 5). For instance, we can agree or disagree whether family is an appropriate object of distributive justice. Some thought that family was too private to be considered an object of social justice, and some others thought that family was the source of many social injustices we ought to consider publicly.[17] However, that discussion did not involve picking up one concept or conception of justice over other alternatives; instead, the discussion needed to clarify whether a shared conception of justice applied to a controversial case such as family. Now, some will be tempted to suggest that the distinction I am proposing between concerns of legitimacy and concerns of justice in the international realm is merely terminological. They will insist that we can agree or disagree about the question of whether it would be appropriate for theoretical and applied purposes to include global justice within

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[14] Under the complex account of borders, associative obligations tend to be multilateral because the normative evaluation is comparative. The border of one country establishes interactions with several other borders, and the nature of these interactions could be assessed in comparative terms. Consider an example. There are three democracies in the north part of one continent. C, U, and M are engaged in a strong and deep relationship with each other; they have established terms for free trade and deep diplomatic and cultural relations. They are also engaged in institutional cooperation regarding key subjects such as security, development, and administration. As a result, they plan and design together their institutions and policies. Country U treats C as its partner, thus administrating border institutions relative to C accordingly. U welcomes C's nationals and their foreign affairs offices, and other institutions exercise political power in order to accommodate the close relationship with C, yet U treats M in a different way. U does not welcome M's nationals and also places other kinds of restrictions on the rest of M's border institutions. According to the complex account of borders, U wrongs M and its habitants because it has established a relationship with M that has moral character, and as such, it entails certain obligations. U has grown into a complex and deep relationship with both C and M. This deep relationship creates associative responsibilities that are not exhausted by consent, yet U only consents to acknowledging those obligations for the case of C. The lack of explicit consent in the case of M, however, does not cancel the associative obligations that U has acquired with M through its practices. When U engages in a deep and complex relationship with M yet decides to exclude M's nationals, it undermines the ground of legitimacy insofar as it exploits and subjects M's nationals by benefiting from a relationship with them but mistreating them at the same time.

[15] I am in debt to an anonymous reviser who suggested to me this objection.

[16] I am grateful to an anonymous reader that raised this objection.

[17] See (Young 1990) for discussion.

the more general conception of distributive justice, but in the end, that is a terminological query about a controversial instance. I believe the distinction I am stressing is not merely terminological.

I follow Dworkin when I reject that all the conceptual disagreements of this kind are always criterial or semantic. There are certain problems that require an interpretative approach such as determining what morality requires in certain circumstances characterized by the lack of special relationships or relationships of partiality. In this case, inclusionists have assumed that immigration problems require accounts of global justice that establish claims between individuals from different political communities because there is no global community. However, this simply neglects the fact that borders are intergovernmental institutions that potentially could establish forms of international governance over immigration restrictions. This kind of institutions and the governance they will produce in the close future will constrain in turn the claims of global justice that immigrants residents and citizens could press against each other.

If my interpretative thesis is sound, the tension between exclusionists and inclusionists is not merely semantic. Exclusionists take justice as an evaluative concern by asking what normative conclusions we can extrapolate about immigration considering how immigration policy is conventionally understood as largely discretionary. In contrast, inclusionists take justice as determining whether any immigration control is right or wrong. For defenders of exclusionism, justice is a remedial virtue of institutions here and now, and for defenders of inclusionism, justice is a context-independent value about what is right. In contrast, interpretative moral questions such as who gets to decide whether two persons from different nationalities who love each other could live together in the same place or what is the limit of immigration authority regarding the movement of highly qualified people cannot be answered by discussing the scope of justice in a semantic way. For such a question, we need an interpretative dynamic account that allows the division of labour between different levels of analysis in order to determine first what kind of uses of political power are morally permissible for borders and later what legitimate uses of immigration authority are just. My three-step approach offers at least three layers of analysis that supplements the standard account. The standard account assesses immigration policy according to the interests of some residents and citizens only, but under the three-step approach, that assessment needs to be weighed against the international legitimacy of border institutions.

The second objection however stresses that typically international legitimacy has little or nothing to do with immigration policy.[18] We know this is true because the legitimacy of borders is more obviously linked with territorial disputes. The moment borders cease to be accepted by the consent of parties, there are important consequences. Conflict arises (armed, diplomatic, or otherwise) as was the case in the Atacama region between Perú, Chile, and Bolivia. Recently, Bolivian president Evo Morales decided to break the border treaties signed by both countries. He filed a case with the International Court of Justice on 24 April 2013, but the international court, following the principle of uti possidetis, did not change the borders formerly established by the previous treaty. However, it is not clear what would be the implications of my approach regarding noncompliance and "illegitimate border authority". As I said before at the beginning of this section, my account of the legitimacy of borders needs to be developed further. For now, the consequences are merely normative.[19] For instance, it is important to note two important things about territorial legitimacy. First, territorial legitimacy is not alien or unrelated to immigration controls. It is quite the opposite, as we saw; if my critical objection is sound, the possibility of grounding legitimate exclusionist immigration controls depends, to a certain extent, on the possibility of establishing a certain form of legitimate dominion or moral claim over the land. Second, the complex account of borders I am proposing is neither prescriptive nor descriptive. It is normative in a realistic fashion. It captures some features and good practices of borders of liberal democracies and offers an interpretation of their functions that is in accordance with our moral claims

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[18] I am in debt to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
[19] Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this.

and principles. Therefore, the fact that the legitimacy of borders has here and now little to do with the legitimacy of immigration controls is not necessarily an objection if the interpretative account shows that immigration controls and legitimacy of borders should be connected.

Note that this shows a shift in the approach. Previously, discussing assessments of justice and legitimacy, I have proceeded by means of conceptual analysis to try to find the most coherent way to make sense of claims, concerns, and standards regarding exclusion of would-be immigrants. With my account of borders, I sought to think about border institutions as they are here and now according to an interpretation of their best traits and practices as if we were going from the ground up. The hope is that the approach from legitimacy of borders serves to outline an alternative way of thinking about rights to exclude would-be immigrants.[20]

One example of this realistic normative approach is precisely the untheorized relationship between political communities, institutions—in this case, borders—and the land. As a matter of fact, we currently lack a good explanation of how borders can legitimately seize a part of the earth, yet we continue with the normative account of borders in the hope that we can find good reasons to understand claims over the land that are coherent with our concerns about legitimacy and justice. This needs to be unpacked.

One influential view holds that peoples may hold legitimate control over territories when they demonstrate they have legitimate and just manifestations of political self-determination. Peoples are communities that share a distinct *political* identity which derives from a collective mobilization for creating and maintaining legitimate institutions of justice. In contrast with nations that are sustained and protected by the power of the state, political identity is sustained organically by the characteristically social mobilization and agency that peoples have in contrast with other groups and other forms of collective control (Moore 2015, p. 50). According to Margaret Moore, borders should be drawn around groups that meet the criteria of legitimate peoplehood because peoplehood generates a right of occupation of the land. These heartlands generate a qualified and *pro tanto* right to control borders, including the power to exclude potential migrants, justified as an extension of jurisdictional authority and (like jurisdictional authority) in terms of the moral value of collective self-determination.[21]

The problem with this account is that it misrepresents the kind of political relationships that seem more important in contemporary liberal democracies by attributing jurisdictional rights to peoples instead of acknowledging that, in the conditions familiar to us, states are the only agents establishing jurisdictions. Of course, Moore could answer that her work is also a normative account of territory, but her account also begs the normative question because what we are challenging is precisely the entitlement over the land, including all territorial rights such as jurisdiction. In order to see this, three distinctions should be in place. First, following Moore, we can distinguish states from peoples and we know that we have more peoples than states, so presumably, there are several peoples inside a single state. Second, Moore also accepts the distinction between rights over the land and territorial rights. Land is all the surface not covered with water, while territories are social constructs. Typically, property rights are applied to land while jurisdiction is a territorial right. Finally, we can distinguish legal rights from moral rights. Any jurisdiction establishes the validity over a territory of several legal rights and legal rules, while moral rights are stablished by status or by certain basic human interests in the sense that they apply to all jurisdictions.

Now, note that, when she attributes to peoples the capacity to establish jurisdiction, this leaves unanswered the question of how peoples acquire the right to reject outsiders while only establishing that peoples acquire the right to impose valid law over a territory. We know this because jurisdictions tend to be inclusive rather than exclusive. For instance, when an immigrant crosses the border

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[20] About this kind of approach, see (Walzer 1983, chp. II); "Membership" and, more recently, (Carens 2013, pp. 8–13).

[21] Of course, the resultant exclusionary rights are qualified rights because they have to be pursued in ways consistent with basic human rights, for instance, by being accompanied by policies that address serious deprivation in those parts of the world which we typically think of as "migrant-sending societies".

without permission, we do not assume that they are legally or morally permitted to rob banks or to seize property insofar as we believe that regardless of their migratory status, they are subject to our jurisdiction. Of course, we could argue that, in our jurisdiction, there is a law that says "non-citizens must be kept out until a permission to come is given to them", but this does not solve the normative challenge since what is under scrutiny here is the moral right of states or any political agent to establish and enforce those kinds of rules. Furthermore, Moore's manoeuvre has very unpalatable consequences. Suppose we accept that peoples have territorial rights and Yucatecos (inhabitants of the state of Yucatan) in Mexico qualify as a people following Moore's characterization. One day, they wish to resist Chilangos (inhabitants of México city) from moving to their beautiful city of Mérida and they change the law in order to prohibit the immigration of Chilangos. Under what grounds can we challenge that? Coherence with Moore's rationale will suggest that we could not, and if Yucatecos are serious about their rejection of Chilangos, they will have a qualified *pro tanto* right to resist their immigration tendencies as much as mobilized groups can resist gentrification. Therefore, it will be very difficult to explain how exclusionary rights could be transferred or administrated by the state, as dissenters could always challenge states' authority over immigration laws.

It seems that the legitimacy of immigration controls is, after all, necessarily connected with the international legitimacy of borders. Moore's basic right of occupation explains the need for certain space and jurisdiction, but it cannot justify current borders because it only identifies peoples' heartlands. The lack of capacity to normatively draw borders results in a lack of grounds for exclusion of would-be immigrants. After all, as we saw, land, as opposed to jurisdiction, is not an idea, a system of rules, or a social construction. Land is a scarce resource that not only allows opportunities for physical survival, for instance, when we farm it or build refuge from the elements, but also makes possible opportunities for organization that develop collective valuable forms of discharging individual duties and institutional mutual care. However, it is not clear what reasons could be invoked for excluding would-be immigrants from it, particularly when these immigrants wish to cooperate in the production of such goods.

6. Conclusions

Nothing that I have said here implies that the core intuition behind inclusionism is untrue or conceptually incoherent. Defenders of inclusionism must realize that both exclusionism and inclusionism constitute efforts to make sense of claims of political justice.[22] Exclusionism focuses mostly on the problem of justice for members and leaves the problem of the legitimacy of immigration controls (justification of land and land-control) completely underdetermined. Inclusionism, on the other hand, turns the problem on its head: whereas exclusionism tries to determine what justice requires from border restrictions, inclusionism seeks to determine what kind of political justice is required for a world without borders that requires the distribution of land and the redrawing of borders. While inclusionism points to political arrangements that are yet to be envisioned, exclusionism works under the assumption that states are the only agents capable of playing this role in any meaningful way. Exclusionism also assumes that states are legitimate when they are able to establish relationships of justice among members, but inclusionism shows that states' legitimacy is incomplete unless it acquires legitimacy beyond borders. But both assume without argument what is being challenged: the legitimacy or illegitimacy of exclusion from the land administrated by immigration institutions that are both local and international.

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[22] As we saw, this means that exclusionism and inclusionism are different conceptions of justice in immigration, but I assume both have a good idea about a concept of justice they want to satisfy. Exclusionism seems to be mainly concerned about how to satisfy the substantive claims of citizens, while inclusionism seems to be mainly concerned about which political arrangements may satisfy the substantive claims of everyone. About the difference between concept and conceptions of justice, see (Rawls 2001a, p. 5). For concepts of justice, see (Cohen 2009, p. 279).

To be clear, I do not categorically reject exclusionist's or inclusionist's core concerns about justice. Instead, I insist that the way they frame their claims of justice tends to simply assume what we must justify: the kind of legitimate institutional control over the land (borders) and the land itself that makes normatively possible justifying the exclusion of would-be immigrants. Therefore, my suggestion is to take a step back from the traditional understanding of political justice and to assess separately the different normative requirements that pose the problem of immigration controls and policy. I have suggested to take this in three stages.

First, we appeal to the conceptual difference between legitimacy and justice even if justice contains democratic legitimacy of some sort. This is because, in the second stage, we appeal to the *sui generis nature of borders as domestic and international complex institutions*. From the domestic point of view, borders should accommodate requirements of justice, even political justice, but from outside, borders should coincide with requirements of international legitimacy. In a nutshell, the requirements of political theory and the theory of international relations must appear to be coherent for the case of border controls. My account at the third stage then establishes an institutional mechanism to connect exclusionist's claims of justice for the interest of citizens and residents with inclusionist's project of global emancipation and equality. Exclusionary rights may instead be distributed by an international or global institution of some sort according to standards of global justice.

However, I leave unsolved the problem of legitimate claims over the land, and under my account, the legitimacy of borders, to a certain extent, rely on this other kind of legitimacy over a physical resource such as the earth. Perhaps Kantians are right when they claim that only when a just system of international relations has been constructed may states claim that kind of right grounding as a result their exclusionary claims. Be that as it may, I believe it is somehow explanatory to be sure about the possible sources of exclusionary rights. They should come from a normative explanation of borders sensible to ethical considerations in international relations and from claims over the land when used for establishing relationships that allow us to discharge our moral obligations and to find our rights protected by others. I leave this last problem for another paper.

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Article

Group Asylum, Sovereignty, and the Ethics of Care

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Abstract: It is assumed that the states have the right to control their borders and decide whom they want to exclude, isolate, ban, or impose restrictions on. Although it seems that the problematic notion of "sovereignty" gives the state the right to make these kinds of decisions, there are situations where ethical duties to other human beings supersede sovereignty and where, in fact, those ethical duties limit sovereignty. This would be the case of group asylum situations. In this paper, we propose Axel Honneth's ethics of recognition as a complement to the liberal notion of solidarity. By introducing a derivation of the ethics of recognition, namely, the "ethics of care," we argue that our connection to others and the ethical duties we have with them impose some limits on the idea of sovereignty.

1. Introduction

Intense debate abounds in the public sphere concerning the regulation of borders and the way in which states should treat migrants. Recent migrant "crises" in different parts of the world have once again brought up the question of the duties states have toward migrants. It is assumed that liberal democracies should have inclusive migratory policies since they are built upon universal ethical principles: Moral equality among human beings, respect of individual human rights and freedoms, and the idea that people should not be discriminated against on the grounds of their gender, sexual orientation, race, nationality, or religion. Yet, as we see so often, liberal democracies do not always act in accordance with these principles. Quite often, immigration controls disregard and disrespect human rights, especially when large groups of people who, for some reason have been forced to leave their places of origin, are concentrated at the borders, and exceed the state's administrative capacities to react appropriately. These groups of displaced people and asylum seekers are often seen as a danger to the country they wish to enter, and consequently, it is common for states to tighten border controls (for a discussion on border controls from the perspective of global ethics, see Camacho 2019).

The ethical criteria by which border controls are established are not frequently discussed in the scholarly literature on the ethics of immigration. Some exceptions, among a few others, are Carens (1987, 2013) and Fine (2013). Caren's argument leads to the conclusion of opening borders (see also Cole 2012, 2016; Abizadeh 2008). We do not think, however, that the ethical approach to border controls necessarily leads to prescribing open borders. Fine evaluates the "moral justifications" for immigration controls, questioning the right of the state to exclude, but she does not provide a specific ethical model, as we will do, to face that question. As she mentions, there is a general assumption that states have the right to choose whom they want to admit, and it is generally granted that they even have the right to ban entry of migrants (Blake 2013, 2014). This does not mean, however, that there should be no discussion concerning the ethical grounds on which those decisions are made. It seems, however, that raising ethical constraints on border controls would limit the state's sovereignty. It is difficult to provide a sufficiently broad definition of "sovereignty" and, in fact, it is a problematic

concept widely discussed in scholarly literature (Zaum 2007, pp. 27–50; Waltermann 2019). Here, we understand the term as the excersising of supreme authority over a political entity territorialy defined. There is nothing easy about establishing how the liberal ideal of moral equality and respect for universal human rights can be harmonized with this idea of state sovereignty and democratic self-determination (Benhabib 2017, p. 24; Miller 2007, pp. 163–200; Stilz 2019, pp. 187–215). Benhabib points out, for instance, that in many cases the states interests sacrifice the right to universal hospitality. Hence, she argues that liberal democracies "need to decriminalize the world wide movement of people and treat each person, whatever his or her political citizenship status, in accordance with the dignity or moral personhood" (Benhabib 2004, p. 177).

Jürgen Habermas, a German sociologist and philosopher, is among those who have discussed this delicate balance. He asks how states can preserve their sovereignty, and, at the same time, commit to respecting universal obligations that transcend their borders. Do states have special duties towards migrants? According to Habermas, special duties arise among persons who are considered members of a common group or society. This is the case of relationships that imply proximity among different persons as happens, for instance, with family, friendship, or the interaction among neighbors or fellow citizens of a political community. In these kinds of relationships, there are positive duties that are indeterminate because it is impossible to quantify the degree of support and solidarity among the members of these communities (Habermas 1996, p. 510). These positive duties happen, according to Habermas, within the social boundaries of a political community. Habermas conceives that even the state can be considered a legal community in which ideally special duties among its members exist. With this in mind, it is unclear what kind of duty the state has towards non-citizens, foreigners, and migrants, given that they could be considered alien to the political community, or they can be considered as members of the political community with different rights, or sometimes without citizen rights.

Are liberal democracies obliged to adopt, in accordance with their principles, an inclusive attitude towards migrants? If the answer is affirmative, do states have the right to select whom they want to include or even to exclude and ban the entry of large groups of migrants, displaced people, or asylum seekers? On what ethical grounds do they make these kinds of decisions? In the first section of this paper, we discuss some of the most common arguments to justify border controls, and argue that, while they do not take into consideration some sort of ethical grounds, they could disregard and disrespect human rights. We also question the cases in which migrants are accepted for utilitarian reasons alone. In the second section, we shall argue that Honneth's ethics of recognition raises the relevance of complementing liberal democracies' inclusion practices, especially the idea of solidarity, by introducing what he calls the "ethics of care," which ideally could provide the ethical grounds to which we have referred. The ethics of recognition is an ethical theory according to which we shall recognize the personal autonomy of all human beings, their freedom, their personal identity, and their personal expectations. Moreover, it considers intersubjectivity, that is, the capacity to share our human experiences with others, as the appropriate process for personal self-realization. This ethical model does not limit the scope of human relations to the institutional framework designed by legal principles, but rather expands the spheres of recognition towards moral attitudes such as empathy, affection, or care. The ethics of care is a derivation of the ethics of recognition from which can be argued that our connection to others and the ethical duties we have with them are based on a common humanity which entails benevolence and compassion.

The ethics of care presupposes an ethical attitude according to which we act considering the welfare of others since our own welfare and the collective welfare itself depend on our relationships with others. This ethical attitude does not nullify the sovereignty of the state, although it does limit its power, especially in cases where the protection of human rights and the integrity of vulnerable people is a priority. Although sovereignty gives the state the right to decide to not admit migrants, there are situations where ethical duties to other human beings supersede sovereignty and where, in fact, those ethical duties limit sovereignty. A situation of this kind would be the case of group asylum.

We shall argue in the same second section that, beyond solidarity and equality, liberal democracies should act according to the ethics of care. Finally, we will conclude discussing the kinds of limits the ethics of care imposes on state-based sovereignty. We shall explain why those limits are not necessarily negative, but rather contribute to the strengthening of liberal democracies.

2. Common Arguments to Justify Border Controls

Friman and Hidalgo (2016) have argued that one can accept liberalism or substantive immigration restrictions, but not both. This dilemma can be posed in the following way: If the state's sovereignty grants it the powers to restrict immigration, then it also grants it the power to restrict liberal freedoms. It would be somewhat ambitious to exhaustively discuss here the moral foundations of liberalism. Several philosophers, from John Locke and John Stuart Mill to John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, have carried out that work. In this paper, we limit ourselves to a fundamental liberal principle, namely, the freedom to migrate, which is widely recognized as a basic liberal liberty, along with freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and others.

The freedom to migrate is a variant of the freedom of movement. The freedom to migrate is part of the right to free circulation, not only internal circulation, but also the right to transiting through other countries and even to apply for residence or asylum. Nevertheless, international circulation is not that simple since different countries assume they have the right to control and restrict the admission of migrants to their territory. States select whom they want to include in their communities and who they can exclude, isolate, ban, or impose restrictions on. For instance, states assume they have the right to impose restrictions on criminals and terrorists, to ban entry to large groups of poor people, or to control their borders in case of pandemic. In these cases it could be argued that there is a security threat (Carens 2013, p. 175). However, there are other cases in which other criteria, for example, race, culture, or religion are used to exclude prospective migrants. Several scholars (Walzer 1983; Miller 2005, 2007, 2016, pp. 222–24; Meilaender 2001, pp. 81–103) have argued that states have the right to decide, shape, develop, and control the kind of community they want and, with this in mind, should select citizens that share common moral and cultural values because such commonality may contribute to greater social cohesion. It needs to be discussed, however, whether selection criteria for the sake of preserving social cohesion shall consider some kind of ethical grounds. There is a wide variety of arguments made to justify that the state actually has the right to select, exclude, or ban migrants. The most common are related to the preservation of cultural identities and the protection of sovereignty and national security.

Some scholars have defended the importance of cultural identities as a "primary identification focus" based on the sense of belonging (Margalit and Raz 1990). In this same direction, the meaning of belonging is seen as an element that reinforces the dignity and identity of individuals and that, when institutions are shaped by a culture with which people are familiar, it facilitates the participation of citizens in the public life of their communities (Tamir 1993; Blake 2008, pp. 974–75). It is true that sometimes shared values or similar ways of thinking may contribute to coexistence and neighborliness among the citizens of a country. In contrast, people with a strong sense of cultural or national identities think that persons with other cultures, customs, or religions could "contaminate" their families or their communities. Cultural differences thus become a strong reason to justify the selection and even the ban of migrants.

Being part of a cultural identity makes people aware of their roots and their legacy. Celebration of a cultural identity and the sense of belonging to it are not necessarily reprehensible. Nevertheless, this can easily develop into the defense of essentialist identities and exclusionary nationalisms, as well as discriminatory discourses and practices aimed against migrants, foreigners, and local minorities and indigenous groups. While it is true that fulfillment is largely linked to people's sense of belonging to a tradition, a nation, and in some cases to a religion, said belonging can also be an obstacle for recognizing, respecting, and living peacefully with other cultures.

Those who defend the need to tighten immigration controls to protect a cultural identity disregard the positive effects of cultural diversity. It is not true that cultural diversity impedes the preservation

of traditions. A great tradition can always coexist and subsist along with other cultures and traditions. In fact, many migrant communities have integrated without difficulty in host countries, preserving their cultural values and idiosyncrasies, while simultaneously adapting to the new cultural environment. In many cases, the interaction between different traditions and cultures not only opens up an opportunity to empathize with other human beings, but also enriches people through their own experiences. Clearly, encounters with diversity may generate some confrontation. There will be cases in which integration processes are not so peaceful. While they will not be exempt from difficulties, liberal democracies have the capacity to promote multicultural integration policies. Conflict is normal in human societies. For this reason, social actors have a crucial job in promoting resolutions that reduce conflict, respect human rights, and preserve peace and social coexistence.

Many people argue that the presence of migrants decreases public safety and increases crime rates. However, the social science literature shows this to be false (take as an example the US-Mexico border, usually perceived as violent, and see Castañeda and Chiappetta (2020) in this special issue; Armenta (2017)). When states do not have the economic and social conditions to guarantee migrant insertion into the community to which they arrive, there is a risk that they will join marginalized sectors that lack access to education, health services, and jobs. Migrants, therefore, are vulnerable to becoming criminals and to be recruited by criminals, terrorists, drug dealers, etc. It is often forgotten that migrants are often exploited and denigrated, and that their integrity and human rights are continually violated, either by migration authorities or by criminals. In cases where it is possible to integrate migrants on a regular basis into society, their situation is still difficult: Some people think that migrants take away opportunities to study or work from nationals. However, as we will see, despite the rejection of their presence, several social scientists have highlighted migrants' impact on the economic and labor spheres as something positive.

Migration can benefit nationals in the labor market. Several economists recognize that the economic effect of migration on the economy is positive because the number of jobs available in an economy is not fixed. Several economists believe that migrants' presence in the labor market encourages employers to engaged in activities that are more labor-intensive. Migrants may not compete with nationals in the labor market because they are concentrated in some types of jobs (Ho and Ariss 2018; Jawetz 2019). All this implies that migration can increase the number of jobs. An example of this is Turkey, which in 2013 ranked 71 (out of 185) in the list of countries with the greatest ease of doing business (Doing Business 2013). In 2018, Turkey moved to position 60 (Doing Business 2018). The presence of more than two and a half million Syrian refugees has led to the installation of a growing number of companies with Syrian capital. This does not mean that some Syrian migrants have not had integration problems. Unfortunately, the poor have the hardest time adapting. As Adela Cortina (Cortina 2020) has pointed out, often times the rejection of immigrants and refugees is a rejection of poor people.

It is true that entry and acceptance for migrants who are highly educated and coming with large economic resources are simpler than for migrants in poverty. Central American migrants' presence in Mexico, for example, is seen as a problem for both the Mexican and U.S. governments precisely because they are low-income people. Adela Cortina coined the term "aporophobia" to designate rejection, fear, and contempt for the poor. It is true that our societies are not empathetic with poor people, who are among the most discriminated sectors. A question is whether a country should care for poor migrants rather than take care of citizens in similar conditions. This dilemma has become a serious concern, for example, in the recent situation at Mexico's southern border. In January 2020, an enormous group of migrants and asylum seekers was blocked by Mexican National Guard troops, while several Mexicans supported the government's decision. It is difficult for many citizens to understand that, although local poverty reduction should be a priority in any democratic society, states cannot avoid responsibility to migrants.

We agree with Adela Cortina that we should think about the means that both government and civil society should develop to include migrants: The dignity of every person demands a minimum of

justice (Cortina 2020, pp. 125–48). Any immigration policy should consider these demands for justice, and we argue that the relationship with migrants should not be reduced to the concern for justice. It should be based on an ethics of recognition. The first step to introduce the ethics of recognition is to abandon the idea, which appears in several economic approaches to migration, of a utilitarian relationship with migrants. Habermas explains the attempt to justify special duties with migrants from a utilitarian perspective. Economistic views are based on the benefits that migrants can offer. The problem is that the utilitarian model becomes discriminatory: There would be no need to help those migrants that are unable to contribute anything to the receiving country (sick people, children, elderly, etc.). The utilitarian stance would force, as Habermas observes, the institution of a migratory policy that only allows access to those whose presence would not unbalance the economic stability of a country. Clearly, in this case, the selection criteria are discriminatory. It should be noted, however, that several countries take these criteria into consideration when selecting or excluding migrants.

Scholarly literature has discussed the legitimacy of selecting migrants according to the distinction between high-skilled migrants and low-skilled migrants (Lim 2017; Fine 2016). This talent-based selection is also discriminatory. Note that the talent-based selection responds to a criterion of inequality between people, something that would not be expected from a liberal democracy. These kinds of distinctions argue that it is better to allow entry to a businessman or a scholar than to a poor person. This kind of selection is not feasible for group asylum sitations such as the ones we are currently facing both with Asian and African migration to Europe, and Central American migration to Mexico and the United States.

For a variety of reasons, in the past ten years, we have witnessed sizable migrations and forced displacements in different parts of the world: Violence, political and economic crises, famine, climate change, persecution and violation of human rights. Many people think that controlling, and even closing, borders is paramount to national security. Consequently, they expect governments to prevent migrants from entering. On the other hand, there are those who, despite the challenges of migration, realize that we are facing a humanitarian crisis and consider it a priority to protect people fleeing violence or other adverse conditions in their countries. For instance, in June 2019, Carola Rackete, a German Sea-Watch captain, rescued 42 migrants in Italian waters. She decided, acting discretionary, to enter the port of Lampedusa, and was immediately taken into custody by Italian authorities and was charged for violating a new law that prohibits aiding and abetting illegal immigration.

Matteo Salvini, the former Italian Interior Minister, and many other people considered Rackete a criminal. Rackete argued that she felt "a moral obligation," that the lives of those people were beyond "political games," and that she made her decision according to "the principle of human rights" (Kaschel 2019). The captain's actions clearly illustrate the tension between, on the one hand, a state that claims the priority of its sovereignty and, on the other hand, an ethical motivation that prioritizes respect for human rights and the care of vulnerable people. Rackete, without making it explicit, acted according to the ethics of recognition and care, the option that, as we shall argue, complements liberal democratic principles.

3. The Ethics of Recognition

Could it be possible to establish ethical grounds for selecting or excluding migrants, thus avoiding the violation of human rights and reacting adequately to large simultaneous claims for asylum and legal residency? Although it seems reasonable to prioritize human rights over states' sovereignty, we have seen, with the case of captain Rackete, that the relevant priorities are usually not entirely clear.

We propose that the ethics of recognition emphasizes our interconnectedness with other human beings, even when they are not part of our political community. As mentioned, this interconnection can be stated as follows: We shall act considering the welfare of others because our own welfare, as well as that of the collective, depends on our relationships with them. From this ethical standpoint, it can be inferred that migration is not an exclusively political and administrative matter, but rather transcends the idea about the sovereignty of the state because it is imperative to protect peoples'

integrity and guarantee respect for their human rights. A basic premise in the ethics of recognition is the moral obligation to respect the dignity of every human being regardless of their race, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, and economic situation. It can be argued that any ethical or political theory shares this premise. The ethics of recognition, however, claims that human dignitiy is an intrinsic value in itself and the cornerstone of ethical decisions. This view stands in stark contrast to the utilitarian view that focuses on the social or economic consequences of ethical decisions neglecting the welfare of the concrete other. It is also contrasting with other ethical theories, as for instance, Marxism, in which there is a tendency to deny the role of individual rights, prioritizing the cooperative process of production as the means for integrating the citizens to the society (Honneth 2017, pp. 35–36). The hallmark of the ethics of recognition is, thus, the emphasis on human dignity over the consequences of ethical decisions.

The idea of "recognition" implies that every human being is able to recognize the common humanity of others. In short, the ethics of recognition establishes that when helping others, we help ourselves. However, this should not be seen as a utilitarian premise because, in this interdependence, concern for others is not motivated by our own welfare, but rather by the collective welfare. This means that, unlike utilitarian ethics, the ethics of recognition assumes that individuals are members of a collectivity and not isolated cells fixated on their own welfare. The ethics of recognition transcends the bounds of our political communities, is inclusive, it is cosmopolitan, it rejects discriminatory practices, and purports that we have special duties with migrants.

Habermas, for his part, sustained that human beings are part of a political community and thinks that special duties with the members of a political community exist. The members of a political community stand in solidarity with foreigners, according to Habermas, when they support new members' integration as long as they adopt the relevant social institutions and culture. In this sense, Habermas' conception of solidarity is not enough because it focuses on the welfare of the political community, and not on the welfare of foreigners, when what we need is a balance between both.

According to Habermas, the inclusion of every individual in practical discourse presupposes a symmetrical relation between members of a community. This is why he emphasizes that real "social integration" implies the adoption of institutional and cultural values in order to socially adapt. Honneth disagrees with Habermas' conceptualization of solidarity (Honneth 2007b, pp. 123–24). He believes that this understanding of solidarity leaves out cases where there is an asymmetrical relationship, such as those where people are "in such an extreme state of need or hardship that the moral principle of equal treatment can no longer be applied in a balanced manner. Therefore, human beings who are either physically or mentally unable to participate in practical discourses deserve at least the selfless care of those who are emotionally bound to them" (Honneth 2007b, p. 124).

Certainly, Habermas does not reject moral obligations with concrete others. He assumes that we should take care of the "welfare of one's fellow man," so he proposes a principle which he refers to as the "other of justice" (Habermas 1989). According to this principle, there is a concern for others that even extends into the affective sphere. Notwithstanding, Honneth points out that Habermas' concern for others presupposes the membership in "an ideal communication community," which allows for a "shared life context" (Honneth 2007b, p. 123), which should not be bound by political borders.

As Max Pensky has noticed, Habermas' social theory of communicative action locates the foundations of solidarity in a mode of communicative reason that transmits itself through modern social institutions. Habermas' theory of communicative action demands a high level of linguistic sophistication from citizens that implies social and cultural closeness among its members (Habermas 1984, pp. 99–101). In accordance with the communicative theory of Habermas, "'solidarity' means the bonding effect that arises in and through deliberating citizens, not in view of the contingent ethical bonds that obtain insofar as such citizens happen to be members of this particular society, but insofar as they have internalized and continually approve of just those norms constitutive for practice in any modern constitutional democratic society" (Pensky 2011, pp. 134–35). In this sense, Habermas underlines the crucial role of social institutions over the concrete other. Evidently, in liberal

democracies, the role of social institutions is essential, but not sufficient. There are cases in which social institutions are weak or for some reason have ceased to exist. Consider, for example, the current situation of Venezuela and Syria, two cases in which there are governmental crises and, consequently, social institutions are not reliable.

To overcome the limitations of the Habermasian conception of solidarity, Honneth claims that the idea of the "other of justice" should be supplemented by the Levinasian–Derridian ethics of care (Honneth 2007b, pp. 118–24). For Levinas, in our encounters with other people, "(. . .) the other always faces me as a person in need of protection and concern to such a degree that I am overburdened in all my finite possibilities to act and thus concurrently become aware of a dimension of infinity" (Honneth 2007b, p. 118). Put it simply, our encounters with the others constitute a "face to face" moral experience. Derrida picks up this Levinasian notion of "face to face," and he "views the assymetrical obligation to provide unlimited care to another human being in his or her individual need as a central principle of morality" (Honneth 2007b, p. 119). The ethics of care, indeed, takes into consideration the asymmetrical responsibility towards the concrete other, rather than the solidarity limited to the supposed members of a shared communicative community (cf. Sinnerbrink 2011, p. 193). In short, solidarity is necessary, but a complementary and stronger moral attitude is needed, namely, care or help (Honneth 2007b, p. 101). This care is characterized by not seeking any payback or benefit. According to Honneth, most contemporary societies have forgotten moral attitudes in which we voluntarily attend to the concrete other, providing help and support, without considering reciprocal benefits (Honneth 2007b, p. 101).

From Honneth's ethics of recognition, we shall propose that the idea of "care" should be recognized as ethical grounds that need to be integrated into social institutions. The idea of care invites us to prioritize people's integrity and human rights over the sovereignty of the state. This does not imply, however, neglect of the political community. The ethics of care does not imply that states should renounce their sovereignty, but rather highlights that states' right to sovereignty has limits in so far as there are ethical duties to those outside one's particular political community precisely because our common humanity transcends those political communities. Importantly, the ethics of care should not be understood as a romantic or sentimental attitude. The ethics of care leads us to ask ourselves about our connections to and ethical duties with the rest of humanity, and it poses a true challenge to individualist and statist theories. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, if the people living in liberal democracies want to take human rights seriously, they must understand that the sovereignty of states has limits. These limits should be understood as guidelines that indicate that beyond a specific normativity, in group asylum situations, states face an unusual circumstance where decisions should be made with extreme caution.

The ethics of care recommends carrying out a very careful deliberative process that takes into consideration both the capacity of each state to help, as well as the conditions of the migrants who wish to enter. Recently, Blake has related the ethics of care with the political virtue of mercy (Blake 2020, pp. 199–201). Both, mercy and the ethics of care, assume that states should undertake a rigorous self-assessment of their responsibility in making decisions regarding the destiny of migrants. Concerning these decisions, we must keep in mind that the primary goal is to actively help those who find themselves obliged to leave their lands, their homes, their countries. Hence, the ethics of care encourages reacting to the vulnerability of others, providing assistance according to the possibilities of each actor involved in defining immigration policy. Often, countries do not have the capacity to react in these deliberative processes and, consequently, the international community must be involved. Openness to the international community is characteristic of liberal democracies, and implies voluntary acceptance of certain commitments arising from international agreements.

Participation in these kinds of agreements means that sovereignty has its limits. These limits could be seen negatively insofar as they hinder the power of the state. Hence, some might think that proposing an ethics of care, which is characterized, as mentioned, by the relevance it gives to people and their human rights, could diminish the sovereignty of the state. Our proposal here is that far from

diminishing the sovereignty of the state, the ethics of care and its strong commitment to human rights, as we shall see, strengthens and confirms that sovereignty.

Up to now, we have argued that the ethics of recognition leads to the idea of "care," and, in this direction, to an ethics that are focused on the protection of individuals, without diminishing political communities. We also argued that liberal democracies should admit this ethics of care as a guiding principle. Although it imposes limits to sovereignty, these limits are not necessarily negative. Actually, the ethics of care provide states with the opportunity to carry out a deliberative process that strengthens their sovereignty. This deliberative process certainly implies some tension between sovereignty and respect for human rights. There is a serious ethical dilemma when states must decide to the possible detriment of their sovereignty. Some scholars have even discussed whether the relation between sovereignty and human rights is antithetical (Cohen 2012, pp. 159–63). However, this collision, usually seen negatively, is not necessarily so. We wish to suggest that these collisions, tensions, and conflicts are positive and crucial for the maturity of liberal democracies. When states perceive migration as a challenge to their sovereignty, they must be aware that their decisions may define the future of many people. Therefore, states must exercise their authority responsibly, seeking greater possibilities or alternatives for resolution that do not reduce them to closing borders (thus turning their backs on the humanitarian problem), or simply opening borders indiscriminately.

When facing group asylum, liberal democracies meet the challenge of strengthening their liberal principles, both administratively and politically. From the administrative perspective, migration policies and asylum must be rethought. Migration institutions must be strengthened and, in particular, more regional development alternatives that involve the international community should be considered. Assuming these alternatives is a sign that states actually take on their role as the result of democratic decisions and aspirations for increased democraction in Tilly's (2007) sense of incorporating excluded residents and that they are really committed to protecting human rights. To remain indifferent to migrants' situations, or to avoid joint responsibilities to a problem that requires the involvement of various social institutions in each region, is to renounce the principles that sustain liberal democracies. As well as renouncing to a universal ethics from which we recognize ourselves as members of a human community sharing a common home, the planet Earth.

4. Sovereignty and the Ethics of Care

We have mentioned that there are cases in which migrants in vulnerable situations have been banned in some countries. This is, for instance, the case of the migrants protected by captain Rackete. As we mentioned, Italian authorities considered Rackete's action as a violation of the state sovereignty. She argued, however, as we explained, that she felt a moral responsibility to help those people. The Italian court—an arm of the state—absolved her, but public opinion was divided between those who considered Rackete's action as criminal, and those who were moved by her empathy with migrants. Instead of reacting according to liberal democratic principles protecting the integrity of individuals in a vulnerable situation, the former Interior Minister prioritized the protection of the state's sovereignty. In strictly legal terms, the Minister acted with legitimacy. In ethical terms, we could have expected a real concern for the care of the others. Liberal democracies should protect, as we have argued, not only the members of their political communities but also any vulnerable individual.

Liberal democracies cannot disregard helpless people who are trying to save their lives. Without ethical grounds for political and administrative decisions, the policies to address group asylum will become increasingly inhumane. Here, we have argued that the ethics of care can provide these ethical grounds. These ethics, which find their justification in the ethics of recognition, recommends that, in extreme cases, before thinking of applying solidarity, as Habermas would think, liberal democracies should act, as Honneth argues, according to the ethics of care. We have argued that this ethical model appeals to the recognition of a common humanity and claims that our connection to others and the ethical duties we have with them transcends the bounds of our own political communities and our institutional legal frameworks. As we have insisted, these ethics do not eliminate

conflict and tension between the sovereignty of the states and respect for human rights, but they do contribute to coping with the conflict by considering it essential to the ethical and political development of human societies. According to Honneth, conflict is characteristic of liberal democracies. Struggle is what enables individuals to be recognized (Honneth 1995). As a matter of fact, it is the only way in which human beings shape their identities; the only way we realize that we are autonomous is by recognizing autonomy in the others (Honneth 2007a, pp. 130–31). Modern societies, according to Honneth, have forgotten the relevance of recognition. Honneth proposes a review and transformation of institutional practices, which are mainly instrumental, into humanized practices, confronting what he calls the "forgetfulness of recognition" (Honneth 2008, pp. 147–59).

As can be seen, Honneth's proposal has political intentions that surpass individual autonomy. These intentions consist in the insertion of the idea of "care" as an essential ethical attitude in the recognition of every human being, especially the most vulnerable among us. In our view, the idea of care challenges the state with an ethical obligation without diminishing its sovereignty. Instead, it strengthens democratic liberal principles since democracies (1) cannot remain indifferent to a problem as large in scale as group asylum; (2) cannot evade responsibilities by arguing that they are protecting their sovereignty; (3) must react to group asylum situations in consideration of the fact that care for individuals is a priority; (4) finally, in reacting to these kinds of situations, they must be involved in a deliberative process in which, administratively and politically, they sometimes must limit their sovereignty in order to respect and protect human rights.

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Article

Analyzing Migration Management: On the Recruitment of Nurses to Germany

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Abstract: In Germany, a grave labor shortage in the nursing and elderly care sectors has prompted the response of recruiting skilled nursing staff from abroad in recent years. This article analyzes these recruitment practices as forms of "migration management": German migration policy has changed according to this paradigm to attempt utilitarian control over migration processes and mediate between labor market concerns on the one hand and isolationist, politico-cultural seclusion on the other. Based on original research through interviews and document analysis, we identify four relevant levels of analysis in researching migration management in the context of the recruitment of skilled nurses: (1) Definition of problem areas: How is migration programmatically legitimized as a solution to social problems? (2) Categorization of migration: How are migration processes classified? (3) Change in statehood: How are sites and actors of migration control being privatized and diversified? (4) Technologies: By means of which procedures, legal foundations and political instruments does migration management take place in the everyday? We believe that taking these four foci as points of departure would be beneficial for further inquiries in critical migration research.

Keywords: care; migration; migration management; nursing; recruitment; globalized labor markets; Germany

1. Introduction

For some years now, it has been maintained that Germany's health and care sector is suffering from a serious shortage of skilled care personnel, which is expected to become even more severe in the future (Hämel and Schaeffer 2013, p. 423). Forecasts predict a lack of up to 520,000 full-time nurses in 2030 (Prognos 2012, p. 2).[1] The reason given for this is usually a growing demand for care in the wake of demographic change, along with a concurrent shortfall in the supply of nurses. Today, hospitals, nursing homes, and home care providers are already experiencing great difficulty replacing skilled personnel upon retirement or otherwise leaving the industry. The causes for this lie in the economization of the health and care sector: the changes in the structure of funding and of incentives have led to higher demands on productivity, while the patient–staff ratio has remained the same or even declined, resulting in nurses having to shoulder a both mentally and physically more exhausting workload. As a consequence, in 2017, an opening for a hospital nursing position remained vacant for an average of 146 days and in elderly care for 171 days (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2018a, pp. 12–13), while the average of all openings was only 103 days (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2018b, p. 6).

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[1]   While Germany is also a destination country for (informal) carers providing long-term care in private homes, this article focuses on qualified nursing professionals working in hospitals, elderly care homes and for mobile health care providers.

Against this backdrop, recruiting nurses from abroad has become a key strategy in maintaining a sufficient workforce in the health and care sector in Germany (Braeseke et al. 2013; Bonin et al. 2015; Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2012; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 2012). Members of the German federal government have explicitly suggested pursuing a large-scale foreign recruitment policy (Federal Minister of Health Jens Spahn) and advocated for specific exemption clauses in right-of-residence law (Federal Minister of Labor Hubertus Heil) (Bild am Sonntag 2018) or proposed special provisions for refugees in the care sector (Neues Deutschland 2018).

We will argue that, in Germany, immigration policy is increasingly being framed in terms of its labor market potential or, more broadly, as a solution to various societal problems. The changing expectations toward migration not only create a basis for classifying migratory movements as desirable or detrimental, but also divert attention from complex drivers of migration and the subsequent inclusion of migrants into German society. Therefore, it is important to explore how and to what extent the principles of migration management are shaping migration processes in Germany. Referring to existing literature and based on our own research, we identify four constitutive elements of migration management: (1) presenting migration as a solution strategy for different problem areas in the society; (2) defining supposedly distinct categories of migrants that are used to facilitate or hinder their access to the host society; (3) involving new (types of) actors in policy-making and implementation; and (4) devising technologies (e.g., programs and procedures) that support the steering of desirable migration.

As the care sector is already largely regulated in accordance with labor market demands, it is particularly suited for tracing how the shift toward a potential-oriented migration policy is actually taking place. Our own research on the recruitment of nurses[2] demonstrated how different kinds of actors identified potential pools of skilled nurses in other countries, eliminated barriers and defined immigration paths for potential workers on the basis of utilitarian criteria, thus testing their ability to persevere in the labor market. Moreover, it was often argued that utilitarian principles should be applied to programs designed to admit immigrants on humanitarian grounds. This article will discuss the research results along the four proposed dimensions we identified as guiding principles for managed migration. As these developments can also be expected to extend to other "shortage occupations" in the future, the analytical framework can be developed further to reflect the application of the principles of migration management to other fields of migration or types of migration. In our view, the framework presented here makes the recent shifts in migration policy toward a utilitarian rationality visible. Thus, it enables a comprehensive critique of the attempts to capitalize on the divisions and stratifications within the myriad of migration phenomena.

2. The Principles and Politics of Migration Management

The concept of migration management suggests that if migration processes are managed in a strategic manner, it benefits all parties involved. Thus, the advocates of this approach claim to be able to mediate between economic needs and politico-cultural attempts at isolation by introducing principles of utilitarian optimization to the steering of migration processes (de Jong et al. 2017, p. 4). However, rather than pursuing an overarching strategy, such endeavors remain heterogeneous and involve state institutions, supranational organizations, and think tanks, as well as private enterprises.

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[2] The empirical research referenced in this paper took place between 2015 and 2017 during the project Betriebliche Integration von Pflegefachkräften aus dem Ausland (Organizational integration of foreign nurses) conducted by the Department of Human Geography, the Institut für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Kultur (Institute for Economy, Labor, and Culture) and the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute of Social Research) [all at Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main] and funded by the Hans Böckler Foundation. During this endeavor, which is only partially referenced here, 14 interviews with representatives of employers, recruitment agencies, vocational training institutes and qualification recognition authorities (among others), as well as 40 narrative interviews with migrant and autochthon nurses, were conducted. While we consider the perspectives of migrant nurses themselves to be essential, their voices and experiences are not part of this paper due to the focus on a specific political project of migration management. Their perspectives were reflected at length in other publications resulting from the project, which were published by Pütz et al. (2019).

These new types of actor constellations, as well as the increasing role of private actors in developing and implementing sector-specific instruments as technologies for steering migration, reflect new relations of power in society and a fundamental change in statehood (Buckel 2012; Forschungsgruppe »Staatsprojekt Europa« 2014).

In Germany, a long phase of attempted isolation against immigration in the course of the recruitment ban in the 1970s has been superseded by a paradigm focused on the potential of immigration (Pütz and Rodatz 2013), which has found expression in new types of migration management. What this refers to is a policy approach that also perceives migration as a resource and is explicitly guided by the "economic and labor market policy interests of the Federal Republic of Germany" (§ 1, German Residence Act).

At the European level, the European Commission together with think tanks such as the International Centre for Migration Policy Development and the International Organization for Migration have been driving forces for a greater openness toward a migration management policy guided by a focus on human capital (Parusel 2010; Georgi et al. 2014). The main instrument regarding labor market entry in EU-migration policy has been the Blue Card directive, which has, however, ultimately had only scant effect in terms of steering migration (Georgi et al. 2014, p. 210). The European level nevertheless continues to play an important role in the analysis of migration management because it has placed migration more prominently on the agenda of the EU Member States and issued other legal regulations (see Section 3.4). However, compared with other countries, Germany was late in initiating the shift toward a migration management driven by labor market demands (Kannankulam 2014). The change began in 2000 with a green card initiative for IT professionals and continued with a reform of citizenship law and the introduction of the Immigration Act in 2005. The federal government saw the Immigration Act in particular as an important component for steering immigration according to economic needs and opened up additional avenues for immigration primarily for highly qualified individuals from third countries (Ette et al. 2012, p. 16). Between 2011 and 2013, the paradigm shift in immigration policy for the highly qualified gained increasing momentum in the wake of reforms such as the comprehensive implementation of the Blue Card directive in Germany or the introduction of § 6, para. 2 of the Employment Regulation (Kolb 2014, p. 73), which led the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to state, as early as 2013, that Germany displayed a rather liberal system of immigration for the highly qualified (Kolb 2014, p. 71).

The political project of recruiting nurses to Germany refers back to several of these policy changes, but was also made possible through changing cultural framings of migration. Meanwhile, the migration of nursing professionals has become the prime example of migration management in Germany. After laying out the context in which this development took place, we will now demonstrate how these migratory movements are shaped by the techniques of migration management along the four dimensions identified through our research.

3. Analyzing Migration Management: Recruitment of Nurses in Germany

3.1. The Demographization of the Care Crisis: Migration as a Solution Strategy

A constitutive feature of migration management is a programmatic legitimation suggesting that key social problems can be solved by means of (orderly) migration. In this vein, the term migration management refers to the supposed ability to pursue a rationally motivated migration policy on the basis of expert knowledge (Geiger and Pécoud 2010, p. 11; Georgi 2007, pp. 72–73). In the context of migration, this notion can be pitted against deep-seated resentment associated with migration (Balibar 2005).

The skill shortage in the health and care sector is a much-discussed problem. Estimates of the expected shortfall in care staff range from about 55,000 (in 2025; Afentakis and Maier 2010) to 520,000 (Prognos 2012, Prognos 2012) full-time jobs (Rothgang et al. 2012; Ehrentraut et al. 2017). The wide discrepancy between these figures is in itself a clear indication that a skill shortage is not an objective

state of affairs. Defining it is already part of the scientific-political construction of such a shortage, which in the current debate is characterized by abstracting from the deeper politico-economic and cultural issues of an insufficient funding and devaluation of care work. For instance, an aspect that remains underexposed is that the economization of the health system has resulted in changes in the structure of funding and of incentives as well as in a successive deterioration of working conditions in the health and care sector (Chorus 2013; Winker 2015, pp. 75–77; Auth 2017, pp. 313–15). Cost-reduction strategies have increased productivity through the intensification of work, low wages, and cutbacks in patient–staff ratios (Hedemann et al. 2017). However, the current debate on an aging society and a lack of skilled workers tends to hide these relations from view. To reflect on this theoretically, we could draw on a term coined by Schultz (2016, p. 120) and speak of a "demographization" of social problems. What this term seeks to express is that a skill shortage, for instance, is constructed as a demographic problem and negotiated in terms of the number of qualified workers while losing sight of issues of employment relationships and working conditions (Schultz 2016, pp. 121–25).

Instead of addressing the latter, strategies of securing a qualified workforce call for recruiting nurses from abroad and thus suggest that it is basically possible to deal with the care crisis via migration (Kordes 2019). This approach legitimizes migration as being essential for a changing society to fill the gaps of the demographic pyramid or in specific segments of the labor market (Meissner 2018, p. 294). The diagnosed care crisis is a focal point where these two gaps overlap. The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth's "Elderly Care Education and Training Initiative (Ausbildungs und Qualifizierungsoffensive Altenpflege)" repeatedly refers to the seemingly inevitable demographic constraints and then draws the following conclusion:

> "The partners agree that, because of the substantial increase in the demand for skilled personnel in elderly care, not only must the domestic [sic] potential be more strongly promoted and tapped to secure a foundation of skilled staff, but the potential available in the EU labor market, as well as, at least in the mid to long term, qualified immigration from third countries, must also be fully utilized" (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2012, p. 48).[3]

But what impact has this strategy already had on the labor market in the care sector? Since 2012, several recruitment programs along with exemption clauses in immigration law have boosted the migration of nurses to Germany considerably.[4] As a large part of those migrants come from EU countries and therefore enjoy freedom of movement, this increase in the immigration of nurses can be determined only by consulting statistics on the recognition of credentials.[5] According to these statistics, the number of annual applications for the recognition of credentials in the care sector has increased from approximately 1.500 in 2012 to around 11.500 in 2018 (cf. Figure 1). Until 2014, this increase originated primarily from other EU countries; since then, however, requests for recognition from third countries have surpassed it, signaling the influence of current migration management practices on migration channels and patterns.

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[3] All quotes were translated from German by the authors.

[4] Statistically, it is not possible to differentiate between autonomous and recruited migration. Although autonomous migration originates primarily in countries that enjoy privileges arising from freedom of movement, these countries are also subject to private and public recruitment initiatives. Conversely, it is possible to immigrate from third countries in the absence of recruitment activities. However, this involves considerable effort. All statistical data regarding recognition proceedings refer to the country of issuance of the respective diploma, not the citizenship of the applicant—although the two are almost exclusively identical.

[5] As a result of this lack of statistical data, the actual number of migrants seeking employment as nurses is larger than indicated here but cannot be determined precisely. Conversely, it is conceivable — although presumably only in individual cases—that people whose credentials have been recognized upon applying from their home countries may ultimately abstain from migrating to Germany (Schmitz and Winnige 2019, p. 8).

Figure 1. Number of new applications per year for recognition of credentials as registered nurse by region and selected states, 2012–2018.

A large part of this immigration is an immediate result of a change in the management of migration in the care sector, namely the introduction of public programs, launched in 2013 at the latest, to recruit individuals from this occupational group. These programs, such as MobiPro-EU, for instance, targeted other EU countries. It was one of the public programs that paved the way for the concerted recruitment of nurses from abroad. It addressed individuals between 18 and 35 years of age who were registered as unemployed in an EU member state and willing to take up skilled employment in a "shortage occupation". It was open not only to state but also to private sector agencies, and was thus a typical example of the increasing significance of private actors in managing migration processes. MobiPro-EU covered expenses for language classes, relocation, and recognition procedures on behalf of participants and agencies (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2016).

Other programs were launched specifically for the recruitment of nurses from third countries. The most important one since 2013 is Triple Win, which was initiated by the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, the quasi-public German agency for development cooperation) in conjunction with Germany's Federal Employment Agency. Triple Win involves bilateral placement agreements with four third countries (the Philippines, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Tunisia). Moreover, the same players launched a recruitment program with Vietnam in 2013 to guide certified nurses into vocational training for elderly care. The tremendous significance of these recruitment programs for recruiting candidates from third countries is reflected in the application numbers (cf. Figure 1): the few countries involved in these recruitment programs account for almost the entire increase in applications from third countries, in comparison to about 100 other third countries responsible for the remaining small numbers.

Furthermore, the analysis of the available data shows that Germany has gained increasing significance as a destination of global labor migration, which it is seeking to consolidate. Upon

request from the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the federal government recently gave a comprehensive account of its plans to further expand recruitment activities (Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2018). The FDP's care policy spokesperson, Nicole Westig, remarked in response that the results are still insufficient. She stated that, in light of the dramatic situation in the labor market for nurses, all potentials must be utilized and that recruitment could be an important component to do so (Szent-Ivanyi 2018). This illustrates that migration policy is perceived to be a legitimate solution strategy to address the care crisis. The relevance of this strategy is reflected not only in sheer numbers but also in current efforts to develop new structures that would position Germany as a destination for nurses from abroad.

3.2. Categorization: Figures of Migration in the Care Sector

To utilize the aforementioned migration potentials, it is a constitutive practice for migration management to categorize migration flows and the migrants involved. Such processes of sorting are central to the functioning of migration management as they determine which types of migration (e.g., countries of origin and paths of migration) and which migrants (e.g., characteristics of their work history and other attributes) are to be encouraged and which ones are to be preferably stopped. In principle, migration management distinguishes binarily between desirable and undesirable forms of migration (de Jong et al. 2017, p. 4). From a governmentality perspective, Ratfisch (2015) has termed such programmatic distinctions as idealized "subject figures of migration (Subjektfiguren der Migration, our translation)". He understands the EU's categories of legal, illegal,[6] and humanitarian migration as an attempted ordering of diffuse migration phenomena. The "rationalisation" (Lagios et al. 2018, p. 9) of migration control is conditional on the discursive production of such orderings.

According to this categorization, foreign-trained nurses are essentially defined as "desirable" migrants. Our analysis shows that, beyond this basic classification, there exists a fine-grained system for categorizing migrated nurses that depends on their certified skills and the degree to which these can be economically utilized in the labor market. According to our research, these more detailed categorizations are applied primarily by labor market intermediaries involved in the placement of nurses (see our discussion of actor constellations and technologies in Sections 3.3 and 3.4). As "marketizing agencies" (Çalışkan and Callon 2010, p. 8), these intermediaries play a crucial role in shaping migrants into tradable commodities and determining their market value and thus contribute to establishing and stabilizing the market for nurse placements. In this context, marketization means that nurses are prepared—in spatially and temporally differentiated processes ranging from training in their countries of origin to employment in a German care facility—in line with the demands of (potential) employers so that they can be placed as workers in the labor market. In this way, migrants are objectified as nurses, which involves differentiated processes of stratification and categorization Rand et al. 2019, pp. 49–51).

One of the key characteristics for distinguishing the commodity of "nurse" proves to be the certified level of proficiency in German. In the recruitment process, level B1 or B2 is the minimum for recognition of credentials. From the perspective of agencies and employers, language proficiency beyond these levels not only enhances their "market value" considerably but also serves as an indicator of greater extralinguistic skills. Our study shows that supposed language deficiencies are taken as a sign of a lower capability or limited occupational aptitude of the nursing recruits:

> "We begin with simple personal care and making beds; the very easy stuff. When that's covered, they have to document it. Because this is also an important part of the tools of the trade. Then we wait and see what their German is like, as it were" (Practical instructor/mentor (Ward A), Hospital 1)

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[6] Ratfisch deliberately employs the language used by the European Council. We prefer speaking of 'illegalized migration' (Düvell 2002, pp. 52–53) to indicate that humans as such cannot be illegal; only by means of legal intervention is the mode of 'illegality' constructed.

Objectification also takes place by separating nurses from their social relationships in their countries of origin and tying them to labor market intermediaries or would-be employers. Both moves enhance the calculability of the placement process and reduce the costs involved, respectively:

"Because the young ones (nurses from Romania) often already have children and a family. (laughing) (…) Yes, they typically stay at home. (…) It's clear; the two months here are without children. And that has to be clear from the outset because they cannot learn as much if a child is here." (Placement officer 3, Hesse)

Our interviews show that the image that employers and placement agents have of the future nurses reflects a specific subjectivity (Rand et al. 2019, pp. 51–53), or what Ratfisch calls a discursive "figure of migration" (Ratfisch 2015, p. 3). In our interviews, five sought-after attributes correspond to this image of desired nurses: malleability, willingness to adapt, high motivation, flexibility of commitment, and high geographical mobility. Migrants are therefore constructed as working subjects with useful skills and individual abilities who must be provided conditions to enable channeling their actions and labor power into desired paths (Ratfisch 2015, p. 10). Our interviews indicate that the nurses are judged by the extent to which they have internalized those principles of economic rationality (Tomei 2016), and thus already conform to the type of subject associated therewith:

"There is this example—the question at the core of emotional intelligence – you are probably familiar with it: 'A lollipop now or two lollipops an hour later.' (…) And ultimately we want two lollipops; we offer two lollipops, but you have to wait six months before you get the lollipops; and this question is of a selective nature. Because there are people who cannot imagine this in the first place; they can't think about such cycles; they don't want to. Those are therefore not the right ones. And those who don't want to do this won't learn the language either. (…) We still explain it, but we also let it stand as a selective criterion. Because the person who is willing to muster emotional intelligence to this degree and say 'I know it's worth the investment' is also a reliable worker in the long run." (Placement officer 1, Hesse)

Migration management that increasingly includes private actors in the process of steering migration turns migrants into the commodity of "labor power", which goes hand in hand with multifarious categorizations in regard to their "market value". Here, categorizations of a more individual kind overlap with structural aspects such as geographic origin (cf. Figure 2). Accordingly, we find a multitude of divisions and classifications of migrants within a category such as "legal migration". This differentiation of access paths and rights might be referred to as a "politics of categorization (Mourão Permoser 2017, p. 2550) and is highly significant for those affected as it creates stratified access and multiple legal positions. In the nursing field, distinctions are made according to four regions: (1) EU member states,[7] with freedom of movement and harmonized recognition of credentials; (2) third countries that enjoy preferential treatment and are targeted by recruitment programs; (3) other third countries; and (4) countries in which the World Health Organization (WHO) has determined a critical shortage of health personnel and should therefore not be subject to such recruitment (WHO 2006, p. 12).[8]

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[7] Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland are essentially treated on the same terms as EU member states.

[8] The WHO list has been adopted into German law so that, according to § 38 of the Employment Regulation, the German Federal Employment Agency is the only eligible placement service provider for individuals from the 57 countries on that list.

Figure 2. World map displaying the number of new applications for recognition of credentials as registered nurse by distinct regions of origin, as well as individual countries, 2012–2018.

3.3. Change in Statehood: Privatization and Diversification of Migration Control in the Case of Nurses

Migration management is invariably associated with a change in statehood that is reflected in newly assembled and weighted actor constellations involved in initiating and implementing the respective policies. Accordingly, we have been witnessing a shift in the functions of migration control

in recent years that is transforming the role of the state (Menz 2011). The state is increasingly assuming the role of a manager and is assigning key tasks of implementation to private actors (e.g., private recruitment agencies) in a multi-scalar actor network (Hess et al. 2014, p. 15). Scott (2017, p. 396) describes this process as "rescaling and venue expansion". According to this reasoning, there have been "outward, upward and downward" shifts in initiating, implementing, and accounting for migration policy. An outward shift can involve, for instance, the externalization of risk or the engagement of external expertise, or an upward shift, for example, the regulation of labor migration at the European level (Scott 2017, pp. 397–98).

The recruitment of nurses takes place in such a diverse network of state and non-state actors that spans across multiple scales. This can be traced particularly well with regard to an initiative created by the state of Hesse: as early as 2012, the Hessian state government launched an initiative for the recruitment of young, unemployed nurses from the Community of Madrid for Hesse's elderly care facilities (Rand et al. 2019, p. 43). The pilot project was developed in cooperation with the Federal Employment Agency's Regional Directorate Hesse (Regionaldirektion Hessen der Bundesagentur für Arbeit), the League of Non-Statutory Welfare Services in Hesse (Liga der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege in Hessen), and the Federal Association of Private Social Service Providers (Bundesverband privater Anbieter sozialer Dienste) (Hessisches Sozialministerium 2013). The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) covered the costs of language courses, and MobiPro-EU subsidized nurses' relocation expenses. The recruitment initiative coordinated the activities of the participating actors. It collected information on the labor needs of elderly-care facilities in Hesse and accompanied representatives of these facilities to a job fair in Madrid. Additionally, a B1 level language course specifically tailored to the needs of the care sector was developed in collaboration with the Darmstadt regional administrative authority, which is in charge of recognizing qualifications acquired abroad, and StartHaus Offenbach, which is a non-statutory youth welfare service provider.

In the countries of origin, where mobilization, selection, and initial preparation of would-be migrants takes place, networks of actors form as well. Their primary role is not in the field of job placement in the narrow sense but in laying the groundwork for migration (Rand et al. 2019, pp. 48–49). For instance, universities are encouraged to prepare nurses for the possibility of migrating at a later point in time (e.g., "by replacing English with German in classes teaching foreign languages, with the prospect of being prepared for migration"; Placement officer 1, Hesse). Language schools in the countries of origin are involved in the recruitment activities by participating in the process of selecting the nurses or assisting in the conclusion of contracts. These language teachers also act as "culture brokers" (Moroşanu 2016, pp. 359–61; Bludau 2015, p. 96) in that they advise the nurses during language classes regarding how to behave in workplace and everyday settings in Germany. At the same time, they assume the task on behalf of labor market intermediaries of monitoring the participants' learning success and their performance potential.

A key aspect of current recruitment initiatives is the involvement of labor market intermediaries, among them temporary employment and job placement agencies (Rand et al. 2019, pp. 43–45). In recent years, they have discovered the recruitment of nurses from abroad as a new, promising line of business and have developed their service portfolio accordingly. This has been further enhanced by the fact that, after some initial attempts, many employers abandoned their own recruitment activities in favor of outsourcing them to private sector or state-like actors (e.g., GIZ). In other cases, care facilities developed the recruitment of skilled staff into a business model of their own, mixing the role of service provider and labor market intermediary:

> "First, for our own needs. Then we became aware of how much work it actually involves and how much energy it consumes. And then we said, 'Okay, plenty of others have the same problem that we have.' And then we turned it into a business model." (Director of an elderly-care facility, Hesse)

As Benner (2003, p. 622) has shown, labor market intermediaries can establish themselves as actors because they reduce employers' transaction costs of recruitment from abroad, manage the risks involved in the recruitment process, and develop networks to support recruitment activities. In line with this finding, we can state for the German labor market in the field of nursing that labor market intermediaries ensure the continuous adaptation of regional labor markets to changing circumstances. As our project shows, intermediaries promise a reduction in the high transaction costs arising from non-transparent circumstances surrounding the recruitment process – both for employers and for the nurses (Schwiter et al. (2014) have observed similar behavior for placement agencies in private home care settings).

To a large extent, the aforementioned groups of private sector actors rely on state initiatives to open up the field of recruitment strategically. In this process, the role of the state is not limited to creating a regulatory framework but also involves deliberate measures to prepare and support specific recruitment channels. Such state-driven recruitment initiatives intend to establish Germany as an attractive destination country in globalized labor markets for nurses. State authorities provide the following services in the context of recruitment initiatives:

- Matching demand for skilled labor in Germany with the supply of skilled labor in EU countries in accordance with the principle of the free movement of labor within the EU (e.g., the Federal Employment Agency's Foreign Placement Agency (Zentrale Auslands und Fachvermittlung), together with European Employment Services, organizes job fairs in other EU countries);
- Providing a systematic overview of the formal and organizational aspects involved in recruitment from third countries, which employers frequently perceive as representing substantial barriers, and making it available to a variety of actors (e.g., checklists for recruitment, language and skill-oriented preparation in the country of origin, application of residential and working permits in Germany; (Peters et al. 2016);
- Creating platforms for projects where common agreements can be made that extend to all participating organizations (e.g., in the context of the Hessian recruitment initiative, an agreement was reached defining the conditions under which recruits could continue attending language classes during their induction phase).

Despite the long-term prospect, establishing the recruitment of nurses as a strategy for securing skilled personnel in the care sector is regarded as being of a temporary nature. In addition, the participation of public authorities in the Hessian project was not intended to be a permanent arrangement as in other pilot projects. The goal was for market actors to secure their supply of skilled labor on their own:

> "We only make the offer; as an association, we're only attempting to organize it as a service, so that the companies can do it. But how they do it in the end is simply up to them." (Representative of an association of service providers, Hesse)

3.4. Technologies: Steering the Migration of Foreign-Trained Nurses

An essential element in the functionality and stabilization of new forms of managing migration is devising specific technologies for steering migration in politically desirable ways. In line with Rose and Miller, what we have in mind here are those "programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions" (Rose and Miller 1992, p. 175). As socio-technical processes, technologies for steering migration are a manifestation of a biopolitics that aims to influence the composition of the population (Georgi 2007, p. 64). Moreover, such technologies obscure the political background of migration management by directing attention to management tools and issues of technical viability. Steering through technology engenders a depoliticization of the social relations of migration (Georgi 2007, pp. 72–73; de Jong 2016, p. 348).

One of the key technologies for steering migration are the processes for the recruitment of nurses from abroad that were established through legal reforms. Of particular relevance to migration in nursing was the departure from a fixation on university degrees: § 6, para. 2 of the Employment–Regulation, which entered into force on 1 July 2013, enabled the immigration of individuals with vocational education and training credentials in occupations considered relevant to the labor market (Kolb 2014, p. 79). Technically, this key objective of migration management was implemented by determining (1) "recognized credentials" in (2) regulated vocational training occupations listed on the Federal Employment Agency's so-called "positive list (Positivliste)". It is compiled biannually on the basis of an analysis of shortages of skilled labor and lists occupations in which filling positions with applicants from abroad is considered "justifiable from a labor market and integration policy point of view" (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2018b, p. 17). Steering migration via a list of occupations issued by the Federal Employment Agency attests to the high priority given to migration policy as an instrument to optimally coordinate labor supply and demand (Rand et al. 2019, p. 37).[9]

Another important technology in the care sector is the standardization of qualifications via the recognition of occupational credentials, which was regulated comprehensively in 2012. This has resulted in regional differentiation: first come applications from long-time EU member states; second come applications from new EU member states (accession since 2004), in which case the occupational credential must have been acquired after accession to the EU; and third come applications from third countries (Sommer 2014, p. 78). What Sommer failed to take into account, and our study has been able to show, is that applications from third countries with placement agreements benefit enormously from such structured arrangements compared to other third countries, despite the formally required case-by-case review. A requirement for the recognition of credentials in nursing regardless of region of origin is, however, proof of knowledge of the German language. Depending on the state in question, this may be level B1 or B2 according to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages or also certificates related to specific occupations such as B1 + Nursing.

Recently, the technologization of the steering of migration has also entailed digitization: the 2016 amendment of the EU Recognition Directive introduced the so-called European Professional Card. In combination with the Europe-wide Internal Market Information System (IMI), the card intends to expedite recognition procedures and thus the transfer of formal qualifications. This involves, for instance, digitizing and reviewing documents in advance so that, given sufficient language proficiency, recognition of credentials within Europe is granted at the click of a mouse (European Union 2019). In this way, digital communication technology, which was previously primarily discussed as a means of monitoring illegalized migration (Dijstelbloem and Broeders 2015; Sontowski 2017), has now also found its way into the management of labor migration.

The 2012 Recognition Act intended to facilitate recognition procedures, yet third country nationals are still subject to case-by-case reviews in the field of care, which poses a considerable obstacle. This illustrates the extent to which recognition authorities function as gatekeepers and, in the nursing field in particular, how the construction of differences in job tasks and training has an impact (Krawietz and Visel 2014). Research with case workers shows that, when assessing the equivalence of credentials, they looked for "substantial differences". The standard that they often applied in the process was that equivalence required "identical" content. Differences in training content were almost exclusively seen as deficiencies that needed to be offset and not as potential to be tapped (Sommer 2014, pp. 69–71). Resulting from the relevance of case worker decisions, as well as a differing legal basis, we can see that granting recognition is handled very differently depending on the certificates' region of origin (cf. Figure 3). For example, recognition procedures take considerably longer for third country diplomas and, in most cases, make recognition conditional on meeting certain compensation requirements.

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[9] In recent legislative procedures, the German parliament (Bundestag) resolved that, for the time being, the positive list would no longer be applied as an instrument of selection. The new law intends for immigration to be possible for all occupations in which professional or vocational credentials are recognized.

Therefore, while our research shows how crucial recruitment programs like Triple Win are to streamline these processes with some success, the recognition of professional credentials remains the main obstacle to increased recruitment and migration of nurses from third countries.[10] As the opposing trends in the number of applications from the EU versus the third states show, these stark differences in recognizing credentials swiftly and fully will only become more pertinent in the future.


Figure 3. Decisions issued in new credential recognition procedures for registered nurses and total number of applications by region of origin, 2012–2018.

4. Discussion and Outlook

In this contribution, we used the example of recruiting nurses from abroad to demonstrate that analyses of migration management can be systematized along four dimensions: a first level of analysis shows that steered migration is widely considered a legitimate solution to the societal problem of the care crisis. The common reasoning underlying this perspective is exemplary for a demographization of social relations that involves obscuring the structural roots of the nursing shortage. Second, in the process of migration, categorizations of migrants come into play. Nurses are objectified in terms of language skills, as well as subjective requirements, and turned into the commodity of "nurse". Depending on the region of origin, this involves granting them different privileges, legal paths of access, and paths of migration. Third, their recruitment is increasingly organized in diversified actor networks in the context of changing statehood. In the care sector, this involves state initiatives as important initiators and loci of coordination that bring together additional private and intermediary actors, put the structures of recruitment in place, and set the process in motion. Fourth, it has proven fruitful to interpret the concrete instruments used in recruitment as technologies for steering migration. Apart from specific legal provisions and instruments such as the positive list, which make migration into regulated vocational training occupations possible in the first place, one of the main technologies is the standardization of nurses via recognition procedures.

The present contribution has shown that a migration policy oriented toward potential that takes the form of migration management finds paradigmatic expression in the recruitment of nurses as a strategy

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[10]   On the problems inherent in the contemporary practice to require candidates to apply from abroad, see Best et al. (2019).

to address the societal care crisis and the shortage of skilled personnel. These four distinct dimensions, which are of central importance to migration management, are intertwined via a shared rationality of economic utilitarianism (Rose and Miller 1992): the productive steering of migration and mobility in light of the increasing flexibilization of work and the economy. If we consider these developments from the viewpoint of critical migration research, we can confirm the thesis that migration management is dominated by a logistics mindset. The management of nurse recruitment analyzed here reflects the idea of being able to accomplish a sector-specific steering of migration just in time and to the point (Altenried et al. 2017, pp. 24–27).

We assume that the four dimensions of analysis outlined in this article can be transferred to other studies in the field of migration management as well. Such research could examine, for instance, recruitment projects in other shortage occupations or in other areas of migration management, such as programs for voluntary repatriation (Dünnwald 2010), or could probe in more detail single or several dimensions.

We predict for the future that recruitment will continue to increase, professionalize, and include market actors to a greater degree. The previously strictly regulated field of nurse recruitment will be subject to fewer and fewer legal restrictions. Moreover, those involved in recruitment are currently gaining experiential knowledge and are adapting the structures in public administration and private enterprises. In the event that the new immigration act (Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2019) is implemented as planned, this would make other third countries interesting targets for exclusively privately organized recruitment endeavors. In the near future, precarious recruitment could thus loom increasingly large, as standards (such as the Global Code of Practice in the recruitment of nurses) might be undermined if recruitment is guided by for-profit motives alone. The flipside of an increasingly positive connotation of migration in migration management discourse must also not be neglected: new programs for promoting 'desirable migration' go hand in hand with an increased exclusion and illegalization of 'undesirable' forms of migration, which are constructed as representing an economic burden or a politico-cultural threat (Menz 2011, p. 120; de Jong et al. 2017, p. 4). The relatively free movement of refugees through Europe in the summer of 2015 has additionally resulted in a shift in hegemonic discourses on migration and again unveiled racist and colonial continuities in the way we speak about 'migration' in general (Bhambra 2017; Jäger and Wamper 2017). To what extent these changes will also restructure the discourses on the migration of skilled labor remains to be seen.

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Going by an English Name: The Adoption and Use of English Names by Young Taiwanese Adults

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Abstract: It is easy to understand why Taiwanese students play the part of the name assigned to them in English class, but why do so many of them continue to use this name long after their school years? A survey of young Taiwanese adults, with follow-up interviews, investigated how and why they acquire and use an English name. The results mirror previously reported tendencies and suggest some new insights into the motivation and functionality of this practice. The data show that self-identification with their Western name offers pragmatic social and cultural advantages, including international identity, escape from rigid cultural formalities impeding social advances, establishing friendliness without getting too close, as well as self-expression. As concerns the often discussed nature of English names, the results indicate that the selection of an English name is influenced by Chinese name selection practice, the tendency to make the name unique or somehow related to the Chinese name, and especially by its intended role. As in previous studies, we found some unusual names, but these were used mainly as a nickname in communication with peers.

Keywords: English name; Chinese name; Taiwan; pragmalinguistics; sociolinguistics; naming practices; identity; nickname

1. Introduction

In recent years, it has been increasingly common to hear Asian people introduce themselves under their "English name", although only a fraction of them were born in a western country or into an international marriage. This trend of using English, or more precisely, foreign names, can be observed especially among ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong (e.g., Mathews 1996; Li 1997), Singapore (Tan 2001), Macau (Cheang 2008), Taiwan (Liao 2000; Chen 2015), and also mainland China (Lee 2001; Edwards 2006; Henry 2012). While the practice of acquiring and using an English name can be at least partially ascribed to the challenging pronunciation of Chinese names and specific Chinese naming practices (e.g., Jones 1997; Li 1997; Louie 1998; Liao 2000; Chen 2016; Guccini 2017, etc.), including the relative flexibility of having multiple names in traditional Chinese culture, it may vary in some local aspects, having arisen under different historical circumstances and pursuing various aims.

Cheang (2008, p. 197), researching the use of English names by the Macanese, noted that in many countries with a colonial past, it is not uncommon for people to receive a name in other than their native language. Mathews (1996, p. 404), who studied the use of English names by ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong, pointed out that western names are convenient especially in educational and commercial settings for being perceived neither as formal as full Chinese names or intimate as Chinese given names. According to Li (1997), the Hongkongers who have adopted an English name are called by their Chinese name much less frequently. Other research into the use of English names by Chinese learners of English from the Chinese mainland (Edwards 2006) has indicated that English names can be imposed by teachers of English (cf. Sercombe et al. 2014), and that the widespread practice of adopting

English or anglicized names reveals the users' attitudes, both positive and negative, to British culture and learning English. Chien (2012) found that using English names positively influences the English learning attitude of Taiwanese elementary school children.

A number of studies discuss the nature of English names adopted by ethnic Chinese (e.g., Lee 2001; Liao 2000; Heffernan 2010), pointing out that many of these names significantly differ from names typically used in English-speaking countries, and attribute this difference primarily to the influence of Chinese naming practices. However, it remains unclear in what situations such unusual names are actually used.

The above-mentioned papers address the issue of the adoption of English names by ethnic Chinese from various perspectives, and with the focus on various target groups, including, for example, ethnic Chinese students staying abroad (Heffernan 2010; Chen 2016; Guccini 2017; Schmitt 2019).

This paper explores the practice of acquiring an English name among the Taiwanese, and the functions that these names are seen to fulfill outside of English class, in their adult life, not only when communicating in English, but also in Chinese. While it is expected that most adults in their 20s and 30s have acquired an English name, as the acquisition seems closely connected with the Taiwan's education system, the aim of this research is to provide insights into the motivations for its continuous use in their adult life.

The research also investigates the perception of the relative importance of their English name, and from this perspective considers their particular name choices as well as the manner and circumstances in which they use their name.

Furthermore, we question to what extent the adoption and use of their foreign name outside of English class has become an integral part of Taiwanese culture.

2. Methodology

The initial data for this study were collected through a survey questionnaire (Google Forms, English and Chinese versions) (Please see English version in Supplementary Materials) filled out by 76 respondents, 61 females and 15 males, age 18–41. Since the goal of the research was to understand the motivations for the continued use of English names by young Taiwanese adults, which is a qualitative question, we chose a smaller sample size questionnaire complemented by follow-up interviews, rather than a sample size sufficient to support statistical analysis, although noticeable trends were pointed out in the paper.

The questionnaire survey was conducted in the autumn of 2019, shortly after 40 of the respondents had arrived at the Faculty of Informatics and Management of the University of Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. They came for one semester from various study fields from several different Taiwanese universities. Three respondents worked as teaching assistants at the Department of Asian Studies at Palacky University, Czech Republic, and the remaining respondents were in Taiwan, reached through one of the teaching assistants. The gender imbalance was caused primarily by the predominance of women at the universities. However, there was no indication that gender was a significant factor among our respondents, so no attempt was made to seek gender balance or to divide the respondents into two groups by gender.

Questions raised by the responses to this initial survey were further investigated for more in-depth information during interviews with 11 respondents at the University of Hradec Kralove, who either expressed interest in the research or were asked to clarify some answers, and, additionally, the 3 respondents at Palacky University.

The mother tongue of the respondents was mostly Mandarin, in a few cases Taiwan Southern Min or Taiwan Hakka, but all of them were fluent users of Mandarin. English was their first foreign language, which they had studied for at least 10 years, and most of them enjoyed using it. With regard to their education, they either were enrolled in or had graduated from at least a bachelor's degree, and most had experience studying, or at least traveling abroad.

The structure of the questionnaire, which consisted mostly of open-ended questions, was as follows: The first part solicited the abovementioned background information. The second part inquired about the circumstances under which the respondents acquired their first English name, who had given it to them and when, and how many times they had changed their name. We sought more detailed information concerning their currently used name, including why they selected it, their satisfaction with it, and its perception in respect to their Chinese name. The last set of questions focused on how and why the respondent uses their current name in interaction with foreigners, and with other Taiwanese.

The follow-up interviews followed the structure of the questionnaire and were used to clarify the meaning of some responses and elicit more detailed information concerning issues raised by the survey. Additionally, the respondents were free to express their feelings and viewpoints, which exposed further aspects not included in the original questionnaire.

The comments by the respondents cited in the following section to illustrate the various points under discussion come from the questionnaires. Those written in Chinese are presented in English translation.

The research was conducted with a limited number of respondents who might well be better educated and more global than their peers, although, as explained above, the respondents staying in the Czech Republic had just arrived and it was, in most cases, their first stay abroad. Thus, their stay in Europe might influence their future use of their English name but not so much their responses to the questionnaire.

3. Results

3.1. Acquisition of an English Name as an Established Practice within Taiwan's Education System

Heffernan (2010, p. 33) noted that the English names of Hong Kong respondents in his survey tended to be chosen by a family member, but not so in Taiwan, the Mainland or Korea. Although some of our respondents stated they had received their English name from their parents, at birth, or a few years later, the majority received their first English name from their first teacher of English at an educational institution, most of them during either pre-school education or elementary school education, the rest when in high school.

In Taiwan, it has become a common practice to receive an English name during the first English class at either a regular school or a cram school (private after-school classes). Until 2001, English was taught as a mandatory subject from junior high school, in 2001 it was officially introduced to elementary schools as well, starting in the fifth grade, and four years later in the third grade (Chen and Tsai 2012). Thus, respondents above the age of 31 started learning English at school not later than at the age of 12 or 13, i.e., in junior high school. Those 25–30 years old had started by the age of 10 or 11, i.e., in the fifth grade of elementary school, and younger respondents by the age of 8 or 9. However, some of them started learning English much earlier, in kindergarten or privately. In addition to making it possible for foreign teachers to pronounce and remember their students' names, the acquisition of an English name is used to help the students identify with the target language and culture (Chien 2012).

The practice now has been ubiquitous for several decades, and consequently is an expected part of their shared culture. The vast majority of the respondents (98.1% of those below the age of 30 and 85.7% of the older respondents) have an English name. Only four respondents (one in her 20s and three in their 30s) did not initially admit to having an English name. These four perceived their Chinese name easy to pronounce and remember, and one of them additionally considered it more respectful to be called by her Chinese name.

Many respondents described the bestowal of an English name by their teacher as a routine at their school. Some teachers suggested the respondents a few names to choose from or tried to find a name that would sound similar to the respondent's Chinese name, but in some cases the selection depended more on the seating order in the classroom than anything else. One respondent (29 yrs.) mentioned that she received her English name, *Naomi*, when she was eight from the office lady at the counter of the children's English cram school.

3.2. Changing Names

Considering the nature of the acquisition, it is not surprising that more than half of the respondents changed their English name at some point in their life. This selection of one's own English name shows an obvious interest in having an English name, and particularly having one that expresses the bearer's self-identity. Most of those who had not changed it either received it from their parents (just as their Chinese name) or had a chance to influence its selection. The majority of those who changed their name did so only once, often because they did not particularly like the name selected by their teacher, and thus later chose a new name they liked, as illustrated by examples 1 and 2:

(1) *My first English name was Angela, and I thought it was too common when I was 13, so I changed it by myself. I took my current name from an actress of an American TV drama that I liked at that time.* (Elena, 24 yrs.)

(2) *I changed my English name when I went to college because my previous English name, which I had received from my kindergarten teacher, was too childish.* (Claire, 20 yrs., transl. from Chinese)

Some respondents mentioned that they had used various names, depending on the class or occasion, and later, in high school or at college, chose their current name, with which they feel comfortable. Interestingly, some respondents make use of several names at the same time: they can get a new English name in addition to their existing name or names upon entering some new social circle.

As example 1 demonstrates, a frequent reason for changing the name is that it is too common. Meeting a person with the same name is a good enough reason to choose a new one. The new name does not necessarily have to be unique but needs to be unique within the respondent's environment (cf. Liao 2000, pp. 135, 173; Lee 2001; Cheang 2008, p. 200 reported similar findings for Macau).

Another reason for changing the name is the desire to have a name that would have a deeper meaning than just some randomly selected name, would better express or suit the respondent's personality, would be evocative of the sound or meaning of the respondent's family name or Chinese given name, etc. (cf. Chen 2015). Here are some examples of English names that are related to their bearers' given names through sound similarity: 毓昕 *Yùxīn*[1] → *Cindy*, 明軒 *Míngxuān* → *Michelle*, 亮婷 *Liàngtíng* → *Tina*, 奕伸 *Yìshēn* → *Eason*, etc.

In addition, the selection is frequently motivated by Western popular culture, the respondent's favorite personality, often an American TV drama character or actor (example 1), member of a music band, sportsman, etc., or is carefully selected from a name dictionary. The influence of Western culture is obviously present in name selection, and its popularity among the younger generation shows a desire to be a part of Western culture.

Most respondents are satisfied with their current name, including many who had not been satisfied with their first name. A few respondents still plan to change names when they find one they really like, or when their life situation changes (example 3).

(3) *My current name Pica is motivated by my school nickname Pikachu. It seems too "childish" so I might have to get a new one when facing some professional occasion.* (Pica, 23 yrs.)

3.3. The Nature of the Names

It has been repeatedly pointed out in the literature that Chinese people tend to like unique English names, including names that are common nouns, such as *Butterfly* (Heffernan 2010), *Moment* (Liao 2000, p. 157), *Bison, Echo* or *Feeling* (Lee 2001), names of famous personalities such as *Magic Johnson* (Lee 2001), fictional and mythological characters such as *Lancelot* (Liao 2000, p. 157), *Jekyll*, *Satan* and *Medusa* (Lee 2001), etc.[2]

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[1] Chinese names are transcribed using the Pinyin system.
[2] McPherron (2009) noted that mainland Chinese English names may be quite unusual (i.e., not typically American or British), but many of his respondents said that they would change their name if they went abroad.

However, only a few of the names given by our 76 respondents were of such various natures. The rest of them were already existing names (see Table 1 below). According to worldwide statistics provided by the website "The meaning of the name",[3] more than half (51.5%) of the respondents' names rank among the 500 most frequent names (male and female names combined), and more than two thirds (70.6%) rank among the top 1000 names. Another website, MyNameStats.com,[4] which provides statistics for name occurrence in the United States (also male and female names together), yielded similar results: 55.9% of the names rank among the top 500 and 67.7% among the top 1000 names. Only 10.2% of the names according to the former statistics and 13.2% according to the latter were as rare as ranking outside the 10,000 most frequent names. Furthermore, some of the more unique names given by our respondents are simply modified variants of relatively common names, such as *Anny* (from *Annie*), or *Evone* (from *Evonne*), which the name bearers either misspelled or just wanted to be unique (cf. McPherron 2009).

Table 1. Frequency of occurrence of the respondents' English names.

Frequency of Occurrence	"The Meaning of the Name" (%)	MyNameStats.com (%)	Examples
1–499	51.5	55.9	**Male:** *Gilbert, Jack, James, Joe, John, Neil, Sam, Wayne;* **Female:** *Alison, Angela, Ashley, Carol, Cindy, Claire, Erica, Grace, Heidi, Jenny, Jessica, Joanne, Lisa, Michelle, Nicole, Peggy, Samantha, Shane, Shirley, Tammy, Tiffany*
500–999	19.1	11.8	**Female:** *Belinda, Daisy, Elena, Maggie, May, Naomi, Sylvia, Trisha, Vivian, Yolanda*
1000–1499	5.9	5.9	**Male:** *Johann, Kai;* **Female:** *Demi, Genie, Hollie, Ivory, Kelsie, Mina, Winnie*
1500–1999	2.9	5.9	
2000–4999	10.3	4.4	
5000–9999	0	2.9	
10,000–19,999	2.9	2.9	**Male:** *Draven, Eason;* **Female:** *Effy, Evone, Pica, Sylvania, Witty*
20,000–39,999	4.4	0	
40,000–	2.9	10.3	

Four of the names given by the respondents are actually just Romanized Chinese names, which the respondents nonetheless considered their English name (e.g., *Yachi*). For some Taiwanese, the term "English name" seems to refer not just to a name that might be used in an English-speaking country, but to any name written in the Latin alphabet.

3.4. The Perception of One's Own English Name

When asked to categorize the significance of their English name, almost 40% of the respondents valued their English name as much as their Chinese name, and one person even higher. The rest considered it less important or a nickname (Table 2).

Table 2. The perception of one's own English name.

	Respondents (%)
Name which is more important than your Chinese name	1.4
Name which is as important as your Chinese name	39.7
Name which is less important than your Chinese name	28.8
Nickname	30.1

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3   Available online: https://themeaningofthename.com/ (accessed on 6 March 2020).
4   Available online: https://www.mynamestats.com/ (accessed on 6 March 2020).

Those who marked their English name as equally important as their Chinese name usually have a more frequently used name; names such as *Effy*, *Draven*, *Pica* or *Witty* were considered a nickname or less important than their Chinese name. For example, *Effy* (30 yrs.) received this name from her husband. She likes it because it is cute and considers it her nickname, which she uses only occasionally.

The only respondent who marked his "English" name more important than his Chinese name studies his MA overseas. He does not like being associated with China, and therefore has no affinity to Chinese names in general. He even changed his name on his official documents, although he chose the name *Johann* because it is close to his Chinese name *Jiāhàn* (佳翰). He does not mind his own name in particular, but he dislikes Chinese names in general.

It might be expected that those who are not particularly happy with their Chinese given name might place more importance on their English name. While they receive their Chinese given name at birth and cannot influence the choice (although one respondent has changed her name), with the English name they have the freedom of selection. Yet there does not seem to be any correlation between the preferences for their Chinese or English name based on the liking/disliking of the former. Unsurprisingly, those changing their English name were among those actually using it.

Those who consider their Chinese name more important emphasize the fact that it has a meaning, that it is the first gift they received from their parents, and that they live in Taiwan. Several respondents clearly value the permanence of their Chinese name.

> (4) *As for Asian people, our original names have more meaning to us, according to our religion and culture. The English name is a kind of name that helps me get in touch with foreign culture.* (Claire, 21 yrs.)

> (5) *Chinese name is a name parents will think about for a long time to pick or create... From the name, we can understand what parents want to give to their child. You can only change your name twice during your whole life, but we can change our English name anytime . . .* (Cindy, 22 yrs.)

Those who consider their English name as equally important as their Chinese name say that while both names represent them, the English name is also part of their identity, especially for those who have chosen their own name, and they would not now want to change it.[5]

> (6) *They are both "me".* (Daisy, 22 yrs.)

> (7) *I like the* [English] *name I use now. I use this name not only as a nickname but also as my official name when I publish a paper or make a public presentation. This name is also registered in my passport as an "also known as".* (Gilbert, 41 yrs.)

> (8) *One* [the Chinese name] *is the expectation of my parents, one* [the English name] *is the name I chose for myself.* (Shirley, 29 yrs.)

3.5. Using Their English Name

Almost everyone gets an English name for their English class, and it is among that group they use it almost exclusively, and this use usually spreads to interactions with peers even outside the classroom. Several respondents also mentioned parents, who initiated or otherwise supported its acquisition. On the other hand, many parents of the respondents do not even seem to know the English name of their child, or do not consider it important. This could be related to the relatively recent nature of this phenomenon.[6]

Their use of their English name varies widely, influenced by both their attitude and environment. During their elementary and high school years many respondents considered their English name simply

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5   On questions of identity, particularly for overseas students, see Schmitt (2019).
6   For parental views of the adoption of English names see Huang and Ke (2016).

an unavoidable thing required mainly in English classes, especially those taught by foreigners, but later they began to appreciate it not only in communication with foreigners but even with other Taiwanese.

As Table 3 below and the respondents' further comments indicate, the next place after school where English names are commonly used is in companies, especially those with foreign partners or customers. As many as 38.5% of the respondents use their English name in communication with their colleagues, which is a high number, considering that many of the respondents are still students and probably not all of them have a part-time job. In interaction with close friends, the respondents use their Chinese given name or full name, their Chinese nickname and also the English name. The choice depends, among other factors, on the particular situation and mood. One in four respondents marked the English name as the most common choice. The same number of respondents marked English for communication with not very close friends, but not the same ones. Some prefer using it with close friends, some with not very close friends (see Section 3.5.2). Not surprisingly, English names are also preferred when communicating on Facebook and other social media where the English name serves as their pseudonym.

Table 3. The use of English names with certain groups of people.

	Number of Respondents (%)
Parents	9.0
Partner	16.7
Close friends	25.6
Not very close friends	25.6
Colleagues at work	38.5
Teachers of English	92.3
Other teachers	19.2

It is possible in Taiwan to include the English name as an "also known as" in the passport along with the Chinese name (cf. Schmitt 2019), and 12.3% of those who possess an English name take advantage of this possibility. Several respondents mentioned having their English name on a school ID or other document. These examples show a serious identification with the English name, and even official authorities accept its use.

When asked in which situations they would use only their Chinese name, most of the respondents mentioned official situations, when signing official documents or when they need their name to match their official documents. Chinese names are also preferred in communication with older people and within the family.

3.5.1. English Names in Communication with Foreigners

Similar to Neil in example 9 below, almost all the respondents prefer using their English name when communicating with foreigners. Several respondents explained that sometimes they did not even recognize that a foreigner had called their Chinese name. They wish to avoid a situation when the foreigner cannot remember or pronounce their Chinese name correctly, which could be embarrassing for both parties. In addition to accommodating the foreigner, they also protect their own face, as example 10 illustrates:

(9) *I feel more comfortable when people call my English name*. (Neil, 21 yrs.)

(10) *The last word of my Chinese name is hard to pronounce in the right way for foreigners. If they pronounce it in the third tone, the meaning of the word will change from poem to dung. And I really want to avoid that kind of situation*. (Ivory, 21 yrs.)

Many Chinese given names are quite problematic for foreigners. Those who can speak Chinese may not realize that without the knowledge of the rather complicated Romanization rules one can hardly guess the reading of a name such as *Guǎngxiáng* or *Xiānqīng*, and, moreover, pronounce it with

the proper tone (which, unlike in these two examples, is usually not even indicated in the transcription), and thus with the correct lexical meaning. Such a name is then hard to remember, too. An English name also makes a clear distinction for a foreigner between the given name and the family name. An English name thus makes it easier to start a conversation and develop rapport.

Some of the respondents, on the other hand, feel uncomfortable using an English name, since people from most non-English speaking countries use their own name when communicating with foreigners.

> (11) *When I studied abroad, I always used my Chinese name. Everyone from different countries used their real name to introduce himself or herself, only Asians hesitated. I felt bad for this kind of situation. We can still be proud of our own name.* (Ashley, 23 yrs.)

3.5.2. English Names in Communication with Other Taiwanese

Although some respondents answered that they only use their English name when communicating with foreigners and never with Taiwanese people, for others it is quite common. The following two respondents (examples 12 and 13) both have an English name and consider it as important as their Chinese name, yet they have a very different experience with its use in interaction with other Taiwanese people:

> (12) *I never met a situation that they* [Taiwanese people] *would call my English name, except for an English class.* (Peggy, 21 yrs.)

> (13) *It is a very common way for the Taiwanese to use the English name with their friends they meet in informal occasion.* (Gilbert, 41 yrs.)

For some respondents, an English name is simply trendy, classy, or cute. Many in the younger generation like to identify with Western culture, an aspect which is not unique to Taiwan. To *Jack* (20 yrs.) an English name gives a feeling of a Chinese person born in the U.S., an image he likes. Its use is convenient as it is usually easier to write (requiring fewer strokes) and, interestingly, easier to remember. This is quite understandable in regard to foreigners, especially those who do not speak Chinese, but surprisingly, this is often true even among the Taiwanese. Naturally, native speakers of Chinese have no problem pronouncing Chinese names, but because of the high frequency of similar-sounding names, they may find a Chinese name difficult to remember with confidence.

In addition to being used among friends, where they are usually treated as a nickname, some respondents mentioned that they used their English name when meeting someone for the first time. They reported that English names are easier to use; they help people get closer and facilitate friendship (examples 14 and 15). Addressing and referring to people in Chinese requires a thorough judgement of the person's age, social status, the degree of familiarity, formality of the occasion, etc. to choose the proper term of address. An inappropriate choice may jeopardize smooth communication. In Chinese culture, developing relationships is a process that normally requires quite some time and a number of steps (for a detailed explanation see (Li 1997, p. 502)). The English name is a shortcut, a convenient means of address, which is less formal than the surname, and at the same time less intimate than the Chinese given name, the use of which might be in that situation considered inappropriate or overfamiliar.

> (14) [The English name] *is convenient because you don't have to choose whether to call the other person with his or her full name, just last name with Mr. or Ms. or just first name.* (Eason, 27 yrs.)

> (15) [The English name] *makes it easier to get closer with new friends.* (Pica, 23 yrs.)

While in some situations the use of the English name helps to get closer, in others it helps keep the desired distance. Several respondents mentioned that they prefer using their English name when meeting someone for the first time (especially people of approximately the same age) or someone they are not familiar with, if they want to sound friendly enough, but do not wish to risk a closer relationship.

(16) [I use the English name] *at my work or when meeting someone I'm not familiar with. I think the Chinese name is used only when he/she is already a friend.* (Eason, 27 yrs.)

(17) *I don't want my Chinese name to be known by unfamiliar people.* (Naomi, 29 yrs., transl. from Chinese)

Whether accelerating intimacy or keeping a distance, the use of the English name conveniently helps to create "safe closeness".

4. Conclusions

One increasingly influential name selection criterion in many countries is for the name to be easy for foreigners to remember and pronounce, and to identify the name bearer as part of global society. For example, in Japan, which employs Chinese characters in its writing system, a growing number of parents seek for their children foreign-sounding names, or names which they think would sound natural in the West, such as 望愛 *Noa* (*Noah*), 咲空 *Sara* (*Sarah*), or 伶音 *Reo* (*Leo*), creating an interesting combination of a "foreign" sound and a "domestic" visual form (Baresova 2016). By contrast, the Taiwanese seem to stick to more traditional names (although the selection of the characters used in the names has been, of course, influenced by various trends), and the need for a name that would succeed in the globalized society is accomplished by the acquisition of an additional "English name", which is (as mentioned in Section 3.2) often somehow related to the Chinese name, most frequently through sound similarity.

Twenty-first century Taiwan has been taking steps toward being a Mandarin-English "bilingual nation" (Financial Supervisory Commission Republic of China (Taiwan) 2019). In addition to the practical benefits in global communication, it promotes a distinct Western identity and cultural separation from mainland China (Eliassen and Rich 2019). The use of English names has become symbolic of their vision of global modernization.

The origin of using English names in Taiwan seems to be closely connected with Taiwan's English language policy and education. Assigning an English name, originally for the benefit of teachers unfamiliar with Chinese, has become an integral part of the immersion experience of language acquisition during the last several decades. Our respondents acquired their first English name not later than in high school, and current children receive it during elementary school or in a private English-immersion preschool with foreign teachers, the number of which has increased considerably since the turn of the century, or even at birth.

It is often pointed out that Chinese people, including the Taiwanese, tend to choose very unusual English names. These "English names" are not necessarily names typically used in English-speaking countries but are in some way Western. The tendency to pick a unique name is important in Chinese name giving (Liao 2000), but it is also a more general trend, which has been observed worldwide (Lee 2001), including Japan (see Kobayashi 2009; Baresova 2016), among other countries.

While the acquisition of an English name has become an integral part of Taiwanese culture, as almost every young Taiwanese person has an additional "English" name, the perception of having an English name varies. Consequently, the way people perceive their English name influences their choice of name as well as the way they use it. Our survey indicates that the selection of an English name is not only influenced by Chinese name selection practice and the tendency to make the name somehow related to the Chinese name, but also depends on whether it is considered a nickname to be used mostly with friends, or a name as important as the Chinese name to be used in their work environment. As in previous studies, we found some unusual names, but these were used mainly as a nickname in communication with peers.

Although, for a few respondents, their experience with an English name did not extend beyond school classes, it is generally considered a convenient tool for communication in global multicultural society, which contributes to smoother communication, and the young adults surveyed increasingly see merits in its use even when interacting within their own culture, such as facilitating easier but limited intimacy, and providing a unique, positive, easy-to remember identifier.

The research was conducted with a limited number of respondents, all of whom were studying at or had graduated from university and most of whom had some experience abroad. Thus, our respondents might well be more global than their peers. Consequently, their use of English name might not be representative of the general population in Taiwan. However, our research indicates that even young Taiwanese without foreign experience find it beneficial to use an English name, and conversely, some respondents while abroad have grown averse to it. A large-scale random sample research project would clarify the prevalence of using an English name and might further explain the cultural and pragma-linguistic motivations of this interesting aspect of Taiwanese culture.

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Global Health Diplomacy Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Strategic Opportunity for Improving Health, Peace, and Well-Being in the CARICOM Region—A Systematic Review

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Abstract: Increased globalization has ushered in changes in diplomatic purposes and practices. As such, global health diplomacy (GHD) has become a growing field connecting the urgencies of global health and foreign affairs. More academics and policy-makers are thinking about how to structure and utilize diplomacy in pursuit of global health goals. This article aims to explore how the health, peace, and well-being of people in the region can be achieved through global health diplomacy. A systematic review of the literature was conducted on various terms such as "Global Health Diplomacy OR Foreign Policy"; "Disasters", "Infectious disease epidemics" OR "Non-Communicable diseases" AND "Caribbean" by searching PubMed, Scopus, Embase, Web of Science databases, and Google Scholar search engines. A total of 33 articles that met the inclusion criteria were analyzed, and the critical role of GHD was highlighted. There is an increasing need to understand the complex global health challenges, coupled with the need to design appropriate solutions. Many regional initiatives addressing infectious and chronic diseases have been successful in multiple ways by strengthening unity and also by showing directions for other nations at a global level, e.g., the Port of Spain Summit declaration. GHD has a great scope to enhance preparedness, mitigation, peace, and development in the region. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the region needs to strengthen its efforts on equity issues, health promotion, and sustainable development to promote peace and well-being.

Keywords: global health diplomacy (GHD); globalization; CARICOM; public health; health security; epidemics; Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19); non-communicable diseases (NCDs); peace; foreign policy; Caribbean

1. Introduction

The global interconnectedness of health in our modern world is unquestionable. There is evidence to support how the state of health of one nation may affect the health and well-being of others globally. Each country must be resolute/firm in addressing health concerns in its foreign policy as they are with their domestic policy. Traditionally, the main issue on the global agenda was addressing mainly communicable or infectious diseases (Saker et al. 2004). Increasingly, health issues are dominant and pervasive in the evolving global diplomacy agenda. Within this milieu, there are competing interests of actors, states, and other relevant parties that must be taken into account and influence the determination of the global health agenda. Equally important, is not only to understand the impacts (both good and bad) of globalization on health but also to develop appropriate, collective,

and effective global responses to these emerging issues. Even though global health is not afforded the same priority as politics and economics, certain global health threats/epidemics, such as the current COVID-19 pandemic, make the state actors/governments consider it as a top priority as it has crippled and stagnated the economy and global supply chain systems. As per the Institute of Medicine's Expert Committee, "Global health is the goal of improving the health for all people in all nations by promoting wellness and eliminating avoidable diseases, disabilities, and deaths. It can be attained by combining clinical care at the level of the individual person with population-based measures to promote health and prevent disease. This ambitious endeavor calls for an understanding of health determinants, practices, and solutions, as well as basic and applied research concerning risk factors, disease, and disability." (Fineberg and Hunter 2013). The WHO's Report from the International Meeting on Health in All Policies (HiAP) in Adelaide (Kickbusch 2010) and the term HiAP was first used in Europe during the Finnish presidency of the European Union in 2006. The aim of HiAP is to collaborate "across sectors to achieve common goals. It is a strategy to include health considerations in policy making across different sectors that influence health, such as transportation, agriculture, land use, housing, public safety, and education. HiAP reaffirms public health's essential role in addressing policy and structural factors affecting health, as articulated by the Ten Essential Public Health Services, and it has been promoted as an opportunity for the public health sector to engage a broader array of partners." (Kickbusch 2010). Since then, Global Health Diplomacy (GHD) has evolved in significant ways and is ill-defined through different schools of thought have defined using various terminologies. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), GHD enables multiple stakeholders to contribute to the greater health needs of humanity. It brings together the disciplines of public health, international affairs, management, law, and economics and focuses on negotiations that shape and manage the global policy environment for health. The relationship between health, foreign policy, and trade is at the cutting edge of global health diplomacy (Kickbusch et al. 2007). As Kickbusch and colleagues highlighted, recently, there has been increased importance afforded to GHD primarily because health itself has become a topically discussed issue by various actors outside the WHO, G8, G20, BRICS, and the EU (Kickbusch and Kökény 2013). While looking through an "economic vs. ethical lens" about global society and neo-colonialism, Rubbini pointed out that in the relations between developed and emerging countries as part of global health diplomacy, there is a risk that the former can adopt behaviors induced by the financial needs of overcoming their crisis and if the "ethical lens" is to prevail, it will be most likely be the hypothesis of a global society where there is a respect of human rights in order to drive growth and harmonization of relations between Governments (Rubbini 2018).

Furthermore, foreign ministries are becoming more involved with the health domain and the rise of new public–private partnerships and alliances. This is no different within the Caribbean HiAP Community (CARICOM), where GHD is growing in importance. The CARICOM is an organization comprising twenty (20) countries: 15 member states and five associate members. It was established in 1973 on three main pillars: economic integration, functional cooperation, and foreign policy coordination. The Secretariat is the principal administrative organ that is based in Georgetown, Guyana. Considering the increasing security concerns and challenges facing the region, its leaders agreed to establish security as a fourth pillar (Martinez et al. 2020). Within the revised treaty of the CARICOM, there are five organs, one of which is the Council on Human and Social Development, which supports the improvement of health. Another initiative is the Caribbean Cooperation in Health, a regional health strategy that has prioritized preventing communicable and NCDs, and strengthens health systems, environmental health, food and nutrition, mental health, family and children's health, and human resources training (Buss and Tobar 2018). The 21st century has brought new opportunities and challenges for the health of the populations in the Caribbean region, whose countries are linked by geography, history, and culture. Chronic and communicable diseases are devastating to individuals and communities, threatening quality of life and becoming an increasingly important factor in the Caribbean's development. In the Western hemisphere, the epidemic of chronic disease has most affected the Caribbean region Shirley Augustine (Augustine 2010). Other health initiatives by CARICOM

include the Pan Caribbean Partnership Against HIV and AIDS (PANCAP) and the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), a regional public health institute founded in 2010 (Powers 2011).

As globalization has pushed health to the forefront of international diplomatic efforts, global health diplomacy has emerged as a means of neutralizing, managing, and correcting health threats. Viruses such as the recent novel Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19), Ebola (Chattu et al. 2020), Zika (Sikka et al. 2016), and Chikungunya have demonstrated that health issues are not contained/confined to one country, can have detrimental consequences, and require an immediate response. On 11 March 2020, the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic, and as of 22 May 2020, there have been 4,995,996 confirmed cases from 216 countries and territories with 327,821 deaths (WHO 2020). As per the CARPHA's status report, dated 22 May 2020, there are 22,254 cases in 33 countries/territories (including 24 CARPHA Member States) in the Caribbean region, with 807 deaths and a high-risk alert for further importation of cases (CARPHA 2020). In order to confront this reality, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are increasingly engaging with global players and forums to have their unique positions and voices heard in the complex global field of health diplomacy. The SIDS of the CARICOM region are vulnerable to many natural and man-made disasters and also not well equipped with essential infrastructure to handle emergency situations and mostly dependent on neighboring big nations for support. Hence this review was undertaken with an aim to understand and explore the emerging role of GHD in addressing these challenges and how the health domain, peace, and the well-being of citizens can be achieved through the practice of GHD in the CARICOM region.

Although globalization has pushed health as a forerunner in international affairs, it also promotes a global culture based on consumerism and trade. Consequently, international banking institutions are gaining power, with the weakening of the nation-state, and local health institutions are increasingly less responsive to the public health demands with advances in the global economic development process. The IADB's Suriname Land Management Program (SLMP) is a good case in relation to the latter. It shows how economic development programs that change non-marketed land and mineral resources into marketable resources for the global economy, which affect health outcomes. The balance of payments requirements motivate the Suriname government to adopt adjustment policies that dispossess indigenous people of their land and livelihoods. It is an example of how the health and well-being of indigenous people are linked to inequalities generated by a neoliberal approach to economic development (Peplow and Augustine 2017). Perhaps, more "people-centered" policies for economic-development that meets the "balance-of-payment" goals, as outlined in the UNDP 1997–2002, can be developed and adopted.

2. Materials and Methods

In this systematic review, we tried to collect the existing evidence on GHD in the Caribbean for infectious diseases, HIV/AIDS, vector-borne diseases, health security, non-communicable diseases, and natural disasters. To find relevant articles for this review, PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus, Embase databases, and Google Scholar search engines were used to find the articles published during the period 1950–2019. Keywords included MeSH and common terms related to the topic: "Global Health Diplomacy" OR "foreign policy" OR "foreign affairs" OR "international relations" OR "Health Diplomacy" OR "Medical Diplomacy" OR "Negotiations" OR "Multilateral Engagement" OR "Noncommunicable Diseases" OR "Infectious Diseases" OR "Disasters" OR "Storms" OR "Hurricanes" AND "Caribbean". Articles published in any language other than English, articles that were not unavailable in full text, dissertations, and redundant studies were excluded. Two authors (V.K.C. and G.C.) independently assessed the study eligibility by reviewing the titles of all potential citations. Discrepancies were resolved by consensus between the reviewers. Full texts of all the relevant articles were assessed, and the data were extracted from each eligible study on the location of the study, the author's name, and the presence and discussion of the keywords of interest. All the reference lists of identified articles of a Caribbean context were chosen.

3. Results

Overall, 3245 articles were extracted from all the databases. Initially, the title and abstract of the articles were screened based on the inclusion criteria, leaving 211 articles for full-text review. Around 178 articles were excluded due to lack of focus to the Caribbean region, unavailability in full-text form, or redundancy. Finally, 33 articles were selected for the final review. The screening process and search results are provided in the PRISMA flow diagram (Liberati et al. 2009; Figure 1).

Figure 1. Flow chart showing the database search and article selection process using PRISMA guidelines.

This review attempted to highlight the key points that are essential for this multidisciplinary field in order to make successful negotiations. Nonetheless, high expectations are anticipated for global health initiatives by achieving development and diplomatic goals, which are documented in this review. All the important disasters, infectious diseases, including the recent COVID-19 pandemic, NCDs epidemics, and essential frameworks, are shown in the tables and figures in the next section. We also described the context, practice, and components of global health diplomacy, as applied in the Caribbean region.

3.1. Challenges and Outcomes of Global Health Diplomacy in the CARICOM Region

Caribbean nations have launched responses to unfavorable health trends regionally. Moreover, many countries in this region are heavily dependent on tourism for their survival. In this regard, small island states such as St Lucia, Barbados, Grenada, and Jamaica are particularly vulnerable to health threats. The Prime Minister of St. Lucia, Kenny Anthony, told the Miami Herald that "we are an exceedingly small country with very limited resources and inexperienced in dealing with a global health crisis" (Chattu 2017). Hence, there is an urgent need to strengthen and have effective, coordinated measures for addressing health threats within the CARICOM region.

The concept of nations joining together in the diplomatic fora to tackle public health problems is a core principle of GHD (Koplan et al. 2009). In this regard, the need for an appropriate and effective practice of GHD was evident with the global response to the Ebola outbreak in 2014. This crisis showed demands for more concerted policy responses, as well as diplomatic coordination at the global level during such a health emergency crisis. Partly in response to this, but also in recognition of the need to address ongoing global health disparities and realize the Sustainable Development Goals, CARICOM countries have focused greater attention and scrutiny on health policy. As such, regional health diplomacy is geared towards the dual goals of improving health and strengthening relations among CARICOM nations.

In the area of health, there have been some significant developments towards health promotion: the establishment of 5 regional health institutions, investments in tertiary-level institutions, and the Caribbean Cooperation in Health, which is the guide for the regional health agenda for the CARICOM states (Theodore-Gandi and Barclay 2008). In 2007, Heads of State of Caribbean nations convened the Summit on Non-Communicable Diseases to address, for the first time, the combined epidemics (i.e., cardiovascular illness, diabetes, cancer) in the region (PAHO 2011). The Caribbean regional "Port of Spain declaration" is one of the good examples of successful health diplomacy, which has led to the formulation of the WHO's Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs (Chattu and Knight 2019). Country-specific achievements underscore the important strides made toward improving health outcomes. Moreover, the emphasis by governments within the region on sanitation, nutrition, and primary health care has shown improvement in the health status of people in the Caribbean (CARICOM 2006).

3.1.1. Natural Disasters in the CARICOM Region

The 2010 earthquake in Haiti is an extreme example that took lives of over 230,000 people, displaced 1.5 million, and was followed by the largest cholera epidemic ever reported in a single country (Domercant et al. 2015). The other natural disasters that happened during the past decade (OCHA 2019) are summarized in Table 1 below.

3.1.2. Waterborne Diseases

In relation to health, natural disasters such as tropical storms and hurricanes provide the ideal context for the spreading of infectious diseases (World Health Organization 2006). Heavy rainfall, floods, and stagnant water produce the setting for the development of diseases related to water pollution. For example, Hurricane Matthew triggered the outbreak of cholera in Haiti in October 2016, as the spread of the disease was from contaminated water sources and person-to-person transmission. Additionally, in cases where is there is the internal displacement of people who are required to remain in temporary shelters where sanitary conditions are lacking, this intensifies the likelihood of contracting infectious diseases.

3.1.3. Vector Transmitted Diseases

Vector-borne diseases are human diseases caused by parasites, viruses, and bacteria that are spread by vectors (World Health Organization 2006). These diseases disproportionately affect the poorest populations. In recent years, outbreaks of dengue, Chikungunya, yellow fever, and Zika have caused great anxiety among populations, claimed lives, and put pressure on health systems in several countries (Sikka et al. 2016). Furthermore, the occurrence of some vector transmitted diseases can be directly linked to tropical storms. For example, diseases such as dengue can spread during hurricane season, as stagnated water and water storage containers are ideal for the reproduction of infected mosquitoes (vectors). Dengue remains a vital concern in the Caribbean and, as seen in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, require monitoring by PAHO as an upsurge of cases was observed weeks after Hurricane Matthew.

Table 1. Major natural disasters in the Caribbean region during 2010–2020.

Year, Event	Countries Affected	Impacts
2010, Earthquake	Haiti	230,000 deaths; 1.5 million displaced with total damage of USD 8 billion
2010, Hurricane Tomas	St. Lucia	44 deaths and damages of USD 463.4 million
2012, Tropical storm Isaac	Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba	24 died in Haiti and 5 died in the Dominican Republic with damages over USD 310 million.
2012, Hurricane Sandy	Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and the Bahamas	69 deaths in these countries with cumulate damage over US$3.58 billion
2015, Hurricane Joaquin	Bahamas, Cuba, Haiti	34 deaths and over 7000 directly affected with a loss over USD 200 million
2015, Tropical storm Erika	Dominica	574 people left homeless; 713 displaced due to flooding and landslides. A total of 733 victims and economic loss of USD 8 billion
2016, Hurricane Matthew	Haiti, Cuba, Dominican Republic, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Bahamas	546 dead in Haiti, 4 in Cuba, 4 in the Dominican Republic, and 1 in St Vincent and the Grenadines and damaging many homes in Bahamas. Estimated damage of USD 5.74 billion
2017, Hurricane Irma	Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Martin (French Part), Sint Maarten (Dutch Part), Turks and Caicos Islands, Virgin Island (British), Virgin Island (US)	47 deaths and affected over 10 million people. Estimated damage of USD 22.2 billion
2017, Hurricane Maria	Dominica, Dominican Republic (The), Guadeloupe, Haiti, Martinique, Puerto Rico, Virgin Island (British), Virgin Island (US)	143 deaths and affected over 927,000 people. Estimated damage of USD 91.6 billion
2018, Floods	Trinidad and Tobago	150,000 affected directly and estimated damage over USD 3.7 million
2019, Hurricane Dorian	Lesser Antilles, Puerto Rico, The Bahamas	67 deaths and affected over 29,500 people. Estimated damage of USD 3.4 billion

Source: Prepared by the authors based on the available statistics (OCHA 2019).

3.1.4. Medicine Supply

Another important area is the area of medicine supply. Hurricanes can adversely impact on medicine supply in terms of its accessibility and the safety of vaccines and prescription drugs for patients with non-communicable diseases. During hurricanes, there is the likelihood of power cuts and energy shutdowns, and some of these drugs require refrigeration. This is a major problem during natural disasters, and the security of the medicines cannot be fully guaranteed.

3.2. Growing Epidemic of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) in the CARICOM

CARICOM countries vary in size, geography, and resources. In this region, NCDs are seen as the highest health-related problems and the main cause of death. Aging of the population, successes in primary health care in the treatment of infectious and other diseases, and economic development have led to an NCD-epidemiological transition within the Caribbean region (Razzaghi et al. 2019). During the period of 1999–2014, the 3 major NCDs, namely, cardiovascular diseases (CVDs), diabetes mellitus (DM), and cancers accounted for 39–67% of all deaths in the 20 Caribbean countries.

3.2.1. Cardiovascular Diseases and Hypertension

Cardiovascular disease (stroke, coronary artery disease, and diabetes) is the major cause of death in the region. Elevated blood pressure is the primary cause of cardiovascular disease. The regional

Port of Spain Summit declaration of 2007, initiated by the regional heads of the state, is the only policy dedicated to NCDs using a multipronged and multi-sectoral approach. Through successful global health diplomacy and negotiations, this Caribbean declaration was elevated to a global level and resulted in the development of the declaration on the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases by the UN in September 2011 (Chattu and Sakhamuri 2018). The CVDs were ranked as the leading cause of death during this decade, as shown below in Table 2.

Table 2. Caribbean countries showing the cumulative proportions of death from non-communicable diseases (NCDs) during 1999–2014.

Country (Year)	Cardio-Vascular Diseases (CVDs)	Diabetes Mellitus (DM)	Cancers (Ca)	Cumulative Proportion of Death per 100,000 (CVDs, DM, Ca)
Anguilla (2005–2014)	24.46	9.97	3.36	57.79
Antigua and Barbuda (2005–2014)	28.29	8.91	18.43	55.63
Aruba (2005–2014)	28.33	6.05	23.79	58.16
Bahamas (2004–2013)	27.81	5.16	17.91	50.88
Barbados (2004–2013)	24.97	9.07	21.16	55.20
Belize (2005–2014)	18.67	8.87	11.58	39.11
Bermuda (2005–2014)	31.16	5.17	26.64	62.97
British Virgin Islands (1999–2004; 2008–10)	15.36	5.23	19.88	40.47
Cayman Islands (2004–2013)	21.85	3.90	25.19	50.94
Dominica (2005–2014)	30.14	7.87	19.67	57.68
Grenada (2005–2014)	30.68	10.08	19.33	60.09
Guyana (2004–2013)	31.95	8.11	8.29	48.35
Jamaica (2002–2011)	26.29	11.05	18.05	55.39
Montserrat (2005–2014)	32.08	21.10	13.41	66.59
Saint Kitts and Nevis (2004–2013)	30.57	9.01	16.80	56.37
Saint Lucia (2005–2014)	26.83	9.03	17.18	53.03
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (2005–2014)	31.74	9.49	15.29	56.51
Suriname (2005–2014)	26.76	6.32	12.46	45.54
Trinidad and Tobago (2001–2010)	31.55	13.89	13.77	59.21
Turks and Caicos Islands (2000–2009)	24.48	5.81	11.89	42.19

Source: Prepared by the authors based on the research NCD mortality in the Caribbean (Razzaghi et al. 2019).

3.2.2. Diabetes

Diabetes is a major cause of death and concern in the region and has been increasing over the last decade (Rivera-Andrade and Luna 2014). The Anglophone Caribbean is experiencing significant increases in obesity and diabetes levels. Although atypical diabetes is prevalent in this region, type 2 DM is the major public health burden, with prevalence rates that are higher than those reported in many developed countries. (Boyne 2009). This burden is compounded by staggering projected incidence rates for obesity and, thus, diabetes. Thus, primary prevention measures (lifestyle interventions), active diabetes screening, and surveillance will be needed for the 21st century. Since the origins of diabetes may also begin from early life, more research is required to describe these mechanisms, as well as to introduce appropriate public health measures. These intervention strategies should probably be directed toward women of child-bearing age, as well as children. This would result in the perception that intervention for diabetes (and other chronic, non-communicable diseases) needs to occur throughout the life span. However, the precise nature of such interventions is indeterminate presently.

3.2.3. Cancer

Almost 1.1 million new cancer cases were estimated in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a total number of deaths estimated at around 600,000 (Bray and Piñeros 2016). Overall, prostate,

colorectal, and breast cancer are now the leading causes of cancer in the Caribbean, with higher rates of prostate cancer (PCa) incidence and mortality among black populations in this region. Changes in lifestyle factors, such as decreased fertility and birth rates, changes in tobacco smoking habits, and changes in diet, most likely explain the changing cancer profile in the Caribbean. Differences in diagnostic and treatment practices, access to healthcare and public health policy, could further explain the overall variations observed in the Caribbean (Joachim et al. 2019).

3.3. Vulnerability to Current COVID-19 Pandemic and Other Infectious Disease Epidemics

With the rise of communicable diseases like COVID-19, Ebola, and Zika, it has been seen how these diseases threaten the well-being of citizens globally and affect the peace and development initiatives of many countries. Consequently, the well-being and protection of all human lives become critical and require a number of interconnecting and engaging bodies and partnerships in furtherance of GHD. As of 22 May 2020, COVID-19 has affected all the states and territories in the Caribbean (Johns Hopkins University 2020) and has caused a great economic loss to the Caribbean region with over 20,742 infections and over 790 deaths (Table 3). As a result of this crisis, many countries have closed their borders, stopped all the flights (incoming and outgoing) and cruise ships, and announced lockdowns in order to contain the epidemic. However, this has affected the CARICOM to a great extent as the region depends mostly on imports, income from tourism, and also creates a burden on their fragile health systems with frequent disasters and epidemics.

Table 3. Caribbean countries showing the cumulative proportions of deaths from the recent COVID-19 pandemic and total cases from Zika epidemic.

Country	Tested Positive for COVID-19	Deaths Due to COVID-19	Recovered from COVID-19	Cases Tested for Zika	Zika Positive	Test Positivity (%)
Anguilla	3	0	3	60	20	33.3
Antigua and Barbuda	25	3	19	123	24	19.5
Bahamas	97	11	44	99	9	9.1
Barbados	90	7	70	130	40	30.8
Belize	18	2	16	392	61	15.6
British Virgin Islands	8	1	6	180	17	9.4
Cayman Islands	137	1	61	213	28	13.2
Dominica	16	0	16	381	78	20.5
Grenada	22	0	17	179	43	24.0
Guyana	127	10	57	198	42	21.2
Haiti	805	28	21	-	-	-
Jamaica	539	9	181	223	9	4.0
Montserrat	11	1	10	31	5	16.1
Saint Lucia	18	0	18	192	52	27.1
Sint Maarten	77	15	59	383	146	38.1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	15	0	15	210	39	18.6
St.Vincent and the Grenadines	18	0	14	302	83	27.5
Suriname	11	1	9	33	6	18.0
Trinidad and Tobago	116	8	108	2150	721	33.5
Turks and Caicos Islands	12	1	10	154	24	15.6
Total	2165	98	487	5614	1447	25.8

Source: Prepared by the authors based on evidence from (CARPHA 2020 and Francis et al. 2018).

3.4. Addressing Any Epidemic/Health Security Threat through GHD

Health has become an issue of national security/global concern and GHD aids in the development of new bilateral or multilateral agreements to safeguard the health and well-being of people in a globalizing world. The health and well-being of citizens essentially emphasize the growing interlinkages between global health, diplomacy, and foreign policy. Given the history and prone for regular disasters and threats in the region, a hypothetical scenario depicted below (Figure 2) explains how a typical emergency situation in any CARICOM nation can create complications and how these challenges can be addressed by multi-sectoral coordination and applying global governance frameworks through successful GHD based on the international norms and agreements. The CARICOM members can be successful in dealing effectively through their regional unity, existing partnerships with Latin America and North America, regional bodies such as Organization of American States and other bilateral and multilateral organizations working in the region by taking advantage of the existing norms, agreements and negotiate with donor agencies to get the necessary support in order to revive from the crisis situation. Hence, GHD holds great promise to address the needs of global health security through its binding or non-binding instruments enforced by global governance institutions. As such, CARICOM States must become equipped with the tools for effective health diplomacy.


Figure 2. Representation of the critical role of global health diplomacy in addressing a crisis situation and its consequences in the CARICOM region. Source: Framework prepared by the authors based on the evidence from the region in the recent events/epidemics.

4. Discussion

We examined the basic foundations of various approaches to global health diplomacy, along with their implications for the policies shaping the international public health and foreign policy environments. Increasing demands on global health diplomacy need a delicate mixture of technical expertise, legal knowledge, and diplomatic skills that have not been fully or thoroughly developed between the foreign service and global health professionals. A review by Birn and colleagues uncovered notable articulation of a set of values and strategies that characterize social justice oriented south–south cooperation compared to other types of health aid. The analysis was found to bear relevance for the conceptualization, policy development, and practice of equitable health cooperation, demonstrating that anti-hegemonic health solidarity is possible even amid considerable political constraints (Birn et al. 2019). A recent review by Smith to identify factors affecting civil society influence in the pre-implementation stages of the policy process found that the power of civil society actors was enhanced when they joined strong epistemic networks and broader coalitions of stakeholders, were resourced, and framed issues in ways that resonated with national policies and political priorities (Smith 2019). Williams and Rushton argue that the key contemporary discourses influencing Global Health Governance are biomedicine, human rights, economism, and security, but that other (currently

recessive) discourses also have an influence. Though these discourses are promoted by different global health actors, who have gained salience in particular issue areas, the contemporary Global Health Governance is shaped by the interplay of these discourses—a process in which both power and ideas play a role (Williams and Rushton 2009).

Today's agenda in this globalized world includes a different range of issues, such as climate change, the growing burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), urban health, equity aspects in public health, food insecurity, the growing burden of refugee and forced migration, and strengthening comprehensive health systems to deliver the universal health coverage (UHC) and other United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is necessary.

CARICOM took the initiative for the establishment of PAHO Office of Caribbean Program Coordination (OCPC) in October 2005, which supports the Caribbean region in achieving the objectives of its health agenda, contributes to global and regional public health action and building Caribbean infrastructure and capacity with a focus on sustainability. Despite these achievements, many bottlenecks do exist for accessing care and affecting the well-being of the Caribbean people. As such, some recommendations can be proffered to improve the general health of the CARICOM region.

4.1. Establish a Critical Cadre of Leaders in GHD

The PAHO–OCPC considers the leadership element as a major priority of its agenda for the Caribbean region. Health leadership in the Caribbean in the face of a rapidly changing global environment is no longer confined to the traditional model of leadership solely undertaken by the medical profession. As Kickbusch pointed out earlier, there is a need for this cadre of global health diplomats who have a critical understanding of health and also the practice of diplomacy since such serious health issues have implications at the global level in this globalized world. (Kickbusch et al. 2014). A study in Thailand concluded that for building capacity in GHD, it is essential to educate both health and non-health actors on global health issues and to use a combination of formal and informal mechanisms to participate in GHD. Additionally, in developing sustainable capacity in GHD, it requires long term commitment and strong leadership from both the health and non-health sectors (Thaiprayoon and Smith 2015).

4.2. PAHO/WHO Alliances

It is critical that PAHO/WHO strengthens ties with all stakeholders and partners working on the development agenda within the region, ensuring the participation of every member. The acknowledgment and understanding of the historical roles of the cultural, economic, and political aspects unique to the CARICOM region are critical, especially as strategies are developed to protect and promote regional health and development.

4.3. Regional Partnerships for Peace and Health Development

Communication and community engagement: Strengthening the information, education, and communication (IEC) campaigns with a focused message to educate all the citizens. There is a great need for involving and working with civil society organizations and the private sector as well. For example, the Healthy Caribbean Coalition (HCC) was informally established following a multi-sectoral regional meeting in 2008 as a direct response to the POS Declaration's call for a whole of society approach to the challenge of NCDs. HCC currently comprises over 100 health and non-health civil society organizations across the region and remains the only Caribbean NCD alliance. It works in NCD prevention and control with close regional and international leadership to leverage the power of civil society by strengthening and supporting its membership in the implementation of programs. In 2013, with support from the American Cancer Society, the HCC started to work with regional cancer societies to build capacity to effectively advocate for cervical cancer prevention. This has resulted in a collaboration with 23 cancer societies across CARICOM and the conduct of situational analyses in the region. Also, in partnership with PAHO, the HCC developed advocacy campaigns and formed the

Caribbean Cancer Alliance (CCA), which further led a joint regional awareness campaign, namely, the Caribbean Civil Society Cervical Cancer Advocacy Initiative, which is a result of community and stakeholder engagement (HCC 2020).

4.4. Promotion of Peace in the Region

The CARICOM region has been facing a number of challenges on various fronts to tackle their economies, political instabilities, fragile systems, problems of refugees and migrants, and the devastating impacts of climate change. The declaration by UN Human Rights Council (OHCHR 1948) emphasized "peace, development, health, security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing", which is highlighted in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as the interrelated dimensions of "peace, health, and social development". For example, SDG-3 emphasizes health and well- being, SDGs -10 and -17 focuses on development, and SDG-16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions. The interconnectedness between peace, health, and development is depicted below, where global health diplomacy acts as a dynamic wheel engaging with these dimensions (Figure 3). The three domains provide a continuum for addressing the challenges posed by natural disasters, economic crises, and conflicts as these crisis situations offer an opportunity for professionals in international relations, development sector to become engaged with the health sector while simultaneously allowing global health experts to interact within the domain of diplomacy.

Figure 3. The interconnectedness between global health diplomacy, peace, health, and development.

4.5. Strengthening Leadership, Governance, and Systems

Limited research resources, policy, and governance: Regional institutes such as CARPHA should play a more proactive and pivotal role in the creation of regional response teams in all the island nations collaborating with the departments of public health at The University of the West Indies located in different campuses in the region (Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Barbados) (Chattu 2017).

The recent establishment of the Caribbean Center for Biosecurity at the University of the West Indies campus in Barbados is a great addition to improving health security in the region. It is aimed at

reducing or eliminating biological threats that could adversely affect the Caribbean's way of life and destabilize regional economies (UWI 2018).

Lack of skilled health care personnel: Strengthening of surveillance and epidemic response team by having more qualified staff and improving training, equipment, laboratories, and containment. Strengthening and coordinating the preventive and control measures at ports of entry at all borders (illegal entry points too) so that the island community can be protected.

4.6. Collaboration with Global Health Institutions

The global health institutions need to play a lead role and assist the regional and individual states by reviewing the standard operating procedures, guidelines, and reinforce the effectiveness of the measures that are being implemented. The role of global health diplomacy and its practice should be encouraged to reach a consensus among the stakeholders to overcome the regional health security threats.

4.7. Promoting Digital Health and Providing Access to Quality Health Information

Digital health is fast emerging as one of the most defining trends of this decade and will have a profound influence on geopolitical and socioeconomic realities in the future (Ranganathan 2020). Telemedicine offers an opportunity to improve health systems delivery, access, and efficiency. Telehealth and telemedicine in the Caribbean are at a relatively early stage, with a lack of cohesive telehealth strategies and policies which need to be strengthened in order to improve access to all its citizens, especially during this COVID-19 pandemic, with stringent public health measures in place. Essentially, it is important to emphasize that health information is an essential input for public health policy-making. Public health policy-making is highly reliant on the accessibility of sound data, which in return must be produced, investigated, and distributed through cohesive health information networks. A comprehensive health information system should function in a systemic manner, that is a structured process of collecting, sharing, examining, and using health-related data for critical decision-making and as a means of converting information into knowledge for action for the benefit of the region. Linked to the latter is the development of health technologies (HT) in the region. The lack of policies and standards to regulate the implementation and practice of HT, the underdevelopment of support technologies, and inequities in access to accessible HT. Therefore, for the region, telemedicine would be indispensable in creating futuristic and resilient health systems that can support the small island communities amidst pandemics, and by the technological innovations such as artificial intelligence and robotics, will have a long-term impact on future medicine to respond to future pandemics beyond the current pandemic.

4.8. Establishment of Regional Global Health Diplomacy Centre

The establishment of a regional Global Health Diplomacy Centre (GHDC) is key in conducting and improving research, training, and capacity building, focusing on global health governance and diplomacy for the Caribbean region. It would be a first of its kind for the region and echoes the broader trend in both the practice and analysis of global health, which focuses increasingly on the connection between health, foreign policy, trade, and development. This Centre would bring a better understanding of the regional global health in relation to the roles of government, private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Also, the Centre would enhance capability by engaging in research, knowledge acquisition and dissemination as well as by conducting wide-ranging training sessions and workshops in global health diplomacy for and with major stakeholders in the region.

Within the CARICOM region, the growing interdependence between countries has increased substantially in recent decades, with greater proximities in their social and health realities. As a result, these countries are increasingly sensitive to events in neighboring countries. In this context, health diplomacy serves as an appropriate instrument for collective action and for influencing the global determinants of health, as well as for the production of some key global public goods in health.

The examples of regional partnerships, collaborations, and involvement of civil societies discussed in this article demonstrate the potential advantages of these integration processes for health. Hence in this context of CARICOM, the emerging challenges of health and health threats posed by infectious agents or man-made bio-attacks, there is a need for greater emphasis to "think locally and act regionally."

As Buss and colleagues highlighted, the regional integration processes in health provide an opportunity to build a political health community with shared values and interests, joint efforts, coordination, and cooperation to manage the current health challenges and build a common agenda in order to guarantee the right to health for all the region's inhabitants, e.g., the common efforts to achieve UN SDGs by 2030 (Buss and Tobar 2018). Regionalism needs to reorient its mechanisms to promote the positive role of NGOs, individuals, and public–private partnerships for global health. Regionalism would also offer grounds for experimentation of global health diplomacy. As global health diplomacy is gaining in importance, negotiators should be well prepared. In this regard, some countries have added health attaché to their diplomatic staff and also diplomats to the staff of international health departments. Furthermore, the challenge is that increasingly rapid decisions and skillful negotiations are required in the face of outbreaks of disease, security threats, or other issues.

5. Conclusions

In an increasingly interdependent globalized world, it is critical for every country to live in a safe and healthy environment and ensure the well-being of its populations. Increasingly, there is the need for greater cooperation between global health experts and foreign policy practitioners to be well informed of their activities and by clearly drawing the link between these activities and the broader policy objectives of foreign policy. Global health proponents also have the space and opportunity to become more visible and to emphasize within diplomatic circles the health implications associated with climate change and human trafficking. Still, in light of the difficult financial and non-financial constraints faced by many donor countries and inherent tensions between foreign policy and global health objectives, the scope and influence of GHD going forward remain unpredictable. However, if global health and foreign policy practitioners collaborate for greater mutual understanding and coordination, the conditions can be created for all parties to benefit from the growing importance of GHD.

Recommendations

To have established centers dedicated to the promotion of GHD for the Caribbean. Centers can be established at (1) the Center for Biosecurity, the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Augustine Campus (2) the Diplomatic Academy of the Caribbean (DAOC), the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine campus, in collaboration with national/regional agencies to conduct workshops, training sessions, and regular webinars on GHD. To invest in developing a center for excellence with a multidisciplinary team foreseeing the emergencies/disasters/epidemics and ensure preparedness. Additionally, to represent at a global level and influence the global platforms for issues like climate change, pandemic preparedness, and anti-microbial resistance to combat the issues effectively.

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Article

On Decolonising Borders and Regional Integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region

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Abstract: This paper uses insights gained from a qualitative study of informal cross border actors on selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) borders to argue for the decolonisation of these borders. It is asserted that, although SADC citizens enjoy a 90-day free visa in member states, this should not be simplistically taken to mean that there are "open borders" and free movement of persons in region. The recognition that a border "open" to formal actors may be closed to informal cross border actors based on issues of power and class is the foundation for the decolonisation of these borders, a process which should articulate to the regional integration project in the region. Such a decolonisation of borders should recognise in policy and/or border management regimes all cross-border actors, especially non-state actors, who are criminalized and rendered invisible through cross border discourses and policies. This point is worth emphasizing, because most people who cross African borders may not be the formal actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) and/or their proxies who are favoured by cross border policies, but ordinary people such as informal cross border traders and border citizens, who need decolonised borders for them to enjoy freedom of movement, rather than being depoliticized and relegated to the subaltern who cannot speak, let alone move.

Keywords: decolonisation; SADC borders; regional integration

1. Introduction

A good context for a discussion of the dialectics between borders and in particular decolonised borders and regional integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, requires an understanding of the logic behind regional integration. The African Union (AU) through the Abuja Treaty aims for continental integration to be set up through an African Economic Community [AEC] (Treaty Establishing African Economic Community 1991) [1]. The strategy for attaining the AEC is through Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which should provide the building blocks. Eight such RECs exist across Africa[2]. In this paper the focus is on SADC. The 16-member[3] SADC traces its origin to the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), which was

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[1]   Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. 1991. See http://www.au.int/en/treaties/treaty-establishing-african-economic-community#sthash.gaX4N06U.dpuf (accessed on 13 August 2017).

[2]   The eight RECs the AU has identified for this purpose include; Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA). See http://www.au.int/en/recs/ (accessed on 26 November 2012).

[3]   These are: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. https://www.sadc.int/media-centre/frequently-asked-questions (accessed 30 November 2019).

constituted of nine frontline states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The SADCC was essentially a political project aimed at contending with and resisting apartheid South Africa (Gwaradzimba 1993; Schoeman 2002). As a result of this, SADCC relied on a "project-based approach with each member state taking responsibility for a particular sector focused attention on the coordination of members' development initiatives rather than on formulating a regional economic development strategy" (Schoeman 2002, p. 4). The changing global power relations such as the collapse of the Cold War and the rise of the neoliberal economic order, as well as the fall of the apartheid regime, were some of the factors which influenced the transformation of SADCC into SADC. In other words, the emphasis was now on regional integration as a response to the onslaught of economic globalisation (Schoeman 2002). As a result, the SADC Treaty, signed in August 1992, transformed SADCC into SADC, which seeks regional integration through formal regional institutions (Declaration and Treaty of SADC 1992). This approach to regional integration can be explained by Balassa (1961) theory of regional integration, which proposes four stages. These stages are first, the formation of a Free Trade Area (FTA), second is the development of a customs union (CU). The third stage involves the establishment of a common market (CM) and which should evolve into an economic and monetary union (EMU) in which supranational institutions govern economic policies, in the fourth and final stage. It is on this basis that, the 2001 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) was developed as a roadmap for the regional integration project (SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2001)[4]. This roadmap envisaged a FTA by 2008, a CU by 2010, a CM by 2015, an EMU in 2016, and an economic union by 2018.

A regionally integrated SADC should be characterised by free movement of people, goods and capital and the establishment of an economic community. It is in the spirit of the free movement of people, that the 2005 Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC focuses on the implementation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty (Declaration and Treaty of SADC 1992, Article 10.3). The free movement of people is necessary for achieving one of the objectives of SADC, which is to "to strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region" (Declaration and Treaty of SADC 1992, p. 5). However, it should be remembered that the orientation of SADCC towards cooperation and not integration permeated into and has remained one of the challenges facing SADC in which the national priorities emphasise more territorial sovereignty than regionalization (Saurombe 2009) and the strengthening and consolidation of the SADC citizenry. This has led to a piecemeal and ineffective approach to regional integration (Dzinesa et al. 2018). At the centre of the obsession with territorial sovereignty is the issue of the coloniality of borders, whose decolonisation could contribute to strengthening the links and regional integration referred to in the preceding part. This is the context within which this paper is located- decolonisation of borders and regional integration in the SADC. Consequently, this discussion on the decolonization of borders and how it could contribute to and/or enhance regional integration in the SADC raises four important questions. First, what is the current logic of cross border management regimes? Second, is there need for decolonized borders in the SADC? Third, are decolonized borders even possible when colonial borders are not a historical artifact but a colonial present? Finally, could decolonised borders articulate the regional integration project in the SADC?

2. Methodological Issues

This paper is part of a cross border research project on informal cross border actors in the SADC region, which started in 2013. Data specific to this paper were gathered through structured interviews

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[4] This was revised in April 2015. There is the SADC Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015–2020. The overarching aim of the Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015–2020 is to deepen regional integration. See https://www.sadc.int/files/5415/2109/8240/SADC_Revised_RISDP_2015-2020.pdf (accessed 30 November 2019).

conducted with 60 respondents (who had used both official and unofficial points of entry to and from the SADC countries under analysis) between 2013 and 2017. The respondents include informal cross border traders (ICBTs) who travelled across the Botswana-Zimbabwe and South Africa-Zimbabwe borders for purposes of buying and selling goods and border citizens (who are people who live on the borderlands of the countries under consideration). The research participants were chosen following nonprobability sampling theory in the form of purposive sampling of those who were willing to and actually responded to the interview questions. These questions focused on the nature and dynamic of cross border interactions, frequency of travels, challenges faced at the border, how they (informal cross border actors) interpreted and interacted with and understood the border. The rationale for deploying a qualitative interview approach was the need to grasp the interviewees' interpretations (Creswell 2009; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009) and experiences (Entrikin and Tepple 2006). The data collected by these means was manually analysed by first reading through it, identifying and classifying themes, and explaining and connecting themes as suggested by Creswell (2009). These two borders were chosen for the study based on the researcher's experience that they experienced higher volumes of cross border traffic. In addition, these borders aptly demonstrate coloniality (a notion which is explained in full in the following parts), which requires decolonisation. In particular, the Limpopo River is the geographical feature which forms the 200 km border between South Africa and Zimbabwe and Beitbridge is the official operational crossing point. This border is fenced and also patrolled by the South African National Defense Force (SANDF), the South African Police Service (SAPS) and some private security agencies (Araia 2009). On the Zimbabwean side, the army also patrolled the border (Moyo 2016a). Similarly, the Zimbabwe–Botswana border is fenced and also patrolled by the army (Moré 2011).

3. Theoretical Considerations: Borders and Decolonisation

Taking into account that the argument in this paper is anchored around the concept of decolonisation, there is need to discuss and contextualize its theoretical value in this paper. The starting point is to understand coloniality, which "must not be confused with colonialism. It survived the end of direct colonialism [. . .] it continues to affect the lives of people, long after direct colonialism and administrative apartheid have been dethroned" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, p. 11). In this vein, what is important to emphasise is "the invisible vampirism of technologies of imperialism and colonial matrices of power that continue to exist in the minds, lives, languages, dreams, imaginations, and epistemologies of modern subjects in Africa and the entire global South" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, p. 11). Coloniality then, should be seen as the "darker side" of modernity as it structures, sustains, rearticulates and reproduces the colonial social and political divisions (Capan 2017, p. 3). In the context of borders in the SADC specifically and Africa in general, this means that, there is a colonial present in the way that they are enforced and managed. This is manifest in that, despite their arbitrariness and artificiality, the so-called post-colonial African states rigidly enforce the Berlin borders (see Bach 1997). This coloniality of the border has led to "arrest, detention, incarceration, abandonment, and deportation" as the logic of border governance (Mbembe 2017, p. 2).

Stated differently, coloniality is not a border practice, but a frame of reference which influences the way borders are managed. This is because there is the strict adherence to the colonial borders, which like during direct colonialism, disregarded the cross-border interactions, such as those of border citizens and informal cross border traders. I argue against this frame of reference and posit that the enforcement of colonial borders in the so-called post-colonial African states means that African people are not free, because their "struggles for freedom and self-determination have always been intertwined with the aspiration to move unchained" (Mbembe 2017, p. 2). If the treatment of people on African borders and borderlands, and indeed those crossing the border from one African country to the other, emphasizes the need to murder or expel them should they transgress the border (practices evident before African countries attained juridical-political independence), this demonstrates the coloniality of the border. This is instructive, because colonial and apartheid immigration laws were "anti-African and

anti-black" (Mbembe 2017, p. 2). In the case of countries like Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, whites were free to migrate into and out of these countries, but not black people. That this should be happening after the end of apartheid and colonial rule in Africa, adequately demonstrates the coloniality of borders, which stands against the goal of free human mobility and by extension regional integration in the SADC region.

Notwithstanding, the issue is not that borders in Africa do not or should not matter, but that, what matters is the way that they are managed and/or governed. Concerning this, it needs to be noted that "borders separate areas in war from countries at peace and democracies from dictatorships; they structure settlement patterns, cultural forms, typical economic activities, consumption opportunities or kinship ties" (Dobler 2016, p. 147). If borders matter, and it is also accepted that any type of border is separatist (Asiwaju 1993; Ramutsindela 2017), then the question of how they are or can be properly governed comes to the fore in an African setting such the SADC, in which countries are collectively pursuing regionalism. Consequently, the question of why borders which were produced by Europeans in 1884–1885 and the colonial and racial governance integral to them should permeate into and continue to inform and haunt how borders are managed in the SADC deserve scrutiny. This is how and why I call into use the concept of the decolonisation of borders in the SADC.

Based on the discussion on the coloniality of borders, the decolonisation of the same in the SADC, should be viewed as the management that considers and is informed by inter alia, the existential experiences of people at, near or along the border and indeed in adjacent and other African countries who cross the border for a variety of reasons which may range from familial to economic. Concerning decolonised SADC borders, the idea is that SADC countries will not continue to rigidly enforce the separatist influence of colonial borders on African states, but rather, there will be free movement unhindered by such borders. This, in view of the fact that borders are territorial markers and drivers of sovereign jurisdictions that materialize in the social, economic, and political process of bordering, inclusion and exclusion (Laine 2015). In this sense, decolonising borders falls in line with Agenda 2063, which is a blueprint for the development of an integrated, prosperous, and united Africa by 2063 (Agenda, 2063). A brief comment on this is needful. In a descending order, the building blocks for Agenda 2063, are an integrated African continent, a sound Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) [whose establishment is in progress], and the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC), set for 2028. At the bottom of all these are the RECs such as SADC (Treaty Establishing African Economic Community 1991). For this reason, RECs such as the SADC (and their successful integration and decolonisation of borders) are the foundation for Agenda 2063. I will return to this point in the following sections of this paper. Differently stated, African people lost their sovereignty and freedom of movement as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 as indicated earlier. That this loss is rigidly enforced and maintained by African countries that are supposedly free from colonial rule, only but demonstrates the coloniality of the borders. For which cause, there is the need for an articulation of a strategy for border management that is "radically different from anti-humanist norms and practices prevalent on matters concerning the management of human mobility" (Mbembe 2017, p. 2). For this reason, decolonising the border should be seen as managing the border "from our own perspectives (African perspectives) and for our own purposes (African people crossing the borders)". It should be regarded as "a strategy for change [that] has to take into account not only adding more perspectives but also the practices of knowledge production" (Capan 2017, p. 9).

This is important to highlight because "not only did colonization invent the colonized, it also disrupted the social patterns, gender relations and cosmological understandings of the communities and societies it invaded. In doing so, it rearticulated particular European understandings" of the world (Lugones 2011; cited in Bhambra 2014, p. 118). This resulted in the (dis)organisation of the "the world into homogenous, separable categories arranged through hierarchical dichotomies and categorical logics" (Lugones 2011; cited in Bhambra 2014, p. 118). Viewed thus, decolonising the border as

deployed in this paper becomes an essential element of decoloniality, if decoloniality is conceptualized as delinking from coloniality in its various forms (Mignolo 2015). This is important not only because of the need for African states to be "vigilant against the trap of ending up normalising and universalising coloniality as a natural state of the world [but also that] it must be unmasked, resisted and destroyed because it produced a world order that can only be sustained through a combination of violence, deceit, hypocrisy and lies" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, p. 11).

4. On Economic Dynamics and Decolonising Securitized Borders

In an attempt to engage with the research questions presented earlier, the following sections focus on the economic, political and social cross border interactions in the study areas. First, the economic cross border interactions. Informal cross border traders depended on buying and selling goods between Botswana and Zimbabwe and between South Africa and Zimbabwe. For instance, some cross-border traders travelled from Zimbabwe (Plumtree) to Botswana (Francistown) with various goods (e.g., crafts, and agricultural produce) for sale. From these sales, they bought goods for resale in Zimbabwe (Moyo 2017). A forty-year-old shop owner in Plumtree, "travelled with unprocessed beans, which were sold in Botswana, out of which it was possible to buy goods for resale back in Zimbabwe" (Interview with an informal cross border trader, Plumtree, December 2014). Some of the journeys of cross border traders involved travelling to Francistown to buy goods from formal wholesalers "because these were relatively cheap or unavailable in Zimbabwe" (Interview with an informal cross border trader, Plumtree, January 2015). These were later resold in their shops and flea markets in the Zimbabwean border town of Plumtree (Moyo 2017). Similarly, between South Africa and Zimbabwe, such actors travelled as far as Johannesburg for the purposes of selling in such a destination and also buying goods for resale in Zimbabwe. The sort of goods that they bought varied on the season, but included among others, electronics, groceries, building material, office equipment. In this regard, a young female shop owner in Beitbridge asserted that;

> "for me, what influenced the decision on what to buy from South Africa was the demand. I bought most of the items for which there was a demand back home, and this sustained my business in that I would not have a pile of unwanted or un sold goods. From simple conversations with people and observations of some lower end retail shops, it was possible to gather what people wanted, which I made available whenever I travelled to South Africa".

(Interview with an informal cross border trader, Messina, September 2016)

The result of this, is that, the shops and flea markets on the border towns of Plumtree and Beitbridge were fully dependent on buying goods from shops and wholesalers in Francistown, and Messina and Johannesburg respectively and this suggest a functional interdependency (Moyo 2017).

However, there are no explicit policies between Botswana and Zimbabwe and between South Africa and Zimbabwe that clearly and directly respond to the issue of non-state actors such as informal cross border traders, but instruments such as the SADC Protocol on Trade, which clearly favours the so-called formal actors. For instance, one Zimbabwean informal cross border trader stated that "crossing the border from Zimbabwe to Botswana and sometimes from Zimbabwe to South Africa is my source of livelihood, but the major challenge is that there is a limit to how much and the type of goods that one can import to Zimbabwe" (Interview, with an informal cross border trader, Plumtree, December, 2013). This is confirmed by the fact that, the Zimbabwean Exchange Control (General) Order, 1996 S.I. 110 of 1996, among others, generally set standards for the nature and quantities of goods that traders could import (see Exchange Control (General) Order, 1996 S.I. 110 of 1996). In addition, the police and the army on the Botswana and Zimbabwean sides of the border rigidly enforced immigration controls. However, this did not deter the cross-border traders from engaging in their activities "because we have ceased to think of these people as a challenge, since there are many ways of evading them and contesting the strict and militarised control of the border" (Interview with an informal cross border trader, Plumtree, January 2013). For example, stringent immigration controls,

for those who 'legally' crossed the border led to among others under-declaring goods and bribery so as transport their goods across the border (Bhamu 2017). Further, some traders crossed at undesignated points along the Zimbabwe-Botswana border to buy and sell goods. One respondent declared that "I have crossed the border at undesignated points and sold my goods in and around communities such as Butale and Moroka in Botswana and as such the border is not such a big issue for me" (Interview, with an informal cross border trader, Plumtree, December 2013). This evidence seems to point to the fact that, the activities of informal cross-border traders occur in spite of state control and regulation.

What can be seen from the views of respondents in the preceding discussion, is a clear case of transnational economic activities by non-state actors. The big issue is that, the SADC states frustrate the activities of these actors. Cross border traders narrated of ill treatment by immigration officials, the army and police on the Botswana and South African sides of the border. This is "because these state agents are always aggressive and treat us like criminals, when in reality we engage in an honest way of living (Interview with an informal cross border trader, Beitbridge, December 2015). In fact, Zimbabwe is also guilty of stringent border controls even against its own citizens as can be seen in the case of the Zimbabwe Exchange Control Order of 1996. Further, a recent case was that of the Statutory Instrument Number 64 of 2016, which resulted in bans of goods that were imported from South Africa. Those actors who attempted to violate this instrument had their goods impounded on the Zimbabwean border (see Moyo 2016b). Consequently,

> as cross border traders we now transported our goods from the South African border to Zimbabwe at undesignated pointes along the Limpopo River as a way of contesting the border and the punishing effects of the Statutory Instrument Number 64 of 2016. As you may be aware, unemployment is high in Zimbabwe and the government has failed to provide jobs. The irony is that it is the same government which implements these insensitive policies with the result that we have to resist such. As I have said, we move our goods across the Limpopo River and this involves organizing means of transporting goods, regardless of quantity and/or size across the Limpopo River".

(Interview with an informal cross border trader, Messina, September 2016)

In all this, the crucial point is that, there is an informal architecture of informal cross border activities that occur between Botswana and Zimbabwe and between South Africa and Zimbabwe. But, the securitization and maintenance of the coloniality of borders by SADC states in question, stands in the way of enhancing the activities of these actors. What is also important to emphasise from the narratives of informal economic actors is that they are the ones who appeared to suffer the impacts of the borders in the SADC sates in question. The so-called formal actors and multinational Companies (MNCs) seem to have not as much hassles. One is led to ask if this is any different from the colonial period, in which colonial institutions were used to exploit the resources, including cross border trade from Africa and yet the African people, were oppressed and suppressed by a plethora of laws and institutions such as borders. This seems to be playing out again, when informal cross border traders and border citizens are excluded. If non-state actors continue to face the exclusive impact of the border, for whose benefit is regional integration or indeed the AfCFTA and continental integration? Is it for the neo-colonial institutions that continue the colonial present? I will respond to these questions in my conclusion.

The argument which can be levelled against this discussion is that SADC citizens enjoy a 90-day free visa in all SADC countries. Proponents of this view may therefore assert that SADC borders are open and there is free movement. Concerning this, I advance that, the "opening of borders" is not enough, because borders may be open but not decolonised, based on issues of power and class. A case in point in the SADC region is that many formal cross border actors enjoy "open borders", because there are a host of policies such as the SADC Trade Protocol (Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region 1996), which support the activities of such actors. But a border open to formal actors may be closed to informal

cross border actors; forcing them to defy such borders by employing methods, which are classified as illegal by the state. Such classification is based on the absence of legislation which recognises their existence just as was the case during colonialism. My argument here is that decolonised borders should recognise in policy and/or border management regimes all cross-border actors, especially non-state actors, who are criminalized and rendered invisible through cross border discourses and policies. Clearly, the issue of borders comes to the fore, to the extent that the SADC regional integration project, which is an integral aspect of the AU integration project and Agenda 2063 targets decolonisation of these borders. This is basis for the argument that there is need for the decolonisation of borders in the SADC to make these institutions inclusive in terms of enhancing cross border interaction for all actors.

Hence, in the following part, I propose the nature and dynamic that this decolonisation of borders should take. One way would be to offer them (informal cross border traders) border passes so as unburden them with the stringent border formalities. They could use these in place of passports and visas, such that there may be no need to illegally cross the border. There are precedents in other parts of the world. For example, in one of the most securitised borders in world, the Spanish-Moroccan border at Ceuta and Melilla actually allowed the Moroccan citizens (informal cross-border traders) from borders areas like Tetouan and Nador to travel to and from Ceuta (Spain), without visas (Ferrer-Gallardo 2008, 2010). This Schengenisation (Ferrer-Gallardo 2008, 2010) of informal cross border traders/border citizens demonstrates a pragmatic management or governance of the border. Therefore, I advance that, providing border cards to the cross border traders in the study areas under discussion is necessary, because as interview data shows, some of these cross border traders may not have passports and if they do, they may have exhausted the ninety-day visitor's visas a year that are applicable to SADC citizens.

Informal cross-border traders argued that this was not enough (ninety-day visitor's visa) for their businesses and in fact, amounted to a restriction, which meant that the border was rigid to their circumstances. In addition to border cards, decolonising the border should involve the expansion of the simplified trade regime (STR) from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to all SADC countries. The STR as implemented in COMESA is to enhance movement and the import and export business of cross border traders. It is made up of the Certificate of Origin[5], which details that the goods in which cross border traders trade, originate in COMESA. It also shows a common list of goods (on which cross border traders must not pay customs duty) and a simplified customs documents in which cross border traders declare the goods on the common lists[6].

Consequently, offering border cards to cross border traders and spreading the STR could unleash the economic potential in these actors such that they expand their businesses. This is similar to what, Ong (2006) refers to as the strategic response to population and space and equipping people for self-mastery. Most importantly, these two suggested ways of decolonising the border will undo the impact of the border in a region that seeks regional integration. In the SADC region, this is an important point to raise for two reasons. First, in official policy, non-state actors such as informal cross border traders are not seriously considered. Second, not only is the free movement of economic actors, even if they are non-state actors the zeitgeist of modernity, but also an essential part of the ongoing SADC regional integration and AU continental integration projects.

5. Regarding Political and Social Dynamics and Decolonising SADC Borders

Ordinary people, border citizens and informal cross border traders at both borders under study seem to suggest that the border controls were unnecessarily stringent. When the border

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[5] "Under the STR, governments have agreed a list of products that do not require such a certificate for small consignments. This list is displayed at the border posts and is available at the offices of the CBTA and Customs both at the border and in the main towns. A Simplified Certificate of Origin can be obtained at the border post and is signed by the Customs Office" http://malawitradeportal.gov.mw/kcfinder/upload/files/Simplified%20Trade%20Regime_2.pdf (accessed on 3 July 2017).

[6] http://www.zimra.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=56 (accessed on 14 August 2017).

between Botswana and Zimbabwe was constructed after colonial conquest, it separated families and communities. However, respondents in this study asserted that, the movement of people between the two countries has occurred in spite of the border. It is for this reason that cross border interaction between Zimbabwe and Botswana have existed over a longer period of time. Therefore, the argument that people migrate and illegally cross the border from Zimbabwe to Botswana for economic reasons only is very limited, and if nothing else, simplistic and uninformed. People cross from Zimbabwe to Botswana and vice versa for among others, familial and cultural reasons, despite the fact that it is securitised (Interview with a border citizen, Plumtree, December 2013).

On the issue of border securitisation, for example, in 2003, the Botswana government started the construction of about 500 km of an electric fence on the border with Zimbabwe (Moré 2011). The Botswana government claimed that this was intended to stop the spread of foot and mouth disease, but the Zimbabwean government interpreted it as a way of closing off Zimbabweans fleeing economic and other problems in their country into Botswana (Moré 2011). In 2008, Botswana deployed a large army to this border to intercept Zimbabweans attempting to cross into the country (Munnion 2008). In what could be seen as retaliation, in 2014, the Zimbabwean government threatened to block Botswana and Zambia from building a bridge across the Zambezi River at Kasane (Kasane Bridge). This is because the Kasane Bridge would divert cross border traffic away from Zimbabwe (Beitbridge) through Botswana and Zambia (Bhebhe 2014). From this, we can see that not only are the Berlin borders rigidly and faithfully implemented, but can be a source of tension at government level, which may potentially escalate into a conflict, at least judging from the diplomatic spat between Botswana and Zimbabwe.

Further, African states even go to the extent of demonstrating and resorting to the repressive state apparatus like the army just to enforce the border. Respondents stated that "this did not deter" them "from crossing the border" (Interview with a border citizen, Plumtree, December 2013), as they continued to move across the border from Zimbabwe into Botswana for example. In fact, a forty-five-year-old man in Plumtree declared that he had "family and relatives in Butale and thus regularly crossed the border to Botswana for these reasons". He even stated that he used a Botswana cell phone sim card, because the network coverage was good, for which reason he had no use for a Zimbabwean sim card as his life really "revolved around Plumtree and Botswana" (Interview with a border citizen, Plumtree, January 2014). A similar account was narrated by a Zimbabwean in Plumtree, whose rural home was Malalume, who stated that "we have family in Maiatengwe in Botswana and the border is not really a deterrent and we simply cross whenever the need arises and we also communicate by cell phone as we both use sim cards from Botswana" (Interview with a border citizen, Plumtree, January 2014).

For these reasons, interview data show that, there are several categories of Zimbabweans who cross the border to Botswana. The first includes those who do so for familial and community ties. These were clearly border citizens. For such people, the border does not deter them. It does not matter if they had passports or not, because, they "still find other means to cross the border at undesignated crossing points" (Interview with a border citizen, Plumtree, December 2013). These interactions suggest that, the securitised border between Botswana and Zimbabwe is not always successful. Similar interactions appear to exist between South Africa and Zimbabwe as manifest at Beitbridge border (see Moyo 2016a). Concerning border citizens on the South-Africa-Zimbabwe border, they argued that:

> Illegality was a construction of the white people who constructed the border, because we had always crossed the river without needing any permission. I have family, community and friends on the other side of the Zimbabwe-South Africa border and nothing can ever erase that. After majority rule in 1994, there was no difference, the controls at the border were even more tightened and yet again, just like the colonial and apartheid years, the idea that people who have always been family and community were turned strangers, belonging to different countries was vigorously highlighted. At the Beitbridge border, it was now black people and not white people who were harassing and telling us that we were Zimbabwean and needed a

visa to travel to Messina and the surrounding rural areas, where we have friends and family, a community.

(Interview with a border citizen, Beitbridge town, August, 2013)

In this context, transnational ties can be seen, where people who live in both Botswana and Zimbabwe and South Africa and Zimbabwe by maintaining, and in cases where the states put up stringent border controls, enforcing regular cross border interactions. Clearly, SADC sates fail to understand that cross border migration does not occur because of inequality only (de Haas 2006; cited in Castles 2010). The assets that sustain such interactions include among others culture, language community and familial ties. The colonial present of borders cannot destroy or exhaust these assets which do not exist *ex nihilo*, but centuries-long histories and interaction.

When immigration regimes attempt to securitize the border as in the case of Botswana and South Africa in which the border is patrolled by the army and police over and above the immigration policies, the people involved defied the border. These examples show that the non-state actors do successfully contest the border from below. There is a network of cross border interactions that needs to be recognized and strengthened through the decolonisation of borders. These findings therefore echo how the securitised EU/Spanish border at Ceuta and Melilla has failed to stop the migration of people into Europe as people find ways of defying the border (Ferrer-Gallardo 2008, 2010; Scheel 2013; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013; Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas 2013; Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). Similarly, the India-Bangladesh border has failed to stop centuries-old ties, which were disrupted by the construction of the border as people continue to cross the border at undesignated points in total dismissal of sovereign power that the border symbolises and transmit (Jones 2012).

6. Conclusions

Viewed through the lenses of decolonization, this paper posits that SADC nation-states like Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe rigidly enforce the coloniality of borders. This involves the securitisation of borders as well as the deployment of policies which favours formal at the expense of informal actors. This observation responds to the first research question posed at the beginning of this contribution. Regarding economic activity, informal cross border traders have established transnational networks, but the coloniality of borders continues to stifle these activities. Further, on the border between Botswana and Zimbabwe there are people who share the same language and culture and as is the case on the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe (see Moyo 2016a). Such people contest the border by practices and strategies ranging from illegally crossing the border and forging double identities. Again, and from the point of view of the border citizens, the illegality of crossing the border is a state and colonial construct as is the need to forge multiple identities. Such practices suggest the need for decolonised borders in the SADC region. This summary responds to the second question as indicated in the introduction of this paper. And based on the suggestion of the need for decolonised borders in the SADC, the issue of how this can be done arises and is discussed next as an overall comment on the third research question of this contribution.

Interview data suggest that there were informal cross border networks which have been set up by the informal cross border traders and likewise by border citizens. Regarding the former, SADC states can engage in "forms of government that feature [. . .] direct intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses". This could lead to "rendering individual subjects "responsible" (and also collectives, such as families, associations, [. . .] shifting the responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc. and for life in society into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of "self-care"" (Lemke 2000, p. 12). On the matter of border citizens, interview data suggested that the issuance of identification documents in Zimbabwe was district-based. For example, border towns like Plumtree and Beitbridge in Zimbabwe have unique identity numbers just like other districts in the country. For this reason, it should not be

difficult for South Africa and Botswana to admit such Zimbabweans as border citizens on the basis of their identification numbers as people inhabiting a borderland, torn apart from their kith and kin as a result of and when colonial conquest and partitioning of Africa occurred. This can be set in motion if the concerned SADC states engaged in pragmatic strategies that understand and take into account the colonial, historical, socio-economic and migrations past of the region.

From this point of view, decolonised borders are possible in the SADC—a possibility far removed from a runaway borderless dystopia that pessimists of a decolonised SADC border regime envision. The vision is so because it is informed by the desire by states to uphold the mythical, if nothing else, apocryphal ideology of territorialised nationalism in the SADC. This is important to emphasise because not only do borders produce political subjectivities, but also that societies and political systems are always in state of becoming, such that it is possible to think of and act on "alternatives to the static exclusivity of landscapes of dominant power (counter-hegemonic borderscapes)" (Rancière 2010; cited in Brambilla 2015, p. 24). In fact, in one of the most hardened, securitised and technologized borders in the world at Ceuta and Melilla (EU/Spanish-Morocco border), there is now the recognition of the need of "forging of a cross-border metropolitan amalgamation between Ceuta and its hinterland", based on the existing architecture of cross border interactions, which the securitised border has failed to stop (Ferrer-Gallardo 2010, p. 35). If such borders as the EU/Spanish Moroccan border at Melilla recognise the futility or perhaps ineffectiveness of securitising the border and seem to be influenced by activities on the ground, the decolonisation of SADC borders could gain insights from this and other aspects discussed in the preceding sections. Otherwise, the SADC, will be a building block for the AU and Agenda 2063, which is not beneficial to the ordinary person, as such people will still suffer the Berlin creation of 1884–85, to the benefit of so called formal actors, MNCs and their representatives. In which case, this is the promotion and sustenance of coloniality.

On the last research question established in the introduction of this contribution, it must be reiterated that, the key insights that this paper has cast on SADC borders, is that their management demonstrate a statist propensity. Such a proclivity is informed by the technologies of imperialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). At the centre of the management of the border is the mimicking of the erstwhile colonial powers' policies which divided instead of uniting African people. There is therefore need for border policies that unite African people as argued in this paper. This unity will lead to the enhancement of the freedom of movement of people across borders. By delegitimising the technologies of imperialism which divide and usurp the freedom of movement of African people -ugly sides of modernity (Capan 2017), this will, in turn, mean that African borders generally and SADC borders specifically will not be anti-African and anti-Black (Mbembe 2017) and in this lies the potential of regional integration if borders are decolonised. This point is worth emphasizing, because most people who cross African borders may not be the formal actors such as MNCs and/or their representatives who are favoured by cross border policies, but ordinary people such as informal cross border trades and border citizens, who need recognition for them to enjoy freedom of movement rather than being depoliticized and relegated to the subaltern who cannot speak, let alone move.

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Article

Sick Enough? Mental Illness and Service Eligibility for Homeless Individuals at the Border

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Abstract: This paper measures mental illness among individuals experiencing homelessness in a border city and compares it to the general housed population. We use original data from a homeless survey conducted in El Paso, Texas. Respondents self-reported any possible mental illness or related symptoms. We find that mental illness is not disproportionally common among the homeless, yet this is something that is often claimed by laypersons, some social service workers, and some researchers that limit sampling to institutionalized settings where formal mental illness is often among the prerequisites for admission. We find that "severe mental illness" among homeless persons is 6.2% (only around 2–3% higher than the general population), and "any mental illness" is 20.8% (only 1–3% higher than in the general population). Our results are consistent with other research focusing on street samples.

Keywords: homelessness; mental health; point in time; diagnosis

1. Introduction

Is the prevalence of mental health higher for people experiencing homelessness than among those who are housed? The visibility of mentally ill homeless individuals around universities or downtown areas may lead many to believe that mental illness is one of the leading causes of homelessness. This paper addresses mental illness among people experiencing homelessness in a city on the U.S.–Mexico border. The findings have methodological and policy implications.

Individuals experiencing homelessness who are not disabled enough have little access to public housing in the U.S. under Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs. The U.S. federal mandate prioritizes "chronic" homelessness, which is defined to include those who have experienced homelessness for an extended period and also have disabilities:

> The statutory definition also requires that the individual or family has a head of household with a diagnosable substance use disorder, serious mental illness, developmental disability, post-traumatic stress disorder, cognitive impairments resulting from a brain injury, or chronic physical illness or disability (HEARTH 2015, p. 75792).

Even among state and local municipalities, funding transitional or permanent housing of homeless individuals is often limited to target specific subpopulations, such as victims of domestic abuse, homeless children, those with mental illness, and other groups deemed the most deserving. Eligibility for housing is most often limited to those with a "verifiable disability," which neglects many others in need (Lyon-Callo 2000). Previous work shows how social service workers manage to "fit" their homeless clients into overly restrictive housing requirements by using "fitting stories" or narratives (Smith and Anderson 2018). This brings into question the prevalence of disabilities. As one supervisor put it, "if agencies are too stringent, then they don't help many people" (Smith and Anderson 2018, pp. 542–43).

We believe that the stereotype that a majority of people in homeless situations experience severe mental illness makes access to services more restrictive. Three beliefs contribute to this stereotype, (1) that the deinstitutionalization of people from state mental institutions constitutes the largest group of homeless individuals on the streets, (2) that there is a consensus among the literature as to how to study mental illness among this population, and (3) that there is a higher prevalence of mental illness among the homeless compared to housed populations. We challenge these beliefs in this paper.

Estimates of mental illness prevalence among homeless populations vary widely between studies. The related research spans fifty years, and our study is novel in two ways. First, studies that limit sampling homeless populations to include only those who are within institutionalized settings (shelters, transitional and permanent housing facilities, jails, prisons, and mental health facilities) have found higher rates of mental illness, some as high as 100% (Fazel et al. 2008; Fischer 1989; Shlay and Rossi 1992; Lee et al. 2010). Nevertheless, many people avoid services (Canvin et al. 2007), and many homeless people avoid shelters and subsidized housing in general by staying on the streets instead (i.e., under bridges, in parks, an automobile, vacant buildings, or "doubled up" with someone willing to take them in). Emergency shelters can be avoided for a variety of reasons, including that they are overcrowded, noisy, among other things (Wasserman and Clair 2010). Research often neglects these subpopulations that represent a substantial part of the homeless population. In El Paso, TX, a city ranked 19th largest in the U.S. (City Mayors Statistics 2010), we counted 20% more in the total homeless population by including individuals who did not stay in shelters (Smith and Castañeda-Tinoco 2019).

Some suppose that street samples include individuals who are avoiding the stigmas of their severe mental state, which may be the case for some. However, studies that sample beyond shelters and include street populations find far fewer cases of mental illness. Researchers in Austin, TX found 9% of those living outside of shelters to be mentally ill (Snow and Anderson 1993). Researchers in Australia found 15% of respondents on the streets to have a severe mental illness before being homeless and 16% after experiencing homelessness (Johnson and Chamberlain 2011). Additionally, HUD's annual Point-in-Time (PIT) national count, which is the most referenced source by federal policymakers, routinely finds 30–33% to be mentally ill, each year, over the past ten years (HUD 2007–2018 2019). Most prior research limits sampling to those already sheltered or are in institutional settings, including homeless shelters, jails, or hospitals. This approach neglects that mental illness is, "In line with the eligibility criteria" for service access (Aubry et al. 2015, p. 471). So people need to be disabled under the federal definition of "chronic" homelessness as a prerequisite to receiving housing assistance. For example, an annual review titled *The Prevalence of Mental Disorders Among the Homeless in Western Countries: Systematic Review and Meta-regression Analysis* (Fazel et al. 2008) shows that almost all studies devoted to the subject in the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Australia, Greece, France, and Holland limit sampling to places where respondents are actively seeking housing services such as shelters, day centers, missions, or "facilities for the homeless" in almost all studies (a few include soup kitchens and hostels). Therefore, most literature—particularly quantitative studies—disregard homeless populations who avoid housing services. Alternatively, most noninstitutionalized *street* samples find substantially fewer homeless who are mentally ill, as we elaborate below.

Second, we use categories from the U.S. National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), which studies domiciled (housed) populations, by distinguishing "serious mental illness" (SMI) from "any mental illness" (AMI). Some cases of AMI are not severe enough for access to housing services per HUD's definition of "chronic homelessness" (HEARTH 2015). Current homeless policy and existing research measure mental illness more generally in ways that lack distinctions between its various forms and levels of severity. We use NSDUH's distinctions of SMI and AMI, traditionally used for studying the "housed" population, to study those experiencing homelessness to delineate those who are eligible for housing (SMI) to those who are not "severe" enough.

We modeled our homeless street census on the HUD annual Point-in-Time survey. We focused on homeless individuals with mental illness (SMI and AMI), stressing the necessity to gauge by severity because not all types of mental illness qualify for access into housing services under the current

policy, which is a point often underestimated by prior research. For example, diagnoses of situational depression or other mood disorders do not qualify for housing vouchers under Continuum of Care funding, as noted below. We believe that people with less severe mental illnesses deserve housing assistance as much as those with more severe cases, which falls in line with those who advocate that housing is a human right (Bratt et al. 2006).

We start by summarizing two competing theoretical frameworks often used to explain this issue, commonly referred to as the "Deinstitutionalization" and the "Medicalization" of the homeless population. Next, we consider budgetary reductions of welfare assistance throughout the 1980s. We then outline how measuring mental illness among the homeless has been polemical due to various inherent methodological issues regarding whom to count. We demonstrate how methodologies commonly used to study homelessness produce an overrepresentation of mental illness while simultaneously underestimating how many homeless with mental illness qualify for existing services. To our knowledge, this study is the first to directly compare the severity of mental illness among the homeless to that of the domiciled (housed) population.

2. Historical Arguments: Deinstitutionalization versus Medicalization

Contemporary research on homelessness points to how cities prioritize efforts to "manage" homeless populations via mechanisms of control instead of housing them (Willse 2015). Some ethnographic work focuses on the details of the harsh policing of the homeless (Stuart 2016). Other research is framed around how to best provide housing for the homeless, focusing on the effectiveness of the "housing first" philosophy (Padgett et al. 2016; Chen 2019), while others point to the cost-effectiveness of prioritizing homeless populations with disabilities (Culhane et al. 2002). However, focusing on disabilities, particularly mental illness, has been a contested issue for decades.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, a drastic increase of visible homeless followed the deinstitutionalization of state mental facilities and President Reagan's budget reductions to welfare. This led to increased attention to homelessness (Kozol 1988; Stern 1984). Regan-era budget reductions included decreasing HUD's budget from over $65 billion to just over $10 billion (85% reduction) and included massive rollbacks to such programs as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and food stamps (Kozol 1988). Cities like Chicago experienced a noticeable increase in their visible homeless, which grew by eight times from what was previously recorded and showed overall demographics change from single males to include females and families with children (Jencks 1994). Researchers following the 1980s influx of visible homeless call the phenomenon the "new homelessness," noting a more diverse "face" of homeless populations, which includes females, children, and families increasingly experiencing homeless spells (Lee et al. 2010; Rossi 1990).

Many social service providers, policymakers, and quantitative researchers often point to the process of deinstitutionalization from state mental hospitals to explain the massive increases in the homelessness population following the 1980s. Researchers since the 1980s (Jencks 1994) and more recently (Dear and Wolch 2014) have explained the process of deinstitutionalization as a process by which service-dependent populations do not have enough access to services in general. Jencks (1994) emphasizes five deinstitutionalization phases: (1) the late 1940s to early 1950s when federal policy reduced state mental hospitals that were deemed more harmful than beneficial to patients; (2) in 1965, Congress established Medicaid, state mental hospitals transferred their residents to nursing homes to save on cost; (3) in 1972, beneficiaries could gain Social Security Income (SSI) income, food stamps, and Medicaid totaling $500/month, (4) in 1992, discharged patients from inpatient facilities for people experiencing mental health issues became immediately eligible for services following hospitalization; (5) restrictions on involuntary commitment followed the critiques in the works of Thomas Zsasz and Erving Goffman on psychiatry and asylums, respectively (Goffman 1962; Jencks 1994). Edwin Fuller Torrey (1988) also chronicles the process of deinstitutionalization of patients from state mental facilities by saying that the numbers peaked (500,000) during the 1950s and were

halved (less than 200,000) by 1970, which is over a decade before increases of visible new homeless were noticed during the 1980s, and official national homeless counts began.

Following the 1980s, research on homelessness attempted to explain demographic changes among the new homeless populations. Some researchers argue that empirical evidence did not support the claim that deinstitutionalization was the primary driver of homelessness in the 1980s. Snow et al. (1986) provided a multi-prong critique: (1) noting the timing discrepancy between deinstitutionalization and evidence of the new homeless populations, (2) questioning how researchers created estimates of the mentally ill, and (3) pointing to structural issues such as poverty, unemployment, reduced welfare benefits, and increased cost of housing as playing more dominant roles than mental illness in expanding the homeless population. Researchers were forced to consider contextual factors beyond the traditional single male homeless "old hobo," as they were called in the 1920s, or distinctly the "hobohemia" period before the era of the new homelessness (see Anderson 1923).

Researchers still argue over the causes of the increase in homelessness since the 1980s. While some point to the deinstitutionalization of state medical hospitals, others point to structural issues of welfare reductions that caused social service agencies to scramble for limited available funding to continue operations under a medicalized framework (Huey et al. 2012; Lyon-Callo 2000). Some argue, more generally, of a combination of structural issues, policy changes, institutional failures, and individual vulnerabilities as proximal and distal causes (Gaetz 2020). Surveys of homeless populations conducted during the 1980s, such as those of Fischer (1989), found consistently high rates of addiction and mental health problems, particularly among single men. However, research has since found biases in their measurement of reported mental illness because rather than focusing on respondents' current experiences, as is the norm for other populations, they recorded experiences during the lifespan of homeless individuals (Snow and Anderson 2001; Snow et al. 1994; Snow et al. 1986). Homeless populations are often studied differently than domiciled populations. Building on what Conrad (1992) calls the "medicalization of society," researchers provided critical analysis of how homelessness is framed. Research also found that claims of high rates of reported mental illness among those experiencing homelessness were swayed by social exchanges with intake workers and insurance billing demands (Braun and Cox 2005; Lyon-Callo 2000).

It is crucial to consider how those experiencing homelessness access services. Bogard (2001) explores popular stereotypes about homeless individuals and the conceptual construction of homelessness, arguing that contextual indicators produced the contemporary homeless situation. By comparing New York City to Washington, DC from 1977–1981, she argues that a more structure-focused housing approach took place in Washington, DC. This was overcome by a medicalized version of defining homelessness in New York City, which inspired homeless policies throughout the U.S. (Bogard 2001). She notes that this divergence is represented in the academic literature about homelessness, where some scholars focus a majority of attention on pathological shortcomings of homeless individuals while others focus on broader contextual factors (Bogard 2001). She emphasizes that those focusing on pathological shortcomings are individualizing responsibility, like the New York model, and advocate for a strong therapeutic intervention and an increase in related services. However, others draw attention to structural issues, like the DC model, which includes rising housing markets and income inequalities, all of which should be remedied through public policy and not focus on personal impairments of homeless individuals. Two separate meta-analyses find inadequate wages and the rising cost of housing as persisting causes of homelessness (Lee et al. 2010; Shlay and Rossi 1992).

The extent that mental illness drives people into homelessness should be compared to what percentage of the homeless population has a mental illness. Symptoms may appear after experiencing living rough (outside). There is an ongoing debate over the prevalence of mental illness among those experiencing homelessness due to the various contexts in which it is measured (Fazel et al. 2008) and lingering methodological problems of measurement (Susser et al. 1990). Findings are inconsistent and range between 4–100% (Fischer 1989; Lee et al. 2010; Shlay and Rossi 1992). This wide range may be due to different sampling frames. Studies that survey shelter inhabitants find far higher amounts of

mental illness than those that sample from the streets, or beyond the service system (Hopper et al. 2008; Smith and Castañeda-Tinoco 2019; Snow and Anderson 1993). The broad range of findings draws attention to how the methods used can often predetermine the results.

Street samples attempt to collect more data on street dwelling homeless individuals and what Rossi et al. (1987) called the "marginally or precariously housed" among hotels and those who double up with friends and family (Smith and Castañeda-Tinoco 2019). Examples of the hidden homeless or marginally housed homeless include those who stay on a friend's or family member's couch, rotate staying with various friends or family, or someone who stays in a hotel/motel one night but may sleep outside the next—and visa-versa. The marginally housed are especially challenging to survey or count due to their absence in traditionally recognized homeless spaces, which makes calculating those with mental illnesses especially complicated.

Problems go beyond operationalizing who is "homeless," and defining "mental illness." In a review devoted to measuring mental illness among those experiencing homelessness during the 1980s, Susser et al. (1990) cite common problems, such as (1) sampling issues (especially sampling homeless outside shelter populations), (2) delineating the measurement of incidence of homelessness versus prevalence of homelessness, (3) getting diagnosed by a lay volunteer rather than a qualified diagnostician, and (4) defining reports of general "distress" as symptoms. They go on to say:

> Uncertainty pervades . . . Reported diagnoses and assessments by means of scales are fraught with problems of interpretation. There is no measure that is comparable across all or even most surveys . . . At this time it is essential to identify the sources of error and the limits to our knowledge, for the field to advance (Susser et al. 1990, p. 410).

Considering how difficult prior research found measuring mental illness among homeless individuals, it is problematic to assert that a supposed majority of the people experiencing homelessness are in fact mentally ill, or more mentally ill than those who are not experiencing homelessness. More importantly, it is problematic that many of those experiencing homelessness who are not mentally ill "enough" cannot access housing services.

Problems persist despite the slew of scholarly calls for policy reevaluation. Many ethnographers find that people experiencing homelessness are forced to participate in a medicalized context when they interact with service providers. It is important to consider how social contexts of being without a home might lead to coping strategies that are rational survival strategies, a point emphasized by Snow et al. (2014) in their paper *On the Precariousness of Measuring Insanity in Insane Contexts*. After all, people are not mentally ill just because they are not living in a home. For this reason, they argue that researchers should be aware of mistakenly interpreting their homeless respondents as dysfunctional when it could just be their adaptation to the social context of being homeless, which is not a "normal" situation (Snow et al. 2014).

2.1. Lingering Medicalized Structure

Since the 1990s, cities receiving federal funding from HUD have used a tiered model consisting of emergency shelters, transitional housing, and permanent housing, commonly referred to as the "Continuum of Care" (CoC) (Gowan 2010; Wong et al. 2006), and the 2009 Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing (HEARTH) Act formally mandated it (Perl 2017). The CoC consists of three phases to help people experiencing homelessness through the housing process: phase one is emergency shelters, phase two is transitional shelters, and phase three is permanent housing (Gowan 2010). Emergency shelters can be overwhelmed with hundreds of people who complain of little sleep due to noise during the night, risk of theft, and drug activity in the restrooms, and all this can prompt inhabitants to reconsider how rational it is to stay there (Wasserman and Clair 2010). Then, homeless individuals must be processed and be accepted into case managers' already overburdened caseload to access housing services via transitional housing or permanent housing (Ranasinghe 2017).

Shelter Plus Care previously targeted those experiencing homelessness who were SMI, had verifiable addiction, or had HIV/AIDS. The HEARTH Act has since identified CoC funding to be exclusively for those who fit the definition of "chronic" homeless (i.e., those who have documentation of a formal disability and have experienced homelessness for over one year or four times in three years). CoC funding represents 88% of all Homeless Assistance Grants (Perl 2017, p. 30). While some researchers focus on HUD's mandate to fit time criteria of "chronic" homelessness (Smith and Anderson 2018), all homeless individuals seeking housing via CoC must have a formal disability that is interpreted by diagnostician or clinical social workers to be severe enough for admission into housing—not just any mental illness will do.

Limited funding compounds the issue of housing the homeless. In the United States, each city has varying levels and types of local, county, and state funding availability that supplement its federal funding. However, there are only a handful of local municipalities that supplement funding beyond what HUD provides (Padgett et al. 2016). Additionally, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) staved off mass homelessness following the Great Recession of 2008 by briefly supplying Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program (HPRP) funding across the U.S.—bolstering "Housing First" initiatives. Despite its successes, all HPRP funding ceased in September of 2012 (HUD 2019). Unless cities continue to provide external funding, social service workers, and the people they work with must participate in the current medicalized CoC model in order to navigate successfully into housing.

Under current policy, written documentation includes a formal diagnosis of SMI, among other qualifying vulnerabilities. For example, common preliminary conditions for formal access into these programs state:

> Individuals were eligible to receive housing at either residence if they were living on the street or in a shelter and had at least two of the following disabilities: substance use disorder, mental illness (axis I or axis II diagnosis), and HIV-AIDS. To qualify for residence in the Lyric, one of the disabilities had to be a diagnosis of an axis I mental illness. A small proportion of Canon Kip units (nine units, or 9%) were allocated to individuals with only one diagnosis. A clinician confirmed all diagnoses in writing, and a social worker certified homeless status (Martinez and Burt 2006, p. 993).

Considering formal diagnoses must be in writing, only a handful of researchers have focused on how homeless individuals interact with service providers in this regard. Theresa Gowan's ethnographic research found, among three general types, that those experiencing homelessness often speak in terms of "sick-talk" while interacting with service providers and researchers. By this, she means that some homeless individuals speak of mental illness and other medical conditions that may qualify them for services even when unprompted. It is still unclear if sick-talk exists due to perceived desired responses that respondents think may help them access housing.

Additionally, Lyon-Callo (2000) found it standard practice for social service workers to medicalize the framing of homeless clients in their advocacy for homeless services, beginning the moment they walk through the service door for intake. If homeless individuals are unwilling to conform their identity to the existing medicalized purview, it can result in the stigmatized official label of "non-compliant" among service providers and result in being discharged from services altogether (Lyon-Callo 2000). In other words, it might be their reluctance to conform to a medicalized shelter system that leaves people sleeping on the streets. Medicalized systems occur in both CoC models and Housing First models (Osborne 2018). The previous literature questions how those experiencing homelessness adapt their interaction with both service workers and researchers following the lingering assumption, or desired response, that affirmatively identifying as mentally ill (among other illnesses) may be necessary in exchange for housing entry. This is especially true if they are not otherwise verifiably "disabled" under current policy.

2.2. Comparison to the Domiciled Population

Historically, defining mental illness among those experiencing homelessness has been problematic, yet these assumptions are contextualized when compared to mental illness among the housed population. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMSHA) uses the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) to distinguish serious mental illness (SMI) from any mental illness (AMI) in their study of domiciled populations. The NSDUH measure mental illness of the domiciled (housed) population and provide a more specific determination of the severity of mental illness among homeless individuals than has been previously utilized. The NSDUH consistently found that the prevalence of any mental illness (AMI) among the general population in the U.S. over the past ten years to range from 17.7–19.1%, and serious mental illness (SMI) to range from 3.7–4.6% (SAMHSA 2020).

3. Methods

We conducted a Point-in-Time (PIT) study using a modified version of HUD's official PIT survey in El Paso, TX. While HUD's PIT is perhaps the best and most referenced public data gathering on homelessness, there are extensive problems with its methodology (NLCHP 2017; Smith and Castañeda-Tinoco 2019). Despite HUD's PIT limitations, we have two reasons to do this. First, we focused on street populations and not solely those from institutionalized settings. Second, PIT aggregates are the most widely used database to inform public policy (HUD 2019; Jackson 2007). We enacted a few moderate improvements, as we describe in this section and elaborate in the limitations section.

3.1. Replication

HUD currently conducts a mandated annual homeless Point-in-Time (PIT) to count the total homeless population in every major city across the United States. The information gathered in HUD's PIT count is reported to the U.S. Congress (HUD 2007–2018 2019; Jackson 2007) and the U.S. Census Bureau for population estimates and public policy development concerning homeless services, poverty, and urban planning. Although the methods of HUD's PIT counts have been heavily critiqued (NLCHP 2017), it is the most utilized quantitative data available on homelessness.

Most major cities conduct two separate counts as part of their annual HUD PIT count. The first part counts those within the service industry, such as at shelters, soup kitchens, and halfway houses, while the second part is a "street count" to account for those experiencing homelessness not accessing shelter services.

The first author worked as a social service worker from 2002–2008 and participated in HUD PIT counts since 2002 in Cincinnati, OH, Covington, KY, Phoenix, AZ, and El Paso, TX. The street count is typically conducted using volunteers from the local community who receive limited training, usually an hour. Homeless subpopulations that do not fit traditional stereotypes have been difficult to study, specifically immigrants, people sleeping in automobiles, or those temporarily living with friends or extended family. These groups are hidden populations that are often difficult to sample (Rossi et al. 1987; Smith and Castañeda-Tinoco 2019).

The National Coalition for the Homeless (2013) acknowledges the caveat that "Point-in-time count methodologies vary and are imperfect and as such the aggregated numbers do not represent a precise count of homeless people" (5). Thus, any percentages of subpopulations should be aggregated with similar caution. Controversy over the operationalization of terms has also compounded problems with HUD's count. This includes periodic changes in defining such terms as "homeless," "chronic homelessness," and "mental illness." The 2009 HEARTH act renewed and restructured the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act initially passed in 1987 and finally defined homelessness as "one without adequate place to sleep at night" (HEARTH 2015). The official HUD PIT survey also measures mental illness with only one question by asking, "Do you think you have any current

psychiatric or emotional problems?" Despite this question being widely used across the U.S. (HUD 2018), it is problematic for several reasons, including that simply saying "yes" does not technically qualify as having a diagnosed mental illness. Furthermore, such responses grant no certainty to the severity of the symptoms or accessibility into services. Most people conducting PIT counts are not mental health professionals and cannot make clinical assessments themselves.

3.2. Our PIT

We conducted a Point-in-Time (PIT) Replication Study in El Paso, TX, using a modified version of the HUD's official PIT survey used to count the homeless population. Our study focused specifically on delineating varying types and severity of mental illness among the homeless population. It consisted of the same survey questions as El Paso's official HUD PIT street count conducted on 24 January 2013, with the addition of three follow-up questions concerning mental health/illness (The survey instrument we used is published in Smith and Castañeda-Tinoco 2019).

We conducted the PIT replication study between 4:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on 27 February 2013. Respondents were included if they reported being homeless according to HUD's "chronic" homeless definition or stayed the previous night in an "inadequate place to live" according to the 2009 HEARTH Act, which also includes Rossi et al.'s (1987) "marginally housed" populations. We focus on those who reported that they had mental health concerns or reported symptoms or diagnoses of mental illness. All reported symptoms of mental illness, even potential mental illness, were included and counted as any mental illness (AMI).

The project received IRB approval from the University of Texas at El Paso where the class was taught as part of a larger study (see Loza et al. 2017), whose protocols were reviewed by an interdisciplinary group of scholars at the Hispanic Health Disparities Research Center and approved by program officers at the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities at the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH). This replication count was a possible research project for undergraduate students enrolled in Castañeda's "Methods of Research" class. Students were trained in proper research techniques for weeks, including on how to conduct surveys and interviews efficiently and ethically before conducting the survey, and were given clear direction on what to do in risky situations and had direct oversight (class syllabus is supplemental material published in (Smith and Castañeda-Tinoco 2019)). All participants received human subjects training and took the test to be certified to protect human research participants by the NIH. Students often worked in pairs, and small teams were aided by graduate students, including Curtis Smith and Josue Lachica, both of whom had ample experience working with homeless individuals as outreach workers.

As in other point-in-time censuses, the goal was to survey and count every single homeless person possible. Students had designated areas within the city to survey the homeless population. Surveyors did not enter any homeless service centers and wrote a short description of what the homeless respondents wore so that any duplication of surveyed respondents could be tracked and eliminated during data analysis. With the same objective, we had respondents name the city and street where they grew up.

We describe the success of the study in a previous publication (Smith and Castañeda-Tinoco 2019) in finding hundreds more homeless individuals than the official PIT count that year. A paper comparing homeless situations along ethnic lines (Castañeda et al. 2014) has been used as a textbook case study on how to study health disparities among minority vulnerable populations (Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero 2017, pp. 239–43).

We added the following three fill-in-the-blank questions to the PIT survey carried out one month prior by the local coalition for the homeless: "Have you ever been formally diagnosed with a mental disorder?" "If so, by whom?" And then, "What symptoms do you experience that concern you?" The answers to these questions were recorded in the database exactly as respondents answered them. We recorded all responses of self-reported mental illnesses and symptoms of potential mental illnesses. Since the first author had a history of employment by mental health organizations

and had received training to assess homeless people for potential mental illness, he categorized all responses according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association 2000).

All "yes" responses to the official question were included. Respondents concerned with their mental health were measured according to diagnoses, or by their reported criteria of symptoms of possible mental illness according to the DSM-IV. Symptoms were obtained in the open-ended text responses were then categorized by potential diagnoses. We included answers to "what kind of symptoms?" referencing mental health in general, and any responses referencing symptoms of SMI were classified as such in a new variable. This is a substantial improvement from the official PIT survey for El Paso, which asked, "Do you think that you have any current psychiatric or emotional problem(s)?" For example, identifying as "unhappy" could be characterized by depression by some, "paranoia," or seeing things others do not see could be "schizophrenia," or a combination of "happy" and "paranoia" were coded as possible, undiagnosed, "schizoaffective disorder." We also recorded if participants were diagnosed or undiagnosed. If respondents indicated that they had been diagnosed by someone who was not a clinician, surveyors marked that the respondents answered "myself," and then were considered "undiagnosed" in the data. To avoid undercounts and underestimating, "undiagnosed" was aggregated to "diagnosed" to represent total populations with *possible* mental illnesses. Therefore, our mental health prevalence is on the generous side and possibly overcounts actual cases.

3.3. SMI and AMI

We apply NSDUH's terms, "SMI" and "AMI," to assess how many could access housing programs. The NSDUH says:

> Respondents were defined as having any mental illness (AMI) if they were determined to have any of the mental disorders ... regardless of the level of functional impairment ... Respondents were defined as having serious mental illness (SMI) if they had any of the mental disorders ... result[ing] in substantial impairment in carrying out major life activities ... The SCID and the GAF in combination were considered to be the "gold standard" for measuring mental illness (pp. 65–66).

Considering how the domiciled (housed) populations are measured according to severity is relevant to homelessness because only those with formal diagnoses considered severe enough are accepted into housing.

We used the terms of any mental illness "AMI" and serious mental illness "SMI" as utilized by SAMSHA's NSDUH. First, we focused on those who answered "yes" to the question, "Do you think you have any current psychiatric or emotional problems?" or provided any affirmative answers to the subsequent questions on mental illness. Those cases were separated into a variable and coded as "AMI." The official question is framed to capture their current condition. However, we also instructed surveyors to mark any mental illness in their history (i.e., prior hospitalization or diagnoses). AMI represents an aggregated total of anyone who reported any symptom or diagnosis of mental illness.

We realize that it is not feasible for HUD to use traditional assessments utilized for the severity of mental illness, such as the Level of Care Utilization System (LOCUS) because administering these assessments would be too time-consuming as each assessment takes over an hour (LOCUS 2020). To streamline this process, we asked open-ended questions that could then be categorized. We recorded all respondents who said they either had (a) a formal diagnosis or, (b) symptoms of mental illness, following the DSM-IV, on any part of the survey, and categorized them as "diagnosed" or "undiagnosed." We needed to categorize these reported diagnoses along with any symptoms of possible serious mental illness to create a category for "SMI." Jans et al. (2004) list of SMI disorders include:

> ... diagnoses of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, manic-depressive disorder, autism, severe forms of major depression, panic disorder, or obsessive-compulsive disorder, because

these disorders are so severe that they almost always lead to serious impairment if not treated (p. 55).

Using this list of disorders in Jans et al. (2004) and the DSM's descriptions of SMI, we categorized reported symptoms into the corresponding mental illness. For example, if the respondent indicated any sort of depression, then the surveyor asked for the duration of depression. If the symptoms of mental illness responses were anything that had lasted over twelve months, then they were coded as "dysthymia" and categorized as SMI. Cases that were not considered SMI but were still "mentally ill" were left in the AMI category.

We also coded these cases in a separate variable called "undiagnosed" and "SMI" if respondents reported symptoms of conditions listed in Jans et al. (2004). We assumed that they could be diagnosed if they had access to a formal diagnostician, so we recorded any indication of mental illness in our analysis. The two numbers of "diagnosed" SMI and "undiagnosed" SMI were added together for a total population of SMI.

All cases that reported symptoms of possible mental illness were added to cases that were diagnosed, SMI, or AMI, respectively. If clarification was needed, we followed-up with surveyors or physical surveys during the coding process to ensure accuracy. In short, if respondents reported a mental illness diagnosis on Jans et al. (2004) list of SMI disorders, then they were coded as SMI, and categorized as "diagnosed." We also included those who reported being institutionalized/hospitalized for their mental illness as "diagnosed" and "SMI."

Similar to SAMSHA and NSDUH, conditions not severe enough were left in the AMI category. However, SMI is technically included in the AMI category. Therefore, to make these categories mutually exclusive for comparison, we created another category called other mental illness (OMI) for those cases unambiguously not severe (SMI). OMI cases were any respondents who described mental health concerns, symptoms, or diagnoses of mood disorders and disorders such as Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. These disorders are not as severe. Like SMI, we aggregated OMI according to "diagnosed" and "undiagnosed" to get a total population of OMI.

AMI comprised an aggregated total of SMI and OMI (including diagnosed and undiagnosed). After the categories of AMI and SMI were separated along with "diagnosed" and "undiagnosed," the comparison could be made with the non-homeless. OMI homeless cases theoretically struggle to fit categories seen as vulnerable enough for housing access, according to funding sources for housing and homeless assessments, such as the Service Prioritization Decision Assistance Tool (SPDAT 2020). When finished with this step, we delineated cases with reports of any indication of mental illness according to the following categories: SMI, AMI, diagnosed, or undiagnosed.

Included in the standard HUD PIT survey was the question, "What type of services did you really need but you could not get in the last 12 months?" A possible answer to this question was "Mental health services." Additionally, if a respondent felt that they might be experiencing mental illness, surveyors were instructed to offer an on-site, good-faith mental health assessment by an expert and provide transportation to a formal diagnostician for proper assessment. No respondent asked for this type of help. We also provided service referrals, and all surveyors had the cellphone numbers of nurses and social workers ready to meet individuals who requested it on the spot.

4. Findings

Our survey was applied to a total of 678 homeless individuals who were found through network sampling or under bridges, at local parks, or otherwise on the streets, although 24% of respondents said they had slept in a shelter the night before being surveyed. Given that we counted respondents who provided any indication of mental illness, however severe, we found 19.8% answered "yes" to the official question, "Do you think that you have any current psychiatric or emotional problem(s)?" Seven cases described any mental illness conditions or symptoms in subsequent responses, which brought the total AMI population to 20.8% (see Figure 1). Among the AMI population, 4.3% were diagnosed SMI, and 1.9% showed symptoms of SMI (including undiagnosed who described only

symptoms). When aggregated together, we found the total population for SMI to be 6.2%. When we subtract the total SMI population from the total AMI population, we are left with 13.6%. Other Mental Illness (OMI) are those who reported symptoms of mental illness according to the DSM-IV but did not report SMI diagnoses or symptoms of potential SMI. Of the total population of 678, 10% provided symptoms that included mood disorders, such as emotional, insomnia, sadness, or otherwise situational conditions. The OMI population is that which prior research on the subject typically includes in their findings on general mental illness. However, the current definition of "chronic" homelessness does not consider that these cases are severe enough to qualify for housing services. In short, 14.6% (OMI) of the mentally ill homeless do not report symptoms that are severe enough to access current housing that prioritizes only the chronic homeless.

Additionally, some affirmative responses to the official question ("Do you think that you have any current psychiatric or emotional problem(s)?") responded to our original follow-up survey questions with answers such as "foot aches," "non-mental health condition," "economics," or other non-mental concerns, and three cases were concerns about addiction despite addiction already being recorded in another variable. These cases were removed from the mental illness category.


Figure 1. By Authors. AMI = Any Mental Illness; SMI = Serious Mental Illness; OMI = Other Mental Illness (AMI but not SMI).

When asked, "What type of services did you really need but you could not get in the last 12 months?" 6.3% reported needing "mental health care" (see Figure 2). When only considering those who desired "mental health care" services, most were those who were diagnosed (Diagnosed SMI or Diagnosed OMI) or previously had experience with mental health services. For this question, OMI was split between "diagnosed" and "undiagnosed" at 13.9%. Those with symptoms of SMI (undiagnosed) and desired services were the least at 11.1% (see Figure 2). Only 27.8% of this group reported an SMI diagnosis, and another 11.1% exhibited symptoms of SMI (see Figure 2). Interestingly, the largest number of those who desired services but could not access (33.3%) was among those who marked "no" for the official question regarding mental concerns. Thus, one-third of those who desire to qualify for mental health services do not report a mental health concern, which could mean they either underreport mental health concerns or simply wish they could qualify for services they know they do not currently qualify for. If homeless individuals do not have mental health concerns but desire services in any form, this should be considered for policy implications and is discussed below.

Additionally, 75% of the total sample fit the time criteria of being "chronically" homeless by having been homeless for over one year or four times in three years. Most of these cases did not have an accompanying disability.


Figure 2. By Authors.

5. Discussion

Snow et al. (1986) explain in their article *The Myth of Pervasive Mental Illness among the Homeless* three reasons for the medicalization of the homeless: the medical profession defines the scope of the problem and granted expertise, the problem is framed from the standpoint of the medical model, and that the medicalized perspective functions as the only way the problem is viewed and debated publicly. They conclude saying,

> Additionally, attention has been focused primarily on "flaws" and "impediments" within homeless individuals and the mental health system, rather than on the larger social structure. As a consequence, socioeconomic factors—such as the lack of jobs with decent pay, dislocations in the job market, and decline in the availability of low- income housing—tend to be ignored or discounted as the major causes of homelessness. The general result is that the prevalence of mental illness among the homeless is exaggerated and the stereotypic image of the homeless as men. (Snow et al. 1986, p. 420)

Our findings for this sample in El Paso, also show that the actual majority of the homeless are not mentally ill despite popular belief. Further research in El Paso and other cities should test whether this is the case elsewhere.

Our findings support the medicalization hypothesis over the deinstitutionalization argument. In other words, our findings support the argument that homelessness has been individualized and medicalized in ways that defund universal services and prevent many who are poor from receiving aid. By asking respondents to clarify what their mental health concerns were, we produced findings very close to other homelessness studies that sampled street homeless instead of sheltered homeless (see Figure 3). Our 20.8% total of homeless respondents with any mental illness (AMI) is consistent

with most available research on the subject that samples street homeless (see Figure 3). We found only 6.2% SMI, which is surprisingly similar to the housed population in the U.S. at 3.7–4.6%.

We see that mental illness in general (AMI)—and much less SMI—is not disproportionally common among the homeless, something that is often claimed by laypersons, some social service workers, and research that limits sampling to shelters (or otherwise institutionalized settings) where formal disability is often a prerequisite for admission. While our findings are comparable to prior research focusing on mental illness more generally (HUD 2013; Shlay and Rossi 1992; Snow and Anderson 1993; Susser et al. 1990), our study stands out because we specify the severity and compare to the general population. We recognize the uniqueness of our census in comparison to other studies on the subject because we sampled the streets and included respondents who reported sleeping in the streets and shelters as well as the marginally housed population sleeping in cars or "couch surfing" to capture the full diversity of the homeless population, which is beyond the traditional sampling of people experiencing homeless spells. The comparison and resemblance to the housed population should not be too surprising since many individuals experience homeless spells but are not homeless long-term. There can be a revolving door between renting, being evicted, working while homeless, and getting back into housing (Jencks 1994; Rossi 1991).

Susser et al. (1990) stated that "Uncertainty pervades existing survey data on the frequency of mental illness among the homeless . . . no measure that (*sic*) is comparable across all or even most surveys (p. 410)." Studies still use varying methods and motives for studying the subject, which we feel calls into question who is creating and using the assessments meant to study it. We feel we have furthered the knowledge on the subject, based on who is sampled.

Our findings are consistent with prior studies that reflect lower rates among street samples in comparison to higher mental illness rates among the sheltered, or otherwise institutionalized, samples. Shlay and Rossi's (1992) meta-analysis of 60 studies on those experiencing homelessness found that 33% of homeless individuals have a current mental illness with a significant standard deviation of 23 and a range of other findings on mental illness from 4–100%. They also acknowledged a considerable variation in prior research, saying that they can often focus attention on stereotypical subpopulations of homeless people who stay in specified types of shelters neglecting other populations. Additionally, Snow and Anderson (1993) focused on the prevalence of mental illness. The study surveyed 800 homeless individuals in Austin, TX, within service centers, and on the streets. Careful not to overlook any hidden mentally ill populations, the results of their study included anyone who could possibly be mentally ill, even if respondents that had not been formally assessed, or if reports were coming from third-party homeless people. Evidence of possible SMI was found to be at 9% of homeless respondents, with a follow-up study that found 16% SMI (Snow and Anderson 1993). In our study, only 6.2% described symptoms of SMI or were diagnosed SMI, so we can conclude that only 6.2% of the total population could qualify for housing services under CoC subsidized housing services due to their mental illness alone (assuming they have no other disability). HUD's PIT consistently reports around one-third of the homeless population to be mentally ill over the past ten years (HUD 2007–2018 2019).

5.1. Compared to the Non-Homeless Population

Our findings are also similar to studies that measure mental illness among the general U.S. population. The NSDUH reports the prevalence of AMI from 2008–2018 to range between 17.7–19.1% and SMI 3.7–4.6% (SAMHSA 2020). Studies such as Kessler et al. (2005) also indicate mental illness among the general population in the U.S. to be as high as 23% SMI, but do not include AMI in their findings. These surveys are unlikely to include respondents who were homeless at the time of the survey.

Figure 3. Comparison across studies, including HUD (2013), HUD 2007–2018 (2019), Kessler et al. (2005), NSDUH (2018), Snow and Anderson (1993), and Shlay and Rossi's meta-analysis (1992). Studies that sample only sheltered or otherwise institutionalized homeless are omitted. * Studied only SMI; ** Studied any mental illness (did not specify SMI).

Additionally, HUD's annual PIT is the top referenced quantitative information used to develop policy. Figure 3 illustrates how HUD's PIT national aggregates consistently found 30–33% mental illness for over a decade (HUD 2013; HUD 2007–2018 2019). To our knowledge, the studies in Figure 3 include all available literature on the subject in the past 50 years that sample homeless populations outside of institutionalized settings.

Figure 4 shows a cross-tabulation of the distribution of all those who reported symptoms or diagnoses of mental illness, by where they stayed the night before the day they were surveyed. As suspected, those who reported diagnoses of SMI at a higher rate stayed in the shelter system at 11.2% (2.6% + 8.6%) compared to 5.1% who stayed on the street or unspecified, and 5.3% among the marginally housed. Those who reported OMI symptoms or diagnoses totaled 10% in shelter compared to 9.3% on the streets or unspecified, and 14% among the marginally housed.

Where do People with Mental Illness Stay?

		None	OMI		SMI		Total
			Only Symptoms	Diagnosed	Only Symptoms	Diagnosed	
Housing by category	*Sheltered*	119	9	6	4	13	151
		78.8%	6.0%	4.0%	2.6%	8.6%	100%
	Street or Unspecified	284	18	13	7	10	332
		85.5%	5.4%	3.9%	2.1%	3.0%	100%
	Marginally Housed	121	13	8	2	6	150
		80.7%	8.7%	5.3%	1.3%	4.0%	100%
Total		529	41	27	13	29	633
		82.8%	6.4%	4.2%	2.0%	4.5%	100%

Figure 4. By Authors. SMI = Serious Mental Illness; OMI = Other Mental Illness.

It is common for some prior research to assert that it is concerning that one-fifth to one-third of the homeless population shows signs of mental illness. Instead, we argue that it is not concerningly high compared to the general population. In the case of this study, the narrative goes beyond asserting that one-fifth of the population is mentally ill. We demonstrate that AMI is similar to the domiciled (non-homeless) population. We also show that SMI among those experiencing homelessness is only a fraction of AMI and that it is very similar to the domiciled population. This SMI category is the only population eligible for CoC housing under the current policy. We want to emphasize that with the blank space in Figure 3 that the actual majority of homeless are not mentally ill, which is consistent with other studies in recent decades that sample beyond sheltered or otherwise institutionalized homeless. If we want to help homeless people, it is not only through mental health services but through housing assistance to those in economic need.

5.2. Research Implications

It is concerning that the most widely used survey, HUD's PIT, only uses one question in their annual survey to measure mental illness among the homeless population: "Do you think that you have any current psychiatric or emotional problems?" We are aware that different cities may have another version of the official survey, but most cities only use HUD's official questions. Responses from our additional questions provided substantial additional information. We also are not alone in advocating that HUD improve the official PIT count (NLCHP 2017). Recently HUD's question has been changed to, "Do you have psychiatric or emotional conditions such as depression or schizophrenia?" (HUD n.d.).

Research such as Shlay and Rossi (1992) meta-analysis of over 60 studies adds that "Wide variation in estimates of the prevalence of mental illness are shown because there is neither a universally accepted definition of mental illness nor a common method for measuring mental illness" (Shlay and Rossi 1992, p. 137). However, to our knowledge, there has been no indication of distinguishing mental illness among the homeless by type. By including the marginally housed and categorizing mental illness by severity, our contribution clarifies how many homeless individuals report mental illness who qualify for housing services under the current definition of "chronic" homeless under current federal HUD policy. Despite continued support for increased availability of mental health services by advocacy groups and some prior research, we find fewer street homeless individuals who may report mental health concerns in official surveys actually exhibit or report the necessary clinical SMI conditions that could qualify them for such housing under HUD's official policy and limited funding allocations. That is, asserting high rates of mental illness among those experiencing homelessness that are already

institutionalized is misleading mainly because policy already mandates that sheltered homeless be limited to the very subpopulations the research is trying to measure.

Despite popular belief, there is a clear trend among the literature that the actual majority of the homeless are not mentally ill, and even fewer are seriously mentally ill (SMI). It is time to rethink how homelessness is researched and reconsider social policies that cater to stereotypes on homelessness. Even substance abuse has been found to happen only after time spent experiencing homelessness (66%) compared to before experiencing homeless (33%) (Johnson and Chamberlain 2008). Likewise, future research should consider whether homeless populations develop mental illness before or after spending time on the streets.

We believe our claims on mental illness among homeless individuals may appear challenging to advocate for because researchers and policymakers alike fallaciously assume mental illness is high because of reports that only sample the institutionalized homeless. They assume that studies omit, or overlook, cases because they do not fully understand (a) street homeless populations, (b) details of official housing policy stipulations, or (c) the categories SAMSHA uses to measure the general population or their respective findings. However, our findings are supported by other studies on the subject. Additionally, most assessments only ask binary "Yes/No" questions. Thus, anyone experiencing homeless with an understanding of the medicalized model can conclude that saying yes hints of desired responses from homeless respondents to simply answer "yes" in hopes for a chance at housing. Gowan (2010, p. xxi) refers to this phenomenon of constructing an identity to explain a reason for their homelessness "sick talk." Research also shows that social service workers feel that they need to "fit" their clients into this system by doing similarly (Smith and Anderson 2018).

Further analysis of our data shows that respondents occasionally reported "hearing voices." Someone said people were "out to get them." However, in these particular cases, it seems that these responses were related to a real fear—threats by others actually existed—and were not a symptom of schizophrenia or paranoia. These cases were still recorded in our data, but more importantly, other researchers or HUD volunteers could misinterpret these few cases as mental illness due to brief interaction with respondents and the fact that HUD measures mental illness with only one official survey question. The process is not so simple when speaking with a diagnostician. While answers can often represent a single symptom of SMI on HUD's survey, actual diagnoses per assessment, such as the MINI assessment (Sheehan et al. 2006), indicate that more information needs to be observed by a clinical diagnostician before a formal diagnosis should be given. Diagnoses are also largely at the "clinician's judgment" (Sheehan et al. 2006, p. 20). So, some of these cases would be turned away by the housing bureaucracy.

Despite the many methodological difficulties in researching mental illness, which are accentuated when conducting research among homeless populations, it must be undertaken. Gowan (2010) notes the importance of not simply focusing on the actions of homeless individuals who seek services, but of considering the larger culture that surrounds homelessness, and advocate for a more critical perspective in understanding the mental illness phenomenon within it. Observing mental illness among those experiencing homelessness within the scope of social service agencies can neglect the notion that the participants operate within a system that is irrational by design (Huey et al. 2012), and that it may be more rational for certain homeless individuals to sleep outside instead of seeking shelter services (Wasserman and Clair 2010). These notions demonstrate the necessity of a systematic analysis rather than merely observing the actions of individuals (Gowan 2010; Snow et al. 1986).

We made measuring the homeless outside of what Willse (2015) calls the service "industry," a priority. Our decision to include street homeless and marginally housed populations might also explain why our findings on mental illness are different. We do find variations across groups, but the total among all groups is 20% who show signs of any mental illness (AMI). We argue that policy caters to the most visible and homeless individuals who exhibit uncommon behavior at the expense of the broader population. Research on the institutionalized homeless among the service industry is prioritized and reinforces existing policy, which we will explain further.

5.3. Policy Implications

HUD currently prioritizes 88% of its funding for Homeless Assistance Grants to Continuum of Care funds, formerly called Shelter Plus Care (Perl 2017), which mandates that homeless clients present written documentation of disability along with the duration of time spent homeless under the official "chronic" definition (Homeless Assistance Reauthorization 2019). We also believe this is evidence of a medicalized model. SMI accompanied by written documentation of formal disability are the only mental illness cases that fall under the current "chronic" definition mandated by HUD after drastic budget reductions of the 1980s. Options are limited for those experiencing homelessness who enter housing services under HUD.

We argue that funding priority should be more inclusive to broader populations of those experiencing homelessness. We want to elaborate that we do not advocate cutting funds that benefit the mentally ill. Policymakers should consider more expansive funding, such as in the DC model (Bogard 2001).

Our findings also support the argument that social service workers may use medicalization to frame clients in exchange for service aid, which is in agreement with Lyon-Callo's findings (2000). They use strategies that continue to medicalize those experiencing homelessness under the current policy (Dordick 2002; Osborne 2018; Smith and Anderson 2018). They must cater to the federal definition of "chronic" homelessness, mandated by the HEARTH Act of 2009 (Homeless Assistance Reauthorization 2019). Research such as Smith and Anderson (2018) and Osborne (2018) reference social service workers using the Service Prioritization Decision Assistance Tool (SPDAT), a tool commonly utilized across the U.S., to sell the idea that their homeless clients deserve housing over other homeless people who are waiting. Mental illnesses, such as instances of situational depression and most mood disorders, are deemed not "severe" enough to access many housing services.

Based on the policy recommendations on the traditional CoC model above, we suggest the prioritization of Housing First policies. We make this argument with full recognition that the implementation of existing Housing First programs in the United States shows lingering medicalized frameworks (Osborne 2018), which should be researched, evaluated, and improved further.

5.4. Limitations

While the data used for this paper concerns only the border city of El Paso, TX, experiences in other cities lead us to think that this is also the case elsewhere. We also have cited studies conducted by others with supporting findings. Further research should verify whether the mentally ill are in the minority within the overall homeless population in most cities in the United States and other parts of the world.

Does the fact that we studied a border city make homelessness different from that in non-border cities? Given that El Paso borders directly with Mexico, we find a higher number of Hispanics among the homeless than in other cities (Castañeda 2019). Nonetheless, Hispanics are still underrepresented, given their share of the general population (Tan and Ryan 2001; Castañeda et al. 2014). There are a number of Hispanics and others who are foreign-born, yet the majority of respondents (66.6%) are U.S.-born. Some homeless individuals may indeed have returned voluntarily or been deported to Mexico. We also have information that many individuals were not born in El Paso but in other parts of the United States. This internal migration may be partly due to weather (Siorda et al. 2014) and to the relative tolerance of the local population, and to the affordability or the area and the resources afforded to have a transborder life (Comar 2011; Campbell and Lachica 2013; Castañeda et al. 2015). Beyond those already cited, qualitative studies in the area further complete the description of the homeless experience and mental health stigma in border cities (Moya et al. 2017; Aviña Cerecer 2020).

Contrary to the stereotypes, El Paso is not more dangerous than other cities (Castañeda and Chiappetta 2020), and its residents are not more likely to use drugs (Loza et al. 2017). Mental health could indeed be related to drug use or a decrease in social network size (Wright et al. 2017; Golembiewski et al. 2017). However, this is something beyond the scope of this paper.

Our methodological limitations fall in line with the many limitations of the official HUD PIT count (NLCHP 2017) with problems, such as (1) inconsistent methodologies across time and geographic location in the United States making trends uncertain, and (2) undercounting unsheltered adults and youth. However, we improved on other problems with the PIT that the NLCHP (2017) identify, such as (1) counting the unsheltered population, (2) counting kinds of homeless individuals that are not served by social service agencies, and (3) making sure to avoid counting the "supply [but] not demand" of the homeless utilization of services.

In attempts to broaden sampling to include those who are not institutionalized, we also included surveys from the marginally housed population, which could have lowered the number of mentally ill because they are not in the shelters or medicalized systems. Our study focused on street and marginally housed homeless individuals that were not as subject to the medicalized framing. Our numbers capture more of the homeless universe than is traditionally sampled on the subject. We also found 20% more people than the official count (Smith and Castañeda-Tinoco 2019), but we are still likely undercounting people who are sleeping on the streets or are marginally housed. If it were possible to capture all cases, then they would probably further decrease the percentage of SMI among housing insecure people. Again, we also contend that this study overestimates AMI and SMI because we included any indication of mental illness during their lifetime and were not skeptical of responses. Students did not diagnose; they collected all responses, which were then categorized by potential diagnoses. We categorized all symptoms under the assumption that they could be diagnosed to avoid producing low estimates. For this reason, we feel that we slightly overestimate the cases of mental illness, both SMI and AMI.

It is also possible that some respondents had a mental health concern, but since it was not severe enough to be SMI (or able to receive housing), respondents answered "No." This, in turn, would have had the effect of lowering the number of respondents reporting mental health "concern." Additionally, we understand that cases of mood disorders, such as depression, can often be so severe that they are debilitating and may also count as SMI. For these cases, we categorized "depression," and surveyors were trained to ask follow-up questions to record if it interfered with daily tasks. However, these limitations cannot completely account for depression that may be debilitating enough to be considered SMI.

Another population to account for, which seems to be the focus of some advocates, includes those who may hide their mental illness, e.g., those who answered "No" and did not report their mental health concerns, although they were formerly diagnosed, or those who were unwilling to share their symptoms. This limitation also affects other studies attempting to measure mental health concerns because of possibly stigmatizing concerns. Additionally, gathering information on the general population that hides their SMI would be equally as difficult. Addressing this issue would entail a new study focusing on those who may be mentally ill but fail to report it. This is an issue in any health survey relying on self-reporting.

We also counted 54 cases that reported symptoms of depression or anxiety that could be interpreted by diagnosticians as severely debilitating, and thus SMI. That would increase the total number of SMI to 14.2%. While this is consistent with other studies, we believe this would overestimate our data on SMI because not all reports of depression are severe. Furthermore, feeling depressed about experiencing homelessness is situational and commonly rational, as voiced by Snow et al. (1986). On this topic, we also want to enunciate that we did not use the SCID or the GAF in combination as the NSDUH, which advocates call the "gold standard" of measuring mental illness (SAMHSA 2020). Future research should consider this because it is done with the general population or use another assessment tool (possibly the MINI due to its brevity) on the streets.

We also argue that funding for research on this subject heavily incentivizes a medicalized framework for analysis. Funding sources such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Health and Human Services (HHS) cater to research interested in supporting a health purview. Thus, NIH and HHS -supported research biases policy, which in turn further medicalizes homeless individuals. Future research should also consider if those experiencing homelessness base their responses on desires for

mental health services, indicating that they are acculturated to the service industry and thus provide the socially-desired response. This is especially important with increased homelessness due to job loss due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

6. Conclusions

Many sociologists have been mindful to consider the socially constructed environmental norms surrounding homelessness when researching this population. However, research suggests that efforts to improve and refine the methodologies currently used are still needed (Lee et al. 2010; NLCHP 2017). The COVID-19 pandemic will likely increase poverty and homelessness due to structural economic downturns, and policymakers should consider the exclusionary path to housing aid under current policies. Research on homelessness has only recently begun to acknowledge its limited scope and possible methodological biases, such as the tendency to target respondents who are visible to the public eye while ignoring more hidden homeless populations. In an annual review devoted to homelessness, Lee et al. (2010) state that "such [methodological] problems have spurred technical improvements and explicit attention to how aspects of research design shape results" (p. 503). It is in light of these methodological difficulties that this study was conducted.

The methodologies and findings presented in this paper represent a step forward in describing access to services and a more accurate understanding of the prevalence of serious mental illness among this vulnerable population. Those experiencing homelessness should not need to be severely mentally ill or otherwise disabled to be eligible for housing. We feel that medicalizing homelessness further stigmatizes individuals experiencing homelessness, but we do not intend to stigmatize homeless people who are experiencing mental illness or to demerit their challenges and deservingness. To be clear, the assertion that there is a "majority" of people experiencing homelessness who are mentally ill is fallacious. Prioritizing homeless services for those with SMI does a disservice for the bulk of those who are experiencing homelessness. Our findings also support various meta-analyses that point to structural causes of homelessness over individual pathologies. People who have lost their housing should not need to be mentally ill as a means to accumulate enough stigma to exchange for housing eligibility under HUD's Homeless Assistance Grants, which are also the only available avenues through HUD without a waiting list of many years, such as Section 8 housing. It is time we rethink how homeless housing assistance is provided. For example, New York City's ability to house homeless people in hotels and other units during the COVID-19 pandemic shows that this is possible if there is the political will to do so. Budget studies also show that housing first initiatives are more financially sound than relying on stays in emergency rooms, jails, and continuously engaging EMTs and police officers to manage homelessness (National Alliance to End Homelessness 2020).

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Article

The Dispossessed of Necropolitics on the San Diego-Tijuana Border

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Abstract: This article presents results of a first-hand investigation that took a year of ethnographic work (methods of observation and interviews) during 2016–2017, with the post-structural theoretical framework of Gilles Deleuze, on the United States–Mexico border, in the San Diego-Tijuana corridor. The Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies of the University of California San Diego, PREVENCASA A. C., and Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosi supported this research. In this research, statistical data, observations, and synthesis of in-depth interviews were utilized about those defined as the 'dispossessed': users of hard drugs, and/or in homelessness conditions of discrimination in a highly contrasting border such as that of the United States and Mexico. Among the main results are the relations between mental and embodiment limits, necropolitics and territory, as well as the approach of post-structural political discourses about the body and mind that allow us to understand the subjectivities in question, proposing two types of homelessness.

Keywords: border; homelessness; hard drug users; self-inflicted violence; body without organs

1. Introduction

Critical studies recognize that the most significant challenge for humanity nowadays relates to the environment on a global scale and social equity. Both problems are part of the same process, and colonialist discrimination is its link (Foucault 1996). It is also in highly contrasting borders such as United States–Mexico, where not only does this become visible, but highly specialized and normalized. Necropolitics[1], brutal as it is shameful, produce nomadic subjectivities and morbid bodies. Here, the main objective is to make visible hard drug users (HDU) in homeless situations, as these nomad and morbid subjectivities which Deleuze and Guattari (2002) identify as 'body without organs' (BWO) and the way they are making part of the border territory.

Applying this category means following a deductive methodology, but also an inductive one, because as an anthropologist, the collection of information is by first-hand about these people and their nomadic use of the border territory. This anthropological work consisted of doing ethnography with indigents or in homeless situations, HDU on the American and Mexican sides. With the help of PREVENCASA A.C. and the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), over a year was observed and questionnaires were applied to multiple HDU, including in-depth interviews with eight of them on the Mexican side (seven Mexicans and one American) and two by the American side, in addition to one American activist and two Mexican medical specialists.

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[1] The connection with the study of *necropolitics* has been of course Marxism and Critical Theory via Mbembe (2008) but also Valencia (2010) and Estévez (2018). Once the necrotic devices and control gore have been identified, discrimination here is presented as the best soft political weapon that ensures the continuity and permanence of colonialism as well as the hyper-exploitation of the neediest.

To make this deductive association between homeless hard drug users and their daily territorial way of life, this investigation demonstrates results carried out from June 2016 to June 2018 with a post-structural theoretical framework (G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, and M. Foucault; among others). Additionally, statistical data are presented around those who are defined as the 'dispossessed': HDU and/or indigents in conditions of hard discrimination, on a highly contrasting border. The condition of this boarder is apparently controlled by two large 'Molar Structures'[2], one being Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and the other being what G. Deleuze defines as 'sex'.[3]

Among the main results are links between necrocapitalism, the local subjectivities in question and territory. In addition to this is the post-structural approach of political discourses about the body and mind that allow us to understand these highly discriminated local subjectivities.

The territory to be investigated was *La Línea*, the international border boundary in the San Diego-Tijuana corridor, around *Cruce Pedestre Oeste El Chaparral* in the northern part of Tijuana, from 2nd Street to 11th Street. While on the United States side, research focused along the Blue Line of the San Diego Metropolitan Transit System, which runs from San Ysidro to the San Diego downtown heart: American Plaza.

Between First Street and Third Street of Tijuana, there is a 'Tolerance Zone' (TZ). This zone implies that there are about three to five blocks occupied by sex workers, motels, bars, strip clubs, canteens, the sale of controlled drugs without prescriptions in pharmacies, and restaurants. There are also diners with slot machines in which some sell drugs undercover, taco stands, housing type junkyard spaces, *changarros*,[4] mechanical workshops, small food cars, meth street dealers and hidden *narcotienditas*.[5]

Instead of discriminating against these people, hard drug users, and/or indigents, we must respect their painful sentimental search despite their dispossessed status. Indeed, they revealed possible 'Lines of Flight' (LF) in an ontological search for the construction of a 'Body Without Organs' (BWO).[6] Exposing divergent capabilities and possibilities of the human being. Beyond the moral question of whether their lifestyle is good or bad, healthy or sick, the truth is that their situation corresponds to what G. Deleuze called BWO. Those are alternative subjectivities to the dominant models revealing divergent mental possibilities, bodily and socially, from which we can learn, overall, considering the immediate future of Western civilization.

At the San Diego-Tijuana border, it was found that for multiple seemingly random reasons, many people live on the streets, as part of a growing problem that is getting out of the hands of the state and local community. In reality, these people reveal the existence of a humanly impacted necrotic border, a highly lucrative 'necromarket' as a productive machine of disease, violence, death, and pain.

Far from the idea that the situation of each dispossessed is random, there are structural, social, political, and cultural constants, i.e., the abuse of banned substances, including the two hardest drugs on sale for mass use, heroin and methamphetamine. Another constant is depression and anxiety

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[2] Molar structures are those that structure and are structured by a set of social structures. G. Deleuze places them as true forces in motion of transhistorical order of the being. The molar is supported by multiple political devices and material conditions that are interweaving tensely, from all scales (not to be confused with the macro), in a large amount of organic and inorganic matters (Deleuze 2010, p. 75).

[3] Meaning something that "... can only exist as ghosts that ... change and completely distort (sexuality), like shameful thing..." (Deleuze 1995, pp. 6–7). In other words, far away from any moral judgment, the sex market on the Corridor San Diego-Tijuana under structural conditions, as TOC and violence, is unpleasant, compulsive and stressful.

[4] Markets where you can find the basic commodities for standard people.

[5] These are little bunkers where you can find all kind of narcotics, specially *marihuana, crack, crystal* and *heroin*.

[6] About these two concepts BWO and LF, Gilles Deleuze clarifies about LF "Men ceaselessly make an umbrella for them, on the underside of which they trace a firmament and write their conventions, their opinions; but the poet, the artist, makes a cut in the umbrella, tears the firmament itself, to give way to a little of the free and windy chaos and to frame in a sudden light a vision that arises through the ripping ... Those lines of light are the lines of flight through which to escape the landscape and its supporting meta-discourses" (Deleuze and Guattari 1997, p. 204). About BWO, it is the kind of body that results from the application of certain LF, especially, those that change the logic and organization of relations between mind and body or the function of certain organs. Driving those LF can produce or be produced by what psychology identifies as mental illness, drug addiction, anxiety or depression, between other flamboyant ideas and daily conducts.

disorders, constants that have allowed to raise a possible typology of homelessness and/or hard drug users: Dependent Depressives and Obsessive Depressives.

As an introductory way regarding this highly depressive condition, one afternoon in May 2017, an informant who self-identifies as Pinocchio, for his taste of pills and lies, stated:

> When I look in the mirror, defeated, don't I? Like a failure, empty, what's the right word? . . . Somebody that has no struggle evicted, somebody that has no battle, no illusions, desolate. Where do I put my eyes, what future do I have, where have I lost the dream? (I'm) little . . . what I'm going to do. Others maybe do it better; in a particular field that we could be competing, I do not give the fight. Academically I do not have the levels; physically, I am not prepared...my physical appearance has a lot to desire. I see many reject . . . I see that many reject me. I am uneased. I find no motivation. I do not recharge my batteries...

The fundamental goal of this article is to contribute, by social science data, to non-discrimination. Following M. Foucault, discrimination is a social, molar and, micropower dispositive[7], which has isolated and rejected mental, gender or racial differences, under the idea of health, science, and progress. As it can be read here, hard drug users in homeless conditions are the most isolated and abusive of all.

Briefly, it will also be shown how following the vanguard of neurosciences and sciences, it is possible to corroborate both the concept of BWO and LF, not only leaving possible discrimination behind but also through fieldwork and informants, pointing to limits of neurodiversity and no limitations of the nervous system plasticity.

It seems that the HDU and/or indigents of the Tijuana-San Diego border are examples of an extreme cerebral, desiderative, sentimental, economic, and social plasticity of humankind. This condition under the San Diego-Tijuana border is radicalized. This border can even provoke their challenging situation by particular territorial dynamics of transnational organized crime (TOC) and by what Gilles Deleuze calls: sex.

Not to forget that this border is composed by at least two main national structural conditions that are overlapping two drastically different visions of the world. On one side is rural Mexico, on the other is the hegemonic programmatic[8] of North American globalization, another border condition that works as a pot of cultivation for violence, morbidity, and social decomposition—conditions produced necropolitics.

2. About Materials and Methods

The results of the ethnographic research, obtained first-hand through observative participation and the reflexological method (Hammersley and Atkinson 1994), are presented here in a synthetic way. Questions and answers are not presented in detail since, according to the objectives raised here, the important thing is to integrate, in an explanatory manner, the information obtained within the post-structural theoretical framework of Deleuze and Guattari (1997, 2002).

The ethnographic work consisted of coexisting with HDU in homeless situations on both the American and Mexican side. With the help of PREVENCASA A.C. and the University of California San Diego (UCSD), for over a year, multiple dispossessed in different spaces and activities were observed, photographed, and followed in their nomadic routes and surviving activities such as scavenging or sex work. In-depth interviews were also done with eight of the HDUs on the Mexican side, two men on the American side, one American activist and two Mexican medical specialists.

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7 Foucault (1996) commonly uses this term to show the various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures, which enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social body.
8 *Hegemonic Programmatic* is a political category coined by Antonio Gramsci that refers to the class ideology that dominant groups try to impose on other classes as the only valid and possible one. Currently, this programmatic is *Postmodern Multiculturalism*.

3. In the Purgatory

For the dispossessed Mexicans, to pass to the United States often becomes dystopic not in the conquest of Heaven or Paradise (for Latin American Christians and American hippies, respectively) but of Purgatory. The liberating subliminal possibility of the American Dream meets a boundary. In Baja California, most of the deportees due to heavy drugs, depression and other mental issues are already psychologically dead; they only await the death of their bodies.

The existential project of BWO of the HDU indigent, driven by the programmatic hegemonic, begins as a utopian dream, but having to face multiple adversities results in frustration, depression or some constant anguish that implodes humans who were initially very excited.

Thus, the illusion of being a successful personbody[9] transits towards the BWO to finally become a raw material of necropower. They are no longer producing an alternative utopia but death in life. They are purulent bodies dispossessed of subjectivity. Even some of them have been totally dispossessed of their citizen identity, since the police has stripped them of their identifications.

This whole process of losing the idea of coquetting Heaven is coherent with the relentless demand of necromarkets, which permanently constrains illegal migrants to move from *Bios* to *Zoé*[10] and vice versa in a few cases (Comar 2011).[11] Therefore, through dispossessed, the political system can extract financially up to the last drop of highly profitable purulent capital.

For at least 30 years, the river of Tijuana, or as it is known *El Bordo*, has been a canal of black and gray waters. Still, it is also the place of extremely precarious settlements where HDU and criminals, in search of redemption, are living. That place on the edge of the border is right between the American heaven and Mexican hell. A specialist of PREVENCASA A.C. states it was inhabited between 3000 and 5000 possible BWO until 2015. In 2016, a few of these inhabitants were returned to their states or countries, but many of them dispersed throughout the streets of the TZ of Tijuana and its surroundings. In 2017, at least 2000 indigents living in bad conditions are in the area to this day.

During the last months of 2015, serval intense raids were maid and many of the underground neighborhoods were destroyed. However, inside the black waters bed, the dispossessed still today were digging caves called *ñongos*, while in the few trees, they weaved with ropes and rubbished their so-called nests. From a study conducted during 2013, it was apparent that 72.6% of inhabitants of this "Purgatory" did not have identity documents and 52.4% had some knowledge of English. Their population was mainly born in Mexico, in Baja California (the local ones), Sinaloa, Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Michoacán, and Guerrero (Albicker and Velasco 2016).

While the intensity of dispossession on the Mexican side is more profound, the truth is that the amount of homeless in the city of San Diego is more significant than in Tijuana. In San Diego County alone, homelessness is a severe social problem, at least since 2017, about 5000 people were calculated in this unfortunate condition, 2000 of whom were temporarily living in some kind of shelter provided by the state or in a borrowed place. The remaining 3000 were permanently on the streets (personal interview with Michael McConnell of *Homelessness San Diego Task Force* and *Homeless Real Humans*).

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[9]   The BWO (Deleuze and Guattari 2002) is the ontological antithesis of the *personbody* model, it is the sum of the internal contradictions of it, which is a dual and Manichean model, composed of a good and metaphysical soul at the same time as a physical flesh body, decadent and sinful. *Personbody* that has an ideal body shape to be desired. A model that denies obesity, and equally, with a certain idea of being a unique person that denies any extreme movement of pleasure or anorganic dislocation.

[10] Agamben (2003) states that Classical Greeks distinguished a domesticable life by social politics, the Bios, from one outside of all human order: Zoé.

[11] One of this few cases who pass from Zoé to Bios is Scott Comar, a survivor from a heroin addiction and indigent conditions. After a spiral of progression downward in the Ciudad Juárez and El Paso border corridor, from 1998 to 2003, Comar was able to emerge as a "new" clean person and make an auto-ethnographic PhD. Sharing his difficult history of redemption "in the hope that someone would be able to develop a deeper understanding of what addictive patterns are all about" (Comar 2011, p. 200). Indeed, this is the goal.

Nevertheless, the problem is growing, for example, in the 2017 census, 392 homeless people were just in the Oceanside zone alone, more than double than in 2015–2016, when their key needs were "34% employment assistance, 31% rental assistance, 28% drug or alcohol counseling and 19% mental health services" (Oceanside homeless count, San Diego Union Tribune 2017).

In fact, between 2007 and 2017, California was the highest-growing U.S. state of indigents, with 16,136 more homeless people. New York reported the second-largest increase with just 3151 more people. Similarly, California reported the largest increase in homelessness, 13,252 people, as well as chronic homelessness, 5996 people (State of Homelessness, End of Homelessness 2018). The numbers along the corridor of this investigation, on the American side, where there are more than 200 assistance homes for people who are forced to live without a home.

The dispossessed on both sides of *La Línea* share certain characteristics. However, their condition is more insane in Tijuana, as many of them roam the streets with severe purulent wounds exposed. Additionally, some are carriers of a sexually transmitted disease like HIV, as well as other severe physical and mental illnesses. In 2015, there were activist alerts about an HIV epidemic in Tijuana. Today, thanks to the help of organizations as PREVENCASA A.C., the risk of contagion of HIV among the hard drug users and the homeless population has been reduced by up to 40% (interview with the deputy director, Dr. Lilian Pacheco).

Even though living among the streets of Tijuana or San Diego is very difficult, the inhabitants of the purgatory practice diverse techniques to survive. For example, they cover their bodies with a layer of dirt and grease that helps them protect themselves from the harshness of street life, like insects and the weather. Therefore, for many of them, to be addicted to hard drugs is the only way to avoid pain and misery.

Along the San Diego-Tijuana corridor, on the Mexican side, used as *Picaderos*,[12] are some alleys, dark banqueted sidewalks, wasteland, and abandoned houses in different points, located mostly between the long 1st, 2nd and 3rd streets. Some dispossessed also inject themselves along the 16.7 km. of the border board. The hard drug users come to these places 24/7, exchanging syringes and sex.

On the San Diego side, to consume hard drugs and sex, there are hundreds of tents overall around imperial avenue, informal shelters on the sidewalks or under bridges, as well as on the side of the rivers, where there are also extensive amounts of camps. For example, right on the catacombs of the San Diego River on the edge of Fashion Mall, the city's largest and most luxurious mall, there are constantly camps where recurring homeless consume the trash of the mall and upscale neighborhoods like Mission Valley and Fashion Mall Condos.

Concerning the territory of this purgatory, it is also true that between the psychic life of the dispossessed and their daily activities, there are profound paradoxes, such as that of a free mind in its glimpse of enjoyment, but highly dependent on drugs and their community, in which their lifestyle is possible.

On the Mexican side, the dispossessed places him or herself as an anchor rooted in TZ of Tijuana. They think that only there they can be as they should and want to be. Even after losing their significant other, friends or family, many do not find the courage to leave drugs, alcohol, sex work and return to their homeland, either to Mexico or to the United States. For example, Holly, an American HDU and sex worker interviewed who, even after losing her Mexican boyfriend by methadone treatment, deeply depressed refused to return to her parents, daughter and son in Wisconsin. With a very particular slang, she stated that her boyfriend was killed on purpose at a Mexican government clinic just "because he was a *Junkie.*"

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[12]   A place where people go to "get high", usually to shoot up heroin or *Spriball*.

4. On the Red Edge of a *Narcoline*

The facts observed in the ethnography might as well be determined by the dynamics of two molar structures: TOC and sex. Both under severe border conditions (an American richness vs. Mexican poverty, a vertical dynamic use of state powers vs. a lack of state) are binding and divergent forces. Both are unconscious attractors of clean money, but also of morbid and necrotic types.

These molar structures (re)produce social grammars and power practices of all taxonomy through discursive metastories[13], including racist and elitist narratives, reproducing generic and identity social structures, but at the same time, they are also deterritorializing symbolic codes[14]. The middle-class is spreading metastories of several Christian Churches and the underground community of crime and drugs, around the cult of the *Santa Muerte*[15], *narcocorridos*[16], and even around sex without protection. The "evil or sick others", as the middle-class calls them, are always in search of an unlimited enjoyment where the desire is to find pleasure beyond all limits.

By a dialectic between TOC and sex, the necrotic social forces of deterritorialization are precisely tensed. Only certain homeostasis between these structural forces that locally (un)organize the symbolic codes of every inhabitant can produce extreme daily violence, either due to fights between TOC gangs or those given inter and intra subjectively (for example, auto injuries, drug addiction, and assaults with violence, respectively).

According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), TOC includes the following offenses (from minor to most serious): counterfeit goods, illegal gambling, cybercrimes, wildlife and cultural property trafficking, extortion and *cobro de piso*[17], laundering money, drugs, guns and people trafficking, kidnapping, and murder by hired assassins.

Two are the hard drugs that the TOC illegally trade and are severely affecting the border population, particularly the dispossessed. These are the two most potent of all drugs that "*jalan pa'rriba o jalan pa'bajo*":[18] methamphetamine and heroin, respectively, or as they are known in the streets, *crico* and *chiva*, their most lethal use being the injected combination called *Spriball* to differentiate it from *Speedball* (cocaine with heroin).

The estimated levels of criminality calculated by the FBI through the *Crime Data Explorer* indicate that the State of California, from 2007 to 2017, has a rate of criminal violence higher than of all the United States. In the last year, it presents 449.3 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants, while the country is 394.0. To better dimension this high crime and violence, it is essential to know that California is only about 10% of the national population.

According to the *United States Sentencing Commission* (2017), heroin trafficking occupied a total of 13.8% of all drug-related crimes, displaced in importance to crack that now holds 8.2%, while marijuana has decreased by 14.1%. However, the most-demanded drug that increases during this time, from 19.4% to 36.9% is methamphetamine—demonstrating the particular importance of the trafficking of this drug in the San Diego-Tijuana *narcoline*. From 2012 to 2017, the Southern California district has always surpassed the list with 659 cases in 2012 and 682 in 2017, demonstrating constant demand and, most likely, continuous production. Unlike that of the other districts that have had increments as impressive increases like the Western District of Texas breaking up from 197 cases to 518 meth-related crimes.

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13 A *Metastory* is a concept proposed by Lyotard (1987) with which he gives account of social and political stories that structure a large number of stories. For example, the story of the French revolution, or here in Mesoamerica, the myth of *Quetzalcóatl*. Both discourses were the norm and are still norming ideologies, behaviors and fantasies of a very diverse nature since a long time.

14 To *deterritorialize*, another Deleuze category (Deleuze 2010), basically refers to a social process of lost symbolic meanings. This comes from the idea that the process of reproduction of sense is correlative to process of appropriation of space.

15 The *Santa Muerte* is an idol in Mexican and Mexican-American folk Catholicism. An embodiment of death.

16 Those are songs dedicated to a certain *Drug Dealer* or to different gangs.

17 This is a colloquial word for extortion, criminals demand the payment of quotas to the merchants in order not to kill or torture them, burn their business or to kill their customers.

18 *Jalan pa´rriba y pa´bajo* is Mexican slang referring to a drug trip, in the sense of whether it makes you feel excited and euphoric (pa rriba) or sleepy and drowsy (pa bajo).

According to the FBI (United States Government 2017), it is clear that between 2007 and 2017, trafficking has decreased in the case of powdered and base cocaine, as well as oxycodone. Even marijuana has reduced from 8000 defendants to 2000. However, *chiva* and *crico* have been increasing over the same period, the former going from less than 2000 to more than 3000, and the latter from 5000 to 7000 offenders.

Concerning sex molar structure, the number of health cards issued for sex work in TZ of Tijuana was investigated, their number has increased by 70% in the last five years. The numbers in the clandestine context are higher since the 1980s of the twentieth century, when this TZ shrunk.

By the dynamics of TOC and political interests, historically, all sexuality in TZ of Tijuana were suppressed becoming sex (Deleuze 1995). Reading the history of the city of Tijuana, as a Red Zone by the very first time, it seems that far from being a space of liberation from the repressed, it has controlled rules and conditions for high repression.

Along the streets, in plain sight, the women and transsexual bodies offer their services, but it seems to be impossible with them to release tension, exchange affection, or have lasting and positive stimulants. All sex workers live under high time pressure to get more money for them and somebody else. This pressure is higher for a HDU due to their addiction. Furthermore, here the necrocapital micropower revolves around the female body, which TOC is renting for sex. A female sex worker can generate between 1000 and 30,000 dollars per month.

Besides, in general scale, in the era of neoconservatism of President Donald Trump, sex work has diminished every desire of transcendence of the subject. Far away from the sacred sex practice of the past or the Far East, nowadays, sexuality has been reduced to a marketing machine. Prostitution and pornography have entered the privacy of "good homes". Thus, the TZ far from being an area of tolerance for pleasure, the truth is that it has become emotionally toxic—a part of the necrotic capitalist machine and emotionally toxic.

There is then, in the TZ, negative feedback between the fantasy of achieving sexual enjoyment and emotional depression because it is highly hostile territory for pleasure. Here, the development of the sex industry is tied to TOC. As Han (2014, p. 18) points out in *The Agony of Eros*: "Love today... is being domesticated into a consumer formula devoid of risk and daring, without excess or madness . . . all negative feeling is avoided.... today's love lacks all transcendence and transgression."

Thus, the sex discourse in Tijuana must navigate between two points. On the one hand, there is the ideology of the small bourgeois of municipal government that promotes Tijuana as a safe city, ideal for so-called sex tourism. On the other hand, Tijuana has broken all of the most brutal records of national violence. It is around this TZ of Tijuana where there have been more deaths and where the largest market of drugs for local and international consumption is located. Thus, in this TZ, such repression is an ideal breeding ground for social breakdowns and violence, where time is money, generating a morbid context from which TOC feed "the authorities" as part of the local necropolitics.

5. The Dispossessed: HDU and Indigence

For the dispossessed, the causes of their misfortune are conducive to death, illness, and violence. According to the multiple interviews done for this research, they highlight the following reasons to be in homeless conditions: economic (rent increase, work layoffs, incapacity to work), medical expenses (disability, severe chronic illnesses), abuse of prohibited or controlled substances, family problems (divorce, runaway from parent's house), immigration complications (deportation, criminalization), deterioration and loss of personal, family or communal mental health. All of these are causes aggravated by the neglect of the Mexican State. However, on the other American side, it seems by an absence of community making, lack of political coordination between the different agents and agencies of the city of San Diego.

Likewise, in San Diego, the problem did not grow due to lack of money but of land on which to build apartments for indigents, mainly due to the high value of the buildings and the refusal of the neighbors. Although to this, thousands of homeless are already living in apartments in downtown,

into wealthy neighborhoods, where payment rents are between 5 and 12 thousand dollars per month for a condo. However, their neighbors never coexist with the dispossessed, nor do they smell their waste deposited on the streets, much less listen to their wails or watch their daily struggle. Rather, these wealthy residents of downtown do not get out of their fancy cars, rushing in and out of their underground parking lots.

While the causes of living on the streets are multiple, becoming a HDU is understandable under these conditions. On the American side, it is clear that the economic pressure is very high, leading people of all ages, whole families, to work double days and still not being able to pay the rent, pushing them to enter the purgatory of the outlawed, the morbid or the criminal, that is, the necromarket. Besides, Lee (2018) shows us how the tightening of border security policies has gone hand in hand with further dispossession of the rights and dignity of migrants without official documents.

Family cross-border support is essential for Mexican dispossessed, also a failed state full of corruption, helping them to have a slightly more stable life. However, without cross-border family support, they are in serious trouble. Contrary to the United States, where the state protects property better and also supports homelessness, in Tijuana, there is no perceived state support for them to have a home and work of their own. On the Mexican side, there is much less access to programs of physical and mental rehabilitation and integration into the community. The only help they receive is from less than five NGOs, highlighting *Casa Hogar del Migrante* of the Chatolic Order of *Salesianos* and PREVENCASA A.C.

Another big difference between the dispossessed of Tijuana and San Diego is that while the largest internal migration in the U.S. is the one going from the East Coast to the West Coast, they are all people with legal immigration quality. Meanwhile, on the Mexican side, the vast majority of the dispossessed have no identification documents, because stripping them of these is part of Mexican necrocapital device, producing more rapture and outrage than on "the other side."

According to Mexico's Secretary of Interior in 2017, there were 166,986 deportees from the United States to Mexico, of which about 80% came by land. They often go from being sublimated humans by the idyllic progress of the American dream to being dispossessed, emptied economically and libidinally, by their circumstances but also by local authorities. Many of the deported dispossessed are forced to give up their profits and businesses in the United States, as well as having to leave their relatives, falling into a severe depression or anxiety to then join the necrotic tissue of poverty and addictions.

Dispossessed are people who, as children, were considered entirely normal. It is in adolescence or early youth, between the ages of 11 and 15, that their personal history invites them, or forces them, to migrate from their place of origin to the USA, initiating through these LF, their body and mind to nomadism. During this migrating time, certain traumatic episodes or genetic conditionings such as dysthymia or deep mental illness are also evident or emerge.

According to interviews, it was found that all of the informants were functional, up to a certain point of breakdown, a mental frontier, from which all presents mental symptoms, mainly depressive ones, either of self-critical or dependent type. It has even been reported " . . . to the dimension of self-criticism as the most relevant, and even, as the only predictor of depression (...) and other clinical tables, such as eating disorders and anxious pictures" (Dagnino et al. 2017, p. 84).

Thus, from their place of origin, the dispossessed are already a BWO. Throughout their early life, they were not a trace[19] (Deleuze and Guattari 2002) of the personbody model since their childhood. They refuse to produce economic gains for the market. Exploring their LF, they refuse to be mere repetitions of building exploited life forms, announcing as immature migrants new limits of body pain, but also of willpower.

For the dispossessed, it is highly enjoyable but pernicious the search for enjoyment, given its effects of insensitivity to pain and isolation against making community. While in the vast majority of

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19   A concept that can be translated to a human repetition as a tracing on carbon paper.

subjectivities, the most intense pleasure without limits, Lacan's *Jouissance* is a mere desire or awareness of its inaccessibility. With the dispossessed, it is possible, and it is believed to be an experiment by fleeing in pursuit of its morbid and deadly fantasy. However, it is true that the immanent condition of the Being is to overflow itself (Simondon 1980). Humans will never be able to recognize the last frontier, between pleasure and *Jouissance*.

Thus, it is not that the dispossessed cannot build subjectivity, but that they do not seem to achieve a certain balance between their inner world and external conditions. More precisely, the BWO of the dispossessed produces so much friction and emotional shocks that it creates a callus between feeling and thinking, doing and knowing, losing all possible ratios between the chaos of their daily life and their hyper-ordered self-critical thinking.

Paradoxically, the necrocapitalist process has the body of the dispossessed living utterly free in the streets, but their minds and libidinal energy alienated. They lose any possession, official identity, and self-steam, but their body walks freely. Thus, the dispossessed on both sides of the border have different losses of very diverse degrees and types have been gradually or suddenly stripped of all property.

The crumbling bodies of the hard drug users are the clearest example of an impacted territory. What they once had as their own is being taken away or merely stopping their agency, to invest desire in it. While the necropolitic state drains them one by one of their properties, their citizenship, and human possibilities, they are criminalized, and thus, not only they are isolated, but they are robbed of their human and citizen quality.

However, how is it possible that the dispossessed endure so much pain and discriminating signs of multiple people every day? The only rational and reliable response found is the BWO, this existential process of being suppressed from the Oedipus, of the Social Order, this force of denial of the personbody dominate and hegemonic model. The BWO is not a simple bodily modification, as suddenly as the postmodern conservative multiculturalism presents. It is an alternative civilizing project, the ontological antithesis of the personbody, that is, the sum of the internal contradictions of the latter body model and dominant subjective.

What can we say of the shame at exposing their fragility of their *nuda vida* (Agamben 2003) to which the state throws them out by declaring them non-citizens, not beneficiaries of services, solely for their mental, financial or racial health problems? How is it that the community has also invisibilized them to the point of normalizing their misfortune? It is the very same logic of madness, in which the apparent reason discriminates all non-functional mental capacity to the capitalist production mode[20]. Necropolitics first declaring mental illness as radically adverse to health and good manners, then isolating it, holding them in psychiatric clinics, in prisons, in special schools, and so-called rehabs.

When madness is economically necrotized, obtaining gains from their pain and suffering, the social agent is frozen. The society demeans him, or her, of any functional proposal, dispossessing them from being a worthy form of human life. Nevertheless, precisely, the concept of BWO and the whole philosophy of Gilles Deleuze goes in a different direction, in understanding that there are long-term LF, through which most of the illegal migrants move with their dignity away from the dominant subjective model, away from the Oedipal ideology.

Thus, giving a scientific response to the pain of HDU in homeless situation involves rethinking the whole social order in its relationship with mental states and community-making. Both of these are aspects that contain discrete social preconceptions, far from reality, but very useful for the development of necropolitics.

For the dispossessed instead of death as an end—for the Liberal State and themselves, they are already dead in life—it remains a significant misfortune: painful and gradual exploitation. From the common sense of Trump's neoconservatism and even from the progressive government of San Diego,

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[20] *Mode of production* as a category of *Dialectical Materialism*, that means, the way goods and human population are produced.

the process of dispossession is the product of bad personal decisions. Nevertheless, contrary, it is the expression of a specific way of making a border territory, perhaps the most radical and liberal of its chances: the wild west of the American Mexican frontier.

The dissolution of personbody and their body organization in the neoliberal production mode begins at least from the 1960s. When made evident in Europe and high-class segments of the United States of what Suelly Rolnik, following Brian Holmes, calls flexible personality, which is the product of subjection policies characterized by intense cultural hybridization, provoking "the dissolution of every hierarchy on the world map of cultures and the impossibility of any stability that, in principle, would mean the end of any illusion of identity" (Rolnik 2018, p. 2).

The limits of the subject start blurring at least since those student struggles of the sixties. Among those generations, they begin to find LF on a massive scale and what in the nineteenth century was the only privilege of the delusive romanticism of the nobles and artists, spread to other planes of intelligence and sensitivity, to other population groups with modest economic level.

Thus, for the dispossessed, the utopia of the American dream becomes a necrotic dystopia. As a genealogy of European and American Capitalism, homelessness in California is more integrated into society, even though this implies a dissolution of personality and identity. It is rationalized as part of this flexible subjectivity's historical development, typical of its liberal governments and population, with a very different attitude than that of conservative ideology of Mexico.

Unlike San Diego, there is no government institution in Tijuana required to give specialized care to hard drug users or indigent people with other mental disorders. It does not even matter if, in addition to living on the streets, they are HIV positive or have some other severe transmissible disease.

According to interviews in Tijuana with staff from the *Hospital de Salud Mental Angel García Vazquez*, neither the Health Sector nor the *Desarrollo Integral de la Familia* (DIF), are forced to take the homeless from the streets and provide them some support. The police only take them when they are "acting seriously against morals," them being naked or delusive by physically attacking other people, taking them only if they are not too dirty, but just to release them once again immediately. Alternatively, they pick them up when they are buying or using drugs, taking away their valuables, their identifications; beat them up and drop them back on the streets.

This stripping of official identity and self-esteem, commonly done by municipal and federal police, is a vital part of the dispossessed apparatus. Likewise, it is also done with sex workers around the red zone. They are the prey of discrimination for economic exploitation. Both bodies are stigmatized to legitimize their removal, their dispossession, and once again put back on the streets to sell sex and buy drugs.

In Tijuana, there are many hard drug users, especially vulnerable women, who are one step away from a meth and/or heroin abstinence crisis. They roam the touristy *Avenida Revolución*, not only to ask for money but to also shout insults or delusive speeches ordered by specific mental commands. Besides, unlike the Americans, Mexican indigents roam around showing more pain and misfortune; it can be seen among their ripped clothes large wounds on their legs and arms, caused by injections and abscesses that produce sores, rashes, and purulent blood.

Currently, it is the police and the judicial bureaucracy that best alienate this necrotized condition of not to be considered a personbody by the state. They are the ones who profit the most from this justified discrimination. Indeed, worried specialists denounce[21] that necropolitics are the result of the fall of the liberal capitalist project, but this is erroneous. It is not only concerning the overexploitation of goods but also of bodies and the workforce. Such as the declaration of War Against Drugs (pushed by

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[21] For example, Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Stiglitz and Alan Greenspan, are known for a critical view of free market fundamentalism and globalization. "Or as President Obama and the World Economic Forum of January 2012 addressed among others the widening gap between the rich and the poor" (Goede 2012). Yet, it is not an error in the system but a logical consequence of it, *necropolitics*, as reproduction of poverty and violence, it is part of a free market. Even more today with an intensification of extractivism of commodities at a global scale.

Mexican president Felipe Calderon or American president Richard Nixon), which to this day has only corroborated that prohibiting sexuality and drugs, benefits no one but a few bureaucrats and, for the most part, those of the judicial and police systems. The current taboo on the sex market and drugs only prepare the territory for the emergence of a neoconservative anatomopharmacopolitics[22] (Preciado 2002), by neurochemical control which is more discriminatory than morals and religion.

The dispossessed from all over the world and history are far from showing the end of every human possibility or the effectiveness of moral punishment, demonstrating what Simondon (1980) identifies as the overflowing condition of Being, that is, the human being always advances beyond it limits, transforming bodies and mentalities—although *necropolitics* disguises dispossession as a logical consequence for being subversive, ignorant, tacky, 'fucked up' or mad.

This need to transcend, to overflow outside of oneself, to overcome their precarious and violent conditions, the dispossessed on the Mexican side call it "dream" or "hope" and identify it with migration to the United States. This migration can even be understood as a rite of passage between confraternities of men. Always this same impulse of the Being, to be in better conditions, is fed by limitless unconscious love, in this case to hard drugs and sex, but consciously restrictive by indigence and dispossession.

There is then a cluster of neurophysiological symptoms that are structuring a syndrome; these are due to depression, anxiety, sadism, and masochism. There is a morbid unconscious pleasure in the subject due to depression and pain caused by the constant and intense reflection of their losses.

Hard drug users and/or indigents of the San Diego-Tijuana border transform their bodies and minds, both in genetic (inheriting weak, stressed, or strengthened organs) and epigenetic terms, drastically altering the organicity of their organs. An act that falls into the category of a BWO but that in the case of dispossessed, is a failed BWO apparently, far from the strength required by their alternative existential project. The dispossessed body is an already deterritorialized territory, that is, a body without roots, not only to the floor but to itself. It is a body full of memories that haunts them, but that is already without history. They are making memories but without events. Therefore, they are a personbody with no energy and without organicity.

For example, at Fashion Mall, San Diego's most expensive mall, was spotted an immense man. Despite a large amount of mud on his skin and clothes, it could be seen that he was Caucasian with certain mental disorders. In addition to his uneven appearance, nothing else would be strange except that in both legs lived flashy ferns, already fully integrated to his body, curious purple rhizomes about 5 cm long, shaking to the slight breeze that enveloped us. It is probably then that, in some cases, the existential challenge of the BWO of some homeless people, at least on the American side, is their total integration into the natural world, by the way one of the most common hippie drug users' utopias.

In many cases, the body of the dispossessed has lost a sense of location. It is insensitive for moments and parts, emptied of life becoming depressed and hypersensitive, without vital organicity, no dreams to fulfill, no goodwill to sublimate, no hope to live. In fact, in both depression and anxiety, self-criticism is fierce, as is the loss of social ties and self-inflicted violence—from ripping out hair, cutting the skin leading to suicide—mental conditions, which lead the subject to self-destruction through the way of un-structuring their mental abilities (Rojas Hernández and Cerecer 2009). The dispossessed, with a neurochemistry addiction to methamphetamine and/or heroin, are living in an intense and decadent career of self-inflicted violence, only understandable from the redeeming sense of a masochistic delirium.

From the anatomopharmacopolitical of necrotic power, the dispossessed are highly profitable bodies; far from gradually dying, their humanity is erased, but their bodies are producing profits for drug dealers and corrupted policies. Slowly, the callus starts to get purulent, internal organs, family memories,

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[22] The original term was coined by Preciado (2002) in Spanish, *anatomofarmacopolítica,* which refers to a political control by a biosociopsychological power.

and mental logics are corroded. Their bodies and minds start falling apart, but obviously at the cost of pain that does not give in. Likewise, demonic and divine voices do not cease to demand and insult them and others. Their memories hurt, so it is better to be erased. For example, Gloria, a mature HDU sex worker around fifty years old, was deeply depressed by her memories of the way her daughter rejects her and to see herself so lonely. With no social guarantees, no family, no friends—no one, even to speak in confidence.

Indeed, many dispossessed are victims of abandoned families, where abuse and cold violence flourished with boundless passions, including abuse from one or both parents, who, on several occasions, were also a generation with strong addictions to alcohol or crack cocaine. For example, Regina from Tijuana is the third generation of an addicted family, all around her, father, grandfather, aunts, cousins, boyfriends, all were under *crico* and/or alcohol effects, of a childhood full of all kinds of limitations: educational, emotional, economic, and political.

Thus, as a consequence of two or three failed personbody model generations, the sibyl's overflow, more precisely implodes, towards the non-containment of any subjective border. Out of any sentimental attachment, consistently dead and reborn, the youngest dispossessed only see their own and family life go by.

Finally, in this chapter, two more contradictory games of the same HDU cluster and/or indigent are presented. First is that while self-criticism is the most constant in them, they hardly reconsider doing things differently. Secondly, while they lose the limits of all logic, they are usually strictly handled by a limited map. In their daily life, although they have a mind without limits, they strictly know the places, times and, reasons for their survival: where to go, at what time, with what sense, with what purpose, with what person. They are people of strong habits. Thus, study subjects were identified as chronic indigents due to a large number of times they were located in the same place, about the same time, doing the same thing. Therefore, they have a daily nomad life but living inside a limit circle or repetitions.

They travel their route with excellent precision every day. They are ubiquitous minds very well located in a repeated, constant territory, that of self-criticism to infinity, and beyond, but always aware of the territorial resources that they can and cannot access.

It is also true that they all have their place on the floors of the streets, under the bridges, under some streetlight, at the foot of some gate, their squat, plus a hole in the wall or on the floor in which they keep (un)significant memories.

Thus, the failure of the homeless and/or HDU is not a lack of territoriality sense but the very sense of a limit, so they are trapped in a traveling circuit, they are nomad migrants of the mind and nations, but always around their small urban circuit.

6. Conclusions

In this article, the reader could corroborate the central hypothesis by the offered methodology: most of the HDU indigents or in homeless conditions, by both sides American and Mexican, are indeed a part of necropolitics of neoliberal capitalism. The market already absorbed all these people under its logic of profits and interests. The dispositive of power that dominates them, the main dispositive of necropolitics is an anatomopharmacopolitical one.

Transnational crime organizations and sex, in Deleuzian and Han terms, are the two molar structures that, as a one-way tunnel, are leaking inside constantly more bodies to a necrotic situation. At the same time, under the micropower of subjectivity, the desires and conditions of being put these bodies in what G. Deleuze, after A. Artaud, identifies as Body without Organs or BWO.

So, here, it was deconstructed the political and economic mechanism of production of BWO on the San Diego-Tijuana corridor, detecting their peculiar and rare textures at a social and personal scale. These necrotic social nets and human bodies are produced, at least, by three essential objective conditions. By one side, we have a frontier situation produced by at least the economy of two drastically different nations, the United States and Mexico. Another condition is the search for a kind

of *black plusvalia*, one that is produced by deaths, drugs, assassins, lack of governance by the Mexican side (corruption, lack of justice) and vertical American use of justice.

Furthermore, the other structural condition is those subjective forces that G. Deleuze identifies as masochism: a symbolic, psychological and physiological condition where the subjectivity renounces to exercise their volition, their desires of his or her own. Differing their passions, their identity to what J. Lacan defines as Other a[23], in this case, are heavy drugs and the search of *Jouissance*: pleasure beyond all limits.

After this research, it is clear that this is not a moral or juridical question. Hard drug users and/or in homeless conditions are not the effect of their lazy character and sick mind. They are people that, since they were young, were in search of better human conditions, following the American dream and on the American side, the Californication way of being. Both kind of HDU are producing an anorganic (lack of organic organization) body condition. Their organs are not under the logic of a classical force work body; in search of their *Jouissance*, their organs have different functions. Pain and pleasure are thresholds for them that are beyond normality.

Another cause for this subjective and territorial border condition is the utopia of making dreams come true, the condition of violence and hunger in their origin places, but also the hunger for money and the flexible personality subjectivity model.

Therefore, as most social scientists could define, the person could not stand above economic and political constrictions even more to this kind of deep emotionally unconsented force. To discriminate against these people only by their lifestyle and vulnerability, it is the real sickness of our times. By necropolitics, neoliberal capitalism is producing subjectivity either for having a healthy and wealthy life or for a poor and twisted one. The United States–Mexico extreme frontier conditions oversight these differences. Leaving by one side, not just economic richness and the other poorness and misery, but discriminated politics and citizens by one and dispossessed not-citizens by the other.

On a personal scale of mind and personality, how is this all possible? The truth is that only in the deep piety of masochism, of a *Sacher Masoch* (Deleuze 2001), can all this make sense. Every masochism is a libidinal movement because it implies experience—more often failed than achieved—of one unit composed of two, like a hinge, it is a blind and unconfessable unconscious desire for absolute surrender to oneself but only through another. It is an unreserved delivery to *One other*[24], more precisely, without any sense of limits between one and another; this is the power that generates and pushes the dispossessed beyond their limits.

It seems that the outlawed world of the indigent hard drug users is, directly and indirectly, proportional to that of their enjoyment, resulting in two types of dispossessed BWO according to their depression, the self-critics, who manifest greater self-inflicted violence. Hence, their pleasure is indirectly proportional to their *jouissance*, and those of the dependent type, who to increase their *jouissance,* extend their dependence with the Other. For the HDU dependent type, this is more than obvious, because their "I" is sublimed entirely by the Lacanian *Object a,* while in the self-critical type the masochist enjoyment has been densely elaborated from reason and fantasy. In both cases, there is no longer a project of life; we are not dealing with an alternative counterculture, but in the vertices of an emerging (de)culture of gradual self-destruction, in a border context of drastic political and economic contrasts.

The dispossessed are empty beings by saturation of themselves, religiously with no more faith, alienated, living the catastrophic tunnel effect[25] of suicide, obsessively directed towards object a, which turns out to be something or someone as particular and unreachable—for example, the return to

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[23] Refers to the object of desire as a person or thing. The *a* it´s from *un autre* in French.

[24] It seems that the dependent HDU homeless has their sense of limits blocked, no border contains them, but paradoxically, they are very limited in their territory.

[25] Tunnel vision is the loss of peripheral vision with retaining of central vision, resulting in a constricted circular tunnel-like to depression or anxiety.

the US for deportees or the desire of being treated as a formal bride by a transgender sex worker—ideals easily replaced by hard drugs. Their surrender to the Other is such that only in their self-denial, in their self-sacrifice, they find their *jouissance*, hence their self-inflicting violence.

In this BWO, it is not the breaking of taboo that gives it pleasure, as in the case of the Functional Perverse, but the search for *Jouissance* that produces taboo, reintegrating that lack of pleasure and justice to the market as necrotic tissue. This is what hooks them with the idea of absolute love, then to prohibit, differentiate, and distance them—rejecting even their humblest offerings and their cross-border gestures of unconditional love.

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