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Histories of Ethos
World Perspectives on Rhetoric

Edited by
James S. Baumlin and Craig A. Meyer

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About the Editors

Craig A. Meyer, PhD, is an Associate Professor of English. He earned two master's degrees at Missouri State University, one in creative nonfiction and one in rhetoric and composition. He later earned his PhD in English at Ohio University with a specialty in rhetoric and composition. His research focuses on rhetoric; first-year, academic and creative writing; disability studies; popular culture; and social justice. He has published works in diverse areas such as ethos, creative writing, disability, Hip Hop, *Star Trek*, disability, corruption in higher education, and local histories. As a teacher/scholar, he focuses on how students can incorporate rhetorical principles into their daily lives so they can better understand and actively respond to our world.

James S. Baumlin A graduate of Georgetown (BA) and Brown University (PhD), James S. Baumlin is a Distinguished Professor of English at Missouri State University, where he teaches Renaissance literature, the history of rhetoric, and rhetorical and critical theory. His published books include *Theologies of Language in English Renaissance Literature*, and *John Donne and the Rhetorics of Renaissance Discourse*. His co-edited collections include *Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory*; *Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis*; and *Selected Essays of Jim W. Corder: Pursuing the Personal in Scholarship, Teaching, and Writing*. Before Missouri State, Baumlin taught at Texas Christian University, where he met Jim Corder, his mentor in ethos. Baumlin ascribes his own career-long commitments to rhetoric, creative nonfiction, and scholarship of the personal to Corder. Corder's influence can be seen within this current volume.

Preface to "Histories of Ethos: World Perspectives on Rhetoric"

Some years ago, James S. Baumlin called to ask me to join him on a project about ethos. Never one to turn down an opportunity to work with Jim, I listened to his idea about an encyclopedia-like text on ethos. As our discussion expanded and continued, we soon realized the Eurocentric nature of much of the previous scholarly discussion surrounding ethos. This bothered us (it still does). We thought of gathering scholars from around the world and having them write about ethos from their perspective, their positionality, and their culture. To our knowledge, no collection had ever compiled a global discussion of ethos in quite the way we were thinking.

Thus, we divvied up the work. Jim looked for a publisher that suited our needs; I set out to contact scholars with expertise and experience in Asian, Middle Eastern, and African cultures, among others. I soon learned why such an undertaking was so rare, if one had ever been attempted. With different languages, time zones, and technological differences, communicating and explaining the Histories of Ethos project was intensive work. Part of the challenge in communicating with scholars was explaining the importance we placed on their articulations of their interpretations of ethos based on their culture, location, experience, and background. Through the trajectory of this project, I spoke with scholars around the world, made friends with people I would never otherwise have met, and read about cultures I knew very little about. As I learned about other cultures, I reflected back to my own, and I (we) hope readers consider their own cultures as important and deserving of scholarly ethotic attention. This communal self-awareness and our hopeful progress toward understanding, empathy, and cooperation also became a strong driving force over the last few years, impelling our project toward completion.

As a human race, we face many challenges and we must learn to come together, to listen to each other, and to work together to solve them.

One of the clear limitations of this project was language. While we needed contributions to be in English, there is no doubt that many potential contributions were lost to the language barrier. We hope future projects are able to incorporate these voices that we were unable to at this time. Additionally, we hope that this project inspires further projects, collections, collaborations, and conferences that explore ethos and that connect people from around the globe.

As editors, we are grateful for the authors and their contributions. (Any oversight, of course, is our own.) Through many revisions and discussions, the authors worked to ensure the quality product you now view. The reviewers also deserve a round of applause, since this peer-reviewed and refereed work would not be possible without their professional and underappreciated dedication; their insights and suggestions have made this a better volume. Furthermore, we thank MDPI for funding this entire project. We are forever grateful to the editorial, production, and other MDPI staff for their tireless work and dedicated time to this project. Every person we worked with was gracious, supportive, helpful, and kind. My co-editor and I do wish, however, to thank Ms. Gloria Qi by name: more than an editor, she was an advocate and guide for our work. Without any one of the aforementioned, this project would not have been possible; hence, our gratitude and respect for each and all is unwavering and unending. In addition, we thank Luis Quintero for the cover photo.

We dedicate this work to our teachers, our students, and our collective humanity in hopes that, through these ongoing discussions about our differences and similarities, we find peace and prosperity for everyone, everywhere.

James S. Baumlin, Craig A. Meyer
Editors

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Editorial

Positioning Ethos in/for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction to *Histories of Ethos*

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Abstract: The aim of this essay is to introduce, contextualize, and provide rationale for texts published in the *Humanities* special issue, *Histories of Ethos: World Perspectives on Rhetoric*. It surveys theories of ethos and selfhood that have evolved since the mid-twentieth century, in order to identify trends in discourse of the new millennium. It outlines the dominant theories—existentialist, neo-Aristotelian, social-constructionist, and poststructuralist—while summarizing major theorists of language and culture (Archer, Bourdieu, Foucault, Geertz, Giddens, Gusdorf, Heidegger). It argues for a perspectivist/dialectical approach, given that no one theory comprehends the rich diversity of living discourse. While outlining the "current state of theory," this essay also seeks to predict, and promote, discursive practices that will carry ethos into a hopeful future. (We seek, not simply to study ethos, but *to do* ethos.) With respect to twenty-first century praxis, this introduction aims at the following: to acknowledge the expressive core of discourse spoken or written, in ways that reaffirm and restore an epideictic function to ethos/rhetoric; to demonstrate the positionality of discourse, whereby speakers and writers "out themselves" ethotically (that is, responsively and responsibly); to explore ethos as a mode of cultural and *embodied* personal narrative; to encourage an ethotic "scholarship of the personal," expressive of one's identification/participation with/in the subject of research; to argue on behalf of an iatrological ethos/rhetoric based in empathy, care, healing (of the past) and liberation/empowerment (toward the future); to foster interdisciplinarity in the study/exploration/performance of ethos, establishing a conversation among scholars across the humanities; and to promote new versions and hybridizations of ethos/rhetoric. Each of the essays gathered in the abovementioned special issue achieves one or more of these aims. Most are "cultural histories" *told within the culture* being surveyed: while they invite criticism *as scholarship*, they ask readers to serve as witnesses *to their stories*. Most of the authors are themselves "positioned" in ways that turn their texts into "outings" or performances of gender, ethnicity, "race," or ability. And most affirm the expressive, epideictic function of ethos/rhetoric: that is, they aim to display, affirm, and celebrate those "markers of identity/difference" that distinguish, *even as they humanize*, each individual and cultural storytelling. These assertions and assumptions lead us to declare that *Histories of Ethos*, as a collection, presents a whole greater than its essay-parts. We conceive it, finally, as a conversation among theories, histories, analyses, praxes, and performances. Some of this, we know, goes against the grain of modern (Western) scholarship, which privileges analysis over narrative and judges texts against its own logocentric commitments. By means of this introduction and collection, we invite our colleagues in, across, and beyond the academy "to see differently." Should we fall short, we will at least have affirmed that *some of us* "see the world and self"—and talk about the world and self—through different lenses and within different cultural vocabularies and positions.

Keywords: ethos; selfhood; identity; authenticity; authority; persona; positionality; postmodernism; haunt; iatrology; trust; storytelling; Archer; Aristotle; Bourdieu; Corder; Foucault; Geertz; Giddens; Gusdorf; Heidegger

1. Introduction

> A person's identity is not to be found in behaviour, nor—important though this is—in the reactions of others, but in the capacity *to keep a particular narrative going*. The individual's biography, if she is to maintain regular interaction with others in the day-to-day world, . . . must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing "story" about the self.
>
> —Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Giddens 1991, p. 54)

> Ethos is created when writers locate themselves.
>
> —Nedra Reynolds, "Ethos as Location" (Reynolds 1993, p. 336)

"We seem able to approach ethos only within a set of paradoxes and . . . contradictions" (Baumlin 1994, "Introduction", p. xxvi), writes James S. Baumlin:

> We begin by outlining a fundamental opposition between Platonic and Aristotelian models of ethos—that is, between a theological or metaphysical truth and a verbally constructed appearance. We then chart the historical growth of consciousness and personhood, observing the relatively recent birth of self-consciousness, but we are immediately compelled, following Marxist and poststructuralist theories, to deny the singularity and stability of consciousness, authorship, voice, text, self. The nature of the self and its representations in language have fallen in doubt, not simply decentered or destabilized but radically questioned, questioned even as valid categories of being. Thrown into a crisis of interpretation, we confront a range of theories that would shatter the author's hypostatized voice into a set of textual functions, that would deny the speaker's conscious control over his or her now stratified, "heteroglot" language, that would refuse to locate the speaker or writer "inside" or "outside" (or anywhere), that would render self-presence and self-possession a bourgeois fiction, that would find authors like Derrida and Foucault and Barthes writing about the "death" of the author (a curious paradox, this). Where are we left? Does ethos remain . . . a definable (or defensible) rhetorical concept? Is it at all useful? (Baumlin 1994, "Introduction", pp. xxvi–xxvii)

The questions above remain relevant and answerable, though our ways of answering must suit the needs of the twenty-first century. In effect, this present essay picks up where that previous survey—published more than a quarter-century ago—leaves off. Here, we focus on mid- to late-twentieth century discussions of ethos and remain on the lookout for traditions, trends, and ideas capable of carrying us into the new millennium.[1] Excepting those places where Aristotelian theory has been reinterpreted, we find little need to repeat the 2500-year history of Western ethos.[2] We seek, rather, to outline the current scholarly conversation, particularly in those places where ethos is being redefined, hybridized, and innovatively applied—or where it should be.

We write by way of introduction to the essay collection, *Histories of Ethos: World Perspectives on Rhetoric*. Here, the "histories" being told are, in large part, "other" than those subsumed within Western theory, and we intend this collection to be forward-looking, articulating possible futures for ethos and ethotic discourse.[3] We proceed in Foucauldian manner, seeking not the "essential nature" of ethos but rather its engagements in intellectual discussion. In this regard, Nick Mansfield shows us

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1 Seeing that ethos, pathos, and logos have entered common English vocabulary, we print them in roman.

2 Aristotle remains the singular exception: we cannot ignore the Aristotelian legacy (particularly in its vocabulary), since his *Rhetoric* continues to inform discussions of ethos today. For useful surveys of ethos in Western historical rhetoric, see Wisse (1989); Smith (2004); May (1988); Kennedy (1963, *Art*); Baumlin (2001, "Ethos"; 1994, "Introduction"). Discussions of individual theorists are recorded in notes following.

3 We take "discourse" expansively, as comprehending the realm of praxis in communication; we take "rhetoric" more restrictively, as representing the theories that categorize, explain/critique, and predict living discursive praxis.

the way: "The question to be answered is not 'how do we get beyond these theories to the truth they aspire to . . . ?' but 'what do the debates and theories themselves tell us about where we are placed in the history of culture and meaning-making?" (Mansfield 2000, Subjectivity, Kindle ed., pp. 174–78). He continues:

> The insight that the genealogist seeks is not the truth that will finally make further discussion redundant, but how the discussion itself—with its wild inconsistencies and its bitter antagonisms, in which the rivals, like enemy armies in some famous battles, never quite seem to catch sight of each other—defines the way we live and represent ourselves. (Mansfield 2000, Kindle ed., pp. 178–80)

To paraphrase Mansfield, our task is not so much "to explain" ethos as "to reach a better understanding of how the issue" of ethos "has become so important to us" (Mansfield 2000, Kindle ed., p. 180). And its importance is hard to overstate, given that *we live in an age of ethos*: issues of "trust," expertise, and "charismatic authority" have largely supplanted Enlightenment logos or "good reasons" as the ground of popular discourse.

As Nedra Reynolds notes, "ethos . . . shifts and changes over time, across texts, and around competing spaces" (Reynolds 1993, "Ethos as Location", p. 336). Tensions remain in most aspects of the current conversation, from etymology to application, and virtually every formulation of ethos finds itself situated within a binary opposition—a dialogue or dialectic of some sort. Our approach, thus, is genealogical: tracing terms back to their origins, we give each side a fair hearing, leaving readers to choose *which* version/s of ethos serve in *which* times and places within *which* specific exigencies before *which* specific audiences.[4] The essays gathered in *Histories of Ethos* do tend to take sides; our task, here, is to outline the parameters of theory within each major debate. In effect, this present essay is a study of the contemporary "discourse *of ethos-discourse*," as reflected in our edited collection.[5]

As a term of rhetoric, ethos derives from Aristotle, who was first to theorize its praxis. His major discussion—from the *Rhetoric* 1.2.2—follows (Aristotle 1991):

> [There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some of the technical writers propose in their treatment of the art,

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[4] In glancing Janus-like across histories and futures of ethos, we are indebted to Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) (Nietzsche [1887] 1969) as well as to Foucault. Citing Bové's (1985) essay, "Mendacious Innocents" (pp. 367–69), Douglas Thomas writes,

> Two of the key elements of Nietzsche's method of genealogical research are pointed out by Paul Bové: *uncovering what is present* . . . and *focusing on the future through a better understanding of the past* . . . . Genealogical readings call for discoveries of an ever-present past, previously veiled or disguised, through the analysis of displacements, errors and chance in history, and provide new insight into the present. More important, genealogy gives new interpretations to the future. (D. Thomas 1993, "Utilising", p. 104; emphasis added)

[5] We take "contemporary" theory broadly, as falling within the epoch of postmodernism: as such, it reflects the state of intellectual culture after World War II, the Holocaust, and Hiroshima. Twenty-first century discussions of ethos remain in dialogue with mid- to late-twentieth century thought: with Kenneth Burke and Chaïm Perelman; with the later Heidegger; with the postwar existentialism of Georges Gusdorf and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; with Derridean deconstruction; with the social theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu; with postcolonialism and feminism; with the varieties of post-Freudian psychology (including behaviorism); with post-industrial capitalism and the rise of corporatism; with the posthuman interfaces of artificial intelligence. The *post-* in postmodernism declares much of what concerns us (and inspires us) in this essay collection.

> that fair-mindedness on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character [ethos] is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuading. (1356a)[6]

Yet Aristotle himself appropriated the term from Homeric poetry and pre-Socratic philosophy, where it inhabited different discursive spaces with different nuances of meaning. Even in its earliest appearances, ethos pulled in different directions, particularly as these are "contained within" variants of Greek etymology and usage.[7] And contemporary theory—as reflected in textual criticism, media and communication studies, gender studies, law, theology, anthropology, sociology, psychology, ethics, politics, economics, even ecology—continues the fight over meanings and applications. Is ethos a verbal behavior or the "dwelling place" that contains such behavior? Does it belong to the speaker or to the audience (or to both, or to neither)? Does it dwell in the space "between" rhetor and audience? Is it a directed, symbolic action or a dialogic transaction? Is it revealed or constructed by means of speech? (Does it pre-exist speech? Does it "exist" at all?)

Like many terms from Greek philosophy (logos, *pistis*, *kairos*, to give a few) ethos remains untranslatable in any word-for-word correspondence. Numerous terms gesture in its direction, though no one word or phrase captures its nuances in English. Character, authority, charisma, credence, credibility, trust, trustworthiness, sincerity, "good sense," goodwill, expertise, reliability, authenticity, subjectivity, "the subject," self, selfhood, self-identity, image, reputation, cultural identity, habit, habitus, habituation, person, persona, impersonation, performance, self-fashioning, voice, personal style: these make for a sampling of stand-in terms. Theorists have played variations on the Aristotelian vocabulary: there's Jakob Wisse's (1989) "rational ethos" and "ethos of sympathy," Jim W. Corder's (1978) "generative ethos," Stephen K. White's (2009) "ethos of citizenship," Robert K. Merton's (1973) "scientific ethos," Michael W. DeLashmutt's (2011) "cyborg ethos," Liesbeth Kothals Altes' (2014) "narrative ethos," John Oddo's (2014) "intertextual ethos," Kristie S. Fleckenstein's (2016) "photographic ethos," Valerie Palmer-Mehta's (2016) "feminist ethos," Stacey Waite's (2016) "queer ethos," Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's (1988) "ethos of the subaltern," and so on. Theorists have coined their own terms suggestive of ethos: there's the Freudian *ich* or ego-consciousness (heir to the Cartesian *cogito*), the Jungian "Self," the Heideggerian *Dasein*, the Burkean "agent," the Sartrean *pur soi*[8], the Lacanian *sujet divisé*[9], the Gusdorfian *parleur*, the Barthesian *auteur*, etc.

There are patterns in these lists. Some terms point to the existential components of ethos; some to its sociological/cultural expressions; some to its linguistic/discursive praxis. Indeed, the terms above serve as our hunting ground. For it seems that any adequate "map" or model of ethos will include *a version of self* and of its relation to culture and language. Equally important is the insight that each theory *orients itself from* (and, in so doing, privileges) one of three perspectives: that of self, or of culture, or of language.

We begin with an existentialist presumption of an ontology of self, which "expresses" or *reveals itself* by language.[10] Within this model, the self is real—a being-in-the-world. *It may need language*

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[6] Here and elsewhere, we follow George A. Kennedy's translation (*Aristotle on Rhetoric*). W. Rhys Robert's translation of this last phrase, however, is rather more emphatic: "On the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses" (Aristotle 1941, *Basic Works*, p. 1329).

[7] Our task might have simplified had Aristotle restricted the term to his triad of *pisteis*—ethos, logos, and pathos—as outlined in Book I of the *Rhetoric*. Yet the varieties of "'character'—not just of the speaker, but of the 'judge' in law courts and assemblies, of various audiences, of different communities, and as depicted in narrative—*function in different ways in discourse*" (Baumlin 2001, "Ethos", p. 267); emphasis added). Within these varied functions, Aristotle "establish[es] their etymological 'family resemblances' as ἦθος (that is, 'rational ethos' or a speaker's rhetorically-constructed character), ἔθος (that is, moral character as reflected in "custom" or "habit"), ἤθη (that is, the various character types identifiable with each audience, including ἤθη τῶν πολιτηῶν or the 'characters of states'), and *ethopoiea* (that is, the literary depiction of character within the structures of dialogue or narrative)" (Baumlin 2001, "Ethos", p. 267).

[8] See (Sartre [1943] 1993, Being and Nothingness, Hazel E. Barnes, trans.).

[9] See (Lacan 2004, *Ecrits: A Selection*, Bruce Fink, trans.).

[10] We cite Georges Gusdorf (1912–2000) in this regard, who declares expression a necessary "coefficient of speech" (Gusdorf 1965, *Speaking*, p. 70), such that "the whole of human experience in its militant sense may be understood as

to reveal itself (Heidegger), but its existence precedes discourse.[11] Giving the "essential nature" of the self, an existentialist model seeks an ethos of "authenticity." In contrast, a social-constructionist model privileges culture over self, often reducing the self to a repertoire of behaviors—of cultural "rules" and "recipes." Within such a model, the self is *constructed* by language and other modes of cultural-symbolic communication/participation. Here the self has no meaning—no "being"—outside of its cultural container; and, since the self "enacts itself" within specific roles and behaviors, its "nature" (if such a term applies here) arises in *performance*.[12] The self, in this sense, is a mode of personation—a mask.[13] Within such a model, ethos gives the "roles" (Goffman) and "rules" (Geertz) of the socially-constructed self.

In even greater contrast, poststructuralist models privilege language over self and culture alike. Within such a model, the self-expressive self "dissolves" within the interstices of texts. Following Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), deconstructionists declare writing's primacy over speech: "orphaned" from the living, embodied voice of the speaker, the written text confesses its loss of authorial presence (Derrida 1981, *Dissemination*, p. 148). Indeed, the author's "death" is proclaimed—though with little mourning.[14] Within such a model, one cannot say that the self "textualizes" itself: that, after all, would posit the speaking/writing subject as a point of origin whose existence precedes language. Rather, the self reduces to a grammatical function, a mere pronoun: "I." Stuart Hall states this position in its extreme: "Identities," he writes, "are points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us. They are the result of a successful articulation or 'chaining' of the subject into the flow of discourse" (Hall and Gay 1996, "Who Needs", p. 6). Within this model, notions of selfhood—whether existential or cultural in origin—remain mere fictions, textually inscribed.[15]

These versions of selfhood provide rhetoric with its enabling premises, upon which it has built its contemporary versions of ethos. We should note, however, that such premises *cannot be proved from within* the discourses that they generate.[16] Competing versions, thus, are the *starting points* of

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a striving for expression" (p. 73). Within an interpersonal self/other dialectic, one's "relation to others," notes Gusdorf, "is only meaningful insofar as it *reveals that personal reality within the person* who is himself speaking. To communicate, man expresses himself" (p. 69; emphasis added). Here and elsewhere, we regret the masculinist vocabulary embedded in such texts.

[11] Theologian Roger Trigg articulates this position: "So far from the differentiation between subject and object being the consequence of a concentration on language, language itself depends on it. The self cannot be constituted by language. It is presupposed by it" (Trigg 1998, *Rationality*, p. 159).

[12] "Whatever else the self is," writes James T. Tedeschi, "it is developed in the context of relationships with others during which self-presentational behavior is performed" (Tedeschi 1986, "Private and Public", p. 5). Tedeschi presents an extreme version of the social-performative model:

> Indeed, if one removed the identities of the individual as a parent, sibling, offspring, productive worker, and so on, it is doubtful there would be anything left to refer to as the self. Other aspects of the self, such as competence, moral qualities, and character traits, also have meaning only in the context of social interactions. (Tedeschi 1986, "Private and Public", p. 5)

[13] Indeed, the Latin persona translates literally as "mask" (Baumlin 1994, "Introduction", p. xii), the sort worn by actors on public stage (hence the *dramatis personae* or "cast of characters" in drama). Erving Goffman (1922–1982) elaborates on the social "mask": it is "a recognition of the fact that everyone is always and everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a role . . . . It is in these roles that we know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves" (Goffman 1959, *Presentation*, p. 19).

[14] Roland Barthes (1915–1980) argues similarly: "Writing is the destruction of every voice, every origin. Writing is that ... obliquity into which our subject flees, the black-and-white where all identity is lost, beginning with the very identity of the body that writes" (Barthes 1986, "Death", p. 49). In writing, thus, "the author enters into his own death" (Barthes 1986, "Death", p. 49).

[15] Pertaining to personal and cultural narratives alike, identities arising from a "narratization of the self" are, Hall declares, "necessarily fictional" in nature (Hall and Gay 1996, "Who Needs", p. 4). Such claims return us to the question of ontology. "This view," writes Margaret S. Archer, "elides the concept of the self with the self of self: we are nothing but what society makes us, and it makes us what we are through our joining society's conversation. However, to see us as purely cultural artifacts is to neglect the vital significance of our embodied practice in the world" (Archer 2001, *Being Human*, p. 4).

[16] Put baldly, discourse cannot prove what it must "take for granted." In summarizing Judith Butler's critique of natural or real vs. "fantasized" bodies, Nick Mansfield elaborates on this point: "the very identification of a nature and a reality that pre-exist culture is itself a model produced within culture, another 'culturally instituted fantasy'" (Mansfield 2000, *Subjectivity*, Kindle ed., pp. 1334–36). He continues:

discussion, by means of which we can organize our explorations of the varieties of ethos and ethotic discourse. Through the following paragraphs, we elaborate on several versions of self and the theories they enable.

We begin with a working definition provided by Jim W. Corder (1929–1998). Ethos, Corder writes, is "character as it emerges in language" (Corder 1978, "Varieties", p. 2).[17] By "character," we assume both personhood and persona—that is, the self's expressive self-identity as well as its social presentation or mask. There is a double movement, both inward and outward, in this term, which introjects how one "sees" oneself, as well as projects how one "is seen" by others. One hopes for sincerity, authenticity, and self-consistency in this doubled, inside/outside "showing-forth" of character. When inside and outside match, one can speak of ethos as self-revelation: "what you see is what you get." But there can be a slippage or disjunction between the person and persona—again, between the inner and the outer versions of self. In that case, one can speak of ethos as performance.[18]

To this inside/outside dialectic, let us add considerations of culture. Character "emerges," but does so within a distinctive "cultural dress," one that presents itself—in effect, "clothes itself"—within markers of identity/difference (ethnicity, gender, social status, regional accent, etc.). Michel Foucault (1926–1984) gives the Athenian ethos as illustration: "Ethos was the deportment and the way to behave. It was the subject's mode of being and *a certain manner of acting visible to others*. One's ethos was seen by his dress, by his bearing, by his gait, by the poise with which he reacts to events, etc." (Foucault 1987, "Ethic of Care", p. 6; emphasis added). Ethos, in this sense, displays cultural "markers,"[19] such that the speaker's task is "to open a space" through language that allows the self to be heard and, saliently, *to be seen*. Adding the self/other binary to this model, we note that speakers position themselves against hegemonic counter-discourses that, historically, have served to efface or oppress cultural "difference."

> The belief that there are categories that exist independent of and prior to the systems that theorise them is an act of faith, produced within a specific culture at a specific time in its history. The idea of a "real" biological body, which depends on culture's guess work about what exists outside of culture, must equally be seen as an object of belief, rather than an immutable fact. Gender, therefore, is neither a result of nature's own categories, nor an interpretation appended to them. Distinctions attributed to nature are only produced from within culture—in other words, within gender. (Mansfield 2000, *Subjectivity*, Kindle ed., pp. 1336–40)

The same qualifications hold for an ontology of the self, which we are content to take "as an object of belief, rather than an immutable fact." As such, we can theorize about the embodied self—that is, we can *talk about it*—without claiming to know more than we can "know" or prove.

[17] As we've seen, Georges Gusdorf makes use of this same vocabulary: "To speak," writes Gusdorf, "is to wake up, to move toward the world and others. *Speaking actualizes an emergence*" (Gusdorf 1965, *Speaking*, pp. 93–94; emphasis added).

[18] Goffman's influential *Presentation of Self* (1959) asserts the "moral character of projections" (p. 13): "Sociology is organized on the principle that any individual who possesses certain social characteristics has a moral right to expect that others will value and treat him in an appropriate way" (p. 13). He continues:

> Connected with this principle is a second, namely that an individual who implicitly or explicitly signifies that he has certain social characteristics ought in fact to be what he claims he is. In consequence, when an individual projects a definition of a situation and thereby makes an implicit or explicit claim to be a person of a particular kind, he automatically exerts a moral demand upon the others, obliging them to value and treat him in the manner that persons of his kind have a right to expect. He also foregoes all claims to be things he does not appear to be . . . . The others find, then, that the individual has informed them as to what is and as to what they ought to see as the "is." (Goffman 1959, *Presentation*, p. 13)

[19] For discussions/applications of genetic and cultural "markers of identity," see essays in the special issue of *Racial and Ethnic Studies* 26.2 (2016). We have broadened our use of "markers" to include all expressions (mental, physical, social, demographic) *of difference*—of the ways that self-identity, cultural identity, and linguistic identity function within a self/other binary. We accept, as a matter of course, the anthropological perspective and its relevance to ethos. "We are," writes Clifford Geertz (1926–2006), "incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish ourselves through culture—and not through culture in general but through highly particular forms of it: Dobuan and Javanese, Hopi and Italian, upper-class and lower-class, academic and commercial" (Geertz 1973, *Interpretation*, p. 113). As Geertz notes further, our "great capacity for learning . . . has often been remarked," but even more crucial is our "extreme dependence upon a certain sort of learning: the attainment of concepts, the apprehension and application of specific systems of symbolic meaning" (p. 113). These "systems of symbolic meaning" constitute culture, which, in turn, conditions individual human experience, expression, and self-image.

Though neoliberalism aspires to a universalized, rational model of "'human being'—a creature eventually, ultimately, to be seen without color" or other markers of identity (Sennett 1990, "Racial Identity", p. 192)—we follow Foucault in questioning whether "there can be a society without relations of power, if you understand them as means by which individuals try to conduct, to determine the behavior of others" (Foucault 1987, "Ethic of Care", p. 18). Foucault elaborates:

> The problem is not of trying to dissolve them in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give one's self the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics, the *ethos*, the practice of self, which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination. (Foucault 1987, "Ethic of Care", p. 18)

The "utopia" that Foucault derides remains a dream-motif of the Enlightenment, whose aspirations toward universalism—toward a genuinely race-, gender-, and color-blind discourse—continue to define the (post-)modern academy.[20]

Over against "the utopia of a perfect transparent communication," one confronts the "games of power" embedded in discourse. By these "games," Foucault addresses a specific function of ethos: along with a speaker's "cultural dress," ethos identifies the ritualized *modes of address* that confer authority upon those who would "speak on behalf" of some group—some institution, organization, party, or class interest. For "groups need representation," notes Karl Maton, "since they cannot speak *as a group*. They therefore invest their moral authority in . . . individuals who, *thus consecrated*, are the voice 'of the people'—a claim to which they give tacit assent" (Maton 2014, "Habitus", p. 56); emphasis added). In the following, we switch theorists (and vocabularies) from Foucault to Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) though, again, we draw our example from antiquity.

In the warrior-council of Book I of the *Iliad*, Agamemnon demands the slave girl, Briseis, from Achilles. Insulted, the Achaean champion begins to draw his sword. But, visited by Athena (who tempers his wrath), Achilles returns it to its sheath. In its stead, Achilles wields a different instrument, the *σκῆπτρον*—the *skeptron* or "scepter" (or, as A. T. Murray translates it below, "staff"), by which he speaks a dire, "mighty oath":

> But the son of Peleus again addressed with violent words the son of Atreus . . . . "Heavy with wine, with the face of a dog but the heart of a deer, never have you had courage to arm for battle along with your people . . . else, son of Atreus, this would be your last piece of insolence. But I will speak out to you, and will swear thereto a mighty oath: by this staff [*σκῆπτρον*] that shall never more put forth leaves or shoots since first it left its stump among the mountains, nor shall it again grow green, for . . . the sons of the Achaeans carry it in their hands when they act as judges . . . this shall be for you a mighty oath. Surely some day a longing for Achilles will come upon the sons of the Achaeans one and all, and on that day you will not be able to help them . . . when many shall fall dying before man-slaying Hector. But you will gnaw the heart within you, in anger that you did no honour to the best of the Achaeans." (*Iliad* 1.222–44)

In Homer, the *skeptron* "is the attribute of the king, of heralds, messengers, judges, and all persons who, whether of their own nature or because of a particular occasion, are invested with

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[20] While we remain hopeful in the possibility of living harmoniously as "free, rational, and responsible being[s]" (White 2009, *Ethos*, pp. 26–27), we concur with Stephen K. White's post-Enlightenment critique of the "ideal of self":

> [The Enlightenment ethos] does not incorporate all of what, over the last few decades, has been referred to with the phrases "identity politics" and "the politics of recognition." These phrases draw our attention beyond respect for the individual in the universalist sense, to the acknowledgment of people's diversity, their distinctiveness in language, religion, sexuality, nationality, and traditional practices. (White 2009, *Ethos*, pp. 26–27)

In sum, the Enlightenment model of self remains logocentric, not ethocentric. White adds, "this demand that one's identity be acknowledged in its distinctiveness, or difference, is one of the most controversial subjects in contemporary political theory" (White 2009, *Ethos*, pp. 26–27). Indeed: and it remains a focus of contemporary rhetorical theory.

authority" (Bourdieu 1991, *Language*, p. 193). But, as Bourdieu states elsewhere, this "authority *comes to language from outside*, a fact concretely exemplified by the *skeptron* that, in Homer, is passed to the orator who is about to speak. Language at most *represents* this authority, manifests and symbolizes it" (Bourdieu 1991, *Language*, p. 109; emphasis added).[21] A speaker's assumption of authority, thus, is not a *consequence* of ethos (as per Aristotle); rather, *it is a precondition*—a "given," and accessed by means of the *skeptron*.

Like other cultural practices, public discourse has its "plans, recipes, rules, instructions" (Geertz 1973, *Interpretation*, p. 51), which speakers are assumed to adopt or adapt in positioning themselves as having, not just the right *to speak*, but *to be heard* in speaking. Within specific institutions, organizations, and communities, there are authoritative/charismatic *roles* as well as rules: priest, novitiate, judge, tribal elder, teacher, apprentice, employee, manager, salesperson, politician, political commentator, soldier, athlete, scientist, rap artist . . . each with its distinctive "speech genres" (Bakhtin 1986), social rituals, and stylistic/expressive strategies.[22] The question that postmodern culture poses is one of competing voices unequally positioned with respect to power: *Who* speaks *for whom*, and by what instrument or means?

Continuing his analysis, Bourdieu finds material symbols of authority in contemporary media:

> The abundance of microphones, cameras, journalists and photographers, is, like the Homeric *skeptron* . . . the visible manifestation of the hearing granted to the orator, of his credit, of the social importance of his acts and his words. Photography—which, by recording, eternizes—has the effect . . . of *solemnizing* the exemplary acts of the political ritual. (Bourdieu 1991, *Language*, p. 193; emphasis in original)

While the camera records a speaker's visual presence, it's the microphone that stands in for the *skeptron* today. As women and people of color have learned too well, the difficulty in achieving social justice—in being *seen* and *heard*, whether individually or as a group—lies not in refutation within public debate, but in practices of silencing: that is, of being denied the *skeptron*.[23] Having placed rituals of authority "outside of language" and having acknowledged their cultural contexts, we're ready to turn to Aristotle.

2. Aristotle: Ethos as "Character"

Rhetorical theory of the mid-twentieth century wedded itself to Aristotle (384–322 BCE). His *Rhetoric* had already saturated nineteenth-century scholarship, displacing Ciceronianism from its two-thousand-year reign; still, it was in the mid-twentieth century that Aristotle became the dominant authority in "academic rhetoric"—particularly within composition programs as these were beginning

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[21] In fact, the conferring of authority belongs to "rituals of social magic" (Bourdieu 1991, *Language*, p. 111). The "magic" of such rituals, Bourdieu adds, "does not reside in the discourses and convictions which accompany them . . . but *in the system of social relations* which constitute ritual itself, which make it possible and socially operative" (Bourdieu 1991, *Language*, p. 268 fn. 6; emphasis added).

[22] Susan Miller notes the "various forms of instruction" in moral character that are "threaded through the identities of seer, prophet, poet, physician, philosopher, hero, and orator" (Miller 2007, *Trust*, p. 34):

> In different ways that link these figures, each mediates between sacred truths that comfort us as assurance that more than we know might become known and the illusion that we know more already insofar as these figures *make statements we trust but cannot verify*. And paradoxically, what is said of those secrets is trusted in proportion to its ability to be unsettling". (Miller 2007, *Trust*, p. 34; emphasis added)

In other words, we rely on charismatic authority "to know" *what we cannot know ourselves*.

[23] In this respect, political demonstrations are expressive in function: that is, they create the political identity of those who "enact themselves" as demonstrators within "the act" of demonstrating. So Bourdieu suggests: "by demonstrating the demonstrators and, above all, the leaders of the demonstration, the demonstration demonstrates the existence of the group capable of demonstrating its existence and of leaders who can demonstrate its existence—thereby justifying their existence" (Bourdieu 1991, *Language*, p. 193). But demonstrations "work" only if they are covered by mic and camera. (The collapse of the "Occupy Wall Street" movement came when local news stations, pressured by city governments and chambers of commerce, ceased regular coverage.)

to evolve out of departments of English. The so-called "Chicago School" built its critical foundations upon the Aristotelian canon; supplanting the old, belletristic "current-traditional rhetoric," the "New Rhetoric" (as it came to be called) was, in large part, a revival of Aristotelianism strengthened by new translations, editions, and commentaries (Cooper 1932[24]; Freese 1926[25]; Grimaldi 1980, 1988; Aristotle 1941[26]; Roberts 1941; Solmsen 1941[27]; Wisse 1989; Kennedy 1963). Even where the "New Rhetoric" sought to expand its vocabularies and boundaries (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Burke 1969), it did so extensively in dialogue with Aristotelian classicism.[28] Aristotle's dominance is readily explained: his systematic approach; his "demystifying" of persuasion (as opposed to the "irrationalism" of Gorgianic *apate* and the theology underlying Plato's *psychagogia*);[29] and, above all, his commitment to "reason" (logos) reinforced the intellectual foundations of modernism. In sum, Aristotelian rhetoric served the Enlightenment discourses of science, technology, and neoliberal political philosophy. For, logocentric in its linguistic epistemology, the *Rhetoric* articulates a "rational ethos" (Wisse 1989, *Ethos and Pathos*, p. 33) that appealed to postwar Western intellectual culture.

There's an elegant symmetry in the *Rhetoric*, which outlines three *pisteis* or modes of "artistic proof" (1.2.2.), these being logos (an offering of "good reasons"), pathos (an appeal to an audience's emotions), and ethos (an appeal for an audience's trust). In another major passage (*Rhetoric* 2.5.7) Aristotle identifies the components of ethos specifically, "for there are three things we trust other than logical demonstrations" (Aristotle 1991):

> These are practical wisdom [*phronesis*] and virtue [*arete*] and goodwill [*eunoia*]; for speakers make mistakes in what they say or advise through [failure to exhibit] either all or one of these.... Therefore, a person seeming to have all these qualities is necessarily persuasive to the hearers. (*Rhetoric* 1378a)

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[24] See (Aristotle 1932, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, Lane Cooper, trans.).
[25] See (Aristotle 1926, *Aristotle: The 'Art' of Rhetoric*, John H. Freese, trans.).
[26] See (Aristotle 1941, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, Richard McKeon, ed., W. Rhys Roberts, trans).
[27] See (Aristotle 1941, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, Richard McKeon, ed., W. Rhys Roberts, trans).
[28] In her introduction to the 2007 essay collection, *What is the New Rhetoric?* Susan E. Thomas acknowledges the classical legacy:

> Since the 1960s, the definitions of "new rhetoric" have expanded to encompass a variety of theories and movements, raising the question of how rhetoric is understood and employed in the twenty-first century. When scholars and business leaders gathered at the University of Sydney on 3 September 2005 to discuss "What is the New Rhetoric?," three major themes emerged:
>
> 1. How the classical art of rhetoric is still relevant today;
> 2. How it is directly related to modern technologies and the new modes of communication they have spawned;
> 3. How rhetorical practice is informing research methodologies and teaching and learning practices in the contemporary academy. (S. E. Thomas 2007, p. 1)

[29] Describing persuasion as an *apate* or "deliberate deception," the sophist Gorgias (c. 485–c. 380 BCE) claimed for rhetoric a power of witchcraft:

> Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity . . . . Sacred incantations sung with words are bearers of pleasure and banishers of pain, for, merging with opinion in the soul, the power of the incantation is wont to beguile it and persuade it and alter it by witchcraft. (Gorgias 1990, "Encomium", p. 42)

Whereas Gorgias aims at deception, Plato's Socrates practices "a *psychagogia* or leading of the soul to truth" (Baumlin 2001, "Ethos", p. 264). As Socrates asks his young interlocutor, Phaedrus, "Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an art which leads the soul [ψυχαγωγία] by means of words . . . ?" (Plato 1966, *Phaedrus*, 261a–b).Platonic ethos assumes the moral and, ultimately, theological inseparability of the speaker-agent from the speech-act. Indeed, "Plato is uncompromising in asserting this equation: truth must be incarnate within the individual, and a person's language must express (or, first, discover) this truth. Conversely, any attempt to separate a person's speech from his actual character serves to deny the incarnational aspect of truth and discourse alike. As Socrates says to Phaedrus, "If we are to address people scientifically, we shall show them precisely what is *the real and true nature of that object on which our discourse is brought to bear*. And that object, I take it, *is the soul*" (Plato 1966, *Phaedrus*, 270e; emphasis added).

Commenting on this passage, James L. Kinneavy and Susan C. Warshauer note the "complex interrelation among speaker, hearer, and subject matter" in Aristotle's system, such that "*arete* refers to the speaker, *eunoia* to the audience, and *phronesis* to the subject matter" (Kinneavy and Warshauer 1994, "From Aristotle", p. 179). In fact, *phronesis* refers to the logos-aspect of ethos, *eunoia* to the pathos-aspect, and *arete* to ethos or "moral character" per se. We can add that logos—"rational appeal" or the use of "good reasons"—originates with/in the rhetor, though audiences are left to judge its claims and to respond accordingly. And whereas pathos—an appeal to the audience's *pathe* or emotions—is raised by means of a rhetor's appeals, it's with/in the audience that hope or fear or outrage or desire is raised. In this sense, the Aristotelian logos "belongs to" the rhetor and is judged by the audience, while pathos "belongs to" the audience and is elicited by the rhetor. In contrast, ethos "lies between" the speaker and audience: belonging to neither wholly, the rhetor's ethos is built out of a speaker-audience interaction.

Though Aristotelian ethos describes a responsive, transactional model, there is one passage in the *Rhetoric* that, taken at face value, radically textualizes the speaker's self-presentation. We've quoted it earlier: it's the declaration that persuasion "through character . . . should result from the speech," and "*not from a previous opinion* that the speaker is a certain kind of person" (*Rhetoric* 1356a; emphasis added). If trust comes "from the speech" solely, then the speaker's ethos is fashioned *from within* discourse and becomes *part of* the discourse in its totality. Such a claim contradicts the teachings of Aristotle's older contemporary, Isocrates (436–338 BCE), for whom "the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul" (Isocrates 1990, "Antidosis," p. 327). Weighed against Athenian tradition, Aristotle's textually-constructed ethos is an anomaly, repeated nowhere else in theory or in praxis.[30]

In contemporary poststructuralist terms, the Aristotelian rhetor is reduced to an effect of language: exactly "who" the speaker "is" depends on how the audience "reads" him. If the audience "reads" him as being worthy of trust, then the Aristotelian rhetor's ethos-maneuvers will have succeeded. Whether the rhetor *deserves* that trust remains an ethical question lying outside the text. And, within this radically textualized model, the ethics of ethos *must* "lie outside," since Aristotle's *Rhetoric* undergirds an ethos of appearances.

Having established the importance of a speaker's apparent truthfulness, Aristotle turns to the audience and ways "to prepare" "the judge" for a favorable impression (*Rhetoric* 2.2–4):

> But since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment (people judge what is said in deliberation, and judicial proceedings are also a judgment), it is necessary not only to look to the argument, that it may be demonstrative and persuasive but also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a certain kind of person and to prepare the judge; for it makes much difference in regard to persuasion . . . that the speaker seem to be a certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be a certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be disposed in a certain way. (*Rhetoric* 1377b)

Words like "construct," "suppose," and "seem" point to the amorality of rhetoric generally while transforming Aristotelian ethos into an effect of speech, "separate from any consideration of the

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[30] We wonder if scholars have made too much of *Rhetoric* 1356a. As unpublished lecture notes, the *Rhetoric* contains numerous interpolations, repetitions, and contradictions; how much weight Aristotle himself would have given to this passage remains a point of speculation. But there is one point that we can make with certainty: it was the school of Isocrates, *not* of Aristotle, that trained Athenians in rhetorical *paideia*; and, for Isocrates, reputation necessarily precedes (and informs) one's speaking. Thus, "the man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no, on the contrary,"

> He will apply himself above all to establish a most honorable name among his fellow-citizens; for who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud, and that *the argument which is made by a man's life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words*? (Isocrates 1990, "Antidosis", p. 339; emphasis added)

speaker's prior reputation or 'true' moral character" (Baumlin 2001, "Ethos", p. 266).[31] Within this constructionist model, the rhetorical situation renders the speaker an element of the discourse itself, "no longer simply its origin (and thus a consciousness standing outside of or prior to the text) but, rather, a signifier standing *inside* an expanded text. The rhetor's physical presence and appearance, gestures, inflections, and accents of style, all become invested in acts of signification," whose objective is to gain an audience's trust (Baumlin 1994, "Introduction", p. xvi).

Unsurprisingly, this version of Aristotle appealed to theorists of the 1970s and 80s—the high point of poststructuralism in the American academy.[32] With the recent ascendance of cultural studies (within composition pedagogy especially), theorists have sought to reinterpret the *Rhetoric* as a document in cultural/communal consensus-building and positionality. A "rhetorical community," as Susan Miller describes it, delineates "an *ethos*—a *sensus communis* and a *locus communis*—a place where interlocutors abide, about which they contest, and from which they draw appeals" (Miller 2007, *Trust*, p. 198):

> Those who dwell within a rhetorical community acquire their character as rhetorical participants from it, as it educates and socializes them. The community does this at least in part by supplying the Aristotelian components of *ethos*—the judgment (*phronesis*), values (*arete*), and feelings (*eunoia*) that make a rhetor persuasive to other members of the community. (Miller 2007, *Trust*, p. 198)

Thus, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* presupposes a social context" (LeFevre 1987, *Invention*, p. 45). Karen Burke LeFevre adds that the "three kinds of proofs . . . presuppose the existence of others who may or may not accept certain proofs" (*Invention*, p. 45). She continues:

> Perhaps most pertinent to a social perspective is Aristotle's concept of ethos . . . [which] arises from the relationship between the individual and the community. "Ethos," says Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "does not refer to your peculiarities as an individual but to the ways in which you reflect the characteristics and qualities that are valued by your culture or group. In Aristotle's view, ethos cannot exist in isolation; by definition it requires possible or actual others . . . . [I]n fact, the Greek meaning for "ethos" as "a habitual gathering place" calls forth an image of people coming together . . . . Ethos, we might say, appears in that socially created space, in the "between," the point of intersection between speaker or writer and listener or reader." (LeFevre 1987, *Invention*, pp. 45–46)

It's the notion of "the 'between'" as a site of dialogic/dialectical engagement that intrigues us.[33] Citing LeFevre, Susan C. Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds argue similarly:

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[31] There's no need to mince words on the amorality of rhetoric: as a two-edged sword used for attack and defense on either side of any issue, rhetoric offers no guarantee as to the ethics of its practitioners. Weapons of any sort—and rhetoric has often been described in militaristic terms—inhabit a neutral territory, being neither good nor bad in themselves. The judgment rests not on the instrument but on the agent. (Such is the NRA's basic claim: guns don't kill people, people kill people—with guns.)Then again, Goffman bases social interaction generally on the concept of "appearance management," which drives a wedge between "successful" and "sincere" performance:

> [W]hile persons usually are what they appear to be, appearances still could have been managed. There is, then, a statistical relation between appearances and reality, not an intrinsic or necessary one . . . . Some performances are carried off successfully with complete dishonesty, others with complete honesty; but for performances in general neither of these extremes is essential, and neither, perhaps, is dramaturgically advisable. The implication here is that honest, sincere, serious performance is less firmly connected to the solid world that one might first assume. (Goffman 1959, *Presentation*, p. 71)

[32] Composition theorists might also remember the expressivist pedagogies of the 1960s and 70s. To classicists, cognitivists, and social-constructionists, these may have seemed a mere "fad," though they built upon postwar philosophies of existentialism. (Were this survey meant to be comprehensive, we would add the behaviorist models of self that undergird the rhetorical pedagogies of cognitivism.)

[33] What LeFevre claims for ethos, Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) claims for language generally: "As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing ... language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other," making "the word in language" half one's own and "half someone else's" (Bakhtin 1981, *Dialogic*, p. 29). Though Valentin

> [T]he rhetorical practice of *êthos* marks the position of the self, to the admittedly limited extent that it can be articulated by the author, making no claim that this speaking self is completely known or stable. Appearing "in that socially constructed space, in the "between," the point of intersection between speaker or writer and listener or reader" (LeFevre 45–46), *êthos* is the admission of a standpoint, with the understanding that other standpoints exist and that they change over time. (Jarratt and Reynolds 1994, "Splitting Image", p. 53)

In their typography, Jarratt and Reynolds follow Corts (1968, "Derivation", p. 201) in "clarify[ing] the 'confusion' between an older [Homeric] word ethos (spelled with a Greek epsilon), meaning 'custom' or 'habit,' and the newer [Aristotelian] êthos (spelled with an eta), meaning 'character'" (Jarratt and Reynolds 1994, "Splitting Image", p. 42). With this distinction, we are brought to Heidegger, whose discussion of ethos as "haunt" has opened new spaces for contemporary theory—spaces where collectivities and group identities are fashioned and gather together.

3. Heidegger: Ethos as "Haunt"

In a scene from Book 6 of Homer's *Iliad*, Paris is described:

> Even as when a stalled horse that has fed his fill at the manger breaketh his halter and runneth stamping over the plain . . . on high doth he hold his head, . . . and as he glorieth in his splendour, his knees nimbly bear him to the haunts [ἤθεα] and pastures of mares; even so Paris, son of Priam, strode down from high Pergamus, all gleaming in his armour like the shining sun, laughing for glee, and his swift feet bare him on. (6.506–16)

Within this Homeric simile, we find the earliest literary etymon of ethos: the ἤθεα ἵππων or "habitats of horses" (Homer 1924, *Iliad*, 6.511). In his "Letter on Humanism" (Heidegger 1949), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) is arguably first to uncover, within ἦθος or ethos-as-character, the more primal ἤθεα or ethos-as-dwelling place. His reading of Heraclitus (c. 535–475 BCE) does not cite the *Iliad*, though the Homeric ἤθεα lies in the background:

> The saying of Heraclitus (Fragment 119) goes: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων. This is usually translated, "A man's character is his daimon." This translation thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one. ἦθος means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which the human being dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to the essence of the human being . . . to appear. According to Heraclitus's phrase this [essence] is δαίμων, the god. The fragment says, the human being dwells, insofar as he is a human being, in the nearness of god. (Heidegger 1949, "Letter", p. 269)

From the Homeric "habitats of horses," Heidegger carries ethos into the "abodes of men," where Being is revealed, known, cared for, and preserved.[34]

N. Voloshinov (1895–1936) reduces "the inner psyche" to an effect of language, nonetheless he, too, describes selfhood as a transaction occurring in a "between" space:

> The reality of the inner psyche is the same reality as that of the sign. Outside the material of signs there is no psyche.... By its very existential nature, the subjective psyche is to be localized somewhere between the organism and the outside world, on the borderline separating these two spheres of reality. It is here that an encounter between the organism and the outside world takes place, but the encounter is not a physical one: the organism and the outside world meet here in the sign. (Voloshinov 1986, *Marxism*, p. 26; emphasis in original)

Like the "subjective psyche" that it seeks to express, ethos exists "somewhere between the organism and the outside world" (Voloshinov 1986, *Marxism*, p. 26)—this "somewhere between" being "none other than a discourse whose language is in part one's own but in equal part a possession of one's history and culture" (Baumlin 2001, "Ethos", p. 273).

[34] We should acknowledge that the Heraclitean passage is never mentioned in Aristotle's *Rhetoric.* Its presence, thus, is allusive and implicit at best. So notes Craig R. Smith:

Let us confess up front that we can't unpack Heidegger's prose in any way that does justice to his phenomenology. Nor can we turn a blind eye to Heidegger's unapologetic Nazism.[35] It seems a paradox that his ethic of *Sorge* or "care" preceded the "care ethic" of Carol Gilligan (1982) and Nel Noddings (1984) (among other feminist moral theorists) by several decades—and that his ethotic theory would be invoked in discussions promoting multiculturalism. Despite its author's wounded reputation, the "Letter on Humanism" has something to teach us about contemporary ethos.

Returning to the passage above, the Heraclitean translation is "modern" in that its world view is, paradoxically, pre-Socratic: that is, it invokes human being as an embodied existence *in-the-world*, and not as an abstraction belonging to metaphysics. The Greek *daimon* has any number of meanings, including "lesser god," soul, and destiny: indeed, "character is fate" remains the most obvious (and accessible) Heraclitean paraphrase. Though Heidegger wants to invoke a sense of mystery and unfamiliarity (*Unheimlichkeit*) in the paraphrase, we follow Michael J. Hyde in emphasizing its revelation of the Truth of Being: "The human being," writes Hyde, "is called to be true to its essential character (*ethos*). We *are* the opening of a dwelling place where the truth of what is—be it a stone, tree, eagle, ourselves, or whatever—can be taken to heart, appreciated, and cared for" (Hyde 2004, "Introduction", p. xx; emphasis in original). Thus Heidegger holds out the hope that there "is" an ontic Truth of Being that precedes and transcends all ideology or "social construction." As *Dasein* or Being-in-the-world, we are called to bear witness to the Truth of Being and to dwell within that space wherein our humanness lies. In this unified life-world—the Heideggerian "fourfold" (*Geviert*) of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities—we are called by conscience to serve the world as witness, companion, and caretaker.[36]

We have labored to make this point, since Heideggerian philosophy undergirds any modern claim on behalf of ontology: that is, on behalf of the Truth of Being. Similarly, Heidegger underwrites a theory of self-authenticating ethos that *reveals itself*—and expresses, indeed *celebrates* itself epideictically—rather than "merely" constructs itself via language.[37] Finally, the Heideggerian

> [A]t no place does Aristotle see *ethos* as a dwelling in the sense that Heraclitus used the term. . . . The first *place* that Aristotle acknowledges in the *Rhetoric* is the Areopagus, the high court, where, of course, ethos was enormously important . . . . For Aristotle, it is a given: everyone has *ethos* whether it be noble or ignoble. Before one even speaks, that *ethos* has an ontological dimension because it emerges from the way one makes decisions, the way one lives on a day-to-day basis, the way one dwells. Those decisions are informed by one's values, one's practical wisdom, and one's goodwill, all of which are addressed in detail by Aristotle. Thus Aristotle *assumes* the knowledge of the Athenian fore-structure of *ethos* as a dwelling place and then reformulates the notion of dwelling place to present a rhetorical understanding of *ethos*. (Smith 2004, "Ethos", p. 2)

[35] Uncompromising in his criticism, David H. Hirsch turns the Heideggerian proposition that thought "shows-forth the thinker" *against its author*: "It is now clear that Heidegger's attraction to National Socialism and his extended membership in the Nazi party were consistent with, rather than aberrant to, his thinking. By the same token, it is possible to contemplate connections between national Socialism and the post-Auschwitz perpetuation of Heidegger-inspired antihumanist theories in the guise of what has come to be called postmodernism" (Hirsch 1991, *Deconstruction*, pp. 255–56).

We don't know what to say, other than that Heidegger's Nazism is a reprehensible ethical failure. We wish we could posit two Heideggers, distinguishing the one who joined the German National Socialist Party in 1933 from the one who survived the war to write his "Letter on Humanism" in 1949. But of course, we can't.

[36] Again, we quote Hyde: "Existence calls, and for the sake of others and ourselves, we are obliged to respond in a responsible and thus rhetorically competent way. Something that is other than the self demands nothing less. The demand comes with acts of disclosure. With a showing-forth of all that there is" (Hyde 2004, "Introduction", p. xxi).

The human responsibility as caretaker introduces ecological themes into Heideggerian philosophy: "The basic character of dwelling," says Heidegger, "is to spare, to preserve. Mortals dwell in the way they preserve the fourfold in its essential being, its presencing . . . . Mortals dwell in that they save the earth . . . . To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it" (Heidegger [1951] 1978, "Building", p. 328). Rather, "to spare and preserve means to take under our care, to look after the fourfold in its essence" (p. 329).

[37] As Hyde notes (Hyde 2004, "Introduction", p. xxi), the conscientious or caring rhetor's task is "to disclose or show-forth (*epi-deixis*)" Being. Such rhetorical artistry, Hyde adds, "assumes an epideictic function" (p. xxi). We aim to expand upon this last insight: within traditions of "cultural and narrative ethos," the aims and strategies of epideictic rhetoric—a rhetoric, that is, of ceremonial occasion, celebration, and self-display—come to the fore. We argue, in fact, for the discursive confluence of ethos, expressivism, and epideixis.

notion of human being as existential/ecological caretaker undergirds our argument on behalf of a commodious, iatrological rhetoric. Here, too, we draw on Hyde's reading of Heidegger:

> We did not create the fundamental structure and workings of this primordial place and its attending call of conscience; rather, they are "givens,'" they come with the Being of existence, they are part of the essential character of human nature. We are creatures who dwell on this earth and who are thereby destined to hear and answer a call that, among other things, requires a capacity for practicing the art of rhetoric. The ontological structure of existence is such that we must learn to *dwell rhetorically*. . . . The call of human being, of conscience, calls on us to be rhetorical architects whose symbolic constructions both create and invite others into a place where they can dwell and feel at home . . . . (Hyde 2004, "Introduction", p. xxi; emphasis in original)

Adding to this analysis, we call attention to a lesser-known text, Heidegger's lecture, "Building Dwelling Thinking" (Heidegger [1951] 1978), which helps gloss his Heraclitean discussion. Having declared that "building (*bauen*) aims at dwelling (*wohnen*)" ("Building", p. 326), Heidegger proceeds to play with the German etymology, much as he had done with the Greek:

> We do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, because we are *dwellers*. But in what does the essence of dwelling consist? Let us listen once more to what language says to us. The old Saxon *wuon*, the Gothic *wunian*, like the old word *bauen*, mean to remain, to stay in a place. But the Gothic *wunian* says more distinctly how this remaining is experienced. *Wunian* means to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, *Friede*, means the free, das *Frye*; and *fry* means preserved from harm and . . . safeguarded. To free actually means to spare . . . . [Sparing] takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own essence, when we return it specifically to its essential being, when we "free" it in the proper sense of the word into a preserve of peace. To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its essence. *The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing*. (Heidegger [1951] 1978, "Building", pp. 326–27; emphasis in original)

We do not see how this exploration of the German *Wohnen*-as-dwelling, delivered several years after Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism," can be kept insulated from the Greek ἦθος-as-dwelling. Surely his lecture, "Building Dwelling Thinking," helps us read the more famous, more influential "Letter."

The Heideggerian model appeals to us for many reasons, not least of which is the ethical claims that it makes upon the speaker.[38] One speaks not simply to declare one's "dwelling place," nor simply to share that dwelling, but also *to care* for it. Situated within a self/other dialectic, the act of self-expression becomes an invitation *to dwell with* others, "to open a space," by means of language, where self and other "can dwell and feel at home" (Hyde 2004, "Introduction", p. xxi). It is an invitation to hospitality.

As an expansion upon Aristotelian *eunoia*, it's the Heideggerian attitude of caring that leads us into a new "New Rhetoric," one suited to the pluralist, post-Enlightenment, multiculturalist discourse of our age. It should be noted, however, that Heidegger does not acknowledge "cultural difference" within his discussion of ἤθεα or "haunts." For Heidegger, the ethos-as-dwelling is *Being*—as opposed to the "beings" that constitute nations, ethnicities, classes, and occupations. Hence, any discussion of

[38] Like Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) explores the interrelationships among self, world, and language. For future study, we'd suggest putting the twentieth century's two great philosophers into a dialogue over ethics and ethos: in what ways does Wittgenstein's philosophy of language—particularly his posthumous *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1953) reinforce, complicate, or question the Heideggerian model presented above? (As a starting point, we'd recommend Paul M. Livingston's (2015) essay, "Wittengenstein Reads Heidegger, Heidegger reads Wittgenstein: Thinking, Language Bounding World.")

positionality in the Heideggerian "haunt" is a misprision, though useful for our purposes. We have one more component to add to our model; we find it back in Aristotle, though not in his *Rhetoric*.

But, first, we must return to Homer.

4. From Ethos to Mythos: The Case for Storytelling

In Book 9 of the *Odyssey*, having enjoyed the Lord Alcinous's hospitality, Odysseus yields to the request that he give his name and tell his story:

> First now will I tell my name, that ye, too, may know it, and that I hereafter . . . may be your host, though I dwell in a home that is afar. I am Odysseus, son of Laertes, who am known among men for all manner of wiles, and my fame reaches unto heaven. But I dwell in clear-seen Ithaca, . . . a rugged isle, but a good nurse of young men; and for myself no other thing can I see sweeter than one's own land. Of a truth Calypso, the beautiful goddess, sought to keep me by her . . . and in like manner Circe would fain have held me back in her halls . . . but they could never persuade the heart within my breast. So true is it that naught is sweeter than a man's own land and his parents, even though it be in a rich house that he dwells afar in a foreign land . . . . But come, let me tell thee also of my woeful home-coming, which Zeus laid upon me as I came from Troy . . . . (Homer 1919, *Odyssey*, 9.16–38)

In such a passage, Homer models for us the hospitable aims of a commodious discourse. If asked, "Who are you?" one's answer unfolds in narrative: "I was born in ——," "I have lived in ——," "I went to school at ——," "I teach at ——," "I am married to ——," and so on. Whether revealed or constructed, self-image unfolds or "emerges," as Corder puts it, within structures of language: specifically, within stories. These are *shared by* individuals *within* culture: that is, stories translate actions, events, and experiences into sharable meaning inviting response. Such, indeed, is a reigning premise of our essay and of the greater collection, *Histories of Ethos*: that our stories, whether individual or collective, are primary bearers of ethos in the twenty-first century.

In emphasizing the role of biography—that is, of "life-writing"—in self-identity, Anthony Giddens (1938–) carries ethos into the realms of storytelling: "self-identity," he writes, "is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of traits, possessed by the individual. It is *the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography*" (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 53; emphasis added). We quoted Giddens in an epigraph, but we give the passage here in full:

> The existential question of self-identity is bound up with the fragile nature of the biography which the individual "supplies" about herself. A person's identity is not to be found in behavior, nor—important though this is—in the reactions of others, but in the capacity *to keep a particular narrative going*. The individual's biography, if she is to maintain a regular interaction with others in the day-to-day world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing "story" about the self. (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 54)

Understanding Giddens, we are reminded that "story" (mythos) is a subject of Aristotle's *Poetics*. In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle discusses *ethopoeia* as a mode of "stylistic ethos" (Baumlin 2001, "Ethos", p. 267).[39] But we can go further and describe a mode of "narrative ethos" that treats mythos as one of

[39] Focused on style, Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* contains a group of passages pertaining to character-delineation, of which the following (3.16.8–9) is representative:

> The narration ought to be indicative of character [ἠθικη]. This will be so if we know what makes character [ἦθος]. One way, certainly, is to make deliberate choice [προαίρεσις] clear: what the character is on the basis of what sort of deliberate choice [has been made].... Other ethical indications are attributes of each character, for example, that someone walks away while talking; for this makes his arrogance and his rudeness of character clear. (1417a–b)

four *pisteis* or "proofs," functioning rhetorically and contributing to the self-expressive aim of ethical/ethotic discourse.[40]

Rhetoric consists of more than persuasion (if, by persuasion, one aims at compelling an audience's consent to a specific course of action, policy, or point of view). Aristotle acknowledges this fact: in addition to deliberative rhetoric—the "art of persuasion" properly so-called—his *Rhetoric* describes forensics (a rhetoric of accusation and defense) and epideixis (a rhetoric of ceremonial occasion and artistic self-display). It is in self-display that ethos, epideixis, and mythos coalesce. By declaring narrative—mythos, *not* logos—the foundational activity of human social discourse, we seek to ground postmodern ethos in storytelling. There are more components to ethos than one's storytelling; the *Rhetoric* convinces us of that. But story is the glue that holds them all together.

Action, agency, time, and place—the stuff of narrative—are ethotic building blocks. A singular moment in time, often one of trauma or tragedy, can come to dominate the narrative—hence, the identity—of a person, or of a people. When a specific marker of identity is embedded within an action or event-in-time, one's storytelling is reshaped accordingly: a speaker can affirm and commemorate, defend and advocate, repair and seek justice, or seek transcendence (seek, that is, to move beyond the self-defining marker). A psychosocial model of ethos as "self in process" assumes that ethos can, in fact, evolve or change over time. In this sense, ethotic discourse rests in telling and retelling, in making *appeals to the future* as well as in acknowledging the past.[41]

Let us revisit the Corderian definition, "character as it emerges in language" (Corder 1978, "Varieties", p. 2). Rendered coherent through the conventions and structures of narrative, *a storyline emerges*: within the history of its telling, the personalized self-image—call it "the self"—comes into view. The self-as-narrated unfolds within "thematic patterns" of habit: choices of lifestyle, occupation, dwelling, attitudes, affects, addictions. Markers of identity derive from culture, demographics, ethnicity, and a gendering of the body. Behaviors and speech patterns replicate by reenacting life-choices and attitudes: one calls oneself the same name (and the same nicknames among friends); one goes to bed and wakes up in the same place; one goes to work at the same job in the same place at the same time of day (and returns to the same home in the same place at the same time of day); and, one yields to the same prejudices, the same affects and attitudes and desires (and addictions), all on a daily basis. By such repetitions, the individual becomes scripted within a storyline that translates the

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[40] For a discussion of mythos as a fourth "proof," see (Baumlin and Baumlin 1994, "On the Psychology of thePisteis", p. 100). Part of the art of storytelling is self-reflexive, in that it focuses on the character of the storyteller. So Liesbeth Korthals Altes notes with respect to narrative fiction:

> In fact, signaling and deciphering sincerity, deception, or irony and classifying speakers regarding their authority, reliability, and expertise have been the core business of storytelling since humankind's very first stories. Whole literary genres, such as satire or the engage novel, are defined by their assertion mode and ethos, as are the types of literary authors, narrators, and characters, from the ironist and unreliable *Picaros* . . . to the *doctus*, prophet, or gadfly . . . . Thus literature spells out codes of conduct and exemplary paths for ethos projection and attribution, helping to shape, transmit, and question culture-bound folk semiotics and hermeneutics of ethos. (Altes 2014, *Ethos and Narrative*, p. 7)

[41] Respecting our collection, perhaps a more hopeful title would be *Histories, and Futures, of Ethos*. Each species of rhetoric, Aristotle tells us (*Rhet*oric 1.3.4), "has its own 'time'" (1358b), though epideixis spills over into past, present, and future. Eugene Garver explains: "When Aristotle introduces the three kinds of rhetoric in 1.3, he says that deliberation concerns the future, judicial rhetoric the past, but he does not say that epideixis is about the present . . . . Later in the chapter, he does claim that each kind of rhetoric has a specially appropriate time, but again makes an exception for epideixis" (Garver 1994, *Aristotle's Rhetoric*, p. 71). As Garver translates the passage (*Rhetoric* 1.3.4),

> [T]o epideixis most appropriately [belongs] the present, for it is the existing condition of things that all those who praise or blame have in view. It is not uncommon, however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or of the future by way of anticipating it (1358b). (Garver 1994, *Aristotle's Rhetoric*, pp. 71–72)

singularity of personhood into character and community. In effect, one becomes the protagonist of one's own mythos.

Character can be understood as the "personal styles" of an individual whose life-narrative is rendered interpretable and, indeed, predictable through its replicable consistency of behavior. (This consistency, this predictability, is a working definition of sanity: the ability to wake up the next day and be the same person . . .) In conforming to "a character," the individual works within a culture-bound set of typologies, social roles, rules, and responsibilities. In practice, a dialectic arises between personhood and character-type, in that a shift on one side causes shifts on the other (and the postmodern agent is, as Giddens notes, defined by choice-in-lifestyle: one day, she may choose *not* to go home).[42] The point is that our personal stories have meaning within patterned life-histories that are historically- and culturally-conditioned.

Following a psychoanalytic model of identity-formation, we presume that specific life-events—traumas for the most part—play constitutive roles in identity-formation. The abused spouse *lives within* an event *and a narrative* of that event: the abuse becomes thematic within that person's self-image and life-story. Not all identity-forming events are traumatic: love, an act of heroism, an occupational or material or intellectual or social success, sudden fame, a mystic experience: any and all such life-events can become the "identity theme" (Holland 2011, *The I*, p. 51) within an individual's storyline.

A further corollary to postclassical ethos (indebted both to psychoanalytic praxis and to modern feminism) is the need to tell one's story, particularly those aspects that bear wounds. Indeed, the highest aim of ethotic discourse is, or ought to be, *to share one's story*; and, with respect to one's functioning as audience, the highest corresponding aim is *to bear witness* to that other's story. Self-knowledge (in both the Socratic and the Freudian sense) and self-expression or display (in the Gusdorfian/Corderian sense) are ethical urgencies of an ethocentric (as opposed to logocentric) discourse.

A narrative theory of ethos is postclassical for a further reason, in that it replaces the classical model of rhetorical *agon* or competition with a therapeutic model. The highest aim of discourse is not to persuade, compel, or "gain compliance," but to recognize, accommodate, and heal—to heal oneself and one's community through mutual understanding, consensus, equity, mutuality. Thomas Szasz (1920–2012) has called this an iatrology, a speaking of "healing words" (Szasz 1978, *Myth*, p. 29).

Following Heidegger, we hold to the possibility of a stable ontology or Truth (taking "truth," simply, to mean "what is," irrespective of whether the human creature *can know it* or *speak it* adequately); still, as an expression of our Heideggerian (and feminist) commitments, we assert that any "truth" lacking in hospitality—or, more forcefully, in caring, equity, understanding, increased freedom, dignity, and personal fulfilment—is likely no more than oppression. Some years ago, Corder made similar claims in an essay, "Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love." (If the word "love" embarrasses us intellectually, then let's replace it with "health," or with "hospitality," or with "community," or with "equity," or with "dignity," or with "freedom," or with "justice." Any of these value-terms will do when harnessed to an ethotic, iatrological rhetoric.) He writes:

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[42] "Lifestyle," writes Giddens, "is not a term which has much applicability to traditional cultures, because it implies choice within plurality of possible options, and is 'adopted' rather than 'handed down'" (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 81). He continues:

> Lifestyles are routinized practices, the routines incorporated into habits of dress, eating, modes of acting and favored *milieux* for encountering others; but the routines followed are reflexively open to change in the light of the mobile nature of self-identity. Each of the small decisions a person makes every day . . . are decisions not only about how to act but who to be. The more post-traditional the settings in which an individual moves, the more lifestyle concerns the very core of self-identity, its making and remaking. (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 81)

Going beyond Gidden's analysis, we would argue that the ongoing enculturation of most lifestyle choices impacts "character," even in postmodernism.

> Let there be no mistake: a contending narrative, that is, an argument of genuine consequence because it confronts one life with another, is a threat, whether it is another's narrative becoming argument impinging upon or thundering into ours, or our own, impinging upon the other's. (Corder 1985, "Argument", p. 19)

The "threat" posed by another's "contending narrative" arises from the positionality of oppressive cultural and societal structures; and it is these structures that return us, yet again, to Aristotle.

The classical-Aristotelian model of rhetoric-as-persuasion must have an ethotic component, in that any significant change—of mind or emotion, in action or attitude—will impact an audience's habits of behavior and, correspondingly, its self-concept. Still, we question the extent to which a person's self-concept (with its concomitant behaviors, habits, affects, addictions) *can* change by means of storytelling.[43] We presume that the ability to change one's story can change the storyteller. Following Alcorn (1994, "Self-Structure", p. 12), we assume that self-concepts, like the stories that undergird them, require some stability (that is, some predictability and replicability in behavior); but, while self-concepts are self-protective and inherently resistant to change, they are subject, nonetheless, to *retelling*. Whether the story changes the storyteller or the storyteller changes the story, the essential unity of the self, the self-reflexive self-concept, and the self-revealing/ self-constructing story is foundational to an ethotic, iatrological rhetoric.

The iatrological model is rhetorical in structure, being dyadic.[44] Storytellers need audiences: even when one speaks to oneself, one does so as "self to an other." We are selves *in community*; our stories have meaning within the broader cultural narratives to which they largely conform. A self-concept fulfills itself as ethos when it is "outed," that is, enacted or performed "in public." The notion of an ethos separable from the co-presence of an other—an audience-witness—is an absurdity. Ethos is fulfilled in the presence of the other. We are compelled to tell our stories in a world of storytellers. Within a sharing community, ideally, *we take turns* speaking and listening, bearing witness to one

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[43] As Marshall W. Alcorn Jr. notes, poststructuralist theory describes "an overly weak self," composed "of collected social discourses" and "conform[ing] effortlessly to textual influences" (Alcorn 1994, "Self-Structure", p. 6). "This view of the self," Alcorn adds, "helps us appreciate the social determination of selfhood, but it implies that the self, once formed, has no organized, 'characteristic' inner structure" (p. 6). As if fusing insights from Freud, Bakhtin, and Voloshinov, Alcorn offers an important corrective to the poststructuralist effacement of self:

> A particular self is not an infinitely changing collection of voices housed within a biological organism. It is a relatively stable *organization* of voices. We need not adopt the various models of self-organization advocated by psychoanalysis, but as rhetoricians, we should acknowledge that the self has a relatively stable inner organization. (Alcorn 1994, "Self-Structure", p. 12)

Rhetoric, thus conceptualized, "might be defined as a well-focused and carefully crafted strategy for changing self-organization" (Alcorn 1994, "Self-Structure", p. 14). And, due to "the inner dynamics of self-division—the ability to liberate repressed voices, to activate self-conflict, to reshape the linguistic form of self-components" (p. 12)—the most potent mode of change comes as a mode of self-persuasion. As Alcorn notes, "Self-persuasion comes not from the outside, as an external authority goading people to accept certain values, but from the inside, as an internal voice (both an agent and an expression of self-change) reorganizing relationships among self-components" (p. 26). We find ourselves very much in agreement with his model of self and its implications, both for ethos and for rhetoric generally.

[44] "For discourse," As James S. Baumlin and Peter Scisco write, "is dyadic—a rhetorical two-way street between speakers and audiences—and rhetoric is responsive in its intended effects: speakers address audiences in order to gain their favor and assent" (Baumlin and Scisco 2018, "Ethos", p. 201; emphasis in original). They continue:

> Until an audience responds or complies in some manner, the dyadic structure of discourse remains unfulfilled. Hence, a "speaker" "speaks to" an audience in ways that "reveal"—or, alternatively, construct—a credible character or image. Rarely do rhetors assume a passive audience: rather, audiences are presumed to collaborate in fashioning or affirming a speaker's . . . image. There are further complications in accommodating one's intended audience. In seeking an audience's assent, a speaker must understand and appeal to that audience's own character: that is, to its values, its habits, its predispositions, its prejudices, its aspirations and idealized self-image. A premise of social psychology . . . is that audiences tend to trust or "like" speakers who are "like them" in some way. A speaker's character may be "revealed" or "constructed," but it might also be projected, and an audience's projections of trust and reliance are likely to be unconscious in their workings. (Baumlin and Scisco 2018, "Ethos", p. 201)

another. We *share in* the diversity of stories. Following Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998), we might think of "community" itself as a sharing of "localized narratives" or *petits récits*.[45] The same dynamics that define individual character arise in the creation and healthy maintenance of community.

As we've argued, community is premised in a sharing of stories. And here we face a problem explored by Michel Foucault, among other cultural critics: we dwell in worlds marked by an intersection of power and discourse. In a world of unequal distribution of power, ethos becomes an *agon* of competing texts. More than sharers or witnesses, people are cast as objects of control and "compliance." In this power-riven model, people not only compete for ethos (that is, for the right to "be seen" through/in their words); they lose ethos within opposing narratives, alienated by acts of naming: queer, radical Islamic terrorist, disabled, Mexican rapist, "animal," etc. Contemporary American political rhetoric plays out its "culture wars" with markers of identity/difference as its weapons and ethos as its battlefield.

While iatrology—a healing of self and community through an expressivist/epideictic rhetoric—remains a dream in our culturally, politically, economically fractured world, we can, nonetheless, take steps towards its realization.[46] The first step in healing ourselves, individually and collectively, is to unleash the self-expressive power of our storytelling: in effect, to make an appeal in good faith for a witness, in order "to be seen" in our texts. As we look beyond the Western, Eurocentric-masculinist Enlightenment model, we discover alternative histories, epistemologies, logics, moral systems, sciences, medical practices, pharmacies, arts, rituals. We need to learn from them; at the least, we need to listen to them—or learn to listen. We cannot expect that the forces of hegemonic culture will hold back in their attempts at silencing alternative voices. Political campaigning will continue its attack ads, "controlling the narrative" by demonizing opponents. Even the academy plays its power games, policing credentials of those who "earn the right" to speak authoritatively (and reap the rewards therefrom).

In recent years, the academy has become more open to diversity, interdisciplinarity, and hybridized approaches/genres; but it, too, needs to learn greater humility and hospitality. The scholarly ethos pretends to impersonality, "universality," and rationalism.[47] While caricaturing the modernist "model citizen," White's character sketch strikes very near the academician:

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[45] In *The Postmodern Condition* (Lyotard [1979] 1984), Lyotard offers *petits récits* as an antidote to the totalizing-oppressive "grand narratives" of modernism: "progress," "Enlightenment emancipation," Marxism, etc.

[46] "Our time" is one "of fragmentation and isolation," as S. Michael Halloran observes, a time when ethos can succeed only by the degree to which a speaker "is willing and able to make his world open to the other," thus risking "self and world by a rigorous and open articulation of them in the presence of the other" (Halloran 1975, "On the End", pp. 627–28). Halloran wrote this in 1975. *Our own time* is one of fragmentation still, according to Mansfield:

> Selfhood is now seen to be in a state of perpetual crisis in the modern West. Alienated intellectuals and suicidal youth; culture wars and volatile markets; endless addictions to food, work, alcohol and narcotics; sexual inadequacy and thrill killers—all feed into education and entertainment industries that keep the intensity of our selfhood perpetually on the boil, nagging and unsettling, but also inspiring and thrilling us with mystery, fear and pleasure. It is this ambivalence and ambiguity—the intensification of the self as the key site of human experience and its increasing sense of internal fragmentation and chaos—that the twentieth century's theorists of subjectivity have tried to deal with. (Mansfield 2000, *Subjectivity*, Kindle ed., pp. 108–14)

[47] In the following passage, Carolyn R. Miller unmasks the logocentric assumptions lurking in the discourse of science. We should ask: To what extent do her observations hold for scholarship in the humanities?

> [O]ne of the primary conclusions of recent work in the rhetoric of science and technology is that this rhetorical style of impersonality, in which facts "speak for themselves," is itself an appeal that universalizes results originating in particularity; the scientist must seem fungible, so that her results could have been—and might be—achieved by anyone. This appeal is an *ethos* that denies the importance of *ethos*. The technical *ethos* must be informed but impartial, authoritative but self-effacing. One of the major strategies for achieving this delicate balance is the transformation of *ethos* into *logos*. (Miller 1994, "Expertise", p. 203)

> *He* is conceived as *disengaged* from his social background and oriented toward *mastery* of the world that confronts him; nevertheless, he can *discover*, by the light of *reason*, *universally applicable principles of justice*, found in some *foundationalist account* of God, nature, progress, or human communication that can become the basis of political *consensus* with other individuals. (White 2009, *Ethos*, pp. 33–34; emphasis in original)[48]

As scholars, we should make a habit of positioning and declaring ourselves within our writing. For a few years after the turn of the new century, a "scholarship of the personal" was promoted (in composition journals primarily), an approach allowing for reflection upon the processes as well as the products of one's research, often within a narrative frame. Combining strategies of the "traditional" scholarly and personal essays, this "scholarship of the personal" is the sort of hybridization needed rhetorically/ethotically today.[49]

Fortunately, we have companions in this call for a "return of the human" to the humanities. In his recent work, Mikhail Epstein practices precisely the sort of inventive, genre-bending "performative discourse" (Epstein 2012, *Transformative*, p. 19) described above. His *Transformative Humanities: A Manifesto* (2012) diagnoses the problem: with the ascendance of poststructuralism, the humanities "stopped being human studies and became textual studies. No one now seems to expect anything from the humanities except readings and re-readings, and, first and foremost, criticism rather than creativity and suspicion rather than imagination. As a result, the humanities are no longer focusing on human self-reflection and self-transformation" (Epstein 2012, *Transformative*, p. 2). Indeed, it's been a long time since the humanities *mattered* socially or politically. If we who teach within the humanities are to reclaim a voice in public affairs—if *we* are "to be seen and heard," in the manner described in this present essay—then we need a purpose beyond "mere theory."

Epstein reminds us what that purpose is, and it's expressive at its core. It's not in the object-world of the sciences that our proper studies lie.[50] In fact, our task lies not in study so much as in creation—in the creation, specifically, of our "humanness," as Epstein declares:

> The crucial distinction between the humanities and sciences is that in the humanities the subject and the object of the study coincide; in the humanities, humans are studied by humans and for humans. Therefore, to study the human being also means to create humanness itself: every act of the description of a human is, by the same token, an event of one's self-construction. In a wholly practical sense, the humanities create the human, as human beings are transformed by the study of literature, art, languages, history and philosophy: the humanities humanize. (Epstein 2012, *Transformative*, p. 7)

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[48] White adds, "this complex of characteristics … has been the target of a variety of twentieth-century thinkers from Heidegger to feminism, from Carl Schmitt to Foucault and postmodernism, from Horkheimer and Adorno to Charles Taylor" (White 2009, *Ethos*, p. 34). It's time that the academy were weaned off of this elitist self-image.

[49] We refer readers to volume 64.1 of *College English* (2001), with its focus on "personal writing." In a later volume (2003), Jane E. Hindman lists several of "the rhetorical moves and genres" associated with "'the personal' in scholarship" (Hindman 2003, "Thoughts", p. 38):

> … a specific, individual positioning of the researcher and/or the subjects of a qualitative study; an instance of "outing" oneself by revealing religious, sexual, ethnic, racial, or economic affiliations; an autobiographical account, a memoir; a hybrid genre of theory and autobiography; an embodied writing that examines the institutional origins of individual affect and taste; a reader's individual decision how to consume and circulate texts. (Hindman 2003, "Thoughts", p. 38)

For a sample of this approach, see Craig A. Meyer's essay, "From Wounded Knee to Sacred Circles: Oglala Lakota Ethos as 'Haunt' and 'Wound,'" included in this collection.

[50] In the process of demystifying the sciences through the humanities, "humans do not so much discover something in the world of objects as build their very subjectivity by way of self-description and self-projection" (Epstein 2012, *Transformative*, p. 8). Playing with the title of Thomas Nagel's well-known essay, "What is it like to be a bat?," Epstein writes, "the question itself appears to be the answer to another, more essential question: 'What is it like to be a human?' To be a human means to emerge out of self-containment and immerse oneself into the being of the other, as it were one's own. To be human means *to ask* what it is like to be a bat" (Epstein 2012, *Transformative*, p. 215; emphasis added).

The essays gathered in *Histories of Ethos* seek to be true to this humanizing task. But the same qualification holds for Epstein as for Heidegger: being "clothed" in culture, our humanness needs to be seen in its diversity.

As for the politics of hegemonic culture, we ask: Who wields the *skeptron*? Who enjoys "the right to speak," to be heard? By what means can an individual or group assert that right? Must an oppressed minority flatter the "dominant voice" by mimicry or ventriloquism, by kowtowing to the dominant discourse and its rituals of authority?[51] Must self-expression—the ultimate ethotic act, the act of speaking "to be seen"—be an act of defiance? The #MeToo movement in America today is more than an appeal for justice: it is a combining of individual voices into an ethos expressive of the victim who will remain silent no more. And we are its witness. Surely the #MeToo movement is iatrological, in that the women who are speaking out seek freedom and redress from trauma and oppression. They are "being seen" in the telling of their story; and, yes, there are patterns to their story. In response to their revelations, American society is learning to tell *its own story* differently. In time, perhaps, we will be healed of this sort of institutionalized violence—or at least, we will be cured of the "blindness" that *tolerates* sexual exploitation, among other modes of social, cultural, political, economic oppression.

We enlarge our ethos when we learn to speak differently of ourselves and of others, when we repudiate acts of silencing, when we offer ourselves as witnesses, when we create community by means of shared stories. Ethos is invested in every aspect of our speaking, listening, and responding. Let the Enlightenment "Age of Reason"—the epoch of logocentrism—pass; let ours be an *Age of Ethos*. Let us aim to make our discourse caring, accommodating, epideictic, iatrological, inventive, and personal.

5. Conclusions

In this introduction to *Histories of Ethos*, we have made a series of claims that individual essays will put to the test. Some will explore the "cultural dress," some the "modes of address," by means of which individuals situate themselves within communities in place and time. Competing versions of ethos, both in theory and in praxis, will be applied.[52] The role of narrative in identity- formation—both individually and culturally—will be a recurring motif. And, while individual essays might explore only a portion of the spacious field of ethos within any culture at any time, we assume that any claim regarding ethos can be turned, dialectically, into its "enabling other." No premise or claim

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[51] On this subject, see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" There's a further paradox in academic writing, in that we're encouraged to universalize and "depersonalize" our texts (in imitation of the sciences) even as we imitate—in effect, ventriloquize—the dominant theorists of our times. Ours is not so much a "cult of personality" as it is a "cult *of vocabulary*." In passing through the rituals of tenure/promotion, we are expected to master "academic literacy" in displaying an ability "to talk the current lit-crit talk" (Spellmeyer 1996, "After Theory", p. 909). But this mastery comes at the cost of an authenticating "personal style." What does "The Profession" teach us if not ventriloquism and impersonation, "demand[ing] that *we remake ourselves* in conformity with the project of the theorist" (Spellmeyer, "After Theory" 909; emphasis in original)? And "our reward for submitting" to this regimen, as Kurt Spellmeyer notes, "is seldom the renewal of connections to actual others, the people we happen to know in daily life. Don't we learn, instead, to serve an anonymous 'they'?" (Spellmeyer 1996, "After Theory", p. 909). Spellmeyer elaborates:

> [T]hink, if you can stand it, about all the essays written ten or fifteen years ago that began with the claim to be writing "on the margin"; or of all the works today that call themselves "genealogies" . . . . The writers of these works are not simply sycophants or opportunists. They write in this way is to *become* Derrida, to be *become* a second Foucault or a little Lacan. In the same way, Madonna's fans dress like walk and talk like her, and read books about her life. (Spellmeyer 1996, "After Theory", p. 909)

Granted, we've called our own essay a "genealogy." But we would like to think that we're using the Foucauldian vocabulary strategically and that the vocabulary is not using us. Spellmeyer's point pertains to ethos, though he does not use the term: "the time has come to acknowledge that academic literacy, at least as we've constructed it so far, is deeply complicit with the same culture of disembodiment that makes possible Elvis look-alikes and the stalking of the stars by their admirers" (Spellmeyer 1996, "After Theory", p. 909).

[52] We note, too, that some essays in our collection lean toward theory and analysis while others lean toward praxis and performance. We trust that the essays in *Histories of Ethos* can cross-reference each other, reducing their need to repeat the same theoretical underpinnings and assumptions: it may suffice that each consciously and conscientiously *commits* to a coherent theory/approach/vocabulary that can be found more fully articulated elsewhere in the collection and broader secondary literature.

has been banished or disallowed from this collection. Hence, we affirm that ethos can be revealed *or* constructed; that it can pre-exist a speaker's discourse *or* be produced within (or by means of) discourse; that it can ally itself with, *or* it can subvert, logos or pathos. If it can heal and liberate, surely it can be used to harm. Self necessarily posits an other; identity implies difference. Narratives can be "fixed" within a culture's folk pathways and traditions; but these can also be revisited, reinterpreted, reshaped, retold. Ethos can be carried into new regions. With smart technologies, ethos enters the realm of the artificially-intelligent nonhuman—the cyborg. Even the "deep ecology" movement posits a "planetary ethos."[53]

Let us summarize the aims and aspirations of our collection, as represented in this introduction. We might go so far as to declare the following a Manifesto—an intellectual call-to-action—for ethos in/for the twenty-first century. Once again, we seek the following:

> to acknowledge the expressive core of discourse spoken or written, in ways that reaffirm and restore an epideictic function to ethos/rhetoric;
> to demonstrate the positionality of discourse, whereby speakers and writers "out themselves" ethotically (that is, responsively and responsibly);
> to explore ethos as a mode of cultural and *embodied* personal narrative;
> to encourage an ethotic "scholarship of the personal," expressive of one's identification/participation with/in the subject of research;
> to argue on behalf of an iatrological ethos/rhetoric based in empathy, care, healing (of the past) and liberation/empowerment (toward the future);
> to foster interdisciplinarity in the study/exploration/performance of ethos, establishing a conversation among scholars across the humanities; and
> to promote new versions and hybridizations of ethos/rhetoric.

We end with a selection of passages from Corder's "Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love." We present them without commentary: they speak for themselves. And they speak for us, affirming several of our central themes. (Once again, if the word "love" embarrasses, put "hospitality" in its place.)

> Each of us is a narrative. A good part of the time we can live comfortably adjacent to or across the way from other narratives. Our narratives can be congruent with other narratives, or untouched by other narratives. But sometimes another narrative impinges upon ours, or thunders around and down into our narratives. We can't build this other into our narratives without harm to the tales we have been telling. This other is a narrative in another world; it is disruptive, shocking, initially at least incomprehensible, and, as Carl Rogers has shown us, threatening.
>
> When this happens, our narratives become indeed what they are perpetually becoming—arguments. The choosing we do to make our narratives (whether or not we are aware of the nature of our choosing) also makes our narratives into arguments. The narratives

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[53] Coined by Norwegian philosopher and naturalist, Arne Naess, "deep ecology" rejects "shallow environmentalism" for being "simply an extension of the anthropocentric Western paradigm" of land use, wherein "the reasons for preserving wilderness or biodiversity are inevitably couched in terms of human welfare" (Naess 1973, cited in (Keller, "Gleaning", p. 140). As David Keller notes, "shallow environmentalism falls short of valuing nonhumans apart from their use-value. Deep Ecology, in contrast, asserts that all organisms have intrinsic value. In this way Deep Ecology is fundamentally nonanthropocentric" (Keller 1997, "Gleaning", p. 140).

With his Gaia hypothesis, James Lovelock goes further in positing that the "whole earth," in all its living and non-living components, functions *as if* it were a single, unified, self-regulating organism—in effect, a self (Lovelock 1979, *Gaia*, pp. x–xii). By analogy with biological life, planetary ecology can be studied as a delicately balanced (and, with global warming, increasingly threatened) homeostasis. Clearly, the "deep ecology" movement is foreshadowed by Heidegger's ethics of "caring for" and "sparing" the "fourfold" of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities. (Also, much of American Indian ethos is definable by earth-sustaining attitudes and practices.)

> we tell (ourselves) create and define the worlds in which we hold our beliefs. Our narratives are the evidence we have of ourselves and of our convictions. Argument, then, is not something we *make* outside ourselves; argument is what we are. Each of us is an argument. We always live in, through, around, over, and under argument. All the choices we've made, accidentally or on purpose, in creating our histories/narratives have also made us arguments, or, I should go on to say, sets of congruent arguments, or in some instances, sets of conflicting arguments. (Corder 1985, p. 18)

Again:

> Sometimes we turn away from other narratives. Sometimes we teach ourselves not to know that there are other narratives. Sometimes—probably all too seldom—we encounter another narrative and learn to change our own. Sometimes we lose our plot, and our convictions as well; since our convictions belong to our narratives, any strong interference with our narrative or sapping of its way of being will also interrupt or sap our convictions. Sometimes we go to war. Sometimes we sink into madness, totally unable to manage what our wit or judgment has shown us—a contending narrative that has force to it and charm and appeal and perhaps justice and beauty as well, a narrative compelling us to attention and toward belief that we cannot ultimately give, a contending narrative that shakes and cracks all foundations and promises to alter our identity, a narrative that would educate us to be wholly other than what we are. Any narrative exists in time; any narrative is made of the past, the present, and the future. We cannot without potential harm shift from the past of one narrative into the present and future of another, or from the past and present of one narrative into the future of another, or from the future we are narrating into a past that is not readily ours. How can we take that one chance I mentioned just now and learn to change when change is to be cherished? How can we expect another to change when we are ourselves that other's contending narrative? (Corder 1985, p. 19)

And again:

> Argument is emergence toward the other. That requires a readiness to testify to an identity that is always emerging, a willingness to dramatize one's narrative in progress before the other; it calls for an untiring stretch toward the other, a reach toward enfolding the other. It is a risky revelation of the self, for the arguer is asking for an acknowledgment of his or her identity, is asking for witness from the other. In argument, the arguer must plunge on alone, with no assurance of welcome from the other, with no assurance whatever of unconditional positive regard from the other. In argument, the arguer must, with no assurance, go out, inviting the other to enter a world that the arguer tries to make commodious, inviting the other to emerge as well, but with no assurance of kind or even thoughtful response. How does this happen? Better, how can it happen?
>
> It can happen if we learn to love before we disagree. (Corder 1985, p. 26)

And once more:

> Rhetoric is love, and it must speak a commodious language, creating a world full of space and time that will hold our diversities. Most failures of communication result from some willful or inadvertent but unloving violation of the space and time we and others live in, and most of our speaking is tribal talk. But there is more to us than that. We can learn to speak a commodious language, and we can learn to hear a commodious language. (Corder 1985, pp. 31–32)

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Islamic Ethos: Examining Sources of Authority

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Abstract: This paper investigates the construction of Islamic ethos in the early Islamic period, highlighting what constitutes the guiding principles of its authority. As a religion that is currently subject to many ugly charges, a careful examination of its core historic values provides a counternarrative to the distorted ideology perpetuated by extremists such as The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as well as to the Islamophobic and anti-Muslim racist discourse circulating in the West. The counternarrative presented here serves scholars of ethos whose expertise lies elsewhere than in religious studies. While providing this historical narrative, I highlight how Islamic ethos is derived from multiple sources of religious and cultural/communal authority, mainly from The Qur'an (the holy book of Muslims); the *Sunnah* (the Prophet Muḥammad's example, deeds, and customs); and *ijtihad* (the interpretations and deductions of Muslim religious leaders). Tracing the construction of Islamic ethos through the creation of the Muslim community (*Ummah*) in 622 CE and the establishment of the Caliphate in 632 CE reveals guiding principles of conduct that are, in contrast to the discourses mentioned above, realistic, practical, and adaptable to current global needs and exigencies.

Keywords: Islamic ethos; nonwestern rhetorics; authority; Islamophobia; The Qur'an; *Sunnah*; *Ijtihad*; Islamic State; Muslim community (*Ummah*); Caliphate

1. Introduction

Islam today is undergoing a major crisis; it is under attack from extremists that commit atrocities in the name of Islam and from Western forces that perceive it as the enemy. The Arab Spring[1] has let loose social forces that were subdued in the past by dictators or strong men of power. When these forces unleashed, Muslim-majority countries, such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, were thrown into political turmoil. The political authority in the pre-Arab Spring era in these Muslim-majority countries lacked a true democratic leadership. In the movement towards true democracy, demonstrations that varied in size and intensity swept these nations, overthrowing dictators or shaking their absolute authority. Among the forces that grew rapidly as a result of the political turmoil are extremist military groups, such as The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL: alternatively ISIS, The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). These groups invoke the Qur'an[2] to justify military actions against civilians. The same tactic is used to recruit more militants. These groups aim at reverting to the model of the first Islamic community (*Ummah*)[3] as established by Prophet Muhammad

[1] The Arab Spring was a series of protests that happened across several Muslim-majority countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Syria beginning in 2010. Protesters called for the overthrow of dictators, the increase in democracy, and the improvement of living conditions—to name just a few demands.

[2] A list of glossary terms can be found at the end of the article.

[3] Fred Donner believes that the documentation prior to Ma'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan's reign (685–705 CE) is "too meager to permit firm conclusions" regarding the existence of a structured Islamic State at that time (Donner 1986, p. 283). Therefore, similar to the scholars I cite in my piece, I refer to the early Muslim community at the time of Prophet Muhammad as the "Muslim community" or "Muslim society" to emphasize that a form of structured community did exist. The era after the death of Prophet Muhammad is referred to as The Caliphate.

in 622 CE and the Caliphate installed after his death. However, the Quranic evidence these groups employ is usually manipulated, fabricated, and taken out of context. Mark Townsend, Home Affairs Editor of *The Observer*, reports on the ISISI-produced book *The Jurisprudence of Blood* (*Fiqh al-Dima*) that is used to justify their barbaric, violent actions (Townsend 2018). Townsend gives special attention to the topic of "surrender vs. fighting to the death" that mandates jihadists to "choose death instead of handing themselves over to the enemy" (Townsend 2018). He then cites Islamic Studies scholar Sheikh Salah al-Ansari, who counters that "no religious requirement existed [in Islam] to 'fight to the death' and that the Islamic tradition of warfare encouraged the humane treatment of prisoners of war" (Townsend 2018). Like other Islamic scholars, Al-Ansari believes that ISIS tends to disregard the "traditional Islamic scholarship," and I add, they also neglect the Islamic interpretive tradition that developed over many centuries (Townsend 2018).

Muslims have been denouncing ISIS and its practices since its emergence, especially for its awful violations of human rights and women's rights, including through statements issued by Muslim leaders condemning ISIS and its practices and on social media through the #NotInMyName campaign and other outlets (Bin Hassan 2016, p. 5). Although the Muslim world as a collective has distanced itself from ISIS, ISIS has had some success in promoting its "distorted version of Islam . . . to the Muslim world" through "its propaganda machinery" that "promoted the religious legitimacy of its self-proclaimed Caliphate, as well as its offensive jihad, suicide bombings, 'lone-wolf' attacks, and brutal executions" (Bin Hassan 2016, p. 5). As for its treatment of women, The Counter Terrorism Project labels ISIS as an "anti-women ideology," as its practices towards women include rape, enslavement, forced marriages, social isolation, and forced covering, to name a few (ISIS's Persecution of Women 2017). While there are imperial forces working to increase the divide and the tension in that region, the current situation begs the question: Could this distorted interpretation of religious scriptures get more approval? How can Muslims work from within to create democracies that are in tandem with their belief systems? Could a deeper understanding of Islamic ethos and its roots play a role in how these questions are answered? Meanwhile, a collective guilt is undeservedly placed on the majority of Muslims, who do not approve of this association between Islam and radicalism. For most of the 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, Islam is compassionate, just, and capable of keeping up with the exigencies of time.

Religions, including Islam, are by their nature based upon oral traditions joined to the inner workings of faith; as such, they cannot always be traced to discernible, textual sources. However, an examination of the textual sources that do exist for Islam is particularly timely in the light of modern Western Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism. In an era in which Islam is under attack and subject to many ugly charges, such as violence and dogmatism, a careful examination of Islam's collective, communitarian ethos reveals the inaccuracy of these charges. Contrary to the stereotypical image that prevails in Western media outlets, one of the main principles in Islam mandates that "Let there be no compulsion in religion"[4] and that tolerance is highly valued (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 2:256). The Qur'anic ethics emphasize justice, care, compassion, and accountability. Yet this is not the narrative being heard in mainstream debate. This anti-Islamic sentiment creates a need to explore the guiding beliefs and principles of that religion.

In its historical, cultural, textual, and oral–traditional foundations, Islam is a communitarian religion and, as such, aims at neighborliness, equity, the protection of civil rights, and peace. The Qur'an as read, understood, and followed by this author is a Qur'an of peace. As contemporary conditions prove, what "is" and what "ought to be" are often at odds; in retelling this early history, I seek to

[4] While I use this Qur'anic verse to indicate "the general command that people cannot be forced to convert to Islam," it is important to highlight, as Jonathan Brown has argued, that Qur'anic verses need to be understood in their own context (Brown 2015, p. 45). In other words, understanding the Qur'anic verses is contingent upon "grasping the specific circumstances of their revelation" (Brown 2015, p. 45). Brown explains that this specific verse was revealed when "a child of a Muslim family who had been educated in the town's Jewish schools" wanted to leave with "the Jewish tribe being expelled from Madina" (2015, p. 45). The verse was revealed to communicate to the parents that they "cannot compel their son to stay" (Brown 2015, p. 45).

articulate an ethotic foundation for exploring contemporary belief and practice: What Islam "is" in its early history allows us to ask important questions about what Islam "ought to be" today. In the narrative that follows, the ethos of Islam is explored through its Prophet and the first four caliphs. This essay seeks to outline the Qur'anic and the *Sunnah* practices of these ethical/ethotic terms, as they constitute the foundation of the Islamic tradition. In Islam, one's proper ethos is built upon the Qur'an preeminently and the *Sunnah* (Prophet Muḥammad's example, deeds, and customs), which teach an ethos/ethics of justice, charity, and personal accountability.

This essay faces the problem of ethos from the start, not just for its subject, but for its author and reading audience. I write as a woman, an academician, and a scholar whose own ethos rests in Islam. I write of the early history and guiding principles of my faith, fully aware of questions my predominately non-Muslim readership is likely to bring to the text. Readers who call themselves scholars and/or critics of Islam will already know the early history sketched here and will have made up their minds. More modestly, this text aims to begin a conversation on Islam as narrative and ethotic discourse; it aims to serve scholars in cultural studies as well as in the varieties of composition and rhetoric, fields to which I have devoted my teaching and scholarship.

In their "Twenty-Five Years of Faith in Writing: Religion and Composition, 1992–2017," Paul Lynch and Matthew Miller invoke Stanley Fish's prediction that religion "is poised to join, if not replace, race, class, and gender as the central interests of humanistic inquiry" in the composition classroom (Lynch and Miller 2017, p. 3). Fish questioned whether academics "were ready" for this phase, arguing that we "should not construe religious students" unfairly (qtd. in Lynch and Miller 2017, p. 3). This call for promoting religious diversity in the composition classroom prompted Lynch and Miller to produce a bibliography on rhetoric and religion. While the Judeo-Christian tradition is heavily represented in the bibliography, the Islamic tradition, as the authors themselves have noticed, is woefully underrepresented. The scarcity of scholarship in the field about Islam and the Islamic rhetorical tradition is a gap that we should address. As Fish noted, it is time to prepare for a future where religion plays a significant role in the composition classroom and the field as a whole.

This piece responds to Lynch and Miller's recognition that Islam has yet to be included in our field's discussions of religion, rhetoric, ethos, and identity. I provide a historical account of the early Islamic period, the historical era in which Islamic ethos was fashioned. I highlight the major historical events, the ethical values, and the moral norms that reflect the character of this religion and its followers and present its religious and cultural authorities. Through the teachings of the Qur'an and the practices of Prophet Muhammad, I give special attention to his treatment of women and to the figure of Aisha, Prophet Muhammad's wife who lived through the early Islamic period. These challenge the Western stereotypical image of Muslim women as passive and submissive, disrupting the "anti-women ideology" perpetuated by ISIS. Through the investigation of its foundational values, I underline how the sense of ethos presented by Islam as a belief system and practice, embraces tolerance, justice, and inclusivity and is adaptable to cultural development, unlike the commonly held belief in the West and the practices propagated by ISIS.

2. Early Islamic History: The Beginnings

The story of Islam and the implications of its ethos are inseparable from the life of Prophet Muhammad, the last messenger of God (*Allah*) according to Islamic convention. The Prophet's mannerisms, behaviors, and actions persuaded people to follow God's commands and the Prophet's teachings, thus attracting them to the religion of Islam. Since his early years, Muhammad, an Arabic name which means "the highly praised," was a special young boy both in his character and in his demeanor. He was born into an Arabic tribe called Quraish in 571 CE. His early life was marked with a series of tragic events, from the death of his father when he was an infant to his mother's death a few years later, and then to his grandfather's passing when he was eight (Nasr 2001, p. 8). Being under the care of his uncle, Abu-Talib, after the death of his immediate family members, Muhammad had to work as a shepherd for his uncle's livestock; a task that he accomplished efficiently and to his

uncle's satisfaction. This well-mannered young boy grew up to be a fine man whose community and family referred to as "The True," "The Upright," and "The Trustworthy One" (Nasr 2001, p. 8). These qualities grounded his ethos as a respectable, honest person. Through his reputation and credibility as a hardworking and trustworthy individual, many people within Muhammad's community decided to join the Islamic faith.

The story of the beginning of Islam as a faith goes back to the days when Muhammad used to enjoy his solitude in Ghar Hira (a cave located in Mecca). One day, he heard a voice commanding him to "read" and he answered, terrified, "I am not a reader."[5] Then, the voice of the Angel Gabriel mediated the first chapter (*surah*) of the Qur'an to Muhammad:

> Proclaim! (or Read!) in the name of thy Lord and Cherisher, Who created–
> Created man, out of a (mere) clot of congealed blood:
> Proclaim! And thy Lord is Most Bountiful—
> He Who taught (the use of) the Pen—
> Taught man that which he knew not. (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 96:1–5)

The first revelation Prophet Muhammad received in 609 CE marked the beginning of Islam. Khadija, Prophet Muhammad's first wife and his senior of fifteen years, was the first person to believe in his message. Her constant support throughout his journey as a Prophet of Islam contributed significantly to the spread of the message of Islam. She was his trusted consultant, whose opinions were sought and taken seriously. This partnership presents an early indicator of the significant role women played in the early Islamic period, contrary to the image of Muslim women as voiceless and disempowered.

As Muslims' first and most important reference guide for conduct, morals, and behavior, within Qur'anic revelations, God speaks directly, in the first person, to the listeners of his words, making his laws and rules known to them (Nasr 2001, p. 29). Prophet Muhammad kept receiving these revelations for 23 years (609–32 CE). The early revelations stressed the oneness and uniqueness of God, rejecting polytheism and emphasizing man's moral responsibility; therefore, it challenged early pagan beliefs. Muslims have been relying on the Qur'an since it was revealed to Prophet Muhammad as a guide to living righteously; hence, it is the heart of Islam, and its significance as a source of ethos is hard to overstate.

3. The Qur'an: The Main Source of Islamic Ethos

In praising the Qur'an as a longstanding miracle, Prophet Muhammad says: "Do you ask for a greater miracle than this, O unbelieving people, than to have your language chosen as the language of that incomparable Book, one piece of which puts all your golden poetry to shame?" (qtd. in Ali 1891, p. 107). The Qur'an, which consists of 114 chapters (*surah*), is considered the most eloquent text in the Arabic language. While it is a complex, difficult book to read, even for native speakers of Arabic, it is a rhetorically sophisticated one. It is an ambiguous text that needs pondering, investigation, and delving into its mystery while keeping an open mind about its different interpretations and meanings. Lesley Hazleton, historian and author of *The First Muslim*, describes her plan to read the Qur'an in three weeks as hubris, as it took her three months to read it utilizing four well-known translations. She commented on the Qur'an's elusive nature as follows: "every time I thought I was beginning to get a handle on the Qur'an . . . , it slipped away overnight" (Hazleton 2010). Although translated in multiple languages, the Qur'an, as many scholars agree, is meant to be read in Arabic. It is through this text that God's words are revealed to Muhammad, which makes it a key reference to God's commands and vision for Muslims.

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[5] Prophet Muhammad was illiterate (*ummi*).

While the Qur'an stresses the communal ethos of Islam, it also emphasizes individuality. So we hear about the uniqueness of one's soul, and that "humans' fundamental nature is unalterably good, so they are entitled to self-respect and a healthy self-image" (Nasr 2001, p. 39). The Qur'an tells the story of the human self in its creation and, in its detailed description of the stages of fetal development, reveals knowledge that has only in recent centuries been scientifically discovered:

> O mankind! . . . We created you out of dust, then out of sperm, then out of leechlike clot, then out of a morsel of flesh, partly formed and partly unformed, in order that we might manifest (Our power) to you; and We cause whom We will to rest in the wombs for an appointed term, then do We bring you out as babes . . . (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 22:5)

It is through this and similar revelations that Muslims perceive the Qur'an, not only as the longstanding miracle, but also as evidence of God's authority, power, and knowledge in which they trust. Islam, after all, is a religion that "centers on its religious Ultimate, God," one God that has no children and whose merciful and compassionate nature overshadows his anger and wrath (Nasr 2001, p. 33). And with this emphasis on the individuality of humans comes an ethos/ethics of accountability.

God sets the parameters for religious and social responsibility, duties, and accountability in the following verse: "It is not righteousness that you turn your faces towards the East and the West, but righteous is the one who believes in Allah, and the Last Day, and the angels and the Book and the prophets. These are they who are truthful; and these are they who keep their duty" (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 22:177). Every adult, mature, sane Muslim is responsible for their actions and held accountable. The Qur'an established a system of ruling that should be carried out by "men of integrity" that believe in consultation (*shura*); this system stresses the importance of holding those in charge accountable for their actions (Sowerwine 2009). Every Muslim should believe in the Day of Judgment where "every soul will be confronted with all the good it has done, and all the evil it has done, it will wish there were a great distance between it and its evil. But Allah cautions you (to fear) Him. And Allah is full of kindness to those that serve Him" (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 3:30). Muslims are not only held accountable for believing in God and the Day of Judgment, but also for caring for one's family and the needy in their communities.

The Qur'an advocates comprehensive measures to be adopted in this regard, making it a religious obligation: "And render to the kindred their due rights, as (also) to those in want, and to the wayfarer: but squander not (your wealth) in the manner of spendthrift" (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 17:26). The Qur'an includes many such verses, mandating Muslims to give compulsory charity (*zakat*) and encouraging them to give voluntary charity (*sadaqah*). According to Islamic law, *zakat* is to be used to support the poor and the needy, in addition to helping those in debt (and, in the past, it was used to free slaves). This compulsory charity (*zakat*), which was established fourteen hundred years ago, is considered one of the main pillars of Islam. Ibrahim B. Syed refers to the *zakat* as a "social security system of Islam [that] is Divine in character and based entirely on the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*" (Syed n.d.). God makes a clear association between attaining righteousness and giving *zakat* as evidenced by this verse from the Qur'an: "By no means shall ye attain righteousness unless ye give (freely) of that which ye love; and whatever ye give, of a truth Allah knoweth it well" (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 3:92). As the Qur'an established guidelines for human interaction, balancing the collective ethos of the Muslim community (*Ummah*) with individual responsibility and moral authority, Prophet Muhammad's life and teachings further reinforced this Islamic ethos.

4. The Journey Continues: Constructing an Ethos of Brotherhood and Community

The Qur'an warns against hate, division, and disunity, urging Muslim believers to embrace an ethos of brotherhood that transcends all boundaries of race, culture, language, and tribal affiliations. As Prophet Muhammad was receiving the Qur'anic revelations, he was confronted with hostility from the residents of Mecca, including some of his own family and tribe (Nasr 2001, p. 15). After a decade of constant harassment, Muhammad and his followers planned their migration to Madina in 622 CE,

where they were welcomed by supporters (*Al-Ansar*). This migration marked a new phase in the history of early Islam as the organizational structure of the community became focused on "brotherhood" rather than on kinship. The brotherhood for which Islam calls entails love for one's brother in the same way one loves one's self. Prophet Muhammad said: "By the One in Whose Hand is my soul, you will not enter Paradise until you believe, and you will not believe until you love one another. Shall I not tell you of something which, if you do it, you will love one another? Spread (the greeting of) peace among yourselves" (Muslim 1330 CE, 5: 33: 3672). As Islam reinforced an ethos of brotherhood, the attention was on creating unity in diversity within the Islamic society (Sajoo 1995, p. 582) where, in the words of Prophet Muhammad, "there is no superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab and for a non-Arab over an Arab, nor for the white over the black nor for the black over the white except in piety" (Asfahani n.d., p. 100).[6] This approach materialized in the implantation of a civil code called the "Constitution of Madina," a formal agreement between Prophet Muhammad and the tribes and the residents of Madina, including Jews, Christians, and pagans (Sajoo 1995, p. 582). Governed by the Constitution of Madina, the first Islamic community was established in 622 CE.

The establishment of this community, as Suhail M. Hashmi argues, was "foundation not just to Islamic history, but also to Islamic ethics. Islam would be henceforth both a religion (in the sense of a theological system) as well as an earthly community" (Hashmi 2007, p. 7). This Muslim community (*Ummah*) created a sense of unity, which transformed after the Prophet's death by his disciples into a Caliphate (632–661 CE). This civil code that governed the first Islamic society is "one of the best examples to understand the importance of peace, security, and interfaith in the religion of Islam" (Tahir-ul-Qadri 2012, p. 1). It included sixty-three articles that controlled and managed the relationship between Prophet Muhammad and his followers on the one hand and the tribes of Madina on the other hand. Reflecting the Qur'an's sentiment of interfaith dialogue and respecting religious difference, this constitution established religious freedom for non-Muslims, stressed the security of the community, created a tax system to support the community during war time, laid out the rules for political alliances, and established a judicial system for conflict management (Tahir-ul-Qadri 2012, p. 2). During this period, Muslims defended themselves against the atrocities of Meccans in different battles, including Badr (625 CE), Uhud (625 CE), and The Trench (627 CE). This is not to contradict the notion of the peaceful message of Islam, as evident in many verses of the Qur'an, such as "But if the enemy include towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in Allah: for He is the One that hearth and knoweth (all things)," but to emphasize the practicality of Islam's guiding principles (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 8:61).[7] As such, violence is deemed necessary in some cases, including in self-defense.

Unlike the commonly held belief by non-Muslims (and perhaps some Muslims as well) that jihad means "holy war," war in Islam "was always regarded as a necessary evil but never holy or sacred" (Omar 2011, p. 708). The word jihad means "to strive" in all matters. Jihad, as Irfan A. Omar notes, "is striving, discernment, and reflection" (Omar 2011, p. 708). When this striving took a military form, it was usually out of self-defense (the need to defend the followers of Muhammad) or to guarantee the survival of their faith. There are multiple examples from Prophet Muhammad's life (*seerah*) that encouraged a peaceful form of jihad. *Jihad* against one's self (*Jihad al-nafs)* is the greatest form of Jihad, as it emphasizes a person's spiritual and moral self-struggle (Ali and Rehman 2005, p. 330). This form of *jihad* entails constant reflection and self-examination and is thus perceived as being at a higher level than other forms of *jihad*. The emphasis on exerting one's effort to the maximum of one's capability is echoed in the Prophet Muhammad's attention to the importance of striving for social justice and speaking truth to power. When asked about the best form of *jihad*, Prophet Muhammad responded: "A word of truth spoken before an unjust ruler" (An-Nasa'i n.d., 15: 39: 4214).

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[6] Al-Asfahani (948–1038 CE).

[7] The title of the translation I am using is *The Holy Qur'an*, which is a direct translation of the Qur'an—the holy book of Muslims.

When engaged in military jihad, Prophet Muhammad made sure to follow the Qur'an's war ethics and teach them to his followers. Following Prophet Muhammad's teachings, Abu Bakr, Prophet Muhammad's companion and the first caliph of Islam, laid out guiding principles for engaging in battle:

> O people! I charge you with ten rules; learn them well! Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy's flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them alone. (qtd. in Ali and Rehman 2005, p. 341)[8]

The teachings of Islam set the guidelines for tolerant, forgiving, environmentally aware military regulations. These civil guidelines, as Ali and Rehman argue, are in agreement with the regulations of modern international law (Ali and Rehman 2005, p. 345). The Islamic ethos of civility and kindness combined with firmness and authority reflects not only the nature of Islam, but also the sophistication of Prophet Muhammad's leadership. He was a leader capable of exercising power and authority while maintaining his merciful and kind nature. Additionally, his leadership emphasized the importance of implementing a model of consultation (*shura*) as directed in the Qur'an, in which he consulted his companions about matters related to the Muslim community (*Ummah*), while he had the final authority. Leaders of the community succeeding Prophet Muhammad continued to use this consultative model of leadership to help them to make decisions. As this community gained more strength, Prophet Muhammad returned to Mecca and expanded the territory, spreading the message of Islam to different parts of the world. The first community established in Madina functioned as "a model of the virtuous Muslim polity in the following centuries, long after the Islamic state had become a polyglot empire extending over three continents" (Hashmi 2007, p. 6). This expansion, as Sohail H. Hashmi has argued, stems from the "conviction that Muslims were bound to spread the Islamic order universally—through peaceful means if possible, through forceful means if necessary" (Hashmi 2007, p. 6).

The political agenda of protecting the first Islamic society and strengthening its fabric from within occupied Prophet Muhammad and his followers at that time. This complicates our ability to apply early Islamic rulers as some sort of paradigms for today. It is worth noting, however, that Professor Paul Freedman emphasizes that Muslim territorial expansion has to be "understood in terms of religious motivation but not in terms of a determination to wipe out Judaism and Christianity," as "there was not a demand for the conversion of the population to Islam" (Freedman 2011). Although the conversion does happen in the conquered regions, "it does not take place immediately . . . nor under great pressure" (Freedman 2011). In other words, according to Freedman, "the motivation provided by the religion to conquer does not necessarily mean that you require everybody you conquer to embrace the religion" (Freedman 2011). While the early Muslim leaders were respectful of other religions in the conquered areas, ISIS's treatment of non-Muslims has been described "by the international community as genocide and crimes against humanity" (ISIS's Persecution of Religions 2017). For ISIS, non-Muslims either convert to Islam or get killed. Even when Muslims engaged in territorial expansion in the early Islamic period, there is strong evidence to support that they believed in peaceful co-existence rather than violently forced conversion.

The Muslim community valued unity in diversity as it embraced non-Muslims in the conquered regions, such as Christians and Jews, and referred to them as the "People of the Book" (*Ahl Al-kitab*). As this sense of community strengthened under Prophet Muhammad's leadership, ethnic allegiances

[8] According to the footnote provided by Ali & Rehman, the original Arabic text appears in Al-Tabari's *The History of the Prophets and Kings* (923 CE). It was quoted and translated by Majid Khuddari in his book *The Islamic Law of Nations* (1966). While the ten rules are mentioned in the Arabic text, a couple of points were combined for ease of translation in Khuddari's translated text.

became less prominent. The "People of the Book" (*Ahl Al-kitab*) were granted the status of a *dihimmi*, which entailed protection for their "life, body, and property, as well as freedom of movement and religious practice" (Martin 2004, p. 451). In return for this protection, they had to pay a tax (*Jizya*). The status of the *dhimmi*s "was secured by a legal institution called *dhimma* ('protection')" (Martin 2004, p. 451). There are several examples in the life of Prophet Muhammad (*seerah*) that exemplify his tolerance and kindness to non-Muslims—from exchanging gifts with his non-Muslim neighbors, to doing business with non-Muslims, and visiting them when they were not feeling well. For example, there was a Jewish family in particular that he supported by giving charity to and his successors kept the same tradition after his death (At-Tahan 1999).

This acceptance, even concern, for others was not limited to those of differing faiths, as Prophet Muhammad also always considered the condition of women and defended women's status. In an era where women were treated as second-class citizens, he revolutionized the status of women. His example stands in complete contradiction to the current practices against women performed by ISIS and other Islamic fundamentalist groups and even the ones practiced in some Muslim-majority countries.

5. Women's Ethos in the Early Islamic Period: The Case of Aisha

As the Muslim world faces new challenges from extremist groups that call for undermining women's agency and suppressing their rights in the name of Islam, examining Prophet Muhammad's treatment of women in the early Islamic period reveals the contradiction of ISIS's message. Islam abolished the practice of infanticide, granted property rights for women by inheritance, gave women the right to divorce, and made men and women equal in the sight of God, as emphasized in the Qur'an: "Whoever works righteousness, man or woman, and has Faith, verily, to him will We give a new Life, a life that is good and pure; and We will bestow on such their reward according to the best of their actions" (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 16:97). These rights which stem mainly from the teachings of the Qur'an were reinforced by Prophet's Muhammad's *Sunnah*.[9] Although there are many female figures in the early Islamic period that would provide a counter narrative to the "anti-woman ideology" perpetuated by extremist groups, including Khadija, Umm Waraqah, and Asma Bint Abi Bakr, my attention will be geared towards Aisha (612–678 AD)—Prophet Muhammad's most beloved wife and the daughter of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph in Islam.

Aisha played a significant role, both during Prophet Muhammad's life and after his death, in the development and understanding of the Islamic faith through the multiple hats she wore as a partner, companion, political leader, transmitter of *hadith*,[10] and scholar. Additionally, the examination of Aisha's figure problematizes the patriarchal authority that characterizes Abrahamic religions. A few scholars have given her attention in the past few years; however, with the West's current imperial rhetoric of saving brown women from brown men,[11] Aisha emerges as an important figure that challenges the stereotypical image of Muslim women as passive and submissive.

5.1. The Wife and "Mother of Believers"

As a wife, Aisha occupied a special place in Prophet Muhammad's life. Many Muslims perceive this relationship as a loving, egalitarian marriage in which both parties had great love and respect for one another. Islamic historians provide some examples that testify to the bond they shared. Prophet Muhammad raced with Aisha, humored her, and had long conversations with her (Muslim 1330 CE, 9: 2055). In addition, they used to drink from the same cup and eat from the same plate (Muslim 1330

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[9] *Sunnah* refers to Prophet Muhammad's actions, sayings, behaviors, personality traits, gestures, and descriptions as recorded by his companions.

[10] *Hadith* refers to the body of knowledge about Prophet Muhammad that was reported by his companions.

[11] I am referring here to the women of Iraq and Afghanistan, who are mainly Muslim women. The notion of "saving brown women from brown men" has been utilized by many postcolonial scholars, such as Gayatri Spivak, to highlight how the colonizer has used the excuse of saving brown women to justify colonial interventions (Spivak 1994, p. 93).

CE, 1: 283). This affection is also manifested in the discussions they had, which depict Aisha as a sophisticated conversation partner:

> Aisha narrated that Muhammad described his love to her like a knot firmly tied on a rope. Aisha used to ask Muhammad from time to time 'how is the knot' and Muhammad used to confirm his love to her. He said: 'The knot is still tied as firmly as it used to be' (qtd. in The Prophet of Islam Muhammad 2017).

In another incident that reflects Prophet Muhammad's love for Aisha and her place in his life, Aisha says: "'While the Ethiopians were playing with their small spears, Allah's Messenger screened me behind him and I watched (that display) and kept on watching till I left on my own.' So you may estimate of what age a little girl may listen to amusement" (Al-Bukhari 846 CE, 7: 62: 118).

Although these stories provide compelling evidence to the mutual love and trust between Aisha and Prophet Muhammad, Aisha's role as a wife to Prophet Muhammad goes beyond her dedication to her husband, as she was part of a community called "The Mothers of Believers," which consisted of Prophet Muhammad's wives.[12] The Qur'an states: "The Prophet is closer to the Believers than their own selves, and his wives are their mothers" (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 33:6). Moreover, the Qur'an addresses Prophet Muhammad's wives directly, requiring them to "remember what is recited in your houses of God's revelation and wisdom" (The Holy Qur'an 2000, 33:34). It is worth mentioning that, as Aisha Geissinger has stated, "Muhammad's wives are the only group among his followers to which such an injunction is specifically directed in the quranic text" (Geissinger 2011, p. 37). The preservation of the Quranic text was the main task allotted to them, which was not easy given that they had to resort to memory for the preservation of the Qur'an in an era in which Prophet Muhammad and his followers faced tremendous resistance from their community. The Qur'an does not only dedicate certain responsibilities to the Mothers of Believers but makes them active contributors and participants in the aid of the Prophet's mission. The communal authority that her positioning brought about as one of the Mothers of Believers required that Aisha had to live up to God's, Prophet Muhammad's, and the Islamic community's expectations, serving as one of the guardians for the Qur'an (Geissinger 2011, p. 37).

5.2. The Scholar and Transmitter of Islamic Religious Knowledge

Another means in which Aisha preserved and served the Islamic faith was by transmitting *hadith*. Leila Ahmed argues that the examination of Aisha's figure within the Islamic context reveals the importance of her role in preserving the verbal text of Islam after the death of Prophet Muhammad (Ahmed 1992, p. 47). Although mainly characterized as a patriarchal society, the early Islamic society and its cultural norms were accepting of women in leading roles, which facilitated accepting Aisha as a religious authority (Ahmed 1992, p. 47). Aisha's testimonies and observations are crucial to Islam, since she had access to Prophet Muhammad's private life and was there observing, recording his actions, behaviors, gestures, and words. Aisha transmitted over 1000 *hadith* on a range of matters, including legal, ritual, and theological issues (Geissinger 2011, p. 41). Although her role as a transmitter of information was crucial, Aisha's own judgment on matters of marriage and divorce contributed to affirming her religious authority. Women felt comfortable sharing their stories, experiences, and problems, especially situations related to marriage. One day, a woman whose father was intending to force her into a marriage came to Aisha, complaining to her about the situation. Aisha told the Prophet, who, in turn, invited the father over for a discussion, in which the Prophet addressed indirectly the issue of forced marriages and emphasized that it was up to the woman to marry the person of her choice (Muslim 1330 CE, 4: 26: 3265). Such incidents testify not only to the trust and the knowledge of

[12] Prophet Muhammad was single until he accepted Khadija's, his first wife's, proposal to marry her at the age of 25. She died when he was 50. He married all his other wives between the ages of 5–60 for multiple reasons. These reasons were mainly relevant to his duty to deliver the message of the Islamic faith to the world.

the religious Islamic rules and familiarity with the religious discourse that Aisha possessed, but also to her status as a confidant to many women and a trustworthy judge in their situations.

Aisha did not take anything at face value. Even when Prophet Muhammad was alive, she used to inquire and question everything, asking questions until she was satisfied with his answers. Her eagerness to learn and her intellectual curiosity allowed her to gain a respectable status as a scholar. It is due to this curiosity that, as the Islamic scholar Hakim said, "one-fourth of the body of religious knowledge" has been transferred to us (Tahmaz 1999, p. 174). Her reputation as the most knowledgeable religious scholar of her time is echoed in more than one testimony. Zurarah bin Awfa, the judge of Al-Basrah back then, narrated that he was told that Aisha was the most knowledgeable person on earth (An-Nasa'i n.d., 2: 20: 1722).

Prophet Muhammad's commitment to ensuring the status of women in Islam was evident in his treatment of women throughout his life. Abu Huraira[13] reported Prophet Muhammad saying: "Act kindly towards women" (Muslim 1330 CE, 8: 3468). His respect and concern for women was also indicated when he requested to spend his last days with Aisha, dying in her lap, leaving behind a dynamic state whose ethos was reflected in the teachings of the Islamic religion that emphasized equity and care.

6. The Ruling of the Caliphs

The leadership of the Islamic society post Prophet Muhammad's death continued to be held by wise, honorable, and trustworthy men—qualities of *phronesis*, *arete*, and *eunoia* associated with classical Aristotelian ethos. The period of the ruling of the caliphs started from the death of the Prophet in 632 CE and lasted through 661 CE. Prophet Muhammad's ethos of consultation (*shura*) continued to be employed in the political discourse after his death through the election of Muslim leaders. Islam emphasizes the importance of obeying leaders within the parameters of God's commands. Therefore, the leader's actions should be in accordance with Islamic law. According to the Qur'an, a leader should be an adult, sane, devout Muslim "with superior ethical character" and should be known for wisdom, God consciousness (*taqwa*), integrity, compassion, consultation (*shura*), honesty, justice, kindness, forgiveness, trustworthiness, and sense of responsibility (Akhter 2009, p. 127). As a person who had these qualities, Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq was the perfect candidate to lead the Islamic state at that time. The tension created around the succession of Prophet Muhammad led to the divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims, as the Prophet's companions were advocating for Abu Bakr, while the Prophet's tribe was rooting for Ali bin Abi-Talib, the cousin of Prophet Muhammad, on the basis of kinship (Hashmi 2007, pp. 11–12). Although Prophet Muhammad did not appoint a successor, his actions in the last days before his death insinuated that his preference was for Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq, as he told Aisha to "order Abu Bakr to lead the people in prayer" (Al-Bukhari 846 CE, 7: 62: 118). Islamic studies scholars, such as Wilfred Madelung, point to this particular *hadith* to suggest Prophet Muhammad's preference for Abu Bakr to be his successor (Madelung 1997, p. 1). The excerpt is from a *hadith* that is considered *mutawatir*, meaning it has the "highest classification of a tradition in hadith criticism," and is characterized by "an established series of transmitters (isnad), at least two per generation, all of whom are deemed reliable" (Esposito 2003). This process "ensures that the tradition is not fabricated" (Esposito 2003). Therefore, for Sunni Muslims, this piece of evidence strongly suggests Prophet Muhammad's support for Abu Bakr to be his successor. This gesture, in addition to his close association with the Prophet and his piety, played a significant role in the election of Abu Bakr as Prophet Muhammad's successor (Sowerwine 2009).

During the ruling of Abu Bakr, which lasted twenty-seven months, he subdued the tribal oppositions in Mecca and expanded the Islamic territory to include central Arabia (Madelung 1997, p. 45). In his first speech after his election, he said:

[13] Sunni Muslims consider Abu Huraira the most prolific narrator of *hadith*.

> Behold! I have been charged with the responsibilities of government. I am not the best among you. I shall need all the advice and help that you can give. If I act well, you must support me. If I make a mistake, advise me ... To tell the truth to him who is given the responsibility to rule is dutiful allegiance. To hide would be treason. (qtd. in McIntire and Burns 2009, p. 81)

This speech aims to establish the ethos of an Islamic leader, whose first requisite is humility. Abu Bakr reminds Muslims that it is their duty to provide advice for their leader and to correct him if he digresses from God's instructions and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. This emphasis on correcting the wrongs is also echoed in a *hadith* by Prophet Muhammad: "Whoever among you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand; if he cannot, then with his tongue; if he cannot, then with his heart- and that is the weakest of Faith'" (Muslim 1330 CE, 6: 47: 5011). This acknowledgment of the different individual capabilities provides those incapable physically or verbally of changing evil with the reassurance that they can fulfill that moral obligation with their hearts.

Although Islamic ethos can give the impression that it stems only from sacred texts, it can be "man-made," in the sense that qualified scholars can resolve issues that are not addressed in the Qur'an or the teachings of the Prophet (*Sunnah*). As the Islamic society expanded to include Mesopotamia, its leadership continued to promote just and humane values derived from God's commands and the Prophet's teachings. However, in order to keep up with changing conditions and the emergence of new issues, Muslims employ "independent reasoning" (*ijtihad*). There is a clear indication that when direct guidance from these two sources is lacking, exercising one's own judgment is key. This process of deriving regulations from the main Islamic sources of authority "may not contradict the Qur'an, and it may not be used in cases where consensus" has been reached along scholars (Esposito 2003). *Ijtihad* in Islam is "a matter of obligation for every able Muslim at the personal level" (Sajoo 1995, p. 581). While Islamic law stems primarily from the Qur'an and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, it was "constructed by jurists in assorted locales beginning around 750 CE over a century after the demise of the Prophet" (Sajoo 1995, p. 581). This body of knowledge is not a one-size-fits-all model, as it varies based on the school one follows.[14]

According to Abu Al-Hasan Al-Basri, a pious Islamic scholar (*mujtahid*, a person who practices *ijtihad*) should have certain qualifications to practice *ijtihad*, including having a moral, reliable ethos as a person and a scholar; being familiar with the Arabic language and with the Qur'an and *Sunnah*; capable of exercising logic and good reasoning; and must follow the consensus of past scholars (*ijma'*) and have the skill to use analogic or syllogistic reasoning (*qiyas*) (Kamali 1991, p. 374). After the death of Prophet Muhammad, *ijtihad* was practiced by his companions, who were considered trustworthy, pious Muslims, and "had the good fortune to acquire proficiency in jurisprudence and legislation under [Prophet Muhammad's] guidance and they had recourse to the process or exercise of *Ijtihad* when a need arose in his absence" (Masood n.d.). One example of this would be when both Fatma bit Abi Bakr, one of Prophet Muhammad's wives, and Al-Abbas, the Prophet's uncle, requested their inheritance from what Prophet Muhammad had left behind. Abu Bakr, one of the Prophet's companions and the caliph of Muslims back then, denied their request based on a *hadith* saying that Prophets' families do not receive inheritance, and that what prophets leave behind should be given to charity.

Since the death of Prophet Muhammad until the present, Islamic scholars have been practicing independent reasoning (*ijtihad*), following consensus of past scholars (*ijma'*), and using analogic or syllogistic reasoning (*qiyas*) to provide answers to religious and legal questions. An example of "consultative *ijtihad*" would be the appointment of Omar Ibn Al-Khattab as the next Caliph of Islam (Kausar 2017, p. 156). Abu Bakr "was performing *ijtihad* in this matter," as his decision to nominate

[14] There are four main schools that constitute the Sunni Muslim Shari'a law named after their founders: Hanafi, Shaf'i, Maliki, and Hanbali (Sajoo 1995, p. 581). While Sunni Muslims gather around these four schools, Shi'i Muslims have a more restrictive approach to *ijtihad* (Sajoo 1995, p. 581). The Jafari School emerged as the leading school of Shi'a Muslims in the eighth century, and since then, religious leaders (*imams*) have been providing guidance in religious matters that are not addressed in the Qur'an and *Sunnah* (Sajoo 1995, p. 581).

Omar for this position was not a random one but based on reasoning and rationalization. The process started by considering who would be most appropriate to lead the Muslim community (*Ummah*) during that time and "whose leadership would be acceptable" to the Muslim community (Kausar 2017, p. 156). Secondly, Abu Bakr consulted with those who were potential candidates for this leadership position (Kausar 2017, p. 156). While the majority were in agreement that Omar would be a good choice, a concern was voiced regarding Omar's temperament (Kausar 2017, p. 156). Abu Bakr's judgment on this point was that this could provide a beneficial counterbalance to his own style of leadership, as he himself tended to be lenient (Kausar 2017, p. 156). After careful reflection and evaluation, Abu Bakr reached the conclusion that Omar would be the most appropriate person to hold his position (Kausar 2017, p. 156). Not only does this form of deductive reasoning mark Islamic ethos as realistic, practical, and capable of keeping up with the emerging issues of society; it also provides Muslims with a body of reliable propositions to help them to lead their lives within the parameters of the teachings of Islam.

This attention to deductive reasoning was a priority for the next successor, Omar Ibn Al-Khattab. A man well-known for his justice, firmness, and humility, Omar further reinforced Islamic ethos of social justice by judging with fairness and abolishing hierarchies. His famous saying, "Since when have you turned men into slaves, whereas they are born free of their mothers?" is among the most celebrated quotes about justice in the Islamic tradition (qtd. in Wirba 2017, p. 73).

As a sophisticated leader, he created "a police to maintain law and order, a welfare service to assist the needy, an education department, and a consultative body to deliberate on public policy and guide him in its implementation" (Griffiths 2005, p. 465). He used to walk the streets looking for poor people to feed, believing God would punish him if there was a needy person to whom he did not attend. A Roman messenger saw him sleeping under a tree when he uttered his famous praise of Omar's leadership: "O Omar! You ruled. You were just. Thus you were safe. And thus you slept" (qtd. in Ahmed 2000, p. 35). The point being that because of his justness and his clean consciousness, he was able to sleep under a tree without any protection. Though a military power under Omar's reign, the Islamic army abided by a set of rules and regulations that dictated causing the minimal amount of harm. Likewise, while great attention was geared towards justice, equity, and care for all individuals, the communal ethos of consultation (*shura*) was prominent throughout the period of the early Caliphs, especially during the reign of Omar. When the time came to find a successor for Omar, he appointed six men and charged them to elect a Caliph out of themselves (Sowerwine 2009). After long deliberations, the electoral committee decided in favor of Othman bin Affan.

In its emphasis upon charity and attending to the needy, the ethos of Islam incorporated justice with a communitarian sense of care that continued throughout the rule of the third Caliph Othman bin Affan, the son of a wealthy merchant, who put his money in the service of the Islamic community and the good of the people. Every week he would buy and set slaves free, and "although he was wealthy he was often without servants because of this habit" (Stacey 2009). Othman focused on building the army, corresponding with governors across the Islamic territory, and unifying Muslims from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds while respecting their differences. As more people were converting to Islam, he had concerns about preserving the Qur'an, so he tasked a committee to produce a standard copy of the Qur'an, make copies from it, and distribute it to all Islamic regions (Stacey 2009).

After the assassination of Othman by rebels, the electoral body assembled and elected Ali bin Abi-Talib, who ruled from 656 to 661, as the fourth caliph of Islam. Ali, the cousin of Prophet Muhammad, is known for ruling with equality and justice, especially in the distribution of taxes (Netton 2008, p. 105). However, he faced many challenges as he was engaged in more than one civil war during his rule. Ali was a central figure in the Sunni/Shia division (Netton 2008, p. 105). As mentioned earlier, Shia Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad appointed him as his successor and that Prophet Muhammad's family (*ahl al-bayt*) should occupy the leadership positions within the Islamic society. Sunni Muslims, however, believe that Prophet Muhammad did not appoint anyone to be his successor and left this issue up to his companions to delegate among themselves (Madelung 1997, p. 119). The battle of Siffin in which Ali fought against the governor of Syria, Mo'awya, resulted in a

disastrous outcome for Ali as he had to step down from the caliphate (Netton 2008, p. 44). He was later assassinated in Kufa in Iraq.

This brief history of the creation of the first Islamic society reveals the roles that Prophet Muhammad and his companions played in the construction of Islamic ethos, an ethos that is socially, politically, and morally committed to the message and the teachings of Islam. While Prophet Muhammad's actions were influenced by the Qur'an—the teachings of God—his companions had the privilege of observing him closely and learning from him first-hand how to manage people with compassion and care.

7. Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Ethos

According to Islamic scholars, Islamic law is derived from three main sources that constitute the cultural and religious authorities of Islamic ethos: The Qur'an, *The Sunnah*, and independent reasoning (*ijtihad*). Although the Islamic ethos might be perceived as rigid in obedience to and enforcement of Islamic law, a careful pondering of the discourses that constitute this ethos reveals a significant call for thought and consideration. The Qur'an, as Ziauddin Sardar, has noted, is "generously sprinkled with references to thought and learning, reflection and reason." The holy book of Muslims "denounces those who do not use their critical faculties in strongest terms" (Sardar n.d.). The Qur'an makes it clear that " . . . the worst of beasts in the sight of Allah are the deaf and the dumb—those who understand not" (The Holy Book 2000, 8:22). The Qur'an encourages critical thinking, which as many scholars, such as Sardar, have argued, is a faculty that "has been central to Islam from its inception" (Sardar n.d.). Prophet Muhammad's *Sunnah* has been instrumental in establishing a religion that advocates for the equitable treatment of people, especially women. Additionally, the weight given to logic and reason within Islamic ethos was evidenced in multiple ways: through the process of selecting the early Caliphs, the attention to consultation (*shura*), and independent reasoning (*ijtihad*), as well as to considering the consensus of past scholars (*ijma'*) and using analogic or syllogistic reasoning (*qiyas*) to provide answers to religious and legal questions.

These discourses have been providing moral and ethical guidelines for Muslims since the time of Prophet Muhammad. In addition to governing the behaviors of Muslims around the world, they reflect the ideology inherent in Islam as a religion whose ethos is tolerant and adaptive to change—one that values human agency and individuality while holding Muslims accountable for their words and actions. Although this historical overview of Islamic ethos shows the difficult path Prophet Muhammad and his followers faced in preserving and spreading the message of Islam, the current social and political forces surrounding Islam present a different set of challenges as extremist military groups have pursued violence and oppression through a distorted ideological lens. However, this ethos does not perceive compassion and care in contradiction to reasoning but as complementary to it. Unlike the way ISIS portrays their strength through embracing violence and intolerance, the righteous believers in Islam, according to the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*, are the ones who demonstrate patience and suppress anger—those who are equitable, just, and forgiving.

These parameters for ethical conduct and moral character for Muslims show how the early leaders of Islam constructed an ethos that is just and adaptable—one that emphasizes compassion and accountability for all, regardless of gender or race. This examination of the construction of the early Muslim community and the rules of conduct that they abided by functions as a corrective to ISIS-like militant discourses that perpetuate violence and intolerance and as a disruptive tool to Western Islamophobia and anti-Muslim prejudice.

The examination I provide in this piece of the construction of Islamic ethos in the early Islamic period allows scholars and students to explore how this ethotic foundation relates to contemporary belief and practice. However, it can also help us to better understand and invite students into the rhetorical work taking place in our classrooms. As scholars and educators, we need to be mindful of how we and our students are situated and are functioning within rhetorical, racist discourses of anti-Muslim prejudice. We should be, as Stanely Fish indicates, "ready" for the discussion of religion in our classrooms. It is not a choice anymore for us "not to be ready," not if we are to build and

encourage ethical engagement with difference, of which religious background can be a major factor. Scholars in different areas have been offering theoretical and pedagogical insights into engaging students about identity issues in ways that problematize their automatic conformity to systems of oppression. Disrupting stereotypes associated with Muslims is not insignificant—stereotypes are not superficial; they are the outcome of multiple discourses at work, as they "represent significant ways in which and through which students know, approach, and attempt to understand one another" (Alexander 2008, p. 139). Therefore, the discussion of religion and religious ethos is timely as it is at the heart of the rhetorics of the clash of civilizations, the war on terror, and the remobilization of Islamophobia. These discourses are currently being used as a means for justifying major political actions against Muslim-majority countries and Muslims in different parts of the world. Engaging with Islam's religious ethos can be a first step for students in multiple humanities disciplines toward reworking these discourses in a way that benefits both Muslim and non-Muslim students. For the former, it can make them feel welcomed in the academic sphere while helping them to better understand issues surrounding their identities and the forces influencing their construction. For the latter, it can problematize ingrained racisms and make for ethical, rather than potentially problematic, engagement with Muslims around the world.

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Glossary

Ahl Al-bayt	Prophet Muhammad's family
Ahl Al-kitab	The "People of the Book;" the groups of people that were given holy books. The general understanding is that they are Jews and Christians
Al-Ansar	Christians who supported prophet Muhammad
Allah	God
Dhimmi	A non-Muslim living in an Islamic territory under Islamic rule
Ijma'	The consensus of scholars
Ijtihad	Interpretations and deductions of Muslim religious leaders
Jihad	To strive in all matters
Jizya	A tax collected from non-Muslims who used to live under Islamic rule in the past as part of an agreement
Mujtahid	A person who practices *ijtihad*
Mutawatir	A *hadith* is considered *mutawatir* when reported by a number of narrators
Qiyas	Analogic or syllogistic reasoning
Sadaqah	Voluntary charity
Sanad or isnad	Chain of narration and authority
Seerah	Prophet Muhammad's life
Shari'a	Religious law stemming from the multiple sources of authority: the Qur'an, *Sunnah*, and *Ijtihad* (reasoning)
Shura	Consultation
Sunnah	The Prophet Muhammad's example, deeds, and customs
Surah	A chapter of the Qur'an
Taqwa	God consciousness
The Qur'an	The holy book of Muslims
Ummah	The Muslim community
Zakat or Zakah	Compulsory charity

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Article

Senegal, the African Slave Trade, and the Door of No Return: Giving Witness to Gorée Island

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Abstract: Recently, the Senegalese people have learned to speak more openly of their history. But, as late as the 1980s—the years of my youth and early schooling—the wounds of colonialism were still fresh. I contend that slavery had been so powerful a blow to the Senegalese ethos that we—my family, friends, and schoolmates—did not speak about it. The collective trauma and shame of slavery was apparently so powerful that we sought to repress it, keeping it hidden from ourselves. We were surrounded by its evidence, but chose not to see it. Such was my childhood experience. As an adult, I understand that repression never heals wounds. The trauma remains as a haunting presence. But one can discover its "living presence," *should one choose to look*. Just 5.2 km off the west African coast of Senegal lies Gorée Island, where millions of Africans were held captive while awaiting transport into slavery. Much of the four-century history of the African slave trade passed through Senegal, where I grew up. In this essay, I explore the history of the island and its role in the slave trade. I describe my own coming to terms with this history—how it has haunted me since my youth. And I argue for the role of visual rhetorics in the formation (and affirmation) of Senegalese ethos. As Baumlin and Meyer (2018) remind us, we need to speak, in order to be heard, in order to be seen: Such is an assumption of rhetorical ethos. And the reverse, as I shall argue, may be true, too: Sometimes *we need to see* (or be seen), in order to know *what* to speak and *how* to be heard. It is for this reason that we need more films written, directed, produced, and performed by Africans (Senegalese especially).

Keywords: African slave trade; ethos; trauma; visual rhetorics; wolof language; Dakar; Door of No Return; Gorée Island; House of Slaves; Senegal

1. Introduction

> Ethos is created when writers locate themselves.
>
> —Nedra Reynolds, "Ethos as Location" (Reynolds 1993, p. 336)

> A person has a past. The experiences gathered during one's life are a part of today as well as yesterday. Memory exists in the nostrils and the hands, not only in the mind. A fragrance drifts by, and a memory is evoked. It damages people to rob them of their past and deny their memories, or to mock their fears and worries. A person without a past is incomplete.
>
> —Eric J. Cassel, "The Nature of Suffering" (Cassel 1982, p. 642)

The following is an exercise in the ethos of storytelling. In the epigraph above, what Cassel writes about the individual can be said collectively of a people: the Senegalese, in my case. Much like a person, a people "without a past is," as Cassel implies, "incomplete." We can go further and state that much of that past—or shall I say, much of the past that matters—is recorded in story. In this essay, I will be practicing a form of "scholarship of the personal," a hybrid genre that conjoins historical-cultural analysis with personal narrative.

I shall be telling the story of my coming to terms with a sad chapter in Senegalese history: specifically, the African slave trade, how I learned about it, and how my understanding of it—as well as *of myself* as Senegalese—has evolved. My own ethos is defined, in large part, by the collective memory of slavery imposed upon Africans. And I shall be focusing on a specific place where this slavery was imposed: Gorée Island, whose House of Slaves led to the Door of No Return. (See Figure 1) For "Ethos," as Nedra Renolds writes above, "is created when writers locate themselves." Ethos, in other words, adheres to places as well as to people. If "a person without a past is incomplete," then I would add that a person's "past" is inconceivable without a "place." The places of one's wounding—individually and collectively, historically and contemporaneously—are infused with the actions and adhere to the victims both in body and in memory.

Figure 1. *Ile Gorée*, Senegal. Creative Commons (photo by Antonin Rémond).

Unless my readers are African or otherwise well-educated, I doubt that they will know much about the history that I will be recounting; or they may know the story through other, likely Eurocentric texts. Some readers may not know where Senegal is. ("It's in Africa, right?" But do not ask them *where* in Africa). Many will know something of the African slave trade, but not of my nation's role in it; even if they know of Senegal, they are not likely to know of the specific place that I shall be describing (see Figure 2). I confess that, in my youth, even I did not know the whole story. In my adulthood, I know that story—and myself—better. Indeed, I know myself *through* the story.

I need to add, however, that it is not the story but the *image* of a doorway that haunts my personal experience of growing up Senegalese. This essay is not about storytelling in words alone. It is about the confluence of verbal and visual rhetorics—of the ways that the African slave trade "dwells" in places visualized as well as in language and memory. Popular media is implicated in this unleashing of the story of Gorée Island. While popular media like films and poster advertising (even advertising as a government-sponsored public service) "give visual presence" to the place I shall be discussing, these are not, in themselves, transparent mediums of communication. They introduce their own distortions, prejudices, idealizations, and partial truths. I shall argue that, yes, visual images have an important role to play in introducing the slave trade to contemporary audiences (African and non-African alike); but these need the supplement of texts. Most important, of course, is to visit the place: to bear witness to it, seeing and feeling it for oneself.

Figure 2. The House of Slaves (*la Maison des Esclaves*), Gorée Island. Wikimedia Commons (photo by John Crane). Note the "Door of No Return" in the lower level.

2. Failing to See

> Seeing is of course very much a matter of verbalization. Unless I call my attention to what passes before my eyes, I simply will not see it. It is, as Ruskin says, "not merely unnoticed, but in the full, clear sense of the word, unseen."
>
> —Annie Dillard, *Pilgrim at Tinker Creek* (Dillard 1974, p. 33)

I was twelve at the time, attending École Neuve Algor Dioum in Diourbel, an inland city some 150 km east of Dakar. I was in the last station of primary cycle in the history programme, in a class taught by Mr. Hanne. In his class, I learned that Africans were kidnapped—stolen from their homelands—and sold into slavery. From the 15th through to the 19th century, captives were taken from across sub-Saharan Africa; and Dakar in Senegal, the west African nation where I was born and raised, was one of the main ports of transit where captives were brought, bought, and shipped off to the Americas. That was the substance of Mr. Hanne's lecture. As he spoke, I could feel the whole class gasp and exhale. Shame mingled with our surprise. Our questions were typical of twelve-year-old boys: "But how could a person be sold in exchange for a rifle or a mirror?" "How could our ancestors have been so weak to be treated this way?" I left class in a daze.

No other piece of information would ever shake me the way that did, changing my view of the world forever. And yet, after his lecture, I do not remember speaking about it; not to my schoolmates, not to my friends, not to my family. Borne in part of confusion but also of shame, that silence on my part seems to reflect a similar reticence on the part of my culture at that time—as if the wound were too big and it were best not to talk about it.

Two years later, I had a chance to go on a group trip to Gorée Island. Lying some 5.2 km west of Dakar, Gorée Island was the largest slave-trading centre on the African coast, containing such monuments as the House of Slaves and the infamous Door of No Return. Our brief visit was not meant to be educational so much as it was a school "merit badge," a way of saying "we've been there." We

had not even registered for a proper tour of the House[1]. I enjoyed the ferry ride but the place—not so much. Being claustrophobic, I had an excuse for not entering the narrow passages leading to low-ceilinged prisoners' cells (see Figure 3). I did not want to know that as many as twenty human beings were stuffed into rooms twelve metres deep and twelve metres wide, not knowing where they were going and what was happening to them (N'diaye 2006). Just glancing into them made my blood freeze. Even today, I can still feel the sensations of suffocation. As for the Door, it seemed like a portal to a black hole in space, leading nowhere (see Figure 4). Two years earlier, I did not want to hear about it (or talk about it); now, apparently, I did not want to see it.

When I was twenty, I left Senegal; that was in 1998. For the next ten years, I lived in France. It is curious how living elsewhere allows one to see one's home place differently. I tell my students (yes, I teach now) that it was at a public exhibition in Nancy, France, that I learned *how large* a rhinoceros is and *how tall* a giraffe can be. *Did I have to leave Africa in order to see it?* (It is almost as if we are blinded and numb to the everyday world: In order to see truly, we have to see differently.) During those ten years spent in France, I returned to Senegal three times, each for very short periods. And during none of those brief visits did I feel the need to go back to Gorée Island.

Figure 3. Passageway to Prisoners' Cells (*Cellules, Maison des Esclaves*). Wikimedia Commons (photo by HaguardDuNord).

[1] School trips to Gorée Island in Senegal at that time were not institutionalized. The consequence of this lack of formality is that we did not even make a phone call or register for a guided tour of the House. Moreover, we failed to show up in time for one of the daily visits. The only sneak peek some of us (the most insistent ones) could have of the place was under the pressure of a security guard who finally let us in for a very short while. A small group of two boys and three girls who came back after the big group moved away and implored on the brink of tears for the clemency of the security guide. It was July 1990. So, we obviously did not see Joseph Ndiaye, but his voice resonated in our ears in the way he would usually narrate the tragedy in that fashion that is so well rooted in the African traditional storytelling.

Figure 4. "The Door of No Return" (La Porte du Non Retour de la Maison des Esclaves). Wikimedia Commons (photo by Wandering Angel).

From France, I moved to Canada. Once in Québec, I took another ten years before going back home to visit family. I also took advantage of that time to teach at Cesti, the journalism section of Dakar's Université Cheikh Anta Diop. This was of great symbolic importance to me, since I was returning to Senegal as a teacher after having left twenty years before as a student. I would not have the time to go to Gorée Island and visit the House with "fresh," informed eyes, but I had learned more of the history in the meantime and was able to share my impressions with colleagues and students[2]. And I knew my task, though the moment was not yet right: As an adult, I would need to revisit the House of Slaves and its Door of no Return. But I know something now that I could never have guessed back then: Wherever I have studied, worked, and taught, I have brought the House of Slaves with me

[2] It might be somewhat puzzling for some readers to notice that I did not/could not go back to the House of Slaves, given how important it reveals itself to be for me. But one thing to bear in mind is that going back to Senegal for a month or less is a hectic experience for many of us, not compatible with the poise needed to go to that place for a proper self-examination. Back to Senegal for that short time, one literally sinks in urgent material needs as well as in concerns that have to do with families and relatives. As a matter of fact, even the locals do not feel the need to go to Gorée (repeatedly). They feel that struggling to cope with everyday life and economic problems is more relevant. Such daily hardships make a visit to Gorée a secondary concern. Besides, it is important to point out that in Africa, we do not have the culture of travelling from a place to another for sightseeing (to see "things"). We would rather do that to meet or visit relatives. As an example, most Senegalese have never been to the local zoo.On the other hand, the paradigm of Gorée Island is not a subject of common discussion in the media. The discussed topics are rather the current economic and political situation which is presented as linked to government's actions rather than to a more remote event. Many consider relating the current situation to the Slave Trade is taking a fatalist stance.The House of Slaves therefore attracts far more foreign tourists along with diaspora, slave-descendant Black Americans than African locals. In fact, they make us remember. Coverage of high-profile visitors to the House of Slave is the only occasion for this part of our history to be mentioned in the media. And we would again see Joseph Ndiaye and hear again his firm and strong voice re-telling his well-known narration that educated locals know so well even without having been there.

unconsciously; and, in my dreamwork, I have stood at the Door of No Return. What I tried *not* to see or speak about has, in fact, haunted me since childhood.

I have my doctorate now. Currently, I teach linguistics, communication, and discourse analysis at Bishop's University and Université de Sherbrooke in Quebec, Canada. Inside, though, I am still that young Senegalese student feeling himself shaken to the core by the lessons of history. And I think back to my initial feelings regarding Mr. Hanne's lecture on the slave trade, which were not so much of outrage as of disbelief—of confusion that turns to anger and leads, curiously, to feelings of shame. And the questions that arose in the twelve-year-old me still rise, today: How could a proud people allow themselves to be enslaved? The trauma that I personally suffered in the hearing of that story—and it is one shared by many Africans today—remains tied to self-esteem. How to overcome the inferiority complex imposed by white colonialism? How to recover self-esteem? These are questions for a person, a community, a nation, a continent.

The so-called "civilized" countries that participated in the slave trade find it convenient to forget, too. *They* prospered off of African wealth in all respects: human, animal, agricultural, mineral and, yes, cultural. Today, their prosperity continues, while the African continent lags so far behind. Colonialism and even the sad episode of slavery is not all that far in the past; in fact, these remain linked to the continent's current challenges. Yes, Africans are owed compensation, but economics alone cannot heal their wounds. African history, I have learned, is a series of atrocities and traumas. Physically, emotionally, psychologically, my ancestors endured much. And, having heard Mr. Hanne's history lesson, the trauma of slavery became my own—though it was in self-image that I suffered the wound. The color of my skin had not changed, but the way I experienced that color changed, knowing what white Europeans did to black Africans.

3. Learning to See Better

> [W]e presume that specific life-events—traumas for the most part—play constitutive roles in identity-formation. The abused spouse lives within an event and a narrative of that event: the abuse becomes thematic within that person's self-image and life-story . . . . A further corollary to postclassical ethos . . . is the need to tell one's story, particularly those aspects that bear wounds. Indeed, the highest aim of ethotic discourse is, or ought to be, to share one's story; and, with respect to one's functioning as audience, the highest corresponding aim is to bear witness to that other's story.
>
> —James S. Baumlin and Craig A. Meyer, "Positioning Ethos" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, p. 17)

I know that the atrocities of the so-called New World's European colonizers did not stop with the enslavement of Africans. The sufferings of indigenous peoples throughout North and South America, Central America, and the Caribbean are reflected in my own people's history, too. Included in this special issue, Craig A. Meyer's essay, "From Wounded Knee to Sacred Circles: Oglala Lakota Ethos as 'Haunt' and 'Wound'" (2018) gave inspiration—and a model—for my own narrative scholarship. The following paragraph, for example, is mine now, but it was taken from Meyer's essay and rewritten, with the Native American vocabulary overlaid by Senegalese:

> To understand Senegalese ethos today, one must understand the importance of the experience of the African slave trade, which extends to the visuals, the emotions, the memories of place—that is, to the entire experience (Fixico 2003, p. 22). *It is the mythos of Gorée Island and the House of Slaves* that we must seek to understand. For the European bystander, it is easy to dismiss the slave trade as having happened over 100 years ago to some group at some place; it is markedly different if one's cultural identity rests in a continual retelling—in effect, a reliving—of colonialism. As Donald L. Fixico writes, "When retold, the experience comes alive again, recreating the experience by evoking the emotions of listeners, transcending

> past-present-future. Time does not imprison the story" (Fixico 2003, p. 22). The telling of these stories forms an integral part of Senegalese ethos, both *as-haunt* and *as-wound*.[3]

And this, too, is my paragraph now, though Meyer's text lurks beneath it like a palimpsest:

> Both the place and the events of the slave trade haunt the Senegalese cultural memory, which rests in the collective experience of trauma and the place—the physical haunt—of its occurrence. As such, a Senegalese ethos derives from haunt and wound. Ethos-as-haunt demonstrates how location constitutes a people, its culture, traditions, stories, and history . . . . Simply put, the events that occur on a parcel of land lends it character to the people of that land . . . . With this summary of the slave trade as a starting point, I turn now to review the Western model of ethos and its potential as haunt. From this understanding of location . . . . I suggest a bridge between haunt and wound as it relates to a Senegalese ethos and the hopeful healing that can take place through an acknowledgement of that woundedness. The conclusion offers insight into Senegalese wisdom for the Westernized humanities and the possibility of healing the wound from two different perspectives: European and African.[4]

As I read Meyer's account of the Massacre at Wounded Knee, other massacres—at Soweto and at Thiaroye—came to mind: As much as the slave trade, these have come to define my sense of the "woundedness" of the African continent generally. Yet my mind wandered first to Jallianwala Bagh, also known as the Amritsar massacre. On 13 April 1919, Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer ordered troops of the British Indian Army to fire their rifles into a crowd of unarmed civilians in Jallianwala Bagh, killing at least 400, including forty-one children (Lloyd 2011). Curiously, I would not have known of the Amritsar massacre had I not seen the 1981 film *Gandhi* (Attenborough 1982), a British-Indian co-production starring Ben Kingsley.

I do not remember how old I was when I first saw *Gandhi*. I do remember very well this next nationwide media event; I believe it showed on Senegalese television in 1986 and, at the time of its showing, it thrust the slave trade back momentarily into the national consciousness. I am talking about the American TV miniseries, *Roots* (Chomsky 1977), based on the novel by Haley (1976). The novel combines two stories. The first is of Kunta Kinte, who was kidnapped in The Gambia (a country neighboring Senegal) in 1767 and sold as a slave in the British colony of Maryland. The second is of the character of the novelist himself, who—inspired by his grandmother's stories—spent twelve years researching his ancestry. His search led him back to Africa, to the Gambian village of Juffure[5]. There,

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[3] Meyer's original reads:To understand Oglala Lakota ethos today, one must understand the importance of the experience of this massacre, which extends to the visuals, the emotions, the memories of the scene—that is, to the entire experience (Fixico 2003, p. 22). *It is the mythos of the massacre* that we must seek to understand. For the EuroAmerican bystander, it is easy to dismiss the Wounded Knee Massacre as having happened over 100 years ago to some group at some place; it is markedly different if one's cultural identity rests in a continual retelling—in effect, a reliving—of the Massacre. As Donald L. Fixico writes, "When retold, the experience comes alive again, recreating the experience by evoking the emotions of listeners, transcending past-present-future. Time does not imprison the story" (Fixico 2003, p. 22). The telling of these stories forms an integral part of Oglala ethos, both *as-haunt* and *as-wound*. (Meyer 2019, p. 4)

[4] Again, Meyer's original:Both the place and the events of the massacre haunt the Lakotan cultural memory, which rests in the collective experience of trauma and the place—the physical haunt—of its occurrence. As such, an Oglala Lakota ethos derives from haunt and wound. Ethos-as-haunt demonstrates how location constitutes a people, its culture, traditions, stories, and history . . . . Simply put, the events that occur on a parcel of land lends it character to the people on that land . . . . With this summary of the Wounded Knee Massacre as a starting point, I turn now to review the Western model of ethos and its potential as haunt. From this understanding of location, I suggest a bridge between haunt and wound as it relates to an Oglala Lakota ethos and the hopeful healing that can take place through an acknowledgement of that woundedness. The conclusion offers insight into Oglala wisdom for the Westernized humanities and the possibility of healing the wound from two different perspectives: EuroAmerican and Oglala. (Meyer 2019, p. 5)

[5] Referring to *Roots* leads us to the Algerian film *Little Senegal* directed by Rachid Bouchareb (Bouchareb 2001). The theme of the movie is somewhat the opposite of Haley's *Root* in the sense that the character Alloune (Sotigui Kouyaté), a tour guide at a Senegalese slave museum decided to go to America to live another more experimental dimension of the deportation, after the theoretical narration of the lave trade and the vision of a common origin. This would make him come to terms with the various realities of how African descendants feel and consider their past. He could experience the problem that we refer to with the 1956 Paris Congress of Black Writers and Artists in 1956 (see later). That trip reveals itself to be a true challenge to

the *griot* or tribal storyteller recounted the village history, which confirmed to the author that he was, in fact, great-great-great-great grandson of Kunta Kinte. The novel was published in 1976; the miniseries aired in the U.S. in 1977. It took nearly a decade to reach Senegalese viewers. What I remember is that Senegalese national television had had serious apprehensions during the airing of this TV series, as white people living in Senegal were being subjected to threats. Through a largely fictional portrayal, the history of the Senegambian wound had been retold and the sense of woundedness awakened. When history contains powder kegs, a government or group can try to hide them; eventually they will be found, and they will explode.

There is a lesson in this. Several times throughout their essay, "Positioning Ethos," Baumlin and Meyer describe reading and hearing synesthetically, as a means of seeing. For example: "The first step in healing ourselves, individually and collectively, is to unleash the self-expressive power of our storytelling: in effect, to make an appeal in good faith for a witness, in order 'to be seen' in our texts" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 19). One speaks, not just to be heard, *but to be seen*: By this means, one's ethos or self-image is "made present." I do not disagree with their rhetorical model. What I am learning is that *the image*, at times, must "speak first," in order to "give presence" to history. Visual media—film especially—has become the privileged mode of storytelling in contemporary world culture. What genuinely surprises me is that the textbook histories that I have learned (and even taught) rarely came fully to life for me *until I saw them mirrored in art*. As with the exhibition in French Nancy (where I saw, "as if" fully for the first time, an African rhinoceros and giraffe), the mediated "framing" of objects, places, and events allows us to see them better—or, at least, to see them *differently*—and respond to them accordingly.

When I was a student in Diourbel, "*Apartheid est un crime contre l'humanité*" was written at the top of the chalk board of every classroom. "Soweto" used to ring in our ears as a cursed word. But it was only in 2003, long after I had left Africa, that I first watched the American film, *Cry Freedom* (Attenborough 1987)—which carved indelibly into my mind the images of the carnage that met black schoolchildren in apartheid South Africa. In June 1976, reacting to the imposition of Afrikaans as the language of instruction in local schools, children poured into the streets of Soweto in protest. (As a linguist by training, I can attest to the role of language in creating ethos, both individually and collectively.) There, they were met with fierce police brutality. The facts have been blurred, perhaps deliberately, but somewhere between 176 and 700 children were killed (Brown 2016).

Yet another massacre strikes closer to home, having occurred in Senegal during French colonial occupation. It took place in 1944 at the military camp of Thiaroye, a small village in the suburbs of Dakar. A group of Senegalese Tirailleurs were protesting to be paid for their military service. Mind you, they were among the African soldiers who had fought for the French Free Army in France, seeking its liberation from Nazi Germany. Against their protests, the French colonial troops responded with bullets. According to "official" records, between thirty-five and seventy Tirailleurs were gathered together in camp and gunned down; witnesses give a higher number, reporting more than 300 Senegalese deaths (Mourre 2017).

When I was growing up, *no one talked about Thiaroye*. The massacre took place on the first of December, which so happens to be the day in which I am penning this paper. As I write, what surprises me is the seeming lack of interest shown by the postcolonial Senegalese government; it is as if they wanted to forget. The French government's lack of interest is not surprising; in fact, the French did their best to ignore, deflect, deny. The general public did not learn of this massacre until 1988, when Senegalese Cineaste released Sembène Ousmane's film, *Camp de Thiaroye* (Sembène 1988). The film was immediately banned in France and remained so for seventeen years, until becoming available on DVD in 2005. Here, indeed, we see why we need more films written, directed, produced, and performed by

an "idealized view of the diaspora", and an experience of "the real and imagined community relationship among dispersed populations" (Letort 2014, p. 142).

Africans (Senegalese especially). Again, as Baumlin and Meyer (2018) remind us, we need to speak, in order to be heard, in order to be seen: Such is an assumption of rhetorical ethos. And the reverse may be true, too: Sometimes *we need to see* (or be seen), in order to know *what* to speak and *how* to be heard. (See Figure 5)

Figure 5. "Thiaroye 44: Une Histoire Inoubliable." Street Mural in Dakar. Wikimedia Commons (photo by Erica Kowal).

What is an individual or a social group made of? A common history and culture of course. But we should also add the impact of place, not just upon history and culture, but upon language. As a linguist, I study the cultural and psychosocial impact of naming. We could mention the classic example of the Inuits, whose language contains so many words for "snow." Since snow defines their world, of course they have names for its various qualities and conditions. Put simply, their language reflects their environment: They need those different words. Similarly, the Touareg living in the Sahara Desert have a broad vocabulary to describe the types of sands that surround them. Wolof, the vernacular language of Senegal, has similar examples. In wolof, the term *sedd* (cold) is used to qualify someone or something welcoming and attractive, while *tang* (hot) would qualify a person, voice, or attitude that is unwelcoming or unattractive. In many Western cultures, these terms are reversed, where *cold* is unwelcoming while *hot* is attractive. Now, let us add geography to language: In tropical countries like Senegal, one longs for coolness, whereas people in Northern climates might long for heat. The places we live in have an impact on our words, which function as a means "to see" the world. The world needs our words in order to be seen, and our words invoke the world as an instrument of seeing.

The above may hold for objects and events outside of us, but what of the memories and mental images that inhabit our psychic spaces? How do we "give voice" to these, making them present to consciousness? In other words: How do we name the wounds that we have repressed, whether individually or as a culture?

4. Connecting Words, Images, Memories

> The mythic seeks instead to unite, to synthesize, to assert wholeness in multiple or contrasting choices and interpretations. Mythos thus offers a synthetic and analogical, as opposed to analytic, mode of proof, one that discovers—indeed, celebrates—the diversity of truth.
>
> —James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, "On the Psychology of the Pisteis" (Baumlin and Baumlin 1994, p. 106)

I never knew how deeply the slave trade had settled into my subconscious until I came across a poster image in a public service ad (Figure 6) campaign produced by the Transport Accident

Commission (Transport Accident Commission 1989) of Australia (Hébert 2011), the statutory insurer for road accidents in Victoria. Dating from 1989, its slogan is in colloquial Aussie English: "If you drink, then drive, you're a bloody idiot." The original image is anamorphic, a sort of visual puzzle. From one perspective, we imagine ourselves lying at the bottom of a deeply dug grave looking up at the sky; from another perspective, we are looking at a glass of frothy beer. An Australian would see the double entendre of grave and beer. I saw the Door of No Return. Was I projecting my own history onto this image? Gorée Island sits quite literally on the opposite end of the globe from Victoria, Australia.



Figure 6. Australian TAC Poster Vs. The Senegalese Door of No Return. Public Service Poster for the Transport Accident Commission (TAC), Australia. Door photo by Willem Proos (courtesy of travelpicturesgallery.com).

Since that childhood trip to Gorée, the image of the Door of No Return has haunted me. It comes to mind in radically different contexts and occasions. I see its outline in places surprisingly dissimilar. In December 2018, during my latest trip to Senegal, I attended a conference at Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar's most prestigious university. For the first time, in front of a Senegalese audience, I spoke of the Door of No Return and its symbolisms. And I asked if others experienced it similarly, as a haunting presence. My intuition was confirmed: It is, indeed, an image that we carry within us, defining us as Senegalese.

The haunting continues, I should add. When in Toronto in August 2019, I visited Niagara Falls with my family. (See Figure 7) Under "Horseshoe Falls"—the Canadian side of Niagara—we did the touristy thing and took the tour, "The Journey Behind the Falls." Tunnels have been carved through the bedrock under the falls. There is a portal cut straight through the rock, allowing one to stand behind the falls; from there, one has a breathtaking view of the rush of water crashing down. Walking down that tunnel leading to that "doorway" portal reminded me of the Door of No Return. How could it not? (See Figure 8) Certainly there is no return from this portal, should one pass through it to the water falling from above. The power of the falls is said to be monstrous, brutal and heavy enough to crush bones. The image is fascinating and frightening, just as the sound of the water is deafening.



Figure 7. Niagara Falls, Canadian Side. Wikimedia Commons (photo by Cjsinghpup).

Figure 8. "Behind Niagara Falls" (photo by Dalla Malé Fofana).

Perhaps my fascination with portals is mythic—archetypal in the Jungian sense—in which case, my cultural experience reflects a "collective memory" belonging to the human species. I am reminded of the common phrase, "light at the end of the tunnel." In an article, "There Are Seven Types of Near-Death Experiences" (Macdonald 2015), Fiona MacDonald cites the work of Sam Parnia, director of resuscitation research at Stony Brook University School of Medicine. The testimonies of people who have been brought back to life after suffering fatal accidents are thematically consistent, according to Dr. Parma: Many imagine themselves moving through a tunnel, at the end of which is a brilliantly shining light (see Figure 9). Mythically, symbolically, we are beckoned to a gateway-passage leading to an unknowable but inevitable void. Whether this mental image has spiritual or medical origins is irrelevant: The point is that the tunnel, portal, and light form *as real an experience* as any other mental or physical event undergone by survivors of near-death. And, typically, it is a world-changing experience, forever changing a person's understanding and expectations of life and death.

Figure 9. "Light at the End of the Tunnel." Wikimedia Commons (photo by Stiller Beobachter).

Returning from archetypal psychology to Senegalese history: Passage through the Door of No Return certainly meant death. It was physical death for many, as millions of Africans died from the bad conditions of prison houses and the prison ships transporting them to the Americas. But it was a death of self-identity for all, as once-free men and women were turned into slaves; and, if they survived the passage, their New World "home" would be one of brutal treatment and ceaseless, backbreaking toil. The enslaved Africans were typically renamed by white owners, which could result in them losing everything: name, family, religions, language, all.

The testimonies of black people who participated to the 1956 Paris Conference—attended by black personalities from around the world—showed how wide and deep the wounds of diaspora have been. The Conference celebrated the solidarity of a people united by ancestral origins and skin color and common experience. The "Back to Africa" movement was founded at this time. While Senegalese Africans still suffered under colonial rule (independence from France would come in 1960), the world's Africans were looking back to the place of their origins. What they were seeking was not a physical place merely but the meaning—the mythos—of that place. It is the linguistic, historical, social, psychological, and mythic unity of Senegalese ethos to which I now turn.

5. Returning to Gorée

> About the time the King's soldiers came, the eldest of these four sons, Kunta, when he had about 16 rains, went away from his village to chop wood to make a drum . . . and he was never seen again . . .
>
> —Tribal story as told to Alex Haley ((Haley 1972), "My Furthest," p. 12)

> In contrast to modern notions of the person or self, [classical] ethos emphasizes the conventional rather than idiosyncratic, the public rather than the private. The most concrete meaning given for the term [ethos] in the Greek lexicon is "a habitual gathering place," and I suspect that it is upon this image of people gathering together in a public place, sharing experiences and ideas, that its meaning as character rests.
>
> —S. Michael Halloran, "Aristotle's Concept of Ethos" (Halloran 1982, p. 60)

There is ethos in naming. To name is to assert power, ownership: We see this in the renaming of slaves (as Kunta Kinte's white master presumably renamed him Toby—a "fine" English working-class moniker). We see this in places, as well. In its history of colonization (Ginio 2008), the Portuguese named it *Ila de Palma*. The Dutch renamed it *Good Rade*. Under French rule, it became Gorée. The meaning of that name could illustrate its strategic location. With the slave trade's transit points reaching from the northwest tip of the continent down to The Gambia, Senegal sat right in the center of the trade. Reaching out into the Atlantic, the Dakar archipelago is the nearest point on the continent to the Americas. Some kilometres farther west sits the island whose harbor offered safe haven for anchoring ships: hence the name *Good Rade* (UNESCO/NHK 2019). But if the name suggests its excellent location for slave traders, it certainly was the opposite for the Africans who were brought there in chains, to await their passage[6].

From a linguistic perspective, it is easy to see how Good Rade becomes Gorée. Consonant clusters are an unusual pattern in wolof, which would explain how the cluster "d" and "r" in (Goo)d+R(ade) would be simplified. Wolof language is also unfamiliar with closed syllables: The final consonant "d," which ends the word *rade*, and the neutral ending of /reid/ would turn the sound /reid/ turns into /re/. I should admit that the origin of the word Gorée has been well studied. But, for Senegalese, the word bears another symbolic meaning as sustained by wolof language. Indeed, the word goree /gɔre/ does exist in wolof and is polysemic, /gɔre/ being an adjective that refers to the quality of a person who is physically free (as opposed to being a slave); at the same time, it designates a person who has high and noble values. If we take a close look at its variants, the word /gor/ refers to "man," "manhood," and "courage."[7] As a verb, it refers to the idea of cutting-loose with violence, or separating an element from where it belongs, the way one would chop a branch from a tree (N'diaye-Correard and Schmidt 1979; Ndao 2002).

Though a small island of 28 hectares and 1300 inhabitants (N'diaye 2006), Gorée personifies the African slave trade. It is, in effect, a "memory island," symbolic of the slave trade and its suffering. Its strategic location made Gorée "the centre of the rivalry between European nations for control of the slave trade" (UNESCO/NHK 2019). Though I have focused on *la Maison des Esclaves*, the island is said to have held more than a dozen slave houses, among which was "the Castle, a rocky plateau covered with fortifications which dominate the Island," and the *Relais de l'Espadon*, former residence of the French governor" (UNESCO/NHK 2019). Clearly, the island's past belongs to its present. If its ethos is to heal, the mythos of the island must move beyond trauma. It can do so by becoming a site of remembrance and reflection, as well as of reconciliation: "The Island of Gorée is now a pilgrimage destination for the African diaspora, a foyer for contact between the West and Africa, and a space for exchange and dialogue between cultures through the confrontation of ideals of reconciliation and forgiveness" (BBC News 2007).

I find hope in the BBC News article cited above, but also find it a bit optimistic: In these many respects, Gorée remains a work-in-progress. Though its role in the slave trade is regularly questioned by some, there have been moments of formal commemoration. In 1944, the colonial administration listed Gorée as a historic site. It was placed on Senegal's National Heritage List in 1975 and on

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[6] We cannot talk about Gorée Island without mentioning divergent historical readings (for further details, see Philip D. Curtin or David Eltis) of the slavery past at Gorée Island. For some historians, there is lack of requisite evidence for the House of Slaves to be considered an official site of slave deportation. Questions are indeed raised about the actual number of slaves deported or about the shoreline being possibly too rocky or not deep enough for ships to dock near the fort.These questions are certainly important for historians and specialists who need more measurable facts for the site to be considered either a cultural or a historical symbol. But African locals totally ignore and dismiss polemics and claims about the minor role (if any) of the House of Slave in the African slave trade. They consider those claims as attempts to erase this so iconic print of a crime on Mankind. In a way, they experience the same feeling as Jews in front of claims that deem Shoah to be fabricated despite many formal evidence. For Africans, since the slave trade is factual and the House of Slaves a physical symbol that connects them to its atrocities, then they would not wonder at all about how important the role it played into it.

[7] Curiously, this mirrors the etymology of English "virtue," where the Latin *virtus*—meaning nobility of character—derives from *vir*, for "man." Hence, *virtus* is the quality of high and noble character associated with "manliness."

the World Heritage List in 1978 (BBC News 2007). And foreign dignitaries have come to pay their respects, none more welcome than the 2013 visit of U.S. President Barack Obama and his wife Michelle (see Figure 10). Current ordinances regulate new construction, ensuring that historic sites are well preserved and protected. There are no private automobiles. With its colonial-style buildings, rural flavor and lack of traffic noise, crossing the ocean to Gorée feels like crossing a time barrier—quite the opposite of Dakar, the busy, noisy, hectic capital city of Senegal.

Figure 10. Barack Obama Greeted by Gorée Islanders. (Official White House photo by Pete Souza).

6. Conclusions: Healing the Wounds of Colonialism

> Ku xam'ul fa nga jëm dellu fa nga jugé (He who doesn't know where he is heading toward should go back to where he is from).
>
> —Wolof proverb

> None of us lives without a history; each of us is a narrative. We're always standing some place in our lives, and there is always a tale of how we came to stand there, though few of us have marked carefully the dimensions of the place where we are or kept time with the tale of how we came to be there.
>
> —Jim W. Corder, "Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love" (Corder 1985, p. 16)

The future of Senegal lies in facing our wounds and haunts, instead of repressing them and running away. We need to speak them, sing them, write about them, turning them into art. There are lessons to learn from the history of the slave trade. But that is only a start: We must face the broader history of colonialism, if we are to evolve toward a more prosperous, just, hopeful future.

We cannot simply erase a half-century of African colonization (Ross 2007). The case of Senegal might be harder than other states regionally, since Dakar was the capital city of AOF (French West Africa) and Senegal enjoyed some special privileges, compared to other colonies. Thus, Senegal was among those former colonies that did not fight hard for independence. After the colonizers left in 1960, Senegalese political leaders continued to look to France for guidance. Their children studied abroad,

becoming not cosmopolitan so much as Europeanized. This led Franz Fanon to write his *Peau noir masque blancs* (Fanon 1952): "Black Skin, White Masks."

Is the modern Senegalese ethos politically and culturally "independent," or is it colonized, still? An inferiority complex remains: We seem to suffer from what Marley (Bob Marley and the Wailers 1980) called "mental slavery"—a habit of looking to Europe for standards and terms of "progress." Economically, the most flagrant symbol of "mental slavery" is the West African currency Franc CFA, which is under French government control (Sylla 2017). If the nation's political leaders remained Eurocentric in orientation, its spiritual leaders quickly broke free from mental domination. Following in the footsteps of India's Mahatma Gandhi and America's Martin Luther King, Jr., Senegal's spiritual leaders understood the futility of violence; instead, they practiced—successfully—the principles of nonviolent civil disobedience. The French colonial authorities had little difficulty dealing with political upstarts. It was people like Ahmadou Bamba and El Hadji Malick Sy who confused them, posing the biggest challenges. As Sufi Muslims, they practiced (and preached) a religion of unity, peace, contemplation, and resilience. Their spiritual work ensured that Senegal remained a peace-loving and peace-seeking nation—one of the very few in Africa never to have known or witnessed civil war or major cycles of violence (Fofana 2015).

There is an aspect of Senegalese ethos that I have hinted at but not yet noted explicitly: As much as land, our life belongs to the sea—which is not always a friendly companion. Even today, Gorée island is not of easy access. The Atlantic Ocean acts like a barrier to cross, and it takes a ferry to get there. Deep water holds mystery for African polytheist former generations. And, even now, there are periodic incidents of fishermen "taken" by the sea, which keeps alive the myth of *Mamy wata* (mommy water). The tragedy of the ferry Le Joola only increases this myth. Le Joola was a Senegalese government-owned ferry that capsized off the coast of The Gambia on 26 September 2002. This "loss of an estimated 1800 lives [is] recognised as one of Africa's worst-ever maritime disasters," being "the second-worst non-military disaster in maritime history" (Barry 2003). Nevertheless, younger generations tend to give less consideration to these traditional fears. As proof, we could point to the number of young people who die in the sea (a death toll of 40 yearly) between June to October, when schools are closed. Young people spend a lot of time on the beach—without learning how to swim properly (Agence France Press 2018).

Poignantly, economic stresses have led to a modern exodus of Africans, who cross the Mediterranean as illegal immigrants in hopes of reaching more affluent European shores (Gueye 2006). Their poverty is reflected in the life rafts and small, unseaworthy vessels that they crowd into, desperate for a better life. The year 2006 was especially bad for young Senegalese, who left West Africa in wooden pirogues, headed for Italy and Spain (Fofana 2017). *Barca wala barzakh* was their motto: Faced with unbearable poverty, they chose *Barça* (Barcelona), or *Barzakh* (death). Senegalese film director Moussa Dieng Kala (Mbaye 2006) asked one of the illegal immigration survivors, "Are you aware that by boarding in wooden pirogues from Senegal to Spain, you are committing suicide?" He was answered, "How can a person who is already dead commit suicide?" (APA News 2006). Over the past decade, thousands of sub-Saharan Africans, many Senegalese, have drowned in this attempt. Indeed, even as I was penning this paper, there are reports of people dying at sea, trying to reach Spain. Of course, poverty remains great in Africa. The allure of European emigration, illegal or otherwise, feeds the myth of a European paradise vs. an African wilderness. This myth reinforces the African inferiority complex.[8] Put simply: For most who risk life at sea, the expectations of a better life prove a false hope. (What kind of welcome can an illegal immigrant expect?).

[8] Again, the myth of European superiority is real, though its expressions are often subtle. I have already mentioned political leaders who keep replicating policies dictated form Europe. We consume European entertainments—films especially—rather than make our own. And even sadder, in my opinion, are the many black Africans, women mostly, who resort to chemical products to lighten their skin. The effects of colonialism remain with us, still.

Still, not all stories of the ocean end in tragedy. Every summer, the annual Dakar-Gorée Swimming Race is held, organized between the capital city of Dakar and Gorée Island. The region's best come to compete in this well-publicized event. To swim competitively in this 5.2 km race requires both speed and endurance. Paradoxically, the annual *Traversée Dakar-Gorée* serves to shorten the distance between city and island, creating solidarity. True, the slaves who tried to escape by swimming could not have made it, given their chains and the 5 kg cast-iron ball attached to their feet—or to their necks. Still, "it's not just a swim race," as Haque (Haque 2018) writes: "it's a tribute to those who remain defiant, refusing their fate as slaves and instead swimming for freedom. [It is] a celebration of freedom and resistance and of the human spirit's ability to overcome adversity." On that positive note, I end this essay.

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Exploring Ethos in Contemporary Ghana

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Abstract: In this article, we discuss contemporary Ghanaian ethos reflecting on female sexual behavior as a discursive construction that shifts and changes across time and space. Borrowing from Nedra Reynold's concept of ethos as a location, we examine the various social and discourse spaces of different rhetors on female sexual behavior in Ghana and how each establishes ethos through identity formations and language use from various positions of authority. With multiethnic, multilingual, and multiple religious perspectives within the Ghanaian population, how does ethos and moral authority speak persuasively on female sexual behavior? We examine contemporary discourses governing normative female sexual behavior and presentation as revealed in both proverbs and social media to drive the discussion toward how these discourses of female sexual behavior and ethos are discursively constructed in contemporary Ghanaian society.

Keywords: contemporary ethos; Ghana; dialogic; heteroglossia; postmodern discourses; proverbs; sexual identity; sexual presentation; conservative values; tradition

1. Introduction

In Book 3 of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle discusses proverbs (Gr. *paroimiai*) under the heading of *lexis* or style (3.11.14); that is, as figures of speech that contribute to the speaker's projection of a favorable self-image. Discussing Aristotle, George A. Kennedy (1991) describes proverbs as "witnesses," in which the testimony they provide comes from the community, not from an individual (p. 108). They represent, as it were, the collective "voice" of conservative culture. In addition, "some proverbs," Aristotle notes, "are also maxims" (2.21.10), in that they contribute directly to persuasion. By Aristotle's own authority, we turn to Book 2 of the *Rhetoric* and its discussion of maxims (Gr. *gnōmōi*) as structures, not just of style, but of argument"

"In regard to the use of maxims, it will most readily be evident on what subjects, and on what occasions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims should be employed in speeches . . . . Now, a maxim is a statement, not however concerning particulars, as, for instance, what sort of a man Iphicrates was, but general; it does not even deal with all general things, . . . but with the objects of human actions, and with what should be chosen or avoided with reference to them. And as the enthymeme[1] is, we may say, the syllogism dealing with such things, maxims are the premises or conclusions of enthymemes without the syllogism. For example: "No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught to be excessively clever," is a maxim; but when the why and the wherefore are added, the whole makes an enthymeme; for instance, "for, not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against them, they earn jealous hostility from the citizens." (2.21.2-5)

[1] In Aristotelian thinking, an enthymeme is a short (incomplete) argument that involves contradictions (Rapp and Zalta 2010) because one of its premises for achieving syllogism (a three-part argument with two premises and a conclusion) is assumed rather than clearly stated.

Proverbs and maxims, thus, are invitations to an audience's assent. Strictly speaking, a maxim does not need to be explained (in effect, to be built into an enthymeme). Rather, a maxim persuades because it claims common sense wisdom as "already known" or "generally agreed" (2.21.5).

By building proverbs into his speech, the rhetor taps into the common sentiments of a community, thereby gaining "cultural authority" (a vital component of ethos). More than lexis and even, perhaps, more than logos, the gnomic utterances of proverbs and maxims contribute to a speaker's ethos. Yet not every speaker can employ proverbs or maxims decorously and effectively, as Aristotle suggests:

> The use of maxims is suitable for one who is advanced in years, and in regard to things in which one has experience; since the use of maxims before such an age is unseemly, as also is story-telling; and to speak about things of which one has no experience shows foolishness and lack of education. A sufficient proof of this is that rustics especially are fond of coining maxims and ready to make display of them. (2.21.9)

Let us summarize this discussion: According to Aristotle, a proverb is a gnomic or sententious statement derived from tradition and most suited to be spoken by men (and we would add, women) of a particular age and socioeconomic status.

The above definition applies to speakers in ancient Greece. To what extent does it apply to contemporary Ghana? The specific focus of this essay—the use of proverbs in the Ghanaian languages of Akan and Ewe—recapitulates much of the description above. In Ghanaian society, the proverb expresses the "collective 'voice'" of traditional (hence, conservative) culture. Traditionally, these are "handed down" quite literally from one generation to the next. Though women as well as men deploy them, the proverbs under analysis here seek to set norms and bounds upon women's (sexual) morality and behaviors.

Ghana today finds itself in transit ethically and ethotically, in that the traditional proverbs (and the conservative sexual morality they undergird) are pressured by different and more modern texts and voices. The proverbs mouthed and taught by parents and grandparents are coming into collision with new voices—a generation of women who counter the older sexist norms that allow men with money and power to exploit women—all the while blaming the women for sexual immorality. The masculinist "double standard" preached in these traditional proverbs is being tested and questioned by young Ghanaian women today, who have access to the technologies of social media. These new media platforms—Twitter in particular—allow women to "construct an ethos" that counters conventional or conservative morality. Yet this same media is cohabited by multiple voices representing the spectrum of Ghanaian society of old and young, male and female, rich and struggling. Within this media, the old proverbs continue to wield their normative control of Ghanaian attitudes towards woman's roles and behaviors. It is for this reason that we declare Ghanaian society to be "in transit," ethically and ethotically.

Before proceeding to an analysis of Ghanaian proverbs, we need a working definition of ethos. Let us begin, then, by noting a rift in current scholarship: In the classical Aristotelian model, two versions have arisen. The first (and most commonly cited) version holds that persuasion "through character . . . should result from the speech" and "not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person" (Rhetoric 1356a as cited in Baumlin and Meyer 2018). The second derives from this Special Issue on Ethos: James S. Baumlin and Craig A. Meyer explain: "If trust comes 'from the speech' solely, then the speaker's ethos is fashioned from within discourse and becomes part of the discourse in its totality." Aristotle elaborates:

> But since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment . . . it is necessary not only to look to the argument, that it may be demonstrative and persuasive but also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a certain kind of person and to prepare the judge; for it makes much difference in regard to persuasion . . . that the speaker seem to be a certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be a certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be disposed in a certain way. (Rhetoric 1377b as cited in Baumlin and Meyer 2018)

Within this rhetorical model, Aristotle illustrates a speaker "construct[s] a view of" themselves, a verbal performance occurring within the speech. However, a socially-constructed model of ethos privileges culture over self and, thereby, reduces the self to behaviors in the context of the culturally accepted norms, proverbs, and participation in the traditions of the culture. Karen Burke LeFevre (1987) notes "Aristotle's Rhetoric presupposes a social context" (LeFevre 1987, Invention, p. 45). She continues:

> Perhaps most pertinent to a social perspective is Aristotle's concept of ethos ... [which] arises from the relationship between the individual and the community. "Ethos," says Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "does not refer to your peculiarities as an individual but to the ways in which you reflect the characteristics and qualities that are valued by your culture or group. In Aristotle's view, ethos cannot exist in isolation; by definition it requires possible or actual others .... [I]n fact, the Greek meaning for "ethos" as "a habitual gathering place" calls forth an image of people coming together .... Ethos, we might say, appears in that socially created space, in the "between," the point of intersection between speaker or writer and listener or reader." (LeFevre 1987, Invention, pp. 45–46)

In contemporary Ghana, we see the latter version of ethos at play, though we look to the possibility that Ghanaian women can, in time, construct themselves in liberatory ways.

The contemporary Ghanaian woman wears her inherited ethos proudly; this ethos, this "cultural dress," is woven from multiple texts whose components include the traditional proverbs governing sexual norms and behaviors and their own movement toward creating a contemporary ethos of themselves. In this essay, we explore the ways that social media has added a "new voice" to the polyphony of Ghanaian popular discourse and the range of responses that this "new voice" has generated.

2. A New Voice in a Traditional Environment

Priscilla Opoku-Kwarteng, more commonly known as Ebony Reigns, was born on 16 February 1997. The self-proclaimed 1990s bad gyal[2] dropped out of secondary school to take up a music career, releasing her first hit single song in December 2015. Both her personality and music brand were perceived by many Ghanaians as openly violating, contradicting, and/or challenging the traditional moral code on female sexual behavior.

On 28 November 2017, Manasseh Azure Awuni, a high-ranking, award-winning investigative journalist in Ghana published, "Manasseh's Folder: A Love Letter to Ebony." This open letter to Ebony Reigns, a 20-year-old, award-winning songstress, who was making headlines in Ghana for provocative behavior, was full of translated proverbs and offered general advice and a warning from Awuni to Reigns over what he described as her nudity during her musical performances. He asked her to focus on music and eschew nudity. In his letter, Awuni tried to establish his credibility (ethos) as a wise, elder male. His use of proverbs spoke to the virtues valued by his Ghanaian audience and culture. For instance, he writes "our elders have taught us that a wise child is not spoken to in plain words but in proverbs" (Awuni 2017). This quote is his understanding of a common proverb in Ghana that exists in some indigenous Ghanaian languages (e.g., Akan and Ewe) and suggests that if Reigns is wise, she will heed the traditional voices of the culture. More importantly, he completes that paragraph noting her similarities to the story of the "mad women of Kete-Krachi" (Awuni 2017). The mad women of Kete-Krachi, according to Awuni, references a young woman who spoke loudly or offensively in the town she lived, and she was so ambitious, she wore herself out and could only warn the next young

[2] The term is believed to mean total opposite of a "good girl". In Jamaican Patois, it refers to a girl who does things that are deemed unacceptable by society, for instance, a highly promiscuous girl/female or a girl/female who makes a name for herself without conforming to what society sees as "right" for women. (https://jamaicanpatwah.com/term/Bad-Gyal/1796#.Xvx3WfIaT2Q).

women in hopes that they did not follow in the same steps (Awuni 2014 "Manasseh's Folder: Mensa Otabil"). Reigns, he explains, is very talented musically, but she will only be remembered for her nakedness and not her talent.

Awuni's letter gained traction on social media and was shared 11,900 times and received 514 comments on Facebook and myjoyonline.com. While a majority of the comments congratulated Awuni and affirmed his position in condemning Reigns's behavior and even added their own proverbs (e.g., "a housefly that refuses to heed advice will follow the corpse to the grave"); others disagreed with Awuni, especially over his description of nudity, but these responses spoke with a modern voice and avoided proverbs (e.g., "Call it seductive dressing but certainly not nudity . . . otherwise it makes us hypocrites for I can't count the number of ladies I see every day dressed seductively"). Several voices chimed in on this example of normative female sexual behavior in contemporary Ghanaian society. Indeed, Awuni himself admits this in his letter when he says, "in this era of Facebook and WhatsApp, the wisest of our generation do not seem to be able to wrap their heads around the simplest of proverbs or the ancient wisdom of speech with which words were woven" (Awuni 2017 "Manasseh's Folder"). In other words, even though traditional rhetorical tools such as proverbs may have culturally encoded an ethos on female sexual behavior (among other things) in Ghanaian society, they may no longer be the main authority in social matters. More importantly, modern discourse tools, (e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter) may carry as much ethos, perhaps more, as proverbs in contemporary Ghanaian society.

In a socioculturally and religiously diversified country, there will be multiple voices on any subject matter including female sexual behavior. How is ethos, regarding the character and authority to speak persuasively on female sexual behavior, achieved in this sociocultural space? Who has the final say on matters of female sexual behavior in contemporary Ghanaian society?

While these two traditions of the classical period remain useful in the contemporary study of rhetoric, they appear "inadequate for postmodern epistemologies" (Johanna Schmertz 1999, p. 86). In postmodern thought, ethos is regarded as a discursive construction by both speaker and audience where neither speaker nor hearer has the final word because there is a rich tradition of conflicting interpretations.

In discussing African ethics, Kwame Gyekye (2010) describes ethics (in part) in a way similar to Wade Nobles (1972) definition of ethos:

> The ethics of a society is embedded in the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is good or bad character; it is also embedded in the conceptions of satisfactory social relations and attitudes held by the members of the society; it is embedded, furthermore, in the forms and patterns of behavior that are considered by members of the society to bring about social harmony and cooperative living. (p. 1)

In addition, the concept of ethos has been either directly or indirectly evoked by feminist rhetoricians particularly in discussing women's agency. For instance, Kathleen J. Ryan and her compatriots have called on (feminist) rhetoricians to rethink ethos and to define it in ecological terms, arguing that defining ethos in such terms "requires a consideration of an ecology of forces around ethos construction-not only social constructs like race and gender but also relations of power, and materiality (things and places)" (p. 1, 3). Similarly, Johanna Schmertz (1999) defines ethos (for feminism) as "neither manufactured nor fixed, neither tool nor character, but rather the stopping points which the subject (re)negotiates her own essence to call upon whatever agency that essence enables" (p. 86).

3. Contextualizing Proverbs

We analyzed selected proverbs that are common in Ghana regarding normative female sexual behavior to drive some of the discussion toward how discourses on female sexual ethos have been created in contemporary Ghanaian society. First, starting with the proverbs from Awuni's letter to Reigns and the comments that followed, we focus on proverbs that speak to normative female sexual behavior in Ghana, most notably Noah K. Dzobo's African Proverbs texts and Peggy Appiah,

Kwame Anthony Appiah, and Ivor Agyeman-Duah's Bu Me Be: Proverbs of the Akans, which are both published and widely circulated collections of Ewe and Akan proverbs. Secondly, we examine the ways in which the general Ghanaian public responded to discourses surrounding Reigns through various social media platforms, which create an individual sexual identity that is not familiar to many contemporary Ghanaians as "culturally Ghanaian".

For us, proverbs provide a cultural opening to explore Ghanaian ethos. Of course, proverbs are typically defined as short, pithy sayings that express traditionally held truths or pieces of advice and are usually based on common sense or experience. Proverbs tend to be a source of dominant ideologies, because they are believed to reflect a people's philosophy, cultural, and ethical values. Proverbs have been studied widely across disciplines and across cultures; some examples include, Irish (Fred Norris Robinson 1945), English (Frank Percy Wilson 1994), Chinese (Lister 1974), and Yiddish (Beatrice Silverman-Weinreich 1981). Proverbs play an important role in many communities, especially those that are predominantly oral, serving both as a memory bank for preserving and as a vehicle for transmitting wisdom and knowledge. Consequently, proverbs are a powerful tool in representing, influencing or shaping the worldview of a group, often reflecting customs, practices, and prejudices of a group.

As already reviewed, we use Aristotle to establish an ethotic framework for contemporary Ghanaian social discourse but proceed to consider the ways that social media test and extend—and in some important ways subvert—the classical Aristotelian model, particularly when the speaker is a young Ghanaian woman. Some proverbs employed in Ghanaian popular discourse conform to the classical Aristotelian model, primarily when their speakers are culturally-situated as masculinist/misogynist and moralizing. Often proverbs can also have a subversive effect on masculinist authority when deployed by women, particularly by women in business and entertainment and when engaged in behaviors discountenanced by traditional masculinist authority. Hence, contemporary Ghanaian discourse inhabits a cultural-dialogic space "in between" the (conservative) traditional oral folkways and the (transgressive/progressive) "new media". It is, in sum, caught in transit between traditional and progressive cultural-discursive norms. In this regard, we may describe contemporary Ghanaian society as a liminal space where there is an obvious break from normative cultural patterns, and where new practices that question normative cultural practices have emerged but the old normative practices are not completely abandoned, (Victor Turner 1974; Joseph Jeyaraj 2004).

Here we consider ways that contemporary Ghanaian social media co-opts proverbial discourse within an agonistic or competitive mediated space that crosses gender, age, occupation, and class. We note that Ghanaian proverbs warrant a rhetorical/ethotic vocabulary of their own, independent of classical Aristotelian theory. While we see proverbs as a source of dominant/normative ideologies (including those on female sexual behavior), we also recognize social media as a platform for interactions among people of all ages, and it represents a social space where both dominant and emerging ideologies on female sexual behavior may be expressed, especially because the interactions on social media "are sometimes anonymous or pseudonymous" (Kozinets 2012, p. 39).

4. Proverbs as Ideology on Female Sexual Behavior

Proverbs provide one snapshot into contemporary Ghanaian society. For instance, Kofi Agyekum (2000, 2005, 2012) analyzes proverbs as an aspect of Akan oral literature through mass media in contemporary times, most notably in the lyrics of contemporary Ghanaian music, aphorisms, and marriage proverbs. Similarly, Yankah (1986, 1989, 1999) discussed proverbs as part of the aesthetics of traditional communication in Ghana (1989) and as rhetoric in the context of the African judicial process (1986). Awuni's love letter to Reigns derives its authority from proverbs and other forms of rhetorical traditions, tales, and stories. Awuni references translated proverbs and attributes them to "the elders," who are believed to be custodians of Ghanaian cultural values. Indeed, Awuni's condemnation of Reigns's manner of dress (calling it "nudity") is based on what he describes as "what

our elders have said." For instance, part of his advice to Reigns requests her to speak to an elder; he writes:

> And anytime you want to repeat what you recently said about your
> nudity, kindly ask your father to tell you what our elders meant when they said,
> "The disease that will kill a person first breaks sticks into their ears."
> (Awuni 2017)

Following this, we identified other similar proverbs from Dzobo's work and from Appiah, Appiah, and Agyeman-Duah's collection that speak to ideologies on normative female sexual behavior that we articulate below. While we do not fully explore every meaning of each proverb, readers will be able to interpret them through their own cultural lens as well, which only enriches our discussion and our collective understanding of them. The following Ghanaian proverbs are well known and, we suspect, easily understood by a general audience: Proverbs a, d, f, h and k are from Dzobo (1975); Proverbs c, I, j and g are from Dzobo (2006) and Proverbs b and e are taken from Peggy Appiah, Anthony Appiah, and Ivor Agyeman-Duah (Appiah et al. 2007).

a. *A woman does not speak with the voice of a man*. This Ewe proverb explicitly puts a man and a woman in two mutually exclusive categories. In addition, it suggests a women's voice is not equal to a man's, even inferior.

b. *When a woman buys a gun, it lies in a man's room.* More than make an essentialist assumption about men and women, this Akan proverb places a limitation or a barrier on the abilities that women can have, their authority, and how ownership of material goods (especially those that are masculine by cultural or perhaps universal understanding) remains with the male and not the female.

c. *All crows look alike but not all of them lay eggs.* This proverb is used as advice, particularly to young men about how to choose their girlfriends or future wives. In essence, even though women look attractive or seem the same, their characters and personalities are not similar. In other words, not all women are suitable wife/mother material, which returns to a misogynistic ideal of women as only bearers of children and subservient to the male, who is the dominant figure in the household.

d. *Human beings are not palm wine. You cannot exploit them by tasting them.* This proverb admonishes people who toy with human emotions, specifically in relationships, betrayals, and exploitation of the opposite sex. It is usually used as advice for young people regarding how they should relate to others.

e. *We marry a woman for her utterances (character) and not for her privates (sexual attractiveness, sex)*. This proverb emphasizes the importance of good character over lust and sexual attraction. This is commonly spoken to young men when they are considering choosing a wife, again which suggests he is the one choosing her and lesser so the reverse.

f. *A girlfriend is not attended to like a farm.* This Ewe proverb reflects on Ewe farmers who traditionally believe in paying close attention to and investing in one's farm in order to get a good yield. The proverb is normally used to caution men not to put too much care and money into their relationships with women because there is no guarantee of absolute faithfulness from women. This proverb, thus, may be argued to be an example of the misogynistic bent of Ewe culture in its views of women and their perceived promiscuity.

g. *One beautiful girl cannot be married into two houses at the same time.* This proverb is often used as advice given to a young woman who overestimates her beauty and usefulness in her relationships with men. This proverb also imposes some implied restrictions about relationship choices on the female, while expanding them for the male.

h. *It is difficult to marry the daughter of a mother-in-law who receives money from two suitors.* To paraphrase, it is difficult to do business with a double dealer or dishonest person. This proverb chooses a

woman, a mother-in-law, to illustrate duplicity in a society where mothers never receive bride price or dowry; whether in patriarchal or matriarchal cultures, moneys and gifts related to marriage are paid to fathers and uncles in Ghanaian society. This proverb implies that mothers-in-law are mostly crooked people.

i. *Walking on the pavement is better than walking in the middle of the street.* This proverb exhorts one to avoid being an attention seeker or being forward and instead to value modesty, silence, and, to a lesser degree, submission. Thus, being modest, not being in the limelight, is a desirable value in traditional Ghanaian society.

j. *The fool cares for his beard, the wise man, his character.* This proverb is similar to proverb f in intent. The common understanding of traditional Ghanaian ethos is strongly against those who are looks-obsessed and vain. From its perspective, good character bests good looks, physique or fashionable clothes.

k. *You don't dissect the stomach of a crocodile in public.* This Ewe proverb has an equivalent in Akan that says that you do not wash your dirty linen in public. This proverb admonishes one not to discuss or showcase confidential or private matters in public such as sex or disagreements. The proverb places a premium on tactfulness and privacy in matters that the society considers sensitive or taboo.

Through these proverbs, we agree with some Ghanaian scholars (e.g., Diabah and Amfo 2015), who have described Ghanaian traditional culture as patriarchal, male-biased, and enforcing gendered roles and spaces, where rigid, essentialist roles with regard to who/what men and women are or can be, and what women and men can/cannot or should/should not do exist. These concepts are illustrated in proverbs a–c above. Again, there appears to exist a certain expected appropriate sexual behavior for young people and Etego-Amengor (2014, p. 257) has argued that the concept of Ghanaian chastity "is about the virtuous woman; the woman who exudes the traditional concept of decorum, modesty, self-service and dignity in all spheres of life". This view is similar to the concepts in proverbs d–i which highlight the expected sexual behavior and emphasize moral values/character (of women), rather than physical beauty/sexual attractiveness. Consequently, if a woman emphasized her sexual attributes in any perceivable way, she might typically be described as immoral (violating an ethos of sexual behavior).

Thus, the features of ethos/philosophy on sexual behavior as demonstrated above show these Ghanaian proverbs may be similar to John Bender and David E. Wellbery's definition of classical rhetoric as "an art of positionality in address. Audience are characterized by status, age, temperament, education, and so forth. Speakers are impersonators who adapt themselves to occasions in order to gain and maintain position", and that "rhetorical speech marks and is marked by social hierarchy" (Bender and Wellbery 1990, p. 7). In this regard, we describe proverbial ethos on female sexuality as projecting age, male dominance, and male authority as normative. To be specific, men are the definers and women are largely the defined; that men create power (over women) through the use of language to assert power. Perhaps, this explains why Awuni, a male with authority (established/accomplished, award-winning journalist) grounds his authority in what the elders (who are typically men) have said in proverbs to advise Reigns, a young, powerless female (school drop-out/songstress) and even condemn her sexual presentation (scanty mode of dressing). Recall that both Awuni and some of his supporters who applauded his *letter to Ebony*, used proverbs, especially in condemning Reigns. Certainly, we conclude that proverbs are a source of dominant ideologies on ethos in contemporary Ghanaian society.

5. Ethos through Ghanaian Understanding and Beyond

According to Kenneth Burke (1966), in *Language as Symbolic Action*, language may be used to "defeat reality" (p. 45). In other words, a speaker may use language to deflect their audience's attention toward or away from certain realities or ideologies. In what follows, we describe how Reigns, the young, female drop-out who is not traditionally regarded as an authority on normative female

sexual behavior uses language (discursive practice) in an attempt to defeat the reality of traditional Ghanaian ethos on female sexual behavior. We examine some social media discourses around her and the controversy she generated in order to infer how she created an identity and a voice that challenged normative Ghanaian ethos on female sexuality.

We begin with some discussion of her music. The lyrics of her songs became a flashpoint that openly critiqued Ghanaian traditions and cultural norms. For example, the lyrics of her song "Sponsor" exposed the justification and even glorification of the exploitation by young women of older men (for material gain) on one hand, and of young men (for sexual pleasure) on the other hand as shown in the excerpt below:

> See I'av got myself a sponsor
> Anthing me i ask edey buy buy
> Even though he is older
> Another one who is younger
> When I ask for something eday cry cry
> *Mese papa yi a m'nya no yi deɛ ɔmame bibiaa* [the older man provides my material needs]
> *ɛnso edru anadwo a wobɛhwɛ na aka me nkoaa* [but I am lonely at night]
> *ɛdaa ɔbɛba me nkyɛn me so ne mu asem a ɔka ne sɛ* [when I touch him on the day he visits me he retorts]
> Cool it for me slow down . . . ..
> *Me sisi yɛ mi ya* [I have waist pains]
> Oh Lord have mercy mercy mercy
> These broke guys have lot of energy
> Inna me down town hot just like oven
> But when the morning comes me no have nothing
> A boyfriend who can't buy you food when you are hungry[3]
> (https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Ebony/Sponsor)

The lyrics in this song violate the spirit of proverbs d and g above. Contrary to traditional thinking, the song questions why a woman cannot keep two men at the same time, especially given the fact many men do keep two women at a time. Further, the lyrics of another of her songs, "Date Ur Fada [your father]," challenge the traditional Ghanaian ethos that permits promiscuity among men but not women by threatening (perhaps, proposing) to engage in an incestuous relationship (that is, date the father of her promiscuous lover), a traditional taboo in Ghana. Below are excerpts from Reigns's song "Date Ur Fada":

> If you break my heart i go date ur fada
> Bony pon dis
> Danny beatz
> The 90's badgyal trend
>
> See i heard them say, heard them say
> Boy you a player
> You dey score like Messi, play like Kaka
> Dribble like Wakaso
> You dey like Barcelona, Real Madrid
> Arsenal, Man U, Chelsea

[3] Translations in brackets provided by the authors, who are L1 and L2 speakers of Akan, the main language of the music.

I go give you my heart, give you body
Do anything for you
Sacrifice my life to be your wife
I'm gonna be there for you

But if you break my heart
I go date ur fada
You gonna be my son
You go call me your mother

Bakasi you know sey I get am o
Bobbie stand you know sey I own am o
And no style dey wey I no sabi do am o
Me I no like Versace
And I no like Designer
Me I no like Ferrari
And I no like Bugatti

But if you break my heart
I go date ur fada
You gonna be my son
You go call me your mother
(https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Ebony/Date-Ur-Fada)

Before her death in February 2018, particularly in the months of November and December 2017, Reigns came under intense criticism in Ghana over both her mode of dressing and her lyrics. Both were perceived to be violations of normative female sexual behavior in Ghana (see proverbs i–k above). The criticisms came in various forms, ranging from friendly advice to downright insults and condemnation through several avenues including social media posts, open letters in online newspapers, and even to radio call-in programs. These criticisms came from people from all walks of life and across different sections of Ghanaian society, including men, women, gospel musicians, and journalists. These criticisms received interesting reactions from other members of the Ghanaian public. We present a few selections of some of these criticisms and reactions as they occurred in real time on social media and other media platforms, in order to infer what contemporary Ghanaian ethos on appropriate female sexual behavior appears to be.

On 7 August 2017, a female Afrobeat artiste, Feli Nuna, was reported on myjoyonline.com to have asserted that the lyrics of Reigns's song "Sponsor" were influencing young people negatively (MyjoyOnline.com 2018). Later in November 2017, Reigns was reported in the Ghanaian media to have dressed in such a way as to reveal portions of her private parts during a high-profile entertainment event. As soon as the news broke, the president of the Musicians Association of Ghana (MUSIGA), Bice Osei Kuffour (aka, Obour), gave a TV interview on Joy TV condemning Reigns's manner of dressing, describing it as "bad" and not conforming to the moral values of Ghana (myjoyonline.com, proverb b). Like the Awuni letter, many people on social media supported Obour's remarks and clearly pointed to societal expectations of conformity to a Ghanaian ethos by young women. This response contrasts a similar incident in which a young Ghanaian male musician, Wisa Greid, exposed his genitals during a concert. While many people saw Greid's behavior as inappropriate and he was arrested by the police, the general reaction of the public was that his behavior was a mere youthful exuberance (notably male). More importantly, his reputation was unscathed, perhaps even bolstered. In reaction to Obour's condemning comments, which were carried across social media, Reigns responded to the MUSIGA president in a Facebook post on November 29 2017:

> Ebony reigns dressing is very bad and is not our culture, but 'chopping' of[f] musicians' money is very good and i think that is our culture.some gh musicians are dying of hunger and what is ur union doing about that mr president? do you really care? #hustle. (Reigns 2017)

Shortly thereafter, Reigns's post on Facebook which was also published peacefmonline.com (Peacefmonline.com 2017) on 30 November 2017, received over 4000 likes, 43 shares, and 223 comments. In countering Obour, the MUSIGA president, Reigns "spoke with the voice of a man," (proverb a). Traditional Ghanaian ethos does not allow younger people, in general, and particularly women and most especially younger women, to contradict or talk back to an older man or to an authoritative male figure. This is seen as disrespectful and, thus, a violation of traditional behavior codes. As expected, some "senior" musicians went on record to advise the songstress to apologize to the president of their association. For more context, Obour once released an award-winning song (Konkontibaa, tadpole) whose lyrics promoted the early sexualization of young girls by men. However, he was never expected to apologize to Ghanaian society, not even by female activists/feminists. In this testy exchange, however, many of Reigns's online followers referenced his song and questioned Obour's authority to judge her, calling him a hypocrite. Another fan of Reigns questioned Obour's credibility in these matters based on his own manner of dressing in the following Facebook post:

- Yayra Koku (Yayra 2017). Nov 29 2017 @11:41 a.m.:
- "Obour hair is Rasta. Is Rasta our culture? So many fools in this country...
- Does he understand BRANDING? Ebony pls next time wear only panties..."

It was in the midst of this controversy that Awuni wrote the open love letter to advise and condemn Reigns at the same time. It is important to note that while Awuni condemned Reigns's manner of dressing and called it nudity and advised her to desist from it, he praised her talent and voice and urged her to concentrate on developing those aspects. In this regard, Awuni was speaking in the voice of the elders, that is, that Ebony, as a young woman, should express beauty in character and not sexual attractiveness. Still in the month of November 2017, an award-winning UK-based gospel musician, Sony Badu, endorsed Reigns's talent and tagged her critics as hypocrites in an online post. His post attracted 235 likes on Adomonline.com (Adomonline.com 2017) and 23 comments on ghanaweb.com (Ghana 2017): two popular social sites in Ghana. As usual, while some comments were affirming both Sony Badu and Reigns, others insulted both of them or questioned Sony Badu's Christian/moral values. Finally, in an article on 8 December 2017, BenjaminAkyena Brantuo, a broadcast journalist, described the Ebony controversy in Ghana as hypocritical/contradictory on the part of the many who condemn her behavior/morals. As he points out, "When the respectable people of our society want to relax with good music, laced with sexual lyrics, performed by a beautiful actress, scantily dressed, guess where they go—Ebony's shows!" (Akyena-Brantuo 2017). Moreover, Reigns received frequent invitations to perform at high-profile events and he concludes that "While it is convenient to disrespect and or condemn Ebony for her dressing, apparently, she does it for our sake" (Akyena-Brantuo 2017). The more pointed element to Benjamin's article exposes the hypocrisy in Ghanaian society. He details as more deserving of attention, the "nepotism and cronyism," the failures of the educational system, and various structures of corruption such as illegal mining and getting unqualified relatives into "grade A schools through the back door" (Akyena-Brantuo 2017). While he exposes these realities, he concludes with a (proverbial) Bible verse (Matthew 7.5): "You hypocrite, first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother's eye."

It is obvious from the above discussion that traditional Ghanaian ethos on female sexual behavior is being challenged and re-fashioned in contemporary Ghana. While some online community members viewed Reigns's use of her sexuality negatively, others wrote that Reigns was young and ignorant. Others warned her of dire future consequences if she did not desist from her behavior. However, Reigns's supporters used many Christian references in their comments and called Reigns's critics hypocrites. They also argued that her detractors were guilty of doing worse things in secret and should

reflect on their own double standards. These exchanges suggest a powerful and meaningful evolution of Ghanaian culture and its redress and reconsideration of traditional thinking.

6. Conclusions: Ethos as Discursive Construction in Contemporary Ghana

The evolution of a current Ghanaian ethos on female sexual behavior involves heteroglossic elements. Mikhail M. Bakhtin (1992, On Dialogism and Heteroglossia) defines heteroglossia as a form of verbal communication whose importance is seen in the fact that "it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between different socio-ideological groups" (p. 291). Applying this understanding to the social and online interactions and proverbs concerning female sexuality, we see the differing and emotive voices and viewpoints making themselves heard. Some of these voices represent dominant traditional, patriarchal normative ideologies (i.e., what the elders have said and the proverbs that have been passed down). Others, mostly young and liberal, subvert the dominant discourses of Ghanaian ethos on female sexual behavior in their support of Reigns's behavior. Indeed, Reigns projects her transgressive voice not only through her linguistic behavior (lyrics and responses to criticism) but also through her manner of dressing and her general way of life. While contemporary Ghanaian ethos is slowly evolving through these dialogic views in society, the latter voice is described by the former as "courting the rage of overzealous liberals and self-proclaimed feminists" (Awuni 2017).

From a feminist point of view, Ghanaian social media and, by extension, most of Ghanaian society, was reacting negatively to Reigns because of her perceived transgressions of Ghanaian traditional, cultural, and Christian moral codes concerning appropriate sexual behaviors for females (proverbs b, c, f, j, k, and l). Most importantly, these reactions occurred because she was a young female. Ghanaian traditional culture is patriarchal and directs Ghanaians into gendered roles and spaces. With modernization, education, and the assumption of authority, female power has grown exponentially in Ghana. Yet, it is still hard for many to accept public expressions of female sexuality and authority. In other words, traditional ideologies of female sexuality as revealed in proverbs and explained by Rosemary Etego-Amengor remain the dominant space. Nevertheless, there are emerging spaces, like that of Reigns. However, such spaces are viewed by many as unacceptable because they are created by young females who are not regarded traditionally as having authority. Indeed, Reigns fought for her differing/untraditional voice or stance in order to be heard. In other words, Reigns challenged and questioned the dominant voice on female sexuality in order to create autonomy for a young female voice. Further, Reigns's use of her body and voice is not only about forming a transgressive identity but also empowering other minority voices (e.g., young females) in a male-dominated culture. According to Bender and Wellbery (1990), what is happening in contemporary Ghanaian society is a common feature of many philosophical systems:

> the cultural hegemony of [classical] rhetoric as a practice of discourse... is grounded in the social structures of the premodern world. Conceived in its broadest terms then, the demise of rhetoric coincides with that long and arduous historical process that is often termed modernization: the replacement of a symbolic-religious organization of social and cultural life by rationalized forms, the gradual shift from a stratificational differentiation of society to one that operates along functional axes. (p. 7)

The public's responses to Reigns represents a dialogism that is a part of the Ghanaian ethos today, as mentioned earlier. Other examples of dialogism in a similar vein involved an earlier incident in 2014 that occurred between an internationally known Ghanaian preacher and a young Ghanaian actress. The popular evangelical preacher Archbishop Duncan-Williams, in a sermon, declared that without marriage, a woman's achievements and contributions to society were useless. He further claimed that the ratio of women to men in the world was 7:1, and thus it was a privilege for a woman to find a man to marry her. He further admonished young women not to misbehave so that men would want to

marry them. This sermon reinforced the ideas of female submission and dependency on men and the importance of good character for females (proverbs a, b, and i).

An unmarried young actress, Ms. Lydia Forson, countered the archbishop's message by writing a sarcastic letter proposing marriage to the already married Archbishop on several news forums in hopes, as she stated, of getting married and having relevance in life. Her letter forced the Archbishop to deny that he was a chauvinist and to state that he did not mean to offend or disrespect Ghanaian women in his sermon (Graphic.com.gh 2014) In this incident, Ms. Forson 'spoke with the voice of a man' (proverb a).

Normally, on the one hand, a man of the Archbishop's standing in Ghana would not be expected to respond to a young woman's rebuke or backtrack on his statements because a young woman was displeased by them. On the other hand, Ms. Forson, a young woman, would not be expected to push back so publicly against a male preacher of assumed high moral standing. This issue elicited hundreds of responses from the Ghanaian public with some supporting Ms. Forson and others, the Archbishop.

A more recent illustration of dialogism in contemporary Ghanaian society occurred in 2018 when a social media influencer and actress, Moesha Boduong, caused a stir in Ghana by telling CNN anchor, Christane Amanpour, that most Ghanaian young women have sex with older/rich men in order to make ends meet (myjoyonline.com). Once again, on the one hand, she was condemned by a huge section of Ghanaians including government officials and women's organizations, and was forced to publicly apologize to the nation for her 'disgraceful comments' which violated Ghanaian traditional ethos on female sexual behavior, as encoded in proverbs i, j, and k. With her comments, she had "washed her dirty linen in public". On the other hand, there was a huge social media support for Ms. Boduong, where it was argued that there was nothing wrong with her views. Thus, the nature of dialogism in Ghanaian society may be best captured by the following quotation from Bakhtin, (Speech Genres, Bakhtin 1984): "There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context" (p. 170). In contemporary Ghanaian society, patriarchal, misogynist norms, traditional and religious philosophies regarding female sexuality no longer (singularly) define the sexual behavior of many young women. Their actions and candidness (which violate traditional rules discouraging explicitly sexual language, proverb l) and their unashamed admissions concerning their use of their sexualities clearly show that young women like Reigns are not afraid to cross moral/taboo lines in traditional/social narratives (violations of proverbs f, h, j, and k). In fact, many Ghanaian women are challenging the proverbial ethos that seeks to reinforce normative notions of women's subservience and inferiority to men (proverbs a–c). These women employ intellectual, rather than the sexual pursuits which Reigns alludes to in her lyrics. Even though these two groups of women work on opposing sides, their actions contribute toward changing the traditional Ghanaian ethos. Thus, they generate new forms that respond to a climate mediated by technological and gender-sensitive influences.

The public condemnation of Reigns' desire to celebrate her sexuality in public and on social media seems contradictory when one considers Ghanaian traditional expectations that women satisfy their husbands sexually any time they demand it. Some possible influences that have also challenged the dominant Ghanaian ethos on female sexuality and emboldened young women like Reigns to be sexually daring, may be found on social media, entertainment, and film industries. Outside of Ghana, American reality stars such as Kim Kardashian and hip hop stars such as Nikki Minaj and Cardi B (whose sexiness contribute significantly to their success), push some young Ghanaian female artistes into modeling these sexually explicit behaviors. The sexualized images of the American stars send messages to young women that to be seen as beautiful, attention-worthy, and successful, they must utilize their sexuality. In this regard, the use of proverbs, which have been described as enthymemes in Aristotelian rhetoric, to encode these cultural norms suggests that the Ghanaian culture/society is not inherently authoritarian but open to dialogism. Thus, the study of proverbs may be important in creating a dialogical theory that incorporates voices from contexts that are less studied or represented in the literature.

Contemporary Ghanaian ethos on female sexual behavior reveals itself through heteroglossia by multiple discursive practices, including traditional proverbs and modern communicative avenues (e.g., social media). Social media has given (young) women like Reigns massive online platforms. With these, they not only challenge dominant ideologies on female sexuality in contemporary Ghanaian society, but also showcase their sexualities and lifestyles as alternatives to the dominant ones. These underrepresented voices embody the polyphony that is shaping new forms of ethos through dress, character, address, and morality in Ghana. The heteroglossic elements of the traditional, the transgressive, gender and class dimensions, all contribute to evolving ethotic forms co-existing in an uneasy mix in contemporary Ghanaian society. As has been observed by Chris Abotchie (2006) and Gladys N. Ansah (2017), theGhanaian society seems to be still emerging (but not weaned) from traditional beliefs and practices in many aspects of life.

From the above discussion, it is evident that this paper contributes to feminist rhetorical scholarship by including the voices of Reigns and by implication, other (young) women into mainstream (traditional) Ghanaian discourse formerly dominated by male voices. The paper demonstrates how young females (powerless by Ghanaian cultural precepts) exert power in society by exhibiting feminist attributes of daring, crossing traditional gender lines and challenging the submissive and dependent roles assigned by their society/culture. The paper illustrates how Ebony Reigns influences a significant segment of young Ghanaians by using her sexuality, behavior, and words as persuasive tools to affect a paradigm shift and contribute to the shaping of a contemporary Ghanaian ethos on female sexuality.

This paper's focus also expands our awareness of female voices and shows the intersections of Ghanaian feminist rhetoric with tradition, culture, and social change. This is critical to a deeper understanding of Ghanaian culture, both past and present.

In addition, this work treats proverbs and ethos from an angle that is different from what past researchers have done with the subject. Our study goes beyond the description of proverbs and their portrayal of women to show their (proverbs) role in not only shaping traditional Ghanaian ethos but also how gender disrupts proverbial influence and creates new ethos forms. This study is also significant in its presentation of a female rhetor as a subject and as a power player in contemporary Ghanaian ethos formation. Unlike other studies in this area of Ghanaian proverbs and ethos, this study employs computer-mediated responses in real time from numerous responders on social media platforms to gauge public reactions towards the female subject/rhetor—Reigns. Thus, the study presents the continuously evolving shift in Ghanaian ethos, setting it apart from other studies in this area.

Finally, the findings of this study contribute to the contemporary debate about cultural identity as well as critical social discourse, and the role rhetorical concepts play in advancing such debate.

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Ethos in Early Chinese Rhetoric: The Case of "Heaven"

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Abstract: Though applicable in many Western historical-cultural settings, the Aristotelian model of ethos is not universal. As early Chinese rhetoric shows in the example of *cheng-yan* or "ethos of sincereness," inspiring trust does not necessarily involve a process of character-based self-projection. In the Aristotelian model, the rhetor stands as a signifier of ethos, with an ideology of individualism privileged, whereas Chinese rhetoric assumes a collectivist model in which ethos belongs, not to an individual or a text, but rather to culture and cultural tradition. This essay will be concentrating on the concept of Heaven, central to the cultural and institutional systems of early Chinese society, in an attempt to explore collective ethos as a function of cultural heritage. Heaven, it shall be argued, plays a key role in the creation of Chinese ethos. This essay will also contrast the logocentrism of Western rhetorical tradition with the ethnocentrism of Chinese tradition. The significance of Heaven in its role as a defining attribute of Chinese ethos is reflective of a unique cultural heritage shaped by a collective human desire in seeking a consciousness of unity with the universe. Just as there are historical, cultural, and philosophical reasons behind logocentrism in the West, so the ethnocentric turn of Chinese rhetoric should be appreciated in light of a cultural tradition that carries its own historical complexities and philosophical intricacies.

Keywords: ethos; Chinese ethos; rhetoric; early Chinese rhetoric; Heaven; cultural heritage

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1. Introduction

Two species of ethos seem to predominate in this special issue of *Histories of Ethos*: one is rhetorical, aimed at swaying an audience; the other is sociological, aimed at attaining or asserting one's "positionality" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018) in the human social world. In Burkean terms, this second species shifts the emphasis from persuasion to "identification,"[1] be it within "scientific ethos" (Merton 1973), "feminist ethos" (Palmer-Mehta 2016), or "cyborg ethos" (DeLashmutt 2011), to name a few. Indeed, most of the essays of this collection focus on the sociological ethos, as seen in "American working-class ethos" (Thelin 2019), "hip-hop ethos" (Harrison and Arthur 2019), "Islamic ethos" (Oweidat 2019), and "disability ethos" (Stones and Meyer 2020). For instance, Stones and Meyer are promoting positionality for people with disabilities when they argue for "a disability ethos of invention" that "creates spaces wherein people with disabilities can express individuality, promote understanding, and transform culture" (Stones and Meyer 2020, p. 2).

In this essay, I would like to strike a balance by focusing more on rhetorical ethos, through a discussion of "heavenly ethos" in classical Chinese rhetoric. But, before furthering my discussion, I wish to point out that the existence of two kinds of ethos marks a postmodern shift in contemporary scholarship and discourse practices: that is, from ethos as the individual, personal appeal of a rhetor to ethos as a collective consciousness embedded, evolved, and promoted within a society and its corresponding institutions, including its discourse systems. I would name the latter a "collective ethos," in the sense that it is projected beyond the selfhood of a rhetor and into realms of the "communal"

[1] Halloran (1975) summarizes Burkean rhetoric well: "The key term for a modern rhetoric is not persuasion but identification" (p. 626).

(Harris 1993, p. 125). This "collective" and "communal" ethos diverges from the model as described by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*.

Aristotle writes of ethos: "Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided" (Aristotle 1990, p. 153). In this way, Aristotle "emphasized the role a speaker's character plays in persuasion" (Baumlin 1994, p. xii). Further, this ethotic persuasion is "achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak" (Aristotle 1990, p. 153). That is to say, the rhetor must construct his material (his artistic proofs) to "make his own character look right" (Aristotle 1990, p. 160). To put it bluntly, an Aristotelian ethos can be "faked," since the textually-produced image functions independently of a rhetor's true character (assuming that "true character" exists).

Though Aristotle's ethos can be taken as "quintessentially a linguistic phenomenon" (Baumlin 1994, p. xxiii) made up of artistic proofs, it never gives up on its own categories of self and selfhood: ethos must be equated with the character of a rhetor in the form of self-representation in order for its persuasive function to be materialized—even though representation as such amounts to an artistic fabrication. The Aristotelian notion of ethos, it would seem, has trapped Western theorists for good, for they can never, in the truest sense of the phrase, "think outside the box" of self—even when that self is reduced to a social "mask" or a linguistic "I" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, p. 5). This situation is summed up well by Baumlin and Meyer: "it seems that any adequate 'map' or model of ethos will include *a version of self* and of its relation to culture and language" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, p. 4). But the question is: Is it possible to theorize ethos without having self or selfhood attached to it? Or, does rhetorical ethos have to be character-based? Is a self-less and character-less rhetoric conceivable? We might get an answer from early Chinese rhetoric, which will be discussed a little later.

A rhetor's character, writes Aristotle, "may almost be called the most effective *means* of persuasion he possesses" (Aristotle 1990, p. 154; emphasis added). Three qualities, he adds, "inspire confidence in the orator's own character": namely, "good sense, good moral character, and good will" (Aristotle 1990, p. 161). But bear in mind that, no matter what, character is just a means to an end in his scheme of ethos. The end is to "inspire *trust* in his audience" (Aristotle 1990, p. 161; emphasis added), to render the audience better disposed to what the rhetor wants it to hear or react to. But another question may be raised: do rhetors have to rely on textually-constructed character in order to build up trust? Or, are there any alternative paths? Early Chinese rhetoric may have an answer in its emphasis on sincerity (*xin*, *cheng*) and sincere speech (*cheng-yan*).

Kennedy suggests that the "moral rightness of the message" in Confucian and Daoist texts could constitute Chinese ethos (Kennedy 1998, p. 151), a point seemingly echoed in Lu's statement on Mencius' *cheng-yan* (i.e., sincere speech) (Lu 1998, p. 175).[2] Lu strikes a Mencian tone when asserting that *cheng-yan* also refers to "an innate moral quality out of which sincere and honest speech naturally and powerfully arise in our efforts to influence one another" (Lu 1998, p. 175). Her further claim that *cheng-yan* is "similar to Aristotle's notion of ethos" (Lu 1998, p. 175) seems a stretch, however, since *cheng-yan* is expressive of one's "innate moral quality," whereas Aristotelian ethos is a mode of persuasion out of artistic proof (and subject, thus, to manipulation). Nevertheless, "*cheng-yan* could be the closest shot in bridging the gap between Chinese and Western ethos," in that it has the effect of inspiring "trust" in Confucian rhetoric (Wei 2017, p. 25). And its rhetorical power is best illustrated by Mencius himself: "It never happens that genuine sincerity cannot move others; on the other hand, nobody would be moved if sincerity was not in place."[3]

[2] Mencius (390–305 B.C.) has been widely considered the second most important figure in the founding of Confucianism.

[3] My translation, based on the original Chinese version in *The Complete Four Books and Five Classics with Annotations*, edited by Han (1995). See "Li Lou (a)," *Mencius* (p. 261).

Mencius' *cheng-yan* reinforces a Confucian doctrine on rhetoric: that is, *xiu ci li qi cheng*, which can be roughly translated as "to cultivate words for the purpose of building trust" or, simply, as "rhetoric oriented towards sincereness."[4] Trust, or sincereness, or truthfulness, is a moral principle in Confucianism: "the aim of the noble man is to be *cheng*" (Goldin 1999, p. 104). Thus, *cheng-yan* can be viewed as "both the means to an end and the end itself of communication" (Lu 1998, p. 175). It differs from Aristotle's ethos in this respect, the latter being treated as a means only. Concomitantly, *cheng-yan* is reminiscent of Burkean "identification," which is seen as a strategy as well as the goal of rhetoric (Burke 1950).

In Confucian rhetoric, *cheng-yan* "focuses more on the appeal of language (i.e., *yan*) than on the very person who speaks or writes it, contrasting the emphasis placed on the appeal of the writer or speaker as a person in Western rhetoric" (Wei 2017, p. 26). This accords with a cultural tradition that downplays the role of an individual for the purpose of preserving social harmony; more significantly, it tells of a philosophical awareness of the structuring power of language in shaping human behavior (Hansen 1983; Graham 1989): hence Confucius' promotion of "rectification of names."[5] It may not seem too much to say that Confucius, as well as his followers such as Mencius, brought "poststructuralist" insights into ancient China, given their recognition that "language, as a social practice, mediates one's conduct" (Wei 2017, p. 26). This might explain, in a fundamental way, why "sincere speech," rather than "sincere personality," is emphasized in the Confucian ethos of *cheng-yan*.

Needless to say, human agency plays a lesser role (if any) in the Confucian model of ethos; in this respect, it contrasts with the Western model, the latter predicated on the premise of "the moral and, ultimately, theological inseparability of the speaker-agent from the speech-act" (Baumlin 1994, p. xiii). If a discourse is agent-less, then where do we locate a rhetor's own ethos? Admittedly, early Confucianism does speak of moral agency, but it is not so much of selfhood in an individual as of "human nature" in general terms (Van Norden 2000). According to Seok, an "active form of moral agency" can still be observed in Confucian discourse, but it is not based on "self-enclosed independency" but rather on "relational and interactive interdependency of communal agency" (Seok 2017). In short, human agency, in the form of asserting an autonomous individual self, is out of the picture in the Confucian tradition, which values and puts to use the performative function of language while at the same time advocating self-cultivation, self-restraint, and self-effacement as virtues that a *jun-zi* (i.e., a nobleman or gentleman in the spiritual sense) must possess.

My point is that the Aristotelian model of ethos, projected through the "identification of a speaker with/in his or her speech" (Baumlin 1994, p. xi), is not universal in application. For, if ethos is to function rhetorically for the purpose of gaining trust (as more broadly defined), then there is a way of formulating ethos without such identification: this is seen in the example of *cheng-yan* or "ethos of sincereness" in early Chinese rhetoric, where a rhetor's personal character matters little in delivering the rhetorical power of trust to move his audience. I have no intention to declare that a Chinese ethos is better. It is just different. The famous "agonistic Greeks vs. irenic Chinese" contrast put forth by Lloyd (1996) may sound a little dramatic, but it captures the difference in sociological footpaths that the ancient Greeks and Chinese had set for themselves: the former privileged personal gain or advancement, whereas the latter valued social harmony, thereby discouraging such gain or advancement. When translated into rhetorical practices, these differing worldviews underlie two vastly different traditions. The Athenian-based rhetoric takes an aggressive, "argue-to-win" approach, bringing into play a personalized speech whose owner (ultimately winner) must be identified: hence, its ethos is character driven, based on self-projection. To the contrary, the Daoist or Confucian rhetoric upholds the

[4] My translation, based on the original Chinese version in *The Complete Four Books and Five Classics with Annotations*, edited by Han (1995). See "Wen-Yan Zhuan," *Zhou Yi* (p. 439).

[5] Briefly put, this promotion reflects a realization that correctness in language could lead to correctness in human behavior.

virtue of conformity to the Way (or Dao), the ultimate source of harmony of all beings, a virtue that often leads to a rhetorical practice that "eschews persuasion and argumentation" (Lyon 2009, p. 178). In line with the doctrine of harmony, rhetoric is also depersonalized, a Chinese feature that renders baseless the identification of a rhetor with his text, hence the kind of ethos projected as self-less and character-less—all the more so if a "poststructuralist" view of language, shared among early Chinese thinkers, is taken into account for its conditioning power over humans.

That ethos, in the sense of inspiring trust, can be projected differently, from the perspective of early Chinese rhetoric, calls for a need "to *see* the history of rhetoric as culturally situated and embedded" (Lipson and Binkley 2004, p. 3; emphasis original). The purpose of this essay is indeed to highlight that need. In what follows, I will be further discussing the notion of ethos in early Chinese rhetoric by looking closely at a deeply revered concept in Chinese culture, *tian* (Heaven), which carries an ethotic function similar to the *skeptron*, as presented by Baumlin and Meyer following Bourdieu (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, pp. 7–8). Like the *skeptron*, *tian* can be used to "claim the cultural authority, expertise, trust, and means to speak and to be heard" (Baumlin 2020, p. 1). Through *tian* or Heaven, Chinese ethos is, in essence, an invocation of one's cultural heritage, with which rhetors identify themselves and, in doing so, create their ethotic appeals or appeals of their speeches/texts. I would call ethos as such a "collective ethos," in the sense that it has little to do with the individual qualities of a rhetor but much to do with a collective consciousness that defines, and is also defined by, Chinese culture in ancient times, as exemplified by Heaven.

2. Collective Ethos

It would be hard to imagine an ancient Chinese rhetor (*shui-ke*) standing above a crowd delivering an epideictic speech or engaging in a public debate, not because democracy failed to prevail in society, but because such a rhetorical behavior was completely out of character with a cultural tradition that discourages individuality but holds high instead the spirit of humility, collectivism, and adherence to social rituals (*li*). And there is one more reason, perhaps more important: that is, rhetoric in early China was hardly seen as an individual enterprise. Rather, it was practiced, socially, in the form of "collective workmanship" (Wei 2017), as typically seen in the production of the Chinese classics, such as Laozi's *Dao De Jing* (*Tao-Te Ching*) and Confucius' *Analects*.[6] These were created as collections of short essays, paragraphs, and axiomatic sentences written and rewritten by generations of disciples of Laozi and Confucius over a span of decades or even centuries. While the texts bear the name of Laozi or Confucius as a token of respect from disciples (Lewis 1999, p. 53), the historical master may have never contributed a single written word to the collection. What is significant about these textual collections is that their authorship appears to break away from all of the "self-structure" (Alcorn 1994, p. 3) associated with a Western ethos: character, personality, person(a), voice, image, and, above all, the self. None of these traits matters in the production of old Chinese texts.

"A theory of ethos," states Alcorn, "needs to be grounded in a relatively clear, but also relatively complex, understanding of the self" (Alcorn 1994, p. 4), but does this theory also apply to those Chinese classics, and, more broadly, to Chinese rhetoric in general? The question is self-explanatory, given the collective workmanship just mentioned. I would not say there is no such thing as ethos in the Chinese classics. To the contrary, the name of historical Laozi or Confucius carries ethotic weight and can be used effectively for the purpose of holding the *skeptron*; but that moniker does not necessarily denote the "inseparability of the speaker-agent from the speech-act" (Baumlin 1994, p. xiii), as commonly practiced in the Western tradition, let alone an ethos built upon and out of an individual rhetor's personal character.

[6] Laozi (570?–480? B.C.) is an early Chinese thinker and the founder of Daoism.

As a result of collective workmanship, early Chinese rhetoricians produced a body of classical texts unmatched by other cultures or civilizations of ancient times (Kennedy 1998). However, many of these texts are just repeated products (though with some variations), something I "discovered" years ago when doing research in a Beijing library. I would restrain from using the term "plagiarism" to describe the phenomenon; rather, it would be more appropriate to see it as a practice of "patterned rhetoric" (Schaberg 2001), where rhetors would strive to speak/write like one another so as to conform to the "order" and "terms" of "received language" (Schaberg 2001, p. 30). One cannot help noticing, from the patterned rhetoric, that "originality was discounted" (Oliver 1995, p. 361) and, further, that "eloquence was viewed as conforming oneself to discourse rituals that had been collectively valued and culturally sanctioned" (Wei 2017, p. 18). This would contrast sharply with the Western tradition, where "rhetoric is seen as an individual endeavor, identified with self-presentation, or even self-sell" (Wei 2017, p. 18). The Western sense of rhetoric, "as an avenue for the individual to achieve control," warrants "originality and individuality," notes Matalene (1985, p. 795).

This "patterned" rhetorical practice reflects, to a large extent, a cultural practice at large of relying on "received wisdom" to find solutions to the problems or issues of the current age. There was a deep-rooted belief among the early Chinese that the past was better than the present and that the "golden age" of the remote past—when the state was run as "a perfect embodiment of *dao*" (Liu and You 2009, p. 156) by sage-kings such as Yao and Shun[7]—ought to be emulated by all rulers through the restoration of *li* (ritualized systems).[8] This prominent feature of Chinese thinking is referred to as "the use of the historical appeal" (Cua 2000, p. 39) or, probably more exact, the appeal of "building on the wisdom of ancestors" (Kline 2000, p. 164). Kline explains: "Before the emergence of the ancient sages the world was in chaos," but "fortunately for Chinese civilization there arose sages who were able to create ritual forms and build lasting institutions that provided the framework for an ordered society and individual cultivation" (Kline 2000, p. 155). Hence the appeal to antiquity. A famous example would be Confucius himself, who "adopted history," as Liu and You have observed, "as an archetypical *topos*" in his rhetoric, which can be re-presented like this: "The past informs and guides the present" (Liu and You 2009, p. 158).

The historical appeal was practiced ubiquitously in early Chinese rhetoric. The reason is simple: it paves the path to the *skeptron*. Whoever speaks in the name of the ancestors can wave the *skeptron* of ethos, but this would—again—throw into question the Aristotelian notion of ethos as an individual appeal on the part of a rhetor, just as the abovementioned collective workmanship and patterned rhetoric would throw into question the agonistic notion of Athenian rhetoric as an individual enterprise. The reason is also simple: a Chinese ethos, in the form of historical appeal, has little to do with the personal character of a rhetor, upon which an Aristotelian ethos is sustained; rather, it is a cultural construct woven out of the collective consciousness of early Chinese society, a consciousness that holds fast to an inveterate belief in history and in the "wisdom" of legendary sage-kings, who are said to have possessed direct inspiration from the "divine" (Schwartz 1989, p. 26). I am using the term "cultural construct" to refer to a simple fact: such a belief cannot be attributed to any single figure or any particular period in Chinese history, but it has been passed on through generations as part of a cultural heritage. A rhetor's job, so to speak, is to build a connection with that heritage in order to appropriate the ethotic power that comes with it.

So, we might say that a Chinese ethos comes from without, as it is constructed out of a cultural heritage, as opposed to a Western ethos, which comes from within, being grounded in a rhetor's self or selfhood. This without/within contrast may explain, in a nutshell, how Chinese ethos "works" as a collective ethos versus its Western counterpart, which "works" as an individualistic ethos. Again, I would not say that a collective ethos is superior to an

[7] Legendary figures in Chinese history.

[8] In Confucianism, *li*, a ritualized system of institutions, plays a key part in keeping harmony in place.

individualistic ethos. It is just different. It reflects the uniqueness of Chinese rhetoric in its own development, and, more broadly, it reflects the cultural values and social institutions surrounding such development in ancient China—a point that will be discussed through the remainder of the essay, in the case of Heaven.

3. Heaven and the Dao

Any Westerner who has an extended exposure to classical Chinese texts would be struck by the "Chinese obsession" with Heaven (*tian*) and Heaven-related notions, such as the Mandate of Heaven (*tian-ming*), the Will of Heaven, the Way or Dao of Heaven, etc. In many ways, Heaven was to the Chinese what God was to Christians in the West (Goldin 1999).[9] However, despite its "omnipresence," the concept of Heaven did not appear as clearly articulated in those texts as the Judeo-Christian God was in the *Bible*. This is because a broad range of associations were carried with "Heaven": Lord-on-High, a cosmic moral order in the sense of the Dao, the "mediator" between humans and the Dao (Liu and You 2009), a physical object in the sense of the sky opposite to the earth, a metaphysical entity representing *Yang* (and complementary to Earth as *Yin*), nature, human nature, and fate or destiny, just to name a few. Ironically, the conceptual vagueness of Heaven turned out to be a rhetorical "advantage" to some rhetors (*shui-ke*), who would (mis)use Heaven to argue the unarguable and explain the unexplainable.

The multivalent meanings of Heaven may indicate a conceptual evolution that it had undergone in early Chinese thought. For example, according to Shun (1997, p. 15), in the early Zhou period (1066–771 B.C.), Heaven "was thought to be responsible for various natural phenomena, to have control over human affairs, and to have emotions and the capacity to act."[10] In addition, it represented "a source of political authority" for the Zhou kings, hence the Mandate of Heaven (Shun 1997, p. 15). But in the later Zhou, Heaven came to be known as a force for "rewarding the good and punishing the evil" and for "the preservation and destruction of states," a change that implies that the king was not the sole beneficiary of Heavenly authority (Shun 1997, p.16). During this period, Heaven was also seen as "the source of norms of conduct," so that a moral basis could be established for "the observance of *li* [rituals; rites]" (Shun 1997, p. 16).

Whatever differences in view of Heaven, the general consensus among scholars seems to be: for Confucius, the term referred to "a supreme, personal deity," but after him it was more and more associated with "a superior moral force or nature" (Ching 1997, p. 80). In the latter sense, Heaven came close to the concept of the Dao, the ultimate principle of governance in the universe for all beings and non-beings. In many classical texts, Heaven and the Dao were used interchangeably to represent the order of the divine and/or the natural, believed to be above or beyond that of the human. But very often Heaven would serve as an attendant notion of the Dao to suggest that the visible or the nameable (Heaven) is contingent upon the invisible or the nameless (Dao). For example, in his essay "On Heaven", Xunzi argued that "Heaven is governed by a constant Way (*tian you chang dao*)."[11] In *Dao De Jing*, Laozi claimed that "the nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth" (Laozi 1972, chp. 1), implying that "Heaven and earth are not the ultimate" (Schwartz 1989, p. 196).

In early Chinese thought, the term Dao was also used to refer to a variety of subjects, covering a range of references greater than Heaven. Philosophically, especially in the school of Daoism, it was meant as a metaphysical concept to represent the ultimate, which by definition remains "completely beyond human perception" (Kohn 1992, p. 46). This

[9] According to Ivanhoe and Norden (2001, p. 360), Heaven in pre-Qin China was "*not* primarily thought of as a place," and was "not connected with any explicit views about an afterlife," which may serve as a point of distinction from the Western concept of Heaven.

[10] Zhou refers to the Zhou Dynasty in Chinese history, roughly from 1066 to 221 B.C. The later Zhou included the "Spring-Autumn" (722–481 B.C.) and Warring-States (403–221 B.C.) periods, which historians often liken to the Axial period in the West.

[11] My translation, based on the original Chinese version in *Selected Readings from Famous Chinese Philosophers*. Vol. 1, edited by Shi (1988, p. 208). Xunzi was an ancient Chinese thinker (about 313–238 B.C.), arguably the third most important figure in the founding of Confucianism.

may add to the explanation why Heaven could be ambiguous, especially when used in association with the nameless.

4. The Dao, Truth, and Western Logocentrism

In this section and the next, I will explore the positions of truth and logic in ancient Chinese philosophy (and related epistemological issues), in hopes of "setting the stage" for further discussion of Heaven and its centrality to ethos in classical Chinese texts. In this passage from *Dao De Jing*, Laozi describes the Dao:

> Look, it cannot be seen—it is beyond form.
>
> Listen, it cannot be heard—it is beyond sound.
>
> Grasp, it cannot be held—it is intangible.
>
> These three are indefinable;
>
> Therefore they are joined in one.
>
> From above it is not bright;
>
> From below it is not dark:
>
> An unbroken thread beyond description.
>
> It returns to nothingness.
>
> The form of the formless,
>
> The image of the imageless,
>
> It is called indefinable and beyond imagination.
>
> Stand before it and there is no beginning.
>
> Follow it and there is no end. (Laozi 1972, chp. 14)

This passage could be easily dismissed as "elusive" by someone with a "positivist" attitude, but it addresses several philosophical issues widely discussed in Western post-modernism. It also registers an extraordinary similarity to the Vacuum Genesis theory of modern physics, which declares that the whole universe started from "absolute nothingness."[12] There is probably no need to elaborate on the "eternal emptiness" of the world from the point of view of Daoism, but we can sense a relevance in Laozi's passage to the questions of truth and language.

First, the Dao, or the ultimate reality, is considered beyond reach in early Chinese thought as it cannot be "seen," "heard," "held" or even "imagined." If we compare it with the transcendental truth framed in Platonic tradition, we may see an immediate difference. In *Gorgias*, Plato's Socrates asserts that truth, like "the great power of geometrical equality among both gods and men" (Plato 1990, p. 100), is accessible to humans if a rigorous reasoning, modeled after his dialectic, is conducted. Since Plato, Western philosophy has been driven by what Derrida (Derrida 1976, p. 11) calls "logocentrism," phrased after the Greek term *logos*. But what has been celebrated in the logocentric tradition is indeed Plato's idealistic notion that absolute truth can somehow be ascertained by humans.

To say that the absolute truth is beyond reach is one thing, but to say such truth does not exist in early Chinese thought is another. Indeed, the Dao is just another word for the absolute. However, unlike their Greek counterparts so possessed with rational demonstration in their quest for the absolute (supposedly independent of human intervention), ancient Chinese thinkers—at least the vast majority of them—appeared to take a "let-it-go" attitude towards it, so that they could redirect their attention to the worldly, promoting their moral or political agendas by utilizing what had already been accepted as true, such as the Dao. A. C. Graham, a noted Western Sinologist, sums it up this way: for Confucius and Laozi, "problem-solving without useful purpose is a pointless frivolity" (Graham 1989, p. 7). Graham's statement seems to reaffirm an earlier observation by Johnston, who

[12] See, for example, "The Creation of the Universe," PBS, 28 October 2003.

notes that the approach to truth in early Chinese philosophy is based on "a pragmatic, [...] not a logical or empirical justification" (Johnston 1976, p. 4). This assessment by Western scholars is also echoed by some Chinese. For instance, Liu and You hold that Confucius was "concerned chiefly with human affairs in his teaching, distancing himself from natural and metaphysical matters" (Liu and You 2009, p. 159). Logically, we may draw two implications from the aforementioned "let-it-go" attitude: first, that the pragmatic approach to truth would yield more space for rhetorical maneuvers (*shui* in Chinese); and second, that such an approach would blend rhetoric (in the realm of the acceptable or conventional) and philosophy (in the realm of the absolute or truthful) into one instead of separating them. This is seen in the example of *Dao De Jing*, which can be read as "a work of rhetoric" and also as a treatise on philosophy (Kowal 1995, p. 364).[13]

Second, Laozi's message can also be interpreted as a recognition that the ultimate truth, if any, cannot be conveyed through language, because it is "indefinable" and "beyond description." Again, we can feel the difference between Laozi and Plato. The latter believes that "the truth behind appearances can be delineated" by a language that is "more analytical, objective, and dialectical" (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990, p. 56). Put simply, for Laozi, the truth is ineffable, but for Plato it can be effable if the right language is in place. A careful reader can see that Laozi poses a paradox by speaking the unspeakable in *Dao De Jing*. On the other hand, Plato also poses a paradox, though in a different way. For, the infinite truth would stop being infinite the moment it turned into a linguistic entity in the hands of mundane humans. In other words, are humans really capable of using the finite (language) to describe the infinite?

5. Logic and Its Position in Chinese Rhetoric

Plato is known for his hostility towards rhetoric, but he never abandons rhetoric; rather, he advocates "good rhetoric," cleansed of emotive and irrational elements that he fears can induce "flattery" (Plato 1990, p. 96). Clearly, Plato sees logic, or logos (as Derrida would call it), as the defining element of "good rhetoric." We know that Aristotle has made a vigorous defense of rhetoric, declaring it "the counterpart of Dialectic" (Aristotle 1990, p. 151), but, like his teacher, he too privileges logic, as seen in his statement about enthymemes, which he claims "are the substance of rhetorical persuasion." In many ways, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* can be read as "a popular logic" (Cooper 1960, p. xx). That Plato and Aristotle and, by extension, the logocentricism of Western philosophy (and rhetoric) privilege logic seems self-explanatory, as logic operates, conveniently, on the premise of truth: whoever knows how to apply logic grasps, in Derrida's words, the "signifier" and "signification of *truth*" (Derrida 1976, p. 10; emphasis original).

Logic, as a special language formulation, was not completely alien to early Chinese philosophers and rhetoricians; rather, it just did not enjoy the status it had with Plato, Aristotle, and other Greeks. As Schaberg demonstrates in his analysis of passages in the *Zuo Zhuan*, "the syllogism was among the techniques of proof available to early Chinese speakers and writers" (Schaberg 2001, p. 41).[14] He uses the following as an example: "one who is the object of awe, concern, modeling, and imitation has *weiyi* [dignity and deportment]; King Wen[15] was the object of awe, concern, modeling, and imitation; therefore King Wen had *weiyi*" (Schaberg 2001, p. 41).

What appears to distinguish the ancient Chinese from the ancient Greeks is that the former generally did not share the same degree of "rigor" with the latter, for two reasons. One reason is that Chinese writers or speakers were pragmatic: if everything is

[13] Western rhetoric seeks the probable (that is, things approximating truth) for its rational appeal; Chinese pragmatism, however, would look for what is acceptable (*ke*), morally and socially, with truth out of the picture. The former is epistemological in approach; the latter is largely cultural (and therefore conventional).

[14] *Zuo Zhuan* is one of the classics in the Confucian canon.

[15] Founder of the Zhou Dynasty (1171–1122 B.C), widely regarded as a sage-king in Chinese history.

already made clear, then the conclusion can be "left implicit."[16] The other reason is that the Chinese preferred to have "logical demonstration" (*apodeixis*) and "showy display" (*epideixis*) "intertwined" in texts (Schaberg 2001, p. 41), a point that appears to confirm what was suggested earlier: the pragmatic approach to truth would blend the rhetorical and the philosophical into one. Overall, however, ancient Chinese writers/speakers would pay much more attention to the former, as rhetorical "elegance [was] paramount, in classical texts such as the *Zou Zhuan* and *Guo Yu*[17] (Schaberg 2001, p. 30).

Apart from sporadic pieces of "logical" writing collected in the aforementioned Confucian classics, pre-Qin China also saw a brief episode of "rationalism," as represented by Mozi (480–420 B.C.) and his school of thought, Mohism. While Mozi and his followers did not formalize logic in the Aristotelian fashion, their "logical sophistication" (Graham 1989, p. 137) has been widely recognized by both Chinese and Western theorists. The early Mohists were primarily concerned over "problems of morals and government," but the Neo-Mohists extended their inquiry into such areas as "logical puzzles, geometry, optics, mechanics, economics" (Graham 1989, p. 137). Mohism has, however, been traditionally viewed as an anti-Confucian, anti-establishment movement. Despite a brief period of thriving in pre-Qin China, its status in the development of Chinese philosophy has remained at best "secondary" (Graham 1989, p. 7), if not marginal.

Due to a renewed interest in Mohism and other schools of rationalism (e.g., School of Naming) in recent decades, many contemporary Chinese scholars feel the "urge" to challenge the "bias" of Western scholars who hold that "Chinese rhetoric is not interested in logic" (Lu 1998, p. 31). For example, Zhi-Tie Dong draws a comparison between Aristotle's logic and Chinese "naming" and "arguing" (largely based on Mohism) and concludes that the latter, despite its lesser degree of formalism, represents "the study of logic in ancient China" (Dong 1998, pp. 4, 190). Xing Lu, for another example, argues that Western theorists have been wrong in using their own rhetorical terminology to judge Chinese rhetoric, for they 'are "unfamiliar" with terms in Chinese "associated with the classical Greek meaning of *logos*" (Lu 1998, p. 37).

The arguments of these Chinese scholars may have merit, but elevating Chinese rhetoric to the "logical" status may suggest, on their part, a misunderstanding of the cultural and intellectual circumstances in which that rhetoric has been practiced. The quest for truth has been part and parcel of the logocentrism of Western philosophy, but this has never been the case within the Chinese tradition. Because the mainstream philosophers in ancient China, who were also rhetoricians, were "pragmatic" about truth, they were generally not particularly interested in using logic—both as the "signifier" and "signification of truth" by Western standards—to demonstrate the absolute. Yes, logic or logos did have its presence in classical Chinese texts, but it was rarely considered the substance of rhetoric due to Chinese rhetors' "faith" in the "incontrovertibility" of "received definitions and texts" (Schaberg 2001, p. 42). In other words, for those rhetors, received wisdom was more important, and perhaps more useful, than something that had to be rigorously proven or demonstrated. Based on my readings of classical texts, even a rationalist such as Mozi would frequently have to resort to "Heaven" to hammer out his argument. So, I would say that the assessment by some of the Western theorists, such as Oliver, that "Chinese rhetoric is not interested in logic" is basically "*ke*" (acceptable), even though it may sound a bit belittling to those who are attempting to "rationalize" classical Chinese rhetoric.[18] Once more, this does not mean that "the Chinese do not speak or write in ways that presume the

[16] For a Chinese, something such as "all swans are white, and this is a swan" is enough; the conclusion, "therefore this swan is white," is self-evident and can be left unsaid. As an added note, Aristotle prefers to leave the premises implicit because of the concern that "a tight logical argument is not effective in rhetoric" (Kennedy 1980, p. 71), seemingly contrasting the Chinese preference for an implicit conclusion.

[17] Also one of the classics in Confucian canon.

[18] The word "*ke*" (acceptable) was characteristically used in classical Chinese texts when a judgment was called for, in contrast to the frequent use of "true" or "valid" in similar situations in Western texts. This may also serve as an example of how ancient Chinese in general were not particularly interested in strict logical demonstrations. For practical reasons, what is "acceptable" would have a wider range of applications than what is "true" or "valid" based on logical demonstration.

facticity of assertions. It is only that there is little interest in raising the issue of facticity or literalness to the level of speculation and theory" (Hall and Ames 1998, p. 135).

6. Ethos as a Cultural Construct

The seemingly unshakable "faith" in "received definitions and texts" (Schaberg 2001, p. 42) may have constituted a rhetorical strategy in itself. Because it was "never open to question," such a faith, Schaberg contends, "encouraged a looseness of form in proofs" (Schaberg 2001, p. 42). For pragmatic reasons, an argument using Heaven to "bluff" others would be easier to make than one relying on a rigid process of rational demonstration, which could well turn out to be a linguistic "drab," given the cultural penchant for rhetorical elegance. I might add that faith in the past, in the form of the historical appeal (as discussed earlier), is still widely observed in today's China. The practice of "repeating set phrases and maxims, following patterns, and imitating texts" (Matalene 1985, p. 804) is especially true in documents produced by the government offices and speeches made by government officials.

Aside from being pragmatic, the emphasis on received wisdom can also be seen as a conscious effort on the part of rhetors to utilize what had already been culturally accepted or established in the past to construct appeals to their own contemporary audiences—a point that I made earlier when speaking of the collective nature of Chinese ethos as a cultural heritage. The variables of such wisdom, such as the Dao, *Yin-Yang*, Heaven, and Confucianism, are all cultural formulations belonging to an early Chinese tradition. This would further explain why Chinese ethos is essentially a cultural, and therefore a collective, construct. As Kennedy observes, the "tradition of the ancestors who continue to watch the living" (Kennedy 1998, p. 151) plays an important role in creating Chinese ethos. This confirms the significance of the cultural in shaping how the Chinese present their ethos (through the ancestral lineage, for example). The remainder of this section will look at the early Chinese rhetorical tradition and its ethotic uses of Heaven as the ultimate source of authority.

For obvious reasons, whoever succeeded in appropriating the power of Heaven or placing himself under the "blessings" of Heaven would conveniently have the *skeptron* (ethos or source of ethos) in his hands to do what might otherwise be thought of as morally incomprehensible: for example, usurping the throne or conquering another kingdom. That is why every founder of a dynasty in Chinese history would invariably claim to inherit *tian-ming* (the Mandate of Heaven) for "the establishment of new regimes" (Lu 1998, p. 50), and kings or emperors would never hesitate to claim the title of *tian-zi* (the Son of Heaven) to ensure their authority as "the ultimate rulers of human affairs" (Lu 1998, p. 55). *Shi Jing* (*Book of Poetry*) contains numerous lines describing how King Wen, founder of the Zhou, had been granted a "command" (*ling*) from Heaven to overthrow the Shang and establish his own dynasty. [19] This is seen, for example, in the stanza of Da Ming:

> The Mandate came from Heaven
> Commanding this King Wen
> To rename the kingdom as Zhou and establish its capital in Haojing
> And to marry an heiress from the state of Shen.
> She later bore King Wu,
> The elder son [of King Wen] who continued the course [of the farther].
> Blessed by Heaven, he [King Wu] carried on the Mandate,
> Coordinating military attacks against the Great Shang.[20]

[19] The Shang Dynasty (around 1600–1066 B.C.). King Zhou, the last ruler of the Shang, is historically perceived as personally responsible for the demise of the dynasty because of his "wicked" rule. In *Shi Jing* and other early classics, he often serves to exemplify how a bad ruler is doomed by the Will of Heaven.

[20] My translation, based on the original Chinese version in *The Complete Four Books and Five Classics with Annotations*, edited by Han (1995). See "Da Ya," *Shi Jing* (p. 753).

Shang Shu (*Book of Documents*), among other classics, contains similar passages of how King Wu used the Mandate of Heaven to "spin" his political ethos—as seen, for example, in a "motivational speech" delivered to his generals and soldiers:

> Heaven always shows its mercy to the people, and the ruler must obey the Will of Heaven. Jie of the Xia disobeyed Heaven above and therefore caused grave calamities all over on Earth.[21] That is why Heaven granted its Mandate to Cheng Tang,[22] to terminate the Dynasty of Xia. Today, the crimes of the king [Zhou] far exceed those committed by Jie. He persecutes the innocent and sends them into exile; he punishes and butchers his ministers who try to voice an honest opinion. He claims to have the Mandate of Heaven, yet dares to say that to revere Heaven is useless, that sacrificial ceremonies produce nothing good, and that his despotic practices won't hurt society. He is thus not far away from his own demise, as shown by the example of Jie. That is why Heaven confers the turn on me to rule the country. Plus, the dream I dreamed accords with the signs revealed through divination: They both tell good fortunes ahead, predicting an inevitable victory over the Shang. It is true that he has followers in millions, but they are shallow and ignorant. It is true that I have only ten ministers, but they are highly capable, knowing fully well how to govern the country and having a strong determination of working together for me. Surrounding oneself with crowds of cronies is nothing compared with leading a few men defined by virtue.
>
> My people have witnessed what Heaven has witnessed [i.e., the ills of the day]; my people have heard what Heaven has condemned. If the people are complaining [of the social ills], I cannot stand aside; I have the sole responsibility to react. Now, I will lead my troops to charge forward.[23]

It is not necessary to perform a lengthy rhetorical analysis to point out the complexity of modes of appeals that King Wu applied and to show their relevance to the historical, cultural context in which the audience was addressed; it is important, nonetheless, to know that the passage quoted above from *Shang Shu* displays a high level of rhetorical technique long before the time of Confucius.[24] For instance, logic—especially in the Aristotelian category of "historical example" (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990, p. 147)—was applied to show that the Shang Dynasty would be doomed because of its despotic king, Zhou. The use of "example" could be summarized thus: King Jie disobeyed Heaven, hence the destruction of his dynasty. Now King Zhou is disobeying Heaven, his dynasty is approaching an end, too. There is little doubt that King Wu was using this "example" to legitimize his military attacks against the Shang as well as to advise his listeners that victory would be on his side.

However, we may also sense a subjugation of logos to ethos in the speech, given that the use of logic is dependent on the Will of Heaven—the basis of King Wu's ethos or, in Schwartz's words, "the ultimate source of the king's authority" (Schwartz 1989, p. 29). In fact, the whole argument would collapse if his ethos could not be sustained by the invocation of Heaven. For example, if Heaven did not exist, or if Heaven did not punish Jie (but rather Jie caused his own failure), then it would be useless for King Wu to present his ethos as the inheritor of a heavenly mandate (as in "Heaven confers the turn on me to rule"); this would in turn render "invalid" the application of a "logical" example that links Jie's fall to the prospect of Zhou's fall. (At least, there is no way to tell that Heaven chooses King Wu to execute its mandate.) But what appears ludicrous to a modern mind made perfect sense to King Wu and his audience, because the king's claim "to a special

[21] Jie, the last king of the Xia Dynasty, established around 2100 B.C. and conquered by the Shang around 1600 B.C. Historically, Jie, together with Zhou (earlier mentioned), is an embodiment of despotism. But unlike Zhou, the existence of Jie is not positively supported by historical evidence.

[22] Founder of the Shang, one of the legendary sage-kings in Chinese history.

[23] My translation, based on the original Chinese version in *The Complete Four Books and Five Classics with Annotations*, edited by Han (1995). See "Tai Shi (middle section), Book of the Zhou," *Shang Shu* (p. 1434).

[24] *Shang Shu* is historically classified as a pre-Confucius classic, though Confucius and his disciples may have played a role in its editing or even revising.

relation to Heaven" had been quite established in early Chinese thought for both "political" and "religious" reasons (Schwartz 1989, p. 43). In this sense, we might say that King Wu's ethos—in the name of the Mandate of Heaven—is a cultural construct of his time.

Schwartz and Ching, among others, have traced the permeance of Heaven in Chinese culture and its association with kingship in Chinese thought to the practice of shamanism in early stages of Chinese civilization. "The emergence of Ti [Heaven]" with its supreme power, speculates Schwartz, "may be associated with the theological meditations of shamans and other religious specialists who were in the royal entourage" (Schwartz 1989, p. 30).[25] In that "motivational speech" quoted above, King Wu's accusation that King Zhou did not revere Heaven may be seen as a recognition of Heaven's "ultimate sovereignty" (Schwartz 1989, p. 30) over all humans under Heaven, including the king. The mention of "sacrificial ceremonies" and "divination" by King Wu is suggestive of the practices of a shamanistic or religious nature in the early stages of Chinese civilization—practices that were used to reveal the power of the divine and to confirm "the king's claim to a monopoly of access to Ti" (Schwartz 1989, p. 30).

In *Mysticism and Kingship in China*, Ching shows that Chinese kings of the early ages were often "shamanic figures" themselves (Ching 1997, p. xiii).[26] For obvious reasons, those "shamanic kings," as well as "their heirs," "fabricated the tales of divine ancestry" to create the "mystical" role of kingship as "mediator between Heaven and Earth" (Ching 1997, pp. xii–iii). The legends of "sage-kings," who have "semi-divine attributes and the ability to maintain communication with the divine" (Ching 1997, p. 67), were indeed the invention of "later times"—possibly by Confucius, Mencius, and other pre-Qin thinkers—who created the "myth" of sage-kings "for the sake of having real rulers emulate such mythical figures" (Ching 1997, p. xii). Confucians and the like may have invented the "sage-king" myth for the purpose of promoting their own moral or political agendas; but in doing so, they were also, wittingly or unwittingly, institutionalizing the office of kingship, together with its "heavenly" authority, just as those shamanic kings in the earlier period had used sacrificial ceremonies, divination, ancestral worship, and other ritualistic practices to institutionalize their rule over all under Heaven. In a way, this may explain why Confucianism was later "declared the official creed of the nation" by the court of the Han (in the second century B.C.), and Confucian classics "became the principal study, if not the sole, of all scholars and statesmen" in post-Qin China (De Bary et al. 1960, p. 19). But perhaps we are witnessing something even more significant here: the institutionalizing (Confucianism) finally turns into the institutionalized.

Though Ching does not use the word "ethos" to describe the authority of the king's "mandate," the following excerpt is quite telling in terms of how ethos was created for the king and how it was institutionalized for its own sustention:

> ... the charisma associated with shamanic ecstasy created the aura for the office of kingship, giving it a sacred, even a priestly character. But this charisma was eventually institutionalised and routinised, by a line of men who no longer possessed the gifts for summoning the spirits and deities. To support their power, however, they frequently resorted to the suggestion of charisma and of divine favour. They fabricated tales of divine or semi-divine origins; they consulted with the deities and spirits through divination, sacrifices, and other rituals. Such examples abounded in the rest of Chinese history. (Ching 1997, p. xii)

It will probably not change the semantics of "charisma," "aura," or "divine favour" if we substitute them here with the rhetorical term "ethos." But what is more revealing is the fact that the power of early Chinese kingship clearly depends on the creation or fabrication of ethos or, in Ching's words, of "charisma," "aura," "a sacred and priestly character," etc.

[25] *Ti*, also *Di* or *Shang-Di* in Chinese (i.e., Lord on High), was the god worshipped by people of the Shang Dynasty. It was replaced by Heaven in the Zhou Dynasty, but with the meaning remaining the same.

[26] For example, the author cites a study by the Japanese scholar, Kato Joken, as saying that King Wen and his son, King Wu, were both "shamans" (p. 17).

The association of ethos with "power" helps explain why it (i.e., ethos) was eventually "institutionalised and routinised," but we may push the argument further: the reason ethos is institutionalized is precisely because it partakes in the process of institutionalizing kingship and its power. Hence the conclusion that ethos and power, or the institutionalizing and the institutionalized, imply each other and are intertwined.

Perhaps we can push the argument even further: if logos is the "signifier" and "signification" of truth in the Western tradition of "logocentrism," then ethos is certainly the "signifier" and "signification" of power in the Chinese tradition of what I would have to call "ethocentrism."[27] The notion of ethocentrism, I believe, should explain, in the fundamental way, why ethos has taken center stage in the development of Chinese, especially classical Chinese, rhetoric. (With this ethocentrism in mind, Westerners may better appreciate why the notion of face, which is also sort of ethos, has carried such a massive weight in the life and thought of the Chinese.)

7. Ethos as an Institutionalized Discourse Formation

Because of the cruciality of shamanic ethos (or charisma) in sustaining the power of kingship, the creation of such ethos (which, in postmodernist jargon, we might say is a discourse practice or a function of discourse practice) was well incorporated into the institutions of the early Chinese dynasties. For example, the Shang Dynasty set up the offices of *Duo-Bu* and *Zhan* specially to take charge of divination, and the *wu* (shaman) at the time was the official bureaucrat responsible for mediating between gods or spirits and humans (Guo 1976, p. 208). In the Zhou Dynasty, the *shamanic* bureaucracy became even more complex and more powerful,[28] given their status as ranked second only to the king. In fact most of the six highest-ranking offices, such as *Tai-Zhu* (Grand Invocator, in charge of sacrificial ceremonies), *Tai-Bu* (Grand Diviner), and *Tai-Zong* (Grand Genealogist, in charge of recording royal lineage), were directly responsible for religious or shamanic practices (Guo 1976, p. 265). The bureaucratic system of the Shang or the Zhou went, of course, beyond the periphery of shamanism, but we could see that the system was quite dedicated to mystifying (and, in doing so, to sustaining) the authority or power of kingship—which it achieved by suggestion of divine or heavenly charisma, aura, etc., in connection with the state-run, institutionalized apparatus of signification (such as divination and sacrificial ceremonies).[29] And the remark made by King Wu, in a speech quoted earlier, that "the dream I dreamed accords with the signs revealed through divination," can thus be taken as a strategy of ethos signifying his relation to Heaven and, as such, implying his Heaven-bestowed power as well.

The "bizarre machinery"—as Foucault (1972, p. 135) would call it—involved in the process of signifying the ethos and therefore the power of early Chinese kingship is a good example of Foucault's thesis in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*: namely, that discourses are institutionalized formations (as in the case of heavenly ethos in China) "made possible by a group of relations [...] established between institutions, economical and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization" (Foucault 1972, pp. 44–45). He goes on to suggest that the power of institutions, etc., cannot escape the "totality" of discourse (Foucault 1972, p. 55) because, after all, discourses are "practices that systematically form the object of which they speak" (Foucault 1972, p. 49). I do not wish to dwell on Foucault's discourse theory, but it

[27] By ethos as "signifier" of power, I mean that ethos has the function of signifying the power, say, of Chinese kingship; by ethos as "signification" of power, I mean such power is also implied in the process of the signification, for example, in the case of institutionalization. And I believe Derrida is suggesting the same—truth is signified by logos and at the same time is implied by logos. Or, I might put it this way: because of truth, that is why we have logos as signifier; because of logos as signification, that is why we have truth. Likewise, because of power, the Chinese king has ethos to signify it; because of ethos as signification, that is why the Chinese king has power!

[28] Ching believes that "religious fervor had greatly diminished" during the Zhou times (8), but I doubt it happened right away in the beginning of the Zhou. Since the Zhou covered a span of over 800 years, it is more likely (and even certain) that religious or shamanic practices played a lesser role in the political system in the later periods of the dynasty.

[29] As Schwartz points out, the king is "in some sense the 'high priest' of the worship of *Ti* [Heaven]" (p. 35).

is important to point out the obvious: that is, the mutually-defining relationship that Foucault describes between the institutionalized (i.e., discourse) and the institutionalizing (i.e., the authorizing institutions) is applicable to the "ethocentric" system of signification in the early ages of Chinese civilization, where ethos and power were mutually implying each other.[30]

So far, I have explained the central position of ethos in the development of early Chinese rhetoric by focusing on its intertwinement with divine power in early shamanic or religious practices—practices that often served to link the authority of kingship to that of Ti or Heaven. This point, as I have argued, helps explain the centrality of Heaven to Chinese ethos. Shamanism in early Chinese culture ought not to be dismissed as "utter nonsense."[31] It is more important to see its practice as a way of signification reflective "of the needs or desires of society and institutions and of available methods [...] of coming to know something," to quote Bizzell and Herzberg (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990, p. 1127). The unique historicity of the early shamanic or religious practices, of the methods of knowing and signifying characteristic of such practices, and, finally, of the association of ethos with power intimated with such practices and methods, ought to lead us to conclude that Chinese ethos, as a discourse formation, is fundamentally a function of a cultural heritage rather than a creation of a personal image making (as ethos, again, is typically perceived in Western rhetorical tradition).

8. A Philosophical Paradigm

The fact that Heaven has played such a crucial role in creating Chinese ethos may prompt one to speculate whether or not the rampant (ab)use of Heaven in classical texts might have something to do with a human desire to appropriate Heaven to "boost" the ethos of the writers behind those texts. While the king may control access to Heaven, it is fair game for anybody else to say that he has the *zhi* (knowing) of how Heaven operates: for example, in terms of punishing evil or bringing down good to those who have diligently obeyed *tian-ming*, or the Mandate of Heaven. (In many cases, the king would need such claims to support his own authority.) As Dong Zhong-Shu (179?–104? B.C.), the leading Confucian scholar of the Han Dynasty,[32] once said: "[To know] is to predict accurately. [...] The person who knows can see fortune and misfortune a long way off, and can anticipate benefit and harm" (Ching 1997, p. 5).[33] From that statement, we can infer that the *zhi* in ancient Chinese society implied some sort of knowing about Heaven (allowing one to "see fortune and misfortune a long way off" or "anticipate benefit and harm") that was not monopolized by the king. In the *Analects*, Confucius is presented as someone who knows the Dao of Heaven, being blessed by "a special relationship with Heaven" (Ching 1997, p. 79), which I think can be taken as a rhetorical move on the part of his followers to add to the appeal of the Great Master. Confucius claims that he is the one who understands "the Mandate of Heaven" and lashes out at "the petty person" for failing to appreciate the Mandate (Ivanhoe and Norden 2001, p. 43, 50). But, again, we may interpret this as a strategy of ethos, used to legitimize his moral mission to restore the *li* of the early Zhou times, which the historical Confucius believed was "the Golden Age of humankind" (Ivanhoe and Norden 2001, p. 1).

[30] The fact that the power of kingship is implied by a system of signification suggests that the system can sometimes override the power of the king. For example, according to Legge (1963), *Yi-Jing* (the *Book of Changes*, used as a divination manual) has intimations that "only defensive war, or war waged by the rightful authority to put down rebellion or lawlessness, is right," that "the younger men [. . .] would cause evil if allowed to share [power] with the oldest son," etc., (*The I Ching*, p. 24), suggesting that the king has to follow what has been unveiled through divination, or signification. Similarly, Ching (1997) points out that the kingship system, which includes the system of signification, "became a factor that restrained a ruler's arbitrary exercise of authority, and sometimes functioned as an ultimate control over state power itself" (p. 34).

[31] The fact that so many Chinese and Western scholars are still fascinated by *Yi-Jing*, which was written starting in the twelfth century B.C. as a divination manual, is quite telling about the shamanic wisdom.

[32] The Han was the first post-Qin dynasty in Chinese history, lasting from 206 B.C. to 220 A.D.

[33] Dong is credited as the most important figure in Chinese history for establishing Confucianism as the official creed of the nation.

But perhaps a more "logical" explanation regarding the "high-frequency" occurrence of Heaven in classical Chinese texts, one seemingly supported by documentary evidence, is a philosophical longing among the ancient Chinese for "seeking a higher consciousness of oneness with the universe" (Ching 1997, p xiii)—which may be rephrased as "maintaining harmony with nature," "striving for unity between man and nature, and between man and the Dao," etc. The idea is that humankind is part of nature or the universe, and therefore, like anything else, is governed by Heaven as a "guiding Providence" (De Bary et al. 1960, p. 17). This sort of idealism, believed to form a philosophical paradigm in early Chinese thought (Ching 1997, pp. 99–131), underpins almost all the schools of philosophy in pre-Qin China, particularly Daoism and Confucianism.

For Daoism, "Heaven's net casts wide," with nothing to slip through "its meshes" (*Dao De Jing*, chp. 73). It advocates "caring for others and serving heaven" (chp. 59) and "realiz[ing] one's true nature" by leading a life of "simplicity," "cast[ing] off selfishness," and "temper[ing] desire" (chp. 19). Its ideal of *wu-wei* or doing-nothing (chp. 2) is sometimes seen by Westerners as a "nihilistic" manifestation, but actually it carries a political message for rulers in, for example, advising them against using a heavy hand in governing (chp. 58). Morally speaking, *wu-wei* cautions people not to be obsessed with material gains, for the "Tao [Dao] of heaven is to take from those who have too much and give to those who do not have enough" (chp. 77). The nihilistic overtone probably comes from the notion of "non-striving" as embedded in *wu-wei*; but, as T. Merton (1965, p. 24) explains, Daoism actually emphasizes conforming one's action to the "divine and spontaneous mode [...] of action" of the Dao, which remains the "source of all good." So, philosophically, we may say that the ideal of *wu-wei*, and Daoism at large, has formulated "an expression of the continuum between the human being as the microcosm of the universe as macrocosm" (Ching 1997, p. xi).

"The Dao of Heaven" stands at the core of Confucius' call for the return of *li* and for moral rectitude.[34] For the Great Master, the consummate ritual system (*li*), established by the Zhou founders, King Wen, King Wu, and the Duke of Zhou[35], has carried within it "a set of sacred practices" (Ivanhoe and Norden 2001, p. 1) embodying the Dao of Heaven. Therefore, his teachings on *li* can be regarded as an attempt to "lead his fallen world back to the Dao, 'Way,' of Heaven" (Ivanhoe and Norden 2001, p. 2). Once Confucius claimed, "though my studies are lowly, they penetrate the sublime on high. Perhaps after all I am known—by Heaven" (De Bary et al. 1960, p. 22), thus linking his teachings to the order of the divine. At another time he uttered, "If I have done anything contrary to the Way, may Heaven reject me! May Heaven reject me!" (Ivanhoe and Norden 2001, p. 18), implying that the Dao of Heaven is the ultimate guiding principle for all human actions. But then what exactly is the Dao of Heaven for Confucius? An excerpt from the *Analects* gives us a clue:

> Confucius said: "I wish I did not have to speak at all." Tzu Kung [his student] said: "But if you did not speak, Sir, what we disciples pass on to others?" Confucius said: "Look at Heaven there. Does it speak? The four seasons run their course and all things are produced. Does Heaven speak?" (De Bary et al. 1960, p. 30)

The Great Master seems to pose a paradox for himself by suggesting that true knowledge is not to be taught or learned but rather comes directly from Heaven, a point that rings quite similar to Socrates' "soul knowledge."[36] For, if this were true, his sacred mission of

[34] The word *dao* literally means "path" or "way" in Chinese. It is used metaphorically to refer to some sort of transcendent governing force of the universe in Chinese philosophy. "The Dao of Heaven" (*tian-dao*), which occurs in the *Analects* (Section 5), could have two connotations: The one is that Heaven itself is governed by the Dao; the other is that Heaven is representative of the Dao. Either way, we can see that Heaven serves as an attendant notion of the Dao, pointing to some kind of absolute truth beyond.

[35] The brother of King Wu (1043–1036 B.C.). After King Wu died, he served as the prince regent, resisting the advice of many to usurp the throne, hence widely regarded as a paragon of virtue by later generations. Historically, he is more significant for his role in establishing and perfecting the rituals and institutions of the Zhou Dynasty, the model for *li* to Confucians.

[36] See, for example, the *Meno* in *The Collected Dialogues of* Plato (1961), where Socrates says that "the truth about reality is always in our soul" (p. 371) and that "there is no such thing as teaching, only recollection" (p. 364).

transmitting the wisdom about the Dao of Heaven would certainly lose its practicable basis. That aside, we may sense that Heaven as referred to by Confucius is indeed "a natural order" (De Bary et al. 1960, p. 17), which does not speak but yet reveals itself through the cycle of four seasons, the growth of ten thousand things, etc.[37] For Confucius, such an order carries norms (as in the "season-comes-season-goes" cycle), or messages of the Dao, which he believes must translate into "a moral order" (De Bary et al. 1960, p. 17) in society. So, the idea of *li* is really about the norm of human behavior, as seen, for example, in his motto: "Rulers must act like rulers, subjects like subjects, fathers like fathers, and sons like sons."

In a word, Confucius' teachings, like Laozi's, fit into the philosophical paradigm described earlier of ancient Chinese thought: the oneness of Heaven and humanity (*tian-ren he-yi*). But Daoism and Confucianism have different leanings: Daoism, in general, is more interested in transcending humanity to the Dao of Heaven, whereas Confucianism is more intent on applying the Dao of Heaven to this world, focusing on what is right for human mortals.[38] The "Dao," as Schwartz points out, has thus become "Confucius' inclusive name for the all-embracing normative human order" (Schwartz 1989, p. 63).

9. Oneness of Ethos and Logos

If we take a closer look at Heaven in Daoism or Confucianism and Heaven in earlier shamanic practices as the ultimate source of ethos for the king, we may realize that these two "Heavens" actually refer to two different concepts: in the former case, Heaven represents an impersonal, natural process, more or less in the category of truth (e.g., transcendent truth), whereas in the latter, Heaven is a personal god or a supreme deity, more or less in the category of power (e.g., the power of awarding the good and punishing the evil). Thus, the word "Heaven" has symbolized what Westerners would see as an antithesis: an "active conscious will" and the "source of universal order" (Schwartz 1989, p. 51) or, to put it in philosophical terms, "the category of ontological creativity and the categories of the primary cosmology" (Neville 1991, p. 72).

Many hypotheses have been proposed to solve this puzzle, ranging from the dismissal that the Chinese mind does not know the distinction between theism and non-theism to the admiration that it is more "inclusive" and "balanced," and therefore able to reconcile what appears irreconcilable to the Westerner (e.g., Neville 1991, pp. 48–74). I have no intention to get into the debate, but I do wish to point out the obvious, something I have mentioned earlier: namely, that Heaven had gone through a conceptual evolution in early Chinese thought—for example, from Lord-on-High worshiped by the Shang people to the "source of norms of conduct" revered by Confucians. Undoubtedly, such an evolution has caused a semantic "problem" for Heaven as a concept—its ambiguity, one of those "corrupting elements" that a positivist feels ought to be purged for the sake of "the reasonableness of discourse" (Bennett 1976, p. 244). However, citing Kenneth Burke, Bennett argues that ambiguity can actually prove an advantage, in that it "makes possible the transformation by means of which a symbolic act develops" (Bennett 1976, p. 247). Burke's analysis of the speeches on love in the *Phaedrus*, says Bennett, illustrates this advantage: because of "the ambiguity of 'love'," the transformation in speech by Socrates, from erotic love to divine love and finally to "the principles of loving speech," can be made possible (Bennett 1976, p. 248).

Likewise, the reason that the ancient Chinese used Heaven to refer to two seemingly antithetical concepts is because "Heaven" as an ambiguous term had materialized a conceptual transformation. Just as the Western "love" could mean both "erotic love" and "divine love," the Chinese "Heaven" could be used—with a degree of comfort—to

[37] Using the phenomena of four seasons, day and night, life and death, etc., had been a cliché among ancient Chinese thinkers to show the existence of a natural order and, further, of the governing force of the Dao.

[38] This may explain, in part, why Daoism later deteriorated into mystic and even superstitious practices, whereas Confucianism came to enjoy the status of state orthodoxy.

represent an "active conscious will," as well as the "source of universal order." Because of this "heavenly" ambiguity (which, I believe, has opened wider space for rhetorical maneuvering), we probably can imagine what would happen next: the king, or Son of Heaven, can utilize Heaven to symbolize his power sanctioned by the divine, as well as his moral authority derived from the order of the universe. I would not say that "the centrality of kingship" (Ching 1997, p. 36) in Chinese society up to the 1911 revolution had been built completely upon the ambiguity of Heaven as a conceptual term; however, it is important to realize how Heaven, with its dual association with the divine and the cosmic, has played a central role in formulating a discourse that transformed the king into "the paradigmatic individual, reflecting in himself so much of that which is greater than himself: the universe as an organic whole, vibrant and alive" (Ching 1997, p. 66).

Perhaps more significant, and more relevant to philosophy and rhetoric alike, is that the Chinese "Heaven" has blurred the line of demarcation between ethos and logos. If ethos signifies power and logos truth (as has been discussed earlier), then we might say that Heaven signifies both, because of its conceptual ambiguity or dual association. That is to say, Heaven can be used as both ethos and logos, and for both rhetorical and philosophical purposes. I have already explained the centrality of Heaven to Chinese ethos, which I think is essentially in the rhetorical category because of its conventional, or cultural, nature. The idea of Heaven used as logos seems self-explanatory if we go back to what was discussed a little earlier: namely, humanity as implied in the heavenly, a moral order in the natural, the transcendent in the cosmic, etc., as all of these can be categorized as truthful and therefore philosophical.[39]

The following passage, from the *Four Texts of the Yellow Emperor* (Chang and Feng 1998), may exemplify Heaven's ethos/logos ambiguity:

> As for the principle of [human] affairs, it depends on whether one complies with [the way of heaven] or rebels against it. If one's achievement transgresses [the ways of] heaven, then there is punishment by death. If one's achievement is not enough as heaven requires, then one retreats without any fame. If one's achievement accords with heaven, one will thereby attain great fame. It is the principle of [human] affairs. One who complies will enjoy life; one who follows the principles will succeed; one who is rebellious will suffer death; one who loses [will have no] fame. (Chang and Feng 1998, p. 139)[40]

In the first place, the passage may be summarized as something like "following the Dao of Heaven," in that it advises readers to act in compliance with Heaven. In this sense, Heaven is used as logos, because it represents a moral order guiding human behavior, something the ancient Chinese would accept as true and absolute. However, if we take a closer look at the passage, we may sense that it is actually advocating the doctrine of the Golden Mean, advising people against being too aggressive or too shy in getting what they want. Thus, the repeated use of Heaven can be seen as a strategy of ethos for the purpose of adding to the appeal of the message. (That is, even though less appealing, the message itself still stays if the author removed "Heaven" from the text.) What is more, Heaven is invoked for its power in punishing those who rebel and in rewarding those who follow—a clear indication of ethos being applied. I may appear overreaching in my explanation, but what seems clear is that "Heaven" is behind both logos and ethos in the text.

The oneness of ethos and logos is not uniquely Chinese. The fact that Plato tried to split philosophy from rhetoric but failed to do so suggests that the truthful simply cannot be separated from the conventional or culturally acceptable in the first place. However,

[39] How to decide what is true or not true is really an epistemological or methodological (e.g., scientific demonstration) issue. Since different cultures may have different epistemological approaches, it is important not to set a universal standard. The Dao, which is regarded as the absolute among the Chinese, may appear ludicrous to the Western mind; the Platonic Truth, which may have an enduring appeal to Westerners, would make little sense to the Chinese. Those Chinese ideas, such as humanity implied in the heavenly, may sound untrue to a Westerner, but they are true or truthful to the Chinese and approached as such by Chinese philosophers. That is why I categorize them as the philosophical and treat them as logos.

[40] From Chang and Feng (1998) *The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emperor*. See Section 8, Book I.

due to the dominance of logocentric thinking, that awareness has gone largely ignored in the Western rhetorical/philosophical tradition. I have argued that the ancient Chinese were pragmatic in their attitudes towards truth; instead of separating them, they blended the rhetorical with the philosophical and the acceptable with the truthful, thus making it possible for ethos and logos to become one. This is seen in the application of Heaven in early Chinese writings, which can help bridge the gap between the two seemingly different categories as presented in the West. We may use a simple diagram for illustration (Figure 1).



Figure 1. Diagram of Oneness of Chinese Heaven.

According to Kenneth Burke, human beings are capable of both using and misusing "verbal symbols," which can in turn become the "realities of human existence" (Bennett 1976, pp. 243–44). This would imply that language practice, as a symbolic or signifying action, creates meanings that may not cohere with reality in the true sense. Further, it suggests that language itself may even imply or constitute reality (i.e., the signifier becomes the signified, Derrida would say), a point that early Chinese thinkers, such as Laozi and Confucius, would have fully appreciated. Indeed, Heaven would be a good example to illustrate how a language symbol can be used, misused, or even abused to create reality far beyond our imagination. The fact that Heaven had permeated through Chinese culture for thousands of years may point to the triumph of a language symbol and the reality created within such a symbol, despite its conceptual ambiguity. Finally, I would like to point out that the oneness of ethos and logos is indeed the triumph of ethnocentrism, in that it indicates that the rational appropriation of logos cannot be set apart from the irrational, conventional, cultural, or rhetorical projection of ethos—and that philosophy, in the end, stands "in defense of un-reason" (Bennett 1976, p. 243).

10. Conclusions

Aristotelian ethos is unique but not universal, for inspiring "trust" does not necessarily have to go through a process of character-based self-projection, as shown in the example of *cheng-yan* or "ethos of sincereness" in early Chinese rhetoric. Further, the notion of collective ethos casts doubt on the applicability of an individualistic ethos in non-Western cultural settings, as the former is constructed out of a cultural heritage without a rhetor's avowed authorship of a text. This stands in contrast to Western ethotic practice, in which the rhetor becomes a "signifier" of ethos "standing *inside* an expanded text" (Baumlin 1994, p. xvi), a practice that reinforces the perception of rhetoric as an individualistic enterprise.

Heaven, a concept culturally prevalent in early Chinese society, has been discussed rather extensively in this essay for the purpose of further exploring collective ethos as a function of a cultural heritage, in which Heaven plays a key role in creating Chinese ethos. To put the discussion in perspective, the essay has also addressed, albeit briefly, the centrality of logos to the Western tradition, or logocentrism, versus that of ethos to the Chinese, or ethnocentrism. Just as there are historical, cultural, or epistemological reasons behind logocentrism in the West, the ethocentric turn of Chinese rhetoric has to be appreciated in light of a cultural tradition that carries its own historical complexities and philosophical intricacies. As I understand it, Heaven in its role as a defining attribute of Chinese ethos reveals a unique cultural heritage shaped by a collective human desire

in seeking "a higher consciousness of oneness with the universe" (Ching 1997, p. xiii). Historically, Heaven symbolizes, and has been institutionalized into, the power of kingship because of its dual association with the divine and the cosmic in Chinese culture. In the former case, Heaven represents the ultimate ethos that only a king or emperor can lay claim to; in the latter, Heaven intimates the order of the universe that a king or emperor can appropriate to secure his moral authority over *tian-xia* (all under Heaven). And because the order of the universe (the Dao, indeed) is conceptually close to what might be called the absolute, or Truth, in Western ideology, Heaven can be said to represent the truthful in the philosophical sense. One may thus conclude that in ancient Chinese discourse, the concept of Heaven blends into one power and truth, ethos and logos, and, finally, rhetoric and philosophy.

While it is impossible to exhaust discussions on the subject, what has been presented here ought to give some idea as to how Chinese ethos had evolved on a track rather different from the Western tradition. The collectivist nature of Chinese ethos may be better understood if we look at it in terms of a cultural construct or a function of a cultural heritage, traced all the way back to early Chinese society, where rulers would engage in shamanic or religious practices to signify, and mystify, their power and authority with the suggestion of divine and heavenly charisma.

Nevertheless, I feel that this investigation is far from over, especially if we look at Confucius' self-cultivation. The idea of self-cultivation has its political and moral purpose of restoring *li*, but it also points to the ideological differences between the East and West in view of the individual and its relationship to society at large. In Chinese culture, the self has been traditionally downplayed, which helps explain why it has been out of the picture where Chinese ethos is projected. Investigating what Confucius and his followers had to say of the virtue of self-cultivation and their impact on the rhetorical practices of later generations might shed additional light on Chinese ethos as a cultural construct.

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From Wounded Knee to Sacred Circles: Oglala Lakota Ethos as "Haunt" and "Wound"

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Abstract: Oglala Lakota ethos manifests a pre-Socratic/Heideggerian variant of ethos: ethos as "haunt". Within this alternative to the Aristotelian ethos-as-character, Oglala ethos marks out the "dwelling place" of the Oglala Lakota people. That is, the Oglala Lakota ground their cultural- and self-identity *in the land*: their ethology, in effect, expresses an ecology. Thus, an Oglala Lakotan ethos cannot be understood apart from its nation's understanding of the natural world—of its primacy and sacredness. A further aspect of the Oglala Lakotan ethos rests in the nation's history of conflict with EuroAmericans. Through military conflict, forced displacement, and material/economic exploitation of reservation lands, an Oglala Lakota ethos bears within itself a woundedness that continues to this day. Only through an understanding of ethos-as-haunt, of cultural trauma or woundedness, and of the ways of healing can Oglala Lakota ethos be fully appreciated.

Keywords: Oglala Lakota; ethos; haunt; wound; ecology; ecological; Wounded Knee; American Indian; cultural wound

> *For American Indians, their oral traditions, tribal values, and Native philosophy help to define their ethos.* ~Donald L. Fixico (Fixico 2013, p. 30)
>
> *The truth of the matter is that all indigenous peoples have a very strong sense of identity and that identity includes a sense of belonging in a very specific space.* ~V.F. Cordova (Cordova 2007, p. 194)
>
> *Native Americans have inherited several generations of unresolved trauma.* ~Eduardo Duran and Bonnie Duran (Duran and Duran 1995, p. 44)

1. Introduction

Before Europeans came to North America, over 500 distinct cultures inhabited the continent, each with its language, practice, traditions, stories, and geographical region. Suggesting that these groups were culturally the same only reinforces the EuroAmerican view of American Indian peoples.[1] There are *some* similarities, but there are similarities connecting all humans. A more nuanced understanding of any American Indian nation begins with an acknowledgment that no American Indian nation is identical to another—an insight that the dominant EuroAmerican popular culture has yet to fully recognize or understand.[2] In this essay, I shall approach American Indian ethos[3] through the lens of a

[1] The term American Indian can be interchanged with many terms, such as First Nations, Indigenous Peoples, First Peoples, Native American, and so on. In this essay, "American Indian" serves as the overall term. I note that Alaska Native can also be included: American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN).

[2] By using the term "EuroAmerican", I refer to the colonizers of North America *and* their descendants, as well as the dominant, oppressive, racist ideology exemplified by that culture, its dominant religion, and other influences.

[3] Seeing that ethos, pathos, and logos have entered common American English vocabulary, I use them in roman.

specific nation: the Oglala Lakota of South Dakota.[4] In Lakota, culture or ethos can be translated as *Lakol Wicohan*.

In seeking to understand *Lakol Wicohan*, we must first recognize the misrepresentations throughout history. Oglala means "scattered" or "divided" (Hyde 1937, p. 8). The Oglala Lakota are one of the seven sub-bands of the Tituwan/People of the Plains. When one considers the fame of some members—Red Cloud, Crazy Horse, Black Elk, and Sitting Bull—and the nation's conflicts with the United States Government and Military, the Lakota can be deemed one of the more important American Indian cultures in North American history. Elements of their culture are memorialized in *Black Elk Speaks* and *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, among recent English language texts.[5] The Battle of the Greasy Grass (the Lakotan name for "Custer's Last Stand" or the Battle of Little Bighorn: 25–26 June 1876) and the Massacre of Wounded Knee (29 December 1890) remain, for both sides, the stuff of legends, but for one side in particular, a wound remains unhealed with the passage of time. The EuroAmerican colonizers' versions of these battles attest to the Lakotas' skill as warriors. Unfortunately, other aspects of the EuroAmerican narrative are rife with misinformation.

Contributing to this cultural trauma is the EuroAmerican's general ignorance of what the Oglala and other American Indians endured during the conquest of North America, including breaking of treaties, intentional genocide, forced relocation, and cultural erasure.[6] Further, EuroAmerican popular culture fails to recognize American Indian cultures as having their own histories—histories that predate European colonizer settlements. These histories include mytho-historical narratives as well as oral histories and an indigenous wisdom that, until recently, has not been seen as "scientific" enough to engender serious research.[7]

EuroAmerican cultures continue to impose two general stereotypes on American Indians. The first is of the frontier hunter-gatherer that routinely outwitted or fought the cowboy. In their westward expansion, EuroAmerican settlers called them (and treated them as) "savages". The twin image of savage and hunter-gatherer presents a number of historical inaccuracies, but also points to the misunderstanding of American Indians as a whole. The second and more recent stereotype sees the Indian nations as helpless, hopeless, depressed people that self-medicate with alcohol or illegal substances. Such stereotypes make it difficult to accurately represent American Indian ethos.

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[4] The Oglala Lakota are often mistakenly referred to as Sioux, even among their own people. Joseph M. Marshall III writes, "The Ojibway called us *naddewasioux*, which means 'little snakes' or 'little enemies.' The French, probably their voyageurs, shortened the word to Sioux. The word has a significant place in the contemporary names by which we are known: Rosebud Sioux, Cheyenne River Sioux, Standing Rock Sioux, and so on" (Marshall 2001, p. 207). For some Oglala Lakota, using "Sioux" is an insult. John Wesley Powell explains further: "Owing to the fact that 'Sioux' is a word of reproach and means snake or enemy, the term has been discarded by many later writers as a family designation" (Powell 1885, p. 300).

[5] Vine Deloria, Jr., American Indian author, historian, and activist, writes, "Present debates center on the question of Neihardt's literary intrusions in to Black Elk's system of beliefs and some scholars have said that the book reflects more of Neihardt than it does of Black Elk. It is admittedly, difficult to discover if we are talking with Black Elk or John Neihardt, whether the vision is to be interpreted differently, and whether or not the positive emphasis which the book projects is not the optimism of two poets lost in the modern world and transforming drabness into an idealized world. Can it matter? The very nature of great religious teachings is that they encompass everyone who understands them and personalities become indistinguishable from the transcendent truth that is expressed. So let it be with *Black Elk Speaks*. [. . .] It is good. It is enough" (Deloria 1979, p. xiv).

[6] Examples such as *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* (Alexander et al. 2004) only further this ignorance, because it offers extensive discussions of slavery and the Holocaust but only a few entries of American Indians and all of them in passing.

[7] A EuroAmerican view discounts American Indian medical, ecological, and scientific understanding. According to Cochran et al., "Multiple examples exist in which indigenous knowledge and the use of indigenous ways of knowing within a specific context have produced more extensive understanding than might be obtained through Western knowledge and scientific methods" (Cochran et al. 2008, p. 273). Further, Frank G. Speck writes, "when we realize how the Indians have taken pains to observe and systematize facts of science in the realm of lower animal life, we may perhaps be pardoned a little surprise" (Speck 1923, p. 273). For more discussion of this issue, see *Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants* by Wall Kimmerer (2013), *The Savage Mind* by Levi-Strauss (1966), and *Sacred Ecology*, now in its 4th edition, by Berkes (2018).

2. Interlude I: My Challenge

For some time—eight years, in fact—I have been researching and writing and rewriting this work. I have had serious concerns about me—a white EuroAmerican—writing about the Oglala. I have routinely asked myself, "Who am *I* to write about *them*?" However, at an October 2018 Digital Humanities conference, two colleagues—an African American and an American Indian—urged me to continue. This work was important, they said, because, as a descendant of a EuroAmerican (colonizer), I was not being complicit in the ignorance and oppression. They explained that my *not* being silent would help make a difference. In "The Problem of Speaking for Others," Linda Alcoff works through some of the concerns I have mentioned. Alcoff provides some caution on how one's positionality can be interpreted or perceived; I note this particularly because I am not Oglala, but I am writing about (not *for*) them. Though, I am left with one of her considerations: She explains that by not engaging this type of discussion, we would have "lost an opportunity to discuss and explore it" (Alcoff 1991, p. 27).

Moreover, some of the drive to complete a project about a community of which I am not a part of is what Paulo Freire, Brazilian educator and philosopher, calls "a new 'culture of silence'" that has come about partly because of technology and partly because we are being subversively conditioned to act and think in certain ways that can be against our own interests or against what most rationale and realistic persons would think and believe (Shaull 2007, p. 33). I write because I empathize with the Oglala. I have learned that wisdom can come from many places if I am able to be quiet long enough to listen, empathize, and understand. In addition, Freire cautioned us about education working either to condition people to "the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, *or* it becomes 'the practice of freedom', the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality to discover how to participate in the transformation of their world" (Shaull 2007, p. 34).

Thus, I take the wisdom of Freire to guide me: "[t]he radical, committed to human liberation," "is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into a dialogue with them. This person does not consider himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all people, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he or she does commit himself or herself, within history, to fight at their side" (Freire 2007, p. 39). I have struggled as a white person to write this understanding of Oglala ethos, tried to respect the culture, the people, the land, and, of course, their wound.

3. A Litany of Misunderstandings

Sadly, EuroAmerican popular culture views American Indians through fictions and faulty narratives. On the one hand, American Indians are idealized as noble, honorable warriors, an idealization that American sports teams—Cleveland Indians, Atlanta Braves, Washington Redskins—exploit in their naming. On the other hand, American Indians are demonized as killers of innocent white settlers who crossed the plains of what is now the United States. Worst of all, perhaps, is the pop-culture assumption that few American Indians survive. For many Americans today, they are gone—all gone, absorbed by mainstream society or slaughtered in the past. All that remains of their legacy are school names, sports mascots, and tall tales.

Consider the misrepresentation of what older history books refer to as "The Battle of Wounded Knee," one of the last major conflicts between the U.S. Military and the American Indian.[8] To better grasp the events at Wounded Knee, we must look beyond the statistics of the people who died, the possible miscommunications that led up to the slaughter, and even the U.S. accounts of what happened. From an Oglala perspective, it was and remains not "The Battle" but "The Massacre at Wounded Knee". While the U.S. military pinned twenty medals on its soldiers' chests, it took 100 years for the U.S. government to offer a mostly symbolic statement of "deep regret" for the slaughter (Congress Adjourns; Century Afterward, Apology for Wounded Knee 1990).

[8] Here and in the previous paragraph, too, I point to the erroneous EuroAmerican view that puts all American Indian nations into one homogenized group.

To understand Oglala Lakota ethos today, one must understand the importance of the *experience* of this massacre, which extends to the visuals, the emotions, the memories of the scene—that is, to the entire experience (Fixico 2003, p. 22). *It is the mythos of the massacre* that we must seek to understand. For the EuroAmerican bystander, it is easy to dismiss the Wounded Knee Massacre as having happened over 100 years ago to some group at some place; it is markedly different if one's cultural identity rests in a continual retelling—in effect, a reliving—of the Massacre. As Donald L. Fixico writes, "When retold, the experience comes alive again, recreating the experience by evoking the emotions of listeners, transcending past-present-future. Time does not imprison the story" (Fixico 2003, p. 22). The telling of these stories forms an integral part of Oglala ethos, both *as-haunt* and *as-wound*.

To better understand the genesis of this trauma, some review is necessary. The singular modern event impacting Oglala Lakota ethos is the Wounded Knee Massacre. Ethnographer James Mooney details the event:

> At the first volley the Hotchkiss guns trained on the camp opened fire and sent a storm of shells and bullets among the women and children [. . .] The guns poured in 2-pound explosive shells at the rate of nearly fifty per minute, mowing down everything alive. The terrible effect may be judged from the fact that one woman survivor, Blue Whirlwind, with whom the author conversed, received fourteen wounds, while each of her two little boys was also wounded by her side. In a few minutes 200 Indian men, women, and children, with 60 soldiers, were lying dead and wounded on the ground, the teepees had been torn down by the shells and some of them were burning above the helpless wounded, and the surviving handful of Indians were flying in wild panic to the shelter of the ravine, pursued by hundreds of maddened soldiers and followed up by a raking fire from the Hotchkiss guns, which had been moved into position to sweep the ravine.
>
> There can be no question that the pursuit was simply a massacre, where fleeing women, with infants in their arms, were shot down after resistance had ceased and when almost every warrior was stretched dead or dying on the ground. The wholesale slaughter of women and children was unnecessary and inexcusable. (Mooney 1972, p. 118)

Jeffery Ostler gives further detail: "In all, the Seventh Cavalry killed between 270 and 300 of the 400 people in Big Foot's band. Of these, 170 to 200 were women and children" (Ostler 2010, p. 123).[9] Describing the aftermath, Herbert Welsh (a political reformer and advocate for American Indian rights) writes, "From the fact that so many women and children were killed, and that their bodies were found far from the scene of the action, and as though they were shot down while fleeing, it would look as though blind rage had been at work" (Welsh 1891, p. 452).[10] To these, we can add Robert M. Utley's account, which provides vivid detail of the massacre soon after it occurred:

> Shortly after noon the cavalcade [of about 75 Oglala, Dr. Charles Eastman, Paddy Starr, who led contracted white workers to bury the slaughtered (at $2 a body), and more soldiers to maintain

[9] To show contrast to the number of Lakota, Robert M. Utley reports, "In all, [Col. James W.] Forsyth had a little more that 500 effectives" (Utley 1963, p. 201). This, of course, neglects reference to the weaponry the U.S. Army brought to bear on the mostly unarmed Oglala, most notably the Hotchkiss cannons.

[10] Welsh, however, writes highly of the U.S. Army forces: "Evidence from various reliable sources shows very clearly that Colonel Forsythe, the veteran officer in charge, did all that could be done by care, consideration, and firmness to prevent a conflict" (Welsh 1891, p. 451). Welsh finds the "Indians" fired first and they "were wholly responsible in bringing on the fight" (Welsh 1891, p. 452). A paragraph later, Welsh places blame to yet another source: "But responsibility of the massacre of Wounded Knee, as for many another sad and similar event, rests more upon the shoulders of the citizens of the United States who permit condition of savage ignorance, incompetent control, or Congressional indifference and inaction, than upon those of the maddened soldiers, who having seen their comrades shot at their side are tempted to kill and destroy all belonging to the enemy within their reach. That the uprising ended with so little bloodshed the country may thank the patience and ability of General Miles" (Welsh 1891, p. 452). Even this "advocate" for American Indian rights considers the Lakota U.S. enemies as he defends the slaughter of innocents. (Note: Gen. Nelson A. Miles was Col. Forsythe's commanding officer).

> order] drew up at the Wounded Knee battlefield. In silence the people stared at the scene. The crescent of more than 100 tepees that had housed Chief Big Foot's followers had been all but flattened. Strips of shredded canvas and piles of splintered lodgepoles littered the campsite, together with wrecked wagons and twisted pots, kettles, and domestic utensils. Here and there the skeleton of a tepee rose starkly from the wreckage, bits of charred canvas clinging to the poles. Snow covered mounds cluttered the ground from one end of the camp to the other [. . .] Each mound hid a human form, torn by shrapnel and carbine bullets, caked with blood, frozen hard in the contortions of violent death. They were all ages and both sexes. The storm of shot and shell had spared none. Paddy Starr found three pregnant women shot to pieces, another woman with her abdomen blown away, a ten-year-old boy with an arm, shoulder, and breast mangled by an artillery shell. Others made similar discoveries. (Utley 1963, pp. 2–3)

Both the place and the events of the massacre haunt the Lakotan cultural memory, which rests in the collective experience of trauma and the place—the physical haunt—of its occurrence.

As such, an Oglala Lakota ethos derives from haunt and wound. Ethos-as-haunt demonstrates how location constitutes a people, its culture, traditions, stories, and history. From that haunt, the events that occurred on that haunt add to their ethos. Simply put, the events that occur on a parcel of land lends it character to the people on that land. EuroAmerican culture is only beginning to understand its own ethos-as-haunt in North America; American Indians, having longer tenure in North America, understand this more fully. With this summary of the Wounded Knee Massacre as a starting point, I turn now to review the Western model of ethos and its potential as haunt. From this understanding of location, and of *mythos* and storytelling, I suggest a bridge between haunt and wound as it relates to an Oglala Lakota ethos and the hopeful healing that can take place through an acknowledgement of that woundedness. The conclusion offers insight into Oglala wisdom for the Westernized humanities and the possibility of healing the wound from two different perspectives: EuroAmerican and Oglala.

4. Revisiting Ethos (Aristotelian and Otherwise)

While ethos is untranslatable in English, its classical-Aristotelian meanings detour through numerous terms, including character, credibility, trustworthiness, and reputation. However it is used or expressed, the term embraces three components: the speaker or person to whom ethos and its qualities are assigned; the audience who perceives or projects these qualities onto the speaker; and the "rhetorical scene," where the speaker (and, occasionally, audience) is situated in time and space.

As an analytic method, the classical-Aristotelian model seeks to pin these components and categories down, as if ethos were reducible to the contents of a text. An advantage of this approach is that it allows scholars to get a handle on ethos, to examine it, study it, and then articulate what is understood. Yet ethos, as I am learning, continues to shapeshift, morph, grow, retreat, and extend itself, becoming more. In other words, our study (and experience) of ethos continues to evolve beyond Aristotle. The model that I wish to unfold in this essay affirms an authentic, core self that abides beyond culture and its influences, though *it wears culture* as a mask of sorts. Through the shutters of such masks, we see and are seen: they provide filters through which we comprehend the cultures we interact with and our respective roles therein. These masks—our personas—are means by which we present ourselves in the places where we situate ourselves; to the extent that face and mask coalesce, we can declare ourselves, at least in part, the products of environment.[11]

"For Aristotle", writes Craig R. Smith, "*ethos* was about building the credibility of a speaker before an audience, not about the speaker's inherent worth" (Smith 2004, p. 5).[12] Such has been the

[11] I am not the first to further this understanding of an evolving ethos. Contributors to *The Ethos of Rhetoric* (ed. Michael J. Hyde), among other scholars, have done much of this heavy lifting; to them I owe a debt of gratitude.

[12] Aristotle (1991) crucial discussion of ethos follows (1.2.2):

general understanding of ethos in the modern era. Further, Aristotle's rational, textually-constructed, logocentric (indeed, logos-centric) model undergirds the EuroAmerican mindset that negates any natural/supernatural explanations falling outside of its rationalist paradigm. As James S. Baumlin and Craig A. Meyer note, "There's an elegant symmetry in the *Rhetoric*, which outlines three *pisteis* or modes," which, as we know, are ethos, logos, and pathos (Baumlin and Meyer 2018). In this symmetry or system, there is convenience. This convenience provides order and structure. This order and structure have become the basis of the Western model. Through and because of that model, we should recognize the oppression of other ideas or possibilities that fall outside the elegance and simplicity of Aristotle's modes and their (mostly) agreed upon meaning.

The problem with most Western rhetorical scholarship is that it takes Aristotle's logocentric system as a recipe book complete in itself, neglecting the fact that his *Rhetoric* must itself be contextualized and historicized—that is, *situated within its own time and place*. In compiling his lecture notes into the text as we've received it, Aristotle could assume that his audience *already knew* that ethos was, at least in part, derived from place and filtered through the daily life of the *polis*—which includes the Athenian citizens' haunts or "dwelling places," their experiences of/within/on these haunts, and the meanings (personal and traditional) attached to those experiences. Aristotle's textually-constructed model of ethos needs to be restored to its own living cultural context and seen as part of a larger cultural praxis.

Though elegant and convenient as an analytic model, the still-reigning version of Aristotle operates largely in ignorance of cultural context—in effect, of his text's own haunt. Once we recognize where the modes of *pisteis* reside, we understand ethos a bit better. Pathos is elicited from the audience and is expressive of their hopes, fears, sentiments, and so on. Logos derives from the rhetor and is based on the rationality of his arguments. But if pathos is with the audience and logos is with the rhetor, then where is ethos? It is with both and neither. As Karen Burke LaFevre notes, "Ethos, we might say, appears in that socially created space, in the 'between', the point of intersection between speaker or writer and listener or reader" (LeFevre 1987, p. 46). Such a socially created space is understood through the *history* of that space, a history that is passed down through stories, experiences, and traditions. Here, in the "in-between" of ethotic practice, is where Oglala ethos unfolds. Ethos-as-character and ethos-as-haunt both contribute to our understanding.

An Oglala Lakota ethos is rooted in the land and the events and experiences taking place on that land. As part of that representation, the events and conflicts on that land leave cultural memories—wounds that can be articulated and understood. In some cases, the wounds need attention in order to heal. Such healing can only occur by attending to the circumstances that created the wounds on the land and, thus, to the people, as well as to the continuing effects of those wounds. This aspect of ethos deserves further exploration. As already noted, ethos has been approached through classical-Aristotelian notions of credibility, expertise, and moral character; however, an earlier, Homeric usage makes a better "fit" with Oglala Lakota cultural practice:

> Firstly, then, I will tell you my name that you too may know it, [. . .] I am Odysseus son of Laertes [. . .]. I live in Ithaca, where there is a high mountain called Neritum, covered with forests; and not far from it there is a group of islands very near to one another—Dulichium, Same, and the wooded island of Zacynthus. It lies squat on the horizon, all highest up in the sea towards the sunset, while the others lie away from it towards dawn. It is a rugged

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> [There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. *And this should result from the speech*, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some of the technical writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuading. (*Rhetoric* 1356a; emphasis added)

> island, but it breeds brave men, and my eyes know none that they better love to look upon. The goddess Calypso kept me with her in her cave, and wanted me to marry her, as did also the cunning Aeaean goddess Circe; but they could neither of them persuade me, for there is nothing dearer to a man than his own country and his parents, and however splendid a home he may have in a foreign country, if it be far from father or mother, he does not care about it. (Homer 1900, pp. 9, 16–38)

In this passage, Odysseus describes his homeland, its beauty and ruggedness. In so doing, he provides insight into the people who live there; more importantly, he declares his intention to return—no goddess could seduce or persuade him to abandon this task. His identity—his ethos—is invested in his name, his lineage, *and his homeland*. In the *Odyssey*, ethos designates "one who is found in a certain place" and, perhaps more importantly, one's "belonging in" a particular place (Chamberlain 1984, p. 97).[13]

Analyzing its presence in the *Iliad*, Todd S. Frobish notes that "the word *ethos* does not refer to some quality of character but to a haunt or an accustomed place of activity" (Frobish 2003, p. 19). Further, "*Ethos* means abode, dwelling place," writes Heidegger in his "Letter on Humanism" (Heidegger 1977, p. 256). The word, he adds, "names the open region in which man dwells" (Heidegger 1977, p. 256). As Charles Chamberlain notes, "*ethos* refers to the range or arena where someone is most truly at home" (Chamberlain 1984, p. 99). Discussing etymology, Arthur B. Miller sees the Homeric ethos as referring generally to "*the abodes of men*" (Miller 1974, p. 310). This goes beyond Aristotle but allows us to understand what Aristotle meant (and how his contemporary audience would have understood him). Smith provides more context:

> [A]t no place does Aristotle see ethos as a dwelling in the sense that Heraclitus used the term. . . . The first place that Aristotle acknowledges in the Rhetoric is the Areopagus, the high court, where, of course, ethos was enormously important . . . . For Aristotle, it is a given: everyone has ethos whether it be noble or ignoble. Before one even speaks, that ethos has an ontological dimension because it emerges from the way one makes decisions, the way one lives on a day-to-day basis, the way one dwells. Those decisions are informed by one's values, one's practical wisdom, and one's goodwill, all of which are addressed in detail by Aristotle. Thus Aristotle assumes the knowledge of the Athenian fore-structure of ethos as a dwelling place and then reformulates the notion of dwelling place to present a rhetorical understanding of ethos. (Smith 2004, p. 2)

Certainly, Aristotle seems to have incorporated haunt into his understanding of ethos.

This idea of ethos-as-haunt is especially relevant to American Indian cultures, since it points to the land itself as a defining element of cultural practice and identity. Before EuroAmericans came, the Oglala Lakota lived with the land in accordance with their ecological ethos. However, an Oglala Lakota ethos can be now represented and understood through the conflicts with EuroAmericans on that land, conflicts that have left cultural wounds on the Oglala.

5. Interlude II: Riding in Pine Ridge

"Why don't they *use* this land?" asked an elderly man, EuroAmerican and White, his booming voice snapping me out of my reverie. It was back in the summer of 2011, and I was riding on an old school bus around Pine Ridge, South Dakota, working with Re-Member. Re-Member offers Lakota cultural experiences for volunteers and practical assistance to the Oglala such as building bunk beds, outhouses, wheelchair ramps, and other functional construction for homes. Before he spoke, I was thinking back to my childhood—growing up in Michigan in the mid-1980s, riding to school, and bouncing around a similar bus: the plastic-like vinyl smell of the benches, each just small enough to be

[13] Chamberlain refers to *Od*. 14.411; *Il*. 6.511, 15.268.

uncomfortable, windows partly open (often stuck at an angle), the pull of the powerful engine, with school kids joking and laughing—and that is when he spoke.

Speaking to nobody in particular, he leveled his challenge at all of us—all volunteers who had committed at least one week of service to this rural and poor community of Oglala Lakota. Pulled from their own thoughts and hushed discussions, many of the twenty or so bus riders turned to look at him. Exhaling audibly, he continued, "I don't know, build a casino or put cattle on all these rolling hills". My eyebrows furrowed.

After another pause, he spoke again: "They could be making a lot of money and get out of here or fix their own homes". After another pause, I said, "They *are* using the land". He looked at me as if I had spoken nonsense. After a moment, others spoke up; I decided to stay silent as a vigorous discussion broke out about tradition versus modernity. But, perhaps more accurately, the discussion centered on the different perspectives of two cultures and, if by implication only, on the failure of one to respect the other. He argued that the Oglala should be "using" the land: raising animals for slaughter, mining, growing crops, or casino gambling. By his understanding, this "use" would allow them to make money and not live, by his impression or standards, in poverty. Implicit in his words, he was suggesting they should be pulling themselves up by their proverbial bootstraps, not depending on "us" to help them; they should do it themselves. Perhaps, too, he was suggesting that they do not know how to take care of themselves or their community and that they need "our" White, EuroAmerican, Westernized help to become more "modern," in effect, more "civilized".

Indeed, one might ask: *Why don't* the Oglala "use the land" more exploitatively, in the EuroAmerican way?

6. Some Other Haunts

Before I respond to that question, let me consider the area near Wounded Knee. About one hundred miles away from Pine Ridge, one of EuroAmerica's national treasures has been blasted and carved out of the granite of the Black Hills: Mount Rushmore. "This is what it means to be an American!" declared Lincoln Borglum, son of the artist of Mount Rushmore, who finished it for his father (qtd. in Blair and Michel 2004, p. 159). Indeed, Mount Rushmore highlights the colonizing nature of "American" conquest in North America: as Carole Blair and Neil Michel explain, "[Mount Rushmore] was a planned monument honoring 'continental expansion', sited in a territory that, by treaty, still belonged to the Lakota, and that the local Native people considered consecrated ground" (Blair and Michel 2004, p. 169). As Jim Pomeroy writes,

> It's important to invent alternative pasts for a culture that finds it hard to accept the real one. It's paradoxical that a Shrine of Democracy is placed at the center of land acquired through well documented rape—the most blatant example from 500 hundred years of genocide and hemispheric conquest. Rushmore implies that the European has always been here. It obscures a shameful memory and eases racial guilt much the same way an individual represses thoughts reminding him of a painful experience. (Pomeroy 1992, p. 53)

Cogently, one can argue that Mount Rushmore stands as an insult to the Lakota, and such an argument highlights the narrative of the EuroAmerican way of conquering and colonizing. This narrative has sought to negate and overwrite other narratives that suggest any other version or understanding of truth, or perspectives of ethos. During the planning stages of the monument, there was discussion about including a woman, Susan B. Anthony, and an American Indian, Red Cloud (Ostler 2010, pp. 45, 46); both were dropped because the designer, Gutzon Borglum, supposedly concluded it should be "an unambiguous symbol of male manifest destiny" (Ostler 2010, p. 147).[14]

[14] Yet, one can also argue that the Crazy Horse Memorial (still under construction) is a counter to Mount Rushmore and highlights a Lakota hero. While perhaps true, it seems probable that such a monument only repeats the problems of Mount Rushmore.

To return to the question about using the land, the remoteness of Pine Ridge dissuades the likelihood of industry or large-scale agriculture moving in. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Oglala did survive by ranching and farming (and some still do), but, because of small parcels of land, drought, and various government incursions and influences, many of these "farms" no longer exist (Robertson 2002, pp. 50–51). The Great Depression hit especially hard too. Due to low crop prices among other factors related to the Depression, "Lakotas were forced to sell the few assets they had accumulated. Farm machinery, cattle, even dishes, were converted to cash" (Ostler 2010, p. 142). The U.S. Government, crippled by nation-wide distress, provided only temporary relief and no meaningful long-term support. As such, the Lakota were left with little foundation upon which to (re-)build, since most of their resources had been wiped away surviving the Depression. While some farming, ranching, and similar commerce did creep back, it would never return to the level of the early 1900s. After 1973 and the second Wounded Knee incident, Pine Ridge did manage to attract "two small plants, one assembling fish lures and one making moccasins" (Kehoe 2006, p. 89); while these helped for a while, both later closed, due partly to international competition and lower wages outside the U.S.[15] Given the aftereffects of the Wounded Knee Massacre and the 1973–1974 Wounded Knee conflict, Pine Ridge Reservation "was (and is) one of the poorest districts in the entire United States" (Kehoe 2006, p. 80). Alice Beck Kehoe explains:

> Its prairie is too dry for any large-scale agriculture other than ranching, which could not support the growing population on the reservation. Remote from cities, railroads, and major highways, the district cannot attract industry or build service employment. Without jobs, some Oglala hung around bars in the small towns on the periphery of the reservation in Nebraska and South Dakota. Prejudice against Indians ran rampant in many of these towns, themselves economically straitened. (Kehoe 2006, p. 80)

The combined effects of conquest and colonization, the Dust Bowl and Great Depression, and prejudice deepened the wound caused at Wounded Knee. In other words, we have come back to the land and its history.

We, as scholars, must ask why. Eduardo Duran and Bonnie Duran explain the difference between EuroAmericans and American Indian perceptions of history:

> Western thought conceptualizes history in linear temporal sequence, whereas Native American thinking conceptualizes history in a spatial fashion. Temporal thinking means that time is thought of as having a beginning and end; spatial thinking views events as a function of space or where the event actually took place. (Duran and Duran 1995, p. 14)

EuroAmericans are more consumed by when something happened. Western history, thus, retreats into logic, into the abstractions of causality, whereas American Indian history is more attune to location and importance and seeks understanding through ceremony and commemoration. Thus, the Oglala cannot simply *get over* genocide of their people on the lands the genocide happened on.

American Indians have a stronger sense of the sacredness of their ancestral lands—the Great Plains, in the case of the Oglala—than the colonizers of the Americas. (Then, again, the EuroAmericans are emigrants by definition, having left the lands of their ancestors for a "new world".) The Oglala have been part of the Black Hills for generations. Some historians suggest they migrated from the Great Lakes region, but what historians believe matters little when we look closer at the meaning of the Black Hills to the Oglala.[16] Vine Deloria Jr., American Indian author, historian, and activist, writes,

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[15] As for one other means of commerce, the Lakota nation does operate two casinos (Prairie Wind Casino and Hotel (opened in 1994) and East Wind Casino (opened in 2012)), but they can by no means be considered well-known or destination attractions—at best, they are local gameplay establishments.

[16] Regardless if the Oglala did migrate from the Great Lakes (or other region) to the Black Hills, there is ample evidence of them visiting or living in the Black Hills long before the 1700s.

> Every society needs these kinds of sacred places because they help to instill a sense of social cohesion in the people and remind them of the passage of generations that have brought them to the present. A society that cannot remember and honor its past is in peril of losing its soul. Indians, because of our considerably longer tenure on this continent, have many more sacred places than do non-Indians. (Deloria 1999, p. 328)

Deloria explains that American Indian sacred places would be understood as sacred because of an important event, such as where the buffalo would come from each season in Buffalo Gap. For the Oglala, Wounded Knee *names a place and an event conjoined*: to speak of the land is to speak of the massacre (and *vice versa*), whose sacred character is marked (rather, marred) by an as-yet-unhealed wound to the land, its memory, and its people.

We come to realize the potential of the term ethos by building on Michael J. Hyde, who writes,

> one can understand the phrase 'the ethos of rhetoric' to refer to the way discourse is used to transform space and time into 'dwelling places' (ethos; pl. ethea) where people can deliberate about and 'know together' (con-scientia) some matter of interest. Such dwelling places define grounds, the abodes or habitats, where a person's ethics and moral character take form and develop. (Hyde 2004, p. xiii)

Hyde points out how location influences—in fact, makes us—who we are, and how our ethics grow from our environment. He also reasons that narrative acts to enhance dwelling places and community cohesion. To understand Lakota ethos, then, we need to recover the *mythos* of Wounded Knee: for it is in myth that place, people, and action become one.

7. *Mythos* and/as Ethos

> *Our [American Indian] philosophies come of being from a place and a community, of knowing a place and respecting its boundaries.*
>
> *In part, this is why we Native peoples persist in our identities. There is cultural mooring and values having to do with the environment, the place, and the stories of that place.* ~Hogan (2007, p. ix)

As Baumlin and Meyer (2018) suggest in the "Introduction" to this collection, narrative ethos—that is, *mythos*—functions rhetorically as a fourth Aristotelian proof or "mode of persuasion," providing for expression of ethos-*as-haunt* and *as-wound*. Stories, traditionally, provide explanations for aspects of a culture, such as its creation. And variants in culture make for variants in the telling: as Cordova asserts, "There are numerous 'creators', one for each of the groups. No one argues over the truth or validity of one group's story over another. It is understood that the story being told is a localized creation" (Cordova 2007, p. 104). When we can accept that wisdom, then we can acknowledge that a group's story is created "not only in time and space but in a specific place. Each group views itself as being created for one specific place" (Cordova 2007, p. 104). This realization demonstrates how and why the wound of the Oglala cuts so deep—they were created for and from that place. We recognize that one single event in an historical narrative "can come to dominate the narrative" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018). The Wounded Knee Massacre left a mark on the Oglala. At present, it still dominates the narrative, because it has not been healed. More precisely, it has not fully been heard by the audience that needs to hear it. Such a wound deserves, in fact requires, healing, justice, and, perhaps, transcendence; and *mythos* can act as a means of healing.

Stories bind and connect the community. James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin write, "The mythic seeks instead to unite, to synthesize, to assert wholeness in multiple or contrasting choices and interpretations. *Mythos* thus offers a synthetic and analogical, as opposed to analytic, mode of proof, one that discovers—indeed, celebrates—the diversity of truth" (Baumlin and Baumlin 1994, p. 106). *Mythos* functions as the appeal that unites and synthesizes meaning among truths. By recognizing Oglala *mythos*, we open ourselves to truth from other perspectives beyond the myth of "Manifest Destiny" that EuroAmericans brought with them to North America. In opening ourselves, we are

releasing centuries of pain in hopes of healing, one of the more caring aspects of ethos. Oglala identity and recognition of their ethos has been hindered by the failure—perhaps an unwillingness or hesitation, even an impatience—on the part of EuroAmerican culture to pause and hear the Oglala story, which includes their history, haunt, and being *from their perspective*.

From the first firing of arms of the U.S. Army on the Oglala Lakota, (at least) two narratives have been embattled against each other. Jim W. Corder reminds us:

> Let there be no mistake: a contending narrative, that is, an argument of genuine consequence because it confronts one life with another, is a threat, whether it is another's narrative becoming argument impinging upon or thundering into ours, or our own, impinging upon the other's. (Corder 1985, p. 19)

The reality of the Oglala narrative has proven to be a threat to the competing and dominant narrative of the EuroAmerican culture, because it calls into question the truthfulness of that narrative or neglects the gravity of the Oglala narrative and experience. The dominance and consumption of the Oglala narrative caused the wound on the haunt of the Oglala. The overwhelmingly obvious problem is that the Oglala narrative has been taken up by the EuroAmerican narrative, which then retells *their* story to them. The trauma is reified by not being the Oglala ethos, character, or story, but the *caricature* of the dominant narrative's retelling of their trauma, which can, then, be easily dismissed and left neglected based on EuroAmerican linear temporal thinking.

Dominant narratives may bear witness to another's narrative, but more often than not, they overtake, consume, and restate that narrative into what the dominant narrative wants to accept or proliferate. This ingestion of Oglala ethos and *mythos* fails at the ultimate aim of ethotic discourse, which is to heal, to share story, to listen, and to learn from another's narratives. This directs us to recognize the ultimate goal, then, of discourse, which is "to recognize, accommodate, and heal" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018). As the Oglala have struggled to have their narrative heard, the dominant EuroAmerican narrative has failed to listen and bear witness, much less to atone for its failings.

As Paulo Freire explains, it is simple to see an oppressed people as an "abstract category" instead of "persons who have been unjustly dealt with" (Freire 2007, p. 50). We can recognize this in regard to the Oglala, because, as I have noted, they can be understood as some Indians on some reservation off on the backroads of South Dakota, a state with a present population of less than a million people.[17] This distancing from mainstream EuroAmerica and media highlights how easily groups like the Oglala can be forgotten and dismissed, which adds to the level of oppression they feel. They can be labeled foreigners, Indians, "those" people, or other, but not part of the U.S. citizenry, because they are not part of the EuroAmerican colonizing culture and narrative—they are seen as remnants of what *was* here, not what *is* here.

8. Interlude III: Visiting Wounded Knee

When you visit Wounded Knee, you will sense its solemnness. Standing in the valley where the Lakota were gunned down, you can look up the hillside and imagine how it felt to see the Hotchkiss cannons pointed at you. You look about you and realize some of the futility at attempting escape: save for a slice of creek nearby (where many did attempt to find some safety), the valley is a veritable killing field. There would be little to no chance of escape.

Beyond the terrain and solemnness of the place today, a cemetery sits atop a small hill saddled between some larger, rolling hills. Fenced by chain link, the graves of several fallen rest there. A rainbow of cloth swatches and ribbons decorate the fence. Most are faded by time, sun, and weather. Well-worn paths encircle the fence and grave markers. Every few minutes a car rumbles by, and every

[17] For context, the city of Columbus, Ohio, U.S. has more people and is the 14th largest city in the U.S.

few of those a car horn blows or a yell comes from an occupant. I can only assume what the meaning is—perhaps a kind of respect of the memorial.

On my first visit in mid-2010, I did not have the heart to enter the small fenced area; I walked around it and gazed in. Others in our volunteer group were more bold. Some took pictures. I did not have the heart for that either; only my memory would keep me rooted in this moment—the openness, the loss, the pain. The feel of that place commands your respect: it is, palpably, an ethos-as-haunt.

Wounded Knee has no marker to speak of, save for a double-sided small billboard that offers one generalized report of the massacre. An unknowing person could drive by and miss it, assuming the billboard is simply another advertisement.

9. The Wound of Wounded Knee

> *[The Wounded Knee] massacre has reverberated through the hearts and minds of Lakota survivors and descendants. ~Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart.* (Brave Heart 2000, p. 246)

> *Lakota historical trauma is defined as cumulative and collective emotional and psychological injury both over the life span and across generations, resulting from a cataclysmic history of genocide. ~Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart.* (Brave Heart 1999, p. 2)

Various U.S. Governmental and legal actions have deepened what Duran and Duran call a "soul wound".[18] Duran and Duran provide further context for understanding this concept:

> Beginning in the 1800s, the U.S. government implemented policies whose effect was the systemic destruction of the Native American family system under the guise of educating Native Americans in order to assimilate them as painlessly as possible into Western society, while at the same time inflicting a wound to the soul of Native American people that is felt in agonizing proportions to this day. (Duran and Duran 1995, p. 27)

Further examples of this systemic destruction include children being forcibly removed from their family, rituals such as the Ghost Dance and Sun Dance being outlawed by the U.S. Government, and cultural markers such as hairstyle, clothing, and food being actively controlled by the EuroAmerican culture through both legal and societal/cultural pressures. With the U.S. government outlawing their ceremonies, the wound could only deepen.

While treaties were agreed upon (some might say forced upon) American Indians, the EuroAmerican culture seemed ignorant or uncaring of them. Treaty-protected lands were routinely violated and various means of "civilization" crept in, such as mining, railroads, and so-called settlers. In fact, the lands promised through these treaties remain contested and point, again, to ethos-as-haunt: for the land unites the people, not only as a living community, but also as the sacred burial grounds of ancestors. For the living and dead alike, the land provides an ethos. The ignorance and neglect of these treaties maintains the Lakotan woundedness through legal means by the dominant culture.

After being forcibly contained on the Pine Ridge Reservation, the Lakota maintain part of their haunt, but endure the pain of what happened on it, with no release of the pain. Celane Not Help Him, a Lakota and granddaughter of Iron Hail (who survived Wounded knee), explains her feelings: "when I pass by Wounded Knee, I always go by crying, and then leave crying because what happened here's

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[18] While there are too many to recount here, a brief review may be helpful: The Fort Laramie Treaty in 1851 established land claims to American Indians in exchange for safe passage on the "Oregon Trail". The second Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 solidified Oglala ownership of the Black Hills, which the U.S. broke in 1877. As a result, the court awarded the Lakota 15.5 million in 1980 for the Black Hills (see *United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians*); at present, this money (now well over 100 million dollars) has been refused by the Lakota who demand the land instead. (This abstract settlement reinforces the ignorance of Western and EuroAmerican understanding of Oglala ethos-as-haunt.) The Dawes Act of 1887 allowed the President of the United States to survey and allot segments of land to individual American Indians. Finally, the Indian Re-Organization Act (1934) was supposedly designed to reverse the assimilation process of American Indian and reestablish their respective traditions.

not easy. It's over a hundred years ago but still it looks like it happened yesterday. Lot of people say it's the Battle of Wounded Knee. It's not a battle, it's a massacre" (qtd. in (Penman 2000, p. 15)). The haunt of the massacre, alone, continues to plague the Lakota. The inability to actively heal it has cycled back upon itself to reinforce the wound. William K. Powers provides more explanation:

> The Oglalas at Pine Ridge never quite recuperated from the grim horror of Wounded Knee. It has been only within the past decade that most of the survivors have died, and their children still live to retell their families' involvement in the massacre. It is not surprising that members of the American Indian Movement, when appealed to by the traditional faction of Oglala Sioux Tribal Council to intervene in local political matters, selected Wounded Knee as the site for the seventy-one-day protest in 1973–1974. A year earlier, approximately two hundred young adults destroyed the Wounded Knee museum adjacent to the battlefield. Indian photographs were torn, artifacts destroyed or stolen, and the interior of the museum vandalized. It was as if the young Indians were destroying that what was symbolic of their oppression and despair; the only Indians that white people knew were the Indians in books, photographs, and museums. (Powers 1977, p. 122)

Even today, too many people take as-given television westerns or characterizations of American Indians that regarded them as savages, violent, inhuman, even animals. Paulo Freire explains,

> For the oppressors, [. . .] it is always the oppressed (whom they obviously never call 'the oppressed' but—depending on whether they are fellow countrymen or not—'those people' or 'the blind and envious masses' or 'savages' or 'natives' or 'subversives') who are disaffected, who are 'violent', 'barbaric', 'wicked', or 'ferocious' when they react to the violence of the oppressors. (Freire 2007, p. 56)

Freire reasons that oppression maintains its grip partly because the group fears further oppression by the oppressors (Freire 2007, p. 47). We see this in Oglala history: when they fought back, more severe punishments were leveled against them and massacres such as Wounded Knee occurred or were more likely to occur because the U.S. government became more trigger happy in responding to indications of fighting back, failure to concede to demands (or treaties being broken), or not acting quickly enough when ordered.

After the Wounded Knee Massacre, the Oglala never died out; they never went away. Some 50,000 live on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. Over the last few decades, the Oglala have been re-energizing their ethos. They face challenges. It remains one of the poorest places in the United States.[19] Housing is inadequate and in gravely short supply. Some roads remain unpaved. Some homes lack plumbing or even electricity; many lack adequate insulation and are compromised by mold, asbestos, and other environmental toxins. Medical care can be difficult to obtain. Some children's education does not exceed the 8th grade. Addiction to alcohol or drugs is not uncommon. The unemployment rate hovers around 75%. The suicide rate among the young people is at least four times the national average. The tribal government has proved corrupt on more than one occasion, providing handouts to family members and neglecting the people. And the U.S. Government has never fulfilled treaties that the Lakota signed in good faith.

A problem with stereotypes is that they reach into the "real world" for proof. Drug and alcohol addiction are, indeed, a crisis-level problem. We must, however, question how much of this crisis rests in the Lakota nation's historical trauma or "haunting". We must ask the same of the suicide rate. Are not these crises fueled by an ongoing oppression of the Oglala and their culture? Keith Janis, a

[19] According to the U.S. Department of the Interior's 2014 *Draft Report for Purpose of Tribal Consultation* (U.S. Government Printing Office 2014), "the per-capita income is less than $8000 a year". As of 2016, City-data.com, an online compiler of publicly available data, reports that over 50% of Pine Ridge residents are below the national poverty level (City-data.com 2018).

vocal Lakota activist, recounts a recent visit to a hotel in Rapid City, SD, where a woman called him and his family "filthy Indians". "My beautiful Lakota granddaughter," says Janis, "she had to hear that. Our kids today just want to die because they're sick of all this oppression" (qtd. in (Boseman 2015)). Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart et al. explain more: "Another part of the process of alleviating the emotional suffering of Indigenous Peoples is validating the existence of not only the traumatic history but the continuing oppression. The Lakota, for instance, share the challenges of mourning mass graves, of the lack of proper burials, of massive collective traumatic losses, and of ongoing oppression and discrimination" (Brave Heart et al. 2011, p. 287). Duran and Duran, too, point out,

> Once a group of people have been assaulted in a genocidal fashion, there are psychological ramifications. With the victim's complete loss of power comes despair, and the psyche reacts by internalizing what appears to be genuine power–the power of the oppressor. The internalizing process begins when Native American people internalize the oppressor, which is merely a caricature of the power actually taken from Native American people. At this point, the self-worth of the individual and/or group has sunk to a level of despair tantamount to self-hatred. This self-hatred can be either internalized or externalized. (Duran and Duran 1995, p. 29)

Freire supports what Duran and Duran have illustrated: an oppressed people can be brought to internalize the narrative imposed upon them. The narrative "that they are sick, lazy, and unproductive" becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: "in the end they become convinced of their own unfitness" (Freire 2007, p. 63). As the first American Indian woman to receive a PhD in Philosophy, V. F. Cordova speaks with considerable authority. In describing the imposition of EuroAmerican culture, she clarifies the internalization more: "We have come to take Euroman for granted as a part of our landscape—we don't bother to raise questions and his 'reality' or 'validity.' Instead, *we question ourselves*" (Cordova 2007, p. 52; emphasis added).

Duran and Duran continue to explain how suicide, alcoholism, domestic violence are manifestations of oppression, since any resistance against the EuroAmerican (e.g., protests against the Keystone pipeline, mascots, etc.) was, and continues to be, immediately put down with violent, even military or police-state responses or threats of violence (Duran and Duran 1995, p. 29). So when Oglala like Keith Janis discuss the ongoing oppression, EuroAmericans need to realize the oppression, and the depth of the soul wound.

We can see once this wound is inflicted, the culture can reflect such a wound in manifestations such as those we see in the Oglala: higher than average suicides, alcoholism, domestic abuse, and so on. These can be seen as an attempt to manage such a wound, to feel powerful, or in control. Perhaps part of the ongoing trauma is "For American Indians the United States is the perpetrator of our holocaust" (Brave Heart and DeBruyn 1998, p. 65). They continue,

> We assert the historical view of American Indians as being stoic and savage contributed to a dominant societal belief that American Indian people were incapable of having feelings. This conviction intimates that American Indians had no capacity to mourn and, subsequently, no need or right to grieve. Thus, American Indians experienced disenfranchised grief.
>
> Disenfranchised grief results in an intensification of normative emotional reactions such as anger, guilt, sadness, and helplessness. (Brave Heart and DeBruyn 1998, p. 67)

Les B. Whitbeck et al. write, "the 'holocaust' is not over for many American Indian people. It continues to affect their perceptions on a daily basis and impinges on their psychological and physical health. There has been no 'safe place' to begin again" (Whitbeck et al. 2004, p. 128). While the Oglala may be partly on their ancestral home, they are not safe because of having to fight for clean water, against mining companies seeking minerals, oil, and gold, and the influence of EuroAmerican culture that suggests they no longer exist. Whitbeck et al. continue, "There has been a continual, persistent, and progressive process of loss that began with military defeat and continues to today with the loss of

culture. As one elder poignantly put it: 'I feel bad about it. Tears come down. That is how I feel. I feel weak. I feel weak about how we are losing our grandchildren. The losses are not over. They are continuing day by day'" (Whitbeck et al. 2004, p. 128).

We see these results in the Oglala Lakota today. Can we find reasons for this continuing loss? Our explorations of ethos-as-place and as-wound suggest that the land, and the people, need to complete their grieving. The sacred character of Wounded Knee demands a ceremonial healing that contains traditional ways of storytelling. For the wound to heal, it needs to be given back its capacity to speak; however, the mere telling is not enough. Rather, the Oglala Lakota must have their stories heard. From the sacred place of wounding, the Lakota call out to EuroAmericans to bear witness to that wounding and to join, by serving as witness, in bringing healing to place and people conjoined. Do the Lakotan ways of grieving differ from EuroAmericans? Yes: as Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart and Lemyra M. DeBruyn argue, "European American culture legitimizes grief only for immediate nuclear family in the current generation" (Brave Heart and DeBruyn 1998, p. 67). For the typical EuroAmerican, this would negate any understanding of the Oglala who continue to suffer the wounds from Wounded Knee and other legal and cultural abuses (which, again refers to EuroAmerican linear-temporal thinking).

In her own healing work, Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart records the grieving stories of participants. As one Oglala says,

> I think losing the land was the most traumatic . . . I remember my aunts and uncles and my dad talked about . . . how they were treated, some were shot, they were telling me about that my grandmother was shot . . . They were starved . . . . You know, the big lie, that the people were forced to believe in history books, stand and salute the flag that wiped out a generation, forced into slavery, forced into their church system . . . So this happened in my great grandparents' generation when they lost the buffalo. My grandparents' generation lost the land and their livelihood . . . That's from generation to generation. There are a lot of answers that I don't have and a lot of questions that I do have and there is a lot of hurt inside me . . . Some of these things happening over the years are still happening today, like my grandparents, my great grandparents had their children moved to schools . . . I was moved, my brothers and sisters moved, my kids . . . I couldn't watch them grow up because we were all moved. It's the same problem happening over and over again . . . There's a big hole in my heart. We see it happening to our grandchildren already . . . where does it stop? (qtd. in (Brave Heart 2000, p. 256))

Yet, the wound inflicted by over a hundred years of genocide, murder, and forced assimilation is undergoing a slow healing process. Refusing to assimilate and give up their heritage, the elders are teaching the youngest generations Oglala history, language, and culture while maintaining the traditional pow wows, dancing, and music—despite the ongoing misunderstandings and misrepresentations of them and their culture. The ongoing challenge for the people is to heal, to the extent that healing is possible with the ongoing oppression, the wounded memories, injustices, and pains of the past. To be more precise, the Lakotan challenge is to find ways to manage the "haunting" of genocide while being present in "the haunt" of their ecologically-sensitive culture.

To further the healing-work of the Oglala, we can look to Freire:

> As the oppressors dehumanize others and violate their rights, they themselves become dehumanized. As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors' power to dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had lost in the exercise of oppression.
>
> It is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors. (Freire 2007, p. 56)

This action of taking away the oppressors' power can, according to Freire, be considered an act of love and humanizing, and this also acts as a form of healing.

10. Lessons in Healing

For lessons in healing, we turn to that sad chapter in European history, the Holocaust. Whereas the Jewish people and their experiences have been recognized globally, the American Indian experience remains largely ignored. This ignorance and "denial" serve as a continuation of the oppression and, yet again, deepens the wound (Duran and Duran 1995, p. 30). Whereas the Jewish people received some reparation and support from around the world, American Indians continue to be oppressed and ignored. It is little wonder why the wound cannot heal, especially when they are forced to drive by one of the greatest examples of their oppression.

Those who lived through the European Holocaust or have understanding of it recognize that trauma has a cultural as well as a psychological component. In similar fashion to the primarily Jewish victims of the Holocaust, the Lakotan victims of Wounded Knee deserve acknowledgment and an opportunity to heal, but note, too, that those victims include descendants. Moreover, part of the distinction of the WWII Holocaust is the locations of the concentration camps. Many of them are memorial sites and museums that highlight the atrocities of the Nazi regime. They, too, often support educational programs or cultural programs. For American Indians, few such sites exist and certainly no global network or educational programs are utilized. The Oglala, however, continue dwelling on the area of their greatest holocaust, with only a billboard and an oppressive culture offering as witness.

As Lacanian analyst Jean-Luc Nancy explains, "the return to the familiar abode is still the return to ethos" (Nancy 2003, p. 136). The problem for Celane Not Help Him and other Lakota, though, is that Wounded Knee offers a return, not to a place of nostalgia, peace, and domesticity, but to a burial ground. Moreover, it is this "proximity of that with which we are obsessed but that is lost to us, the proximity of that whose loss haunts us" (Nancy 2003, p. 136): in the context of Wounded Knee, the Lakotan "loss" exceeds the personal: it is not an individual, but a collective, trauma that obsesses—literally, besieges—the Oglala Lakota today. The place and the massacre at Wounded Knee become both the haunt *and* the haunting for the Oglala. Beginning in 1881, the U.S. Government prohibited the Oglala from performing its ceremonies. This prohibition continued until 1978, with the passage of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Thus, after the Wounded Knee Massacre, the Lakota could not, by EuroAmerican law, perform grieving ceremonies on the haunt of that slaughter. To the EuroAmerican mind, the passing of a friend or family member demands a "proper burial" with traditional rites in sacred church grounds; to be denied any of this would be declared an outrage. But again, for close to a century, the Oglala were prohibited by U.S. law (and by U.S. military might) from performing or completing their ritual mourning, not just of a friend or family member, but a large part of their community especially those massacred at Wounded Knee.

Among the first to study the cultural trauma caused by Wounded Knee was Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart, a Lakota herself. In her doctoral dissertation and subsequent work, Brave Heart has explored, and explained, how this trauma reaches across generations and is "related to a series of psychological outcomes for individuals, including unresolved grief, complicated/prolonged grief, post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD), and depression" (Brave Heart et al. 2011, "Historical Trauma," p. 284). The discussion of Oglala Lakota historical trauma is necessary to better understand ethos. Through this understanding, non-Oglala can potentially learn about the damage European colonizers and their descendants (who I have called EuroAmericans) have done to indigenous peoples around the globe and find ways to support their healing of the wounds they inflicted.

There have been different ways of generating healing among American Indian populations. One example is Brave Heart's "Historical Trauma & Unresolved Grief Tribal Best Practice" model that provides the Oglala with a means of healing. The model is composed of four areas: confronting historical trauma and embracing tribal history; understanding trauma; releasing pain; transcending the trauma. In concert, these four areas work in a circular fashion to promote healing and return the Oglala to the Sacred Path. Brave Heart believes, "the Lakota must shift from identifying with the victimization and massacre of deceased ancestors and begin to develop a constructive collective memory and a healthy collective ego, which includes traditional Lakota values and language" (Brave

Heart 2010, p. 302). To do so, she argues for two focal points: "(a) education about historical trauma would lead to increased awareness of associated affects, and (b) sharing these affects in a traditional context would provide cathartic relief" (Brave Heart 2010, p. 249). In other words, recognizing the trauma and using ceremony to heal it are avenues in managing the impact of the collective trauma.

Another method of healing, the "Honoring Children, Mending the Circle" model is a cultural adaptation of trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy, which was partly developed by Dolores Subia Bigfoot, a Northern Cheyenne, child psychologist, and Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma. This is one in a series of four related models developed in coordination with the Indian Country Child Trauma Center as part of a drive to establish local programs promoting well-being among American Indian populations.[20]

As we see, there are outlets for healing, but these are seemingly focused on one population: American Indians. It seems logical that efforts to heal only American Indians will have limited results because the *cause* of the oppression remains in effect. That cause is the dominant EuroAmerican culture and its failures to respect the *mythos*, experience, and testimony of the Oglala.

11. Conclusions: Listening and Loving

The complexity of ethos offers several concluding remarks for this essay. The recognition of ethos-as-haunt has provided insight to Oglala ethos. Oglala narrative, via *mythos,* functions as a means of carrying their ethos across time allowing it to unfold in time and space. Too often, for American Indians, such expression has been of wounds. That element of ethos was forced upon them by the actions of EuroAmericans through multiple forms of assimilation, warfare, and oppression. The ethos-as-haunt and the *mythos* of that haunt demonstrates ethos-as-wound, because it derives from events such as the Wounded Knee Massacre. Through this expression, we gain understanding of ethotic discourse, which has a primary aim of healing.

Because of this complex relationship, ethos can be seen as a process that allows a speaker or a culture or a group to emerge and gain power from that emergence. Part of this includes power over their self-image, which liberates them from oppression and promotes healing and understanding. Thus, we come to recognize a humane element of ethos as well. This humaneness aspect highlights qualities of identity and diversity within the human relationship—a respect for each of our human value. In order to exercise this functionality, however, we must be open to the expression of love and listening, which creates a sacred circle, of sorts. And for this, I turn to Paulo Freire and Jim W. Corder, but also to the Oglala Lakota and a well-known phrase among them: *Mitákuye Oyás'iŋ*, "we are all related".

The Lakota ethos is unified through an ecological understanding that manifests itself in their *mythos* and also, alas, in their wounds. The healing of those collective wounds is enabled by telling their stories that, again, cycle back to ecology, the land itself. The land—a specific hill, a particular gravesite, a stone tower—becomes the vessel that holds the culture, the traditions, the practices. One can argue that Lakota ethos has been in suspended animation as it struggles to heal the haunt. Part of this healing comes through ethos-as-haunt and as wound, but also through the *mythos* that Brave Heart and Bigfoot have noted—the telling of their story and the subsequent healing in its being heard.

As such, Wounded Knee can act as a metaphor for the Sacred Circle. The circle is haunt, wound, healing, and a return to haunt, which is an expression of ethos. The sacred circle is our peoples coming together and becoming part of each other, listening to each other, and learning from each other. The U.S. forced the Oglala to become part of them and this action wounded the Oglala, a wound which remains to this day. To come full circle, EuroAmericans must listen to the Oglala, hear their history, because it is true.

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[20] Other programs are certainly growing in popularity and availability, such as the American Indian Life Skills program, which is another possibility that offers AI/AN ways of managing the effects of EuroAmerican culture, which points to traditional cultural healing, coping skills, and ways for youth to help each other.

Certainly, the models by Brave Heart and Bigfoot are useful and necessary. However, as Bigfoot notes, "The barriers to treatment include fragmented service system, limited funding, unavailable services and racism coupled with mistrust and fear of mental health treatment. [. . .] The need for appropriate and accessible mental health services in Indian country is high" (Bigfoot 2007, p. 3). Until such services and support are readily available, other action must be taken. Perhaps the most obvious might be the introduction of cultural listening by EuroAmericans. Further still, one segue may be educational settings. One starting place would be the Humanities, which can eventually filter to other disciplines such as the sciences where, as I noted earlier, EuroAmerican culture continues to neglect American Indian ecological wisdom and experience.[21] In order to address the EuroAmerican culture's failure to fully acknowledge nations like the Oglala, more direct educational opportunities should be explored. To be more specific, while we should support the ongoing local programs promoting well-being of American Indian nations, we fail to address the ongoing EuroAmerican misunderstanding and ignorance of them, which makes headway on an ethoic scale impossible, because the oppression will only continue since it itself is not being fully or appropriately addressed within the EuroAmerican culture.

EuroAmericans must help heal the wound of the Oglala that the Westernized world caused; we must own the causation of the wound; we must help heal the wound; we must not be silent any longer. We have seen how ethos can be wounded, but now we must see how it can be healed. To do so, the recognition of ethos as healing becomes an important additional element. Robert Wade Kenny suggests:

> *ethos* is understood as the quality of personhood that calls humanity to care for its self, its world, and its others in such a manner that the dwelling Heidegger regards as fundamental to our Being is made possible. It is not, however, a quality that is simply *in* us, like our liver or a bone; rather, it is behind us and ahead of us, and it only enters us to the extent we take it upon ourselves in the things we do. And, therefore, it is possible to distinguish a disposition toward being that is genuine from one that is not. The genuine disposition toward life is the caretaking disposition, and this is the meaning of *ethos*. It is not part of what we are, but rather *how* we are in the world. (Kenny 2004, p. 36)

As I have moved away from the static, Aristotelian model of ethos I have considered ethos-as-haunt, *mythos*, ethos-as-wound, and ethos as a means of healing. And only by listening to the Oglala work through their wound can we find a way to heal themselves, because in wounding one, oneself is wounded too.

Corder writes, "What can free us from the apparent hopelessness of steadfast arguments opposing each other? I have to start with a simple answer and hope that I can gradually give it the texture and capacity it needs: we have *to see* each other, *to know* each other, *to be present to* each other, *to embrace* each other" (Corder 1985, p. 23). Yet, Corder reveals more for us that we can filter through the conflicts between the U.S. government and EuroAmerican's treatment of the Oglala; he writes,

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[21] The humanities are meant to explore the human condition; and yet, as Mikhail Epstein argues, the humanities "stopped being human studies and became textual studies". He continues:

> No one now seems to expect anything from the humanities except readings and re-readings, and, first and foremost, criticism rather than creativity and suspicion rather than imagination. As a result, the humanities are no longer focusing on human self-reflection and self-transformation. (Epstein 2012, p. 2)

Further, as Baumlin and Meyer note, "it's been a long time since the humanities *mattered* socially or politically" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018). Now is the time to bring other voices into the EuroAmerican educational collective conversations about what it means to *be* human, so we (all) can be *more human* because we (all) are missing too much of our collective story; it has been drowned out by one overwhelming narrative, that of EuroAmerican colonization, (so-called) advancement, and civilization. The wounds of the Oglala are one set of wounds on one group of people, but they provide insight into the failure of colonization.

> [I]n our most grievous and disturbing conflicts, we need time to accept, to understand, to love the other. At crises points in adversarial relationships, we do not, however, have time; we are already in opposition and confrontation. Since we don't have time, we must rescue time by putting it into our discourses and holding it there, learning to speak and write not argumentative displays and presentations, but arguments full of anecdotal, personal, and cultural reflections that will make plain to all others, thoughtful histories and narratives that reveal us as we're reaching for the others. The world, of course, doesn't want time in its discourses. [. . .] We must teach the world to want otherwise, to want time to care. (Corder 1985, p. 31)

Freire, too, writes of love:

> Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for people. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. [. . .] Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to others. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause—the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical. As an act of bravery, love cannot be sentimental; as an act of freedom, it must not serve as a pretext for manipulation. It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love. Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the love which that situation made impossible. If I do not love the world—if I do not love life—if I do not love people—I cannot enter into dialogue. (Freire 2007, pp. 89–90)

Corder and Freire offer us a means to reach out to each other and listen, truly listen, to each other. EuroAmericans rushed to judge and judged harshly the Oglala, and now they must stop and listen to the damage and the pain and the trauma and the wounds they so eagerly caused as they rushed forward in the name of progress and civilization. What have we gotten from that rush forward? What do we know now that we did not know then? Or, better, *who* do we know better? Are we better? What stories have we told? What falsehoods have we perpetuated? More importantly, what stories have we listened to?

When the answers may not be forthcoming for EuroAmerican colonizers, it is time to listen. Listen to the Oglala elders and youngsters and hear their stories, their narratives, to come to care for them—to build relationships with each other. And so, I conclude with words from Russell Means, an Oglala raised on Pine Ridge, because he offers insight into *Lakol Wicohan* and *Mitákuye Oyás'iŋ*:

> I came to understand that life is not about race or culture or pigmentation or bone structure—it's about *feelings*. That's what makes us human beings. We all feel joy and happiness and laughter. We all feel sadness and ugliness and shame and hurt. [. . .] Nobody cares who has the best reason to suffer. If you're rich and hurting, you feel no different than someone who is poor and hurting. Then I realized that if the human family has all the same feelings, all any of us should worry about is how to deal with them. [. . .] Deal with feelings and relationships. The cultures of every indigenous society in the world are based on improving relationships—the individual's connection with the dolphin, a wolf, an eagle, a tree, a rock, a spider or a snake or lizard, with other human beings, with the clouds and with the wind. (Means 1995, p. 531)

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Haunt or Home? Ethos and African American Literature

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Abstract: The African American rhetorical tradition could be described as a shelter in an alien environment or as a way station on a long journey. A focus on ethos suggests that such a narrow approach to African American literature cannot do justice to these literary texts: how these writers employ images and symbols, craft and deploy examine identities, blend, criticize, and create traditions, explore contemporary issues, and create community. Because of cultural and racist narratives, African Americans could not simply use either the pre-Socratic or Aristotelian approaches to ethos in their fight for social justice. This essay demonstrates how a postclassical approach to ethos that draws on Bourdieu's concept of habitus and is focused on community-building and self-healing is central to the African American literature and rhetoric.

Keywords: African American literature; ethos; slave narratives; Phillis Wheatley; Martin Luther King; Malcolm X; W.E.B. Du Bois; Booker T. Washington

1. Introduction

In a provocative essay from 1997 entitled, "Home," Nobel-prize winning author Toni Morrison compares living and writing in the United States as an African American woman with occupying a house rather than a home. For Morrison, cultural memory shapes contemporary action, and her characters cannot escape how America's racial history has shaped their lives, coloring how they see the world and influencing their interactions with both African Americans and whites. The nation's racial past is a source of trauma and a burden, and the African American community is scarred by this history, even if shared history offers a potential source of healing and solidarity. Morrison describes her writing as part of an ongoing project to imagine "how to convert a racist house into a race-specific yet nonracist home" (Morrison 1998, p. 5). Throughout the essay, she reconceives race, racial signifiers, and the modern United State nation as potential dwellings in which African Americans must meet and then live, write, think, speak, persuade, and create. These dwellings could be haunted houses or nourishing homes of support and love. Morrison's contrast between houses and homes constitutes a modern reiteration of Greeks' approach to ethos but with an important emphasis. The dwelling place of ethos, character and context, is not a destination that can be reached. Rather, it is a shared journey—between speaker/writer and audience—of exploration, discovery, and creativity. It is also an uncompleted act.

Frequently, scholars and students of the African American rhetorical tradition expect that the texts in this tradition should possess a single rhetorical function or goal: challenging racial hierarchy in its various manifestations.[1] Of course, much African American writing and speaking has sought to influence public opinion, politics, and social structure, especially during the eras of slavery and

[1] In his *What Was African American Literature?* Kenneth Warren argues that African American literature is the product of Jim Crow segregation and had single focus and purpose (Warren 2011, pp. 1–9).

segregation. However, they do much more than that. Like a dwelling, the African American rhetorical tradition could be described as a shelter in an alien environment or as a way station on a long journey. A focus on ethos, however, suggests that either approach to African American rhetoric by itself cannot do justice to these texts: how these writers employ images and symbols, craft and deploy examine identities, blend, criticize, and create traditions, explore contemporary issues, and create community. Because of the cultural and racist narratives that have dominated American culture, African Americans could not simply use either the pre-Socratic or Aristotelian approaches to ethos. This essay demonstrates how a postclassical approach to ethos that draws on Bourdieu's concept of habitus and is focused on community-building and self-healing is central to the African American literature and rhetoric

The paired concepts of home and ethos to help us better understand African American literature and culture and explore the potential for what Baumlin and Meyer term a "therapeutic model" or reparative model for ethos whose goal is to "recognize, accommodate, and heal—to heal oneself and one's community through mutual understanding, consensus, equity, mutuality" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, p. 18). This model is postclassical and rooted in postmodern criticisms of ethos and stands alongside the Aristotelian approach, which focuses on persuading others. Because ethos brings together character, persuasion, and context, it helps to reveal how race, racism, and racial identity constitute homes or, in Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, "a habitus,"[2] that shape how writers write and readers read. Karl Maton observes that "habitus links the social and the individual because the experiences of one's life course may be unique in their particular contents but are shared in terms of their structure with others of the same social class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, occupation, nationality, region and so forth" (Maton 2014, p. 52). Bourdieu's concept of the habitus offers an important and necessary adjunct to classical notions of ethos, by emphasizing that character is not simply the product of individual decisions and actions but part of an existing social structure. Race operates similarly as both a social structure and an individual experience, limiting the rhetorical choices of African Americans and the kinds of stories they can tell. Given the social and construction of race and the circumscribed spaces, or homes, African American writers and their readers occupy, African American writers must engage with and deconstruct dominant understandings of racial character to create a literature and a public voice that constructively engage racial inequality. The resulting texts also seek to help build a stronger Africa American community by healing traumas produced by America's history of racism.

Traditionally, ethos is defined as an appeal to character (Solmsen 1954, p. 25). This sense of ethos emphasizes how a speaker deploys character in relation to a specific audience, which has proven problematic for African American writers and intellectuals due to the history of racism where racial categories constituted de facto markers of a lack of character. Recent work on ethos, especially Michael J. Hyde's, recuperates the earliest meaning of the Greek term ethos as a haunt or a dwelling. Hyde argues: "The human being is called to be true to its essential character (*ethos*): We *are* the opening of a dwelling place where the truth of what is—be it a stone, tree, eagle, ourselves, or whatever—can be taken to heart, appreciated, and cared for" (Hyde 2004, p. xx). Hyde's intervention is attractive for critics of African American literature because it emphasizes where African Americans live and how character is central to the battle for freedom and racial equality. It also suggests there is a possibility for self-care within the rhetorical uses of ethos.

Framing ethos as a dwelling marries character and context, or as Bourdieu would say habitus and field, and insists that rhetoric is not a mere device for persuasion. Rather, ethos is a dynamic unity of our habits, our social roles, and the wisdom to know how to live well. Ethos includes both our way of life and the social structures that allow that way of life to come into being. For African American

[2] Bourdieu defines habitus as the schema or worldview that shapes a person's worldview. The habitus is a product of one's social position and role in society. Fowler observes: "the habitus of the dominated frequently leads them to choose actively what they are objectively constrained to do (Fowler 1997).

culture, ethos is both a personal project of building a character to live a meaningful life in racist culture and a literary project where cultural artifacts testify to the good character of the race, responding to and repairing the harms of living in a racist society. The etymological origins of the concept help to reveal how race inevitably gets intertwined with rhetorical appropriations of ethos. Margaret Zulick's approach to ethos supports this understanding:

> To the philologist, however, there is a rather stark contrast between the archaic meaning of "haunt" or the habitual territory of a wild animal to the late classical "character." Charles Chamberlain's etymological study reveals, however, an intermediate, metaphorical application of the term to mean "custom" or "habit." One can perhaps see how the name has traveled from "air" to "habit" (via "habitat") to "character" in the sense of the constellation of habits of thought, manners, and reputation that constitutes a rhetorical subject. (Zulick 2004, p. 20)

Race, as a haunt, functions as a social and legal fiction, ascribing habits and customs to individuals based on appearance and serving as a proxy for (racial) character. This essay explores how, African American intellectuals frequently used art and literature to counter invidious racial stereotypes during the antebellum, Jim Crow, and post-Civil Rights eras even as they sought to use art to help African Americans heal from the traumas that resulted from slavery, segregation, and limits of the Civil Rights movement. The essay concludes by considering why debates about racial character continue to the present day and why ethos remains an essential element of African American rhetoric and literature.

2. Ethos in Early African American Literature

Early African American writers found literature an unwelcoming discourse, as white readers questioned whether African Americans possessed the intelligence to produce literature and the existing models for literatures offered only caricatures for African Americans. In his 1784 *Notes on Virginia*, Thomas Jefferson writes, "misery is often the parent of the most affecting touches in poetry. Among the blacks is misery enough, God knows, but no poetry" (Jefferson 1984, pp. 266–267). He further laments: "never yet could I find that a black had uttered a thought above the level of plain narration; never see even an elementary trait of painting or sculpture" (p. 266). For the early African American orators, poets, and writers, American culture was a fairly hostile place. Most whites, such as Jefferson, questioned whether African Americans possessed the intellect to produce art or literature of any kind. Also, because slave laws prohibited most African Americans from learning how to read and write, there were few black literary publications until the 1840s and 1850s and, even then, they were limited to fairly small-run newspapers. One space where African Americans intellectuals could present their ideas was within the black church. Orators, such as Richard Allen (1760–1831) and David Walker (1796–1830), found some success and notoriety. They typically drew on the Bible in crafting arguments for democracy and against slavery. Their speeches and writings emphasized how slavery had not sapped or diminished the character of African Americans. Rather, they tended to question the moral character of whites who professed to believe in the Bible but then failed to realize its moral teachings. Their rhetoric sought to persuade whites from their racist beliefs about black character and build community among African Americans who lacked political or legal standing.

In the fields of poetry and non-fiction, African American writers could not simply engage in creative explorations. Rather, these early writers needed to write themselves into the traditions of literature before they could even begin to experiment with form or structure. In the context of antebellum America, being a "Negro" categorically excluded Africans Americans from the very status of being a writer. Thomas Jefferson's dismissed "Phillis Wheatley's poetry as lacking originality" (Jefferson 1984, p. 264). Wheatley (1753–1784) was the first African American to publish poetry in the United States. Because her work needed to mimic existing literary conventions, Jefferson was not impressed and failed to find the requisite creativity in her work.

The slave narrative was a popular genre in the antebellum period. These narratives, which drew on religious writings, captivity narratives, and the picaresque novel, described the journey

from slavery to freedom. As journey narratives, they underscore how the culture of slavery affects character and how the quest to achieve freedom, equality, and literacy requires a lengthy process and ongoing struggle against dominant white perspectives. Olaudah Equiano published the first slave narrative, in 1789. Frederick Douglass wrote probably the most famous one in 1845, and Harriet Jacobs is recognized for her 1861 narrative, *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl*, which explores the challenges slavery brought for women. Because the slave narratives served as abolitionist tracts, the authors needed to emphasize their intellect, moral virtue, and Christian faith. These constraints limited what African American writers could write and, in turn, caused early critics to question the artistic value of their work. Nonetheless, the focus on virtue allowed these writers to reframe their experiences to emphasize their autonomy and their efforts to heal themselves from the horrors of slavery. They also offered glimpses of how African Americans came together as a community despite the hardships and obstacles they faced.

For writers, such as Wheatley and Douglass, being understood without offending the primarily white audience was no easy task. Consider Wheatley's most famous poem "On Being Brought from Africa to America" (1773):

> 'Twas mercy brought me from my *Pagan* land
> Taught by benighted soul to understand
> That there's a God, there's a *Savior* too.
> Once I redemption neither sought nor knew
> Some view our sable race with scornful eye,
> "Their colour is a diabolic die."
> Remember, *Christians, Negroes*, black as *Cain*,
> May be refin'd and join th' angelic train.

In this poem that explores the link between ethos and exile, Wheatley cannot merely challenge race-based slavery and the hypocrisy of so-called Christians who participate in the slave trade. Her task is much more delicate. She must affirm the value and truth of Christianity, acknowledge that Africans were "heathens" (according to late 18th century discourse), distinguish between moral and immoral Christians, criticize contemporary racial stereotypes, and defend the character and virtue of black Christians. Wheatley's poem is thus revolutionary not in its metaphors or structure, but in its application to Africans whose humanity had been stripped from them. Wheatley is writing herself into the field of literature as her habitus or character, defined by her race and gender, exclude her from the discourse.

Since the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s and the Black Arts movement of the 1960s, it has been fairly commonplace for critics to analyze African American literature based on its relation to African American linguistic and cultural traits. In this rendering, the character or ethos of African American literature is intertwined with a shared set of habits and practices that can be traced from Africa to America through the Middle Passage, slavery, segregation, and then the Great Migration (1915–1960).[3] Wheatley's work, however, resists this way of framing the African American rhetorical tradition as her writings do not draw explicitly on an African American tradition of writing, nor does the poem overtly challenge race-based slavery or racial segregation. Such an approach would overlook the rhetorical genius of Phillis Wheatley. The poem, especially the last four lines, defends the race from the claim that African Americans are beyond religious salvation. Not unlike later African American writers and orators, Wheatley dares white Christians to live up to their professed values. To establish her standing to speak, Wheatley demonstrates her character by embracing Christianity and rejecting, at

[3] See Gates (1988) for his discussion of signify in' as an example of this approach.

least rhetorically, African spiritual beliefs. There is an ironic undercurrent to the poem as well. The opening line—"T was mercy brought me from my *Pagan* land"—seems to describe the slave trade as a "mercy". Also, the word "brought" understates or even erases the violence of the trade and agency of those who participated in and profited from the slave trade. Despite the poem's calm tone, its rebuke of racist theologies that deny African Americans access to eternal salvation suggest that Wheatley is well aware of these ironies. The central task of the poem is to argue for African American personhood, especially a religious recognition of her status as a human being, that places ethos and character at the center of African American literary production. In fact, this claim of self-possession and ownership is a necessary pre-condition for establishing ethos in the modern world.

The slave narratives also illustrate how ethos, as both haunt and character, shaped African American literature during the antebellum era. The abolitionist press published these slave narratives as part of its propaganda effort to rid the country of slavery. Because these abolitionist accounts featured violence, daring adventures, and a good dose of Christian morality, the resulting books found a broad audience. When Frederick Douglass set out to write the account of his liberation from slavery, there was considerable skepticism from white southerners that an African American could write such a piece. Even northerners suspected that white abolitionists were crafting, if not creating out of whole cloth, the accounts of slavery that emerged during the 1840s and 1850s. To combat these concerns, the slave narratives frequently included letters and essays from famous white abolitionists, attesting to the veracity of the accounts. *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass* (1845) began with a preface from William Lloyd Garrison, a well-known abolitionist:

> Mr. Douglass has very properly chosen to write his own Narrative, in his own style, and according to the best of his ability, rather than to employ some one else. It is, therefore, entirely his own production; and, considering how long and dark was the career he had to run as a slave,—how few have been his opportunities to improve his mind since he broke his iron fetters, it is, in my judgment, highly creditable to his head and heart. (p. 7)

The stated purpose of Douglass's writing was to reveal the horrors of slavery. However, more importantly, his slave narrative demonstrated how slavery was robbing African Americans of dignity, morality, and justice and offered a path to self-healing and self-ownership for African American readers and demonstrated the value and virtue of African Americans for white audiences.

Critics have noted that these framing devices worked to de-emphasize the creativity that it took to write a good slave narrative and allowed white abolitionists to consider themselves as the theoreticians of the movement. By the time of Douglass (nearly fifty years after the first slave narratives), there came to be a generic formula, of sorts, for African American writers to follow. It emphasized the moral character of the liberated slave and how slavery had impeded the effort to attain virtue and live a good Christian life. Moreover, the slave narrative sought to demonstrate how slavery compromised the moral and spiritual virtue of slave owners. Because the entire social and economic framework of the country depended on slavery, even the slaves of "good" owners could not escape the pernicious effects of evil slave-masters.

As with so much in African American literature, slave narratives reflect a sustained engagement with rhetoric and character. The writer is not merely describing a scene, character, or dilemma, but is fighting to write at all. Slave law prohibited slaves from learning how to read and write, and many slave owners discouraged even religious gatherings among slaves because they feared what might happen in those gatherings. The result is that many African Americans were doomed to ignorance, which was, in turn, used to justify their enslavement. Abolitionists deployed the slave narratives to demonstrate the intelligence and morality of African Americans, while Southern supporters of slavery challenged them as frauds. Douglass wrote his narrative to both defend his character and argue for the

possibility that African American literature could exist.[4] Douglass and other writers of slave narratives put pen to paper to change American law and culture and to offer hope and a method for self-healing for other African Americans. They were not seeking to achieve in literature for the mere sake of individual gain. Rather, there was a commitment to the broader community. Moreover, the spiritual dimensions of the slave narratives and the poetry of Phillis Wheatley is not an accident. There was an instrumental reason to engage religion in this quest for personhood, liberty, and equality: if African Americans possessed spiritual worth and moral value as acknowledged by God, then man-made laws allowing slavery and second-class citizenship would be unjust and immoral. Further, their journeys to physical and spiritual freedom and healing offered models for other African American who heard their stories and could be inspired by them. Ethos as character was fundamental to African American literature during this period because it constituted a necessary rhetorical building block, even if it was temporary respite from the onslaught of then dominant views, as African Americans made the argument for freedom. At the same time, ethos was also a "haunt" because whites viewed African American writers with suspicions about their intellect, ability, and culture. During this period, these suspicions shaped the choices African American writers made and limited the kind of writings that would be produced, published, and read.

3. Ethos during the Era of Segregation

After the Civil War, African Americans hoped that the end of slavery would improve their political, social, cultural, and economic situation. While the period of Reconstruction (1865–1877), immediately after the Civil War, brought many African Americans into political power, it was a short-lived success. By the 1890s, Jim Crow segregation was common all over the South and endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in the *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) decision. Not only did whites create separate facilities for African Americans, but they took political power in a ruthless manner, as white supremacist organizations, such as the Ku Klux Klan, flourished during the early twentieth century. Many Southern African Americans were forced into sharecropping, which shackled them into a never-ending cycle of debt. Booker T. Washington (1856–1915) rose to prominence during this period to become the leading spokesperson for the African American community. In his famous 1895 speech at the Atlanta Exposition, he urged African Americans to pull themselves up by their bootstraps and focus on achieving economic success:

> Our greatest danger is that in the great leap from slavery to freedom we may overlook the fact that the masses of us are to live by the productions of our hands, and fail to keep in mind that we shall prosper in proportion as we learn to dignify and glorify common labour, and put brains and skill into the common occupations of life; shall prosper in proportion as we learn to draw the line between the superficial and the substantial, the ornamental gewgaws of life and the useful. No race can prosper till it learns that there is as much dignity in tilling a field as in writing a poem. It is at the bottom of life we must begin, and not at the top. Nor should we permit our grievances to overshadow our opportunities. (pp. 146–147)

Washington argued that political or social activism will prove ineffective in changing things. Rather, he believed that character would be developed through hard work and that the best way to gain the respect of whites is by accumulating wealth.[5] Washington closes his famous 1895 speech by emphasizing the importance of a certain kind of character: "It is important and right that all privileges of the law be ours, but it is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercise of these privileges. The opportunity to earn a dollar in a factory just now is worth infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in an opera-house" (Washington 1970, p. 148).

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[4] See generally, Douglass (1997).

[5] Following the logic of Bourdieu's habitus, Washington is correct that economic wealth would provide a certain kind of capital. Du Bois, as we will see, questions if that kind of capital would be sufficient to succeed in promoting racial equality.

While many African Americans supported Washington and his approach, a significant number of African Americans disagreed. W.E.B. Du Bois (1868–1963) challenged Washington's focus on economic success and believed that African Americans should focus on education, civil rights, and voting to promote personal and group success. He further believed that a small group of highly educated African Americans, known as the Talented Tenth, should lead the African American community in this fight for social and political recognition. Intellectual achievement, not hard work and what Bourdieu would frame as social or cultural capital, was Du Bois's answer to the question of what kind of character or ethos African Americans ought to develop. The conflict between Du Bois and Washington centers on which habits and roles African American should develop and what constitutes virtue or excellence. Further, their debate about character hinges on who is the audience for these performances of character—whites or African Americans—and which specific performances of character will help African Americans gain the spiritual and emotional tools to thrive. Du Bois, working with many Northern whites, started the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The NAACP sought to promote racial equality in education, politics, and social structure. The debate between Washington and Du Bois split the African American community as the two men offered competing visions for how to develop the character of African Americans. Southerners and working class African Americans tended to support Washington's vision, while northerners and those with more education gravitated toward Du Bois's position.

By the mid-1920s, writers, artists, and intellectuals believed that art and literature was a key site in the battle for racial equality. By creating an artistic movement, they sought to challenge existing racial stereotypes and prejudice. African American literature, according to this line of argument, was an instrumental tool designed to counter white propaganda and one that could transform freedom and equality from a dream into a reality. More than mere political propaganda, these intellectuals believed that literature could help forge a common identity and culture among African Americans, who were divided by social class, region, and the urban-rural divide.[6] Literature and art were key tools in the dialectic relationship between self and community. Alain Locke (1885–1954) became the de facto spokesperson for the "New Negro Movement," which today is known as the Harlem Renaissance (1920s and 1930s).

Despite the shared goals of the Harlem Renaissance, the ferment of creative and critical work in the movement produced a stunningly wide array of positions about how best to achieve these goals. W.E.B. Du Bois argued during this period that literature constituted a form of propaganda, emphasizing its rhetorical value to correct erroneous assumptions (logos), build sympathy across racial lines (pathos), and demonstrate the character of African Americans (ethos). Locke differed from Du Bois and focused more on how increased and more sophisticated creative expression would prove the value of African Americans. Relying heavily on logos, he believed that cultural achievement led the way to political and social equality ("New Negro", Locke 1968, pp. 15–16). Both Locke and Du Bois believed that the Talented Tenth or the most educated and talented African Americans would help bridge the races. Langston Hughes (1902–1967), in his famous 1926 essay "The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain," challenged Locke's emphasis on cultural achievement and Du Bois's plea for racial propaganda. Hughes urged writers to embrace the unique aspects of black culture because he believed that African American could become good artists and truly love themselves if only by accepting the habits, practices, values, and ordinary ways of black people. (Hughes 1994, pp. 94–95). Hughes cautioned against producing literature with the singular aims of persuading or pleasing white audiences. Zora Neale Hurston (1891–1960) shared this sensibility with Hughes and emphasized

[6] Many African American intellectuals of this period believed that African Americans lacked a unifying or common culture, marked by regional differences and the rural/urban divide. Slavery and segregation only created the appearance of a shared culture (and one that seemed anti-intellectual). Many argued that once African Americans embrace modernity, the distinctions between black and white would diminish.

pathos in her writing.[7] Among these writers and intellectuals, there was a sharp disagreement about whether the focus of African American rhetoric should be aimed externally at whites who embraced Jim Crow segregation and might relent or at African Americans who needed to recognize their moral worth and needed to build a healthy and whole community.

Of course, this conversation also included voices that thought that the entire concept of a unique or distinctive African American voice was ridiculous. George Schuyler (1895–1977), in his 1926 essay "The Negro-Art Hokum" (Schuyler 1994) and his novel *Black No More* (1931), disagreed with the entire premise behind the New Negro Movement and the Harlem Renaissance. Schuyler's voice is important because he lays the foundation for later black conservatives who emphasize character rooted in virtue—not social activism—as the key to improving the position of individual African Americans. Schuyler's approach to ethos broke from modern version promoted by other African American intellectuals; he believed individuals developed and possessed character, not whole communities.

The flourishing of the Harlem Renaissance is an important reminder that segregation was both ubiquitous but varied. To consider Jim Crow as a single system fails to capture how African Americans could and did navigate the systems and found some agency.[8] While segregation suggests separation, it would be a mistake to assume that Jim Crow was static. From the beginning of World War I through the 1950s, African Americans moved in great numbers from the rural South to the urban North, looking for jobs, freedom, and education. This mass movement of African Americans is frequently known as the Great Migration and transformed African American culture, so much so that today African American culture is frequently synonymous with Northern urban spaces. The Great Migration, beyond transforming African Americans, also signals African American agency in the face of constraint and discrimination. Both ordinary African Americans and those in the arts and cultural criticism during this period sought new "dwellings"—symbolized by the Northern urban milieu—to build their lives and offered a new representation of the character of African Americans.[9]

At one level, Alain Locke's "New Negro" was an urban man at home in the industrialized city, trying to repair and improve his station in life. At a deeper level, the New Negro sought to challenge the stereotypical representations of African Americans that were rooted in slavery and the imagery—found in Jim Crow minstrelsy—that supported it. In the language of rhetoric, the New Negro Movement constituted a conscious and intentional effort to reframe the character of African Americans for whites and blacks alike, albeit with competing rhetorical strategies. While the Harlem Renaissance did not generate political or social reform as the 1950s Civil Rights movement did, it was nonetheless successful in creating a generation of writers, painters, and artists who produced a breath-taking diversity of work, which depicted the journey of change African Americans were experiencing. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, the Harlem Renaissance raised the profile of the arts within the African American community and demonstrated the centrality of literature and art as a potential catalyst for change—both internally and externally. Since the Harlem Renaissance, artists have played an increasingly significant role in African American cultural life.

4. Ethos and the Civil Rights Movement

The Civil Rights movement became an important force for political, social, economic, and cultural change during the 1950s and 1960s. It drew upon the African American rhetorical tradition and

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[7] Holmes argues that Hurston offered the most effective rhetorical voice because it was not reduced to either mimicking or reversing dominant white literary values (Holmes 2004, p. 91).

[8] Holmes demonstrates that a literary genius such as Zora Neale Hurston could find agency even in the rural South as her stories capture the intelligence, wit and wisdom of ordinary African Americans living under Jim Crow (Holmes 2004, pp. 75–91).

[9] In his monograph, Eric King Watts argues "the New Negro movement should be credited" with "allow[ing] black artists to have a say in the ongoing production of prevailing taste" (Watts 2012, p. 195). In other words, the Harlem Renaissance opened up the range of artistic possibilities and, despite the efforts of Du Bois and Locke, presented competing approaches to representing the black "voice".

its emphases on ethos, self-healing, and name making. The efforts of Wheatley and Douglass to demonstrate the character of worth of African Americans and the African American community never really ended, as the transition from slavery to segregation did not dismantle racial stereotypes but merely changed how they affected the social order. The debate between Washington and Du Bois about how African Americans ought to achieve success, gain economic self-sufficiency, or focus on political reform, continued throughout the twentieth century. Du Bois's position shifted from his earlier focus on education and civil rights activism to become a Marxist, who believed that only an economic revolution could produce a political one. However, others, most notably Martin Luther King (1929–1968), picked up the positions of the early Du Bois to advocate for social change. Malcolm X (1925–1965) became known for his more aggressive approach to racial inequality. Malcolm X's embrace of self-defense and economic self-sufficiency echoed or rhymed with Washington's approach, even if there is a much greater stridency and anger in his rhetoric.

It has been commonplace to pit Martin Luther King and Malcolm X against each other, as critics and scholars want to identify *the* rhetorical form that was successful in catalyzing the social, legal, and political reforms of the 1960s. In a perceptive analysis from 1991, religious scholar James Hal Cone argues that Martin Luther King and Malcolm X "*complemented* and *corrected* each other; each spoke a truth about America that cannot be fully comprehended with the insights of the other. Indeed, if Americans of all races intend to create a just and peaceful future, then they must listen to both Martin and Malcolm" (Cone 1991, p. 246). The genius of Cone's analysis is he realizes that social change happened because integrationist (King) and nationalist (X) positions worked together to create a political, social, and cultural change. They also spoke to the spiritual and emotional needs of different African Americans. Neither alone would have been successful. In a sense, the debate between Martin Luther King and Malcolm X echoed the debated between Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois, but with a shift in tone and perspective.

As Cone also points out, it was not merely their words or the arguments that mattered. Rather, it was their complementary characters. Martin Luther King offered the refined character of a formally trained Southern minister of solid middle-class upbringing. Malcolm X, on the other hand, represented poor urban blacks who had suffered from racism despite the relative absence of Jim Crow legislation in the North. Cone implores us to understand the pair in dialogic terms:

> We should never pit them against each other. Anyone, therefore, who claims to be for one and not the other does not understand their significance for the black community, for America, or for the world. We need both of them and we need them *together*. Malcolm keeps Martin from being turned into a harmless American hero. Martin keeps Malcolm from being an ostracized black hero. (p. 316)

Cone's dialogic approach to African American rhetoric serves as a model for how to understand and interpret African American writers and intellectuals. It reminds us that these authors and orators are not merely speaking to one audience or another, but to other writers and speakers as well. Throughout King's speeches, for example, he frequently quotes scripture, Socrates, and the Founding Fathers. From one point of view, King's texts, such as "The Letter from Birmingham Jail," seem more indebted to Greek Philosophy, Transcendentalism, and existentialism than other African American writers or thinkers. Such an analysis, however, would neglect that King deployed such sources to persuade whites that their own intellectual traditions demand black freedom. King's rhetoric also built on the efforts of earlier writers who sought to write African Americans into the European and American intellectual traditions. On the other hand, Malcolm X's project of rebuilding African American identity through a revisionist history that placed Africa—and not Europe—at the center of world history was, at heart, a program in character development. Malcolm X, through the Nation of Islam initially and later his own teachings, encouraged African Americans to take pride in themselves and become people of character who built black families, businesses, and communities.

The legacy of the Civil Rights movement is deeply connected to questions of ethos. This is probably best represented by the famous line from Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech: "I

have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character." Many commentators have read this line to mean that Americans ought to develop a "colorblind" approach to understanding race. While this is clearly a portion of what King intended, such a reading rushes over a key assumption and distorts King's message. Like Phillis Wheatley during the late 18th century, King knew that African Americans were constantly being judged and labeled because of race. His appeal to character, here, is in the service of the particular political and social goals of equality and freedom. Despite his reputation for being a dreamer, King is enough of a realist to know that the appeal to character has the potential to forestall racial and racist judgments, at least in some instances. While character may be mutable, King implies that the existence of race-based judgment seems to be an all too permanent of a feature of American life. Although he is arguing for equality in the speech, King seems to assume almost unconsciously that white America will always question the value and worth of his children. Only character has the potential to protect them.

5. Ethos in Contemporary African American Literature

Since the 1980s and 1990s, civil rights activists have focused on how African Americans and other people of color disproportionately remain poor, undereducated and incarcerated, even though formal barriers in education, housing, and employment have been removed. The persistence of race and racism after the demise of Jim Crow has only sharpened the focus on character and identity in the African American rhetorical tradition. Questions of racial character have not diminished in contemporary life. While earlier periods emphasized the word "racial" in racial character, today the concept of character allows society to distinguish worthy from unworthy recipients of government protection, freedom, and wealth. For some critics, what keeps many African Americans undereducated, poor, incarcerated, and suffering from second-class citizenship is character, not race. It is choices, behaviors, habits, or values they adopt that have trapped many African Americans. Thus, any lingering gaps in achievement and wealth are not the result of racism, but flaws in African American culture. Conversely, the educational, economic, and political success of some African Americans once again suggests (to some) that it is not race or racism, but the relative failure of African American culture, writ large, which is the primary force holding back many African Americans.

Race continues to prove to be a significant social, cultural, political, and economic boundary. While that boundary is not a legal mandate, racial lines continue to divide our cities, workplaces, prisons, religious institutions, politics, and even our bookstores. The boundary is shadowy and not always easily definable, yet it is there. As today's critical race theorists, such as Michelle Alexander, Kimberle Crenshaw, Patricia Williams, and Bryan Stevenson would argue, race continues to shape policies and laws. The new legal regime requiring *de jure* discrimination allows enough wiggle room for disparate effects to happen without triggering antidiscrimination law. This can be seen most easily in our criminal justice system. As Michelle Alexander argues in *The New Jim Crow* (Alexander 2010), race still matters because we live in a world where more African American men are imprisoned today than during segregation despite a lowering national crime rate and evidence to suggest that people of all races commit crimes at about the same rate.[10]

Not only does character offer an easy explanation as to why some African Americans "succeed" and others "fall" behind, but it also produces conflict within the black community and alienation for individuals who do not fit dominant cultural ideas about racial identity. Many contemporary African American writers explore how social class, mixed-race identity, profession, gender, and sexual orientation have ruptured the putative African American nation and created significant numbers of

[10] See also Bryan Stevenson's *Just Mercy* (Stevenson 2014). His book describes how racism has profoundly affected the criminal justice system's treatment of African Americans, creating a situation where African Americans are much more likely to be facing the death penalty.

people who feel abandoned by the African American community. Consider Michael Thomas's novel, *Man Gone Down* (Thomas 2007). To critic Kenneth Warren, the novel symbolizes the end of African American literature because the character's struggle to come up with tuition money to a fancy New York private school for his mixed-race children is not shared by all African Americans. The novel's lengthy final scene focuses on a high stakes golf outing in which the protagonist is seeking to win his children's tuition money from some young and rich white men. Thomas's nameless main character (echoing the protagonist of Ralph Ellison's 1952 Invisible Man) does not face any overt racism, but he is facing an identity crisis and a crisis of values. The protagonist cannot help but view the contest, its stakes, and how the participants view him through the lens of America's racial history. The unnamed narrator is well aware of how his education, marriage, and concern about his children's private school tuition seem to place him outside of how the African American community has traditionally defined itself. The reason the golf outing has such symbolic power is that the novel's hero is trying to find a way to accommodate his conflicting desires to meet his white wife's expectations for an upper-middle-class life with his attachment to the African American community and his identity. His angst is the product of the changing boundaries of the African American community and identity, not his desire to abandon blackness or the social, political or cultural irrelevance of the African American community. In other words, the novel is concerned with whether a middle-class man married to a white woman possesses the ethos of African American culture.

Thomas's novel is not alone. Contemporary novels by African Americans, if not focused on historical trauma, explore the personal challenges of being black in contemporary America. Novels, such as Colson Whitehead's *Sag Harbor* (Whitehead 2009), Danzy Senna's *Caucasia* (Senna 1998), Martha Southgate's *Taste of Salt* (Southgate 2011), and Mat Johnson's *Pym* (2011), explore individual journeys to find self-acceptance, self-understanding, self-healing, and some form of social recognition and/or personal success. In other words, these are personal journeys, not metaphorical or symbolic ones representing all African Americans. These African American characters do not represent the masses of African Americans, or maybe even a large number. Rather, Colson Whitehead's upper-class Benjy or Senna's multiracial Birdie are interesting and complex, precisely because of the relatively unique way race affects their lives. They are nonetheless deeply concerned with ethos, as race and racial identity are not mere markers of biology but deeply intertwined with notions of culture and character. They also seek healing from the racial wounds and injuries from which they suffer.

Although an ancient concept, postclassical critiques of ethos, however, can help redefine the goals and stakes of contemporary African American literature in a putatively post-racial age. Today, even forty plus years after the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968, racial classifications, distinctions, and stereotypes continue to shape social interactions and policy decisions, albeit in less categorical ways than during Jim Crow segregation.[11] In the traditional Aristotelian model, ethos means character. Just as Phillis Wheatley and Frederick Douglass embraced religious imagery and rhetoric in their writings to show that African Americans possessed moral self-worth and, thus, were deserving of freedom, contemporary writers frequently explore questions of identity and character as their protagonists try to achieve self-acceptance and social recognition. These questions of character and identity should not be considered beyond the scope of the African American rhetorical tradition, but part of the much older tradition of rhetoric that uses writing, drama, poetry, and oratory to consider how to live and live well. What distinguishes African American writers from others and thus make it a distinct tradition is how social recognition plays a much greater role in their rhetoric and the importance of using appeals to ethos as a form of self-healing.

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[11] For example, recent efforts to combat voter fraud (despite limited evidence of such fraud) seem directed at poorer African Americans who tend to vote for the Democratic Party. The main point, here, is not that the proponents of these measures are racist. Rather, the key point is that proponents feel fairly confident that they can predict, based on assumptions about character and identity, about how this will affect voter turnout and election results.

There is a second way that ethos can help provide some clarity about what African American literature and rhetoric is becoming. Before ethos got defined as "character," it meant a dwelling or haunt. I increasingly think of African American literature as a dwelling from which writers write and readers read. This dwelling, however, is not like a house from which a person can move or sell. African American literature is not an old house that one can put on the market and sell to the highest bidder. Ethos as dwelling does not work this way. Because ethos also connotes character, the dwelling place of ethos is also built upon a foundation of habits, social roles, and virtue. For the past forty or so years, humanities scholars have used the concept of culture to explain how behavior, rituals, beliefs, and values shape institutions and ideas. It also led to explanations about how institutions can possess racist or sexist cultures. While there is not a perfect overlap between ethos and culture, there is a relation. What if African American literature describes and represents the existential dwelling places or "houses," in the words of Toni Morrison, where African Americans live and the "homes"—both personal and communally—they want to find? While these existential dwellings have changed for many (but not all) African Americans as a result of the Civil Rights movement, the concept of race, however, has not disappeared. Nor are African Americans free from race, racism, or, what critical race theorists, call racialization. For better or worse, the concept of race and the reality of race shapes lives, especially for African Americans, and constitute a significant element of where they dwell. Moreover, because a dwelling place can offer shelter even if the roof needs repairing and the basement needs stabilization, the dwelling of African American culture is deeply connected to African American history, music, and cultural practices. As this article has explored, there is ongoing tension between conceptualizing African American identity as a grounded place or social location and as a journey of discovery.

As long as African Americans form a community and identify as such, African American literature will be a dwelling space for writers and readers. Questions of character and identity do not disappear simply because laws change. In fact, if the history of the Civil Rights movement has taught us anything, it is that it can ultimately prove easier to change laws than the underlying beliefs, habits, and rituals that supported them. The focus on ethos helps underscore how the concept of character within African American life is haunt and home at the same time. Rhetoric and the concept of ethos provide us tools to consider how culture continues to construct social relations, individual identities, and art even when legal discourse has changed.

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Article

Hip-Hop Ethos

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Abstract: This article excavates the ethos surrounding hip hop, starting from the proposition that hip hop represents a distinct yet pervasive expression of contemporary black subjectivity, which crystalized in 1970s New York City and has since proliferated into a potent *ethos of the subaltern* embraced within socially marginalized youth communities throughout the world. The article begins by outlining the black diasporic traditions of expressive performance that hip hop issues from, as discussed through the work of Zora Neale Hurston and Amiri Baraka. In the remainder of the article, a blueprint of hip hop's ethos is presented based on five fundamental tenets: (1) properties of flow, layering, and rupture; (2) a principle of productive consumption; (3) the production of excessive publicity or promotion—what hip-hop affiliates refer to as "hype"; (4) embracing individual and communal entrepreneurship; and (5) a committed politics of action and loyalty. While acknowledging hip hop's malleability and refusal to be neatly characterized, the article maintains that its characteristic spirit embodies these core doctrines.

Keywords: hip hop; black aesthetics; New York; flow; layering; rupture; productive consumption; hype; entrepreneurship; politics; counter-knowledge

1. Introduction

The contributions to this special issue aim to reinvigorate contemporary discussions surrounding ethos and its implications for the value and meaningfulness assigned to varieties of lived human experience. An aspect of this involves demonstrating the complexity of understandings and applications of ethos as a concept. We begin from the general definition of ethos as "the characteristic spirit, prevalent tone of sentiment of a people or community, the 'genius' of an institution or system" (quoted in Barnouw 1963, p. 24). Accordingly, we locate hip hop's ethos broadly within what Robert Con Davis and David S. Gross (Davis and Gross 1994) refer to as the *ethos of the subaltern*, suggesting that, perhaps more than most, it features maverick sensibilities of those who assert agency from positions of social marginalization and oppression. Consequently, our discussion may challenge traditional understandings of ethos as a molding force of culture or non-prescriptive determinant of collective behavior.

Caveats aside, this article excavates the densities of ethos surrounding hip hop as a distinct but pervasive expression of black subjectivity situated in the liminal space between the late modern and postmodern epochs. As such, it embellishes the polyphonic character of hip hop in all its complexities and contradictions. Hip hop is simultaneously entrepreneurial and communal; it is implicated in neoliberal modes of survival but offers itself as a social and psychological balm to the violence perpetuated through capitalist inequities; it publicizes unfailingly hierarchical identity politics—in some cases subverting and in others upholding existing relations of power—while being deeply concerned with the politics of identity; it speaks truth to power as it perpetually undermines and/or destabilizes our understandings of what is real. These and other intricacies surrounding hip hop's curious position will be elaborated on in the pages below. More than anything, this ambiguity and

pliability enable hip hop's mobility across geographic and particularly sociological boundaries, and afford a certain degree of resilience against efforts to demarcate it, devalue it, and/or contain it.

In what follows, we begin by outlining the black diasporic traditions of expressive performance that hip hop issues from. This includes both recounting its 1970s New York City origins and putting this well-recited socio-economic history in conversation with the work of earlier cultural commentators regarding fundamental characteristics of black American music and culture. Hip hop, in our view, is predicated on a centering of blackness that takes on distinct dimensions in the context of late-modern capitalism. From there, we propose a blueprint of hip hop's ethos based around five fundamental tenets. These span the range of characteristics of form, expressive priorities, active inclinations, and ethical commitments.

2. Hip Hop as Black Diasporic Tradition

Many scholars of hip hop, as well as a good deal of ardent devotees—sometimes referred to as "hip-hop purists"—define it around four expressive practices, namely: deejaying, break(danc)ing, graffiti writing, and emceeing (see for example, Rose 1994; Chang 2005; Ewoodzie 2017). For more casual observers, the preeminence of rap music, which is understood as either being synonymous with or connected to, but ideologically and/or aesthetically distinct from, hip-hop music, results in the greatest recognition being placed on emceeing and deejaying/beat-making.[1] This "four element" model occasionally gets supplemented by additional elements such as beat-boxing (i.e., human produced musical percussion), fashion, and knowledge (Gosa 2015). Rather than engaging in discussions regarding hip hop as the sum of four or more essential elements, we find it more productive to think about how hip hop gets projected through various expressive practices as well as how stylistic continuities exist across hip hop's spaces of social activity.

Whereas the racial politics surrounding hip hop have generated robust debates regarding the essentialness of blackness to its contemporary manifestations (see for example McLeod 1999; Taylor 2005; Harrison 2008; Jeffries 2011), in excavating the foundations of hip hop's ethos, we start from the position that the centrality of blackness is indisputable. Although the formation of hip hop has been assigned to a particular time (the early 1970s) and place (New York City, specifically the Bronx[2]), in tracing its various confluences and convergences—roots and routes as Paul Gilroy (1993) refers to them—hip hop's expressive priorities and sensibilities clearly mark the continuation of black aesthetic traditions. The pluralities of these traditions get molded through processes of recuperative rootedness in local specificities and expansive mobility across space and time. Hip hop, then, issues from dynamic black diasporic connections that are simultaneously untethered and binding.

Centering blackness in 1970s New York involves acknowledging a wealth of cultural ingredients that were prevalent at the time and place including, but not limited to, traditions of longstanding black New Yorkers, of people who had made their way north one or two generations earlier as part of the Great Migration from the Southern United States,[3] of recent black immigrants (primarily from the Caribbean) whose arrival was facilitated by the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, as well as by the tremendous proximity of and fluidity between New York's black and Latino working-class communities (Harrison 2009). Even with this remarkably generative mix, reminiscent of an earlier influx of diverse cultural traditions that inspired the Harlem Renaissance, Perry (2004, p. 10) compellingly shows how hip hop emanates from "black American political and cultural frameworks" and, accordingly, prioritizes black *American* aesthetics. Indeed, Michael Eric Dyson claims that hip hop

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1 Beat-making has a direct lineage to deejaying and, in fact, since the 1980s has supplanted it as the most recognized aspect of hip-hop music production. The work of the hip-hop beat-maker (or producer) essentially involves using sample-based and or percussion-based music production technologies—for example an E-mu SP-1200 sampler, Roland TR-808, or Native Instruments Maschine drum machine—to achieve the same musical ends that hip hop's pioneering deejays did through turntables and mixers alone (see Schloss [2004] 2014).

2 The Bronx is one of the five boroughs of New York City. The others are Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island.

3 A group that retained strong physical, emotional, and imagined (Anderson 1983) connections to their southern roots.

succeeded in "remythologiz[ing] New York's status as the spiritual center of black America" (quoted in McLaren 1997, p. 158).

To introduce key characteristics of these aesthetic priorities, we draw from two celebrated commentators on and compilers of black American performative traditions. In her 1934 essay "Characteristics of Negro Expression", Zora Neale Hurston proposed a taxonomy of black performance culled from her ethnographic studies in the American South. An astute participant-observer of African–American life, Hurston focused on black vernacular traditions in much the same way that hip hop, according to Dyson, foregrounds everyday experiences of the "so called [black] underclass, romanticizing the ghetto as the fecund root of cultural identity" and principal site of black creativity (quoted in McLaren 1997, p. 158). The enduring confluences between Hurston's (1934) identified black aesthetics and those celebrated within hip hop include:

- a "will to adorn", which inspires performative dramatization and extraordinary ornamentation surrounding the way black people walk, talk, dress, and act-out their everyday lives (p. 24);
- emphases on angularity and asymmetry—in both the visual and dispositional sense—thus encouraging avoidances of orthodoxy and predictability (p. 26);
- an understanding of originality that is grounded in re-interpretation and "the modification of ideas" (p. 28);
- and an appreciation of mimicry as "an art in itself" (p. 28).

In highlighting these, we do not mean to imply that they represent essential qualities possessed by all black racialized bodies or, for that matter, that cultural attributes pervasive throughout the U.S. South were transported directly and completely to New York by the black people who migrated there. Rather, following Moten (2003), we understand blackness as a dynamic cultural force emanating from the traditions and social positionings of communities of people who are racially designated black, but which exists distinct from the anatomies of individuals who comprise these communities.

Like Hurston, Amiri Baraka (Leroi Jones) critiqued, commented on and celebrated black performance from the perspective of an insider who identified as part of the creative communities and expressive traditions he wrote about.[4] In his seminal work on black music, *Blues People*, Baraka listed several "apparent survivals" of African music traditions within black American music (Baraka [1963] 1999, p. 25). Whereas Baraka's reference to survival might suggest that cultural materials can be transferred intact from one local to another,[5] as with Hurston's taxonomy, we again caution that such a reading is far too linear. Following Gilroy's important observations regarding the *Black Atlantic*, we wish to foreground the complex, even messy, swirl of confluences and continuities resulting in perceived tangibilities, which become the bases for recognizing common black subjectivity.

For Baraka, these African diasporic priorities can be foremost recognized in black musical communities' orientations toward rhythm. Here he highlights polyrhythmic emphases characterized by repetitive musical structures that combine multiple rhythm patterns (often assigned to different instruments) to produce contrasting harmonics, timbres and tones. The repetitively exhibited tensions between these different rhythmic strata serve as a basis for experiencing musical and aesthetic pleasure. A second priority, for Baraka, is the antiphonal (or call and response) singing technique common within black musical traditions. Through this blurring of distinction between performers and audiences, the context of a performance becomes paramount; this, in turn, works in harmony with repeated musical structures to promote improvisations that vary according to time, place, and who is present.[6] Additionally, Baraka highlights how song lyrics tend to be connected to and/or derived from oral

[4] We juxtapose this to the long ongoing tradition of outside (read white) researchers and cultural critics claiming a privileged voice in describing and discussing black life (see Kelley 1997).
[5] For an elaboration on this critique see Mintz and Price (1976).
[6] Here we should emphasize that improvisational competency only occurs through an acute understanding of the music tradition one is operating within.

traditions, and how within these orature-based communities, music and other aspects of artistic expression are integrated into everyday life.

The formation of hip hop occurred in and around black performative spaces and was fueled by the dynamic, creative and generative cultural energies that circulated among black New York City youth during the early 1970s. Tricia Rose posits that hip hop came of age "in the twilight of America's short lived federal commitment to black civil rights" (Rose 1994, p. 22). As such, it issued from black youth's inability, and at times refusal, to assimilate towards whiteness. Its ethos, accordingly, takes shape in the hinterland surrounding America's economic and commercial core (i.e., New York), at a time when the marginal citizens of what had recently been hailed as Lyndon Johnson's Great Society were being forced into a series of economic, social and political arrangements that drastically amplified their marginalization.

The details surrounding hip hop's postindustrial New York City origins have been well documented (see, for example, Rose 1994; Chang 2005): rampant unemployment caused by the disappearance of manufacturing jobs within the transforming transnational economy as well as a push toward privatizing municipal services; urban blight exacerbated by a string of arsons, the blackout of 1977 and sanitation worker strikes; the building of the Cross-Bronx Expressway, which cut through the South Bronx—hip hop's famed birthplace—symbolizing a federal commitment to the suburban white communities of southern Connecticut, New Jersey, and Long Island over working-class black and brown communities in the city.[7] While such socio-economic factors create an important backdrop, the contradictory textures of hip hop's distinct late/postmodern ethos were consistently refracted through lenses of recognized blackness.

In his important work on the aesthetics of black radicalism, Moten (2003) locates blackness at the intersection of objectified spectacle and human agency, thus insisting that the "history of blackness is testament to the fact that objects can and do resist" (1). Whereas racialized black bodies are sometimes invisible within white hegemonic spaces, blackness—which Moten claims involves the simultaneous "performance of the object" and "performance of humanity" (2)—is personified through hypervisibility, excessive surplus and a degree of spectacular ornamentation that seizes attention. Through audacious provocations of acting out as a response to objectifying white gazes (Yancy 2016), blackness gets activated as a fantastic and compelling performative force.

In the hyper-mediated context of late capitalist New York, hip hop, through its authorized exhibition of blackness, radiated beyond its originating black spaces to become a dominant global force. Hip hop's emergence as one of the most significant cultural forces of our times rests at the intersection of two conditions. The first is the United States' position as the most powerful exporter of global media—most notably around youth-oriented popular cultural products like music, film and the associated imagery that influences subcultural style (Hebdige 1979).[8] The second condition, symbiotically connected to the first, is the preeminence of the black American struggle as both an inspiration and template for other struggles for human rights and social justice. When reflecting on the global spectacularity of blackness, it is important to consider the racist origins of the American

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[7] Much of this history is discussed at length in the second chapter of Tricia Rose's *Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary America* (1994). In the mid-1970s, a virtually bankrupt New York City secured a federal loan, the terms for which included tremendous service cuts and the loss of a significant number of municipal jobs. During the preceding decade, the construction of the Cross-Bronx Expressway had devastated local communities through forced relocation and the shattering of vital support networks. Amidst this urban devastation, waves of suspected arsons (allegedly motivated by slumlords seeking to cash in on insurance claims and welfare recipients looking to get reimbursed for their moving costs (see Ewoodzie 2017, pp. 23–24)) plagued the borough. This image of Bronx urban decay was compounded by the rampant looting that occurred following the 1977 city-wide blackout and periodic garbage strikes resulting in huge piles of trash throughout the city (Rose 1994, pp. 27–34).

[8] Within sociology and cultural studies, *subcultural* is a contested term (see Bennett 1999). Understanding this, we reference it here in a general sense to signal recognizable, yet evolving and permeable, patterned behaviors—including activities, styles of dress, and language use—artefacts, and dispositions associated with particular musical genres, iconic films, patterned recreational activities, or generational cultural events. Indeed, the hip-hop ethos can generally be thought of as the spirit and source of the expression of various hip-hop subcultures.

entertainment industry—derived from a tradition of black-faced minstrelsy (Watkins 1999)—in relation to the struggles of the most despised peoples on the American racial landscape to achieve full citizenship, equal rights, social equality, and ultimately full humanity. Hip hop appears on the heels of the Civil Rights and Black Liberation (i.e., Black Power) movements.

3. The Blueprint of a Hip-Hop Ethos

We outline our blueprint of a hip-hop ethos around a series of principal tenets. In doing this, we are cautious about claiming a definitive understanding of the framework of emotional attitudes that structure how hip-hop affiliates approach the world. Ethos, according to Gregory Bateson, gets expressed through "tones of behavior" (quoted in Barnouw 1963, p. 100), which impact the way individuals and groups organize cultural categories, deploy cultural symbols, and conduct themselves. Ethos is not experienced as compulsory but is rather internalized and manifested through habitual practices. While it retains a certain degree of stability, like other facets of culture, it is fluid across time and space, and engaged with differently according to the individual and his or her social position. Here we reference the old anthropological adage that "no two people have exactly the same culture" or "no two speakers of the same language have exactly the same vocabulary". Ethos is marked by a density of overlapping and typically implicit observations, practices, priorities, and commitments. These divergences are often most notable surrounding collective social categories such as gender, age and class. Women and men, young and old, wealthy and poor tend to engage with and/or respond to ethos differently. Of course this is also contingent on the particular phenomenon an ethos emerges around. Hip hop, as a black cultural form situated at the nexus of late-modernism and post-modernism, embraces contradiction by both privileging and undermining notions of what is real. Nevertheless, the patterns of observable social practices that inform our notion of ethos are inseparable from the social relations that encompass them. Even with (or perhaps especially because of) hip hop's pungent association with blackness, affiliates of different racial backgrounds tend to inhabit hip hop's ethos differently (see Harrison 2009; Jeffries 2011). Accordingly, notions of ethos, to the extent that they are connected to questions surrounding appropriate behaviors, characteristics, identities, and fluencies, are deeply implicated in debates regarding authenticity (Swearingen 1994).

3.1. Tenet One: Flow, Layering, and Rupture

In her seminal work on hip hop, *Black Noise*, Rose (1994, p. 22) presented its "primary properties" as *flow*, *layering*, and *rupture*. This is a fitting starting point for two reasons. First, despite being one of the earliest academic treatments of hip hop—indeed *Black Noise* is often credited with announcing the arrival of Hip Hop Studies as a legitimate academic field—Rose's model continues to powerfully resonate with the ways hip hop is practiced and imagined. Second, in our effort to map a hip-hop ethos, recognizing the centrality of flow, layering, and rupture facilitates a level of categorical visualization that sets the foundation for the other tenets that follow. Whereas Rose's triad is presented as three distinct, foundational attributes of hip hop, through our subsequent discussions we hope to show how these stylistic continuities work in conjunction.

3.1.1. Flow

Within hip-hop contexts, *flow* is commonly associated with observable aesthetic qualities of performance—most notably surrounding emceeing. Indeed, within hip-hop music, the term has become synonymous with lyrical delivery or rapping style. Thus, a hip-hop lyricist might be referred to as having a "good flow" or flowing in a particular song. Adam Bradley (2017, p. 6) elaborates on the polyrhythmic investments of flowing by explaining that these "distinct lyrical cadence[s]"—relying on tempo, timing, and, at their best, "moments of calculated rhythmic surprise"—get assessed "in relation to the beat". Expanding outward from this popular connection to rapping, we might think of flow as foregrounding seamless continuities in which the beginnings and endings of discrete units blend together to become unrecognizable. We can see this in the way practicing deejays mix songs

together, in the way b-boys and b-girls (i.e., breakdancers) transition from one move to the next, or in the arcs and fluidity-of-lines found in graffiti pieces.

3.1.2. Layering

Layering involves situating multiple strata of expressive materials on-top-of or in close relation to one another. Deejays layer different songs together to form a seamless (flow) or, if the occasion calls for it, strategically punctuated (rupture) mix. Emcees' flows are evaluated on the basis of their polyrhythmic layering on top of the repetitive structure of hip-hop instrumentals. In introducing what he referred to as the *hip hop sublime*, Adam Krims underscored the importance of this layering project in generating sentiments of excitement and pleasure among hip-hop music listeners. Gesturing towards Rose's third property (i.e., rupture), Krims described how hip-hop producers "selectively and dramatically" bring "incompatible layers of sound . . . into conflict with each other", resulting in sensations of beauty, fear, hardness, and ultimately realness (Krims 2000, p. 54). Krims goes on to discuss how, in opposition to the unifying effect of flow, hip-hop music employs "dissonant harmonic combinations" and "clashing timbral qualities" (p. 73) to showcase its polyrhythmic aspirations and layering. This practice of layering different media and performative modes is pervasive across a range of hip-hop expressive practices.

Another dimension of hip-hop layering involves intertextuality, or the relationship hip-hop texts engender with previous (hip hop, black diasporic, or popular) cultural texts. Such intertextual layering produces surplus meaning across the contexts in which these earlier textual sediments resonate. This is, again, most obviously recognized in sample-based hip-hop music production, where utilizing previously recorded songs allows the hip-hop producer to exploit the meanings attributed to earlier recordings to generate new, contextually-specific significances.[9] These acts of creative imitation, reinterpretation, cross-referencing, and indirect signification are all encompassed in the vernacular performance of Signifyin(g), which Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Gates 1988, p. 53) describes as involving "the free play of language . . . displacement of meanings . . . [and] attention to the force of the signifier" to enact a different mode of meaning-making. Gates, quite famously, refers to this revisionary process as "repetition with a signal difference" (p. xxiv). Such intertextuality provides marginalized groups with occasions to communicate coded meaning, through language, performance, and/or what James Scott refers to as hidden transcripts—that is, "discourses that take place 'off stage' beyond direct observation by powerholders" (Scott 1990, p. 4). Although these intertextual priorities have led to controversies surrounding hip-hop music production and copyright use—and they have also, quite ridiculously we believe, been used as a basis for arguing that hip-hop musicians lack originality (see Schumacher 1995)—such responses testify to the cultural potency of intertextual meaning making.

3.1.3. Rupture

Hip-hop music's powerful polyrhythms are established through flirtations with and strategic embellishments of rupture. This appreciation of rupture occurs at the expense of (disrupting) flow; likewise, the achievement of flow is dependent on the potential for rupture. Through consistent modifications (or *breaks*) in musical percussion, rhythmic stability is continuously undermined and reestablished (Katz 2012, p. 24), creating an on-beat/off-beat effect that affiliates recognize as decidedly hip hop. Through their apparent randomness—the predictability of rupture compromises its disruptive effect—ruptures produce sensations of spontaneity. Thus, ruptures succeed in creating the exclamations, asymmetries, and rhythmic angularities that surprise, astonish, and capture the attention of listeners and onlookers. Indeed, noticeable rupture, signaled by a distinct but temporary break in a rhythmic flow, often strengthens the sense of rhythm rather than taking away from it.

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[9] Intertextualism, which both Hurston and Baraka observe in earlier black expressive traditions (see above), also promotes the value of cultural literacy (Rose 1994, p. 89).

3.2. Tenet Two: Productive Consumption

Hip hop emerged through processes of productive consumption and, accordingly, such inclinations remain central to how hip-hop practitioners comport themselves and approach the art of daily living. The most celebrated example of productive consumption in hip hop surrounds the origin story of DJ Kool Herc using turntables—a technology developed for music consumption—as an instrument of musical creation through manually manipulating two copies of the same record into a continuous musical loop or "Merry-Go-Round" (Chang 2005, pp. 78–79). This innovation in deejay practice later developed into the intertextual sample-based hip-hop music production discussed above. Yet, beyond this black diasporic orientation toward textual revision, hip hop's most celebrated origin story involves repurposing technologies of music consumption into technologies of music production. The New York City youth who created hip hop ignored the dictate to keep their hands off record players and instead started manually sampling the breakbeats of their favorite songs.[10]

Such productive consumption extends beyond music to include other efforts to enhance the use value of the limited material resources available to working class, racialized, urban youth. Emerging from a context of scarcity, hip hop promotes borrowing, sharing, and above all else creative renovation. It additionally encourages the creative appropriation of the abundant cultural symbols that saturate the youth-oriented markets of post-war society. During the period of hip hop's formation, these symbols—featured in music, fashion, television, and film—would have been most ubiquitous in the urban milieu, and perhaps nowhere more visibly than in New York City.[11] The countless symbolic resources early hip-hop practitioners adopted and adapted (i.e., rearticulated with signal difference) range from the general to the specific. For example, early b-boys adapted the kung fu stylings of Hong Kong action movies, which were regularly featured on afternoon television and in urban movie theaters, into signature dance moves (Schloss 2009); and graffiti writers featured icons and imagery from cartoons and commercials as regular aspects of their creative imagery.

Practices of productive consumption can be seen throughout post-war youth subcultures where young people creatively refashioned the abundance of consumer materials marketed towards them to generate new collective identities (Hebdige 1979). Yet, as the inheritors of longstanding black diasporic performative traditions that included evocative practices of reinterpreting, repurposing, and recreating though intertextual meaning-making, black youth were particularly poised to be in the vanguard of this new mode of consumer engagement. Indeed, many of the classic, well-documented, white post-War subcultures in Britain and the United States—such as the hipsters, beats, teddy boys, mods, and punks—were heavily inspired by connections to and/or fascinations with black culture. Since hip hop's emergence, its practitioners and affiliates have served and continue to serve as leading youth-culture taste-makers through their abilities to appropriate, innovate off of, and productively consume the cultural materials and symbols that capitalist society throws at them.

3.3. Tenet Three: The Production of Hype

Hip hop is spectacular, in part, because it generates excessive publicity or promotion—what people often refer to as "hype". Peter McLaren (McLaren 1997, p. 165) writes that "rap is a powerful offensive medium in the way that it raises havoc with white middle-class" values. In *Black Noise*, Rose opens her chapter on the sonic force of rap music by relaying a story of an academic colleague—presumably an ethnomusicology department head—who dismissed rap music as something that "they ride down the street at 2:00 A.M. . . . blasting from car speakers . . . wak[ing] up [his] wife and kids" (Rose 1994, p. 62). She goes on to highlight a series of Black diasporic sonic priorities—something she describes as

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[10] A breakbeat, or the "get down section", is a segment of a song that typically consists of sparse, drum-centric, high-energy instrumentation. This practice of manually sampling breakbeats, in turn, leads to the development of several additional techniques including scratching, punch-phasing, back spinning, and scratch-phasing (Ewoodzie 2017).

[11] Today, one might argue that the Internet has minimized the significance of geography on consumer culture.

working in the red—that emphasize high volume and low frequencies towards the goal of achieving levels of sound distortion that blowout stereo speakers and make car audio-systems hum. In an interview with Rose, hip-hop producer Eric (Vietnam) Sadler discussed how *working in the red*—that is, recording and mixing with the sound levels perpetually in the (red) distortion zone—defied the logic of professionally trained sound engineers who consistently clamored "You can't do that . . . it's not right" (p. 74). Moten explains that blackness "has tended toward the experimental achievement and tradition of an advanced, transgressive publicity" (Moten 2003, p. 255 n. 1). Reminiscent of the deejays credited with originating hip hop, producers—the people responsible for crafting the sonic force that announces hip-hop music's presence often well before the sound source (e.g., an automobile or outdoor speaker) appears—ingeniously extend the intended capacities of music technologies, breaking the rules, in order to create something that stands out.

Harrison's (Harrison 2016) work on hip-hop voicing similarly documents the production of hype within music recording studios, achieved through recording supplementary adlib vocal tracks. As a replication of the live performance role played by hip-hop, "hype men (or women)", adlibs typically involve one or more voices punctuating certain words or phrases in the main vocal track by repeating (i.e., layering) them. The repeated phrases usually occur on-beat, often involve end-rhymes in a lyrical couplet, and frequently include the chorus or 'hook.' An adlib track might also include non-lexical but communicative sounds (for instance, grunts, ah-huhs, and sighs) or a running commentary on the main vocals. Such vocal embellishments typically result in performative exclamations that gesture towards ensuing commotion. The outcome is an often unrecognized but compelling insinuation that "something ('shit' perhaps) is about to go down". Such textured vocal adornments signify hip hop as a collective practice situated in public space—even when the production process involves a single person alone in a studio recording multiple adlib tracks. Represented as communal, informal, celebratory vocal performances, adlibs enhance the polyrhythmic qualities of layered vocal flow, thus heightening a song's energy and creating the effect of capturing the spirit of the moment.

Working in the red and adlib vocal recordings represent two primary ways that hip-hop music creators strive to sonically achieve hype. Yet, this inclination towards hype extends to the way hip-hop music is listened to (turned all the way up) as well as to hip hop's visual representations in graffiti writing, fashion, and performance. In each of these arenas, there is a precedent for eye-catching colors, angles, and gestures that astonish by disrupting what has come to be expected. Indeed, the emergence of popular terms associated with hip hop, like "bling" (i.e., expensive and ostentatious clothing and/or accessories), "swagger" (i.e., a confident, possibly arrogant, and potentially even aggressive personal style), and "popping your collar" (self-recognition following a commendable accomplishment) indicate the extent to which attention to (self-)promotion and hype underlies its performance and everyday expression.

3.4. Tenet Four: Individual and Communal Entrepreneurship

The production of hype illustrates one way that hip hop promotes individual and communal entrepreneurship surrounding individuals and their communities. Entrepreneurship is often associated with business activities and the pursuit of money. It would be a mistake to ignore these inclinations in hip hop. Hip hop's partnership with consumerism can be traced to its formative years when pioneering deejays considered it a relatively safe way to "hustle" or make money (Gosa 2015, p. 62). Hip-hop practitioners and allegiants have consistently undertaken efforts to self-promote through displays of extravagant or otherwise conspicuous consumption. As hip-hop music gained popularity, some of its most celebrated artists acted as "pitch men and women" for particular products; likewise, with the

prevalence of brand-name-dropping in their lyrics, hip-hop songs serve as virtual commercials.[12] By the start of the twenty-first century, many of the most successful hip-hop artists were also engaged in various business ventures. Yet, as a cultural formation that emerged from what Perry Hall (Hall 1997, p. 33) describes as one of "the least culturally assimilated sectors of the Black cultural landscape", and that has been *informed* by a tradition of radical blackness (see above), hip hop has an equal if not more substantive potential to facilitate and inspire actions oriented towards eradicating social inequalities and achieving social liberation (see Tenet Five below). Discourses of resistance and oppression are mutually constituted and therefore occupy the same discursive space. Thus, in recognizing the entrepreneurial spirit that underlies hip hop's attitude and approach to the world, we must recognize how, with its inclinations towards (self)promotion and strategic organizational entrepreneurship, it can propagate social uplift and further social inequalities, sometimes simultaneously.[13]

The spirit of competitiveness underlying hip hop is so ubiquitous that it could very well serve as its own tenet. This ongoing competitive quest for distinction, status, and prestige fuels multiple modes of hip-hop activity, but most notably its association with entrepreneurship. The concept of *battling* is fundamental to hip hop. B-boys/girls, deejays, emcees, and graffiti writers all either participate in battles (formal and informal) or hone their craft with the possibility of battling in mind. The prospect of participating in a direct competition (a battle), or even just having one's performance evaluated in relation to the performances of one's peers, motivates the development of hip-hop competencies. Common references to "sucker emcees" or "wack deejays" illustrate how hip-hop artists assert their identities in competitive relation to lesser practitioners, both real and imagined. Schloss highlights the strategic virtues of battling as learning how to handle potentially prickly situations, strategically revealing what one knows, and developing an "ability to control the way one is perceived" (Schloss 2009, p. 108). At its core, battling involves distinguishing oneself and foregrounding personal worth through generative, and at times, strategically spectacular deployments of available material and symbolic resources.

Through its competitive spirit, hip hop proposes itself as a meritocratic space where, ideally at least, an individual's performed competency matters and categories of collective social identity (i.e., race, gender, age, and the like) do not.[14] An important component of performed competency is the ability to self-author a unique personal identity. Rose considers hip hop "a source ... of alternative identity formation and social status" for young people forced to contend with the truncated opportunities available in postindustrial urban environments. Similarly, Christopher Holmes Smith recognizes such identity construction as the "most fertile source of artistic creativity" (Smith 1997, p. 345) within hip hop. The practice of hip-hop naming, which often occurs through intertextual referencing (Gates 1988), works to draw attention to "significant aspects of [artists'] personalit[ies]" (Schloss 2009, p. 75) and suggests aesthetically salient "qualities they wish to project" (p. 70). One's name thus becomes a public platform for this type of identity work.

Hip hop embraces both self-promotion and collective community promotion. Its heightened attention to locality (Forman 2002) may very well have been fueled by the context of its New York City origins where distinctly identifiable boroughs existed in close proximity to one another and vied for competitive advantage (see note 2)—"is Brooklyn in the house?" This emphasis on territoriality gets expressed when hip-hop recording artists mention local references and "shout out" the names of people they are close with. Hip hop organizes around tight circles of affiliated allegiants (i.e., crews), who serve as sources of social support. Whereas successful hip-hop artists have sometimes

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[12] In the majority of cases, these were not intended as commercial endorsements and no compensation was received. For example, the group Run-DMC did not release the song "My Adidas" as an Adidas commercial but rather because they wore Adidas sneakers.

[13] The tension between the street and the executive suite (Negus 1999) is an illuminating dynamic through which to gauge hip hop's nearly fifty-year evolution.

[14] Whereas this may be true for some arenas of hip-hop practice—for example see Joe Schloss's discussion of breaking (Schloss 2009)—Harrison's (2009) work on emceeing shows that race and gender are still consequential in some hip-hop fields.

been criticized for lacking fiscal responsibility and, most notably, spending exorbitant amounts of money supporting their large entourages—MC Hammer's 1996 bankruptcy being a classic example (Commons et al. 2014)—Brown (2012) effectively argues that such behavior might reflect an admirable, anti-capitalist ethos of expanded care for those in one's immediate circle. Thus, when Elliot (1997), in her song "The Rain", asks "who got the keys to *the* jeep?"(as opposed to "*my* jeep"), in the spirit of MC Hammer's entourage, she is gesturing towards automobiles as communally-owned rather than privately-owned property (Brown 2012, p. 268). Such attention to friendship and loyalty are illustrated through the hip-hop communities' widespread condemnations of breaking social ties (e.g., moving out of the "hood" and/or having one's "ghetto pass" revoked) after becoming successful. It is also exemplified in the practice of recording "posse cuts"—that is, songs featuring lesser known members of an artist's crew—which provides friends and associates with opportunities to record and potentially to break into the music industry.

In sum, while hip hop's entrepreneurship unquestionably orients toward embracing aspects of capitalism and individualism, it also retains a strong counter-hegemonic spirit, based on more socialist principles of remaining loyal to one's community and maintaining personal alliances with "those who have been down since day one".

3.5. Tenet Five: Committed Politics of Action and Loyalty

There is a well-circulated narrative within hip-hop circles maintaining that hip hop started out as a form of resistance and critique but then, sometime around the early 1990s, after engaging with the corporate music/entertainment industry,[15] shifted its central themes towards violence, sex and crass consumerism. There is little question that these topics, which in fact proliferate across all of American popular culture, have been prevalent since hip hop or rap ascended to the undisputed status of a pop(ular) music form. The larger question surrounds the extent to which hip hop was ever definitively political. Challenges to this political origin story have most often referenced the aforementioned entrepreneurial drive, with its accompanying pursuit of wealth and status, that has characterized hip hop since its earliest days. Still, as a recent branch of black American cultural expression, molded within some of the most marginalized communities in urban America, hip hop consistently cultivates a disposition of difference and opposition. At times, this quality encourages the expressive uniqueness that enables hip-hop entrepreneurs to materially and/or symbolically prosper in capitalist society. Yet, such an alternative character takes deeper roots in moral dispositions that challenge historical and ongoing inequities—most pointedly, within the U.S. context, those surrounding race and class.

As such, hip hop coheres to what Davis and Gross call an *ethos of the subaltern*, and describe as a "politically situated sense of cultural ethos . . . [that] challenges dominant cultural and political orders with ideologically subversive schemes" (Davis and Gross 1994, p. 66). Rooted in moral ideology, this final tenet of hip hop's ethos—something that we label its *committed politics of action and loyalty*—manifests around three principled calls-to-action: generating and promoting counter-knowledge, repurposing property/space as a public good, and maintaining a loyalty to hip hop and its communities of origin and practice.

3.5.1. Counter-Knowledge

As an acknowledged branch of black diasporic expression—a characteristic that gets consistently reaffirmed through intertextual engagements and an insistence on loyalty (see below)—hip hop promotes alternative perspectives on local, national, and global events. Despite its contemporary presence in multiple sites of privilege, hip hop, in its most culturally anchored manifestations—those spaces where the gravity of hip hop's ethos have the most resonance—fosters counter-hegemonic

[15] Harrison and Arthur (2011) underscore how this corporate engagement started as early as the first commercially recorded rap songs.

stances, nurtured through alternative impulses and indulgences. Accordingly, hip hop both cultivates and flourishes within counter-public spheres, most notably the black *counterpublics*—that is, sacred spaces of discursive engagement where (mostly) black community members reflect on and debate issues outside the surveillance of the dominant hegemony (Harris-Lacewell 2010). With reference to hip-hop practice specifically, Perry (2004, pp. 107–8) draws attention to the *cipher* as a "privileged outlaw space" of inclusion (and exclusion) where collective, heightened consciousness gets directed toward an "alternative ethos and subjectivity".

Outside these grounded sites of committed practice, hip hop offers accessible and stylistically compelling counter-narratives that provide political information, impact political attitudes, and foster personal growth through social and political consciousness (Bonnette 2015). Even hip hop's most nihilistic representations of black life, when considered through a rhetorical Signifyin(g) framework, put forth an "oppositional consciousness" that powerfully critiques conditions in contemporary society (De Genova 1995). As such, hip hop has been used as a tool for reinvigorating educational spheres where critical outlooks as well as alternative sources and methods of generating and spreading knowledge flourish.

Counter-knowledge, of course, is primarily based on information, but might also include ways of achieving goals. For example, hip hop's nonlinear modes of meaning-making, most specifically its indulgence of intertextuality, have been deployed effectively to undermine the authority of dominant texts. Ultimately engaging in these consciously black diasporic practices works to reaffirm political intimacies with other sites of diasporic struggle towards countering global white supremacy

3.5.2. Repurposing Property/Space

Our aforementioned reference to Missy Elliot's "The Rain" (Elliot 1997) as a gesture celebrating communal car ownership and an economy of sharing (see above), introduces hip hop's critique of privately-owned property. Sampling and graffiti reflect two other arenas of practice where conceptions of private ownership get forfeited in favor of the public good. Despite the considerable efforts and resources committed by corporate music entities to reigning in hip hop's sample-based production practices (Schumacher 1995), this most fundamental art of appropriating past music commodities to envision new musical futures anticipated the inevitability of public-assess culture (De Genova 1995). Likewise, there is probably no better example of Moten's (2003) transgressive publicity of blackness (see above) than graffiti writers' seizure of public space as canvases for self-promotion, which, through spreading art into spaces of everyday life, makes a proposed contribution to the public good. Originating out of spaces of scarcity, and with its spirit of entrepreneurship, hip-hop practitioners consistently try to repurpose what is available and, in doing so, regularly bring things into the realm of wider public spectacle and usage. At notable moments in its engagement with mainstream culture—consider, for example, b-boys/girls use of street corners, subway stations, and shopping malls in the early 1980s—hip hop's appropriation of space and property has erupted into controversy (Rose 1994). These frictions, in our view, further support the notion that such inclinations can be attributed to a distinct hip-hop ethos.

3.5.3. Loyalty to Hip Hop

Since its emergence as a pop(ular) cultural form, at least, hip hop has been embroiled in debates surrounding authenticity (McLeod 1999; Harrison 2008). To a large extent, these debates have coalesced around issues of race and class—for example, should white and/or wealthy hip-hop affiliates (the presumed binary opposition to hip hop's black working-class origins) be considered legitimate members of a hip-hop community or nation? Without denying the importance of these considerations—recall the above-made point that affiliates of different sociological identities likely engage with ethos in drastically different ways—we maintain that the moral (political) component of hip hop's ethos forms foremost around questions of loyalty. In other words, do individuals and communities have commitments to hip hop as a cultural form and constellation of expressive practices?

Or is their engagement with hip hop primarily a way to achieve other ends? An investment in hip hop includes recognizing the importance of its history, which intertextually means recognizing the other expressive traditions it engages with. It also means recognizing the centrality of blackness in its formation, evolution and future. Yet, loyalty also extends to include territorial commitments to one's community and crew.[16] As much as *realness* gets hailed as a marker of hip hop's preoccupation with authenticity, potential accusations of "being fake" and/or "selling out" speak to the central place of loyalty in its ethos. Finally, to the extent that affiliation with hip hop personifies a project of realizing and exhibiting both community- and self-worth, being loyal to oneself, sticking to one's (hip-hop) principles, and carrying oneself with integrity as a member of the hip-hop nation is paramount.

4. Conclusions

The qualities that distinguish hip hop's ethos are invariably complex. We suggest that hip hop's position as both a late-modern and post-modern cultural form leads to contradictions surrounding not only its relation to late-capitalism but also its propositions about what might and what might not be real; in this sense, again, loyalty matters more than authenticity. Yet, this malleability, refusal to be neatly characterized, and propensity to self-correct are among hip hop's most resilient attributes. Like many things cultural, the contours of ethos are often most visible when breached—accordingly, a failure to engage in intertextual meaning-making, a muffled avoidance of anything related to "hype", or an absence of loyalty to hip-hop traditions might serve as notable indicators that something is amiss with an alleged hip hop affiliate's ethical grounding. The primacy of blackness in hip hop's formation and evolution—and the importance of acknowledging this—nurtures alliances as well as shared political interests and commitments-to-action among its most ardent affiliates. Yet, at its basis, hip hop utilizes intertextually-positioned continuities and ruptures to generate sensation and spectacle—spotlighting individual and community self-worth—through the generative practices of turning consumption into new modes of cultural production and meaning-making.

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[16] Naturally, such loyalty can only go so far. Depending on the specifics, the disloyalty of others can be sufficient grounds for "cutting them off".

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Article

How the American Working Class Views the "Working Class"

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Abstract: This article reviews the complications in understanding some of the conflicting tenets of American working-class ethos, especially as it unfolds in the college classroom. It asserts that the working class values modesty, straightforwardness, and hard work and has a difficult time accepting an ethos based in formal education. The article also discusses some of the performance aspects of working-class texts and explores the difficulties that outsiders face in trying to analyze/critique working-class experience.

Keywords: class; social class; working class; ethos; identity; habitus; social capital; Bourdieu

1. Introduction

If at one time American politicians and pundits deemed class irrelevant when discussing tensions within the United States, class has now emerged as a significant variable that both major parties have to account for in their strategic planning. For example, many analysts felt Donald Trump's election to the United States' presidency largely was due to the working-class vote, as Trump's appeal to the Rust Belt, especially white, male workers, stole the headlines—despite that a majority of voters who earn under $50,000 a year voted for Hillary Clinton, while a majority of those earning over $50,000 voted for Trump (Henley 2016). In fact, only 25% of Trump voters fit the stereotype of being white, non-Hispanic, lacking a college education, and making below the median household income (Carnes and Lupu 2017). But right or wrong, the apparent values of the working class—its ethos—now play a part in the national conversation.

As a college-level educator, I welcome this conversation, as I have advocated over the years for more attention to be given to working-class issues: in my experience, the conflict between "academic values" and "working-class values" can alienate working-class students. Some of the features of their discourse style, which I align with their ethos, might appear to be anti-intellectual, resistant, or apathetic. In understanding the class differences that go into the construction of ethos, we can better learn how to approach and accommodate these students.

In this article, I examine this ethos, drawing from the scholarly conversation on the working class and rhetorical theory, but divining much from my twenty years of teaching working-class students. Thus, I call on Pierre Bourdieu and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell in the same breath as I do the interactions with my students. I do not view this piece as a sociological analysis as much as I do a conversation-starter, due to how much is missing from the field of Composition Studies and Rhetoric in its discussion of the ethos of our working-class students. Still, I want to include important works that influenced my thinking. I do not wish to sentimentalize the experiences of the working class nor soften any of the rough edges to its outlook on life. Nonetheless, I associate its ethos with many positive descriptors, among them "common sense", "humility", and "straightforwardness". First, I need to clarify what I mean when I speak of the working class by reviewing some important literature and showing where and how my definition diverges from those of others.

2. Who Are the Working Class?

While social class is economic at its base, the term "class" is contested (Thelin and Carter 2017). Throughout the years, class has been and still is associated with tastes, the type of labor one performs, habits, education, the extent of control people have over their labor, language, and power. Understanding it as an identity marker, then, and locating its sense of ethos provides many challenges. Its intersections with other identity markers, such as race and gender, further complicate the issue. There is also a strand of thought that suggests "working class" is not a legitimate identity marker. For example, the field of composition and rhetoric has long celebrated identity, as witnessed by the number of historically underrepresented groups of scholars given space at the national conference, the Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC), to meet and present as special interest groups. However, at its inception and throughout its history at the conference, the working-class special interest group often had to fight off allegations that its establishment as a recognized CCCC's group provided refuge for white academics looking to gain some sort of privilege as a marginalized group (Roeper 2011). As noted class scholar Julie Lindquist worded it, talking about the working class just pisses some people off (Lindquist 2004). Separating issues of race from class is especially problematic, as in terms of identifying behaviors, class sometimes emerges as the important variable in a pattern rather than race. Annette LaReau, for example, conducted a wide-ranging ethnography to locate the differences in child rearing among parents of different social classes. While LaReau does not discount the impact of race in parenting, her study suggests that "the biggest differences in the cultural logic of child rearing in the day-to-day behavior of children . . . were between middle-class children on the one hand (including wealthy members of the middle class) and working-class and poor children on the other" (Lareau 2011). In other words, the children she studied had much more in common with children from the same social class, whether white or black, than they did with children of the same race from a different social class. In order to continue, then, we have to grant legitimacy to class—and working class—as an identity marker that shapes experiences with the world.

This does not solve, though, the question of who we are talking about. Who are the working class, really? Michael Zweig suggests that the working class comprises the majority of society. In his updated edition of *The Working-Class Majority: America's Best Kept Secret*, he estimates that 63% of the United States' population is actually working class. He comes to this conclusion by looking at class as the "power some people have over the lives of others and the powerlessness most people experience as a result" (Zweig 2012). He differentiates among the upper classes, those who have power over the production of goods, those who have power to make laws and policies, and those who have cultural power to influence our thinking, but he blurs distinctions regarding the working class, claiming, for example, that a truck driver owning his own rig might really be in the middle class as a "small entrepreneur" as opposed to a trucker employed by a freight shipper (Zweig 2012). He sees "a degree of overlap between working-class and middle-class experience" and discusses social workers and teachers who view themselves as workers (Zweig 2012). Further, focusing on the level of independence and authority an employee has at work, Zweig believes that at least 8% of those in professional occupations are working class (Zweig 2012).

Politically and strategically, Zweig's notions can help in identifying commonalities among workers so that the majority in the United States can understand the system that often oppresses them and fight back. But as an identity marker, the definition here causes confusion. Not only do I find the lines Zweig established that mark working class from middle class ambiguous, the umbrella fails to capture working-class culture. It elides important distinctions and might alienate those who live paycheck to paycheck in occupations associated with a degree of physical labor, as they might reject being grouped with, say, part-time university adjuncts, whose labor is even more contingent but who enjoy the comforts of working with their minds in the relative luxury of a classroom. That is not to reduce class to a category workers can choose for themselves. Rather, I seek to avoid a classification

that extends too much into middle-class culture so as to not dilute the very real values and sense of ethos that the working class embraces, whether explicitly or implicitly.

For different reasons, I am wary of encroaching upon the turf of African Americans and other ethnic or racial minorities. The dangers of possibly colonizing the experience of those among them who, economically, would be ranked in the working class loom rather large. African American scholar bell hooks explains that even though there has always been a "diverse caste and class groupings among African Americans", most "black folks in the United States have never wanted to highlight the issue of class and class exploitation" (hooks 2000). Labeling the Civil Rights movement as a "class-based struggle", hooks asserts that the establishment used desegregation as a "way to weaken the collective radicalization of black people" by giving only "privileged black people greater access to the existing social structure" (hooks 2000). Those who benefited from desegregation took their money out of black communities, allowing for the infiltration of the drug trade and eroding the well-being of the working-class blacks left in those communities (hooks 2000). Hooks blames "black elites" for policing the black working class and feels that the economic rise to the upper class makes them feel more allegiance to their class interests than to racial solidarity (hooks 2000). This conflict certainly sheds light on our understanding of the term "working class", but it also shows the difficulty in trying to tease out elements that derive from the struggle for racial justice from those that might otherwise be present. So Lareau's beliefs aside, the racial oppression that African Americans and other ethnic minorities have suffered through could be flattened out if they were specifically included unproblematically under the banner of a working-class ethos. While I suspect that some values will still ring true, these experiences deserve to be treated separately and respectfully. I will not pretend, then, that my work here encompasses the entirety of the unique elements that race and ethnicity present to the picture of working-class life.

For the purposes of this article, ultimately, I will use a narrow definition, one that acknowledges the economic threshold of $50,000 a year for a household and, to an extent, the physicality of work, but that looks more at levels of education as the deciding factor. Since my concern is with college-level students, this focus seems appropriate to me and is supported by some of the literature in the field. Journalist Alfred Lubrano, for example, studies working-class life and isolates education as the factor that delineates the working class from the middle class. He refers to the "bridge burning" that must take place in order for a working-class individual to succeed in school (Lubrano 2004). In this respect, he is joined by Richard Rodriquez, whose memoir, however controversial in many respects, also talks about the need to withdraw from the family to achieve an education and how the emphasis on reading, so necessary for that achievement, violates a "macho code" of blue-collar workers and creates a gulf between the educated and their families (Lubrano 2004). Simply stated, the pleasures and the gains that accompany advanced literacy mark the middle class more than the actual occupation of a worker. Education creates both an aesthetic that digs beneath surface beauty and a method of thinking that seeks to question and complicate the status quo. Vocabulary increases, as do allusions to cultural history.

I want to be careful here to separate this legitimate criterion for understanding class from what Marxists refer to as "false consciousness", which is an inaccurate mental representation of social relations that obscures the domination of upper classes over lower classes (Little 2017). People cannot remove themselves from the hardships of the class-based structure simply through education. But accompanied by a salary that exceeds the $50,000 household median, education imprints the tastes and behaviors of what we know as middle-class culture. From my observations and what I have inferred from my students, working-class culture, in contrast, does not value formalized education nearly as much and it avoids the trappings of it that are embedded in language, abstract knowledge, subtleties, complicated analysis, and the arts. While working-class individuals tend to be problem solvers, their way of figuring things out has more to do with trial and error. I have experienced more than once workers I have hired trying to figure out a problem based on past experience rather than consulting a manual. In the classroom, I have noted what I would call resentment from my

working-class students when I have referred them to pages in a handbook in order to correct a faulty citation in an MLA works cited page. They seem to prefer to try to correct it on their own and submit it again for a thumbs up or down from me. Further, a steady pragmatism informs their actions so that the type of navel-gazing found among the middle class would strike them as odd and a waste of mental energy. Members of the working class sometimes demonstrate hostility to the airs they perceive when information from higher education appears to contradict their lifestyles or beliefs. A former student of mine, for example, refused to believe me when I talked to him about the dangers of asbestos. "My uncle worked with the stuff for years and never had any problems", he told me. While the manner in which the information is conveyed factors into its reception, knowledge derived from "book-learning" is suspicious. Working-class individuals appear to feel that those types of theories and facts talk down to them and their experiences, as the working class historically has felt alienated from many literate practices.

This is not to say that the working class devalues smarts. They admire intelligence as much as anyone else does, but they tend to prefer it being conveyed by a person catching on or figuring things out in an activity of value to them. The deeper problem stems more from the arbitrary way that intelligence is measured in our current society and the hierarchy constructed around that measurement. Educational researcher Mike Rose's *The Mind at Work* makes a compelling argument that what we call skills, meaning the abilities that blue-collar workers and those in the service industry use in their various occupations, actually are forms of intelligence not often acknowledged as such. Rose traces the prejudice against work that is "instrumental, applied, and practical" to ancient Greek culture, where such work was thought to have "limiting, even harmful, consequences for civic status and engagement, for the ability to deliberate and interpret ... [and] ... for virtue" (Rose 2004). In fact, as Rose's numerous case studies show, work as varied as serving food in a restaurant to welding promotes such abilities. For the working class, intelligence and street smarts seem to be two separate processes.

Perhaps more so than with markers of other identities involving race, gender, disability, and sexuality, society expects working-class individuals to shed those markers in order to achieve status and wealth. While numerous people of color, women, the differently abled, and LGBTQ members have suffered from stereotypes involving dialect, physicality, and temperament, forcing them to code-switch and concoct other strategies to fit into the norm when opportunities occur for financial or social gain, the term "working class", in and of itself, alludes to an established hierarchy that is often accepted, despite the obstacles it places in the path of working-class people. On the scale of social classes, working class comes below the middle and upper class, not to mention the capitalist or owning class—the less than 1% on top of the heap—who, while often thought of as upper class, really comprise a class of itself. Workers also know who falls below them. The poor and the un- or under-employed are often uncomfortably close to working class. But the American Dream measures—or perhaps judges—the working class in relation to the middle class. In it, the working class should aspire to attain middle-class standing and if they haven't, they have failed. They have not worked hard enough or are not smart or refined enough.

Working-class individuals who do rise financially into the middle class through education are expected to embrace middle-class virtues, to not see themselves as working class anymore. Bourdieu's theorizing on habitus, however, would suggest that the process of mimesis shapes the working class so that how they react to the world, what they value, what makes them comfortable, and how they interact with others socially has been determined (Bourdieu and Nice 1977). As sociologist Karl Maton words it, "members of the same social class by definition share structurally similar positions within society that engender structurally similar experiences of social relations, processes and structures. We are each a unique configuration of social forces, but these forces are social, so that even when we are being individual and 'different' we do so in socially regular ways" (Maton 2014). So while education can impact working-class individuals, changing some of their perceptions and introducing new interests, their core remains linked to their background, making them yearn for some of what they might now call "simple pleasures" and urging them to reject much of the complicated, perhaps

hypersensitive, theories and practices found in the middle class. The working class in a middle-class job lack the cultural capital to know how to socialize among those above them on the corporate ladder or to recognize the best ways to network. Alfred Lubrano suggests such practices "smack of phoniness and . . . [are] . . . antithetical" to working-class "honesty" (Lubrano 2004). Further, subtle matters—mannerisms, posture, verbal expressions, food choices—all mark a person from the working class. Working-class people cannot easily shed what they are unaware of, even if they desire to do so.

3. Ethos

For the reasons such as above, the ethos of the working class might be more apparent to those interacting with working-class people than it would be for working-class individuals to describe. Lubrano never mentions the word "ethos" in *Limbo: Blue-Collar Roots, White-Collar Dreams*, a study of what he calls "straddlers", those working-class individuals who enter the middle class through education. Yet, much can be discerned through his discussion of blue-collar values. He lists a well-developed work ethic, respect for parents, close contact with extended family, an open manner without "messy subtext", loyalty, solidarity, daring, basic and attractive physicality, and an "understanding and appreciation of what it takes to get somewhere in a hard world where no one gives you a break" (Lubrano 2004). These values intersect with some tenets of masculinist ideology, but overall, they coincide with traditional Americana. There's a sense of modesty at the core. You do what you're supposed to do and support those closest around you. Don't be gawdy. Don't complain if things don't fall your way. Be straightforward and don't make up excuses. From these values, then, an ethos can be articulated.

Ethos, as Karlyn Kohrs Campbell tells us, is established when an individual "reflects the characteristics and qualities that are valued" by a given audience (Campbell and Huxman 1982). An ethos that will help persuade a working-class audience would suggest the modesty of character that is valued. J.D. Vance feels that working-class people are cynical and pessimistic (Vance 2016). While this generalization is questionable (Vance's work has been denounced for its one-sided and negative portrayals), even if it were true, such an ethos, if reflected in speech or writing, might alienate a working-class audience. This would suggest that working-class people do not respond to assessments that reinforce negativity as much as they do an ethos that reflects a more positive view of themselves, whether the speaker is one of them or not. The working class already senses that the system is stacked against them. An individual who has charts and statistics demonstrating this might come off as a whiner—someone who has not accepted their lot in life—or perhaps as someone who might be intelligent but, again, not street savvy.

Barbara Ehrenreich, for example, wrote what, for me at the time, was a very compelling account of her going undercover into the world of low-wage work to research how people survived on meager wages. She worked as part of a maid service and as a sales clerk at Wal-Mart, among other jobs. Her conclusion strongly suggests that people cannot make ends meet on the amount of money they make and that these workers suffer so that those in the middle class and above can get labor and goods cheaply (Ehrenreich 2001). As an instructor of college composition at a state-run institution comprised mostly of first-generation college students, I thought my students would benefit from reading this type of unmasking of the capitalist system, not just as writers but as thinkers, so I was happy when her book was chosen for my university's common reading program. I eagerly taught it in my first-year composition course.

My students, though, mostly from the working class, reacted differently to the book, pointing specifically to her persona as problematic. They cited her cynicism and cut into her credibility, what I interpreted after reading their papers as her lack of ethos. She states, for example, that her "mental guide for comportment" among her coworkers was "prison movies" (Ehrenreich 2001). She lingers on the "unwanted intimacy" at having to clean feces stains on a toilet (Ehrenreich 2001). As a Wal-Mart sales clerk, she refers to the "characteristic Wal-Martian beat-up and hopeless look" of her coworkers (Ehrenreich 2001). My students saw her as being too prissy and condescending, that she did not

understand how the real world operates. At one point, Ehrenreich develops a rash and cheats on her promise to live just as her coworkers do. She gets her dermatologist to prescribe her a cream (Ehrenreich 2001). Students cited that section over and over again as a sign that she could not hack it. Inspired by these observations, I re-read the book. Despite Ehrenreich's sympathy for low-wage workers, she compromises her ethos continuously with derisive remarks about the various situations in which she found herself that identify her as privileged. For example, she complains about the lack of comfort in the room in which she is staying during her time as a Wal-Mart worker and compares it to a "normal apartment" rather than merely to a more upscale one (Ehrenreich 2001). She comes off as brainy and skeptical, making an allusion to Sisyphus at one point for her readers, who, she assumes, will catch the reference, while her coworkers, cast in an unflattering light, probably did not (Ehrenreich 2001). My students thought she lacked humility and did not have what it takes to survive. She did not have an ethos, in other words, that the working class could value or trust.

Julie Lindquist's ethnography of a working-class bar, *A Place to Stand*, suggests something similar. One of her key informants, "Walter", talked about a working-class identity as being "hard won, not just adopted uncritically or by default" (Lindquist 2002). My students, it would seem, understood this sense of identity as being earned. As Lindquist shows throughout her study, this ethos holds a strong place in verbal arguments. Argument becomes performance. The working-class person will often refuse to qualify statements and will use any "contrasting background"—a person with a dissenting opinion or a public figure, perhaps—to promote an ethos of common sense that speaks to the "cultural truths" of listeners who they are in solidarity with (Lindquist 2002). Performance can never be exposed as mere performance—a tacit rule in the bar in which Lindquist conducts her study—as such a revelation would suggest that what masquerades as logic is actually ethos and pathos, which would damage credibility and make it seem like the person was not telling it like it is (Lindquist 2002).

Yet, while performance can work to promote solidarity, Lindquist asserts that "the decision not to perform can be read as a decision to make a 'statement'" (Lindquist 2002). In other words, outside of the gamesmanship that might take place in a bar and elsewhere to promote an ethos derived from working-class experience, "*refusing to call attention to one's appeal to ethos* is one way to invent a more effective persuasive ethos" (Lindquist 2002). The working-class person is, in essence, saying that everything else aside, they're telling the truth when they do not perform. That their perspective stems from practical experience is not absent in the discussion, but the responsibility shifts to the listener, who often is confronted with the choice simply to believe or not to believe—the decision is with them and the speaker does not have to say more. The truth has been presented plainly.

Working-class students in first-year writing classes might occasionally present the first form of ethos Lindquist discusses in classroom activities. One student of mine, for example, proudly identified himself as a worker and would constantly try to undermine my in-class exercises that were intended to help students learn how to critically analyze their narratives to arrive at a thesis. I usually instructed the students to reach beyond pat conclusions that were too easy and to scrutinize details to shake up clichés or aphorisms toward deeper meaning. Sometimes the activities were directly relevant to their narratives, other times indirect, but they asked students variously to dissect narratives to find key events that might not have been presented as such, to locate the assumptions under which the narrative unfolded, to look for missing details that might point to a less pat conclusion, and to examine language usage for its connotations. This student would complain that the activities were making too much out of "little things" and during the synthesis where groups shared, always was the spokesperson for his group, only to use sarcasm to undermine the findings of his group. On one particular occasion, he told the class, "I work for a living so I don't have time to search for meaning in every little thing. Life is what it is. You don't need to analyze words to try to make life something else. It just confuses things". He was relying on his notion of common sense to perform, creating an implied us and them, the "us" being the students, I believe, and the "them" being me. By invoking his identity as a worker, he very clearly contrasted his truths with what he would call the silliness of academics.

But far more common would be working-class students seeming resistance to giving details in their narratives, something I've noted through my many years of teaching, especially when compared to middle-class students. Over and over, working-class students have asked me, "Why?" when I have pointed out the need for more development of a narrative through description. While I have theorized as to the reasons for these difficulties and for the questioning that goes along with it, I'm convinced now that it aligns with Lindquist's observations about deciding not to perform. For example, I had a conference in my office with a student, as she wanted to talk to me about my comments on her paper. She specifically asked about my marginal instructions to add more detail. I told her that readers were not present when the events took place in her narrative, a story about her lying to cover up her cousin's shoplifting. "It's clear to you what happened", I said. "But readers need more information. They might have questions about what happened. They might even think you made up the story if it doesn't feel real to them". This stunned her, and I regretted saying the last part. She averted her eyes from me and looked at her paper. "But of course it happened", she said. "I just told you it did". To her and other working-class students, writing an essay was not about convincing a reader of anything. Their truth should be plain to see, and it is up to the reader to accept it or not accept it.

I will close here with one last trait, associated with the idea of earned identity and that plants the working class in a seemingly peculiar place of resenting the poor but admiring the rich. The working class has difficulty accepting handouts, and they avoid government programs unless absolutely necessary. According to Joan C. Williams, they prefer the church or family to help them out during financial difficulty, just until they got back on their feet (Williams 2017). It is difficult, then, for them to sympathize with the poor, who they perceive, rightly or wrongly, as making nearly as much as they by living off the government trough. Even if the working class wanted to accept such help, many government programs do not provide for the working class due to the caps placed on such assistance. The working class makes too much money. The ethos of working for your money is strong here. But often, they view the middle class as having broken some code in succeeding. They have devalued tradition, stability, and dependability in order to advance. Professionals often identify with their work in a way that shows class privilege. For the working class, with some exceptions, a job is what you do to support yourself, not who you are (Williams 2017). The daily contact many of the working class have with the professional middle class leaves them feeling bitter, as well. They often feel invisible or patronized (Williams 2017). Class privilege has subtly been lorded over them. Yet, since contact with the truly rich is limited, the rich become the dream to aspire to—wealth, independence, and even leisure. The rags-to-riches stories often told by the upper classes reinforce the notion that hard work, not betrayal of working values, propelled the wealthy to where they are. Throw in that the wealthy and the politicians at their behest promote tradition and family values, de-emphasize the complications of economic and global reality, and seem to speak their mind on social issues, and a discourse emerges that appears to be straight-shooting and speaks to the ethos of the working class. It, perhaps, allows for faith in difficult times, but more than anything, it validates working-class experience.

This aspect of ethos makes for a conflict that can emerge quite early, especially in the first-year writing classroom. Working-class students often write essays that criticize those who they perceive as not wanting to work. A disregard for the homeless is common. But this might be said for students from all classes, as American media has spread much disinformation on issues surrounding poverty. Therefore, I'm more interested in the subtle ways this feature of ethos presents itself. Professors like myself embody middle-class values, shown very clearly in our dialects and our aesthetics, which I think students expect. But most of us have also moved from our hometowns, both to further our education and then to find tenure-track positions. Rather than working-class students admiring the hard work and sacrifice that goes into this process, they seem to perceive it as odd, or at least at odds with their ethos. When my father died a few years ago, I had to return to California for the funeral and was gone for a week. When I returned, some of my students offered condolences, but I was surprised at some of the questions. "Why were you so far away if your dad was sick?" one student asked. Another asked, "Are you going to move back there to take care of your mother now?" I could see in their eyes

that my answers defied their truths about what adult children should do. My explanation about the reality of the job market did not sit right with them. They were presenting an ethos of tradition and family stability while I had chosen a career in a white-collar profession at the expense of those who raised me. What could they learn from this strange guy standing in front of them who did not seem to value some basic tenets of their culture?

4. Conclusions

Our awareness of working-class issues must include an understanding of ethos and how it can impact working-class students' attempts to learn in institutions of higher education. A working-class ethos is one of humility, and it is attached to a truth or a hope that still resonates with the working class. The ethos also contains elements, as I have documented, that clash with academic expectations. The very type of intelligence valued by the educated middle class is often dismissed by the working class for its lack of pragmatism or what they might call common sense. It is essential, then, to continue the efforts to make class a legitimate identity marker, one as important as race, gender, and sexuality, and to listen to students when features of this marker present themselves in the classroom or their writing.

Even when working-class students use education to advance themselves out of their social class, they still feel its tug. If we assume that a working-class ethos acts as a deficit of sorts, we will continue to alienate these types of students and others from the working class. It is important, then, to note what educators might consider the positive aspects of this ethos and to view it with sensitivity. There is a sense of dignity at the heart of working-class ethos that deserves respect. With this in mind, my hope is that this article acts as an entrance into an understudied area within Composition Studies and Rhetoric. Much more needs to be discovered about working-class ethos, especially in the ways it manifests itself in different locales and communities and in its intersections with other identity markers. It deserves our full attention.

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Article

Disability Ethos as Invention in the United States' Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries

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Abstract: This article posits that disability activists routinely present a disability "ethos of invention" as central to the reformation of an ableist society. Dominant societal approaches to disability injustice, such as rehabilitation, accessibility, and inclusion, may touch upon the concept of invention; but, with ethotic discourse, we emphasize disability as generative and adept at producing new ways of knowing and being in the world. We identify an "ethos of invention" as driving early resistance to socially constructed "normalcy", leading the push for cross-disability alliances to incorporate intersectional experiences and propelling the discursive move from inclusion to social justice. Through our partial re-telling of disability rights history, we articulate invention as central to it and supporting its aims to affirm disability culture, reform society through disabled perspectives and values, and promote people with disabilities' full participation in society.

Keywords: disability; invention; ethos; rehabilitation; accessibility; inclusion; intersectionality; cross-disability identity

1. Introduction

The pervasive disability rights mantra, "nothing about us, without us" accentuates the right of people with disabilities to be included in decisions about disability and the societies in which people with disabilities live (Charlton 1998). Yet, practices and policies of the twentieth century in the United States—specifically those under the interconnected approaches of rehabilitation, accessibility, and inclusion—are lamented in critical disability circles for not fully embracing disability experiences as a means of destabilizing societal actions, norms, and values. Articulated among disability activists and allies is the promise of disability to generate new ways of knowing and being in the world as well as disrupting the ableist attitudes undergirding society. Disability's generative and disruptive potentials reveal an "ethos of invention" that pushes the margins of existing practices and understandings of disability. We employ the phrase "ethos of invention" in a dialectical sense, referencing junctures where people with disabilities have invented an ethos that resists ableist rhetorics and environments but also where people with disabilities have created spaces that allow disability to invent a worldview that breaks down prejudices and reimagines society. In short, an ethos of invention remains tied to the invention of ethos, and vice versa. In this essay, we argue that a dialectical ethos of invention drives the movements—and the rhetorical construction of these movements—leading to a seminal disability legislation and social awareness of disability's contributions to society.

An ethos of invention validates disability's right to claim rights and also sets an ethotic foundation essential to community reflection, expansion, and evolution. The epideictic value and function of an ethos of invention means that it fits well into the "forward looking" ethotic discourse emphasized by James S. Baumlin and Craig A. Meyer in their modern discussion of ethos (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, p. 2). An ethos of invention validates the experiences of people with

disabilities and empowers them in the process of self-definition and self-determination. It responds to an oppressive history of ascribing meaning to the physiological conditions of "disability" and society's corresponding tendencies to diagnose and control the lives of people who fall into socially constructed categories. An ethos of invention creates spaces wherein people with disabilities can express individuality, promote understanding, and transform culture.

Although this essay situates a disability ethos of invention as informing past conversations about rehabilitation, accessibility, and inclusion, we recognize that these conversations are ongoing and that invention remains an important element in the contemporary disability rights movement. The promise of a disability ethos of invention underscores critiques of socially constructed normalcy; it informs the push for cross-disability alliances to incorporate intersectional experiences, and it motivates the reconsideration of inclusion policies through a lens of social justice. Importantly, invention shapes scholarship seeking to (re)write the future of disability "in which disability is understood . . . as political, as valuable, as integral" (Kafer 2014, p. 3). It supports the resistance and contestation of normative systems that displace disability (McRuer 2006, p. 3). Invention also informs the "cultural turn" of disability studies that explores the material experience of disability through a new sociocultural context, one that embraces ambiguous experiences and contradictory identities within the dialectical dis/ability complex (Dolmage 2014, p. 100; see also Goodley et al. 2019). In other words, a disability ethos of invention identifies disability as generative, and this quality suggests the potential of disability to rewrite and re-envision our societies.

In what follows, we explain how an ethos of invention emerges in critiques of dominant sociopolitical practices meant to reduce societal barriers and liberate people with disabilities from an ableist society's grasp. We focus on rehabilitation, accessibility, and inclusion, with the understanding that the terms can be used interchangeably; they are not mutually exclusive, nor are they only practices of the twentieth century. For this essay, we understand the terms as follows:

> *Rehabilitation* in medical contexts marks efforts to modify, train, and develop individuals with disabilities as to better assimilate them into existing culture. Disability scholars understand rehabilitation through a critical lens, best put by Alfred Ndi as the presumption of "an *objective* condition" and efforts "to make changes on the *body* of the disabled person in order to bring it as closely as possible to the condition of *normality*". (Ndi 2012, n.p., emphasis in original)

> *Accessibility* is commonly understood as a legal response to disability discrimination and the right to equal access. More generally, the concept refers to "barrier-free environments" and supports actions that eliminate social, institutional, and structural barriers so that people with disabilities gain entrance to all aspects of society. (Mace 1985, p. 147)

> *Inclusion*, as Emily Russell points out, is "an umbrella term, capturing legal battles over public access, mainstreaming in schools, and increased awareness of disability in cultural expression, political agenda, and academic study" (Russell 2011, p. 198). Often, inclusion is evoked to deepen a discussion of barriers and emphasize the goal of equal participation.

All three terms are used frequently in conversations about *and* by people with disabilities, and, therefore, the terms are contextually negotiated and understood. The definitions we offer here start to demarcate a disability perspective. We hope to demonstrate how an ethos of invention expands the definitions to account for fluctuating disability experiences and a commitment to re-evaluating sociopolitical practices in light of evolving disability knowledge and experience.

2. Rehabilitation: The Spectrum of Invention (for/by) Bodies

Rehabilitation remains one of the most enduring approaches to disability of the twentieth century, serving as a celebration of modern medicine and a common practice for reducing barriers for people with disabilities and assimilating them into society. However, the medical and educational inventions that characterize rehabilitation stand in contrast to the ethos of invention described in this essay.

The ethos of invention emerges as one response to rehabilitation practices that focus on changing individual bodies rather than changing the societal norms that constrain these bodies. The tensions between hegemonic structures/practices of an ableist society and the counter-hegemonic disability perspectives/experiences were quite apparent during the build-up and aftermath of World War I, when social reformers promoted rehabilitation as a means of reducing the stigma of disability, providing for injured veterans, and integrating people with disabilities into the workplace where they could demonstrate the cultural values of economic self-sufficiency. Resistance to these rehabilitative goals came from people who felt constrained by notions of bodily normalcy and who argued that it was the workplace, not people with disabilities, that needed to change.

In the United States, labor constitutes a primary way of serving society, demonstrating cultural values of autonomy, productivity, and self-reliance (Russell 2011, pp. 4–5). This sentiment was evident in the early twentieth century emphasis on "keeping America American", a political phrase that referred to the economic progress and sufficiency of the citizenry (and, by extension, the State) and informed policies designed to identify, reform, contain, and/or keep out people "likely to become a public charge" (Nielsen 2012, p. 108).[1] People with disabilities were firmly relegated to this subordinate status, and the problem of "crippledom" was largely framed as "economic dependency" (Byrom 2001, p. 133).

Rehabilitationists believed that a combination of medical intervention and educational training best positioned people with disabilities to defy the stereotypes and stigmas that constrained their opportunities for employment. Culturally deemed unable to work and dependent on charity, rehabilitation gave people with disabilities an avenue to prove their willingness to work and reclaim the status of "useful citizens" (Rose 2017, p. 192). Rehabilitation represented an intentional attempt to build the utility of people with disabilities, since they were deemed passive victims of fate. In the framework of rehabilitation, individuals were viewed as active in their reaction to an unfortunate situation. Indeed, the articulation of a "rehabilitated wo/man" gave said person ethotic standing as a pragmatic, hard-working, and aspirational American—in other words, as an achiever to be socially and culturally admired. The goal of rehabilitation was assimilation, if not in body, then at least in national ideals.

Rehabilitation measures began in the early twentieth century to address the problem of economic dependency of people with disabilities, and then burgeoned when large numbers of injured World War I veterans returned stateside and needed employment to support themselves and their families. Historical accounts suggest that U.S. society viewed disability, due to sacrificing one's body to serve one's country, as culturally credible; in fact, "Wartime made disability heroic" at a time when society often articulated disability as a threat to progress (Nielsen 2012, p. 87). Evidence of this positive attitude towards veterans was reflected in the number of federal pensions, vocational training programs, and services available for the disabled veteran, and the early implementation of these services compared to the civilian population of people with disabilities.[2] Though veterans still faced discrimination, they were generally seen as "good" citizens who deserved economic and social support. Rehabilitation focused on integrating certain types of people with disabilities deemed heroic or innocent, and left out other people with disabilities with bodies labelled "defective" and "undesirable" by eugenical thinking, a pseudoscientific movement also gaining momentum during this time (Davis 2010, p. 3).

Henri-Jacques Stiker argued that the rise of prosthetics among WWI injured veterans moved disability discourse away from disability as a health crisis and individual "lack" and toward that of "fill[ing]" and "overcom[ing]" that lack through replacement, repair, and rebuilding (Stiker, p. 124).

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[1] (Dis)ability has been only one of many ways to dehumanize people and restrict their full enfranchisement and participation in society. Another example would be the term "illegal aliens".

[2] Another but far earlier example, Nielsen identifies the Revolutionary War Pension Act of 1818 as the first act that establishes disability "as a legal and social welfare category" (Nielsen 2012, p. 54). However, this act extended services only to veterans who were unable "to perform economically productive labor" (Nielsen 2012, p. 54). One of the first federal programs to provide nonmilitary persons vocational support was the Smith-Fess Act of 1920, also known as the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation Act.

Brad Byrom added that the public's increased trust in orthopedic surgery and the rhetoric of their professional journals (which blamed individuals for their dependency) remained central to this shift, constituting the core of what the disability rights movement later identified as the medical model of disability (Byrom 2001, p. 134).[3] The social and political priority given to the medical rehabilitation of World War I veterans, combined with the increased publication, practice, and credibility of orthopedic surgery, caused the medical model to engulf the tenuously defined "social model", or those who identified as social rehabilitationists and "emphasized the need for social and cultural change" as the primary mode of solving the problem of disability economic dependency (Byrom 2001, p. 134).

As such, rehabilitation dominated disability discourse through most of the twentieth century and gained prominence, especially during times of war. Rehabilitation represented an invention in relation to disability that stood in contrast to theories of non-invention, such as exclusion or extermination in the name of a eugenical ideal. Meanwhile, those who drew inventive possibilities from *within* disability experience and objected to the use of medical rehabilitation to resolve disability's external "cultural dislocation" began to organize and to lay the groundwork for sociopolitical change (Snyder 2006, p. 39). Some people with disabilities rejected the defective status assigned to their bodies and the idea that their bodies needed to change to be economically productive, aiming instead to focus attention on the environments that remained unresponsive to the economic value of people with disabilities. To put it differently, people with disabilities countered the invention of rehabilitative measures with another notion of invention that centered on the credibility of people with disabilities, rather than a socially constructed ideal.[4] For example, a group of New Yorkers, who later called themselves The League for the Physically Handicapped, protested the city's Emergency Relief Bureau with slogans like "We Don't Want Tin Cups. We Want Jobs" and "We Are Lame, But We Can Work" (Nielsen 2012, p. 135). After its formation in 1935, the League fought against "unjust discrimination" and a "calloused and inhuman attitude" toward people with disabilities seeking employment, demanding that the workplace adjust to fit the needs of people with disabilities (Death Watch 1935). Resistance by this so-called "radical" group demonstrated that people with disabilities were beginning to see themselves as an oppressed minority with an underrepresented voice, and a consciousness emerged among some people with disabilities that society must transform its thinking (Longmore and Goldberger 2000, p. 901).

The ethos of invention we identify, as contributing to early twentieth century disability discourse, resisted the "tyranny of the norm" that characterized the disability experience, especially in the workforce (Davis 2010, p. 6). Rehabilitation practices throughout the century reinforced the idea that only "able" bodies enjoyed full citizenship and that "deformed, deafened, amputated, obese, female, perverse, crippled, maimed and blinded bodies do not make up the body politic" and did not contribute to a prosperous society (David 1995, pp. 71–72; see also Russell 2011). Rehabilitation also positioned disability as a failed or mistaken iteration of human form that society was responsible for remedying by re-inventing the disabled body. While the League for the Physically Handicapped "never probed disability's function in modern society" or "reshape[d] the terms of public discourse", it did politicize disability's relationship to the workplace and social policies that glorified normalcy (Longmore and Goldberger 2000, p. 920). Their resistance to the oppression of "normal" and the idea that normality preceded a citizen's right to work advanced a shift in thinking about the sociocultural barriers that excluded (and precluded) people with disabilities. As rehabilitationists speculated ways to re-invent disabled bodies, some people with disabilities defied this approach and demanded that disability be seen as a means of re-inventing societal norms.

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[3] The medical model of disability posits the difficulties associated with disability as originating with the "medical problems" located within/upon an individual's body and authorizes medical experts to diagnose and treat those problems (Brisenden 1986, p. 176).

[4] In addition to challenging their categorization as "unemployable", the deaf community also challenged their categorization of "disabled". As Kim Nielsen pointed out, "Already marginalized, they sought to distinguish themselves from those they considered *the truly disabled*" (Nielsen 2012, p. 136, original emphasis).

3. Accessibility: The Limits of a Cross-Disability Identity

Accessibility measures of the late twentieth century regularly and effectively organized around a *cross-disability identity*, which we define as individuals representing a range of disabilities but who all share experiences of exclusion and stigma. As people with disabilities applauded the tactical effectiveness of cross-disability coalitions in guaranteeing entryways into society's structures and, specifically, bringing to fruition the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, an awareness developed that accessibility laws were based on a homogeneous understanding of disability, social barriers, and types of discrimination. Therefore, in addition to cross-disability solidarity, disability advocates increasingly called for more intersectional and diverse representations of the disability experience (see in particular, Bell 2006; Miles et al. 2017; Shakespeare 2010; Sherry 2016; Vernon 1999). As people with disabilities advocated for accessibility, they drew upon an ethos of invention to both advance the credibility of their claims and also advance the complexity of the accessibility conversation.

Working together, disabled activists amplified the power of their voice and persuasiveness of their demand for societal change. Their cross-disability collaborations established a disability ethos in discourse about societal and economic barriers. Protests and work strikes occurred on job sites and in cities, as the disabled put pressure on the government to insure disabled rights. One notable instance of mid-to-late twentieth century collaboration included the short-lived efforts of the League of the Physically Handicapped already mentioned; another included the Disabled Miners and Widows, which teamed up with The Black Lung Association to reform the UMWA (United Mine Workers of America) and pass the federally supported Black Lung Benefits Act of 1973 (Nielsen 2012, p. 159).[5] Parents of children with disabilities also worked together to pass landmark legislation in education, starting with the Education for Handicapped Children Act of 1975. These political coalitions demonstrated the value of organizing around shared experiences of discrimination, rather than specific disabilities, and the impact of that collaboration on the credibility of their claims.

The Independent Movement in Berkeley, California, also required collaboration among people with disabilities who rejected institutionalization as the government's go-to solution for disability and sought, instead, to assert themselves as reliable, creative sources on their own personhood. A cross-disability coalition led the infamous "504 Sit-In" outside The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (or HEW) building in San Francisco in 1977. The group of approximately 150 disability rights activists, supported by other civil rights groups like the Black Panthers, occupied the federal building for nearly a month to put pressure on President Jimmy Carter's administration to sign Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, an anti-discrimination policy which had yet to be enforced since the passing of the act in 1973 (Schweik 2011, n.p.).[6] This particular victory paved the way for the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, with the help of other cross-disability coalitions who "claimed" and affirmed their shared disability identity (Linton 1998, p. 12).

Arguably, cross-disability coalitions successfully pushed policies that created opportunities and legitimized discursive spaces (e.g., legal, political, social) for people with disabilities to generate knowledge, action, and understanding in pursuit of a just society. The collaborations themselves were inventive, and they opened opportunities for continued ethotic discourse. As what was eventually evident, policies that highlighted accessibility and accommodation often lumped the "disabled" into one homogeneous group. Recognizing this tendency, the disability community—true to its ethotic commitment—sought to complicate their shared disability identity.

The ADA depended largely on the advancement of the "social model of disability" which painted a problematic environment, rather the "problems" of disability, as the source of disability limitation and exclusion. This model, while important, did not fully capture the ways disability experiences

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[5] The League of the Physically Handicapped dissolved in 1938 (see Longmore and Goldberger 2000, p. 921).

[6] The sit-in occurred under the organizational umbrella of the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities (ACCD). The signing of section 504 was the ACCD's first major policy-related victory.

challenged ableist norms, structures, and values. Almost two decades after the passing of the ADA, Tobin Siebers offered a nuanced theory of "complex embodiment", that "understands disability as an epistemology that rejects the temptation to value the body as anything other than what it was and that embraces what the body has become and will become relative to the demands on it, whether environmental, representational, or corporeal" (Siebers 2008, p. 27). Siebers articulated a view of disability, one that we argue was already nascent in disability discourse, in which disability "re-invents" itself and its environments as it interacts and interplays with various milieus. According to Siebers, and those who agreed with his assessment, a theory of complex embodiment captured the ethotic essence of people with disabilities. The resonance with this view of disability is evident in the work that actively sought disability perspectives/knowledges/experiences through intersectional approaches, first-person narratives, and other artistic expressions. Collectively, these efforts not only challenged ableist assumptions that displaced disability, but also nurtured a disability culture that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 did not explicitly reference (Brown 2015, n.p.). In effect, the community turned inward and called on its members to insert, affirm, and pronounce their diverse experiences of disability, with the faith that these (inter)actions would continue to advance the movement and reinvent the world in which people with disabilities live.

Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the concept of *intersectionality* to explore how issues of power affected one's lived experiences through a variety of overlapping contexts, including disability, sexuality, race, class, and gender (Crenshaw 1991, p. 1245). Disability scholars picked up Crenshaw's seminal theory to show how disability was only one part of our social fabric; and it was complicated by several other factors. The disability justice performance project, *Sins Invalid*, puts this dual imperative well with the statement, "All bodies are caught in the bindings of ability, race, class, gender, sexuality and citizenship. We are powerful not despite the complexities of our identities, but because of them" (Berne 2018, p. 230). Collective action, then, is based on multifaceted experiences and understandings of disability. Intersectionality not only increases our understanding of disability, it also provides more "tools" for dismantling multiple structures and processes of injustice. Indeed, the increased call for intersectional approaches in the years following the passage of the ADA implicitly and explicitly recognized the limits of policies based on a cross-disability identity and sought to expand the scope of disability's influence on sociocultural norms (e.g., Vernon 1999; Garland-Thomson 2005).

Expressions of intersectional, lived experiences take many forms. First-person narratives offer one way of transferring meaning into the hands of those whose stories are being told. First-person narratives provide "a literature of witnessing" that resist normative and ableist constructions of disability experiences (Siebers 2008, p. 47). The subjectivity of first-person accounts are a way to validate disability experiences from the perspective of those living them and to disrupt the march of meaning traditionally sourced from charitable, medical, and scientific communities (Couser 2000, p. 309).[7] Notably, Audre Lorde (1980) first person account of chronic illness and disability, Laura Hershey (1993) and Evan Kemp (1981) perspectives of charitable fundraising events, and Harriet McBryde Johnson (2003) reflections about the right to life are a sampling of the seminal first-person narratives that have brought disability perspectives into the public sphere in illuminating ways. In 1999, Michael J. Fox demonstrated the efficacy of embodied lived experiences to push forward disability perspectives when he opted to not take his medicine before testifying in front of the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee for increased government funding for Parkinson's research (Michael J Fox Testimony before the Senate 2013). His speech was lauded for its inventiveness, insistence, and persuasiveness and helped build a credibility later dubbed "The Michael J. Fox Effect" (Quackenbush 2011).

[7] The recently published *Disability Experience: Memoirs, Autobiographies, and Other Personal Narratives* (Couser and Mintz 2019) provides a scholarly approach to several of these narratives through summaries, excerpts, and analyses.

Performance troupes that provide artistic access to people with disabilities also contribute to the distribution and increased engagement with varied disability experiences. Phamaly Theater Company, Theater By The Blind, and the Axis Dance Company were all founded in the late twentieth century to give people with disabilities access to performance and its myriad of possibilities. Performance troupes take an active, affirmative response to oppressive social systems and relations of power through the naming and challenging of disability constructions. Disability performances provide a vulnerable, embodied critique that offered audience members a new way of imagining the future of disability in the arts and, just as importantly, outside of it. Performance generates new meanings and spaces where "knowledges [can] be re-examined" and often provide a method and mode of dismantling stereotypical representations of disability (Kuppers 2003, p. 3).[8] In essence, performance generates a new way of interacting with, and in relationship to, other disabled and nondisabled bodies.

Historically, the disability rights movement mobilized around a cross-disability identity that was especially effective in asserting change. People with disabilities discovered that they were stronger together and could use their collective power to push against the societal structures that had long inhibited them. The further development of the movement and the enrichment of disability culture, however, required the expression of even more varied lived experiences. The sharing of lived experiences through an intersectional awareness, first person narratives, and performance are some of the ways people resist ableist assumptions, generate understanding, and foster a rich disability culture. These practices are very much alive today: as Steven Brown pointed out, a rich culture enables people with disabilities to "generate art, music, literature, and other expressions of our lives, our culture, infused from our experience of disability" and to have those expressions viewed, valued, and incorporated into the public imagination (Brown 2015, n.p.). In effect, disability culture "invents" (i.e., illuminates and articulates) spaces and identities in public discourse that enriches society and expands what is possible.

4. Inclusion: Pursuing Social Justice

The language of disability inclusion draws from social and political theories seeking an equal and participatory environment that embraces a plurality of perspectives (see, for example, Young 2000). At stake for people with disabilities are opportunities to participate in political agenda-setting, to see themselves in cultural spaces, and to authorize their own experiences. Yet, it is not enough "to be included" in spaces where people with disabilities traditionally have been barred. In their critique of contemporary inclusion practices, Eileen Hyder and Cathy Tissot argued that inclusion efforts "can represent a surface approach to inclusion, rather than the true ethos of what is meant." The "true ethos" they reference includes the promise of disability participation to bring about social justice and alter oppressive systems that exclude in the first place (Hyder and Tissot 2013, p. 12). Or otherwise stated, inclusion represents the invention of a disability ethos in previously inaccessible spaces/practices, but remains only a "surface" endeavor when the spaces/practices remain unchanged by disability participation.

The possibilities of inclusion are evident in conjunction with every child's right to a "free and appropriate education", as is designated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 2019). Inclusion under IDEA/DEA represents an intentional effort to reduce the stigma associated with disability. The inclusive education ideal is described by the National Center on Inclusive Education as "characterized by presumed competence, authentic membership, full participation, reciprocal social relationships,

[8] It is important to bring attention to the potential "over correction" of narrative. The "overcoming narrative" presents people with disabilities doing something ordinary (such as completing a race or singing in a competition), but, instead of the person being seen through the skill, they are seen as amazing because *even though they have a disability, they can still do this normal thing*. This trope reinforces the "disabled" stereotype and the status quo of disability as being "less than". Obviously, this is problematic.

and learning to high standards by all students with disabilities in age-appropriate general education classrooms, with supports provided to students and teachers to enable them to be successful" (National Center on Inclusive Education 2011, p. 1). Curt Dudley-Marling and Mary Bridget Burns identify proactive inclusion efforts as part of a "social constructivist" perspective that endows students with disabilities the "presumption of competence" and confidently views all children, regardless of their differences, as clever, capable learners (Dudley-Marling and Burns 2014, p. 24).

In practice, however, the social constructionist view regularly collides into a "deficit perspective" of inclusion enabled by the continued existence of general education and special education classrooms. Inclusion is presented as a way to move the marginalized—the underserved, disadvantaged, and oppressed—colloquially, "from the margins to the mainstream." Yet, as scholars point out, this move assumes that people on the margins, such as students with disabilities, are naturally excludable (Baglieri et al. 2011, p. 2123).[9] From a "deficit perspective", inclusion is the process of remediating or compensating for these deficits in a "more inclusive" setting (Dudley-Marling and Burns 2014, p. 24). These actions concretize a hierarchy between the "normal" students and the outliers who are "being included" (Dudley-Marling and Burns 2014, p. 24). Additionally, the pervasive perception that special education teachers are "special" (e.g., unusually patient, kind, tolerant) reinforces the idea that people with disabilities are hard to teach and difficult to assimilate into a mainstream classroom (Lalvani 2013, p. 21).

Positioning inclusion as the bridge between general and special education reifies the idea that inclusivity is a choice or an approach to disability, rather than the right of people with disabilities (Baglieri et al. 2011, p. 2125). Some educators mistakenly perceive special education as a contained "place", of being in the same place at the same time, rather than as a service that could be provided anywhere (Lalvani 2013, p. 25; see also, Beratan 2006). This view also limits how student skills are characterized: consider, for example, the idea that children must *earn* their place in an inclusive classroom through intelligence and good behavior (Lalvani 2013, p. 19). This perspective further paints inclusion as achieved, rather than the inalienable right of people who have disabilities and the right to be educated.

In light of continued systematic oppression and misunderstanding, Lalvani suggests that the language of social justice replace and/or accompany inclusive education practices (Lalvani 2013, p. 25). Inclusion efforts often recognize the ethos of people with disabilities and seeks to invent spaces that welcome such people, but social justice discourse expands the dialectic to emphasize that those spaces can and should change as a result of disability participation. A social justice approach means calling on educators for increased flexibility and a co-constructionistic attitude in classroom instruction. In this view, planning is not an autonomous endeavor on the part of the instructor, but requires instructor prioritization of communication and negotiation with people with disabilities—upfront and often. Jay Dolmage argued that in classroom planning the "inclusion of each individual in the discussion forever changes that discussion" (Dolmage 2008, p. 23). Dolmage's insights compliment Hyder and Tissot (2013, p. 2) and Lalvani (2013, p. 21) in adopting the language of social justice in order to emphasize disrupting societal norms and promoting structural change in educational and social contexts. Inclusion, in this critical paradigm, is a steppingstone for actualizing a disability epistemology that "turns experience into expertise" (Nijs and Heylighen 2015, p. 147). These discussions go beyond the classroom to consider how inclusion practices, framed by a social justice imperative, promise not only belonging, but also change.

Although our essay highlights educational settings as a place where an ethos of invention has shifted the conversation from inclusion to social justice, it is important to note that a similar shift has and is occurring in other aspects of society. For example, the circulation of problematic disability

[9] "Excludable types" was theorized by Tanya Titchkosky (2007, p. 5), but used in Hyder and Tissot's study of discrimination in a library-based reading group for visually impaired readers (Hyder and Tissot 2013, p. 10).

images has had a profound *othering* effect on disability, with the visual spectacle of freak shows, pseudoscientific eugenics, and charity advertisements putting the disabled body in the public eye, but imbued with ableist interpretations of disability as something to cure, take care of, overcome, or fear (see Garland-Thomson 1997, 2001, 2009; Gilman 1982). Disability advocates who engage in the "politics of appearance" (Garland-Thomson 1997, p. 22) create counter-imagery that dramatizes disability in more varied, experiential, and empowering ways. The intentional participation of people with disabilities in their own representation stimulates public conversations about unmet disability needs, disability rights, and disability's (re)newed place in society. For example, we can see these changes in expressive spaces for sexuality and desirability, like the fashion industry, which has traditionally excluded people with disabilities. The rise of disabled models, designers, and fashion bloggers are destigmatizing disability and assistive devices, and influencing the industry to more creatively consider the bodies and identities of the consumers to whom they sell their products (Pullin 2009; Vainshtein 2012).

Calls to include disability in historical studies of the United States operate along a similar assumption that the addition of disability does more than add information; it changes our understanding of history, past actions, and dominant ideologies. As Douglas Baynton explained, disability is a "cultural construct to be questioned and explored", for "[i]t may well be that all social hierarchies have drawn on culturally constructed and socially sanctioned notions of disability" rather than on the "natural" hierarchies that presume the pages of our history books (Baynton 2017, p. 31). Specifically, history is mired in "ideologies of American individualism" (Russell 2011, p. 199) that paint people with disabilities "as embodying that which Americans fear most: loss of independence, of autonomy, of control" (Longmore and Umansky 2001, p. 7). These conceptions of disability remain relatively unquestioned and uninterrogated in historical accounts. Rewriting U.S. culture, then, means rewriting the ableist norms that continually devalue disability in order to justify inequality. In exhuming disability as a cultural construct, the U.S. can see the role ableism played, for example, in the oppression of women, the justification of slavery, and the discrimination of immigrants judged (Baynton 2017). Indeed, discussing disability through the lens of social justice furthers the pursuit of justice for other marginalized groups whose liberation is connected to society's understanding, treatment, and engagement with disability.

5. Conclusions: Disability Inventions and (Re)Inventing Disability

Central to the disability rights movement is epideictic discourse that affirms and celebrates the expertise of people with disabilities in their own self-definition, self-determination, and awareness of ableist attitudes and environments that create barriers to these expressions. Signs of a disability ethos of invention were already nascent in social movements of the early twentieth century, and they fortified the movement as it grew in numbers and influence over the next hundred years in the United States. Rehabilitation, accessibility, and inclusion are approaches that engage with notions of invention. A disability ethos of invention that includes disability perspectives has the potential to radically change society and disability's place in it. After all, ideology is best critiqued by those—like the disabled—who are excluded from its logic (Siebers 2008, p. 14). This ethos explicitly and implicitly purports that disability experiences (physically, environmentally, and culturally derived) are generative loci of knowledge, understanding, and ways of being.

In this essay, we recounted an anecdotal history of dominant practices designed to advance the rights of people with disabilities under the umbrella terms of rehabilitation, accommodation, and inclusion. These practices improve conditions for people with disabilities, but are also critiqued for falling short in how they engage disability perspectives and experiences. A disability ethos of invention is evoked when practices are perceived as reinforcing ableist norms, temporality, values, and systems. A disability ethos of invention centers disability's potential to transform society, unearth knowledge, and create a just world for people with disabilities. For example, as we have discussed, early twentieth century workers resisted the prevailing definition of bodily normalcy that guided popular rehabilitation practices, demanding that the workplace change to accommodate the needs

and wants of people with disabilities, rather than the other way around. Although these efforts failed to question the conflation of worth with economic sufficiency, they opened a door for people with disabilities to challenge ableist norms. A few decades later, people with disabilities discovered the power of cross-disability alliances to gain favorable political change. Yet, these measures relied on a homogenous understanding of disability, and disability circles responded with a call to balance the power of uniting together with attention to intersectional identities and experiences. Theories of inclusion sought a more equal and participatory society for people with disabilities. Yet, again at times, inclusion practices reduced the movement's goals down to simply "being included" in education, in representational structures, and in the annals of history. Demands for social justice emphasized how inclusion is only truly achieved when it changes normalized, naturalized sociocultural conceptions of disability in public discourse.

A disability ethos of invention asserts that differences produce perspectives useful, not only for the lives of people with disabilities, but also society-at-large. It adopts the stance articulated by Siebers (2008) that a complex understanding of embodiment amplifies the expertise of the disabled body to teach us about human variation. A disability ethos applauds and helps in "establishing imperfect, extraordinary, non-normative bodies as the origin and epistemological homes of all meaning making" and, consequently, embraces varied forms of communication and expressions of identity (Dolmage 2014, p. 19). It allows us to explore the ableist assumptions that underscore our interpretations of a person's abilities, or even more profoundly, as Amanda Baggs (2007) argued, to challenge how society defines personhood. It encourages the experiencing of the world by using different senses and by increasing our reflective awareness of our bodies in different environments. It emphasizes that disability challenges the naturalized correlations between body, language, and society. In sum, a disability ethos of invention puts people with disabilities in an empowered position to identify past injustices, change the present, and pursue future liberations.

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Essay

A Dialogue on the Constructions of GLBT and Queer Ethos: "I Belong to a Culture That Includes . . . "

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Abstract: Invoking a dialogue between two scholars, authors Jane Hoogestraat and Hillery Glasby discuss the exigence for, construction of, and differentiation between LGBT and queer ethos. Drawing from Larry Kramer's *The Normal Heart* and the construction of a gay identity, the text explores connections between queer theory, LGBT(Q) ethos, and queer futurity, ultimately arguing for a more nuanced and critical understanding of the undecidability and performativity of LGBT and queer ethos. In framing LGBT and queer ethos as being at the same time a self and socially constructed and mediated—legitimate and illegitimate—ethos can be understood not only as a site for rhetorical agency, but also as an orientation and a form of activism. Finally, the text offers a case study of Adrienne Rich's "Yom Kippur," which is a poem that offers a queer (and) Jewish perspective on identity—from an individual and community level—exhibiting both an LGBT and queer ethos.

Keywords: GLBT/LGBTQ; queer; ethos; normativity; homonormativity; polemic; futurity; undecidability; re/disorientation; legitimacy; rhetorical agency; outness

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> *I belong to a culture that includes Proust, Henry James, Tchaikovsky, Cole Porter, Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Alexander the Great, Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, Christopher Marlowe, Walt Whitman, Herman Melville, Tennessee Williams, Byron, E.M. Forster, Lorca, Auden, Francis Bacon, James Baldwin, Harry Stack Sullivan, John Maynard Keynes, Dag Hammarskjold [. . .] These are not invisible men [. . .] The only way we'll have real pride is when we demand recognition of a culture that isn't just sexual. It's all there—all through history we've been there; but we have to claim it, and identify who was in it, and articulate what's in our minds and hearts and all our creative contributions to this earth [. . .] Why couldn't you and I [. . .] have been leaders in creating a new definition of what it means to be gay?* Larry Kramer (1985, p. 114)

[Jane Hoogestraat] The opening epigraph from Larry Kramer's *The Normal Heart* (1985) introduces a number of threads that will motivate a discussion of the constructions of GLBTQ ethos. First, Kramer notes with pride the contribution that gay men have made to culture, especially literary culture, from ancient times to the present. Doing so both legitimizes the existence of individual gay people in the present and argues for an ongoing and collective need to continue to redefine both individual and collective gay identities into the future. Using my own literary field of poetry as an example, Kramer's catalogue might be amended to read "a culture that includes Sappho, Gertrude Stein, Elizabeth Bishop, Adrienne Rich, Audre Lorde, Jane Miller, Kay Ryan, Gloria Anzaldua . . . "

1. A Re/Disorientation: On How to Read the Text

> *To make things queer is certainly to disturb the order of things*. Sara Ahmed (2006, p. 565)

> *The term 'queer' is used in a deliberately capacious way [. . .] in order to suggest how many ways people can find themselves at odds with straight culture*. Michael Warner (1999, p. 38)

[Hillery Glasby] The editors of this collection on ethos asked me to review Larry Kramer's draft, originally submitted to offer insight into GLBT ethos, to provide perspective and to address revision, since she is unable to do so herself.[1] However, I felt icky about it; she's left the physical world and I did not want to rewrite or co-opt any of her work, to honor the draft and her as a scholar and colleague-of-colleagues (although I have done minor sentence-level text editing to clarify her original draft, I have not altered or revised any of her ideas or arguments). I have never had the privilege of meeting Jane, besides through this draft, so I want to preserve it, her voice, and her perspective. At the same time, I also feel compelled, as I read, to speak with, alongside, and back to her ideas about GLBT ethos. I am a queer femme lesbian, and here I enact and perform a *queer ethos* by speaking openly and directly, writing alongside her text in an attempt to start a dialogue with—and offer a queer perspective to—Hoogestraat's ideas. Moving between a back-and-forth dialogue and in-text interjections, I hope to expand her work on GLBT ethos and articulate my own understanding of queer ethos. Although she cannot comment directly back to create an ongoing dialogue, I do hope these two perspectives—put in dialogue together—inspire further conversation surrounding LGBT and queer ethos among our readers.

2. Naming Our Culture: GLBT, LGBT(Q), Queer

[JH] With awareness of the risks involved, I will provisionally and temporarily use the term "gay" as an umbrella term that includes all of the following: gay men and lesbian women, all people who identify under the acronym LGBTQ (and variations on the acronym), and all people who identify under the heading "queer".

[HG] Even with this caveat, I would differentiate a *queer* ethos from, or in addition to, an LGBT(Q) ethos (Hoogestraat has chosen to use the acronym GLBT, and I choose to use LGBTQ to first name the often-erased lesbian identity in favor of the more historically privileged gay identity). Queer seems to be a better collapsed term than gay, because it is separate from gay men (who have long been privileged and even oppressive in the LGBTQ community, as they have historically benefitted from their gender, whiteness, socioeconomic class, ability, etc., despite their sexuality); it is more plural and intersectional; and it reflects the reclamation project that a queer ethos undertakes. Historically, "gay" has been a more palatable term and sexual identity. The word queer carries much more power, because it hasn't been normalized and publicly accepted to the same extent as gay. Queer doesn't feel comfortable or organic to heteronormative mouths. It offers discomfort, confusion, and begs a reorientation to a pejorative-turned-reclamation-project, so a history of oppression and discrimination is always already embedded in its utterance. Queer does not seek legitimization and sees acceptance as a homonormative move. A queer ethos asks who does the legitimizing and interrogates why there is a need for legitimization in the first place. Queer(ness) undercuts the need for legitimacy and even laughs in its face.

[JH] In the following text, I provide an overview of key concepts, terms, and theorists / theories relevant to the ongoing work of constructing plural forms of gay ethos. Throughout, I will be focusing on the plural, provisional, and future-looking quality of this work, and again (in this emphasis on futurity) I find an echo from *The Normal Heart.* At the end of the speech quoted above, Kramer's character Ned Weeks appears to acknowledge simultaneously both failure (in the midst of the AIDS epidemic in 1985) and a look forward: "Why couldn't you and I [. . .] have been leaders in creating a new definition of what it means to be gay?" (Kramer 1985, p. 115). While Kramer's character believes that he has failed, Kramer the playwright and activist did, as I will argue later in the essay, succeed in

[1] Dr. Jane Hoogestraat passed away on 12 September 2015.

a limited but important way in insisting on a new definition of what it means to be gay, producing an extremely polemical ethos that remains one option in a field that now allows for a much broader range of expression than anyone in 1985 might have foreseen. I will explore what happened to that range of expression by focusing specifically on the work of the following theorists: Lauren Berlant, Judith Butler, and David Halperin.

[HG] Larry Kramer: resister, AIDS activist, playwright, journalist, and co-founder of both the Gay Men's Health Crisis (GMHC) and AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP). As Erin Rand (2008) explains, "this activism [including Lesbian Avengers and Sex Panic!] was intended not merely to promote acceptance or tolerance, but also to reclaim loudly and forcefully the rights to safety and humanity, and to forge identity and end victimization through self defense". Kramer occupies an interesting space in LGBTQ history: at once cast as an angry AIDS activist as well as a gay conservative who decried "irresponsible" gay sexual behavior and promiscuity. Considered controversial and problematic from both outside and inside the LGBTQ community, Kramer remains an important part of gay history and culture, and has played a significant role in humanizing people living with HIV, although he contributed to splintering within the community even as he called it out.

Rhetorically speaking, Larry Kramer is best known for his use of the polemic in his speeches and writing. Usually defined as a controversial and antagonistic verbal attack, Rand (2008) recasts the polemic as a genre that enables agency, not through the text or speaker, but rather through the form's effect, affect, and subsequent action. She explains, "as a rhetorical form that reveals the general economy of undecidability from which agency emerges, then, the polemic is productively excessive and provocatively queer" (Rand 2008, p. 298).

Here is where my recasting of Hoogestraat's essay on LGBTQ ethos comes into play; the LGBTQ ethos she describes leans toward normative and palatable versions of queerness. In fact, as I addressed above, she goes as far as collapsing queer(ness) into the category of gay despite the power and discomfort the word queer evokes. For this reason, I suggest a queer ethos, one that is provocative and resistant, seeking no legitimization with skeptical yet hopeful regards for futurity.

Queer is polemical; gay not as much, and not necessarily. [Similar to] Kramer, the gay men Hoogestraat refers to are limited to mostly middle to upper class, educated, white gay men, [who are] often the first voices to be heard from the LGBTQ community even though lesbians, queer women of color, and the trans community (especially trans women of color) have laid some of the most compelling groundwork for a revolution of ethos and visibility.

In terms of what Hoogestraat calls the "future-looking quality of his [Kramer's] work," there is much discussion from queer theorists about what role futurity plays in and beyond queer theory. Theorists such as Lee Edelman (2004) resist and reject futurity because of its ties to happiness, success, production, and (reproductive) procreation. Others, such as Ahmed (2006) and Josè Esteban Muñoz (2009), see hope and possibility in the future. For Edelman, the future—of the earth, humanity, etc.—is tied to the child, a representation of a distanced future rather than the here and now where already-born people suffer and face injustice. In opposition, queer invokes a death drive, which "names what the queer, in the order of the social, is called forth to figure: the negativity opposed to every form of social viability" (p. 9). The goal is to let go of the pressure of positivity, to embrace the negative, and embrace *jouissance*—the pleasure of the moment.

On the other hand, Ahmed (2006) explains,

> I would not argue that queer has 'no future' as Edelman suggests—though I understand and appreciate this impulse to 'give' the future to those who demand to inherit the earth, rather than aiming for a share in this inheritance. Instead, a queer politics would have hope, not even by having hope in the future (under the sentimental sign of the 'not yet'), but because the lines that accumulate through repeated gestures, the lines that gather on skin, already taking surprising forms. We have hope because what is behind us is also what allows other ways of gathering time and space, of making lines that do not reproduce what we follow, but instead create new textures on the ground. (p. 570)

In this way, futures are most always connected to, understood through, or are created in response to the past, our histories. Rather than reproduce or replicate existing lines, lives, and structures, hope allows for new lines to be forged.

For Muñoz (2009), "queerness is not yet here. Queerness is an ideality [. . .] The future is queerness's domain. Queerness is a structuring and educated mode of desiring that allows us to see and feel beyond the quagmire of the present" (p. 1). Whereas Edelman (2004) sees queerness as here and now, negative, and antithetical to the child of/as the future, Muñoz sees queerness as only possible in the realm of the future: a process and utopic destination. Muñoz argues, "the here and now is simply not enough. Queerness should and could be about desire for another way of being in both the world and time, a desire that resists mandates to accept that which is not enough" (p. 96). Queerness is the hope of something better, something fluid and altogether different; queerness is a potentiality.

Queerness cannot ignore futurity. However, what is to be said of an ethos that cares not for the future?

[JH] Having collapsed above (for purposes of economy) the terms "gay" and "queer", I remain acutely conscious that any definition of ethos in the present must confront the dual legacies of post-modernism and queer theory, both of which radically call into question any notion of a stable individual self, or even of unmediated individual subjectivity. Writing generally of ethos in the era of post-structuralism and beyond, James S. Baumlin (1994) notes: "Post-modernism, which we can partially describe as an attempt to develop post-Cartesian thought, might very well be redefined as an age *after* ethos, since the very notion of the sovereign individual now falls under question" (p. xxi). In general, the field of queer theory argues against any notion of a fixed or essential identity, one that might position an individual as possessing a core self prior to language or prior to the strictures of culture and society. The term "queer" appropriates what was historically deployed as a derogatory term, a term of hate speech if you will, reconstituting the term as productive and having a positive valence.

[HG] Here, I ask readers to interrogate this lean toward productivity and positivity based on Edelman's (2004) above points, his critiques of procreation, as well as rhetoric and composition's obsession with products/production, which Jonathan Alexander and Jackie Rhodes ("Queer" 2011) also address. At times, queer can be too productive, excessive, and even cannibalistic in that it subsumes so much in its orbit. One might even say queer(ness) is one of the most elastic categories to date, which doesn't come without problematic applications . . . problems . . .

[JH] In *Thinking Queerly: Race, Sex, Gender, and the Ethics of Identity*, David Ross Fryer (2010) offers a lengthy definition of the word "queer", most of which I will quote not because I think his presentation is entirely fair, but because it will serve to introduce current issues in queer theory that do impinge on an understanding of ethos:

> first, *queer* is used as an umbrella term, an overarching way of bringing LGBTI identities under one name, both to avoid the awkwardness of alphabet soup and to offer a display of solidarity among the disparate communities the term tries to cover. Second, *queer studies* is used as a challenge to the focus on sexuality implicit in the term lesbian and gay studies [...]. Third, queerness is seen as an alternative to the conservative (read: normative) aspirations of many lesbian and gay liberation movements, movements that a) base themselves on the existence of an essence and inner identity that determines their members, and b) work toward inclusion within the accepted norms of society by claiming that gay men and lesbians aren't a danger because they hold the same values as normative society does. (p. 15)

[HG] The assertions that (1) gay men and lesbians aren't a danger and (2) "*because* they hold the same values as normative society does" are problematic for a queer ethos in that they are homonormative. When LGBTQ people assert their sameness to heterosexuals, they silence and elide very stark differences—not just in sexual orientation but also in experiences, rights, and treatment as second-class citizens. Rather than embracing and achieving normativity, queer(ness) rallies against

acceptance, particularly acceptance based on presenting the LGBTQ self as "the same as" straight people. In *The Trouble With Normal*, Warner (1999) describes this as a misstep in thinking that promotes assimilation, "like most stigmatized groups, gays and lesbians were always tempted to believe that the way to overcome stigma was to win acceptance by the dominant culture rather than to change the self-understanding of that culture" (p. 50). Rather than aligning with the status quo, we must push back against it and deflate its power.

[JH] Fryer (2010) rightly understands that there is a gulf between the language and rhetorical aims of, on the one hand, queer theorists, and, on the other hand, gay and lesbian activists. Kramer, for example, would probably not have much patience with the complex and nuanced work being done over issues of non-sovereignty and dispossession in queer theory. Queer theorists would notice (wisely) that the Kramer epigraph to this essay contains an ahistorical representation of gay identity across widely disparate cultures, times, and conditions. While I will finally be arguing that insights from queer theory have everything to do with the construction of ethos (with the construction of livable albeit provisional selves and futures), I want to do so without leapfrogging over what may be at stake in qualifying the use of queer as it is currently deployed theoretically.

In "'There is no Gomorrah': Narrative Ethics in Feminist and Queer Theory," Lynne Huffer (2001) notes that queer theory remains haunted by what I will term a trace of the ethical self: "the spectre of the ethical subject—who both marks and occludes the epistemological and ontological claims of postmodernism" (p. 9). Huffer notes that often "'queer' and [. . .] 'undecidable' have become virtually synonymous" (p. 15), [which is] a point echoed throughout queer theory. There are at least two problems with collapsing queer into undecidability, the first of which, as Huffer notes, is that "that this is a *specifically queer theoretical* claim that, for the most part, is *not* borne out in the lives of people who, whether they identify as queer or not, are continually interpellated by ideological apparatuses whose stable and oppressive referential content is all too clear" (p. 15). To cite examples that Huffer does not use, when a person on the street is assaulted by the term "queer" yelled from a passing car, the psychic and bodily threat entailed is not undecidable. And when people are denied membership in religious bodies by claims that their conduct and very being is sinful, predatory, and against the laws of god and nature—again, the psychic impact on individuals is not undecidable, nor are the intended consequences of such institutional decision-making undecidable. There is a risk, then, that equating "queer" with "undecidable" will harm some of the very human subjects that queer theory might seek to liberate. In a related fashion, Carla Freccero (2011) suggests that "queer" should also perhaps not be so variously applied as a term that it becomes empty of all charged content. With considerable politeness, Freccero argues: "If in a given analysis, queer does not intersect with, touch, or list in the direction of sex—the catchall word that here refers to gender, desire, sexuality, and perhaps anatomy—it may be that queer is not the conceptual analytic most useful to what is being described" (p. 22).

[HG] Freccero (2011) warns against the problematic results of queer's elasticity and mis/reappropriation by both queer identified and straight individuals. When queerness is distanced from queer bodies, identities, and lives, the decidability Hoogestraat speaks of is put at risk. I would agree; "queer" has become so on-trend, both in and outside the field of rhetoric and composition, that I fear there is a chance it will become too far removed from its home base—actual, material LGBTQ bodies that suffer oppression (for example, we've seen the term "intersectionality" coopted so often that it risks becoming too far distanced from the women of color it was intended to represent and make complex and visible).

3. Queer Theory and the Construction of Ethos

[JH] The above qualifiers notwithstanding, I argue that the work of three leading queer theorists—Judith Butler, Lauren Berlant, and David Halperin—is absolutely crucial to an understanding of the creations of normative and non-normative ethos in the present. Throughout her career, beginning with *Gender Trouble* (Butler 1990), Butler has argued that gender is in large part performative rather than given, constructed rather than essential, and, I argue, requiring a self-aware and performative

ethos. In *Dispossession* (Butler and Athanasiou 2013), Butler and Athena Athanasiou again discusses the inherent instability of the "'internal essence' of gender, something that is everywhere affirmed in popular and medical discourses, but proves to be, within those very same discourses, less stable and sure than it is supposed to be" (p. 129). In empirical terms, no one yet knows if there will be a gay gene, or a combination of gay genes; or a discovery in neuroscience that brains and bodies are hardwired for one identity over others. We are beginning to understand as a culture that being gay or lesbian or any of the varieties of queer is neither pathological nor the result of trauma or lack in infancy or childhood. [However], it is not currently possible to make arguments in favor of love and justice that have absolute roots in biological essence, and it is quite likely that such arguments will never be possible.

[HG] Or necessary or ethical.

[JH] For all the instability that may surround gender and sexuality, and for all of Butler's focus on the performative nature of gender and sexuality, there is another register available here, beginning early in Butler's work and continuing late where she writes powerfully about the role of the psyche and sexuality. To my mind, Butler's clearest formulation on sexuality appears in *Bodies That Matter* (Butler 1993):

> Sexuality cannot be summarily made or unmade, and it would be a mistake to associate 'constructivism' with 'the freedom of a subject to form her/his sexuality as s/he pleases'. A construction is, after all, not the same as an artifice [...]. In the domain of sexuality, these constraints [on the formation of sexuality] include the radical unthinkability of desiring otherwise, the radical unendurability of desiring otherwise, the absence of certain desires, [and] the repetitive compulsion of others. (p. 94)

For the individual subject, the force of psychic and sexual drives may manifest as being given and intractable, so much so that the subject is likely to assert the existence of a soul, or a core self, or a pre-consciousness arrangement—a claim that "surely not all identity is constructed". In the *Psychic Life of Power* (Butler 1997), Butler acknowledges as much, again privileging the level of the psyche: "Clearly there are workings of gender that do not 'show' in what is performed as gender, and to reduce the psychic workings of gender to the literal performance of gender would be a mistake" (p. 144).

Butler's recent work (in Dispossession [2013]) suggests a manner in which gay ethos (my use of the term, not hers) might be created, partly in reaction to regulatory discourse (again my term). Following Michel Foucault, Butler analyzes how "self-care and self-crafting are in some ways modes of poiesis" (p. 69). In a classical sense, "poiesis" refers to that which "'produces or leads a thing into being" (Whitehead 2003, n.p.). Butler continues:

> This opens the question of what the material is on which or which with such poeisis works. On the one hand, it is, as he [Foucault] claims, the body. But on the other hand, it is clearly those regulatory, if not disciplinary, norms that enter into the subject-formation prior to any question of reflexivity. In some ways, we are talking about how a self struggles with and against the norms through which it is formed, and so we are perhaps tracing how a certain forming of the formed takes place. (p. 69)

[HG] In Queer Phenomenology (2006), Ahmed frames this forming as a(n) re/orientation, "an approach to how bodies take shape through tending toward objects that are reachable, which are available on the bodily horizon" (p. 543). She continues, "phenomenology helps us explore how bodies are shaped by histories, which they perform in their comportment, their posture, and their gestures" (p. 552). First, through heteronormativity and the insecurity of heterosexuality, we become oriented toward the normative, constantly disciplined by others and ourselves. Yet, when we experience non-normative desire, we become (re)oriented toward something else, something we have been taught repeatedly to move away from rather than toward. As we embrace the re/orientation, we become misaligned with normative sexualities, desires, and identities: "lines are both created by being followed and are followed by being created. The lines that direct us, as lines of thought as well as lines of motion,

are in this way performative: they depend on the repetition of norms and conventions, of routes and paths taken, but they are also created as an effect of this repetition" (Ahmed *Queer*, p. 555). In deviating from the straight(ening) lines set out for us, we become deviant(s), "slanted", *out of line*. Therefore, a queer ethos is always already focused on how the subject has been created and cast(e) over time, as deviant and deviating, working to both reveal and undermine [the] restrictive forces that legitimize some subjects and erase or silence others.

[JH] In a sense, the construction of a gay ethos requires a particular attention to craft, but again in the classical sense of a poeisis that both produces and reveals. The creation of ethos in this case involves a subject becoming aware of ways, often negative, in which the subject has already been produced through cultural norms and pressures. Butler and Athanasiou (2013) thus explain the problematic role of the "I" found in such self-creating: "So much depends on how we understand the 'I' who crafts herself, since it will not be a fully agentic subject who initiates that crafting. It will be an 'I' who is already crafted, but also who is compelled to craft against her crafted condition" (*Dispossession* p. 70). The tension, then, between what is "given" and what is "made" both structures and animates the construction of individual ethos. Along similar lines, in *Sex, or the Unbearable* (2014), Berlant advocates the "project of imagining how to detach from lives that don't work and from worlds that negate the subjects that produce them" (p. 5).

For the constructions of gay ethos, a number of features emerge to complicate this process of a self-crafting, including a long-standing tradition, which is only recently starting to be remedied, that (1) either denies the possibility of a gay subject position altogether, or that (2) demonizes such a subject position in relentlessly negative terms. These denials and negations form part of the discursive construction of the gay psyche, existing prior to the emergence of individual agency or the expression of selfhood, and their existence complicates gay identity formation in even the most progressive of environments. To return for a moment to the denial of the gay subject position, Butler (1993) notes: "To the extent that homosexual attachments remain unacknowledged within normative heterosexuality, they are not merely constituted as desires that emerge and subsequently become prohibited. Rather, these are desires that are proscribed from the start" (*Bodies That Matter* p. 236). Similarly, in *Saint Foucault* (1995), Halperin argues the need to "shift homosexuality from the position of an object of power/knowledge to a position of legitimate subjective agency—from the status of that which is spoken while remaining silent to the status of that which speaks" (p. 57).

[HG] What does it mean to be legitimate? *Legitimized*? As Alexander and Rhodes (*Queered* 2012) explain, "Now that the homosexual is a much more visible subject, one who is, at times, allowed to speak, then what kind of ethos is that queer allowed? We all know the 'acceptable' queer, the 'right kind' of gay and lesbian: the f****ts and dykes that keep to themselves, that don't throw it in other people's faces, that want to be married and serve in the military—discreetly. The assimilated queer—the queer who is not queer—is the good queer." In their estimation, queer does not seek to be legitimatized while also remaining aware of the compulsion toward the legitimate.

Herein lies the issue with gay versus queer ethos, the ethos of the good gay versus the ethos of the bad queer. In a homonormative view, the non-normative subject shows itself to be less deviant than anticipated, not a social or sexual threat, palatable, acceptable. Here, non-hetero relationships repeat the norms and conventions of hetero relationships: morality, monogamy, marriage, procreation, capitalism and consumerism, citizenship and love of country. It is important to acknowledge if the desire of the rhetor is to appeal to a LGBTQ or non-LGBTQ audience, for what is valued is different, and whether or not the rhetor desires and/or values legitimatization. Also, depending on the rhetor and audience, it must be remembered that a sexuality-based ethos could texture or enrich, run alongside, or even up against another identity-based ethos, in terms of race, ability, class, education, religion, etc.

For example, in *I Am Your Sister: Black Women Organizing Across Sexualities*, Audre Lorde (1985) connects with her audience of black women through race and feminism, but her ethos doesn't stop there, since she is also a lesbian. As she draws on feminist and black ethos, she simultaneously establishes a sexuality-based ethos, knowing that her audience needs some convincing. She explains, "It is not

easy for me to speak here with you as a black lesbian feminist recognizing that some of the ways in which I identify myself make it difficult for you to hear me. But meeting across difference always requires mutual stretching and until you *can* hear me as a black lesbian feminist, our strengths will not be truly available to each other as black women" (p. 3). In an attempt to interrogate and confront the homophobia within black feminist communities, Lorde draws on racism's history, comparing being black and being lesbian, both—separately, perceived as "NOT NORMAL" (p. 4). She concludes her call, "I do not want to be tolerated, nor misnamed. I want to be recognized. I am a black lesbian, and I *am* your sister" (Lorde p. 8). Lorde expresses a desire to be recognized, validated, legitimized. At the same time, she boldly claims the very sisterhood she knows is being called into question. She seeks recognition as a lesbian while also critiquing and confronting the very system of power that discredits that sexuality. In the same way, queer does not set a guideline that one can or cannot value or seek legitimization; rather, queer examines the process and effects of legitimization and those who do the legitimizing. Recognition requires visibility, acknowledgement, and understanding of someone as they are, whereas acceptance often implies assimilation, compromise, or—according to The New Oxford American Dictionary—a "willingness to tolerate".

[JH] Since in the United States, both the news media and the popular entertainment industry have, for at least two decades now, allowed gay discourse to circulate so widely, it is easy to lose track of how both how recent this shift toward a positive language toward gay people has been, and also to gloss over how much demonization still permeates cultural discourses. Even progressive people who consider themselves perfectly comfortable with gay people and with the language of equality often do not realize, for example, that no federal law protects gay people from discrimination in employment. Nor do they necessarily realize that gay sex was decriminalized in a number of states only with the Supreme Court decision of *Lawrence versus Texas* in 2003, or that the American Psychological Association removed homosexuality as a disorder (and hence as pathological) only in 1973. At this writing (August 2014), 19 states allow gay marriage and 31 states do not.

[HG] My partner and I were *un*married June 2014. At the time, it was not *allowed*. In fact, in Michigan, it was actually two-times illegal: gay marriage was not legal, and it was also illegal for us to file for a marriage license. At this writing (October 2018), things have changed somewhat; the Supreme Court case *Obergefell versus Hodges* led to all 50 states extending marriage to same-sex couples. However, there are still attacks on LGBTQ rights (adoption bans, Muslim bans, Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] raids, trans military bans, and denials of visibility and removals of federal protections for trans individuals).

[JH] In August 2014, in 12 of the states that ban gay marriage, that ban has been overruled by either the state or federal court, but it is up for appeal. It is also not clear how the Supreme Court will rule on the matter once a case comes before the Court. I include this litany only to provide evidence of how on the most literal, regulatory level the language circulating around gay people continues to have a very recent history in the negative. The gay crafting of a self or an ethos also continues to be complicated by the circulation of institutional religious rhetoric that, to cite two major examples, considers gay people to be inherently disordered (the position of the Roman Catholic Church) or in violation of Biblical principles (the position on the Southern Baptist Convention, which is the largest Protestant denomination in the United States.) Neither institution allows self-professing gay people to become members.

Often, although not always from religious motivation, gay people are also specifically singled out as being a threat to the existing natural order or the promise of the "good life". In her dialogue with Berlant and Edelman (2013) notes the excess of this scapegoating when she argues the need to:

> engage critically the ways that heteronormativity attempts to snuff out libidinal unruliness by projecting evidence of it onto what Rubin calls 'sexual outlaws' and other populations that are deemed excessively appetitive, casting them as exemplary moral and political threats that must be framed, shamed, monitored, and vanquished if the conventional good life, with its 'productive' appetites, is going to endure [Rubin 2011, p. 131]. (*Sex, or the Unbearable* pp. 4–5)

For Berlant, and as we shall see for Halperin and others as well, any attempt to construct a gay ethos must begin with a deconstruction of what has often gone wrong with the construction of identity in general.

[HG] Warner (1999) also discusses the shame and stigma of sexuality and the conflation of moralism and morality, which results in "moral panic", the harsh regulation and judgment of people who engage in non-normative sexual desires and practices because they are seen as a threat. He explains, "sexual shame is not just a fact of life; it is also political [. . .] when a given sexual norm has such deep layers of sediment, or blankets enough territory to seem universal, the effort of wriggling out from under it can be enormous" (pp. 3, 6). In a breakaway move from sexual prohibition and repression, Warner argues for sexual autonomy and sexual dignity, "making room for new freedoms, new identities, [and] new bodies" (p. 12).

[JH] Berlant (2011) discusses, from a pedagogical standpoint, the difficulty of encouraging others to see their own identities as constructed, [and] the perceived threat entailed: "It was hard to talk about the wildness of affect and the conventionality of emotions without stepping on people's attachment to their emotional authenticity, since performing and being recognized as emotionally authentic is just as important to the modern sense of being someone as understanding one's sexual identity is" ("Starved", p. 82). An interesting opposition emerges here with the assumption that recognizing the "conventionality of emotions" involves relinquishing an individual subject's claim to "emotional authenticity", presumably with conventionality being somehow false as opposed to the truth of authenticity. Halperin (2014) explains that to argue the social constructionist nature of the world, the conventionality of it, if you will, is not to argue that an individual experience of the world, including the intuitive and other deeply felt affects and emotions, is not to argue that these features of experience are false:

> Social constructions are not false [. . .] and it is mistaken to regard social analysis as implying that our fundamental intuitions about the world are erroneous or groundless. On the contrary, they are very well grounded—it's just that they are grounded in our social existence, not in the nature of things. To search for the social grounds of subjectivity is therefore not to invalidate people's deepest feelings and intuitions or to reduce them to the status of mere illusions or delusions. It is, quite simply, to explain them. (*How to Be Gay* p. 327)

Halperin's emphasis on "*social* existence" is important here because, again from a pedagogical standpoint, it is easy to hear "social construction" in such a way to interpret "construction" (wrongly) as false, and to repress entirely the preceding "social".

Whatever else may be involved in the constructions of gay ethos, the work that emerges becomes intelligible only in the context of *communitas*, in the context of the social or the community. However, that precondition of the social, called for as we shall see by a number of theorists, makes for some awfully hard work whose rewards are not always apparent. With an admitted air of weariness, Berlant (2011) notes: "Perhaps it's that there is no *emotional* habitus for being queer and that building a world for it, being collaborative, is a lot harder than not bothering" ("Starved" p. 79). Also, calling, as Fryer (2010) does for a reformulation of identities is also not a very cheerful way in which to proceed: "To think queerly is to recognize that most of us occupy identities in bad faith and to consciously choose not to do so ourselves. Queer thinking is critical thinking through and through" (p. 6). While it is hardly consoling to be told that one, probably, occupies identities in bad faith, Fryer's elaboration of the stakes makes it sound a little better: "In these ways, queer thinking and this definition of the term *queer*, means refusing to be what others tell us to be simply because they tell us to be that way [. . .] Queer thinking also means refusing to accept who we think we are without having interrogated it simply because it seems natural to us" (p. 6).

[HG] In relation to the community and/or the social, I think this is where gay ethos diverges a bit from a (politically) queer ethos: a gay ethos might be concerned with a non-LGBTQ audience (thus looking for approval and to establish themselves as "normal" or "safe" or "the same") whereas a queer

ethos cares not about appearing or being normal, but rather about being engaged in critically analyzing the importance of normality and investigating and dismantling the notion of the normative.

In addition to being deviant, a queer ethos is *defiant*, negative, and interested in—and open to—failure. Drawing from Jack Halberstam's (2011) ideas about queer antisociality and failure, Mari Ruti (2017) describes the negativity associated with *opting out of* a hetero-based model of happiness. She explains how queers might blame themselves when they fail to achieve normative notions of happiness rather than finding fault in the flawed construction of happiness. In this vein, I'm intrigued by what it might mean to consciously and intentionally occupy identities in bad faith, whether from Halberstam's sense of queer failure and through an embrace of the queer sex(uality) and "bottom of the barrel" identities Warner (1999) advocates for in *The Trouble with Normal*.

[JH] Paradoxically, perhaps, it is in the context of the social, of competing discourses of the social, that the possibility of agency necessary for the creations of gay ethos emerges, and again pedagogy emerges as a thread at this point. In *Sexuality and the Politics of Ethos in the Writing Classroom* (Gonçalves 2005), Zan Meyer Gonçalves notes that competing discourse constructions might actually function to make some level of individual agency plausible: "though we cannot get outside of or avoid the situation of being constructed by discourses, the multiple and competing nature of these discourses creates spaces to develop an awareness, a critical perspective, that in turn makes room for individual rhetors to make some choices and thus exert agency" (p. 10). I would add to analysis that inevitably, this sorting out of competing discourses must take place in the context of *communitas*, in the context of the social. Writing about cross-cultural issues, Davis and Gross (1994) make a similar claim: "Recent cultural criticism, however, has begun to recast the concept of the personal agent into something more again to the ancient Greek sense of *ethos* as 'habit', that is, as a pattern of social practice inseparable from social relations". This shift to the social entails "a fundamentally ethical relation to society, a conception of *ethos* that foregrounds the radically constitutive nature of the social relations and precludes the Enlightenment view of the great isolated individual" or autonomous self (p. 65). I would also add, however, that while language (discourse) possesses tremendous power (more power than any of us can be aware of) both on the rational level and on the level of affect, language itself possess neither agency nor decision-making power. To argue that ethos itself is a social construction should prevent us from viewing it as natural, given, or (in any of its local or specific manifestations) supremely powerful. It is instead to open up ethos (social habit, social discourse) to further questioning. Finally, in terms of constructing a "gay ethos", it is important to understand that while language is constitutive, it need not be monolithic; the language that individuals within communities use to express or construct a gay ethos will inevitably be the language of a subculture, adjacent to a more dominant language but also, at times, subversive of that language.

[HG] What if ethos, like queerness, is also framed as an orientation and more internally driven/based rather than externally driven/based? Although Gonçalves' book is groundbreaking in the field of rhetoric and composition, offering incredible insight about how LGBTQ students and their (mostly straight) audiences are positively impacted through the Speakers Bureau—an on-campus organization where LGBTQ students share their stories to build empathy and understanding—one issue with the text is that it is largely geared toward mainstreaming LGBTQ people who seek acceptance from their audiences. Additionally, students are coached by mentors and advisors to not appear too different or threatening *as LGBTQ people*, and their speeches are reviewed before they are performed to ensure the audience's comfort. In this way, Gonçalves largely focuses on how LGBTQ students construct and perform ethos for hetero(normative) audiences rather than for queercentric audiences as Harriet Malinowitz did 10 years earlier in *Textual Orientations* (Malinowitz 1995). As I have already argued, this queer lens adds a "queer habit of mind" which always already interrogates and disrupts the need for and motivation toward validation and legitimization. This refusal both grows from and constitutes agency.

Therefore, as Alexander and Rhodes ("Queer Rhetoric" 2012) explain, "This ethos emerges not from identity—that is, identity to what you know as normal. It emerges, rather, from resistance to

others defining our reality for us. This queerness says you might as well get used to it. Don't get us wrong; this queerness does not refuse to cooperate; it very well may. But that cooperation does not come hand-in-hand with the capitulation of our right to define ourselves." And so, as I have been arguing, it is crucial then to distinguish between a gay ethos and a queer ethos:

Gay ethos: subversive by nature, which I see as being more passive/defined or delineated by external factors and forces; an effect or result.

Queer ethos: intentionally subversive, which I see as being more active/compelled by internal factors and forces; a cause or action.

4. Gay Ethos, Integrity, and the Social Construction of "Outness"

[JH] While the fields of queer theory and gay and lesbian studies do not have a substantial history, as far as I have been able to determine, of focusing on what I have been terming "gay ethos", there are two important references in the literature that refer more or less directly to ethos. Fryer (2010) advocates for the emergence of a "new field", one that centers on the *ethics of identity*, arguing "the motivating question is not primarily the traditional question of ethics, what ought we to do? Instead, the motivating question becomes, in this unethical world, this word of hatred and injustice, *who ought we to be?*" (p. xvi). The plural, who ought we to be, is by no means accidental, and coincides with an emphasis on the social. A decade or so earlier, Mark Blasius (2001) made an almost identical claim when he argued in his essay "An Ethos of Lesbian and Gay Existence" when he foregrounded the term ethos, asserting that "lesbian and gay existence should be conceived as an ethos rather than as a sexual preference or orientation, as a lifestyle, or *primarily* in collectivist terms, as a subculture, or even as a community" (p. 143). Blasius focuses almost exclusively on the political, and maintains that the "key to understanding ethos is through the lesbian and gay conceptualization of 'coming out'" (p. 144). I have deliberately delayed a reference to Blasius' work until near the end of my essay, because his terminology surrounding gay and lesbian ethos has not, as far as I have been able to determine, actually "caught on" in the fields of either gay and lesbian studies or queer theory. More importantly, given Blasius' limited focus on ethos as "coming out," I am not entirely certain that his understanding of ethos is particularly functional.

[HG] In recent years, in the fields of rhetoric and composition and rhetorical theory, there have been numerous contributions regarding LGBTQ and queer ethos and rhetorical agency, from Wallace and Alexander (2009); Alexander and Rhodes (2011, 2012); Rand (2014); and Glasby (2014).

In response to Blasius' position on ethos, I would add that *being out*, and being and *doing* queer, are very different than, although akin to, coming out. Anyone who is LGBTQ understands what it is like to decide whether to come out or out themselves in a certain moment (say when someone assumes they are in a heterosexual relationship or incorrectly reads their LGBTQ relationship) and whether or not it is worth the emotional labor to tackle heteronormativity in that instance. Other times, we come out in order to be out later on, to establish an identity and politic. For example, when I meet a new group of students at the beginning of the semester, I come out as a queer lesbian to them so I can *be* out from the first day forward. However, if I'm on the phone with the person installing my new countertops and I mention that I need to push back the date so I can paint the kitchen first and he says, "just tell your husband to do it; that's what my wife would do," I might not come out in that moment because it's not worth my time or energy. Frankly, it would be exhausting to come out every time someone made hetero assumptions about me, although it can be quite fun and subversive to do so in other moments, such as when people assume my wife and I are sisters (which actually happens a lot). In this way, then, ethos is always more than functional, as it is also *rhetorical*—situated, social, ecological, and emergent. That is to say, when and how we exert, emphasize, or sideline an ethos very much depends on the context of the specific situation, the audience at hand, and the physical and emotional well-being of the rhetor. That ethos—and the positions that we do or do not take in those

moments—are also very much informed, inspired, and influenced by similar situations that we may have faced and managed in the past.

[JH] Before closing with a very generalized and partial taxonomy of available constructions of gay ethos, I want to pause for a final argument in which I suggest that the idea that gay ethos is to be expressed primarily in "coming out" is both needlessly restrictive and also a particular social construction in its own right, with its own history. To return to the place where we began, with Larry Kramer, I wish to argue that the rhetoric that surrounding the closet was made possible, in no small part, by the rhetoric that Kramer made popular in his early work with the group known as the Gay Man's Health Crisis and later in the activism behind ACT UP. In a rhetorical analysis of Kramer's polemical rhetoric, Erin Rand (2008) quotes from Kramer's "1112 and Counting," [which was] originally published in the *New York Native* in 1983: "'I am sick of closeted gays ... There is only one thing that's going to save some of us, and this is numbers and pressure and our being perceived as united and a threat . . . Unless we can generate, visibly, numbers, masses, we are going to die'" (p. 303). Rand notices that this rhetoric essentially lacks nuance, and also does not follow the logic of a conventional argument: "In this passage, Kramer does not attempt to address the various reasons for which individuals may be unable to come out or may choose not to do so; nor does he offer evidence that coming out in large numbers is necessarily linked to empowerment or to increased AIDS research and better medical care" (p. 303). In considering the constructions of gay ethos through public rhetoric, Kramer's language would fall under a category that might be labeled a confrontational rhetoric calling for universal outness, which would then presumably lead to appropriate justice and redress.

However, both Butler (1993) and Halperin (1995) offer more sophisticated analysis of the discourse surrounding "outness", with Butler noting that being "out" is not universally available: "For whom is outness a historically available and affordable option. Is there an unmarked class character to the demand for universal 'outness'? [. . .] For whom does the term present an impossible conflict between racial, ethnic, or religious affiliation and sexual politics" (*Bodies That Matter* p. 227)? I am suggesting that involved in the constructions of a gay ethos must surely be an awareness that gay identity always co-exists with many other identities. I am also suggesting that the extent to which an individual subject chooses to align with various communities in moving through the world will be incredibly varied. To disobey the edict that one must be "out" in all contexts is not always a decision based only on fear or on lack of courage. (What appears to be a self-protective decision may in, some cases, be a decision made to protect others. In a pedagogical context, a certain reserve may also allow students to pursue productive lines of inquiry that might otherwise be foreclosed in advance.) Such selectivity—again practiced in the context of communities with which one must associate, and in the context of communities with whom one chooses to associate—actually becomes a part of the integrity involved in the creation of any ethical self, including in the self-aware constructions of ethos.

Along similar lines, Halperin (1995) notes that the process of "coming out" is inevitably often misread by others: "The closet is an impossibly contradictory place, moreover, because when you do come out, it's both too soon and too late" (*Saint Foucault* p. 35). Halperin continues with the most common rhetorical responses, the first suggesting premature speech: "Why do you have to shove it in our faces?" Variety—or, in the better circles, the supremely urbane form of feigned boredom and indifference: "Why did you imagine that we would be interested in knowing such an inconsequential and trivial fact about you?" (p. 35). [However], as Halperin explains, such self-disclosure is also "already too late, because if you had been honest, you would have come out earlier" (p. 35). What Halperin's work also puts in sharper relief is that constructions of gay ethos occur all over the place within culture, and are by no means limited to the self-fashioning or self-creating/representing of people who identify as agents with gay identities. Halperin notes: "To come out is precisely to expose oneself to a different set of dangers and constraints, to make one oneself into a convenient screen onto which straight people can project all the fantasies they routinely entertain about gay people" (p. 30). In short, a gay ethos will always be responding to a range of external representations, sometimes positive but often not, that are marshaled by non-gay subjects.

[HG] Again, I believe this is, perhaps, the most significant difference between a gay ethos and a queer ethos. A queer ethos is less concerned with non-queer/LGBTQ audiences, focusing more on other queer/LGBTQ individuals, so the rhetor's moves, appeals, strategies, and content are not concerned with establishing credibility despite/in spite of being queer/LGBTQ. There is less need to explain the marginalization and lived experience of being LGBTQ or forge a connection of "sameness" in order to build understanding and empathy, because those affects are always already present for the queer/LGBTQ audience. Hence, rhetorical choices are more internally driven rather than externally influenced. Rather than establishing ethos through more conventional and acceptable modes, a queer ethos recognizes, values, and honors alternative modes. That is to say, the queer rhetor's ethos might be established through personal experience, emotion, positionality, solidarity, trauma, social justice, queer bodies, sex, and desire, and critiques of normativity rather than through traditional notions of credibility and legitimacy that draw on coherent, formal, and distanced empirical and quantitative research.

Rather than being polished and clear, queer rhetorics are messy, ambivalent, unsure of themselves, freer, more experimental with form and genre, open ended, and raw. Queer rhetors and their texts address oppression and normativity head on rather than politely sidestepping so as not to offend or discomfort. As I explain in "Let Me Queer My Throat: Queer Rhetorics of Negotiation: Marriage Equality and Homonormativity": "rather than asking for the authority to speak, write, and be heard, we must grant ourselves the ethos to speak, without fear of being censored or censured" (Glasby "Queer Ethos" 2014).

5. Gay Ethos and a Taxonomy of Available Rhetoric

> *Why would we want to be normal? Isn't the normal what has always oppressed us?* Mari Ruti (2017, p. 1)

[JH] In closing, let me suggest an all-too-brief taxonomy of the range of rhetorics that I consider relevant to the constructions of gay ethos. In additional to Kramer's "confrontational rhetoric", which I identified early and late, there is a "minimizing rhetoric", based on the argument that the difference between gay and straight, non-normative and normative, is a relatively minor difference, akin to whether one was born with brown eyes or blue. There is also, I think, "affiliative rhetoric", [which is] practiced most often by those who have discovered that a close family member or friend identifies as gay, and therefore [become] committed to an ethos of dignity and equality in the treatment of gay people, with a stronger commitment because of a personal knowledge of and closeness to someone who is gay. Finally, there continues to be a split in rhetoric between gay and lesbian activists and queer theorists, with the former arguing for a place within existing institutions (including the traditional institutions of marriage and the military); the latter argues for a critique not only of identities, but also in existing institutions and institutional structures that are not working particularly well in the present for many people who inhabit them.

[HG] In taking this a step further, we locate a commonality among queer theorists/scholars and activists (for many of us occupy both spaces): considering how these institutions create and reward certain identities while deterring and punishing others. However, a more interesting distinction should be made between liberal LGBTQ folks and radical queer(nes)s. Rather than being integrated into the existing system, radical queer activists are concerned with dismantling these institutions and systems of power because justice cannot be retrofit in an inherently racist, (hetero)sexist, xenophobic framework.

As Mari Ruti explains in *The Ethics of Opting Out* (2017):

> Although the rhetoric of opting out of normative society—of defying the cultural status quo, refusing to play along, and living by an alternative set of rules—has always been an important trope of queer theory, the dawn of the 21st century has witnessed an escalation of the queer theoretical idiom of opting out, driving a wedge between mainstream LGBTQ

> activists fighting for full social inclusion and radicalized queer critics who see gay and lesbian normalization as a betrayal of queer politics. (p. 1)

[JH] Paisley Currah (2001) identifies the distinction here as being between "the politics of the local and the politics of deconstruction" (p. 194). Currah quotes the work of Kimberlé Crenshaw to argue: "'At this point in history, a strong case can be made that the most critical resistance strategy for disempowered groups is to occupy and defend a politics of social location rather than to vacate and destroy it'" (p. 194). The politics of the local depends on a rhetoric or an ethos that is sufficient to convince folks that disenfranchised gay people seeking fuller equality are actually quite similar to the audience whose favor they are attempting to win, inhabiting a world of shared values and institutions, and, although varied, inhabiting the same drives. There is probably a reason that Kramer, borrowing from Auden, titled his play *The Normal Heart*.

[HG] A *normal* heart implies a homonormative appeal. Of course, the "normal" heart is one worth pitying and empathizing with, since it is *almost* like a hetero heart. [However], our bodies, lives, and hearts are *queer*, not normal. [Similar to] our hearts, our experiences and access to rights and safety just are not the same as they are for (cis) hetero folks.

[JH] When I think of Kramer's choice in using that title, the deconstructionist in me remembers lines from elsewhere in the W. H. Auden (1939) poem "September 1, 1939" that also seems to me to have everything to do with the impetus of queer theory to confront how much of identity is indeed socially constructed, and in a way that not always works terribly well for anyone involved:

> All I have is a voice
> To undo the folded lie,
> The romantic lie in the brain
> Of the sensual man-in-the-street
> And the lie of Authority
> Whose buildings grope the sky:
> There is no such thing as the State
> And no one exists alone;
> Hunger allows no choice
> To the citizen or the police;
> We must love one another or die.

6. "What Is a Woman in Solitude: A Queer Woman or Man": A Case Study of Adrienne Rich's "Yom Kippur"

[JH] Adrienne Rich (1927–2012) ranks among the most important post-WWII contemporary American poets, and many of her poems might be cited as exploring the construction of gay and lesbian ethos (although she does not, to my knowledge, use the term "ethos"). For more than four decades (at least), her poetry explored issues of sexuality, ethics, and both collective and individual identity. Dated by her "1984–1985", Rich's poem "Yom Kippur" enacts a number of issues in the creation of gay and lesbian ethos, including the future-looking quality of such an ethos, its partial indeterminacy, its productive tension between the individual and the collective, and its need to provide new modes of being and language that is not necessarily readily available in more dominant cultures. The opening of the poem touches on all of these issues, including (with the poem's emphasis on solitude) the construction of an individual self (Rich 1986):

> What is a Jew in solitude?
> What would it mean not to feel lonely or afraid
> far from your own or those you have called your own?
> What is a woman in solitude: a queer woman or man?
> In the empty street, on the empty beach, in the desert
> What in this world as it is can solitude mean? (p. 75)

The questions posed here are both rhetorical and literal; [they are] rhetorical in the sense that religious identity and gender identity are always determined in the context of a community. [They are] literal in the sense that the poem continues to explore the meaning of solitude, and the speaker's drive toward it. That solitude has to do, at least in part, with the hard work of creating an identity, a subject position if you will, that is not supposed to exist. In the specific context of "Yom Kippur", that solitude also has to do with a "queer" woman or man who also has a religious identity or affiliation, a combination that much contemporary conservative rhetoric seeks to deny, positing a strict and mutually exclusive opposition between—on the one hand—religious identity, and—on the other hand—gay or "queer" identity.

[HG] Rich's poem is indeed queer in that it evokes intersectionality and the complicatedness of being both Jewish and queer, which are two identities that have suffered immeasurable injustice and oppression—each on their own and together during the Holocaust and, sadly, even still today.

[JH] Rich considerably ups the stakes in this debate when she narrates an act of historical violence, an event that (in part) motivated the poem:

> [. . .] Jew who has turned her back/on midrash and mitzvah (yet wears the chai on a thong between her breasts) hiking alone/found with a swastika carved in her back at the foot of the cliffs (did she die as a queer or/as a Jew?) (p. 77)

In this context, "chai" is the Hebrew word for "life," a clearly recognized symbol from Judaism. Solitude shifts here to include not just the creation of a non-standard identity, but also the physical risks that the expression of that identity still carry. While Rich's example may seem extreme, it is a necessary reminder that, even into the present, a certain element of fear persists on the psychic level behind any construction or representation of a gay ethos.

If Rich's poem acknowledges that fear, it also embodies a future hope for broader, more inclusive understandings of the construction of gender and sexual identity. The poem looks forward, I think, to the continuing construction of a queer ethos:

> When we who refuse to be women and men as women and men are chartered, tell our stories of/solitude spent in multitude / in that world as it may be, newborn and haunted, what will solitude mean? (p. 78)

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Editorial

From Postmodernism to Posthumanism: Theorizing Ethos in an Age of Pandemic

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Abstract: This essay expands on the previous discussion, "Positioning Ethos" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018), which outlined a theory of ethos for the 21st century. There, my coauthor and I observed the dialectic between ethics and ethotics, grounding subjectivity within a sociology of rhetoric: Contemporary ethos, thus, explores the physical embodiment (with its "markers of identity"), positionality, and "cultural dress" of speakers. There as here, we looked to Heidegger for an expanded definition, one reaching beyond a speaker's self-image to bring all aspects of our lifeworld—cultural, technological, biological, planetary—into a dynamic unity. And, there as here, we observed the dialectic between speaker and audience: Within this transactional model, ethos marks the "space between" speaker and audience—a socially- and linguistically-constructed meeting ground (or, perhaps better, playground) where meanings can be negotiated. Crucial to this transactional model is the *skeptron*, as described by Bourdieu: To possess the *skeptron* is to claim the cultural authority, expertise, trust, and means to speak and to be heard—indeed, *to be seen*—in one's speaking. To our previous essay's ethics and ethotics, this present essay adds the dialectic arising between *bios* and *technê*. We "dwell" in memory, in language, in history, in culture: All speakers in all cultural moments can claim as much. But, writing in an age of postmodernism, we acknowledge the heightened roles of technology, "expert systems," and urbanization in our lifeworld today. What we had described as the cultural "habitus" of ethos is here supplemented by an ethos of scientific technoculture; similarly, what we had described as the existentialist "embodied self" is here supplemented by the postmodern—indeed, posthuman—ethos of the cyborg, a biotechnic "assemblage" part cybernetic machine and part living organism, simultaneously personal and collective in identity. This posthuman con/fusion of *bios* and *technê* is not a transcendence of (human) nature; rather, it acknowledges our immersion within an interspecies biology while expanding our habitus from the *polis* to the planet. It's *these* aspects of our lifeworld—insterspecies biology, bodily health as self-identity, postmodern technology, and urban lifestyle—that COVID-19 pressures and threatens today. In the current struggle between science-based medicine and conservative politics, the *skeptron* assumes life-and-death importance: Who speaks on behalf of medical science, the coronavirus victim, and community health?

Keywords: actant; cyborg; COVID-19; deep ecology; ethos; habitus; pandemic; posthumanism; postmodernism; *skeptron*; technoculture; Braidotti; Bourdieu; Haraway; Heidegger; Latour

1. Introduction

> I live at the tail end of bio-power, that is to say amidst the relentless necro-political consumption of all that lives. I am committed to starting from this, not from a nostalgic re-invention of an all-inclusive transcendental model, a romanticized margin or some holistic ideal. I want to think from here and now, . . . from missing seeds and dying species. But also, simultaneously and without contradiction, from the staggering, unexpected and relentlessly generative ways in which life, as *bios* and as *zoe*, keeps on fighting back.
>
> —Rosi Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Braidotti 2013, pp. 194–95)

> But should we in turn wish to "look into the future" and form an image of what it will be, there is one childish error we must avoid: *to base the man of the future on what we are now*, simply granting him a greater quantity of mechanical means and appliances.
>
> —Henri Lefebvre, *Critique of Everyday Life* (Lefebvre 2014, p. 246; emphasis added)

> It is not absurd to suppose that the extermination of man begins with the extermination of man's germs. One has only to consider the human being himself, complete with his emotions, his passions, his laughter, his sex and his secretions, to conclude that man is nothing but a dirty little germ—an irrational virus marring a universe of transparency.
>
> —Jean Baudrillard, "Prophylaxis and Virulence" (Baudrillard 2000, p. 34)

In "Positioning Ethos in/for the Twenty-First Century"—intended to introduce the *Humanities* special issue, *Histories of Ethos*—my co-author and I surveyed the "current state of theory" on ethos while seeking "to predict, and promote, discursive practices that will carry ethos into a hopeful future" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 1). As we noted back then, *we live in an age of ethos*, wherein "issues of 'trust,' expertise, and 'charismatic authority' have largely supplanted Enlightenment logos or 'good reasons' as the ground of popular discourse" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 3).[1] A mere two years have passed, but much has changed socially, politically, economically, ecologically—and not just in the United States but globally, though the U.S. has become the world's "leader" in COVID-19 infection-rates and death-rates, with little respite in sight. The "hopeful future" that we had called for has erupted into a full-blown crisis of ethos: that is, a crisis of (political) "trust" *vs*. (scientific) "expertise" in combatting pandemic. A deepening partisan divide, the intensifying "culture wars" (enflamed by nationalist "identity politics"), the obfuscation of "fake news," a U.S. president's discounting of science in policymaking and, most crucial at this time, an administration's *refusal to let its scientists speak* has put the American people into a state of panic, paralysis, and confusion.

We offer this present essay as a bookend-epilogue to "Positioning Ethos," focusing on themes that our prior essay had merely hinted at. Increasingly urbanized, the postmodern lifeworld is marked by speed in travel/communication within "built space" (that is, as reassembled architectural, cultural, and technological "dwelling places"). We take habitus, thus, to include the totality of the lifeworld. Here as before, we assert the moral agency of "the speaking subject," which we defined existentially as an embodied consciousness clothed in culture and "made visible" in language (specifically, within the structures of narrative). At the same time, we acknowledge arguments for a "decentered" and "dispersed" ethos, since "the speaking subject" cannot be separated from the structures of biological-terrestrial life and increasingly urbanized technoculture.

Our task in this epilogue to extend our habitus beyond the borders described in "Positioning Ethos," highlighting components of the lifeworld that Enlightenment humanism has placed *outside of ethos*: specifically, the realms of zoological nature and machine technology. The cogency of arguments for the humanimal and the cyborg lead us to invite these posthuman *ethoi* into an expanded conversation over the futures of ethos in/for the 21st century.

The human habitus cannot be reduced to psychology, sociology, and language (narrative specifically). To the extent that ethos defines our "dwelling places" (as reflected in the Latin *habitus*), we need to acknowledge the "where" and the "how" and the "with whom" of our dwelling. We remain committed to the Foucauldian "care of self," but carry that commitment into the realms of biology, ecology, and technoculture. It's not the surge in "identity politics" across conservative swaths of the United States and Europe that occasions this piece; rather, it's the surge of the novel coronavirus and the crisis that it places on our identities—not just as individuals, but as a species. More emphatically than ever, we bind ethos to an "ethic of care" attentive to the needs of both self and other, conjoined.

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[1] Though I'll occasionally write in first-person singular, this essay continues my intellectual collaboration with Craig A. Meyer. I write on his behalf: hence the "we" of this essay.

A thesis of this essay is that ethos continues to evolve, emerging from postmodernism into something else: For the nonce, we'll call that something else posthumanism. Such a claim does not invalidate the existential premises of our previous essay; it does suggest that the dominant practices today in the "care of self" ought to be read in the context of emerging cultural-historical forces, particularly in technoscience. The lifeworld as described in our previous essay looked to the Heideggerian *Geviert*, the "fourfold" of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities. In a posthumanist lifeworld, the "fourfold" expands in its (ecological) meanings and (technological) application.

Zoos and *bios* conjoined: Such is the posthuman ethos, which invokes the biological/ecological community of "companion species" that compose our lifeworld, *without which we cannot exist*. The COVID-19 viral presence, though invasive in our world, changes our self-perception: no longer a single macro-organism, we are in fact an "assemblage" of microorganisms, upon which life depends absolutely. We are at war with a powerful string of genetic *information*—a piece of biological coding that our own human species has never met—hence the "novel" in the name, novel coronavirus. Its sudden emergence and onslaught compels us to look more closely at segments of the lifeworld that our previous discussion had largely ignored. Whereas our previous discussion acknowledged the ethotic realms of the social, existential, and linguistic, this present essay looks to biological nature and to posthumanist technoculture—realms that, increasingly, condition our lifeworld.

Over the space of months, our lifeworld and lifestyles have been radically disrupted, perhaps to the point of redefining them (*and us* along with them), inuring us to something we'll eventually learn to call "the new normal." Under such circumstances, it would be naïve to think that ethos, both in theory and in praxis, remains unaffected. Even as the U.S. government founders, we observe the daily news cycle and its coverage of the war between science—medical technology specifically—and "avenging nature." COVID-19 occasions this revisiting of our prior essay. Contemporary philosophy (particularly the philosophy of science) and posthumanist ecology have already anticipated the effects of pandemic upon our lifeworld and, hence, upon our deployments of ethos. Following a brief summary of our initial argument, I outline the ecological and technological implications of ethos "in an age of pandemic." For our sudden confrontation with COVID-19 compels us to rethink our very humanness in terms of posthumanist technoculture. Having "co-evolved with technology and other life forms" (Nayar 2014, *Posthumanism*, p. 72), the human body is coming to be seen, not as structure, but as process.[2] And whereas ethos is culturally situated or "positioned" in postmodernism, the posthumanist ethos is "decentered"—alternatively augmented through biotechnology and dispersed within an interspecies biology. Before turning to the viral impact upon our habitus,[3] we must survey these fields. (Even in the midst of plague, scholarship proceeds.) And I must beg the reader's indulgence, given the circuitous paths of the analysis following. I trust that, in the end, the essay's twists and turns will converge.

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[2] As Pramod K. Nayar notes, the posthuman "is discussed as a process of becoming through new connections and mergers between species, bodies, functions and technologies" (Nayar 2014, *Posthumanism*, pp. 30–31). Along with our interspecies co-evolution, posthumanist theory sees the human as "symbiotic with" other species. As Nayar writes, "We are companion species with numerous other species, most of which we are unaware of. Posthumanism argues a case for companion species, for multispecies citizenship" (Nayar 2014, *Posthumanism*, p. 126).

[3] As Pierre Bourdieu deploys the term, habitus describes "a socialized subjectivity" and "the social embodied" (Maton 2014, "Habitus," pp. 52–53):

> [I]t is, in other words, internalized structure, the objective made subjective. It is also how the personal comes to play a role in the social—the dispositions of the habitus underlie our actions that in turn contribute to social structures. Habitus thereby brings together both objective social structure and subjective personal experiences, expressing, as Bourdieu put it, "the dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality." (Maton 2014, "Habitus," pp. 52–53)

Considerations of biology and ecology must surely complicate this dialectic. As Rosi Braidotti writes, "Becoming-posthuman consequently is a process of redefining one's sense of attachment and connection to a shared world, a territorial space: urban, social, psychic, ecological, planetary as it may be" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 193).

2. From ἦθος to ἤθεα: Character and/as "Dwelling"

> We begin with a working definition provided by Jim W. Corder (1929–1998). Ethos, Corder writes, is "character as it emerges in language" (Corder 1978, "Varieties," p. 2). By "character," we assume both personhood and persona—that is, the self's expressive self-identity as well as its social presentation or mask. There is a double movement, both inward and outward, in this term, which introjects how one "sees" oneself, as well as projects how one "is seen" by others. One hopes for sincerity, authenticity, and self-consistency in this doubled, inside/ outside "showing-forth" of character. When inside and outside match, one can speak of ethos as self-revelation: "What you see is what you get." But there can be a slippage or disjunction between the person and persona—again, between the inner and the outer versions of self. In that case, one can speak of ethos as performance. To this inside/outside dialectic, let us add considerations of culture. Character "emerges," but does so within a distinctive "cultural dress," one that presents itself—in effect, "clothes itself"—within markers of identity/difference (ethnicity, gender, social status, regional accent, etc.). Michel Foucault (1926–1984) gives the Athenian ethos as illustration: "Ethos was the deportment and the way to behave. It was the subject's mode of being and *a certain manner of acting visible to others*. One's ethos was seen by his dress, by his bearing, by his gait, by the poise with which he reacts to events, etc." (Foucault 1988, "Ethic of Care," p. 6; emphasis added). Ethos, in this sense, displays cultural "markers," such that the speaker's task is "to open a space" through language that allows the self to be heard and, saliently, *to be seen*.
>
> —James S. Baumlin and Craig A. Meyer,
> "Positioning Ethos"(Baumlin and Meyer 2018, p. 6)

We have not changed our minds. As described in the epigraph above, the binary between an existentialist ethos-as-revealed and a social-constructionist ethos-as performed still holds. Along with a speaker's projected self-image and "cultural dress," ethos identifies the ritualized *modes of address* "that confer authority upon those who would 'speak on behalf' of some group—some institution, organization, party, or class interest" (Baumlin and Meyer, "Positioning," p. 7).[4] Ours remains a transactional model, treating ethos as a dialectic engaging speakers and audiences conjointly.[5] And we embrace the expansion of classical-Aristotelian ethos as outlined by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) in his "Letter on Humanism" (1949)—the subject to which we now turn.

Within the Aristotelian *ἦθος* or ethos-as-character, Heidegger uncovers the more primal, Heraclitean *ἤθεα* or ethos-as-dwelling place:

> The saying of Heraclitus (Fragment 119) goes: *ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων*. This is usually translated, "A man's character is his daimon." This translation thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one. *ἦθος* means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which

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[4] For "groups need representation," notes Karl Maton, "since they cannot speak *as a group*. They therefore invest their moral authority in … individuals who, *thus consecrated*, are the voice 'of the people'—a claim to which they give tacit assent" (Maton 2014, "Habitus," p. 56; emphasis added).

[5] Ethos, as Karen Burke LeFevre writes, "appears in that socially created space, in the 'between,' the point of intersection between speaker or writer and listener or reader" (LeFevre 1987, *Invention*, p. 46). Susan C. Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds elaborate:

> [T]he rhetorical practice of *êthos* marks the position of the self, to the admittedly limited extent that it can be articulated by the author, making no claim that this speaking self is completely known or stable. Appearing "in that socially constructed space, in the "between," the point of intersection between speaker or writer and listener or reader" [LeFevre 1987, *Invention*, pp. 45–46], *êthos* is the admission of a standpoint, with the understanding that other standpoints exist and that they change over time. (Jarratt and Reynolds 1994, "Splitting Image," p. 53)

> the human being dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to the essence of the human being . . . to appear. (Heidegger 1998, "Letter," p. 269)

Heidegger's translation is "modern," presumably, in that invokes human being "as an embodied existence in-the-world, and not as an abstraction belonging to metaphysics" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 13). As *Dasein* or Being-in-the-world (Heideggerian terms for our humanness), we are called to bear witness to the Truth of Being and to dwell within that space wherein our humanness finds itself "thrown." Into this unified lifeworld—the Heideggerian *Geviert* or "fourfold" of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities—"we are called by conscience to serve the world as witness, companion, and caretaker" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 13). As we go on to note,

> The Heideggerian model appeals to us for many reasons, not least of which is the ethical claims that it makes upon the speaker. One speaks not simply to declare one's "dwelling place," nor simply to share that dwelling, but also *to care* for it. Situated within a self/other dialectic, the act of self-expression becomes an invitation *to dwell with* others, "to open a space," by means of language, where self and other "can dwell and feel at home" (Hyde 2004, "Introduction," p. xxi). It is an invitation to hospitality.
>
> As an expansion upon Aristotelian *eunoia*, it's the Heideggerian attitude of caring that leads us into a new "New Rhetoric," one suited to the pluralist, post-Enlightenment, multiculturalist discourse of our age.[6] (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 14)

Concomitantly, we note Heidegger's failure to acknowledge cultural difference and the "positionality" or situatedeness inherent in rhetoric. Though his discussion continues to serve ethos theory, it does so through misprision: that is, through a critical misreading (unconscious in many cases) and misapplication of his work. For Heidegger, the ethos-as-dwelling is *Being*, as opposed to the "beings" that constitute nations, ethnicities, classes, and cultures. This theme repeats itself in our later discussions of ethos in ecology and technoscience: We begin with Heidegger but must reach beyond him to articulate models of ethos adequate to the 21st century.

3. From ἦθεα to Γαῖα: Planetary Ethos and/as "Dwelling-Together"

> In this introduction to *Histories of Ethos*, we have made a series of claims that individual essays will put to the test. Some will explore the "cultural dress," some the "modes of address," by means of which individuals situate themselves within communities in place and time. Competing versions of ethos, both in theory and in praxis, will be applied. The role of narrative in identity-formation—both individually and culturally—will be a recurring motif. And, while individual essays might explore only a portion of the spacious field of ethos within any culture at any time, we assume that any claim regarding ethos can be

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[6] A quick primer may be in order. In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle outlines three *pisteis* or modes of "artistic proof" (1.2.2.), these being logos (an offering of "good reasons"), pathos (an appeal to an audience's emotions), and ethos (an appeal for an audience's trust). Ethos itself consists of three components, as Aristotle observes: these are "practical wisdom [*phronesis*] and virtue [*arete*] and goodwill [*eunoia*]; for speakers make mistakes in what they say or advise through [failure to exhibit] either all or one of these . . . . Therefore, a person seeming to have all these qualities is necessarily persuasive to the hearers" (Aristotle 1991, *Rhetoric* 2.5.7; 1378a). Following the transactional model outlined in "Positioning Ethos," we note the intersection of these terms:

> In fact, *phronesis* refers to the logos-aspect of ethos, *eunoia* to the pathos-aspect, and arete to ethos or "moral character" per se. We can add that logos—"rational appeal" or the use of "good reasons"—originates with/in the rhetor, though audiences are left to judge its claims and to respond accordingly. And whereas pathos—an appeal to the audience's *pathe* or emotions—is raised by means of a rhetor's appeals, it's with/in the audience that hope or fear or outrage or desire is raised. In this sense, the Aristotelian logos "belongs to" the rhetor and is judged by the audience, while pathos "belongs to" the audience and is elicited by the rhetor. In contrast, ethos "lies between" the speaker and audience: belonging to neither wholly, the rhetor's ethos is built out of a speaker-audience interaction. (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 10)

> turned, dialectically, into its "enabling other." No premise or claim has been banished or disallowed from this collection. Hence, we affirm that ethos can be revealed *or* constructed; that it can pre-exist a speaker's discourse *or* be produced within (or by means of) discourse; that it can ally itself with, *or* it can subvert, logos or pathos. If it can heal and liberate, surely it can be used to harm. Self necessarily posits an other; identity implies difference. Narratives can be "fixed" within a culture's folk pathways and traditions; but these can also be revisited, reinterpreted, reshaped, retold. Ethos can be carried into new regions. With smart technologies, ethos enters the realm of the artificially-intelligent nonhuman—the cyborg. Even the "deep ecology" movement posits a "planetary ethos."
>
> —James S. Baumlin and Craig A. Meyer, "Positioning Ethos"(Baumlin and Meyer 2018, p. 21)

I take the passage above from the conclusion of our previous essay, to show that its endpoint marks the current essay's starting point. As with our prior discussion of ethos-as-haunt, we begin with Heidegger, whose description of technology has deep implications for ecology. His essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" (1954), "defined the field for many years" (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, p. 2), though the "field" Kaplan cites—the philosophy of science—continues to evolve in ways only partially anticipated by Heidegger.

True to his phenomenology, Heidegger treats technology as a mode of *poiesis*, a means of revealing the Truth of Being.[7] He writes, "We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is. Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of technology belong together" (Heidegger 2009, "Question," p. 9). Heidegger elaborates:

> We are questioning concerning technology, and we have arrived now at *alētheia*, at revealing. What has the essence of technology to do with revealing? The answer: everything. For every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing . . . . Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, that is, of truth. (Heidegger 2009, "Question," p. 12)

But this "realm of revealing" is active upon and transformative of material nature:

> The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end. (Heidegger 2009, "Question," p. 14)

With this last assertion, Heidegger works toward one of the more problematic of his terms, that of nature as *Bestand* or "standing-reserve." For nature—the "stuff" that technology works upon in "unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching"—is a generalized energy held "in reserve," though meant for unleashing and use: "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve" (Heidegger 2009, "Question," p. 14).

Written in the postwar years after Hiroshima, Heidegger's essay informed the dialectic between ecology and technology that continues to this day. Indeed, the terms invoke each other (much as,

[7] As we shall see, this revealing (or "bringing into presence") is the aim and central activity of Heideggerian phenomenology: It is an *alētheia* or "unconcealment" of Being within the space of language.

in the human realm, "the individual" invokes "the social," and *vice versa*). The material products of technology-as-making (*poiesis*) are shaped from the "stuff" of biological and chemical nature; in return, technology works on that same "stuff," releasing the energy that had been held in "standing-reserve." And what of humanity? As a biological species belonging to nature, are we not subject to this same "setting-upon"? "Even humans," David M. Kaplan notes, "the supposed masters of technology, are challenged and ordered into standing-reserve as 'human resources'" (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, p. 2).[8] Taking our cue from Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), we resist Heidegger's "technological rationality" as a mode of political control capable of "colonizing everyday life, robbing individuals of freedom and individuality by imposing technological imperatives, rules, and structures upon their thought and behavior" (Marcuse 1991, "Introduction," Kindle location 93).[9] But we're not through with Heidegger; rather, we turn to his earlier lecture, "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951). Though lesser known than his "Question Concerning Technology," the two ought to be read dialogically, in that the former claims to conserve what the latter would consume.

"We do not dwell because we have built," Heidegger declares, "but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, because we are *dwellers*" (Heidegger 1978, "Building," p. 326; emphasis in original). "But in what," he goes on to ask, "does the essence of dwelling consist?" (p. 326). As is so often the case, Heidegger develops his answer etymologically: "The old Saxon *wuon* . . . mean[s] to remain, to stay in a place. But the Gothic *wunian* says more distinctly how this remaining is experienced. *Wunian* means to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, *Friede*, means the free, das *Frye*; and *fry* means preserved from harm and . . . safeguarded" (Heidegger 1978, "Building," pp. 326–27). Heidegger continues:

> To free actually means to spare . . . . [Sparing] takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own essence, when we return it specifically to its essential being, when we "free" it in the proper sense of the word into a preserve of peace. To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its essence. *The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing*. (Heidegger 1978, "Building," pp. 326–27; emphasis in original)

Over-against Heideggerian *Bestand* is this stress upon *schonen* or "sparing," with its implicit commitment to ecology. "The basic character of dwelling," says Heidegger, "is to spare, to preserve. Mortals dwell in the way they preserve the fourfold in its essential being, its presencing . . . . Mortals dwell in that they save the earth . . . . To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it" (Heidegger 1978, "Building," p. 328).

Will the real Heidegger please stand up? More than rhetorical, such a question is rendered moot, since we'll be reading his essay on technology *through* his lecture on ecology. As the latter notes, "we build . . . because we dwell, that is, because we are *dwellers*." Here, surely, his "Letter on Humanism" (1949) comes to mind, wherein ethos detours through *ἦθεα* or "dwelling place" (Heidegger 1998, "Letter," p. 269): *Such is the human ethos*, as given by Heidegger. And if the technologies of "building" (for which nature subsists as a "standing-reserve") are subordinated to our essential needs in "dwelling," then our humane task—the very task that grants us ethos, defining us as "dwellers"—is "to save the earth," taking it "under our care" (Heidegger 1978, "Building," pp. 328–29). In so doing, Heidegger adds, we "look after the fourfold in its essence" (p. 329). Compared to postmodernist technoculture, the Heideggerian *Geviert* or "fourfold" of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities invokes a seemingly archaic

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[8] As Kaplan notes, "Heidegger calls this way of revealing the world 'enframing' (*Gestell*) . . . a way of ordering people to see the world (and each other) as a mere stockpile of resources to be manipulated. Enframing happens both in us and in the world; it is the revelation of being (human beings and nature) as standing-reserve" (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, p. 2).

[9] See (Marcuse 1991, *One-Dimensional Man*, pp. 147–73).

cosmology. Its significance, for our purposes, rests in its assertion of unity as a *dwelling-together*.[10] Post-Heideggerian in what follows, we find our habitus in a dwelling-together and a belonging-together that grants ethos to all that dwells on earth and in sky—and even, in some sense, to the planet itself.[11]

With this speculation upon a "planetary ethos" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 22), we have reached the endpoint of our prior essay. Clearly, the "deep ecology" movement is foreshadowed by Heidegger's ethics of "caring for" and "sparing" the planet.[12] With his "Gaia hypothesis," James Lovelock goes further in proposing that the "whole earth," in all its living and nonliving components, functions as if constituting a single, unified, self-regulating organism (Lovelock 2000, *Gaia*, pp. x–xii).[13] First published in 1979, his *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth* sought to measure the impact of human technology upon "planetary homeostasis":

> [W]e have assumed that the Gaian world evolves through Darwinian natural selection, its goal being the maintenance of conditions favourable for life in all circumstances, including variations in output from the sun and from the planet's own interior. We have in addition made the assumption that from its origin the human species has been as much a part of Gaia as have all other species and that, like them, it has acted unconsciously in the process of planetary homoeostasis. However, in the past few hundred years our species, together with its dependent crops and livestock, has grown in numbers to occupy a substantial proportion of the total biomass. At the same time the proportion of energy, information, and raw materials which we use has grown at an even faster rate through the magnifying effect of technology. It therefore seems important in the context of Gaia to ask: "What has been the effect of all or any of these recent developments? Is technological man still a part of Gaia or are we in some or in many ways alienated from her?" (Lovelock 2000, *Gaia*, pp. 119–20)

While seeming to recapitulate the Heideggerian *Bestand*—that "standing-reserve" within nature, which falls to human management and use—Lovelock's Gaia introduces a principle of planetary "health" into ecology:

> The larger the proportion of the Earth's biomass occupied by mankind and the animals and crops required to nourish us, the more involved we become in the transfer of solar and other energy throughout the entire system. As the transfer of power to our species proceeds, our responsibility for maintaining planetary homoeostasis grows with it, whether we are conscious of the fact or not. Each time we significantly alter part of some natural process of regulation or introduce some new source of energy or information, we are increasing the probability that one of these changes will weaken the stability of the entire system, by cutting down the variety of response. (Lovelock 2000, *Gaia*, p. 123)

By analogy with biological life, planetary ecology can be studied as a delicately balanced (and, with global warming, increasingly threatened) homeostasis (Lovelock 2006).

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[10] Note the expansiveness of these paired terms, where "earth" represents the planet and its geology, while 'sky' represents the material universe above; similarly, "divinities" invokes all that belongs to deathless spirit, while "mortals" invokes all of biological life, human and otherwise, whose destiny is death.

[11] For posthumanist philosophy, the "presencing" that Heidegger describes becomes a "co-presence, that is to say the simultaneity of being in the world together," which defines the ethics of "interaction with both human and non-human others" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 163).

[12] As Arne Naess describes it, "deep ecology" rejects "shallow environmentalism" for being "simply an extension of the anthropocentric Western paradigm" of land use (Naess 1973, "Shallow," p. 96), wherein "the reasons for preserving wilderness or biodiversity are inevitably couched in terms of human welfare" (Keller 1997, "Gleaning," p. 140). David Keller elaborates: "Shallow environmentalism falls short of valuing nonhumans apart from their use-value. Deep Ecology, in contrast, asserts that all organisms have intrinsic value. In this way Deep Ecology is fundamentally nonanthropocentric" (Keller 1997, "Gleaning," p. 140).

[13] The "as if" in the sentence above marks the divide between popular *vs.* scientistic responses to Lovelock: for scientists like Stephen Jay Gould, Gaia is "a metaphor, not a mechanism" (Gould 1991, *Bully*, p. 339)—and certainly not a super-organism with its own homeostatic-metabolic processes, as proponents of hylozoism (or material vitalism) would claim. We're content to name the planet our habitus, though we respect the cultural traditions that name our planet, animistically, "Mother Earth."

We make this point here, since it marks an intellectual starting point of posthumanist thought. As Rosi Braidotti notes, the "geo-centred perspectives" of posthumanism reject human "species supremacy" while "inflict[ing] a blow to any lingering notion of human nature, *anthropos* and *bios*, as categorically distinct from the life of animals and non-humans, or *zoe*. What comes to the fore instead is a nature–culture continuum in the very embodied structure of the extended self" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 65)—"extended," that is, by virtue of its species-interdependency and shared fate. And this "change of location of humans from mere biological to geological agents calls for recompositions of both subjectivity and community" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 83). Though hers is a radical redefinition of "the category of the human," Braidotti deserves a fair hearing.

As our prior essay engaged "the individual" and "the social" in a dialectic, so this current essay expands ethos into realms of biology and technology—terms that, once again, engage one another dialectically. We turn to postmodern technoscience first, given its impact on our urbanized, postmodern habitus.

4. Urban Ethos and/as Postmodern Technoculture

> Genetically recombined plants, animals and vegetables proliferate alongside computer and other viruses, while unmanned flying and ground armed vehicles confront us with new ways of dying. Humanity is re-created as a negative category, held together by shared vulnerability and the spectre of extinction, but also struck down by new and old epidemics, in endless "new" wars, detention camps and refugee exodus. The appeals for new forms of cosmopolitan relations or a global ethos are often answered by the homicidal acts of the likes of Pekka Eric Auvinen or Anders Behring Breivik.
>
> —Rosi Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Braidotti 2013, p. 187)

> During the mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in space. Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned. Rapidly, we approach the final phase of the extensions of man—the technological simulation of consciousness, when the creative process of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the whole of human society, much as we have already extended our senses and our nerves by the various media.
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> —Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (McLuhan 2003, pp. 3–4)

Prophet of postmodernity, Marshall McLuhan (1911–1980) was among the first to proclaim the human-machine interface, the fact that "all technologies are extensions of our physical and nervous systems to increase power and speed" (McLuhan 2003, *Understanding*, 98). And, in this new age—which is already upon us, though its implications and applications continue to emerge—our human-social relations change, as well: For "electricity . . . decentralizes. It is like the difference between a railway system and an electric grid system: the one requires railheads and big urban centers. Electric power, equally available in the farmhouse and the Executive Suite, permits any place to be a center" (McLuhan 2003, *Understanding*, p. 39). Hence, the "center-margin structure" of 20th century geopolitical mapping is "experiencing an instantaneous reassembling of all its mechanized bits into an organic whole. This is the new world of the global village" (McLuhan 2003, *Understanding*, p. 101). Of course, the "global village" resides within a "global economy," whose "techno-scientific structure" is built out of "different and previously differentiated branches of technology, notably the four horsemen of the posthuman apocalypse: nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 59).

In saying that our lifeworld remains in transit from "modern" to "late modern" or "postmodern" and beyond, we're compelled to police our terms. In hazarding a response, we look to four markers of modernity, each implicated in technology. The modern habitus is *urbanized*, with housing, businesses, entertainments, workplaces, schools, government offices, and other services concentrated into major

city centers encircled by suburbs and exurbs; it is *industrialized*, connected to (and participating in) a regional, national, global production-economy; it is integrated into *networks of transportation* carrying goods (and people) quickly and efficiently across expanses of land, sea, and air; and it is integrated into *networks of communication* carrying information accurately and instantaneously across the globe. And all rests in an abundant, accessible *supply of energy*. Out of these markers—urbanization, industrialization, transportation, and communication, with energy as an underlying resource (very specifically a "standing-reserve")—we have built our lifeworlds.[14]

In transiting from modern to "late modern" or "postmodern" technoculture, *it's the city* (as well as its inhabitant) that has evolved, changing demographically as well as economically.[15] The urban habitus opens up lifestyle choices profoundly impactful upon self-image and identity.[16] At its most optimistic, postmodernism offers "a new strength wrought by prosthetics or genetic avant gardism, a new reach of human movement produced by both long distance and cyber-transport, a new pleasure brought by infinitely proliferating entertainment technology, and a new social life offered by more efficient management of resources and time" (Mansfield 2000, *Subjectivity*, Kindle locations 2689–2692).[17] "Because of the 'openness' of social life today, the pluralization of contexts of action and the diversity of 'authorities' … [l]ifestyle choice is increasingly important in the constitution of self-identity" (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 5). Anthony Giddens elaborates:

> Each of us not only "has," but *lives* a biography reflexively organized in terms of flows of social and psychological information about possible ways of life . . . . "How shall I live?" has to be answered in day-to-day decisions about how to behave, what to wear and what to eat—and many other things—as well as interpreted within the temporal unfolding of self-identity. (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 14)

Being "post-traditional" (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 14), the contemporary urban ethos need no longer rest in cultural identifications and social-ritual practices; in some cases, these can themselves be seen as aspects of lifestyle and its choices.

The postmodern habitus, for good or ill, is the city. But we should add a further warning over vocabulary: since the late 20th century, we can no longer speak of "urban" and "rural" as clearly defined, stable categories. Paul James points to the problem. While cities globally "have come to

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[14] This and several paragraphs following draw materials from three essays: "On the Confluence of Technology, Regional Economy, and Culture" (Baumlin 2019a), "In Transit to Postmodernity" (Baumlin 2019b), and "The Ozarks: Sharing the Ecological Message" (Baumlin and Edgar 2018). What I had applied regionally to the Ozarks (where I live and teach) is in this present essay applied nationally and, indeed, globally.

[15] "It is silly," writes Jane Jacobs, "to try to deny the fact that we Americans are a city people, living in a city economy" (Jacobs 1961, *Death*, p. 200). Though published in 1961, Jacobs's *Death and Life of Great American Cities* remains an influential textbook in urban planning.

[16] "Lifestyle," writes Anthony Giddens, "is not a term which has much applicability to traditional cultures, because it implies choice within plurality of possible options, and is 'adopted' rather than 'handed down'" (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 81). He continues:

> Lifestyles are routinized practices, the routines incorporated into habits of dress, eating, modes of acting and favored *milieux* for encountering others; but the routines followed are reflexively open to change in the light of the mobile nature of self-identity. Each of the small decisions a person makes every day … are decisions not only about how to act but who to be. The more post-traditional the settings in which an individual moves, the more lifestyle concerns the very core of self-identity, its making and remaking. (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 81)

[17] We should note that, in its affluence, the urban habitus (as described herein) belongs to the Global North primarily; even in American cities, inequality restricts access. Postmodernism is in fact purchased.

"Progress," thus, comes with price tags. And advantages come with trade-offs: "No longer defined by locality, or even nationality, the subject is open to, even dispersed amongst, an endlessly proliferating number of information streams. We gain information instantly at the cost of becoming information ourselves, outside of any consideration of personal choice, as liberal political theory understood it" (Mansfield 2000, *Subjectivity*, Kindle locations 2747–2752). Our desires become structured by the available technologies, such that "new possibilities open up to us, but only as they become technologically efficient, manageable and therefore standardized." In this way, "the horizons of the subject are simultaneously expanded and reduced" (Mansfield 2000, *Subjectivity*, Kindle locations 2747–2752).

dominate landscapes far beyond [their] metropolitan zone," the "changing forms of urbanization" have led to "urban sprawl and the decentralization of non-residential functions[: for example, of] retail parks close to intercity highway junctions, massively increased levels of commuting between urban and rural areas, . . . and the emergence of polycentric urban configurations" (James 2015, *Circles*, p. 25). Beyond these lies the hinterland, a rural area "close enough to a major urban centre for its inhabitants to orient a significant proportion of their activities" to that "dominant urban area of their region" (James 2015, *Circles*, p. 27).

In today's parlance, *rural* has become "a catch-all category for 'not urban'" (James 2015, *Circles*, p. 26). Still, these "settlement categories" belong to the mid- to late 20th century. In the 21st century, we need to think in global-local terms. In this tech-driven shift from urban-rural to global-local, we'll be completing our transit through postmodernism. The entrepreneur today may drive to work—out of town or down the street—on behalf of a multinational corporation based in Beijing, China or Basel, Switzerland and drive home to a lakeside condo or a loft apartment in downtown Anywhere U.S.A. For some, their commute might be by FaceTime, Zoom, or Skype. Where one sleeps, and where one does business, can be in different communities on different continents. For instantaneous global communication reconfigures our relationship to physical space—to where we reside and work and play. Given access to technology, anyone can do business anywhere, "broadcasting" worldwide. The difference between urban and rural areas lies, not in access to technology, *but in lifestyle*: specifically, in access to "citified" culture with its eclectic architecture, diverse cuisines, museums, and zones of shopping and entertainment.

Increasingly urbanized in population, the U.S. has transited from a primarily production-based to a service-based economy; and, in seeking its share of an expanding global market, the prized commodity of American production is *not* mined or grown or manufactured goods, but *information*. Indeed, contemporary technoculture overwhelms us with information, such that no one person has access to the whole. A *surplus* of data is one marker of postmodernity; the *fragmentation* of this data into "expert systems" is another. That is, postmodern technoculture functions by dividing information among "experts," who "specialize" in *components* of larger systems—institutional, disciplinary, commercial, technological—without full knowledge or understanding of the functioning of the whole.[18] If we are to thrive as a community within the larger "global village," we need to build a conversation, and a collaboration, among the various "experts" and stakeholders in contemporary technoculture. For the nonce, we'll reduce the conversation to four agents (or, as we'll learn to call them, actants): "the citizen," "the scientist," "the politician," and "the corporation." Out of these four agencies, we can build a viable community. But trust, you'll note, remains a necessary prerequisite: in a decentered, fragmented world, *we rely on others' expertise*.

Such is the postmodern condition: Given the black-boxing of technology, "the citizen" must rely on "the corporation," which must rely on "the politician," who must rely on "the scientist," who must rely on "the citizen," and so on. We'll be returning to this topic, as it pertains to our collective response to the coronavirus. First, we have to illustrate ways that technology reshapes, not simply our habitus, but our embodied self-identities, as well. We'll be focusing on two versions of postmodernist "hybrid" ethos, Bruno Latour's actant and Donna Haraway's cyborg.

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[18] "As late as the 1870s," Pagan Kennedy notes, "families settling on the American prairie would mend their own coffeepots, nail together hog-slaughtering stands, and repair wagon axles" (Kennedy 2016, *Inventology*, p. 168). She continues:

> "Every active and ingenious farmer should have a good workshop and his own set of tools for repairing implements," wrote a [newspaper] columnist of the time. Back then, a town was not just a collection of houses but also a gathering place for blacksmiths, tinkers, seamstresses, and cobblers who manufactured the accouterments of daily life. Inventors weren't remote experts; they lived next door.
>
> (p. 168)

Such pioneer self-reliance belongs to the past: Unless we've expertise in the items following, our SUVs and HVAC systems and iPhones—and even, for goodness' sake, our own coffee pots—lie beyond our mending.

5. Actants and Cyborgs: From Postmodernism to Posthumanism

> A body corporate is what we and our artifacts have become. We are an object-institution. The point sounds trivial if applied asymmetrically. "Of course," one might say, "a piece of technology must be seized and activated by a human subject, a purposeful agent." But the point I am making is symmetrical: what is true of the "object" is still truer of the "subject." There is no sense in which humans may be said to exist as humans without entering into commerce with what authorizes and enables them to exist (that is, to act).
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> —Bruno Latour, "A Collective of Humans and NonHumans" (Latour 2009, p. 168)

> [I]f the proper study of mankind used to be Man and the proper study of humanity was the human, it seems to follow that the proper study of the posthuman condition is the posthuman itself. This new knowing subject is a complex assemblage of human and non-human, planetary and cosmic, given and manufactured, which requires major re-adjustments in our ways of thinking.
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> —Rosi Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Braidotti 2013, p. 159)

> If bodies come into being without the usual procedure, would they be human? Or, if a body has several of its parts replaced by machines or organic parts from other species (xenotransplantation) or even made from genetic material from assorted species, would the body be human? Do clones have human rights? Are foreign parts within our bodies nativized, or do they stay alien and foreign?
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> —Pramod K. Nayar, *Posthumanism* (Nayar 2014, p. 60)

In "A Collective of Humans and NonHumans,"[19] Bruno Latour "seeks to overcome the dualistic paradigm" marking earlier Enlightenment philosophy: specifically, "the separation of subjectivity from objectivity, facts from values, and humans from technology" (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, p. 7). As Kaplan observes, "there has never been such a thing as humanity without technology nor technology without humanity," nor has society existed "apart from science and technology." Rather, "nonhumans, (social) actors, and (objective) networks are 'symmetrical.' Neither is more important than the other; both are always bound up together. Humans and technology are active agents (or rather, actants)" (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, p. 7). Such is the basis of actor-network theory (ANT), which sees the social and natural worlds as engaged in continuous, shifting interrelationships. Since "agents and technologies act jointly together," ANT is ethotic in describing the roles human actants play in "human-technology relations." For "each artifact has its script, its potential to take hold of passersby and force them to play roles in its story" (Latour 2009, "Collective," p. 158). Kaplan illustrates: "I become a motorist when I drive a car; a gardener when I use a rake. As a result, it is more helpful to understand our lives as social-technical; our lives are composed of actants" (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, p. 7). Latour's own illustration makes for a savvy commentary on the American "gun-slinger" ethos:

> "Guns kill people" is a slogan of those who try to control the unrestricted sale of guns. To which the National Rifle Association (NRA) replies with another slogan, "Guns don't kill people; people kill people." The first slogan is materialist: the gun acts by virtue of material components irreducible to the social qualities of the gunman. On account of the gun the law-abiding citizen, a good guy, becomes dangerous. The NRA, meanwhile, offers (amusingly enough, given its political views) a *sociological* version more often associated with the Left: that the gun does nothing in itself or by virtue of its material components. The gun is a tool, a medium, a neutral carrier of human will. (Latour 2009, "Collective," p. 157)

[19] Excerpted from *Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 174–93.

"What does the gun add to the shooting?" Latour asks. He answers, "In the materialist account, *everything*: an innocent citizen becomes a criminal by virtue of the gun in her hand. The gun enables, of course, but also instructs, directs, even pulls the trigger—and who, with a knife in her hand, has not wanted at some time to stab someone or something?" (Latour 2009, "Collective," pp. 157–8; emphasis in original).

The "translation" (Latour's term for the creation of actants) is rendered in narrative—as "the series of goals and steps and intentions that an agent can describe in a story like the one about the gun and the gunman" (Latour 2009, "Collective," p. 158):

> If the agent is human, is angry, wants to take revenge, and if the accomplishment of the agent's goal is interrupted for whatever reason (perhaps the agent is not strong enough), then the agent makes a detour: . . . Agent 1 falls back on Agent 2, here a gun. Agent 1 enlists the gun or is enlisted by it—it does not matter which—and a third agent emerges from a fusion of the other two. (Latour 2009, "Collective," pp. 158–59)

Latour's follow-up question takes us to the heart of actor-network theory: "Which of them, then, the gun or the citizen, is the actor in this situation? *Someone else* (a citizen-gun, a gun-citizen)" (Latour 2009, "Collective," p. 159; emphasis added). We find Latour's analysis compelling:

> *You are a different person with the gun in your hand*. Essence is existence and existence is action. If I define you by what you have (the gun), and by the series of associations that you enter into when you use what you have (when you fire the gun), then you are modified by the gun . . . . This translation is wholly symmetrical. You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun is different with you holding it. You are another subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has entered into a relationship with you. (Latour 2009, "Collective," p. 159; emphasis added)

Thus, the tool-using human agent—*homo faber*, in Enlightenment tradition—becomes "someone, something" else: Call him *homo faber fabricatus*. This "someone, something else," this "hybrid actor" comprising gun and gunman, needs its own terminology, since "agents can be human or (like the gun) nonhuman, and each can have goals (or functions, as engineers prefer to say). Since the word 'agent' in the case of nonhumans is uncommon, a better term, as we have seen, is actant" (Latour 2009, "Collective," p. 159).[20]

This social-technological hybridization can be applied to the human body, itself.[21] With this insight, we arrive at Haraway's influential essay, "A Cyborg Manifesto" (1991). "Late twentieth-century machines," Haraway states, "have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that

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[20] I am, myself, living illustration of Latour's actant: The eyeglasses that I have worn since age seven have become exoskeletal, and the iPhone and laptop are now so thoroughly part of my lifestyle that they accompany me to bed. Indeed, teaching online (the university classroom being closed to pandemic) and pursuing a habit of dawn-to-dusk reading and writing have bound me to my laptop (well named, that); during those times when I'm *not* connected to the web, I'm likely connected to the steering wheel of my SUV or cooking at my electric stove. Even during those "focal activities" of daily domesticity, the cable news might likely be on. My habitus is defined, not by its urban setting alone, but by its black-boxed technologies. My home has two wood-burning stoves, but I've never used them for cooking or for heat. If the power grid failed and my HVAC shut down, I'd alternatively freeze or swelter; if my freezer defrosted, I'd likely go hungry. Such is my reliance on postmodern technoculture and its standing-reserve of energy.

[21] As Nayar writes, "In vitro fertilization, cloning, artificial ventilators and organ transplants in clinical medicine have changed the ways in which we perceive life" (Nayar 2014, *Posthumanism*, p. 107) He continues:

> Technologies have called into question the very definition of life when the patient is kept alive by assorted machines. "Bioethics" is the set of ethical issues that arise from health care, clinical medicine and biomedical sciences. It extends the older "medical ethics" paradigm (which focused on patient–doctor relationships) by examining "the value of life, what it is to be a person, the significance of being human". (Nayar 2014, *Posthumanism*, p. 107)

used to apply to organisms and machines" (Haraway 2000, "Cyborg," p. 72). As in Latour, there's a symmetry in Haraway's model: Within the cyborg "assemblage," "nature and culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other" (Haraway 2000, "Cyborg," p. 71). But, whereas Latour redefines human agency *by addition* (gun + gunman), Haraway proceeds *by incorporation*. The human organism is redefined from within, both as a "biotic system" and (importantly for our later discussion) as a data-driven system of informatics:

> It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine. It is not clear what is mind and what body in machines that resolve into coding practices. In so far as we know ourselves in both formal discourse (for example, biology) and in daily practice (for example, the homework economy in the integrated circuit), we find ourselves to be cyborgs, hybrids, mosaics, chimeras. Biological organisms have become biotic systems, communication devices like others. There is no fundamental, ontological separation in our formal knowledge of machine and organism, of technical and organic. (Haraway 2000, "Cyborg," p. 82)

We cannot overstate Haraway's influence upon theorists of the posthuman, for whom "the boundary between human and animal is thoroughly breached" (Haraway 2000, "Cyborg," p. 72). Throughout the following discussion, two terms recur: "assemblage" and "becoming-"—the latter hyphenated, in that it rejects essentialist definitions while anticipating further evolution in bodies, lifeworlds, and lifestyles.

In his "Transhumanist FAQ" (2003), Nick Bostrom describes what he sees as our current lifeworld lying somewhere "between the human and the posthuman" (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, p. 347) but evolving toward the latter: for, "eventually," technology "will … enable us to move beyond what some would think of as 'human'" (Bostrom 2009, "Transhumanist," p. 345). He elaborates:

> It is not our human shape or the details of our current human biology that define what is valuable about us, but rather our aspirations and ideals, our experiences, and the kinds of lives we lead. To a transhumanist, progress occurs when more people become more able to shape themselves, their lives, and the ways they relate to others, in accordance with their own deepest values. Transhumanists place a high value on autonomy: *the ability and right of individuals to plan and choose their own lives*. (Bostrom 2009, "Transhumanist," pp. 345–6; emphasis added)

More than rewrite the scripts of our lifestyle choices, transhumanism reconstructs the human habitus in its near-entirety.[22]

In the following outline, we rely on Rosi Braidotti for a variety of reasons, not least of which is her defense of traditional humanist categories of subjectivity, selfhood, ethics, and ethotics.[23] "For posthuman theory," writes Braidotti, "the subject is a transversal entity, fully immersed in and immanent to a network of non-human (animal, vegetable, viral) relations" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 193). It is, further, "a moveable assemblage within a common life-space that the subject never masters nor possesses but merely inhabits, crosses, always in a community, a pack, a group or a cluster" (p. 193). While becoming-posthuman marks our evolution as an "interspecies" organism,

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[22] As I reread the paragraphs above, I find the ANT version of myself (Baumlin + eyeglasses + laptop + iPhone + "sheltering" in viral prophylaxis) inching toward Bostrom's transhumanism, that "intermediary form between the human and the posthuman" (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, p. 347). I'm open to that expanded self-identity, despite my existentialist commitments.

[23] As Braidotti deploys it, a postmodern subjectivity "defies our separation into distinct selves," at the same time that it "encourages us to imagine that, or simply helps us to understand why, *our interior lives inevitably seem to involve other people*, either as objects of need, desire and interest or as necessary sharers of common experience" (Mansfield 2000, *Subjectivity*, Kindle locations 122–125; emphasis added). In this way, Mansfield notes, the posthuman subject "is always linked to something outside of it—an idea or principle or the society of other subjects" (Mansfield 2000, Subjectivity, Kindle locations 122–125). It is a subjectivity built upon empathy (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 26): More precisely, it is a "complex and relational subject framed by embodiment, sexuality, affectivity, empathy and desire as core qualities" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 26).

it by no means renders us inhuman; it does, however, demand our rejection of biological essentialism, species supremacy, and individualist ideologies.[24] Braidotti returns us, too, to the planetary-ecological "sparing" previously outlined while casting the fate of humanity as one shared with all zoological life.[25] Once we have articulated this planetary ethos—which she terms "pan-humanity"—we'll have gathered up our tools and can attend, at last, to ethos in an age of pandemic.

Braidotti offers a clear, bold definition: "I define the critical posthuman subject within an eco-philosophy of multiple belongings, as a relational subject constituted in and by multiplicity" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 49). It's "an embodied and embedded and hence partial form of accountability, based on a strong sense of collectivity, relationality and hence community building" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 49). And it "expresses the affirmative, ethical dimension of becoming-posthuman as a gesture of collective self-styling" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 100). We take "collective self-styling" as habitus writ large.

Thus far, we've noted the advances in and advantages of postmodern technoculture. There's a flip side, obviously. Though Braidotti's pan-humanity describes "a web of intricate interdependencies" (urban, social, and political) "between the human and the non-human environment" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 40), its globalist sense of interconnection offers no guarantee of cooperation, much less of "peaceful co-existence":

> This new pan-humanity is paradoxical in two ways: firstly, because a great deal of its inter-connections are negative and based on a shared sense of vulnerability and fear of imminent catastrophes and, secondly, because this new global proximity does not always breed tolerance and peaceful co-existence; on the contrary, forms of xenophobic rejection of otherness and increasing armed violence are key features of our times[.] (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 40)

This "shared sense of vulnerability" carries us to brink of our own historical moment, when catastrophes are no longer "imminent" but upon us. *We should have been better prepared*, since "we live permanently in the shadow of the 'imminent disaster,'" writes Brian Massumi (1993, "Everywhere," p. 10):

> What [postmodern] society looks toward is no longer a return to the promised land but a general disaster that is already upon us, woven into the fabric of day-to-day life. The content of the disaster is unimportant. Its particulars are annulled by its plurality of possible agents and times: here and to come. What registers is its magnitude. In its most compelling and characteristic incarnations, the now unspecified enemy is infinite. Infinitely small or infinitely large: viral or environmental. (Massumi 1993, "Everywhere," p. 10)

The sirens and alarms are no longer outside of us; they pulse through our nervous systems and viscera, keeping us in "fight, flight, or fright mode," adrenally exhausted.[26] I mention this as the pathos-aspect of our response, which has tended to express itself in fear, anger, denial, or paralysis. Rationally, we've known that pandemic was inevitable: Scientists had been warning us for decades.

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[24] As Braidotti writes, "a sustainable ethics" for pan-humanity "rests on an enlarged sense of interconnection between self and others, including the non-human or 'earth' others, by removing the obstacle of self-centred individualism" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 190). Hence, becoming-posthuman "does not mean to be indifferent to the humans, or to be de-humanized." Rather, "it implies a new way of combining ethical values with the well-being of an enlarged sense of community, which includes one's territorial or environmental interconnections" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 190).

[25] The coronavirus, by the way, is clearly one of "the variety of shared diseases that tie humans and animals" together (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 162). Coining the term *zoonosis*, German physician-biologist Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902) sought to break down dividing lines between animal and human medicine, given "the isomorphism of structures between humans and animals in immunology, bacteriology, and vaccine developments. This means that humans are both exposed and vulnerable to new diseases, like bird flu and other epidemics, which they share with animal species" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 161). Such is the etiology of the coronavirus, which can infect our pets, as well.

[26] For many, it's fright especially: If W. H. Auden's poem, "Age of Anxiety" (1947), defined the postwar condition, then ours is an age of outright panic. "Panic is the key psychological mood of postmodern culture," write Arthur Kroker, Marilouise Kroker, and David Cook: "Panic culture" comes to serve "as a floating reality, with the actual as a dream world, where we live on the edge of ecstasy and dread" (Kroker et al. 1989, *Panic*, pp. 13–14).

We cannot deny the paradox described by Braidotti and others: The very instruments of posthuman assemblage—biotechnology, nanotechnology, and artificial intelligence—"pose especially serious risks of accidents and abuse" (Bostrom 2009, "Transhumanist," pp. 353–54). "The gravest existential risks facing us," Bostrom writes, "will be of our own making" (p. 354); to the list above, he adds biological warfare, nuclear war and, prophetically, "something unknown" (Bostrom 2009, "Transhumanist," pp. 353–54). Indeed, it's the "novelty" of the novel coronavirus that surprised us, and against which current biotechnology proves (at this still-early phase of response) largely inadequate. And while COVID-19 is not, strictly speaking, "of our own making" (we reject conspiratorial claims that a genetically-modified SARS virus escaped from a Chinese lab), what *is* of our "making" is our psychological, sociological, political, and economic response.

As theorized above, the nature-culture "assemblage" has something more to teach us: specifically, that the virus, the computer, and the human body (with its "machining" *via* prosthetic enhancements, genetic alterations, hormonal-pharmacological adjustments, and social-behavioral modifications) are made of the same substance. It's not the Heideggerian "standing-reserve" that we're talking about: It's coded information. Paradoxically, the viruses that sicken and kill us are not, themselves, alive. They inhabit an indeterminate space between living and nonliving. On their own, they are inert strings of protein, incapable of any action whatsoever, including self-replication. Placed inside a living host, they spring into action and replicate like wildfire. Now, a virus is little more than a coded sequence of genetic information—of DNA. Consider that a computer virus is a coded sequence of information, too. Such, indeed, is the "condition of postmodernism," wherein the boundaries between living and nonliving, human and nonhuman, biological and engineered, have dissolved. Haraway notes the homology between virtual and viral pandemic: The diseases evoked by machines "are 'no more' than the minuscule coding changes of an antigen in the immune system, 'no more' than the experience of stress" (Haraway 2000, "Cyborg," p. 74).[27]

Haraway brings us to the final stage of our analysis, which is a reconsideration of rhetoric in an age of posthumanism. Within a cyborg ethos, "'Integrity' and 'sincerity' of the Western self gives way to decision procedures and expert systems" (Haraway 2000, "Cyborg," p. 79). Integrity and sincerity—*arete* and *eunoia*, as Aristotle would term them—are components of classical ethos, the third component being *phronesis*, the "good sense" or (in postmodernist terms) "expertise" *that is no longer the sole province of the speaking human subject*. Mansfield glosses Haraway on this point:

> [O]ur present culture is one not of essences and identities, but of overlaps and interfaces—of communication flow and systems management. She writes: "Integrity" and "sincerity" of the Western self gives way to decision procedures and expert systems . . . . No objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves; any component can be interfaced with any other if the proper standard, the proper code, can be constructed for processing signals in a common language" (Haraway 2000, p. 163). *The body itself is now read as a machine. Genes are seen as codes, carrying messages*. This is an image not of the individual body as a self-sustaining system, but as a set of shifting signifying surfaces turned not inwards towards a mysterious, untouchable and sublime essence, but outwards towards an ever-multiplying number of possible interconnections. (Mansfield 2000, *Subjectivity*, Kindle locations 2827–2832; emphasis added)

What, then, shall we do with the information we are gathering on the virus, on its spread, and on the ways of its containment? Who shall speak on the subject? To whom shall we listen?

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[27] Baudrillard's version is more ominous: "Virulence takes hold of a body, a network or other system when that system rejects all its negative components and resolves itself into a combinatorial system of simple elements. It is because a circuit or a network has thus become a virtual being, a non-body, that viruses can run riot within it; hence too the much greater vulnerability of 'immaterial' machines as compared with traditional mechanical devices" (Baudrillard 2000, "Prophylaxis," pp. 33–34). "Virtual and viral," he continues, "go hand in hand. It is because the body itself has become a non-body, a virtual machine, that viruses are taking it over" (Baudrillard 2000, "Prophylaxis," p. 34).

6. Responding to Pandemic: "The Scientist" *Vs.* "The Politician" *Vs.* "The Citizen"

> The new *ethos* for computational systems, which I associate with cyborg discourse, focuses on the establishment of trust.
>
> —Carolyn Miller, "Expertise and Agency" (Miller 1994, p. 207)

> We live in a scientific age; yet we assume that knowledge of science is the prerogative of only a small number of human beings, isolated and priest-like in their laboratories. This is not true. The materials of science are the materials of life itself. Science is part of the reality of living; it is the what, the how, the why of everything in our experience. It is impossible to understand man without understanding his environment and the forces that have molded him physically and mentally.
>
> —Rachel Carson, 1952 National Book Award Acceptance Speech (qtd. in Lear 2009, *Witness*, p. 218)

In receiving a National Book Award for *The Sea Around Us* (Carson 1951), Rachel Carson (1907–1964) was honored for "bring[ing] attention to the public a hitherto unconsidered field of scientific inquiry" (Lear 2009, p. 218). Her acceptance speech was revolutionary in its time. Carson aimed *to make science matter* to the public, giving it voice and authority. In recent years, this challenge has increased. Starting with "climate skepticism," the growing popular mistrust of science (and of academia more broadly) has brought us to a crisis not simply of fact and value, but also of messaging.

Today, we stand at a crossroads. The "American Century" ended two decades ago, and promises to "Make America Great Again" play nostalgically on that political-economic past. (The future *belonged to us*, did it not? Does it still?) In the 21st century, attitudes seem to have downshifted. "The citizen," "the politician," "the corporation," and "the scientist" seem too often to work at cross-purposes. Does "the corporation" *serve* "the citizen" economically, socially? Do they share the same goals? Surely they share the same community, the same resources, the same planet. While some on the corporate side work to protect profits, others work to protect health and the environment, along with the economy. In a post-pandemic world, claims of "American exceptionalism" will ring increasingly hollow, since the U.S. has long ceased to be self-providing and self-reliant in resources.[28] And *there will be more crises*—not just in politics and economics but in climate, ecology, biology.

The global-local nexus presupposes a viable lifeworld; for which reason "our biggest worries," writes Don Ihde, "*ought to be global*, first in the sense of concern for the earth's environment, and second in finding [a] means of securing intercultural . . . modes of tolerance and cultural pluralism" (Ihde 1993, *Philosophy*, p. 115; emphasis in original). Some of us pay lip-service to the "global village." Ironically, it's the postmodernist defeat of time and space that makes infection anywhere an infection everywhere: Some of the earliest American cases of COVID-19 may have arrived at Kennedy International by passenger jet—from Europe, not from Asia. As time and space continue to shrink, events occurring "around the world" and "around the block" affect us equally. Yet the steady rise of nationalism and "identity politics" expresses widespread anxieties over globalism. The "American lifestyle" benefits from global markets. Can Americans continue this pursuit in a world where their lifestyle is untenable on a global scale? Can we insulate ourselves from the world's problems while enjoying the world's resources? Can we continue to consume resources beyond the planet's capacities? Above all: Can we continue to produce and consume without caring for ecology—for planetary health?

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[28] The current administration has threatened China, for example, with some sort of reprisal (most likely economic) over the outbreak's origin in Wuhan, without acknowledging that U.S. laboratories need chemical reagents supplied by China to produce and process test kits for viral exposure.Similarly, the pandemic offers brutal demonstration, not simply of the insufficiency of current biomedical technology, but of the fragility of global supply chains that can bring down entire industries through the lack of one ingredient, component, or resource. At the time of writing, communities throughout the U.S. cobbled together a supply of lab test kits that are effectively useless without application swabs—a mere swirl of cotton tipping a lengthy cardboard rod. An entire system can be brought to its knees by something so simple as a cotton swab.

Braidotti's pan-humanity reminds us of our species interdependency. Were we to act collectively, we could defeat the virus more quickly and with fewer deaths. But it's the American ideology of "rugged individualism" that undermines any possibility of a collective, federally-coordinated response. Quite literally, it's the American ideology that's turned us into the world's pandemic center. Unlike in other countries, *there is currently no national response to pandemic*: The federal government's refusal to mandate (much less enforce) nationwide policies is driven, not by incompetence merely, but by a conservative anti-federalism that asserts "state's rights" in establishing policies (including such dire decisions as to when and how "to open up" social gathering places, despite continuing viral spread). Such is the ideology that privileges individual "freedom" over communal health. A collectivist ethos would spare lives; rugged individualism is killing us.

The COVID-19 crisis offers to mobilize science, technology, labor, industry, and communities in a common cause—the sort of communal effort that the U.S. has not seen since World War II. Will we rise to the occasion? Can we set challenges for entrepreneurs today? Can "the citizen" and "the politician" and "the corporation" and "the scientist" agree on priorities? Can we work to solve inequalities in global economy and consumption? Can we work to conserve natural resources necessary for "quality of life" in our own urbanized cultural setting? Can we build consensus over "quality of life" issues? Can contemporary technoscience contribute to health and prosperity for all, globally as well as locally? And can we learn to include "companion species" in this communitarianism? Can we work to keep nonhuman species from extinction, "sparing" them as if our own biological existence were at stake (which, in fact, it is)? "The scientist" prepares for such projects; whether we have the political will remains an unanswered question. Arguably, "the scientist" working today faces greater challenges than "the scientist" working in "machine age" modernism of a century ago, when polio and tuberculosis, deforestation, economic depression, and military competition among regional powers were the most pressing threats. The stakes were high back then; they seem higher now, and the time much shorter.

Applying the ethotic theories described above (Heidegger, Bourdieu, Latour, Haraway, and Braidotti in particular), we can ask: What changes has the coronavirus wrought? Transforming the countryside and its standing-reserve into "built space," the city remains our habitus; yet the virus has effectively transformed urban spaces, reclaiming them for its own. The largest infection- and death-rates to date belong to New York City, its suburbs and tri-state exurbs. Socially as well as psychologically, the practice of sheltering at home has impacted the American urban lifestyle *by subtraction*: all the advantages of "citified" culture—the pleasures of public gathering in downtown spaces with their cosmopolitan architecture, cuisines, museums, shops, and entertainments—have been taken from us, however temporarily.

For families sheltering together, the coronavirus encourages us to live traditionally *as families*, not just in sharing the same living space but in cooking and eating and conversing and entertaining each other, together. Heideggerian in inspiration, Albert Borgmann's *Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life* (1984) describes these as "focal activities." In so doing, he invokes the Latin etymology of *focus* as "hearth," the traditional multigenerational center of domesticity and source of physical warmth, food preparation, and close conversation.[29] While these "focal activities" are harmonizing

[29] In our human-social lifeworlds, Borgmann distinguishes between "mere devices" that recede into the white-noise background (HVAC systems, for example) and focal objects that contribute to "the reflective care of the good life" (Borgmann 2009, "Focal," p. 62). Kaplan summarizes Borgmann's argument:

> The "promise of modern technology," Borgmann explains, is that the use of devices will free us from the misery and toil imposed by nature, thereby enriching our lives. But, as Borgmann points out, technology has failed to live up to its promise because it is silent as to the ends, purposes, and goods that make up an enriched, fulfilled life. To reform technology we need to revive focal things and practices, not simply make better devices. Focal things and practices contain within them a vision of the good life missing from the device paradigm. We need to become more not less engaged; our technologies need to become more not less conspicuous. Borgmann's examples of focal practices include performing music (rather than listening to it on a device), jogging outside (rather than working out at a gym), and enjoying a traditional home-cooked meal with friends and family (rather than consuming fast food alone). (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, pp. 4–5)

(and, ideally, humanizing), we also note an increase in child and spousal abuse: Enforced sheltering has emphasized the dysfunctionality in many families, effectively imprisoning victims in their own homes.

The ethotic dimensions of human embodiment are impacted radically by COVID-19 and its invasive presence, transforming its human hosts into interspecies "assemblages." If the coronavirus teaches us anything, it should lead us to rethink human biology: More than a macro-organism, the body describes a colony of trillions of separate microorganisms, many dwelling within us symbiotically and beneficially, some threatening us with sickness unto death. Over years of "purifying" the environment of germs, the urban lifestyle has seemingly weakened our native immune systems, allowing viral storms to hit with greater force.[30] Note that this is *not* a criticism of vaccination programs and antibiotics; if and when a COVID-19 vaccine is produced, we'll gladly take it under medical supervision. This *is*, however, to acknowledge that the mid-20th century "culture of antibiotics" is coming to a sorrowful end, having failed before MRSA and other supergerms capable of defeating our strongest pharmaceuticals. The 1930s gave us sulfa drugs; the 1940s streptomycin; the 1950s penicillin; the 1960s doxycycline; the 1970s amoxicillin; the 1980s azithromycin; the 1990s Levaquin; and the 2000s gave us . . . what? It remains to be seen what new antibiotics, if any, shall be synthesized or discovered.[31]

Infection is ethotic: people infected become "carriers," their every cough a viral bullet-spray. People are defined by the infection in ways that change their self-image as "healthy," as "at risk," as "infected" in quarantine, as "infected" in hospital, and as "infected" on ventilator life-support. Latour's actor-network theory provides the equations: an assemblage (person + virus + ventilator) describes an actant in ICU. When out in public, an assemblage (person + mask + social distancing) describes a conscientious citizen following CDC guidelines, whereas (person − mask − social distancing) describes a "risktaker" showing little care for self or others. Healthcare workers have earned a heroic ethos in putting their own lives at risk. Again, Latour provides the equation: (nurse + PPE + safety protocols + coronavirus patient = "caretaker"). Remove the PPE—the personal protective equipment of mask, gloves, and gown—and you've destroyed the healthcare workers' efficacy and safety (and, effectively, their "caretaker" ethos). Survivors of COVID-19 have a near-charismatic status; theirs is an ethos of the "survivor," whose blood is of keen interest for antibody research. And we can cross-reference culture and lifestyle, noting that some populations—the African American and Native American especially—have been hit hard by the virus: Classism, ageism, and racism are exacerbated by COVID-19. Other pandemic-related actants are primarily nonhuman: A test kit, for example,

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COVID-19, I must confess, has affected many of my own lifestyle habits, including such nontechnological, "focal activities" as cooking, housecleaning, and gardening—which I've done *a lot* more of while sheltering at home. (I've expressed pride in my mother's Polish heritage and have cooked Polish foods occasionally; otherwise, the "traditional" cultural components of my habitus are purely nostalgic.) I should add that, with the school gym closed, I bike. And while I play internet chess daily (I'd call that a fairly harmless addiction), I've also begun to play board games with my spouse—something we haven't done in decades.

30 "In a hyperprotected space the body loses all its defences," writes Baudrillard: "So sterile are operating rooms that no germ or bacterium can survive there. Yet this is the very place where mysterious, anomalous viral diseases make their appearance. The fact is that viruses proliferate as soon as they find a free space. A world purged of the old forms of infection, a world 'ideal' from the clinical point of view, offers a perfect field of operations for the impalpable and implacable pathology which arises from the sterilisation itself" (Baudrillard 2000, "Prophylaxis," p. 34).

31 Writing as a critic of postmodern technoscience, Baudrillard declares that biotechnological actants have in fact weakened the body and its defenses:

> Inasmuch as bodies are less and less able to count on their own antibodies, they are more and more in need of protection from outside. An artificial sterilisation of all environments must compensate for faltering internal immunological defences. And if these are indeed faltering, it is because the irreversible process often referred to as progress tends to strip the human body and mind of their systems of initiative and defence, reassigning these functions to technical artifacts. Once dispossessed of their defences, human beings become eminently vulnerable to science and technology; dispossessed of their passions, they likewise become eminently vulnerable to psychology and its attendant therapies; similarly, too, once relieved of emotions and illnesses, they become eminently vulnerable to medicine. (Baudrillard 2000, "Prophylaxis," p. 34)

Baudrillard is like right, though the postmodernist train has left the station *and I'm on it and there's no turning back*. In this respect, I'm currently an assemblage of (Baumlin + hand sanitizers + azithromycin)—but not of penicillin, which would throw me into anaphylactic shock: in this respect, I have "become eminently vulnerable to medicine."

is supposed to provide reliable diagnosis (assuming proper construction, all necessary equipment, proper human administration, and timely interpretation). The test kit is also a black box, in that its construction and working (and evaluation for accuracy) lie beyond the layperson's expertise. In sum: Every aspect of the pandemic affects habitus, embodiment, informatics and "expert systems," practices of self-care, and projected self-image.

In the above survey of ethotic perceptions and practices, we've focused on the various actants of citizenship: "the risktaker," "the carrier," "the patient in quarantine," "the patient in hospital," "the survivor," and "the caretaker." Sadly, "the victim" belongs to this growing list, as well. We have now to treat of "the scientist" and "the politician." As for "the corporation"—the ultimate nonhuman actant in Latour's ANT model—we'll observe, simply, that the fates of businesses parallel those of their human foils, with some profiting, many surviving, some taking risks, many acting conscientiously, and some falling victim to the virus's devastation.

In the midst of our postmodern reliance upon "expert systems," we've entered into a crisis of trust "in institutions, technology, and expertise" (Miller 1994, "Expertise," p. 207). Again, "the politician" *must* rely on "the scientist" and "the citizen" *must* rely on "the corporation" if we're to survive, much less thrive, during the pandemic and in its aftermath. Urbanized and globally interconnected, our lifeworld resides in technoculture. There's no turning back. Though technoscience made much of the mess that we're in, it's our best chance at cleaning the mess up. And yet, given the current fierce competition among political-economic narratives, trust in "the scientist" has eroded at a time when this trust is needed most. In the 21st century, the best public policy—for corporations and communities alike—will promote economy, ecology, and health concomitantly, using technoscience as its means.

It seems ironic that this present age—call it transhumanist or pan-humanist or posthumanist—looks to Aristotle's "rational ethos" as an antidote to the current crisis.[32] The reason is simple: The "expert systems" of postmodern technoscience require the logos-based "expertise" of the scientist in guiding us forward. Yet ours remains, first and foremost, a crisis of ethos, in that large segments of the population nationwide and worldwide "trust" the advice of non-scientists while the scientists—whose expertise earns them the right to be heard and followed—have been distrusted, ignored, or silenced by various means. At this critical moment in the nation's discourse, *we need* the Aristotelian model of ethos: We need to restore *arete* to *eunoia* to *phronesis*.

An aim of ethical/ethotic communication ought to be to make policy—that needful conversation among "the citizen," "the politician," "the corporation," and "the scientist"—more informed, balanced, and intelligible to "the citizen" especially, for whom technology remains black-boxed. And while "the citizen" possesses neither the expertise of "the scientist" nor the power of "the politician," what "the citizen" *does* possess is the postmodern *skeptron* of social media. As Braidotti notes,

> [M]ore Internet-backed interactivity will allow citizens to participate in all forms of planning, managing and assessing their urban environment. The key words are: open source, open governance, open data and open science, granting free access by the public to all scientific and administrative data. (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 180)

While "the citizen" may not have answers, she *does* "have the same capacity to question things as experts. The key is to know what kinds of questions to ask . . . . We have to question technology. *It is*

[32] In describing the interrelation between classical-Aristotelian logos and ethos, Carolyn Miller notes that, "in Aristotelian rhetoric, *ethos* stands in for expertise, because rhetoric occurs where either complete knowledge is not available or the audience is not adequately knowledgeable or competent: *pathos* and *ethos*, *arete* and *eunoia* make up for lack of knowledge" (Miller 1994, "Expertise," p. 204). Yet the rhetoric of science remains committed to "a rhetorical style of impersonality, in which facts "speak for themselves"" (Miller 1994, "Expertise," p. 203). This universalizing of thought—seemingly an Enlightenment legacy—might help us escape the current partisan strategies of *ad hominem* attack: that is, of rejecting the speech (in this case, the recommendations of science) *because of the speaker*. This style of depersonalization, notes Carolyn Miller, creates the paradox of "an *ethos* that denies the importance of *ethos*. The technical *ethos* must be informed but impartial, authoritative but self-effacing. One of the major strategies for achieving this delicate balance is the transformation of *ethos* into *logos*" (Miller 1994, "Expertise," p. 203).

our responsibility" (Kaplan 2009, *Readings*, p. xv; emphasis added). We agree with Kaplan, in that science is itself a mode of discourse whose truth claims are built on consensus. There is, further, a social-constructionist underside to its workings: "The much-praised 'objectivity of science' . . . rests on active inter-subjectivity and social interaction" (Braidotti 2013, *Posthuman*, pp. 175–6). A key to "democratizing science" is to transform its rhetorical praxis by an expansion of audience: Unless practiced as a mode of ethical-ethotic public discourse, science fails to inform policy.

Relying on Bourdieu, our previous essay described the Homeric *skeptron* in its ancient origins and current functioning:

> In Homer, the *skeptron* "is the attribute of the king, of heralds, messengers, judges, and all persons who, whether of their own nature or because of a particular occasion, are invested with authority" (Bourdieu 1991, *Language*, p. 193). But, as Bourdieu states elsewhere, this "authority *comes to language from outside*, a fact concretely exemplified by the *skeptron* that, in Homer, is passed to the orator who is about to speak. Language at most *represents* this authority, manifests and symbolizes it" (*Language* 109; emphasis added). A speaker's assumption of authority, thus, is not a *consequence* of ethos (as per Aristotle); rather, *it is a precondition*—a "given," and accessed by means of the *skeptron*. (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 8)

It's in contemporary media that Bourdieu locates the material-technological-cultural symbols of *skeptron* authority:

> The abundance of microphones, cameras, journalists and photographers, is, like the Homeric *skeptron* . . . the visible manifestation of the hearing granted to the orator, of his credit, of the social importance of his acts and his words. Photography—which, by recording, eternizes—has the effect . . . of *solemnizing* the exemplary acts of the political ritual. (Bourdieu 1991, *Language*, p. 193; emphasis in original)

Our analysis continued: "While the camera records a speaker's visual presence, it's the microphone that stands in for the *skeptron* today. As women and people of color have learned too well, the difficulty in achieving social justice—in being *seen* and *heard*, whether individually or as a group—lies not in refutation within public debate, but in practices of silencing: that is, of being denied the *skeptron*" (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," p. 8). We can describe these as actants: (speaker + *skeptron* = authority) *vs*. (speaker − *skeptron* = silence). While this present essay seeks "to give voice" to science, our previous essay focused on the *skeptron* as an instrument of social justice.

As noted, we've become urbanized and globally connected in habitus. In clothing, cuisines, and entertainments, our tastes are cosmopolitan. Without discounting the markings of birth and markers of cultural identity, we've turned self-identity into choices of lifestyle. Embedded in our lifeworld, AI technologies provide cyborg companions for us, responsive to our needs. Swarm AI may soon evolve, wherein distributed user networks function as a collective intelligence—a "human swarm." Memory has become communal, external: When one stores information on a cell phone, the machine "remembers for us." One day, perhaps, memory will expand internally by microchip implant. Our bodies have become machinable prosthetically, hormonally, genetically. The boundaries between human and nonhuman have dissolved. More than rely on the electric power grid that enervates computer circuitry, *we have become part of that grid* by virtue of the human-machine interface. Much like our eyeglasses, our iPhones and computer tablets have become exoskeletal. We're "plugged in."

By the same token, these technocultural advantages reflect socioeconomic privileges built upon classism, racism, sexism, and ageism. *Most of us* will survive the virus. The same can't be said with much confidence of people in prisons, VA hospitals, or senior care facilities, nor can it be said of people whose living spaces and workplaces are tightly packed, like urban housing projects and peri-urban

meatpacking plants.[33] Other populations—the homeless, the addicted, the immunocompromised—are dying in disproportionate numbers. It's been said that the coronavirus "doesn't discriminate" in its victims; statistics in death-rates among populations give the lie to this superficial claim. "Where you are is who you are": That's an old Marxist saying that holds for us, still. Poverty is ethotic; race is ethotic; age is ethotic; immunodeficiency is ethotic. And so is the coronavirus: Beyond affecting our bodies, lifestyles, and lifeworlds, the coronavirus proves ethos-building in that *it positions us*, biologically and ecologically as well as socio-economically, in its effects and in our response. In behaviors of social-distancing, there are "risktakers" and "caretakers" (and those who simply don't care); in the politics of "shutting down" *vs*. "opening up" shops and businesses, there are those who put life before wealth while others put wealth before life; in partisan media, there are those who suppress the facts and stats while others scramble to tell the truth.

We cannot ignore the abuses of fact by partisan media and of power by conservative pundits and politicians. Throughout the month of April, we endured the daily White House briefings in which an American president kept the mic largely to himself, minimizing and often silencing the health experts standing behind him—experts whose words carried ethos, had they been given freedom to speak and sufficient time at the podium. Unconscionably, the current administration is exercising its coercive authority in suppressing facts and silencing opponents. But consider the COVID-19 patients and those who care for them: Will *they* speak? If so, will they be heard *and be seen* in their speaking? Or who will speak on their behalf? We are reminded, once more, of Heidegger's conscientious call to "serve the world as witness, companion, and caretaker." Unless bound to "an ethic of care," ethos reduces to mere image-making and self-advertising. In our lifeworlds and personal experience, the story of pandemic is being written.[34] The pandemic enfolds us; the pandemic is part of our lives, *is* our lives.

We'd like to end on a hopeful note. In a recent essay collection (Baumlin and Edgar 2018, *Living*), I asked Phillip "Cloudpiler" Landis to weigh in on the present and future of our planet. Describing himself as "a ranking elder and Native American Practitioner of the Sehaptin Culture," Cloudpiler is a member of the Nemenhah tribe local to the Missouri Ozarks. In the following, he takes up the *skeptron* to speak on the planet's behalf. His response returns us, perhaps unsurprisingly, to Gaian cosmology, "focal practices" in family farming, species interdependence, and Heideggerian "sparing":

> I am a medicine man whose vocation and mission, as passed down through generations of the Ahkehkt clan, is to heal the individual, family, community, society, and planet. Though the indigenous technologies of healing are traditional, they are continuously adaptive to conditions at hand, relying always on the gifts of the Earth: water, soil, stones, plants, animals, air, heat, cold—all gifts, but one gift. The Sehaptin cosmos is a unity, wherein the strength of one element sustains the rest, while weakness in one diminishes the rest. A Eurocentric worldview tends to dissect and analyze and compartmentalize, whereas the indigenous worldview seeks unity and synergy and synthesis. Science and religion are one: both gifts, but one gift.
>
> I have been asked how I view the present state of things. The medicine man's technology rests in knowledge, discernment, and decision making. Without these, tools are useless. People come to me with their illnesses, but the illnesses are not theirs alone: They're signs of exhaustion and toxicity in the water, soil, plants, animals, air. We humans are a microcosm of the planet: Having wasted its resources and destroyed its health, we find ourselves wasting away. We live longer than generations before us, but do we live better? The Eurocentric

[33] Though agribusinesses build their processing plants in smaller communities outside of urban centers, the traditional human assembly line of shoulder-to-shoulder labor has been turned, through viral infection, into a humanimal abattoir.

[34] As Giddens notes, "A person's identity is not to be found in behaviour, nor—important though this is—in the reactions of others, but in the capacity *to keep a particular narrative going*. The individual's biography, . . . must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing 'story' about the self" (Giddens 1991, *Modernity*, p. 54). Giddens's narrative model turns ethos into an individual's storytelling: Such was a theme of our prior essay (Baumlin and Meyer 2018, "Positioning," pp. 15–22). Ours, clearly, has become the story of pandemic and its impact upon our lifeworlds.

> habit is to exploit nature, depleting its resources. In using up the land, we are using up the future. Look at the soil. Once a region of native forests and prairies, southwest Missouri was transformed into farms, orchards, and ranches. One hundred years ago, Missouri fed itself. Now, almost all our food is shipped in. If we relied on the land in its current depleted state, we'd starve.
>
> We have a way forward, which the land itself teaches if we're willing to look, listen, and learn. The cosmos is a unified, living creation. Left alone, the soil will regenerate; but one hundred years of human exploitation might take one thousand years to restore at nature's pace. The soil needs our help in regenerating; and we best serve the soil, not by behaving as chemists, but by learning to behave like the millennial forests and prairies that built layer upon layer of topsoil. The technology of proper stewardship consists of a shovel, a rake, and a wheelbarrow. My current homestead was soil-poor when I first took possession of it, showing a quarter inch of tilth depth over most of the acreage. After four years, the soil depth is sixteen inches in places and rising. Yes, I grow my own herbs and vegetables, organically. My family takes care of the soil, and the soil gifts us in return.
>
> I have been asked about the planet's future. The language of the Sehaptin people speaks the unity of the cosmos; and, with every loss of a species of plant or insect or animal, we have to relearn our language. Every loss of species diminishes the whole of life and the language of life. Creation is a song. But ours is a diminished song, with fewer words and fewer notes. Today, the indigenous people sing a song of mourning. With proper stewardship, we can bring some measure of healing to the land. We can add notes to the song and sing it in a more hopeful key. As we do so, we shall restore to the planet its original, recuperative powers. And we'll be restoring our own health, as well. (Landis 2018, "Land," pp. 215–16)

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