humanities

Displacement and the Humanities

Manifestos from the Ancient to the Present

Edited by
Elena Isayev and Evan Jewell

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Elena Isayev's work focuses on historical and current migration, hospitality, displacement and group membership, which she has explored in *Migration Mobility and Place in Ancient Italy* (Cambridge 2017), in various other publications including the Red Cross (2017), and as co-editor of *Mobility in Antiquity* (Routledge, forthcoming). Key strands in her research include place as an intersection of mobilities; hospitality, reciprocity and interdependence; bodies out of place; common and public space. This research draws on work with colleagues in diverse contexts, including Guest Professor at the University of Potsdam (DAAD), and at the University of Pennsylvania in Classical Studies and Ancient History; as Davis Fellow in History (University of Princeton); with Campus in Camps and Decolonizing Architecture in Palestine; as part of a UNDRR/ICCROM expert panel on indigenous knowledge systems; as Principal Investigator leading the team of *Imagining Futures through Un/Archived Pasts* (AHRC, UKRI-GCRF funded 4-year project); as co-creator of AlMaisha (with Diego Segatto and Isshaq Al-Barbary)—a communal learning platform tackling urgencies of displacement and citizenship beyond the state; as co-founder of ROUTES (with Nick Gill, Ben Hudson and Helena Wray)—a research centre at Exeter focusing on Migration, Mobility and Displacement; as co-investigator of *Knowledges in Transit* with Staffan Müller-Wille. She teaches on themes in ancient history, material culture and mobilities at the University of Exeter (UK), as Professor of Ancient History and Place.

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Editorial

On Displacement and the Humanities—An Introduction

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1. Introduction

When we conceived of the volume, *Displacement and the Humanities: Manifestos from the Ancient to the Present*, six years ago, important and urgent studies on the subject of migration had increased substantially over the past decade in response to what has been termed the 'migration crisis'. The issue is seemingly timeless, and yet, the long term historical perspective shows just how ambivalent the category of migration is. What does it mean for human mobility to become a problem—a crisis? Usually, the subject is addressed from either the perspective of the host or the home community, focusing on the impact of arrival or departure. Between these two points are those who are displaced, often for periods that last more than a generation.[1] For this reason, we chose to focus on the critical issue of displacement. We broadly construed this as both the involuntary movement of people from a place of belonging, whether due to forms of conflict, famine, persecution, or environmental disasters, and also, conversely, the suspension of movement that leaves people existing without place.

The more focused heuristic lens of displacement allows us to consider cross-historical perspectives which do not immediately risk conflating 'migration' with 'refuge' or 'asylum'. It also provides a platform for discourse on place, space and territory—as shifting entities in relation to human belonging, statehood, mobility and control. It confronts the visibility and potency of displaced agency. It is not about comparison or lessons learned from history, nor was our aim to portray some kind of teleological historical trajectory either into dissolution or civilisation. Rather, the lens of displacement is about situating historical and modern concerns across the *longue durée*, to enhance our understanding and encourage new questions to expand the possibility of alternative imaginaries of then, now and into the future. This, we believe, is what the Humanities are capable of in exposing the way narratives are constructed and providing possibilities for new narratives, which have the potential to impact how people are perceived—now and in the past—as insiders or outsiders, as welcomed or rejected. Among the many possible definitions of Humanities, the one that encompasses particularly well what this volume tries to achieve is that outlined by Drees, in his work *What Are the Humanities For?* (Drees 2021, pp. 7, 10):

> Humanities are academic disciplines in which humans seek understanding of human self-understandings and self-expressions, and of the ways in which people thereby construct and experience the world they live in. Thus, the tentative definition [is]. . . Most humans are "other humans", near and far. To understand these, we need to be able to communicate—and, hence, we need language. And we need to understand their context, their place, the space they move in. As we seek to understand them, we need to reflect upon the process of understanding and the criteria involved. Our scholarly understanding of others need not be received well, as historical insight may be at odds with the self-understanding of people involved.

. . . In the *humanities* we study human languages, historical episodes, cultures, artistic expressions, ritual practices, religious beliefs, and much more. We study histories and languages of people far and near, and thereby we come to understand better our own language and history as well. By studying their art and their beliefs, we may come to reconsider our own beliefs and expressions as well. By developing our knowledge of humans, by engaging in the humanities, we learn to navigate this complex world with other humans. We are humans studying humans.

The volume brings together contributors who seek to provoke a discourse across the field of Humanities, including the disciplines of Classics and Ancient History. The intention was to create a dynamic collection using a dialogical platform that values diverse forms of knowledge, whether gathered through practice, through lived experience, training or other forms of expertise, ensuring a robust scholarly discourse understood in the most inclusive sense. Our starting point was an invitation to practitioners to offer perspectives and positions on displacement as a way to catalyse the discourse, which was then picked up in more extensive historical studies by contributors who have specialist knowledge within diverse periods and contexts, but with a primary focus on the ancient world. The discussion was taken further by researchers from different disciplines acting as respondents to each historical study, bringing in their additional expertise and reflections to deepen our understanding and suggest new questions. We hoped to gather contributors who, at a theoretical and methodological level, could: remap the priorities for current research agendas; open up disciplines and critically analyse their approaches; address the socio-political responsibilities that we have as scholars and practitioners; provide an alternative site of discourse for contemporary concerns; and lastly, stimulate future interdisciplinary work and collaborations beyond the academy.

Whether we have succeeded in our aims will depend on the continuity of the dialogue, but most of all, we hope for this to be the beginning of new conversations, challenges and collaborations. This introduction is by no means a summary of the work on the subject. Rather, it is a discourse that we envisaged would proceed along three exploratory paths: Volatile Concepts, Tangible Creations and Critical Approaches. These eventually intertwined and diverged as contributors responded to each other's provocations.

2. Between Conceptual and Material Ways of Being

The discussions in this volume were first fuelled by the contributions of diverse practitioners, whom we refer to as Catalysts. It is striking how many of their explorations break down material worlds. They expand notions of place while challenging the impossibility of place-making in contexts of displacement and also what it means to lead meaningful lives beyond existence in the meantime, or within 'permanent temporariness' (Hilal and Petti 2018). In this vein, Ayham Dalal's photo essay, *Uncovering Culture and Identity in Refugee Camps*, forces a recognition that even as people living in refugee camps are pressed into grids of 'sameness', they defy the homogeneity of their white box dwellings. Instead, through subtle material and performative acts, these practices become windows into the multiplicity of worlds they contain. The Catalyst pieces therefore expose how the very act of inhabiting is situated as a transgression. It is visible in the improvised concrete slab architecture of Sao Paolans in Brazil (Ligian Nobre, Anderson Kazuo Nakano)[2] or the Dandara Community in Brazil's Belo Horizonte (Beatriz Ribeiro, Fernando Oelze, Orlando Soares Lopes). We see it explicitly in Alessandro Petti's proposition of recognizing a multi-generational refugee camp as a valid form of human heritage—one worthy of inscription as a World Heritage site—and thus challenging its exceptionalism. The spaces of displacement are deconstructed and shown as places of intersection where individual story-lines converge, revealing a continuum with cityscapes. There is a further questioning of where displaced histories live, especially where displacement has stretched over generations into a state of permanent temporariness—where time itself becomes incomprehensible—as in Yousif M. Qasmiyeh's poem, *Time*. Through multiple examples, the Catalysts not only pro-

vide a different lens, but also reverse the gaze through which to understand the historical and present contexts. They expose the fragile foundations of power structures, and they force a recognition that the precarity and marginalisation assigned to the displaced is also shared by those in society who are emplaced and possess seemingly effective citizenships.

While there is no denial that a tremendous difference lies in the promise of access to rights and protection that those with effective citizenship hold, there are other human rights which extend beyond the reach of nation-state protocols. These may include seemingly simple yet essential rights that humanise even within the condition of temporariness: such as the right to prepare a bride for her wedding, the right to host or the right to conduct research and have one's knowledge and scholarship valued with possibilities for exchange and co-creation. Another way to express this may be a right to rhythm and place. Such rights and the potential of the Humanities is what challenged us to create a dialogical publication that could incorporate multiple forms of knowledge-making and perspectives. We situate this discourse within research projects that focus on such co-authorship as in the volume, *The Right to Research: Historical Narratives by Refugee and Global South Researchers*, edited by Marcia C. Schenck and Kate Reed (See Schenck and Reed 2023). Thus, in the spirit of a dialogical approach and as a way to continue exchanges into the future, the introduction is written in conversation with two contributors of *The Right to Research*: the historians Marcia C. Schenck, based in Potsdam, Germany, and Gerawork Teferra Gizaw, based in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya. Their generous and critical reflections on the themes and aims of this volume are dialogically woven through these pages, in their raw form, thus providing another rhythm to the discourse, which is taken from our discussion of 29 November 2022.

Dialogue I: On Dialogical Research

Gerawork T. Gizaw: What are the steps and how are we going to interact? [00:10:00][3]

Evan Jewell: I think we envisaged it as having a large portion of this transcript in the Introduction . . . if you were okay with that . . . our hope was that, whatever emerged from this, it would be continuing the dialogic structure of the volume. [00:06:00]

Elena Isayev: I think we just need to see what might work better, but keeping it very much dialogical so that it becomes a semi-creative piece of work. [00:09:00]

Marcia C. Schenck: The whole process of research in the first place is a dialogue, right? So that's just making it very explicit by saying, here's the transcription of the dialogue. [00:08:00]

Elena Isayev: . . . so Marcia. . .

Marcia C. Schenck: I am going to speak more about the scholarly production side of this, because that's the environment from which I can comment. And here I actually really like that you talk about a manifesto because to me that's really important to frame it in that way of having a written statement in which you talk about your intentions of what more inclusive scholarship can look like. I was reminded very much of, Michel-Rolph Trouillot's reflections on silences (Trouillot 2015, p. 25). When we talk about refugee history, we often say it's so hard in the archives to really get at the historical agency of those who were displaced. But then there's many ways around that, and I think you have found a great way, by engaging voices from very different contexts, and also by bringing practitioners into the conversation.

The four ways in which historical actors that are at the margins, like refugees or displaced people, get silenced according to Trouillot, are in the making of the source itself, in the assembling then of the archives and in the conception of historical narratives, as well as in the creation of what he calls "history in the final instance". This whole special collection goes to address these different stages.

You're creating an archive, right? You have, for instance, the beautiful poem *Time*, which can be read as a primary source in itself. The Catalysts all contribute to creating an archive. And they are sources by themselves or [00:38:00] in and of themselves. And then you are creating historical narratives where you have the papers authored by historians that reflect on different archives, bringing in the Catalysts as well as primary sources. And then you are writing also a version of history in the final instance with of course the histories and the responses. Pluralizing that, because you have respondents getting back at the papers that are being produced, commenting on them from very different angles. And that again opens up the field of what the final production of history might look like. We can see the different forms of these dialogues when we take, just as an example, Lena, your piece and then the responses to it by Paul Magee and Paul Collis—the recorded conversational response about meanings of non-arrival and arrival in the Aboriginal context.[4] We can also see how diverse history can be, and this is to me a really strong point of the Special Issue, that it addresses all these forms of silencing those at the margins. [00:39:00] And again, by saying "those at the margins", I'm of course talking from a very specific state-focused lens that defines who's at the margins of what.

Elena Isayev: Thank you. . .and also for bringing in the way other frameworks might help showcase [how] things could be taken forward beyond this kind of volume. . . and we might get [to] that towards the end.

Evan Jewell: That really made me rethink, especially the Catalyst section, [00:40:00] just thinking of it as an archive. It's something that hadn't hit home as much as it should have, so thanks for that.

3. Key Themes and Interventions

In approaching this volume and its agenda—or manifesto(s)—we were cognizant of the spectre of previous work on the topic of displacement and the influence of the nation-state and its increasingly technocratic approach to displaced persons and groups. As such, we aimed to move away from frameworks of displacement that placed state-based notions of power and authority at their core, and we sought to discern alternatives. A number of the Catalyst pieces were commissioned because they highlight displacements resulting also from pressures of non-state actors, such as real estate developers in Brazil (Ribeiro, Oelze, Soares Lopes) and Palestine (Athar Mufreh), or because they offer an opportunity to consider alternatives to the nation-state itself. Petti (in this volume, p. 5) asserts that "Palestinian refugee camps are the only space through which we can start to imagine and practice a political community beyond the idea of the nation-state." In this sense, the ancient context also provides alternative imaginaries, since it presents a world beyond and before the nation-state, a world before the technocratic tools used to measure and control movement across geo-political borders. Increasingly, we find numbers standing in for people in the media as well as in scholarship (see, e.g., Jewell, in this volume, for a critique), a trend that risks promoting monolithic narratives and the flattening of heterogeneous experiences of displacement. Hence, our aim here was to re-centre the people and their experience in contexts of displacement. This also means that only a few of the contributors consider the root causes and the triggers for peoples' decision to leave their homes and seek refuge: most explicitly in relation to war and violence (Jason Moralee and Eliza Gettel) and in relation to climatic factors (Elisa Perego and Rafael Scopacasa). For many of the contributors, displacement becomes defined by the experience referred to as in-between, or non-arrival and, at times, de-placement. The discourse that developed between Catalysts, Historians and Respondents addresses a number of key themes which are outlined in the remainder of the introduction.

Dialogue II: Displacement as Mobility

Evan Jewell: The first question we wanted to start off with was: did you find if there's anything that surprised or excited you about the volume or its contributions? Just anything that caught you off guard or stood out to you, good or bad, that made you think differently. [00:12:00]

Gerawork T. Gizaw: Actually, there are many things that really strike me. The first one, which I raise as a good point, is the question that you brought in the beginning related to mobility. I think it's good if I read it now, it says, "what does it mean for a human mobility to become a problem or a crisis?" For me, that's a very big question and I expected some answers in the details there. Unfortunately, the volume goes in a different direction. I don't know whether it is deliberate or I misunderstood the concept. [00:13:00] [The volume] tries to separate displacement away from mobility. It defines displacement as an involuntary movement, and it indirectly defines mobility as a voluntary movement. For me, there is a very big—I don't know what to call it—gap, which differentiates my experience from the experience of that mentioned there [in the volume]. When I think of displacement or, as you said, involuntary movement, I see my experience and others' experience within our context, and most of our mobility could be called displacement because most of it is involuntary. [00:14:00] I understand that as mobility, as a natural way of coping and living. It might be caused by routine conflicts, natural disasters or —whatever we've faced in that system.

So, to me, the real definition of mobility includes displacement . . ., but the volume entirely removes displacement from mobility. So I started thinking, okay, if involuntary movement is displacement, I ask myself, what is the other voluntary movement? I think those voluntary movements like tourism, education, which are considered formal ways of movement now came to exist after nation-states emerged. So it was very difficult for me to go back and find some past [00:15:00] stories related to displacement which are different from mobility. In this sense, I see the gap. Such a gap disfavours people who are like me. Just to give you some specific examples. Here in the host nation, the Turkana community, right now, whenever there is a drought, they cross the Uganda border with their cattle. For me, that's part of mobility. Cattle raiding is common here, in Sudan and Ethiopia, which causes mobility. We consider it as part of our lifestyle. We don't even consider it as conflict, or conflict is part of the lifestyle, that's how I see mobility from our context.

Elena Isayev: Thank you, Gera. Before we answer or respond to that powerful insight, maybe Marcia wants to pick up some of those points.

Marcia C. Schenck: I like the way that you think about displacement as involuntary movement because [00:17:00] coming from a labour history angle, mobility offered a way to not think of migration as very defined, or teleological, but really as happening more on a continuum in which you have more or less mobility and freedom, but really most of it is somewhere in the middle. We don't really have pure forms of forced or voluntary migration, because many people usually move for a variety of reasons at the same time. But at the same time, in recent years, the literature has embraced mobility in very uncritical ways. Almost positing mobility and freedom as equal, and thereby buying into this neoliberal narrative, which will talk about flexibility or self-innovation and [00:18:00] not think about the constraints that come with a global labour market in which one moves for instance, or what other economic imperatives or experiences of violence there might be that compel people to move. So in that sense, I think this kind of uncritical move towards mobility or a celebration of mobility isn't very helpful. While displacement might not be a perfect word, it sort of brings this being "in place" or being "out of place" of a person . . . to the foreground. That to me is very helpful

in thinking about bodies and people that move across time and place, and then one can broaden the conversation: what aspects are perhaps voluntary, what aspects are involuntary? What does that even mean? How do systems, how do contexts influence these decisions?

Evan Jewell: Gera, your response really made me think because it's a really valid critique, I guess in the sense if I understood you correctly, using the term [00:21:00] displacement, are we re-inscribing mobility as a problem, right, as a crisis, because that very term, has all of these implications within it. And, people who are displaced when they are called displaced are often then thought of as a problem. In that sense I think that's something we—I definitely take your point—we didn't really tackle that as much in terms of digging down into the word itself and have we really gotten away from that?

Elena Isayev: In terms of what Gera was saying, I wonder, it's interesting Gera that on the one hand you're positioning, quite rightly (and I think this is what Evan was referring to) as let's not think about these things as dichotomies, but rather see them as part of one process. And then as Marcia is saying, how we define voluntary and involuntary could itself be both problematic and may mean different things in different historical contexts as well as in [00:23:00] socio-political contexts. But I'm also wondering to what extent there is an assumption that most people don't move. So in other words, that mobility occurs only when something comes under stress, except for the very few examples that you gave about positive reasons for mobility, like education or other voluntary reasons for mobility as tourism. And I think that's something that, at least within the ancient context, we can really begin to challenge. So when we think about causality, in historical terms, if we're starting out from the perspective of sedentism as the norm and movement only happens if something disrupts that, then you have very different issues around causalities of why certain things happen. And the movements of people are seen as negative—climatic changes, even in the ancient world that drive people to move somewhere else en masse or sieges that force people out. But the other thing we see outside of mass displacements [00:24:00] is a very high level of individual or personal mobility where people set out without necessarily knowing when they will come back, if they will come back, or even their destination. Different things drive them in different parts of their life. I think there is something we didn't touch on in the Introduction—but pick up in other bits of writing—is the life-cycle. And this also maybe addresses some of what Marcia was saying, which is: if we are to talk about freedom in relation to mobility, it's about having the freedom to move maybe in earlier years of one's life and then having the freedom to not move in later periods of one's life. I don't know if freedom is the right word there, but I think in that sense of seeing things as part of a continuum, is definitely something we need to reflect on more [00:25:00].

4. Citizenship and Cosmopolitanism

Community membership may be the foundation of the ancient city-state and the current nation-state, but the way it is practiced on the ground and delineated by authorities differs significantly through time. Hence, the meaning of exclusion from it, or living in possession of it, is also not self-evident, which opens up possibilities for its alternative imagining, especially through the lens of cosmopolitanism. Some of the contributors challenge the exceptionality of ancient citizenship and consider how the institution could be appropriated by incomers and exiles within a host citizen community. Our authors explore how citizenship could at once provide a privileged status for a certain group, and yet still displace them for the state's imperial ambitions. Some of these studies thus bring out the porous, double-sided nature of citizenship. Benjamin Gray argues that ancient Greek citizenship—an early forerunner of modern models of citizenship—could be harnessed and adapted by displaced people in order to form effective and sometimes innovative

political communities in exile. Some ancient protagonists experimented with cosmopolitan styles of civic interaction and ideology in improvised quasi-civic communities—or '*poleis*-in-exile'. Subverting the exclusionary nature of the institution of citizenship, displaced groups could appeal to powers beyond individual states, as Eliza Gettel demonstrates in the example of the islanders from Delos displaced by Athens in 167 BCE, and also in the role of imperial Rome. In response to her exploration, Irial Glynn finds resonances and divergences with the plight of the Chagos Islanders in the Indian Ocean during the 20th century, in terms of the legal recourse sought by them at the international courts, and the role of colonial powers, such as the UK and US. Their continued presence on the islands was rendered as a radical act of inhabitation, perhaps akin to the Delians. Athar Mufreh's chapter exposes experimentation with Global Real Estate and Smart Cities in the West Bank of Palestine, which captures new forms of elite economic citizenship emerging within a broader geography of displacement and disenfranchisement of an entire group of people.

Different concerns emerge in Dan-el Padilla Peralta's exploration of differentiated forms of citizenship and their constraints on movement, especially those of an immigrant body. Reading alongside forms of its differentiation, which emerged with the growth of the Roman empire, he moves transhistorically from Greece to Rome to Puerto Rico, to consider the insular cases of 19th century US imperialism, wherein "the island colony is doomed never to be a piece of the continent, a part of the main" (Padilla Peralta, in this volume, p. 3). Evan Jewell's chapter on Roman colonization also examines civic hierarchies in the way that the Roman elite deployed colonization initiatives as a mechanism to displace plebeians and freedmen to the margins of empire. The agency of these colonists becomes questionable, as their marginal status is exposed in their stigmatization through metaphors of waste water. These metaphors resonate with Padilla Peralta's reflection on Emma Lazarus' poem on the Statue of Liberty, which "marks the migrant as discard, as excrescence, as effluvium" (p. 10):

> "Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she
>
> With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,
>
> Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
>
> The wretched *refuse* of your teeming shore."

It is no coincidence that most people only quote the first two lines, stopping at "the poor", exposing how enfranchisement and hierarchies of class—together with gender and race—mediate extensions of hospitality to displaced people arriving on a "teeming shore".

Dialogue III: Agency and Metaphor

[*We asked Gera and Marcia to pick out a few examples of interest to them. Here Gera begins by discussing wandering and permanent temporariness in Elena Isayev's piece*].

Gerawork T. Gizaw: The more wandering becomes political, the more it becomes problematic in such contexts, at least. So it's true, and it's in my experience, but we are not wandering for such a purpose. The other one [that interests me] is—how to pronounce it—Diogenes the Cynic who's advocating for cosmopolitan ideals. This is really interesting and I like it, and I wish it would happen, because when I see how the way that some idea of displacement assumes a nation-state, and the way things are intertwined within and across nation sates, I don't think the solutions can be found there. [00:52:00] To me, as a displaced person, I feel as if mobility works like a safety valve. Without this safety valve, the state may not sustain itself and work.

Elena Isayev: I liked very much your way of expressing the safety valve, which I hadn't thought about—mobility as a safety valve. Because that brings a question around what is a safety valve. I think I would question, then, your point at the end which said that, for nation states to survive, they need a safety valve. A lot of people that I've talked to in the past think that the nation states are the problem, so we don't necessarily want them to survive. But is it a safety valve then to

something else? . . . Benjamin Gray's piece in the volume, [00:56:00] when he talks about citizenship. . . he goes into that kind of world in much more detail.

[. . .]

Gerawork T. Gizaw: Another takeaway from Diogenes' reflection, is the statement that refers to everybody's subversion of the wandering state as a way of being political. Actually, this is my daily experience. Yes. Whenever we are wandering, we see, we connect things and the moment we express it, it looks like political. Thank you for mentioning it in that way, but it's not a deliberate attempt and we don't want it to look like that. [00:51:00] The people who are wandering are not the ones who want it to look political, rather it's a surrounding that makes it political.

Marcia C. Schenck: For me it was like it's in your heading Lena [of your chapter], the "defiance of the wandering philosopher". So to me what jumped out was, Diogenes' attitude towards where he finds himself—having not very much, being in a land far away from what he would see as his home—but trying to see that as a strength. I like the reading of agency in that situation because you read it as a rejection of the victim label. And as we know from at least a lot of [00:58:00] scholarship about refugees in the 20th century, the label of victim was a very important one to inspire donations and fundraising for UNHCR and other initiatives around refugees. So in that sense, refugees and the victimization narrative have been very intertwined, at least in the second half of the 20th century. And I think it's very interesting to have an early example of how that narrative actually gets cut. And instead, mobility, and in this case also poverty, is sort of claimed as a choice, and when he [Diogenes] was evicted he says, *but I condemn the others to stay there*. And I think that is a really, really great line because we always talk about leaving as a choice, but really staying is a [00:59:00] choice too. Everybody makes a choice every day, whether that's to pick up and move or whether that's to stay. It's just that the first we always frame as exceptional and the other as the norm. It's a very convincing reading of the agency of those who find themselves perhaps involuntarily moving that lets them be the agents of history, the agents of their own life choices.

[. . .]

Gerawork T. Gizaw: Okay, I forgot about the issue of innovativeness. One of the takeaways considers as if we [displaced people] are innovative. Some writers [like Oka, Jansen and others] who studied Kakuma camp and wrote about our entrepreneurial nature (See Oka 2011; Jansen 2018)—in their discussion, they show how we refugees do everything possible to survive, [01:04:00] including illicit or semi-illicit activities, because the question is about sustaining life or survival and such actions seem justifiable. Yes, that form of innovativeness or that form of entrepreneurial skill is there, but when we go out [of the camp] it may not reward us. So if that type of creativity is considered as innovativeness, I think it may be misleading. There are so many matrices that limit us from what we want to do. We do everything possible to pass through them and get what we want. But should we consider that as if we are innovative? I'm afraid not. I remember when we revised a book with Kate [Reed], one refugee who reached Europe in the Jungle camp, had navigated so many countries, including the UK. He finally came back to the Jungle camp. To cross every nation's boundaries he encountered, he used creative ideas and did everything possible. Yes, of course, there is [01:05:00] creativity there, but at the end of the day, this is what he said: *Now I am a different person. I'm not the one who used to be there at home*. That different persona that allowed him to do very illicit things brought a different type of personality. So I'm afraid that we may also encourage this type of thing when we say refugees are innovative.

Elena Isayev: What you just said is incredibly powerful, but also in conversation with all of us, what it makes me realize is how much work (at least I'll speak for myself), how much work I still have to do to recognize where on the one hand I'm trying to bring things together on a particular plane, but actually in the end inadvertently (that's not an excuse) still create an exclusionary narrative, [01:06:00] or a narrative that is sometimes naive or hopeful, but not hopeful in a way that helps because maybe it masks a lot of things. So . . .thinking about innovation. I'm very critical of the term resilience for all the reasons that you've just described, but I hadn't assigned those criticisms to also thinking about concepts like innovation.

Evan Jewell: I just want to echo what you were saying, Lena. The bit about agency and the problematics, it's a thorny word. We try to infuse it with this positive connotation and so forth. And a lot of our authors use that. [01:09:00] But at the same time, as you say, Gera, it kind of—along with endurance and persistence—these words can be euphemisms, but they also can mask a lot of the actual experience of displaced people. And what you were saying in terms of the transformative—not necessarily in a good way—experience, right? How people are just completely changed irrevocably, even as they are supposedly "innovating".

5. Hospitality

In reflecting on hospitality, we wanted to pick up on the strands of reciprocity, interconnectivity and the role of intermediaries, especially in relation to diverse systems of governance, whether monarchic, democratic or otherwise. How displaced people make and position the host, and what protracted displacement means for host–guest relations, were key questions to push further the hospitality discourse beyond a focus on, for example, the Homeric Epics and Derrida's reflections on unconditional hospitality (Derrida 2000). Focusing on interconnectivities between hosts and guests, Diego Segatto showcases in his Catalyst piece the convergence of mobilities through intimate chance encounters whether in the street or in a home—where the living room forms a site of discourse and new imaginaries. At a different scale, Katharina Rohde focuses on curating the urban arena, as a site for host–citizen and host–guest encounters, across cities such as Johannesburg and Berlin. Co-created intersections, such as Collaborative Pop-Up Restaurants and street performances, which draw on such existing practices as boxing, provide alternative sites of pluralist co-habitation.

Host–guest relations reveal different pressures at the state level, especially in the context of protracted displacement, as explored by Elisabeth Yarbakhsh's contribution. She examines Derrida's reflections on hospitality through the strained relations between Iranian citizen-hosts and Afghan refugee-guests—some of whom have been in Iran over generations, with limited access to rights and protection. The investigation focuses the shifting scales between the national juridical framework of asylum and the domestic expression of initial welcome of the guest—to share food around the *sofreh* (tablecloth). She explores opportunities for a guest who is denied the possibility of transformation into fellow citizen and instead becomes 'hostage' to a narrative of 'guestness'. Addressing host–guest relations more broadly, Benjamin Gray investigates the opportunities and limits of ancient polis (city-state) citizenship-grants and cosmopolitan approaches to it. His critique of Agamben's discourse on such issues is the starting point for Camillo Boano's response to the paper, which employs a spatialising approach—questioning where the city ends and the camp begins—to overcome parameters of nation-state epistemologies.

6. Materiality and Spatiality

These exchanges raise questions about the diverse forms of materiality and spatiality of displacement across time. Material traces of displacement, whether as objects, structures or the landscape, are notoriously difficult to identify in the ancient context, in part, because people who have to flee and need to be on the move take few possessions with them, and

what is brought on the journey may not identify the custodian as coming from elsewhere. While there may be archaeological traces of continuing socio-cultural practices with links to an origin-home and a diasporic community, the circumstances of those who engage with them, whether displaced or not, are difficult to identify. There is no equivalent to the material and digital footprint of the extensive paperwork and documents charting displacement today—which may also not remain beyond this century.

In terms of the built environment, the evidence of rapid abandonment and destruction at ancient sites could signal that its population was displaced. There are also some sites that show the need for hurried construction, but no direct evidence of purpose-built enclosures for accommodating displaced people, as distinct from, for example, ancient sanctuaries, which included accommodation facilities that we know were also used by asylum seekers. Segregation in the ancient Mediterranean context is visible in terms of status but not physical presence. Exiles and asylum seekers, if not denied entry, lived among other inhabitants in the cities and their surrounding landscapes; as such, there is no equivalent to asylum detention centres or refugee camps. It is telling, therefore, that a substantial number of Catalyst pieces focus on architecture and the built environment of the present day, designed by or for people who are marginalised, displaced or both. The transformation of the refugee camp—intended as a short-term solution—into an intergenerational site of inhabitation is confronted directly by Petti and also in Boano's response piece to Gray, who challenge in their different ways the dichotomy between city and camp. Samar Maqusi's Catalyst piece also addresses this by charting the constrained spaces and planning impositions in the refugee camps in Lebanon. On the spectrum between city and informal settlement are occupations, townships and favelas—solutions created in the face of precarity to counteract systemic exclusion and violence. Examples of this are the occupation of a disused site in Belo Horizonte, transformed into Dandara (Soares Lopes, Ribeiro and Oelze), or the creative use of in-between spaces and rooftops as gathering sites for activities 'On the Slab' in Sao Paolo (Nobre, Kazuo Nakano).

These sites, more than physical manifestations of Sassen's 'systemic edge', encapsulate diverse forms of agency that allow for making meaningful lives within conditions of precarity (Sassen 2014). Isayev investigates possibilities for its overcoming and subversion through the relationship between ancient wandering and today's permanent temporariness. The historically contingent approaches to the meaning of land, and its connection to citizenship and belonging, creates clashes in our understanding of the condition(s). Spatially, the place of exclusion in the current world of nation-states is significantly greater than inclusion. Thus, Isayev observes that where past narratives of displacement focus on the inability to return, today, the focus is on non-arrival. The way that both of these reverberate in the experience of people whose native lands have been colonised is viscerally exposed in the response piece by the poets Paul Collis and Paul Magee. In their dialogue on *Non-Return and Non-Arrival in Aboriginal Australia*, which moves through landscape and memory, they confront the possibilities of return to (a) country never left.

Dialogue IV: Meaningful Life and Place

Gerawork T. Gizaw: Actually, all of my explanation here is based on experience and my wild imagination. This is what I thought when I think of displacement and the waiting. It brings the issue of home, host, place of belonging, migration, especially the word non-arrival and non-return. It's because, these [concepts] assume a constant place exists. But the term "mobility" transcends that, transcends boundaries. But the issue of displacement and placement is within the scope of boundary, the issue of host, even home, is within the scope of boundary. From my [00:26:00] practical experience, the issue of home, place of belonging, are not tied with specific place. They come from the experience and the way we attach our feelings to it. So that's why I say mobility may be a more favourable word to my experience than the term displacement.

Elena Isayev: I'll have to think about what we've inadvertently done in trying to open something up. It sounds like maybe we could have actually shut things down because of the assumptions we're making of the starting point that you just described.

Evan Jewell: And what is place, like the role of place I think seems quite important there. We've, maybe [00:27:00] overemphasized that from a particular mindset.

Marcia C. Schenck: I think it comes back to what we're writing against, right? Because we're writing against this bias of stasis or sedentarism. And because that is what we're trying to open up, we come back to it through the back door. And with non-arrival or non-return, I don't think we have to necessarily refer to the place of origin. I think there's a way to speak about that in cycles rather than to go back to one particular place in a linear account. So, like being cognizant of the fact that historical figures or mythical figures move through different places and perhaps redefine what being at home means, as Gera was just saying, that there is an attachment of feelings towards a particular place, rather than the place in itself, necessarily. And so then we can still keep the 'non-arrival' and the 'non-return' as metaphors to talk about this, but making it more explicit that we're not referring to the origin or the place of birth, but that the origin narrative itself could be something that shifts over time.

Elena Isayev: I think Gera in one of our conversations much earlier on, you touched on this, but I don't think we had time to explore it. So if you want to start us off on this now, about meaningful life in the meantime. And I think you challenged the notion of "in the meantime". I don't know if you wanted to say a bit more on that, which seems to tie to exactly what we're talking about here, but we can move on to a different issue.

Gerawork T. Gizaw: No problem. But would you please clarify [what you mean] when you say "meaningful life"?

Elena Isayev: Yeah, so it's about challenging the idea that people are living in liminal spaces and in limbo, which is part of what the conversation we've just been having is about, but trying to recognize that life lived wherever one is living, even if it's to do with non-arrival—between non-arrival and non-return, is [00:30:00] also a life that is meaningful. But, it could be attached to the wandering state in the way you're saying as well.

Gerawork T. Gizaw: Okay. I might put it like this, when I think of a meaningful life in that context, which as you said, is in limbo, what opportunities are there that makes my activity, my actual thinking meaningful, that is the question that I ask. So the life which is meaningful to me may not be meaningful for others based on their experience, whatever it is. So there are things that each one brings that are meaningful to them/her/him. I read a book written by a Holocaust survivor,[5] who [00:31:00] created a very good meaning and came up with psychotherapeutic techniques. I understand that, we can bring out any meaning from every situation, but the problem here is that the meaningful life that one wants and creating meaning because of certain situations are two different things. For example, for me, based on the situations that are imposed on me, I have something that I call a meaningful life. Let's say, for example, based on my background, based on my career experience, there is something that I can offer to my colleagues who are living here. That gives me meaning, but it doesn't mean that I should live like the others because that may not give me meaning and even may create more suffering. People create different meaning based on their own experience. In some cases, some people's experiences are unthinkable, [00:32:00] to me, I ask them how do they do such a thing? That is because I don't have those

experiences, and I don't see those opportunities. So to answer it straightforward, yes, as you said it everywhere, a meaningful life can be created. But what it is, depends on individual circumstance, knowledge, experience, and the belief and value system that one has embraced.

7. Geographies of Displacement and De-placement

Displacement challenges us to forgo the fixity of place, to 'unmap' the hegemonic understanding of space. Catalyst pieces, such as Segatto's, challenge us to de-centre sites we might typically look to for displacement, or re-imagine the camp spaces where the experience of permanent temporariness plays out. Many pieces, while focusing on exclusion, challenge the binary of internal and external spaces of displacement destabilising the border: from Gray's examination of poleis-in-exile, existing within other poleis, to Jewell's examination of Roman colonisation as a mechanism of domestic displacement of subaltern groups. The zones of displacement are often flipped. Some geographies do, however, maintain their borderland characteristics across time, as seen in Moralee's piece on Byzantine borderlands and the village war in Syria, especially the role of chemical warfare, both in the past and in the more recent Syrian civil war. His exploration brings into discussion the 2014 genocide perpetrated by ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) against the Êzidis, and creates space for a dialogue with *Sinjar Lives/Shingal Lives*, a community-driven oral history project and the folklorist Christine Robins. Their response to Moralee's piece opens up further lines of discussion on the political significance of the elusive victim voice.

Beyond territorial enclosures within land, we observed that the island, in particular, arose as a recursive geography of displacement across multiple contributions. This is physically instantiated by the historical cases of the islands of Delos and Chagos, elucidated by Eliza Gettel and Irial Glynn's response to her chapter. Beyond its geographical being, the threads of the 'island condition', as Padilla Peralta calls it, emerge most clearly in his chapter's understanding of the figuration of differentiated forms of citizenship as an archipelago of islands, across which the displaced refugee or immigrant has to island-hop in the pursuit of full citizenship. However, as he points out, this has very much become a repeating island, a repeating experience which constitutes a central anxiety of displacement—the non-arrival at citizenship's door. Physical islands, as seen in the case of Tuvalu, Fiji, also come into focus through Carol Farbotko's response to Perego and Scopacasa's study on climate change and displacement in Roman Italy. In a place like Tuvalu—under increasing threat from climate change—the act of creating artificial islands, as part of land reclamation efforts to counter its effects, becomes a colonial act of displacement of indigenous culture. As a recursive geography, the island seemingly speaks to the physical and figurative barriers which facilitate displacements in the first place, before, and also beyond, the borders of the nation state.

8. Reception and Practice—Decolonising the Classics

Just as the field of Classics has recently been undergoing a reckoning with its racist and colonial heritages and legacies, our volume aimed to extend beyond simply showcasing research on ancient displacement and, instead, transition to praxis—to rethink the Classics classroom and its subjectivities, in and beyond the walls of institutions. An important consideration in working towards that goal was the question of how to recognise and value diverse lived experiences as knowledge. From the perspective of the teacher, Lisa Trentin's piece investigated pedagogical ethics through a critical reflection of her own teaching in Chios and Athens, of a group of Syrian youth who have been displaced. In particular, her piece grapples with the issue of how to create possibilities for students to take ownership of their own stories and the cultural heritage of the places they had been displaced from, while simultaneously confronting their confusion at the way Western cultural institutions and bodies such as UNESCO take interest in their heritage and fetishize their displacement. It confronts the problems of a fixation on classical antiquity and its destruction in war zones such as Syria, at times ignoring its local custodians and other local priorities.

Thus, as many of us teach subjects on ancient migration, we must ask: how do we approach an ethical pedagogy, especially when the class may include colleagues and students who are displaced? This is addressed by Zena Kamash, who, in her response to Trentin, draws attention to the need for acknowledging subjectivity in the classroom: "As a person of mixed heritage (both British and Iraqi), this anxiety resonates: I am neither one nor the other, but, crucially, I have come to realise that I do not need to be; I can be me, simultaneously similar and different to those around me" (p. 2). The critical reflection on positioning of the self is also a focus in the realm of research, not least when Padilla Peralta, in his piece, highlights and explicitly invokes his own psychobiography, but does so on his own terms, in a way that resists the typical demand for the re-performance of one's story of displacement.

Dialogue V: Turning the Lens

Elena Isayev: So what work do you feel remains to be done that this volume does not or cannot do? And what might be included in the next iteration of this manifesto?

Gerawork T Gizaw: Okay. Let me start. I may say something related to the question that says: this volume may make an impact on academia, but does it serve any purpose for displaced people or community to your mind? Yes, absolutely. As I already mentioned, it's helping me to reflect on my own experience. Some of the past stories that are mentioned are good lenses for me to see what's going on here. Even knowing what was happening in the past by itself is consoling, so it really serves us, but it can also be improved. Or in the [01:14:00] next round of dialogue, it can be expanded. For example, where I would like to expand on it is in relation to the regime. Because most of the conversation is now directed towards those who are victims or displaced, it should also be directed to people who are the actors; they are many, and there are stories there. So if all sides of stories come out and we see the whole interaction there, it may become more meaningful and we may understand the reality in a more complete form.

[. . .]

Gerawork T. Gizaw: I got so many [00:48:00] important things from the volume that made me reflect deeply, not to mention that it considered permanent temporariness as a regime, which I didn't see in such a way. And it is the reality, which I fail to understand it in that way. Yes, it's a system that's why it has been sustained for so long. That was quite interesting for me, but it brought another question. Who are the actors in the regime? How can we express them? How can we see the dynamics, the chemistry, are areas to work on. I have to explore more there. Actually, the sides of the people who are displaced, who are in limbo, most of the characteristics are mentioned there, but the regime cannot be built with a displaced person only. So there [00:49:00] are missing pieces there to consider it as a regime, that may be the remaining task.

9. History: Reflections on Agency, Power and Belonging

The lens of displacement allows us to situate historical and modern concerns across the *longue durée*, thus questioning the norm, thereby destabilising it and that which is deemed marginal and exceptional. The Humanities perspective allows us to consider what is at stake in the deployment of such labels—ones that do not in themselves define experience. Within this volume, there is accordingly an underlying resistance to speak for, or speak 'on behalf of', people experiencing displacement—even as many of the authors are displaced. This is distinct from individuals and groups expressing shared challenges and opportunities that characterise the condition of displacement under which they exist, and the forms of its overcoming. The voices that speak in this volume, whether of the current age or the past, whether historic or mythical, and whether through word, object or landscape, are those of complex heroes, of victims that refuse such a label, of actors whose agency officially does

not exist, of colonisers who themselves were forced into dispersion—they tell surprising stories and ones without clear ends.

One such story is that recounted by Alfred Hirt, of the cohabitation on the Egyptian desert frontier between the locals and Dacians—the latter having been expelled from their homes by the Romans and forced into joining armies to control such populations on the frontier. Leveraging epigraphic sources, usually used to support ethnically divided narratives, Hirt reveals how the shared experience of mining, road building and the hazards of living under Imperial rule led to new shared forms of belonging, while still maintaining distinct identities. In some ways there are resonances with later forms of 'settler colonialism', a subject that the historical articles in the volume do not address directly—except in the reception of the Roman model in settler colonial models in Britain and Australia, for instance (see Jewell). What historical examples have to offer to such a discourse is a fundamental question of the volume, and this is directly addressed by Susanne Lachenicht in her questioning of what can be learned from past displacements. She stresses that such discourses are always historically contingent, and that the choice of categories used for historical investigation are never neutral, hence the need to be wary of presentism in any comparative approach. Fundamental for critical historical analysis is an understanding of how the specific is embedded in the general and the inter-relationship between them.

These observations can equally be applied to the term 'displacement' itself, which is not to insist that there would have been through time a phenomenon that would have been recognised as displacement per se. The multiplicity of experiences presented in the volume challenge us to reconsider the appropriateness of the term as a way to bring together these different experiences and to consider what other connectivities between them we may focus on instead. In part, then, one 'manifesto' of the volume and its contributions is to address precisely that question; it is our hope that the methodological interventions of the volume have facilitated its interrogation.

Dialogue VI: Across the *longue durée*

Marcia C. Schenck: What I want start with is actually Susanne Lachenicht's contribution, and that's because I'm currently based in Germany and I'm German and she starts, basing her paper in the German context inspired by 2015, which was a year that saw a lot of arrivals in Germany. I really like that she starts framing her introduction by saying, yes, 890,000 people arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany seeking refuge and asylum in 2015. In the same year though, there were also 864,000 US citizens that moved to Germany and almost [00:42:00] 600,000 people, left the country within the same year. So, just this framing is not the usual framing. Usually you just get one number, which is arrival of asylum seekers. And I think just the framing of the picture brings us back perhaps to the point that Gera made in the very beginning, the picture of mobility, and this isn't even the complete picture, but just starting to sketch out the picture of mobility in Germany in 2015, a little bit actually helps us to put into context numbers. And I think this also brings us to a larger point of the volume. Because there's a tendency, especially in migration studies, but also in the media reporting on people who move, to focus on the numbers and not on the individual human stories [00:43:00]. The very journal in which you're publishing is called *Humanities*, right? So the very approach you're taking to this is human-centred, and I think this is also extremely important, for us to be able to connect better.

And so, to come back to Susanne Lachenicht's contribution, she asked, and I quote (p. 1): *Can we compare present migrations with other, past migrations? And what can we learn from this?* She is not the only contributor who asked this question, but she does it [00:46:00] very explicitly. I think what we can learn from this is that history can be the reminder of how things like borders, citizenship, and movement work very differently in very different government structures, economic structures,

geographical structures. Tracing changing structures over time can be a reminder that the present moment and the nation-state system in which we're living is not how it has to be. So it opens up possibilities to think differently or imagine a different future. And I think that to me would be what, across these different contributions that I've read, is the big takeaway. So we don't necessarily learn from history. [00:47:00] We don't take a one-on-one lesson, but we do take this understanding that whatever categories we use today and however they might work in a systemic level today is just one way of them being not necessarily the way they have to be. And so really open up a different way to collectively think about a different future.

10. Methodology—Dialogic, Multi-Temporal Form

Part of the intervention of this volume comes from its own heterodox structure, authorship and publishing process. The dialogic structure of the volume was conceived in three entangled parts: (1) the Catalyst authors responded to our own manifesto proposal; (2) historians then responded in turn to these Catalysts; (3) these were then responded to by researchers working in another temporal and/or geographical field. This allowed for approaches on the issue of displacement from diverse starting points, as well as a dialogical co-authorship, thus preventing the insularity of viewpoints and balkanization of the different knowledges, including lived, professional, academic and artistic, among others. We envisaged the volume and its dialogues as a process of co-creation whereby lived, grounded experience could be translated into textual forms. The fictional and the imaginary were brought in as having a bearing on the understanding of actual historical lives—and life stories—thus providing a diversity of experiences of displacement.

The process facilitated organic structuring, whereby the temporal order of things was sometimes inverted: the longer paper dealt with more recent displacement (Lachenicht, Yarbakhsh), while the respondent paper entered into the conversation from the world of Classics and Ancient History (Baroud, Kasimis). All of this was made possible by the *Humanities* journal's dynamic and flexible publishing process, allowing peer-reviewed publication on a rolling basis, which proved essential for a rich dialogue to emerge. The open access format of the volume was also essential, meaning that it could reach a whole host of readers who may not otherwise have had access. All of these elements therefore functioned at a structural and methodological level to facilitate the manifesto-like interventions we sought to make.

Dialogue VII: Refusing Boundaries

Marcia C. Schenck: And I think this brings me to answering [00:19:00] the question that Evan posed in the beginning, what did I really like about this Special Issue? To me what's really, innovative about it is this ability to read and explore across so many boundaries. So it's an Issue that brings together people across disciplinary boundaries, across temporal boundaries, across boundaries of being practitioners or academics, across geographical boundaries. And it really enables, in my mind, very unique conversations. Because this is not something that you see often . . . something that bridges that many boundaries. We're quite good at creating boundaries around disciplines, around time periods and staying within our siloed conversations. And I think this is really a very brave attempt to tear down those walls and actually have a conversation all together. And so the way that you [00:20:00] started off with these very concrete Catalysts by people who are practically and currently engaging in creating a city space or, doing architectural work in refugee camps or working with refugees in different cities. So very practical embodied experiences to start off a broader conversation, that feeds into more scholarly discourses actually, I think worked really well.

[. . .]

Gerawork T. Gizaw: As Marcia said earlier, one of the good things of this paper is it brings diverse conversations and different cases together, even challenges are there. And through all those interactions, one can [00:34:00] see the collaborations that have been going on. Regarding the approach, I have one issue. It says, this is not the same as letting contemporary [00:35:00] concerns drive what we research in history, but rather recognizing that our questions of the past are framed in the present through its categories and lenses. As I said earlier, my experience forces me to expect solutions, I wish that we could create a question for our current concern and look back for solutions in the past. For me, that may be more helpful, it could even be a way that we express our responsibilities.

Elena Isayev: Yes. In other conversations, which we've been having together from ROUTES,[6] about boat crossings, we are hopefully trying to do that or at least to edge some way towards that, which is about, how you pose such questions and allow research to [00:36:00] more directly address contemporary concerns.

11. Conclusions

The dynamic process of editing and publishing this volume, in dialogue with more than 30 contributors, means we are in a very different place now to where we started six years ago. While we did not intend in any way to be comprehensive in the subjects covered, a number of themes that require more urgent attention, especially from historians, consistently emerged through the dialogues. All authors' and, especially, respondents' contributions crucially highlight both what needs more investigation, and also new pathways that now need further exploration. The following are just a few exemplary provocations on subjects where there is a lot more to be done.

Environmental concerns were only considered explicitly by Socpacasa and Perego's investigation of the occupation of marginal landscapes, and the interplay of socio-political and environmental forces in shaping the actions of subaltern groups on the move. Similarly, gender is only considered in passing in this volume. It comes into view through Medea's predicament in Isayev's chapter on wandering and, more directly, in Demetra Kasimis' response to Yarbakhsh.[7] The representation of people seeking refuge and the role of gender has come into stark view in the very different ways that the media and policy have been swayed by people fleeing wars in the Middle East over the last decade, and those fleeing the war in Ukraine now.

The authors have confronted material traces of displacement but not those that are written on the body. These are significant in, for example, bioarchaeological methods, which bring forth new and diverse questions. The challenge is to ensure that the questions posed are not such that they further reify divisive strategies. Here, Humanities approaches are critical. A number of papers touched on the meaning of the indigenous and aboriginal through time, yet only the dialogue by Magee and Collis made it the focus of their response. They introduce diverse perceptions of the world, as viewed through indigenous value systems and approaches to human intersections and movements through the landscape. The momentum exists for showcasing and incorporating these diverse value systems further, as, for example, recently recognised in the IPCC report—The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.[8] Crucially, we have only begun to ask how the Humanities' approaches and methods can contribute to the discourse on displacement beyond the academy. How these investigations can feed back into the discourse on the street and into policy requires much more work, not least because what we have not addressed are the root causes of the displacement, and in whose interest it is to keep them alive.

Dialogue VIII: Manifestos for Future Work

Marcia C. Schenck: And now where do we go from here? Three things came to my mind. The first, because I'm a teacher, I think this Special Issue would be really, really fantastic to use in the classroom, specifically those contributions that bring the present and antiquity together. Because this is a combination that

I rarely see in the literature, and I think it would be really fruitful in helping students to question the [00:44:00] categories that they come across now, like passports or borders, when they see how differently these things worked over time. And the second thing would be to bring the Special Issue back to the communities in which the contributions originated. This could be the Dandara community in Brazil, or it could be the camps in the West Bank, or it could be the different universities at which people work. Maybe some of these conversations could be recorded, maybe some of them could be collected. And then we have sort of this meta level of the meta level, right? So like how do different people in different locations now read this material and engage with it, I think would be super interesting to follow up with and have that as an addendum or something to this Special Issue. And the third thing is that I was wondering, because some of our work aims to unsettle the narratives that we [00:45:00] see replicated in the media, and I was wondering how do we reach with that kind of work also people who write for the media? So would that be a press toolkit? Would that be a special event for journalists? To me that [reaching journalists] would be really, really fruitful, just because the different contributions unsettle so many of these narratives that I think a lot of people have internalized when they think about migration, including also journalists.

I love the framework and I think it would be great if a future volume or follow up work could actually address all historical periods. And then also in terms of geographical dispersion, Asia I think is a blind spot right now. Then I also would love to see [01:17:00] a section added that thinks about, alternative imaginations of the future throughout history. So, we have Tangible Creations, Volatile Concepts and Critical Approaches. And the imaginings [historical ideas about different futures]—because we're interested in the study of history to allow us to think about the world in which we live anew. I'd be really interested in how did historical actors throughout all these different time periods think the world anew? What kind of imaginations did they sustain about mobility in an imagined future at that point in time of writing? I think that would . . . help us do the work which we want to do with our deliberations of history in the present.

Evan Jewell: There's so many things that have come out of here. I didn't intervene before, but I mean, Marcia I hadn't thought about, the potential for this to reach journalists who, even in my own paper, that's something that I came across a lot was the discourse of these metaphors of waste. And these were also used in ancient contexts and how they just continue to be picked up. But how do we communicate this kind of thing to the media? I think that's a big challenge for us as academics and for displaced individuals and communities. And, I don't know how we can team up in a sense but holding a media training workshop of some kind. Information session would be interesting. It's given me ideas, [01:20:00] and your perspective is such an important one in terms of really cutting through I think a lot of the academic discourse we can get caught up in . . . in a certain framework, right? I think it will allow us to move forward even in the volume that we're currently editing.

Elena Isayev: I just wanted to follow up what Evan was saying. It's not just that it cuts across academic discourse, but the conversation is a very different kind of academic discourse, which is inclusive in a positive sense, but also inclusive by highlighting that—one hears it a lot, the words privilege—that we are all in an equal plane, but are we? [Yet] saying we are part of the same continuum. So then it's a question of where within that continuum there is that difference. Like the displacement and mobility issue that you [Gera] highlighted at the beginning [that one is part of the other rather than distinct from each other]. How do we do

this... recognizing that this is not about a them and an us, but where we stand on that continuum.

Through the provocations in this volume, we have sought to collapse dichotomies and expose continuities across social frameworks and practice, challenging the idea of the 'norm', through opening and critiquing such concepts as exceptionalism, statehood, citizenship, place and the meaning of time. Through the stimulus by catalysts, detailed studies and respondents, the volume frames a dialogue across practices, disciplines and temporalities. In so doing, we hope that it provokes future work—hence *manifestos*—not only in the historical and literary fields, but in wider research and practice.

Author Contributions: All sections of this Introduction, other than the "Dialogues", were conceived and written by E.I. and E.J. The authorship of the Dialogues is indicated by the speakers, as noted in the written transcripts, of which G.T.G. and M.C.S. represent a majority of the transcribed Dialogues. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Notes

[1] According to the UN, by the end of 2016, about two-thirds of all refugees were in protracted refugee situations, and for half of this group, that period has extended for at least 20 years. UNHCR, Refugee Agency, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016, page 22, and Figure 8. http://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-displacement-2016.html (accessed on 29 June 2023).

[2] All references to authors without dates refer to contributions in this Special Issue of the *Humanities*.

[3] The numbers in square brackets within the dialogue reflect the passage of time during the original recorded conversation on 29 November 2022, which took one hour and twenty-four minutes. Not every single line of the conversation is included here. The original transcript of the dialogue has also been divided into sections, which allows the flow of ideas between the narrative text of the Introduction—which was pre-circulated to Marcia and Gera—and our conversation that engaged with it.

[4] Paul Magee and Paul Collis in this Volume.

[5] Viktor Frankl, based on his experience in concentration camps during World War II, explained the importance of having meaning in life even if one is in a very difficult situation, which is recorded in his book: (Frankl 2006).

[6] ROUTES: Migration, Mobility, Displacement, is a research hub based at the University of Exeter: https://geography.exeter.ac.uk/routes/ (accessed on 29 June 2023).

[7] Works that address the 'Female voice' and experience include: (Kennedy 2014; Kasimis 2020, 2021; Hillner 2019; Rubinstein 2018).

[8] https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/ (accessed on 29 June 2023).

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CATALYSTS

Creative

Quantum Notes on Classic Places

Diego Segatto

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I would like to sing about an unstable, yet constant force that stresses and pushes imagination. It makes cultural and social transformations a process to experience in person.

It endorses a set of technical skills to translate a vision into a representable and viable practice.

It challenges the existent, questions reality, nurtures doubts and reinvents cognitive paths along the way.

It launches "new images" into the public arena.

As omen, a clue of possible shifts, it evokes and sometimes encounters the novelty.

It renovates cultural schemes.

Re:bus mapping. Diego Segatto for Re:Habitat, Bologna 2011.

An explorative game playing with interviews and movements in the city, aiming to build an anti-map. It was conceived through walks, relations and instant inventiveness, deconstructing how territory is normally read. The audience and the public were participants and process facilitators, not statistical subjects.

Antigone says: [1]

"Contemporaneity has produced some good outcomes since the Geneva Convention, legislative tools conceived to protect refugees, although these tools are no longer moving with the times. Contemporaneity also provokes displacements on an ever larger scale that are in many cases planned, on the basis of expectations projected toward new destinations, initiated in the countries of origin. For example the Albanians during the '80s and '90s were very much influenced by the Italian music Festival of Sanremo, thinking that the TV programme broadcasted the representation of what Italy was. Or, rather it is the creation of false myths through social media: people coming from the Sub-Saharan area arrive with a huge amount of information, from word-of-mouth, from websites, from social networks. This of course makes things easier but often also complicates, because they arrive with a preconceived framework that collapses at the moment of landing. They find themselves in a completely different situation from what they imagined. All this is reinforced many times by those who, after a successful inclusion (in the country of arrival), tend to give a sugarcoated version of their experience (to the country of departure). This is, I think, very different from the past: the creation of myths and expectations that are doomed to be disappointing for most."

A journey to Xeniwhere, Branscombe to Beer, UK, 2017, ph: Elena Isayev. A work-group of students, with Campus in Camps programme coordinators, produced a Collective Dictionary as part of Ancient Journeys and Migrants, convened by Elena Isayev (University of Exeter). On behalf of Campus in Camps.

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[1] Excerpt of an interview with a policy advisor of a humanitarian NGO, under the guise of Antigone. For the Collective Dictionary *Xenia*: http://www.campusincamps.ps/projects/xenia/.

At times, a different kind of necessity, intuition or imagination re-positions people around the globe. What was the role of the imagination when tales, spread by the roaming story-tellers, forged ideas of the world? Or what about the fantastical medieval maps, full of symbolic references?[2]

I'm led to believe that, once upon a time, as much as nowadays, those who move or are displaced from their land are led, in turn, to activate sooner or later an imagination that is beyond the necessities of migration and flight.

Rather than to be constrained, imagination and survival are dimensions to be met, digested and integrated.

Free thinking, escape—they can hardly be governed in the long term.

Power Unplugged, cover design for *Architecture after Revolution* (A. Petti, S. Hilal, E. Weizmann—Sternberg Press), Diego Segatto, Beit Sahour, Palestine, 2013. What would happen to the Israeli infrastructure of oppression if its military and civic power were to be unplugged?

Does the historian or the archaeologist—beyond the necessary preparation, competence, determination and method—need imagination to reconstruct the remains of those traces, the habits, the manufacturing, the thinking that is no longer present?

"The past is another country", some say.

Are similar wide ranging imaginative capabilities required to investigate dark matter, quantum mechanics and the varied theories of the universe?

There is no perfect formula, yet, which unveils the secrets of life and the logic of existence.

The unconceived, approached with varied dilemmas and creative responses, is experimented with using available tools to close in on the most plausible hypothesis.

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2   http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/HOC/HOC_V1/HOC_VOLUME1_chapter18.pdf.

Dis Land, digital artwork and printed on canvas 90 × 90 cm, Diego Segatto, 2009. A visual journey, as a tribute to the first artists of displacement: travelers, migrants, refugees, gypsies, nomads and smugglers.

Living organisms, surrounded and driven by diverse quandaries and levels of response, employ the imagination to discover reality and implement its potential through accidental encounters.

They move through exploratory quests.

Awareness, creativeness, inter-disciplinarity, imagination. These engines drive mankind in formulating the "next step".

They swing between the impulse for re-invention and the need for a replicable scheme.

Ghorfat Al Maieshah first flag: Falastin, Wadi Al Qelt, Palestine, 2012, ph: Diego Segatto. A temporary land where disbelief is suspended instead of rights. It is symbolically defined through natural and architectural elements found on site, indoors or outdoors, and delineated in time—subject to an expiry date. Its flag is a curtain portraying a landscape, changing cyclically. Its site of discourse is a particular living-room, where people interested in a dialogue that critically and creatively confronts the issues of hospitality, communal learning and the nation-state assemble. First stop: Sardinia, Italy, 15th–28th August 2017.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

Creative
Collaborations on the Edge

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Introduction

Since 2005 I have been working with mobile communities in the cities of Berlin, Germany and Johannesburg, South Africa. The two cities differ in many aspects but also share similarities. They both have histories of division but also great diversity, which while challenging can also provide the opportunity for the evolution of truly pluralist spaces and communities of citizens and non-citizens. It is in this context that the present project emerged, to encourage points of contact between non/citizens and to imagine future spaces, that host a multiplicity of voices and interests.

Urban Appetite (Johannesburg, 2005)

Photo: Katharina Rohde. Site-drawing: Sian Fisher.

The Urban Design studio—Urban Fabrics—looked at the agency of street traders: in finding space within a dense and highly competitive inner city context; in inventing businesses as a mode of survival; in creating social networks of support. Working together with the studio, the aim was to propose possible solutions that could be incorporated into the future development of the area.

Urban Appetite brought together immigrant street cooks and organized a street restaurant that would respond to the different conditions and needs in the course of a day. During peak business hours, the restaurant's set up allowed for the fluid accessibility of the pavement, and 'Food on the Move' was invented for business—wo/men on their way. While during off-peak, the restaurant extended its space for customers to enjoy a relaxing meal.

This pop-up street restaurant was a collaboration with street traders from different African countries seeking refuge in Johannesburg. Students and invited customers were largely new to this downtown area as it was—and partly still is—perceived as a no-go zone. The restaurant, therefore, triggered discussions around under-explored parts of the city and its makers—who are, to a great extent, displaced people from countries such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, The Democratic Republic of Congo.

A series of actions evolved during the course of an urban design studio held at The School of Architecture and Urban Planning of the University of the Witwatersrand in 2005. Urban Fabrics was set up in the context of ongoing urban regeneration of the fashion district, in downtown Johannesburg, and the threat of street traders being displaced.

(Note: this is the subtext for above project)

Collaborators: Hannah Le Roux, The JDA (Johannesburg Development Agency)

The Expandable Fight (Johannesburg, 2010)

Photos: Katharina Rohde.

The performance, the 'Expandable Fight' evolved during the build up to the FIFA World-cup in South Africa in 2010, when street traders in the inner city of Johannesburg faced evictions on a daily basis:

> Two street traders in a boxing contest in downtown Johannesburg. The space is delimited by an elastic ribbon, which becomes narrower and narrower with each round. The project tackles issues of survivalist strategies amongst displaced people on the street level; the daily struggle for space and goods, facing competition, spatial regulations and harsh law enforcement.

This performance was developed during an Art and Activism studio that took place at the School of Arts of the University of the Witwatersrand. The studio was part of the *Pavement Economies—The Happy Hawker* project that developed in 2009 with the support of the Goethe Institute, South Africa.

Collaborators: Lindy Scott, Jo Voysey.

How We Live Together (Berlin, 2015/16)

Photos: Ingrid Sabatier.

The (relatively) high influx of people to Berlin in 2015 resulted in an administrative crisis in the city and led to a mushrooming of projects and volunteer initiatives in order to welcome and support the newcomers.

'How We Live Together' used urban walks as a method to initiate encounters between people newly arrived in Berlin and urban actors familiar with the city. The collective walks triggered discussions around space-making and possible futures for a pluralist city to emerge, while simultaneously providing an introduction to the manifold neighborhoods. It further served as a networking tool to build friendships, support systems and work opportunities.

The Urban Walks were a collaboration of Katharina Rohde, Ingrid Sabatier & Stephan Schwarz (ISSS architecture and research) and The German Architecture Centre (daz).

Immediate Housing—Sustainable Neighborhood

Photos: Kaja Kuehl.

During a 10 day summer school students of architecture and urban design from Berlin, New York and Brussels were asked to develop convincing concepts for housing that can be built fast, and become an integral part of the neighborhood in the long run. Engaging with newcomers, hosted in an emergency shelter within the former state-security (Stasi) headquarters, provided input for negotiating a balance between shared and private spaces, between off-site and on-site construction and for thinking about integration as interaction. The projects also sought to integrate retail and service providers that offered opportunities for newcomers while also creating vibrant urban spaces in the neighborhood. All the student projects which responded to this idea suggested that housing should not be limited to newcomers, even in the initial phase, but should welcome a variety of residents.

The Summerschool was a collaboration of Kaja Kuehl (GSAPP, Columbia University New York), Katharina Rohde (KU Leuven) and Oliver von Spreckelsen (UdK Berlin) and supported by the housing company HOWOGE.

Creative

'Space of Refuge': Negotiating Space with Refugees Inside the Palestinian Camp

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Abstract: 'Space of Refuge' is a spatial installation directly addressing issues of inhabitation within Palestinian refugee camps in different host countries. It does so by illustrating the various modes of spatial production and subsequent evolution of Palestinian refugee camps, with particular focus upon unofficial acts of "spatial violation" that have emerged because of the increasingly protracted nature of the refugee situation.

Keywords: spatial installations; Palestinian refugee camps; production of space; conflict; protracted refuge

1. Spatial Concept

'Space of Refuge' is a spatial concept and intervention that emanated from extensive fieldwork inside Palestinian refugee camps, namely Baqa'a camp in Jordan and Burj el-Barajneh camp in Lebanon. This was part of my Ph.D research at the Bartlett School of Architecture, which directly addresses issues of inhabitation within Palestinian refugee camps in different host countries. It investigates modes of spatial practice and production by both the refugees inhabiting the camp and the host governments hosting the camps—from the onset of creating these spaces, while situating the term *spatial* here within the historical narrative of the Palestinian camp as a concept of space (refugee camp); and actual materiality of space (tent to concrete); and the resulting established camp-assemblage emanating from a culture of making space inside a regulated and protracted space of refuge. What emerged was a clear demonstration of the impact of a protraction of refuge over space, whereby refugees reappropriated the architectural physicality of the camp over the span of 70 years through producing space that challenged the United Nations' imposed parameters and standards.[1] These standards formed a rigid, grid-like layout of allocated refugee-family plots, beyond which one is not allowed to build space. In addition, the refugees had to adhere to host government policies and restrictions on building materials and heights.[2]

The Palestinian refugees realized their inevitable protraction early on, and thus opted to build up their spaces by transgressing the aforementioned delineated lines, employing what I call acts of *spatial violation*. These acts, considered an official violation inside the camp by the UN and the

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1   In the early 1950s, UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) began replacing all refugee tents with pre-fabricated shelters made out of various materials, including zinc sheets, wooden sheets, and corrugated metal roofs. Please see https://www.unrwa.org/content/replacing-tents-fabricated-shelters, (Misselwitz and Hanafi 2010; Abreek-Zubiedat 2014; Abourahme 2014).

2   See for example Organizing the Procedures of the Department of Palestinian Affairs Relating to Housing and Construction in Refugee Camps and Displaced Persons and Granting Access to Vacant Lands within these Camps for Housing and Public Benefit Projects for the Service Committees and Civil Society Organizations in the Camps (Department of Palestinian Affairs 2012).

host government (Sanyal 2014), are nonetheless tolerated, and have enabled the refugees to construct a *Palestinian Scale*, in physical, architectural terms, which proved to be detrimental as it reached a spatial threshold over a protracted refuge, deemed threatening by the host governments. This new scale, beyond UN and host country parameters[3], provided a camp tissue unequivocal to the refugee, yet inaccessible to the host government security apparatuses. This new spatial condition prompted these host governments to adopt modes of spatial intervention meant to fragment and resize the camp's scale, through opening new wide streets that divide the camp into smaller accessible areas (Achilli 2015, p. 271), or, in some more violent cases, through the complete destruction of the camp, of which Nahr al-Bared camp in Lebanon was the most recent case in 2007 (Hassan and Hanafi 2010).

The diagram below showcases, through mapping, the evolution of the Palestinian camp's architecture, demonstrated through the progression of acts of *spatial violation* inside the camp.

Building the Palestinian Scale

The first attempt to regulate the scale of the Palestinian camp was the UN's camp layout of a grid system in the 1950s consisting of demarcated refugee plots (100 m^2) entitled as "right-of-use" for each refugee family, and housing within it a three-by-four-meter asbestos room (in solid grey, top-left). Anything built beyond the demarcated 100m^2 plot would be considered a spatial violation. Amenities were provided as public nodes throughout the camp, which prompted the refugee families

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3   Please see (Rueff and Viaro 2010).

to immediately construct their own private amenities inside the plot, rapidly saturating the horizontal plane in the 1960s–70s, and initiating horizontal encroachments beyond the plot in the form of *Attabat* (outdoor thresholds, top-right). As horizontal encroachments became difficult, refugees devised another "architectural element" in the 1980s–90s in the form of makeshift external stairs to facilitate vertical expansions (bottom-left), often considered a spatial violation due to the host government's height restrictions. Today, the camp—enabled by acts of spatial violation—has reached a scale transgressing humanitarian regulations, and creating spatial economies (for example renting and selling space) which contests humanitarian and host country policies, while at the same time attesting to their containment and control.

2. 'Space of Refuge'—A Spatial Installation inside the Palestinian Camp

After spending four years conducting fieldwork inside the camps between 2014–2017, and confronted with the reality of camp-spaces being physically altered by host governments to hinder their potential collective agency, it was clear that the urgent need inside the camp was not its architecture, but precisely the operation of it—socially, economically, and most importantly politically. In more specific terms, considering the sociopolitical barriers and the prohibition of discussing conflict overtly inside the Palestinian camp, the need that emerged from the field studies was not that of building actual space, but of discussing space and its sociopolitical determinations on the camp and the refugees. To be able to formulate this inside the Palestinian camp, the interventions needed to be designed utilizing spatial means with the aim of transferring this spatial knowledge to other camps in different host countries, and to global cities (of which London was the first) to augment this critical discussion about space and refuge, and in turn create a spatial network constructed from sharing spatial knowledge. Every time the installation travels to a different space, it opens up yet another hybrid, third space where questions of socio-spatial challenges are addressed.

To ensure a genuine and constructive new space for dialogue inside the camp, the intervention needed to plug into the existing spatiality of the camp, and act as a new, yet harmonious element within the larger existing camp apparatus.[4] Through recreating methods and materiality of construction developed and used inside the camp, 'Space of Refuge' emerged as a installation concerned with negotiating space through space-making by constructing a spatial installation which directly addressed "scale" and "production of space". Inside a rich, complex, and unstable space, such as the Palestinian camp, the interventions were imagined as devices that can cause a disruption to the existing understanding of space and a platform to discuss it. In addition, these interventions would serve as devices to re-map academic and theoretical understanding of spaces of refuge through challenging existing notions and definitions of said spaces.

The 'Space of Refuge' installation superimposes two Palestinian camp-scales in two different host countries: Baqa'a camp in Jordan and Burj el-Barajneh camp in Lebanon (refer to Diagram below). In doing so, the installation reveals how each group of refugees in both countries has come to adopt a very different method of spatial production and to engage in very different forms of spatial violation. The installation incorporates multimedia formats, including film, sound pieces, and photography, always with the aim to create a more democratic form of dialogue.

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4 Please see (Foucault 1980; Delueze 1992; McFarlane 2011).

Diagram showing the superimposition of two camp scales, Baqa'a camp in yellow and Burj el-Barajneh camp in grey.

2.1. 'Space of Refuge' in Baqa'a Camp, Jordan, 2015

(L) An image of Burj el-Barajneh camp in 2014, Lebanon; (C) Intervention site showing superimposition lines on the "roof-site" in Baqa'a camp, Jordan; (R) Superimposition built as a spatial installation.

Through superimposing two camp-scales, a hybrid third is produced, one that can act as an agent for "transferring space and knowledge," and have the potential to proliferate into a new order of "power relations".

Images from inside the installation in Baqa'a camp, showing refugees experiencing the new scale and engaging in architectural maps, as well as films documenting camp spaces from the 1970s until today.

2.2. 'Space of Refuge' in Burj el-Barajneh Camp, Lebanon, 2016

Map showing the installation site in Burj el-Barajneh camp and scale-superimposition concepts (in colors).

Considering Burj el-Barajneh camp's highly dense scale, the installation needed to be built on the ground in common areas. In addition, considering its particular spatial history, the approach to scale-superimposition in Burj el-Barajneh camp differed from Baqa'a camp, in that I opted to superimpose three different modes of spatial scales, each with the aim to produce different "scales" of discussion around space, and potentially trigger the existing apparatus to behave alternatively.

The first mode involved extending the existing scale beyond the current spatial threshold, thus questioning the limits of space, while concurrently revealing the ingenious skills the refugees possess in relation to building space within existing limitations;

Mode 1: (L) laying out the installation outline whereby extending the existing scale, (C) Constructing the installation, (R) Installation piece acting as another element within the larger camp-apparatus.

the second mode involved superimposing the first UN scale built inside the camp (demonstrated through the three-by-four-meter UN shelter room) over the existing scale of the camp, so as to clearly demonstrate the historical evolution of space inside the camp;

Mode 2: (L) Constructing the UN shelter room, (R) Shelter room installation in blue (the official UN color) intersecting with the existing spatial fabric causing the blue shelter to be interrupted on all four sides.

and the third mode was an application of a Foucauldian exercise, stacking the existing grid onto itself while applying a "shifting", to intentionally mask-cover certain areas on the ground and reveal new ones in the form of new, potential space and knowledge.

Mode 3: Images showing the third installation mode which involved stacking the camp grid onto itself while applying a shift to reveal new potential spaces, while the translucent installation material allows the refugee to question this new relationship.

By constructing new scales—in the form of installations—on existing ones, not only is the existing form interrupted, but the existing spatio-movement and circulation are altered as well, forcing the inhabitants to address the intervention as part of their daily inhabitation of the camp.

Image showing the camp inhabitants going about their daily lives while encountering the installations along the way and engaging with them in different ways. Some treat them as another natural element of the camp, while others address them as new operational devices within the camp's tissue.

Interventions inside a complex and conflictual space—such as those of the camps—acquire various functions and have the potential to adopt numerous subjectivities depending on their localized sociopolitical geography within the camp, as well as the materiality of the spatial network of which they have been inserted. Yet, what remains a common element across different camp geographies is the simultaneous production of space and conflict, a conflict that can become productive—as history shows in the camps—in redefining existing power relations.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

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Creative

Uncovering Culture and Identity in Refugee Camps

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Refugee camps, especially in their emergency phases, are places where everything seems to be similar, repetitive, and modular. This impression is not only due to the unified shelter unit that is usually distributed by UNHCR[1] (traditionally a tent, and recently caravans, prefabs, and developed T-Shelters), but is also due to the camps' ordered layout and hierarchical plan (Figures 1–3). This generates an assumption that all refugees are the same, and a feeling of a collective identity emerges: "All of us carry water from the same water tank...all of us go to the same toilet...all of us go to the same mall....and all of us have the same visa [WFP[2] debt cards]...we are all the same . . . we are all refugees"—a young man from Zaatari camp in Jordan explained. This is true, but it is definitely not the whole truth. When a villager from Daraa was asked about how he feels to be in the same camp with city dwellers, he replied, "I felt they are different... the prestige and lifestyle which they are used to does not fit in here...I thought they should be living in Amman—I am even shy to ask them what happened!". At the same time, a man from Damascus complained about the traditions of villagers from Southern Syria; "Their weddings last for weeks and they are mixed [men and women]! In Damascus, it was just one night . . . women celebrate by themselves and men celebrate by themselves!"

Figure 1. Zaatari Camp (Source: Author 2015).

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1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
2 World Food Program.

Figure 2. Zaatari camp as planned by UNHCR (Source: Author, 2015).

Figure 3. The Emirati-Jordanian Camp in Jordan (Source: Author, 2016).

These cultural differences appear in the building and housing traditions within the unified shelters. For instance, another young man who used to live in Damascus furnished his caravan with sofas and a table similar to salons you find in cities, whereas the houses of the Bedouins (nomads) from Daraa and Homs could be identified by their extensive use of tent sheets to demarcate space and construct the dwelling. Yet, these traditions and cultures mix together. In fact, the camp may present itself as an opportunity that would never have happened for some in Syria. A young man from Zaatari explained about how people from his village changed; "They got mixed with new societies, got introduced to new people, saw how they used to live...back in the village they were closed . . . now they expanded their horizons." This observation appears to be valid in an economic sense as well. While many families suffer from the lack of economic opportunities in camps like Zaatari and Azraq in Jordan, some are very well-off. A man sitting inside a house with a small rundown fountain, no different from the houses next to it (Figure 4), explained, "We have a salon for brides attached to our house . . . we had six young girls working for us . . . and sometimes we prepared 16 brides a day!" This gives an idea of the different levels of income inside the camp.

Figure 4. Salon Um-Ahmad for brides with a pink door attached to their house (Source: Author, 2017).

Despite the initial visual/systematic homogeneity, the camp is a site for cultural diversity, contestation, and hybridization. Coming from different regions, backgrounds, traditions, urban settings (villagers, city dwellers, nomads), and economic conditions (rich, middle-class, and poor), a refugee camp resembles a colorful mosaic that is suddenly painted with white, over which the big turquoise signage of UNHCR has been placed. These dynamics, mosaics, and colors need to be uncovered again.[3]

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

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[3] This text is based on the fieldwork notes of the author, conducted between November 2016 and April 2017 in Zaatari camp as part of his Ph.D. research: "Understanding the Morphology of Zaatari Camp: The Role of Culture, Representations of Home and the Social Structuring of Space" at TU Berlin. Taking an ethnographic approach, the study looks at 'Home' as a microcosm to understand the social structuring of the camp's space and reveal the different factors related to it. Additionally to the previously mentioned fieldwork, the study builds on the author's experience and engagement in Syrian and Palestinian camps in Jordan since 2014 as a researcher, consultant and tutor for several workshops and studies.

Creative

On the Slab, Our Architecture under Construction

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On the slab, São Paulo, 2003. Photo by Ligia Nobre.

1. São Paulo S.A.[1]

The 1950s and 60s was marked by the developmentalism, industrialization, and modernization of the peripheral capitalism of Brazil and by the demographic explosion and unprecedented urban expansion in the country. Throughout these decades, São Paulo became the political, cultural, and economic epicenter of Brazil, as well as an example of the worldwide phenomenon of great metropolises. The city's territories are marked by inequalities between the low- and high-income groups, each with distinct access to urban spaces, resources, and public infrastructure. However,

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[1] In Portuguese—s.a. is sociedade anônima; In English it means anonymous society.

the borders are tenuous and porous between the so-called 'global city' and the places of the 'excluded' and 'poor people'. In the 1970s and 80s, the social and political movements occurring in São Paulo contributed to the long process of the "re-democratization" of Brazilian society. In a long-lasting regime—built at the intersection between legal and illegal, public and private—the social urban movements played an essential role in the creation of a new conception of "urban citizenship" (Caldeira and Holston 2004).

In the last two decades, the peripheries have changed a lot; they no longer correspond to the images of rarefied occupation and desolation of 40 years ago. There are completely new territorial configurations with large private investments, such as supermarkets and shopping malls, as well as public facilities, such as hospitals and state schools. In the clash between ownership, rented and illegal occupancy, the violence of the land conflicts erupts in the extremities of the city (Telles and Cabanes 2006). In the "acting out urbanizations" of the peripheries of the southern or eastern areas, the types of dwellings and their location in the urban fabric—with varied mobilities and access—imply completely distinct possibilities and outcomes of life for their inhabitants.

2. The Concrete Slab

The concrete slab is the common denominator within the territorializing patterns of popular "autoconstruction" dwellings—the clandestine settlement, the urban land occupation, or the slums in their final consolidated stages. The slab as a constructive component is used as a roof for constructions, which also generate small plateaus of an artificial topography used in various ways. The production of the slab is intrinsic to the mode of production of the informal city: starting with the irregular access to urban land, and influenced by a peculiar way of building houses, gradually and adjusted to the topographic profile, according to the variations of life trajectories, family cycles and the establishment of social micro-territories.

Although the land occupations and slum quarters bear manifold similarities to those of clandestine settlements, the procedures and strategies of access to the land are quite distinct from one another. Clandestine settlements have been the main alternative access to land for the low-income population in the peripheries of the metropolis of São Paulo, among other large Brazilian and Latin American cities. The informal processes of production of urban lands for "autoconstruction" dwellings define territories with intense use and occupation as well as higher and higher buildings and demographic densities. The gradual construction of a house is carried out by the inhabitants themselves, with the help of friends, neighbors, relatives, and informally hired bricklayers. Henceforth, the slabs' construction and uses follow life cycles, as areas for verandas, additions for new rooms, and places for collective sharing, interconnect domestic and urban dimensions.

A concrete slab construction represents family achievement, that demands many years of work and financial investment. As a political and household *dispositif*, the slab is also a "sign of what's yet to come". It serves as a support for expansions that might shelter families of newlyweds, children, or relatives from out-of-town. It might even be sold or rented, emerging as a source of income for its owners. All these activities take place in the peripheries of the metropolis, and have given rise to increasingly denser housing and population patterns, which in turn generate other cycles of urban informality. The evidence of this process is visible in the emergence of multiple-story houses.

3. Micro-Territories

In the house, the slab is composed of simple constructive systems. In general, it is covered with roof tiles, supported by small beams of concrete, and its permanent features comprise water reservoirs, asbestos roofing tiles, satellite dish aerials, and clotheslines with drying clothes, among others things. Access to the slab is generally through narrow ladders, 'controlled' or not by their respective house dwellers. Its multiple uses include sociability, hospitalities, reciprocal help, and exchanges of experiences and of information; acquaintanceship.

The slab's usefulness reaches its peak on weekends. On these occasions, the slab turns into the place for family gatherings, visiting neighbors and friends, and for the famous barbecue served with lots of beer. It substitutes the old backyards eliminated by the increase in density of these very settlements. The slabs are also represented in the samba, rap, and hip hop. On the slab, people listen to music and play dominos, cards, and even soccer. They celebrate birthdays and marriages, or on New Year's Eve watch the fireworks. Children fly kites, dogs play around, women chat, adolescents date. Active and passive contacts are established, encompassing looks, smells, sounds, and bodies. In these houses with few and narrow openings, the slabs are "large open areas", offering not only a view of the horizon but also room for urban negotiations. The slab is also omnipresent in the collective imaginary, appearing in samba, funk, and in rap lyrics of the hip hop movement, as well as in everyday language; in daily life.

In the extreme case of drug trafficking, these concrete slabs with a privileged, broad view of the territory are occupied, establishing an almost absolute surveillance regime on the streets as well as a definition of closed territories. In this case, negotiations are shortened by authoritarian impositions which draw other diagrams of power relations. From a "surface of sociability" to a "surface of control and watch", the slabs place themselves as architectural "quasi-objects" engaged in the complex tangle of economic, legal, cultural, and environmental relations in the metropolis.

4. On the Slab

The slabs, with their multiple dimensions and ambivalences, pose us questions such as: Which architectures and societies do we want to build for ourselves? Which "signs of what is yet to come" do we want to activate in our daily practices towards the future? The slabs configure open fields with infinite possibilities for shared narratives in the unfinished condition of these landscapes. The heterogeneity which they host is both generative and destructive of social fabrics. Herein lies the potential (and responsibility) for fostering creative narratives, that coalesce on the wider slab that is the metropolis.[2]

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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2   A larger version of this text was originally published in Livro para Ler, 10 anos de Capacete, by Editora Associação Capacete Ltda., Rio de Janeiro, 2008. Translation (Portuguese-English): Marcus Sodré.

Creative

Refugee Heritage. Part III Justification for Inscription

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Photo: Luca Capuano with Carlo Favero.

In order to inscribe a site in the World Heritage list, the property should have outstanding universal values, defined as "cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity.

—UNESCO Operational Guidelines[1]

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[1] http://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines/

In order to be eligible for inscription on the list, nominated properties must meet at least one of the criteria, and shall therefore:

(I)   Represent a masterpiece of human creative genius;

(II)   Exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town planning, or landscape design;

(III)   Bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared;

(IV)   Be an outstanding example of a type of building or architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history;

(V)   Be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the environment especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change;

(VI)   Be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance (The Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria);

(VII) Contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance;

(VIII) Be outstanding examples representing major stages of the earth's history, including the record of life, significant ongoing geological processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphological or physiographic features;

(IX)   Be outstanding examples representing significant ongoing ecological and biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal, and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals;

(X)   Contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in situ conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation.

—UNESCO World Heritage Committee[2]

3.1.a. Brief Synthesis

Dheisheh Refugee Camp is nominated for inscription on the World Heritage list according to criteria IV and VI.

(IV) Dheisheh Refugee Camp typologically embodies the memory of the *Nakba*, the longest and largest living displacement in the world today, and is at the same time the expression of an exceptional spatial, social, and political form.

(VI) Dheisheh Refugee Camp is associated with an exceptional belief in the right to return that has inspired both refugees and non-refugees from around the world in the struggle for justice and equality.

3.1.b. Criteria under Which Inscription is Proposed (and Justification for Inscription under These Criteria)

IV. Typology

The *Nakba* is an unbound and ongoing event of displacement. As its physical expression and material evidence, Dheisheh Refugee Camp represents the suffering of millions of Palestinians.

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2   http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2008/whc08-32com-9e.pdf

Palestinian refugee camps remain a fundamental issue undermining peace between states, cultures, and religions in the region. The camp itself is the materialization of a crime and is in itself a question that calls for justice, land restitution and a change of power relations. In a moment in history in which sixty million refugees around the world are actively navigating identities defined by their exclusion from statehood, Dheisheh offers a historical perspective onto the contemporary condition of refugeehood and the culture of exile.

The perpetuation of legal exceptionality in Dheisheh has created a unique urban condition. The camp is not ephemeral, but it is not a city either. Refugees forced to live in this suspended condition have developed distinctive systems of civic management outside of state and municipal institutions. The camp exists in a limbo where fundamental juridical categories such as public and private do not and cannot exist. Despite the fact that refugees build their own homes and have lived in them for generations, they cannot technically own their house or the land it sits on. This has led to the development of an exceptional form of life in common: *al masha*.[3]

The camp's inhabitants follow an underlying system of informal processes and interpersonal negotiations to make decisions concerning both individual and collective problems. These self-regulated means of conflict management and resolution did not emerge by choice, but rather in the absence of official mechanisms and as a reaction to decades of military and police violence. Constant internal debate—over building new houses, extending properties, encroaching onto pathways and alleys, closing streets for celebrations, etc.—has played a great role in shaping the camp.

The camp is subdivided by the inhabitants into different neighborhoods that maintain the name of their places of origin: Zakaria, Ras Abu Amara, Al Walajeh, Beit Jibrin, and Beit I'tab. Within the camp, there is great value placed on social capital. Norms that have helped deal with adversity over time, such as collective participation and the maintenance of social relations between families, are strongly respected. Networks of mutual support have emerged, such as the "economic safety net" set up by families originating from the village of Zakaria, who regularly pay a certain amount of money into a communal fund that can be accessed for accessing higher education.

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[3] As a term, *al masha* comes from the form of life that emerged during the Ottoman empire under the conditions in which people did not own the land but had the right to use it, to cultivate it together.

Photo: Luca Capuano with Carlo Favero.

VI. Associations

Dheisheh is not only representative of the strength of millions who resisted annihilation and erasure from history through their immutable belief in the right of return, but it is also where we can understand the right of return as essentially the claim for the freedom of movement and the freedom

to decide where to live. Refugees are forced to identify either with their village of origin or their site of exile. Yet how can one ask a young refugee born in a camp in Lebanon whether she is more Palestinian or Lebanese? The belief in the right of return opens a different political space that allows refugees to be multinational: Palestinian *and* Lebanese; Palestinian *and* Jordanian; Palestinian *and* Syrian, Palestinian *and* . . . The aspiration for return is a civic form of cohabitation that is not based on ethnic, cultural, or religious division, but instead involves all states where exiled Palestinians live.

Palestinian refugee camps are the only space through which we can start to imagine and practice a political community beyond the idea of the nation-state. Refugee camps are by definition exceptional spaces, carved out from state sovereignty. Since their creation in 1949 and 1967, Palestinian refugee camps have been directly excluded by the creation of national boundaries. As the Outstanding Universal Value of a World Heritage property depends on its ability to "transcend national boundaries," Dheisheh transcends these boundaries through its lived reality of statelessness, refugeehood, and exile.

3.1.c. Statement of Integrity

The integrity of Dheisheh is marked by a consistent and purposeful act of collective refusal. From the very beginning, several actors have exercised their power to preserve the camp as it is. The camp therefore became a battlefield, where every transformation—from something as simple as opening a window to changing a roof—has served as a political statement about the right of return. Its integrity has been preserved not by freezing the development of the camp but rather by its transformation and continual opposition to normalization and resistance to settling (*tawtin*). Dheisheh's social fabric furthermore draws strength from its refusal to integrate into the urban life of Bethlehem. The camp is thus an architecture of exile; its reality is double. Dheisheh's existence is the material connection to other places: the place of origins.

3.1.d. Statement of Authenticity

The camp has an undisputable origin in the *Nakba* of 1948 and the forty-six villages families were relocated from. The original urban structure of the camp was a military-like grid adapted to the topography. Without municipal involvement and state governance, residents were largely left to determine the evolution of their urban environment according to the values they themselves willed. Over time, the grid has been modified, contested, and absorbed by the lives of its inhabitants. In adapting to urban conditions, unique systems of civic management were developed to preserve elements of the rural cultures residents brought with them.

In opposition to the city, Dheisheh has developed a unique spatial and social structure. It is an entirely distinct property system where refugees own the right to live in a house, but not the land itself. The high density of the camp gives it a similar feeling to a historic town center, with small alleys and tightly woven social relationships. The architecture of Dheisheh can be characterized as "low profile", in that any bold formal gesture is interpreted as a statement against the right of return. Dheisheh's basic materiality is constituted by cement blocks. The low cost and versatility of the material allowed refugees to replace UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) shelters with more durable structures. The simplicity of the blocks enables the camp to maintain its form and design as both permanent and temporary. Always on the verge of being destroyed, Dheisheh's half-constructed, half-ruined form serves to oppose settlement and protect the right of return.

Photo: Luca Capuano with Carlo Favero.

3.2. Comparative Analysis

Palestinian refugee camps hold the oldest refugee population in the world at the global center of religious, cultural, imperial, and geopolitical interests. In order to compare Dheisheh with other

sites, we first need to trace the colonial origins of the refugee camp. The first camps created to regulate entire populations first appeared in European-controlled territories between the late 19th and the early 20th centuries with the intention to bulwark against potential rebellions. Those interned by the Belgians in the Congo and the Spanish in Cuba were indigenous peoples, a population without rights who were never granted citizenship by colonial authorities. The population interned by the British in South Africa was, in contrast, not made up of natives but rather of white Europeans from a former colonial power. The official justification for confining one hundred and twenty thousand Boers in camps was to protect those Boers who did not participate in the ongoing revolt. In spite of these "benevolent" intentions, more than twenty thousand non-combatant civilians died in the camps. Indeed, the concentration and confinement of a population within a small space is often justified by the will for a colonial power to "take care" of the internees.

As a form of rule, the socio-spatial typology of the camp is common among colonial histories: from the German colonization of what is now Namibia and the Italian concentration camps set up in Libya to the villages built in Algeria during the French occupation and those in Kenya by the English. However, it is not until the concentration camps built during the Second Boer War that we can glimpse what would later become a diffuse phenomenon: the use of camps to control citizens of the state. The internment of entire populations became Europe's "solution" not only to colonial resistance but, as occurred in the two world wars, to the waves of refugees and stateless peoples "back home." The first European concentration camps appeared in Holland to "welcome" Belgian refugees after the German invasion in 1914. After spreading to England, France, and beyond, by the thirties the internment camp seemed to be, in the words of Hannah Arendt, the only "country the world had to offer the stateless."

Colonial camps produced a new type of population, one perceived to be—by definition—hostile, and composed of undesirable, dangerous, suspicious individuals who needed to be kept under control simply because they belonged to a particular tribe, religion, or ethnicity. Yet it is in the basic transformation of a people into a population—a statistic to be governed—that we begin to see the possibility for extermination. It is in this historical context the two most extreme camp-forms of the twentieth century were created: the death factories of the Nazi *lagers* and the "new slavery" of the Soviet Gulags. Yet the effects of the camp did not remain confined within barriers and barbed wire, but pervaded the city. Disenfranchisement practices such as denationalization or the revocation of rights became common in France starting as early as 1915, in the Soviet Union starting in 1921, in Belgium in 1922, in Italy in 1926, and in Germany beginning in 1935. By diffusing exceptionalism throughout the space of society, the camp as an experimental form of governance has politically corroded the structural relationship citizens have with their state.

Photo: Luca Capuano with Carlo Favero.

The history of Palestinian Camps is fundamentally tied to this colonial history of camps. Among the most important nominations that signaled a turning point in the perception of World Heritage

as a celebration of "positive human values" is the 1979 nomination of Auschwitz Birkenau, whose Statement of Significance reads:

> The site is a key place of memory for the whole of humankind for the holocaust, racist policies and barbarism; it is a place of our collective memory of this dark chapter in the history of humanity, of transmission to younger generations and a sign of warning of the many threats and tragic consequences of extreme ideologies and denial of human dignity. Between the years 1942–1944 it became the main mass extermination camp where Jews were tortured and killed for their so-called racial origins. In addition to the mass murder of well over a million Jewish men, women and children, and tens of thousands of Polish victims, Auschwitz also served as a camp for the racial murder of thousands of Roma and Sinti and prisoners of several European nationalities.[4]

Similarly, the Island of Gorée is described as: "an exceptional testimony to one of the greatest tragedies in the history of human societies: the slave trade. The island of Gorée lies off the coast of Senegal, opposite Dakar. From the 15th to the 19th century, it was the largest slave-trading centre on the African coast. Ruled in succession by the Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French, its architecture is characterized by the contrast between the grim slave-quarters and the elegant houses of the slave traders. Today it continues to serve as a reminder of human exploitation and as a sanctuary for reconciliation."[5]

In both of these cases, nominated under Criteria VI as associative "evidence," World Heritage becomes a way of dealing with the world's most heinous crimes and events. Both Auschwitz Birkenau and Gorée serve as interesting comparisons to Dheisheh. Like both cases, Dheisheh is the site of a crime, yet one for which the time of reconciliation and commemoration has not yet arrived. It is therefore important to emphasize the cultural dimension of the nomination, the culture of exile.

Dheisheh also contains the expression of resistance as both materially and immaterially significant, similar to the site of Le Morne in Mauritius, which serves as: "an exceptional testimony to maroonage or resistance to slavery in terms of the mountain being used as a fortress to shelter escaped slaves, with physical and oral evidence to support that use. The dramatic form of the mountain, the heroic nature of the resistance it sheltered, and the longevity of the oral traditions associated with the maroons, has made Le Morne a symbol of slaves' fight for freedom, their suffering, and their sacrifice."[6]

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[4] The committee accepted the nomination of Auschwitz Birkenau only on the basis that it would "restrict" the nomination of "similar sites" in the future. Regardless of the intention behind the restrictions, a precedent was set: reconciliatory sites would be few in number and the committee would attribute them to a singular event (rather than treat them as serial nominations). http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/31/

[5] http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/26

[6] http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1259

Photo: Luca Capuano with Carlo Favero.

Australian Convict Sites "illustrate an active phase in the occupation of colonial lands to the detriment of the Aboriginal peoples, and the process of creating a colonial population of European origin through the dialectic of punishment and transportation followed by forced labour and social

rehabilitation to the eventual social integration of convicts as settlers."[7] Both Dheisheh and the Australian convict sites are architectural ensembles illustrating forced displacement and imprisonment. However, they are not nominated for the culture that arose within them, but rather for the "living conditions" and the architectural exhibition of the development of punitive strategies on a global scale. While both serve a direct purpose for a colonial regime trying to expand, their productive mechanisms differ. In Dheisheh, people were removed to make room for the colonial apparatus, whereas in the convict sites people were transplanted to carry out its needs. Seen together, the two make up both sides of the settler-colonial coin: the British convicts became settlers, and the Palestinians became refugees.

In relation to Criteria IV as an "example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history," Dheisheh's urban form and its associated urbanism resonate with the city of Venice. According to its statement of Outstanding Universal Value, Venice has its origin in the "5th century when Venetian populations, to escape barbarian raids, found refuge on the sandy islands of Torcello, Jesolo and Malamocco. These temporary settlements gradually become permanent and the initial refuge of the land-dwelling peasants and fishermen become a maritime power."[8] Venice is further described as an "incomparable series of architectural ensembles . . . and presents a complete typology of medieval architecture, whose exemplary value goes hand-in-hand with the outstanding character of an urban setting which has to adapt to the special requirements of the site." The urban fabric of Dheisheh contains the oldest living traces of contemporary refugeehood and represents a radical urbanism that emerged through years of political exception. It is an expression of the creativity and resistance of millions of women and men to the unique political conditions of the site.

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- The UNESCO nomination dossier was originally prepared by DAAR (Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, Sandy Rishmawi, Elsa Koehler, Isshaq Al Barbary, Mais Musleh) in consultation with Campus in Camps, Dheisheh Camp Popular Committee, Finiq Cultural Centre, Ibdaa Cultural Centre, Riwaq Centre for Architectural Conservation, and the Centre for Cultural Heritage Preservation in Bethlehem. Produced with the support of the Foundation for Art Initiatives and 5th Riwaq Biennale.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

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7   http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1306
8   http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/394/

MDPI

Creative

Private Citizenship: Real Estate Practice in Palestine

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What is the function of the new towns and real estate developments in Palestine?

The context of the West Bank serves as a unique example of the workings of real estate in an occupied territory, while considering real estate as a fundamental tool for globalization and the most critical infrastructure for urban development. The new tools that were introduced there in the mid-1990s—planned neighborhoods, title deeds, new land registrations, ownership contracts, mortgages, banks, and new sources of capital—now constitute a real estate infrastructure integral to the West Bank's development. Rawabi, the first master-planned Palestinian city, is pioneering the mechanics and experience of this global transnational infrastructure.

The evolution of a global real estate market under occupation has become the dominant spatial practice in the West Bank as well as the leading force for the Palestinian economy. The Palestinian Authority's reforms since 1994, aggravated by continual political shifts that created a diffused system of actors, have allowed real estate developers to gain power due to the unclear distribution of tasks, power structures, and territorial sovereignty. The private sector became the governing power, the authority. These private companies use 'real estate infrastructure' to help impose and dictate a conclusive idea of comfort and stability within an imagined reality. This reality is imagined by certain actors from peace envoys and Israel. It is made possible through real estate communities of individual members which 'invent nations where they do not exist' and seek refuge away from the chaotic conditions of the absence of a nation-state. Most of the planning and ideologies of these new communities, if not all of them, enable an even deeper occupation to take hold by reproducing its mechanisims.

What is key here is the sovereignty and who is governing. These emerging suburban communities of Palestine, especially Rawabi, have embodied a distinct territorialization of citizenship or 'spatial governmentality' based on contractual associations such as Home Owner Associations, replicating the American real estate model. These neighborhoods are usually governed by private developers and the individual owners themselves; a situation in which the state does not, or cannot, intervene, and rights and duties are enforced by the governing body or private developers. This explains the distinction between 'members' of contemporary real estate developments in the West Bank—their rights, duties, and relations—and the imposed non-citizen status of Palestinians in the nation-state framework.

With the unresolved status of the Palestinian state, globalization and neoliberal policies are paving the way for a surprising form of Palestinian citizenship. 'Global market citizenship', which can be considered a transnational citizenship, is a form of membership in the economic world of real estate and its financial, social, and cultural protocols. Furthermore, as the territorialization of the Palestinian state has been stalled, the global market is in a way offering a form a citizenship to Palestinians, providing a simulation, substitution, or an alternative to their envisioned modern nation-state. Lacking a nation-state of their own, but slowly becoming subjects of the market, Palestinians living in such new developments are gaining a citizenship defined by their new status as global consumers under occupation.

View of Rawabi in 2013: Located north of Ramallah, Rawabi is a new city promoted as a national project. Apart from the Israeli settlements, Rawabi is the first large-scale private sector land development project of its kind in Palestine. Created by a joint venture between a Palestinian-American businessman and the Qatari government, Rawabi's political, legal, environmental, material, and economic effects readily assemble a full house of actors, policies, and controversy. Image Source: Rawabi Newsletter 2013.

1996
Al-Tira Neighborhood

2009
AL-Reehan Neighborhood

2013
The Diplomats Residence

2007
AL Etihad Villas

Panorama of Al- Tira neighborhood. A new expansion of Ramallah city, the image shows -as appears in the background- examples of the new neighborhoods on the preiphery.

Al-Reehan

Al-Reehan

Year of establishment: 2009
Location: North of Ramallah
No of housing units: 2000
Al-Reehan Real Estate Firm
Owner:PIF

"Al-Reehan..Your Title for a
Refined Living"

Diplomats Housing

Year of establishment: 2010
Diplomats Residence
Location: North of Ramallah
No of housing units: 2000
PIF

Etihad

June 2012
Etihad, West Bank.
Location: North of Ramallah
No. of housing units: 62 villas
Union Construction and Investment UCI
"For an Individual Residential Community"

Diplomats Housing

Etihad

New planned communities around Ramallah: The new planned communities are disconnected by being built on the peripheries and on the hilltops. Their project visions are virtually indistinguishable and follow the very same real estate model, which reproduces many of its architectural typologies and nature. It is a response to the traditional 20th-century desire of middle-class communities to leave the chaotic city centers for the peripheries, seeking security, privacy, and individuality. Image and Diagram Source: Author.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

A Narrative of Resistance: A Brief History of the Dandara Community, Brazil

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Abstract: This paper presents a brief report on the history of the Dandara Occupation, in the city of Belo Horizonte, Brazil. Through a general panorama of the strategies and resistance of the residents and movements involved; this paper shows the importance of the occupied territory in the struggle for the right to housing in the city. Through the narratives of the residents, references and photographic remnants of the initial years of the occupation, a temporal line is developed to the present day that reveals the challenges and opportunities for the people of Dandara in the making of their community.

1. Introduction

The city of Belo Horizonte, capital of the Minas Gerais State in the Southeast Region of Brazil, is one of the few planned cities in the country. However, since its creation, its hinterlands have become characterized by poverty in the peripheral neighborhoods. The form in which Belo Horizonte was built forced the working-class population to stay out of the planned circle. Therefore, the creation of Belo Horizonte in its conception presented the idea of housing in the formal city as a privilege (see for example, Fernandes (2017)).

The original structure of the city, along with many other social and economic processes, is evident in the current, high inequalities that are reproduced within it. A study of the João Pinheiro Foundation (FJP) points out that Minas Gerais has the second largest housing deficit in the country: in 2014, Minas Gerais lacked 529,000 housing units. In the Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte (RMBH), neither the private sector nor the government housing programs (the largest of these being "Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida", PMCMV—My House, My Life, Program) were able to solve this problem. Instead, the housing deficit in RMBH increases year on year.

The housing deficit is a social issue where lack of access to a house is a consequence of market logic. Real estate market supply is so expensive and its access so bureaucratic that it becomes unfeasible for a large proportion of the poorest layers of society to obtain a home through the formal channels. More than that, since housing is treated by the market as a financial asset, there are many properties that are left unoccupied as a form of housing speculation.

This situation in the Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte has led to a severe increase in the Urban Occupations, reflecting the need for a fight for the "Right to the City" in Belo Horizonte (see Ferrari de Lima et al. 2014). Occupation in this context emerges as a reaction to the deficit itself and to the spatial inequalities that have characterized urban centers in general, and particularly in Belo Horizonte. However, there is another relevant element that explains why so many families have

been occupying empty land that does not conform to the "social function of the property": the "cruz do aluguel" (rent cross), as it is called by various social movements. It refers to the fact that many poor families simply cannot pay the rent due to the extremely low wage levels among the working-class and the high cost of life in the Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte.

The Dandara Community was created within such a social framework. Dandara dreamed, and dreamed aloud, of promoting a new way of dwelling; a conception beyond the established market of the exploitation of peripheral subjects in large centers. With intense debates about the right to housing, and severe criticism of the housing deficit in this city that belongs to the few, Dandara was constituted through struggle.

2. Dandara's History in Photos and Memory

The Dandara community is located in the Pampulha region (a zone of high real estate value), in Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais, Brazil). In the early hours of 9 April, 2009, a group of 150 homeless families occupied a territory—like a "sea of canvas tents"—on a piece of land that did not conform to its social function. Since then, along with the social movements *Brigadas Populares* (BPs), *Comissão Pastoral da Terra* (CPT), and *Movimento dos Sem Terra* (MST), 150 families started to build their own houses. The Dandara Community was born.

Once the territory was occupied, the *Brigadas Populares* (a political organization and social movement) took on the process of organization and resistance with the residents. It sought to promote the maintenance and self-construction of housing on the land. In the first few days news of the occupation gained national attention. The media coverage further increased the number of families that joined the occupation process. In three days the occupation increased from 150 to 1086 families. "It was nice because it happened like this, it was a surprise that we had to work so quickly! Within five days, it had already reached 1200 families." This is how Frei Gilvander, an important figure in the history of the occupation, remembers the beginnings of Dandara.

Source: Copyright © 2011 Cyro Almeida[1]. Photo description: Only enter if invited.

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[1] All the photos in this paper belong to the book "Dandara" (Almeida 2014). The author has kindly authorized its reproduction in this paper.

In the following days, due to this phenomenon, there were intensifying calls for resistance and security to stay on the land. Dwellers, members of social movements, and support networks all started to organize daily assemblies. Here the dwellers defined questions that addressed such themes as the logic of the self-managed space, its organization and structure, as well as strategies beyond the 'occupied' territory.

From the articulation of the CPT, a support network was born. At the beginning, this was composed of religious affiliates of the Catholic church, but later it expanded to public lawyers, social architects, and political scientists, along with other professionals. Important agents of these networks were groups from universities, including undergraduate and graduate students who also became involved in the daily challenges of the expanding occupation.

Source: Copyright © 2011 Cyro Almeida. Photo description: Popular assembly in the early years of the occupation.

"(. . .) And we started to join some reunions in there (. . .) and all the organizational process under [the] canvas and fighting the police (. . .)" (Sãozinha, member of Rede de Educação Cidadã (Web of Citizen Education)—RECID *apud*. (Ribeiro 2017, p. 93))

The media attention during the early years of the occupation also played a leading role in the establishment of the community. Through blogs, articles in newspapers, photographic exhibitions, documentaries, concerts, and events in the area, the occupation managed to expand this support network, commanding international visibility. Campaigns on social media made the dilemmas of the occupation accessible to people from all over the world who could contribute to the community's permanence in the territory. All these processes of articulation, from different groups, in addition to the various forces on the ground allowed the occupation to be realized and to remain until the present day. Little by little, the canvas constructions gave way to huts made of wood, which, nowadays, are almost all in the form of stone houses, still unplastered, but full of dreams about the reforms and constructions yet to be made.

Source: Copyright © 2011 Cyro Almeida. Photo description: Dweller of the community in a canvas tent at the beginning of the occupation.

Dandara, the name chosen to baptize the community, was that of a black woman and a warrior, the life-mate of the leader of the slave resistance in Brazil, Zumbi dos Palmares, and an important reference point in the fight against the slavery of the Portuguese American period.[2] Dandara was an important warrior and strategist. When her freedom was threatened she chose suicide rather than returning to a life of slavery.

> "Her fight is preserved in Brazilian history, and her warrior personality is, to this day, an example for other women. Inspired by this model, many reveal, even unconsciously, that "the fight is in the blood", like the warriors of the occupation in Belo Horizonte. Faithful companions, more than wives and mothers, they carry out the work inside their houses, they plant, and they fight—even more than some men—for the ideal of freedom glimpsed from behind the eyes of Dandara". (Andrade and Lelis 2010, p. 38, loose translation)

A symbol of the fight for freedom of black people, the choice of this politically charged name also embodies the empowerment of women in the occupation and in the fight for habitation. Many times, while their husbands were out working, the women maintained the political presence of the community. They are considered the "front line", even in confrontations with the police.

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2   Zumbi was born in 1655 and died in 1695. Slavery in Brazil began in 1532 and ended in 1888. The Palmares settlement grew from 1605 to 1694, and was eventually defeated. Its inhabitants were dispersed across the country.

Source: Copyright © 2011 Cyro Almeida. Photo description: Wagna, one of the leaders of the community, stands in front of her house door.

"In here it's like that, everything you plant, grows! If I plant in this piece of cement, it grows a sprout of cabbage!" (Mr. Orlando, resident of the occupation and militant of the Brigadas Populares (Popular Brigades) *apud* (Ribeiro 2017, p. 58)).

Source: Copyright © 2011 Cyro Almeida. Photo description: see below.

The man in this last photograph is named Orlando Soares Lopes, also known as Mr. Orlando. The resident and leader of the occupation stands in his lot. In this space, the dweller—who has a lifetime of experience in urban agriculture—wills to build his urban garden, or what he also likes to call his "future tomb".

3. Dandara's Legacy

The Dandara occupation process is extremely relevant to the struggles for urban and agrarian reform of the Brazilian left. First, an attempt to overcome a rural vs. urban dichotomy is presented through the conception of the occupation. Thus emerges the Dandara occupation, a territory located in the urban perimeter that proposes to energize this land, making it fertile and productive for those families that occupy it. Dandara embodies the combination of two agendas, three social movements, and the ideal of overcoming the difficulties encountered in occupations and peripheries (also known in Brazil as "favelas") of the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte. The union of social movements does not only look toward a new conception of housing, but an open unity of the leftist movements acting together to promote a space of internal translation between themselves and the residents of the occupation. The takeover of an important sector of the city is the result of overcoming differences and learning from each other's experiences.

Being one of the first planned occupations in the city, Dandara is an example of the dream of producing food and services on one's own land in order to make it autonomous. Social movements, whether for agrarian or urban reform, have united around an occupation project that joins their struggles: the "rururban" (rural and urban) proposal. This is an expression of the fluidity that exists between rural and urban counterparts (in the plural, thus expressing their multiplicity). Rural and urban areas are not alone; there is a co-dependency between the two that is quotidian. Dandara makes it possible to deepen this convergence of agendas, of movements coming from different spaces, both rural and urban. There is no sense in divisions which would prevent a unified housing project that is a support-base for so many families living in conditions of poverty. This effort generates a pertinent reflection on society and especially on the State, which has hitherto regarded rural and urban movements as absolutely distinct issues. This distinction is maintained despite the deep history of migration in this country—the resulting interconnections, and inter-dependencies inherent in these ways of life. Still, the juridical, municipal, state, and federal bureaucracies choose to dissociate the demands of one from the other. The *rururban* project, therfore, is more than a unifying agenda of the movements, it also bring into view the debate of field and city.

The planned *rururban* project, that is Dandara, was predetermined from the experience lived by the locals, which allowed for ambitious plans to be transformed into achievable realities possible in that moment. This model of occupation, comprising two ways of life, has initiated its own trajectory. Increasingly in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte, there are occupations that denominate rururban areas and fight to remain in the territory with their unique standing as *rururban* occupations. The dynamics of this model become autonomous even in this aspect. The concept itself is redefined not only by residents, but also by other movements that incorporate this term in their struggle for access to housing. While it is possible to map the definition of the planned rururban project from the movements of the Belo Horizonte occupation, the directions it takes remain unique and fluid.

Another important aspect that emerged from the analysis of this work is the fundamental role of the support networks in the consolidation and permanence of the occupation. The collective work carried out by its supporters continues to produce a current that strengthens the inhabitants and militants, and which—perhaps as the main point of their involvement—produces an immeasurable exchange of knowledge and experiences.

The empathy that these spaces promote constructs a society based on equity and social justice, but without romanticisation. An experience such as this, of occupying, with the involvement of future professionals, as in the case of those from universities, can promote (trans)formation in these individuals. Whether it affects their ultimate choice of profession or career, their understanding of this

world will never be the same. The same logic pervades all the groups that are involved. Furthermore, the strength that these spaces bring to the families that find themselves in situations like those presented in this paper, beyond any bonds of empathy, give power to their construction and political participation. There is a process of emancipation and autonomy in the act of occupying, and the support networks contribute considerably to the strengthening and maintenance of this process.

4. Final Remarks: Dandara's Current Challenges

From day to day, the Dandara Community keeps growing: houses are built, enhanced, and improved. Gradually, more than 2000 families have conquered the housing struggle that they dreamed and fought for. Today, after eight years of occupation, Dandara is a neighborhood, albeit an informal one, with all the characteristics and limitations of the neo-liberal city that we so often encounter day after day. However, Dandara has something that sets it apart from other neighborhoods in its region. Dandara has a history; one pervaded by struggle and effort. All these characteristics present themselves at some point as an occupation becomes a community before the eyes of the State and even its residents. With transformations resulting from the internal dynamics and ongoing family flows the characteristics of a traditional city enter these settlements, and perceptions of it change.

The perspective of the future of the occupation may be one of the most complex aspects to be considered. The intrusion of the neo-liberal model of the city warns of an arduous struggle to come. As the capital seeks to demonstrate its power, it establishes itself even in places of occupation, resistance, and construction.

Is the logic of the traditional city's system unavoidable? This question has no ready answers. In some aspects, the communities break from some features of the traditional city, but in others they do not. As time goes by, the occupied spaces become more embedded in the formal city. They become neighborhoods and start to access public services—although often precariously—and from there the struggle becomes only a memory. At the same time, walls increase and the cost of people's daily life and housing prices rise due to the planned streets and the large houses—even those not yet finished. In addition to the increasing housing costs, residents start to pay more tributes and taxes for each new service implemented in the community.

The *rururban* project, originally planned by social movements, could be a way out of this new/old reality in occupied territories. The production of goods inside these spaces could provide autonomy and allow maintenance of the territory, not only financially, but also through the union and formative processes of similar occupation projects. However, the demand for housing is urgent and, due to the increasing number of families that need places to live, the occupation of urban lands, like the Dandara case, are more and more prone to family booms occupying the territory.

The reality of these urban occupations is complex in their processes, and defies generalizations about their formation. Beyond this discussion of the difficulties of the structure and maintenance of the work of occupying land, the formative process led by social movements and support networks is the main form of resistance to the current model of society. Only a formation that sets us free from the moorings of the traditional system can drive the beginning of a new model of the city and society.

The occupation is undergoing urbanization. The State has already begun to formalize the territory and incorporate it into the city. This fact has many implications for the occupation that is gradually starting to become a neighborhood. Nevertheless, Dandara's impact is still reflected in other struggles for continued habitation in occupied territories. Dandara represents a milestone in the struggle for housing in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, and Brazil.

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Time

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Abstract: This time sequence opens with a soliloquy, or more precisely, a submission to time, in the form of personal lamentations, and is followed by irregular stanzas spanning unidentified episodes of journeying, the intention to do so, or total stasis. Throughout, time is continuously prodded by the intimate journey within one's own time, by its linguistic and haptic promise, through the name and naming, the names passed on from parents to their child. In this sense, the poem queries the inward pact signed in journeying, between the son on the one hand, and the father and mother on the other, constituting the announcement of history through intersecting times of refugeeness, but equally in the context of humanity and inhumanity as a whole. As time is incessantly probed in this poem, so is journeying within it. In particular, time, as it branches out onto subjective (and non-subjective) times, is conveyed initially through the journeying from *I/We* to *They* in the poem, ushering in competing pronouns in an attempt to blur time itself and those inside and outside it. The premise of this poem, or body of poems, is not in any way to locate time with precision, physically or historically, but to repeat a question which seldom finds a place and time; that is, "where is time" to witness the future?

Keywords: time; the body; journeying; dialects; secrets; farness; land; voice; sound; strangers; refugeeness; borders; crops; tomorrow; river; water; incomplete books; psalms

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A Soliloquy before Time

I tremble. The hand in the hand, smothered, breathless, air in between.

I tremble. My body is a garment hewn from cut-out fabric cast on the road, never a
    coincidence, an offer for the coming tense.

Who is it, the one, the only one to see the road amidst severed faces on unknown bodies?

The journey, what is it? A desolate land, a roaring sea, a name of names?

There is nowhere for me. There I killed my father to steal the name, to sail towards the
    wildest of screams and never return?

My name, they say, is that of a prophet, and my mother's, the silent hand on my shoulder,
    is holy wood for coffins and ships.

I tremble in the name of the name as I see my eyes trespassing in every void and flesh.

I see them in every road, skinned limbs, a dialect gasping for sense and air.

We walk, so we think, never in the absolute presence of one another, breathing the
    blindman's stick.

We walk with feet as heavy as fate, as light as bodies not remembering their bodies.

Each a petrified soul. Each a time.

Time

I

The secret
Creaking of hips while journeying
Faces of sand wrapped in thick cloaks
Dates from the Hereafter sealed in the far end of fruit
A glimpse of something

A blink of an eye
Then resurrection
Things they see with their eyes shut
Things they may recognise with their senses and
Edges
The severity of sleep
As they hallucinate
Then an awakening
It is the time of the tree of the unexpected
Befalling them
Stomping on arid routes like a raging beast
Ravaging the thing guarding all things
In a pale of doubts and amulets
It is far
Farther than the stitch of sound to itself

Is it not, then, the creation of farness?

II

They come
Laps devoid of night
(Perhaps time was absent or
Perhaps it was them in their unworn bodies)
They come or so they say
(When they sought what they desired
When they prodded their shadows to follow them)
They come in seconds
In a time saturated with clarity—a clear time
Now they have come
Let us invite them over
If they agree

We shall walk behind them
Towards their promised cheerfulness and
Land

III

A secret concealing nothing save the time of the road
They walk on a thread of dust
Or water
So as not to forget their intentions in the air
Another secret, it is
Or
  Digging
    Ploughing
    Shoving
    Not finding. . .

  A sighting without a mirror
  Urns of fresh metal and
Time

  A voice withers in throats of flesh and
  Dies
Time's secret is screaming
Calling
So hasten the slaughter
Hasten it, O stranger
Time is a feast
Feast's a sound hovering in sound
In the sublimity of sound

IV

They say:
We will be just like tomorrow
A river
A just river
In the beginning, as in the end, water
The river we cross with scale
And memory
(Silent was the time then)
Hands ominously gesturing at the symbol and
Nothing
(One nothing)
We shall lend the touch its touch again
The time to the kingdom of the thing
The White Ghoul?
The plain under the river?

Where is the river?
Where is it
Where is the water's witch and
The followers of water?

V

Sounds fall deep in the belly
A hole in the belly
Wreathed by the sun's orbits
The moon as it is, motionless as though devoured
Eyes growing rounder until they see another moon
A moon
The shape of a bead on a stranger's forehead

Sounds fall
They rattle in the belly
Time weds the stranger's intentions and
Leaves

VI

They sit with incomplete books and psalms
With a grip of what they do not know
With an amulet the shape of a place
These are similar-different things
Mysteries in the clarity of mind
Clear, sometimes, in their absence
They say:
Clear, do not be
Nor be time by the sword
A heart is for the stranger
God, find time, never find it
Drag it in full time
If You enter

VII

When will they come those strangers?

To write their return to nothing from nothing

From dusty borders and
Crushed wheat

From yesterday

From their broken veins

When will some of this happen?

Will they return for their
Crops
From the faces that remained
From their still faces

Where is the place?

Where is time?

VIII

Where is time?
And what happened to the wind to take them with her
Where is time at this time?
When it remains
When it dies
When it does not return even after a while
Listen
(They listen)
Listen to what is coming
Beyond what is called silence
Listen
(They listen)
Let time go back to where it was

The journey shall begin

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

HISTORICAL STUDIES and CRITICAL RESPONSES

Article

Reading Derrida in Tehran: Between an Open Door and an Empty *Sofreh*

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Abstract: We can only begin to grasp hospitality as we enact it and yet, in the moment of enactment, hospitality eludes us. In this paper I look at the enactment of hospitality in the relationship between Iranian citizen-hosts and Afghan refugee-guests in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to reflect more broadly on questions of Derridean hospitality. Moving between the theoretical and the ethnographic, I forcefully bring to bear on a situation of protracted refugee displacement, a notion of hospitality that has, to a large extent, remained abstract and unanchored. The scalar shifts between the domestic and the national (so integral to Derrida's theorising of the hospitable), are here reproduced in an examination of Iranian hospitality that simultaneously considers the juridical framework of asylum in the Islamic Republic and the domestic or homely expression of welcome, that occurs in the ushering of the guest over the threshold and the sharing of food around the *sofreh*.

Keywords: Derrida; hospitality; Iran; Afghan refugees

Displacement can be thought of as a defining characteristic of the era in which we live. Against the backdrop of ongoing conflict both within and between states, the persistence of global inequalities and the varied impacts of climate change, refugees and the (otherwise) stateless will almost certainly continue to form, as Hannah Arendt perceptively noted in the mid-twentieth century, "the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics" (Arendt [1951] 1973, p. 277). It is little wonder then, that hospitality—that accretion of practices at the site of interaction between host and guest, emplaced and displaced, citizen and refugee—has emerged as a key theme in the social sciences. Indeed, recent years have seen, "a veritable explosion of interest in the subject [of hospitality] across the social sciences and humanities" (Candea and da Col 2012, p. S3).

What *is* hospitality? The question seems simple enough, but this simplicity is deceptive. Indeed, the precise constitutive parts of hospitality have proven difficult to pin down. Hospitality is understood primarily in terms of its practice. As such, definitions of Iranian hospitality founder on certain key symbols such as the *sofreh* (tablecloth) and the open door. Iranians routinely describe hospitality (*mehman navazi*) as a national virtue, an inherent trait of Iranian-ness and an abiding expression of identity. It is understood to be tied up in practices of conspicuous self-abasement and exaggerated courtesy, in accordance with the linguistic-cultural code of *ta'arof*. Afghan refugees in Iran identify hospitality primarily by its absence. "All I want is to stop being a refugee, to one day find a place I can call home", a young Afghan woman tells me, lamenting the elusiveness of Iranian hospitality.[1]

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[1] This and subsequent quotes from both Iranian and Afghan research participants was recorded during fieldwork undertaken by the author in the Islamic Republic of Iran between February and October 2014. The particular quote attributed here to a "young Afghan woman" formed part of a series of interviews conducted between May and October 2014 with an Afghan family of two generations living on the outskirts of Shiraz, in the south of Iran. While the first generation had migrated to Iran in 1985, the second generation, including the woman quoted, was born and raised in Iran—an experience that had significantly shaped perspectives on displacement and belonging. The quote is taken from an interview in September 2014 and was translated from the Persian by the author.

An Iranian-trained Afghan cleric describes the tensions between hospitality and inhospitality in the Islamic Republic as "an open door, but an empty *sofreh*".[2] Jacques Derrida, in a 1997 lecture at Bosphorus University, declared that, "we do not know what hospitality is" (Derrida 2000a, p. 6). The implication is that hospitality is unknowable, "not because the idea is built around a difficult conceptual riddle, but because, in the end, hospitality is not a matter of objective knowledge, but belongs to another order altogether, beyond knowledge, an enigmatic 'experience' in which I set out for the stranger, for the other, for the unknown, where I cannot go" (Derrida 1997, p. 112).

Through this paper I seek to juxtapose two hospitalities: Iranian and Derridean. In doing so, I pose broader questions that speak to the interplay of ethnography and philosophy, asking how we might go about *reading Derrida in Tehran*. What meaning does Derrida have when I open a well-thumbed volume of *Of Hospitality* or *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* in a small room, in a house in which I am a guest, in a strange city?[3] Does meaning shift and take on new form in talking with Afghan refugees, who claim a right to hospitality, drawing not on Derrida but on Khomeini? What contribution can Derrida make to conversations with Iranians for whom hospitality is identified as a kind of national character trait, even as the presence of Afghan refugees is unashamedly derided? What does the language of hospitality reveal and conceal in the often fraught relationship between Iranians and Afghans?

1. From Kant to Derrida

In order to understand Derridean hospitality we must turn to its origins in Kantian cosmopolitanism. In his short essay, *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, first published in 1795, Immanuel Kant outlines his thinking around a cosmopolitan right to hospitality. Here, it is the notion of hospitality as "right" that effectively distinguishes it from charity or philanthropy and, indeed, marks out Kant's thinking as remarkable in its time and having ongoing philosophical resonance. As construed by Kant, hospitality is universal in scope on account of "common ownership of the earth's surface". At the same time, Kantian hospitality is limited to the "right to visit". A visitor, Kant argues, should not be treated as an enemy or as a threat to sovereignty. However, he may be turned away, so long as "it can be done without destroying him". Significantly, the right to visit imposes conditions in regards to the length of visitation. Kant views hospitality as time-limited, arguing that any claim to permanency must necessarily be secured through an additional contract between the visitor and the local inhabitants. As such there is no right to residence but only a right to visitation (Kant [1795] 2003, pp. 15–16).

The distinction that Kant makes between *gastrecht* (right to residence) and *besuchsrecht* (right to visitation), lies at the heart of Derrida's critique of Kantian cosmopolitanism and provides the launching point for a new way of thinking (and *doing*) hospitality. Derrida argues that the limits placed on Kantian hospitality and the contractual conditions that circumscribe permanent residency illuminate the aporetic nature of hospitality.

"Hospitality", he declares, "is a self-contradictory concept and experience that can only self-destruct" (Derrida 2000a, p. 5). This self-destructive element to hospitality—what can be thought of as its essential instability—is, Derrida argues, present right there in Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right and forms part of the enduring legacy of hospitality with which we must inevitably contend.

The internal contradiction that Derrida identifies in Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right, arises out of the elevation of the state in the hospitality nexus. A right of residence is dependent on the establishment of a treaty between states "in which exclusionary and xenophobic restrictions are

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[2] Mullah Azami was born in 1976 in Afghanistan's Ghazni province and at nineteen moved to Iran to study in the seminary city of Qom. The interview with Mullah Azami from which this quote is taken, took place in May 2014 in the family home of another Afghan research participant who was living in the city of Sadra, and with the participation and assistance of an interpreter.

[3] Derrida, Jacques. 2000. *Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond*. Edited by Anne Dufourmantelle. Translated by Rachel Bowlby. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Derrida, Jacques. 1999. *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

indoctrinated" (Brown 2010, p. 311). The granting and withholding of residency places enormous power in the hands of the sovereign, such that hospitality becomes the exclusive domain of the state. Here we see a tension between what Derrida calls the *law* of (unconditional) hospitality—a "law beyond laws"—and the *laws* of hospitality, which are inscribed in the relationship between states and act to place limits and conditions on hospitality. In addressing this tension Derrida is particularly concerned with the implications of Kantian hospitality on the contemporary regime of asylum that circumscribes the lives of refugees globally (Derrida 2001).

Derrida points, in the first place, to a disjuncture between the "great and generous principles of the right to asylum inherited from the Enlightenment thinkers . . . and the historical reality or effective implementation of these principles" (Derrida 2001, p. 11). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967 Protocol) enshrines the principle of non-refoulement, stating that an asylum seeker may not be expelled or returned to "the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (UNHCR [1951] 2010, p. 30). Indeed, it is this threat to life or freedom as a propelling force in displacement that becomes the defining characteristic of a refugee under international law. We can recognise here echoes of Kant's prohibition on turning the visitor away, where to do so would result in his or her destruction. However, Derrida argues that the juridical tradition has "remained mean-spirited and restrictive", pointing to a failure of states to *practice* hospitality (Derrida 2001, p. 11).

At a more fundamental level, Kantian hospitality fails refugees, on account of its very impossibility. Hospitality is negated by hospitality. "Injustice", Derrida argues, "begins right away, from the very threshold of the right to hospitality", for there is "no hospitality, in the classic sense, without sovereignty of oneself over one's home, but since there is also no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence" (Derrida 2000b, p. 55). It is here that Derrida invokes the notion of *hostipitalité* [hostipitality] in order to illuminate the performative contradiction of hospitality; the way in which hostility is intimately and invariably entangled with hospitality.

Rather than abandoning hospitality at the point of acknowledging its impossibility, Derrida calls for a "hospitality . . . beyond hospitality" (Derrida 2000a, p. 14). That is to say, a hospitality that pushes against its own limits, recognising that the "law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality by right" (Derrida 2000b, p. 25). In a world that increasingly throws up borders against refugees (and the moving-poor), demanding ever more complex forms of identification and documentation, Derrida calls for a radical hospitality that asks no questions. Derridean hospitality is a "pure hospitality [that] consists in welcoming whoever arrives before imposing any conditions on him, before knowing and asking anything at all, be it a name or an identity 'paper'" (Derrida 2005, p. 7).

Derrida arrives at this notion of "pure hospitality" via an (often hostile) examination of Maussian gift theory (Derrida 1992). For Mauss, the gift circulates within an escalating system of reciprocity. In other words, the gift, as espoused by Mauss, is a counterfeit gift, just as Kantian hospitality (and the practiced hospitality that follows) is a counterfeit hospitality. Derridean philosophy, by way of contrast, points to an absolute, universal and utopian hospitality. At the same time, however, Derrida calls for giving "*place* to a determined, limitable, and delimitable—in a word, to a calculable—right or law . . . to a concrete politics and ethics" of hospitality (Derrida 2000b, pp. 147–48). As Ulrik Pram Gad (2013, p. 122) argues, there is a role for philosophy in keeping the "pillars supporting the ceiling" of political debate "erect and tall", but we also need to "make ourselves familiar with the strategic terrain we intend to intervene in". That is, "having shown that we can be philosophers, we need the courage to refuse this ambition and return to ethnographic empathy and ordinary language" (Miller 2005, p. 15).

The strategic terrain in which I utilise Derrida's notion of hospitality is the Islamic Republic of Iran, a nation that, over a period of almost four decades, has "hosted" millions of "guests" in the form of refugees from the neighbouring state of Afghanistan. Between February and October 2014, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork, familiarising myself with the terrain of hospitality that shapes

and is shaped by the relationship between Iranian citizens and Afghan refugees. At this point, I shift the focus of my attention from the philosophical to the anthropological, drawing on my fieldwork in order to explore how hospitality is experienced by Iranian hosts and Afghan guests. Through the ethnographic accounts described below, threads the vital question of whether Derrida's *hostipitality* formulation can be usefully applied to contemporary Iran and how, in turn, the Iranian experience might open up to us new ways of thinking hospitality.

2. Afghan Refugees in Iran

Afghans today constitute over 20 per cent of the global refugee population and 40 per cent of those in what UNHCR designates a situation of "protracted displacement" (UNHCR 2015). The vast majority of Afghan refugees (well over 90 per cent) reside in just two countries—Pakistan and Iran (Saito 2009, p. xi). For hundreds of years, Afghans belonging to the Shia sect of Islam have made pilgrimages to holy sites within Iran, most notably the tomb of the Imam Reza at Mashhad (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005, p. 13). Moreover, at times of political crisis Iran has provided a safe-haven for Persian-speaking minorities from the central and western provinces of Afghanistan (Glazebrook and Abbasi-Shavazi 2007, p. 189). In the early-1970s, crop failure as a result of a severe drought, along with rising government taxes, compelled many Afghans to seek opportunities abroad (Saito 2009, p. 3). Most were not obliged to look far. The 1973 oil boom in the Middle East was accompanied by unprecedented growth in Iran's construction industry; providing the lure of relatively well remunerated employment to several hundred thousand Afghans who migrated westward into Iran. By December 1979, the economic incentive, somewhat muted by the revolutionary events that led to the departure of the Iranian Shah in January of that year and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic, was subsumed by an imperative to escape the Soviet invasion and unfolding war in Afghanistan. In the decades that followed, approximately one in three Afghans would seek safety—and a modicum of stability—outside their homeland (Colville 1997; Turton and Marsden 2002, pp. 9–10). Almost half of those who left would cross Afghanistan's western border into Iran, establishing a highly dispersed community, with populations of Afghan migrants found in most large regional centres and, in smaller numbers, throughout rural communities across Iran (Monsutti 2006, p. 12).

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan marked the first major sustained movement of Afghan refugees into Iran and resulted in the emergence of a global Afghan diaspora. At the time, the newly established revolutionary government in Iran had political and ideological motives in warmly embracing the Afghan exiles. Indeed, the early response of the Iranian government has frequently been characterised as "open door" (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005, p. iii).

Iran's open door policy appears, at first glance, to draw less on global notions of asylum, than on ideas around shared religiosity and the revolutionary ideal of a borderless Islam. However, failing to acknowledge the various ways in which Iran was—and remains—embedded within a broader regime of asylum, is to risk perpetuating certain Orientalist myths about the Middle East in regards to the reach of Islam in public life. Iran, having ratified the UN Convention in June 1976 and reaffirmed its commitment to asylum in the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic, is party to the same instruments that shape asylum at a global scale. What happened in the early post-revolutionary period was not an outright rejection of international laws and norms, but a reframing of them in terms of an Islamic sensibility. As such, Afghan refugees in Iran were initially nominated *mohajerin*, an Arabic term which is often translated simply as migrants, but which carries with it a whole cache of meaning and which, for Muslims, recalls the flight of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in order to escape persecution. Drawing on the etymology of the word in Islam's historical mythology, a *mohajer* is understood to have gone into exile for religious reasons where a "regime in power does not allow the free expression of Islam" (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1988, p. 145). The one who welcomes the *mohajer* is therefore performing a valuable religious act. The Iranian government's willingness to welcome Afghans in flight from the Soviet invaders reinforced its own Islamic credentials, while speaking forcefully to the pan-Islamic vision of the Islamic Republic's early leadership.

Throughout the period of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), Iran hosted up to three million Afghan refugees. Having shunned—and been shunned by—the international community following the revolution and the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, and determined to strike its own path unaligned to one or the other of the two Cold War superpowers, Iran was left almost entirely to its own devices in dealing with what would universally be considered a crisis. As aid flowed into Pakistan, where hundreds of thousands of Afghans were being corralled into refugee "villages" on the Afghan–Pakistan border, Iran was confronted with the problem of managing a refugee crisis that remained almost entirely out of sight (and out of mind) of the rest of the world. The response of the Iranian government could reasonably be described as a kind active *non*-management of the situation. The free movement of Afghans within Iran came at the cost of any official recognition or support of refugees by the Iranian authorities.

Up until 1992, refugee status was granted to Afghans on a *prima facie* basis, with the vast majority of Afghans issued "blue cards" indicating their status as *mohajerin*. Those with blue cards were granted permission to remain in Iran indefinitely and had the same access as Iranian citizens to subsidised food and health care, along with free primary and secondary education. However, as it became evident that the Afghan refugee crisis would not be swiftly resolved, the hospitality offered to Afghans fleeing their homeland, gave way to a broadly-realised hostility.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, the painfully protracted war between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988) and the death of Khomeini on 3 June 1989, all contributed to a shift in Iranian attitudes towards Afghan sojourners. A number of scholars have noted the re-emergence, in the 1990s, of a distinctly Iranian national identity (see Adelkhah 2016; Ashraf 1993; Holliday 2011; Rajaee 2000). As the revolutionary focus turned inwards, official discourse moved from emphasising Islam to emphasising the Iranian nation. One of a number of consequences of this shifting discourse was that the welcoming of *mohajer* was no longer perceived politically expedient and Afghan refugees were officially downgraded to *panahandegan*, a term which, like *mohajerin*, can be translated as "refugees", but carries pejorative nuances and suggests impoverishment (Rajaee 2000, pp. 56–58).

In 2001, the "open door" between Iran and Afghanistan was emphatically slammed shut. In March of that year the Iranian government announced that the border between the two countries was "sealed" (in Human Rights Watch 2013) This can be viewed as the culmination—and official confirmation—of a gradual shift in the way in which Afghan migrants were socially and politically situated in Iran.

Immediately following the fall of the Taliban, the Iranian government intensified efforts to repatriate Afghans remaining in the country. The existence of an official repatriation program posits the Afghan migrant as *Other* to the Iranian citizen. Indeed, Afghans in Iran are understood to be *out of place* and needing to be *put back in [their] place*. While voluntary repatriation has generally been viewed as "the foremost durable solution to forced displacement and the solution that would benefit the greatest number of refugees", the UNHCR—known to be a leading advocate of voluntary repatriation—has acknowledged that "the Afghanistan experience has highlighted the complexity of the repatriation and reintegration process" (UNHCR 2008). The extended period that Afghans have remained outside their country and the ongoing instability within, has created a situation where (voluntary) repatriation is an unlikely (and unappealing) prospect for the greater proportion of the Afghan diaspora.

In an attempt to hasten the departure of the remaining millions of Afghans in Iran, officials have instituted a project of "encouraging voluntary repatriation" through the institution of increasingly complex (and costly) bureaucratic hurdles to obtaining and retaining residency status; the gradual withdrawal of the broad rights that had earlier been extended to Afghans; and the institution of a kind of persistent, low-level harassment. This represents a deliberate effacement of the logic of hospitality that has previously governed Iranian–Afghan relations within the Islamic Republic. Ordinary Iranians are made complicit in this policy of inhospitality by the threat of sanction against those citizens who provide services to undocumented Afghans or offer employment or accommodation.

Alessandro Monsutti has described the disorientating situation of arbitrarily shifting hospitality/hostility towards Afghan migrants as a "game of cat and mouse" in which the Iranian government attempts to balance the need for a steady supply of (cheap) Afghan labour against the impulse to "discourage integration and long-term residence" (Monsutti 2005, p. 129). In this game of cat and mouse, Afghans are isolated from broader Iranian society and kept in a state of permanent vulnerability to deportation by a number of distinct devices. A lack of official residency status in the country is foremost in a broad arsenal of policies designed to deter Afghans from entering, or remaining in, Iran.

While Iran has obligations under international law to process asylum claims, in practice there are few, if any, avenues available for Afghans to lodge such claims. A lack of official status acts to maintain Afghans in a state of social and economic vulnerability, whereby they are pushed to the very margins of Iranian society. This de facto isolation of Afghans has its de jure manifestation in the implementation of what are, effectively, Afghan-free zones: urban spaces, cities or entire provinces which Afghans are prohibited from residing in or even visiting (see Justice for Iran 2012). Hospitable spaces in Iran are increasingly reconfigured as hostile and Afghan refugees rhetorically constructed as unwanted (and unwelcome) guests.

3. Myths and Metaphors of Iranian Hospitality

The initial welcome extended to Afghan refugees fits comfortably within a broader narrative of Iranian hospitality. The idea (and *ideal*) of *mehman navazi* has deep roots in Iranian society and exists within a cultural complex of hospitality that extends significantly through time and space. The trope of Middle Eastern hospitality surfaces time and again in ethnographic and travelogue literature of the region, dating back to some of the earliest interactions between Western traveller-guests and their Iranian hosts (see Houston 2009; Matthee 2009). Andrew Shryock argues, in the case of the Balga Bedouin in modern-day Jordan, that the tendency to paint Middle Eastern hospitality as distinctive, points less to Orientalist sensibilities and a "taste for the exotic", than to the existence of a "zone of intersecting ethical traditions" and a "shared language" of hospitality across and between cultures (Shryock 2012, p. S21). Hospitality can only *be* hospitality, where it is recognised as such by those party to it. For early Western travellers to Iran, the hospitality they witnessed and experienced (and, in turn, wrote about, weaving it into a compelling—if confirmedly Orientalist—narrative about Iranian cultural identity) is remarkable not because it was unfamiliar, but because it was eminently familiar, resonating with an ethical code that referenced an ideal of hospitality beyond law.

The moral languages underpinning Derridean and Iranian hospitality are mutually intelligible, on account of certain shared myths. When Derrida speaks of a morality beyond law he is drawing on ideas that thread through classical scholarship and the foundational texts of the Abrahamic religions. Derrida locates hospitality firmly within the nation and yet it is the very existence of the nation that prohibits the realisation of hospitality. In pressing towards an ideal of hospitality—an ideal that supplies critical power and force to hospitality as a theoretical concept—Derrida calls on a hospitality beyond (and before) the nation. This is Old Testament hospitality—the hospitality of Abraham and of Lot (Derrida 2000b, 2002). But also the hospitality of classical Greek scholarship: of Plato and Socrates (Derrida 2000b). It is a hospitality that, conceptually, crosses borders, circulating within multiple cultural spaces. Derrida emphasises the utility of Abraham, in particular, as an exemplar figure of hospitality in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Drawing on the work of Lois Massignon (who perhaps mildly overstates the significance of Abraham in Islamic thought) Derrida identifies a shared and mutually intelligible Abrahamic hospitality.

Iranians claim hospitality as a legacy of history, tracing it back to the advent of Islam and beyond, to the pre-Islamic era. However, the idea that hospitality might reasonably be considered a trait of Iranian national selfhood ("Iranians *are* hospitable" was a catchcry I became familiar with in the course of fieldwork) has a far more recent history in the rise of Iranian nationalism at the waning of the Qajar era (1796–1925). The notion that Iranians can be distinguished from their neighbours on

account of certain identifying characteristics or virtues, was only cemented as *idée reçue* during the twentieth century.

In his pre-revolutionary study, Marvin Zonis (1971, p. 210) identifies hospitality as a central feature of the "ritualistic code of interpersonal behaviour" that functioned amongst the pre-revolutionary political elite of Iran. Twenty per cent of the participants in his study volunteered hospitality as an "outstanding characteristic" of "Persians as a people" and Zonis notes that rules of hospitality function across all social classes (Zonis 1971, p. 210). Today, Iranian hospitality continues to be drawn into narratives of national selfhood, comprising less the "practical and personal expressions of respect and care for actual neighbors, strangers and enemies" (Pohl 1990, p. 75) and more an empty signifier of Iranian identity. The way in which hospitality is positioned within narratives of nationhood, exposes its inherent hostility. Ultimately, hospitality becomes part of a broader bordering regime that, in marking out Iran from not-Iran and Iranian from non-Iranian, reinforces the exclusion of Afghans from the Iranian nation.

In this section, I propose that contemporary notions of Iranian hospitality draw on two distinct metaphors. The first is the metaphor of the open door, which was made active in Khoemini's appeal to the *ummah*—that fictive Islamic community that crosses borders and boundaries and speaks to notions of equality amongst Muslims. The second is the metaphor of the *sofreh*: the tablecloth with all of its attendant notions of consumption and conviviality. Both of these metaphors circulate within a cultural logic of *ta'arof*: the complex linguistic and behavioural code of courtesy that acts to shape Iranian social interactions.

"We did not invite Afghans here to our country", Bahram, an Iranian man in his mid-thirties, living in the town of Marvdasht, tells me, "but we will not turn away a guest who arrives at the threshold unannounced".[4] Notions of Iranian hospitality emerge, in part, out of Islamic principles of welcoming the stranger. Trudy Conway (2009, p. 7) describes hospitality as "the most esteemed virtue" of Middle Eastern culture, singling out Iran as a "traditional" society in which travellers "could always count on a hospitable response". Islamic tradition credits the Prophet Muhammad with instituting a particular narrative of hospitality as religious obligation: "Putting up a guest for one night is obligatory. If you find a guest at your door in the morning, then this (hospitality) is (like) a debt that you (the host) owe him" (Ibn Majah in Siddiqui 2015, pp. 53–54). The debt of hospitality is further multiplied when the guest is a neighbour and a fellow Muslim (Siddiqui 2015, pp. 50–54).

Afghans, in framing their demand for hospitality in Iran, appeal to a shared Islamic identity. "At first [coming to Iran] was like coming to our own country . . . to our own home. The Iranian was my brother and we were equal before God and the law", explains Khodadad.[5] A central tenet of the Islamic Republic, in its initial incarnation under Khomeini's leadership, was the idea of the borderless revolution, emerging out of the imaginary of the *ummah*.

"Before Islam the lands now blessed by our True Faith suffered miserably because of ignorance and cruelty", just weeks after returning victoriously from exile, Khomeini was speaking to seminary students in the city of Qom, arguing against the nationalist vision that dominated certain segments of the revolutionary forces, "There is nothing in that past that is worth glorification. We will break all the poison pens of those who speak of nationalism, democracy, and such things" (Saleh 2012, p. 52). Khomeini rejected nationalism as a manifestation of "Euro-American culture" (Cottam 1988, p. 29).

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4   I met Bahram entirely by chance and conducted a series of three informal interviews—all with the active participation of an interpreter—between July and September 2014. Interviews were conducted in semi-public spaces in Bahram's hometown of Marvdasht.

5   Khodadad and his wife, Fahima, were amongst my primary informants during fieldwork. I was introduced to Fahima—a fifty-year-old Afghan woman who had fled Afghanistan's Herat Province in 1980—by an Iranian friend. Between April and October 2014 I gradually got to know the whole family, including Khodadad and two adult children. Informal interviews and conversations (some undertaken with the assistance of an interpreter, others conducted in Persian and recorded for later transcription), in the context of a broader participant-observation approach, formed the main method of data collection.

In its place he called for a recognition of an Islamic community that extended across the region and beyond. "The oppressed [*mostazafin*] of the world unite", became a slogan that universalised the experiences of the revolution. "We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the World, and must abandon all idea of not doing so", insisted Khomeini in a 1980 speech. "For not only does Islam refuse to recognise any difference between Muslim countries, it is the champion of all oppressed people" (Khomeini 1985, p. 286). Ultimately, the elevation of the *ummah* above the nation fomented the conditions by which the door between Iran and Afghanistan could be "propped open", allowing entry to the "oppressed" *mohajerin* who were fleeing Afghanistan in their millions.

Importantly, the open door is a metaphor that moves within a global space (see Chappatte 2015; Koca 2015). When Iranians, like Bahram, reference the door ("we will not turn away a guest who arrives at the threshold unannounced") it is with an awareness of the way in which it has come to symbolise a particular type of state-hospitality: a hospitality that refugees and asylum seekers lay claim to by virtue of the very act of crossing borders.

The open door as a metaphor of Iranian hospitality was activated in the Khomeini era and in the specific context of Afghan migration to Iran. When the door is invoked in narratives of hospitality it speaks to the breaching of the boundary between inside and outside, private and public. As Derrida (2000b, p. 75) describes it, "the crossing of the threshold always remains a transgressive step".

In traditional Iranian architecture, the *darsar* (front door) is just the first in a series of staging posts or transition points between exterior and interior (Tehrani and Duffy 2015, p. 353). Hospitality does not occur merely at the crossing of the threshold but unfolds gradually, through a series of ritual greetings as the guest moves from the periphery to the centre of the home. This gradual revelation hints at a reciprocal hospitality—a noisy, spoken, negotiated hospitality against Derrida's hospitable silence—and one which finds its apogee in the meeting of host and guest across the *sofreh*.

The *sofreh* is a key symbol of Iranian hospitality, rhetorically standing in for the food that is served on it and the conviviality of a shared meal. The very term hospitality has become synonymous with practices of providing (and consuming) food and drink. While Derrida remains focused on the "abstract, utopian, and illusory" forms of unconditional hospitality (Derrida 2000b, p. 79), he neglects the consumptive elements of hospitality (Bell 2007). In Iran practices of hospitality are intimately linked to the provision of food. Kevin O'Gorman (2007, p. 31) states that it is the sharing of food that binds host and guest and that in Iran "even today, this hospitable relationship is established through the sharing of bread and salt".

From the moment I first entered Iran, I was both ethnographer and guest. Throughout the period of my fieldwork, I became familiar with the rhythms of hospitality: the customs and norms that shaped host and guest behaviour and the interactions that walk a fine line between spontaneous and scripted, but are never forced. In any given hospitable encounter, particular types of food would be presented and consumed in precise ways at precise intervals. Set phrases punctuated conversations at key moments: "You have troubled yourself to visit us"; "Please eat, it has no salt"; "There is no *ta'arof*"; "This is your home". And the anticipated behaviours of those party to hospitality, while rarely made explicit, were mutually acknowledged.

This gentle art of domestic hospitality is elevated to a religious act by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, the influential eleventh century Persian theologian and philosopher. Ghazali devoted a good portion of his treatise, *Revival of the Religious Sciences*, to establishing the laws of hospitality, focusing particularly on the preparation and consumption of food (in Siddiqui 2015, pp. 86–132). There is an expansive Quranic narrative around food, in which eating is celebrated in recognition of God as provider and, implicitly, host. Hospitality has been a consistent feature of religious piety, extolled not so much for aesthetic pleasure, but rather for "feeding those in need, and cultivating relationships with friends, strangers and travellers" (Siddiqui 2015, p. 95).

Sitting together around the *sofreh* and partaking in the communal meal is an element of Iranian hospitality that is so much a part of the taken-for-granted cultural landscape in Iran, that it goes largely unremarked upon. In the context of Iran–Afghan relations in Iran what *is* remarkable is the degree

to which there is, in fact, no meeting around the *sofreh*. The metaphor of Afghan as guest remains just that: a metaphor. The hypothetical commitment to hospitality is rarely translated into concrete expressions of everyday hospitality-in-practice. When Bahram speaks of Afghans as guests it is only in the most abstract way. He knows *of* the Afghan tenants who live and work on his family's farm but he knows almost nothing about them—their history, their daily struggles and their hopes for the future. He is aware of and crosses paths with Afghans on an almost daily basis in the town where he lives, but he knows few Afghans by name, has never been in the house of an Afghan refugee as a guest and has never invited an Afghan into his own home.

The failure of Iranians and Afghans to meet around the *sofreh* speaks to a broader failure of hospitality in the Iranian space. Marjan, an Iranian woman who lives in the city of Shiraz describes the importance of the *sofreh* as an object of hospitality, "I cannot say that I know you until we sit together at the *sofreh*".[6] Indeed it is the "breaking of bread" that temporarily transforms the host's house into a space of hospitality and a "home" for both host and guest (Ala Amjadi 2012). For Afghans in Iran hospitality, and therefore home, remains elusive. The failure of hospitality can, furthermore, be considered a failure of the reality of hospitality to adequately match the grand mythology of hospitality. The pseudonymous policy adviser Antigone (quoted in Diego Segatto, this volume), speaks about "the creation of myths and expectations that are doomed to be disappointing for most." In Iran, it is not only Afghan refugees who are disappointed by the failure of hospitality to match the rhetoric, but also Iranians who, believing earnestly in the cultural ideal of hospitality, are compelled, in their interactions with Afghans, to reproduce a flawed version of it.

The capacity of the metaphor of the *sofreh* to shift from the domestic to the national space is made clear in a 2006 article published in a Marvdasht newspaper (Marvdasht Nama). The unnamed author of the article writes about the hospitality of the people of the southern Iranian town, in terms of a *sofreh* laid out before their Afghan guests, "They [Afghans] have been sitting at the same tablecloth [*sofreh*] as us, the tablecloth which the host has been laying down before them for twenty-five years, and the host never raised his eyebrows [in complaint] that, God forbid, the guest become upset . . . Although the guest is dear, like the breath it can choke you if it comes in but doesn't go out".

The imagery evoked here is that of the host held hostage by the guest. "So it is indeed the master, the one who invites, the inviting host, who becomes the hostage—and who really always has been", writes Derrida (2000b, pp. 123, 125). Conversely, "the guest, the invited hostage, becomes the one who invites the one who invites, the master of the host." In the same *Marvdasht Nama* article the author describes the same slippage between host and guest describing Afghans as guests "who have become hosts" (Marvdasht Nama).

Here, I want to reflect briefly on one particular historical incident that throws into relief the blurring of hospitality and hostage-taking in the Iranian context. The incident dates back to the early days of the Islamic Republic when the US Embassy in Tehran was seized by a group of student revolutionaries with the implicit backing of the Iranian government. While it doesn't involve Afghans or refugees it importantly foregrounds the role of *ta'arof* (the Iranian cultural codes of politeness) in the encounter between host and guest. The video, revealing a televised encounter between hostage and hostage taker, host and guest, has only resurfaced relatively recently. It isn't your typical hostage video. The slim, bespectacled US diplomat, John Limbert (in Sullivan 2009), greets the (then) Iranian president, smiling and engaging in the mild pleasantries of a host welcoming an honoured guest into his home. He urges Khamenei—a much younger looking Khamenei than the figure whose grim visage now stares out of billboards and posters in public spaces across Iran—to be seated, using the obsequious turns of phrase that such hospitable interactions demand in Iran.

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[6] Marjan played a central role in my research. Semi-formal and informal interviews were conducted from May to October 2014. Interviews were conducted in Persian and translated by the author.

This play of hospitality is almost immediately reversed, as Khamenei in turn asks after Limbert's comfort and the conditions of his accommodation. In this exchange Khamenei comes across more as an anxious boarding-house manager than what he in fact is: a mid-ranking cleric elevated by the events of the revolution to a position of considerable (and expanding) power. Limbert's response, and Khamenei's affirmation spoken directly to the camera, that the fifty-two hostages in the US embassy are being well-treated, conforms to a device of such hostage videos, whereby the categories of guest and hostage are conflated (Grebelsky-Lichtman and Cohen 2016). Limbert, however, does not stop at the point of praising the hostage takers for their hospitable treatment of their unwilling guests. Expertly drawing on Iranian modes of hospitality, he levels a veiled, but unmistakable, criticism of the Iranian government:

> There is one problem, you are too inclined to *ta'arof*. For instance, it is a quality of Iranians that when a guest comes you don't want to let them go at all. You want to keep your guest and have them remain longer with you. If I say "it's enough," you say, "stay longer". I say "it's long enough," you say "it's too soon to go". When you engage in *ta'arof* too much it can upset your guest. (Limbert in Sullivan 2009)

William Beeman (1976, p. 312) describes *ta'arof* as "the active, ritualized realization of differential status in interaction". Comprised of a myriad of minute bodily and linguistic cues—small courtesies and polite flourishes—*ta'arof* underpins everyday social activity in Iran. Moreover, performance of *ta'arof* is fundamental to Iranian hospitality, providing a vital framework for the establishment and re-establishment of the respective roles of host and guest. The guest, in any given social interaction becomes hostage to the host, who, in turn, sets the terms of interaction. Acceding to the role of guest (by, for example, accepting a proffered gift or walking first through a doorway) is to "lose" in the subtle game of *ta'arof*. Ultimately, "losing" at *ta'arof* can either act to affirm relative status between individuals—becoming a vital adjunct to Iranian socialization—or, alternatively, represent a disruptive overturning of social order.

The way in which practices of *ta'arof* are misdirected or become corrupted in translation is a key motif in travelogue and biographical literature, becoming a vehicle for exploring, in an often humorous and self-deprecating manner, the (mis-)interactions of Iranians and non-Iranians in a variety of settings.

Ta'arof is implicated in the relationship between Iranian citizen-hosts and Afghan refugee-guests. "We don't want our good deeds destroyed by ugly and inhospitable behaviour towards Afghan guests", explains the editor of a regional newspaper in a 2006 article deriding the presence of Afghan migrants and refugees in the town, "Therefore, we must fold our hands and in a legal and reasonable way request that these guests—who have become hosts—leave" (Marvdasht Nama 2006). Here, the folding of the hands and the blurring of host and guest become a means of censuring Afghan refugees for a perceived breach of the unspoken rules of *ta'arof*. "Our government invited these people in to make a point to the Russians. Now the Russians are gone and we're stuck with three million Afghans", complains a young Iranian woman, "I say our generosity has been taken advantage of".[7]

Iranians argue that in taking advantage of hospitality Afghans invoke the "ugly and inhospitable behaviour" of their hosts, thereby threatening the entire edifice of Iranian hospitality. Bahram explains, "Even now after thirty years our sense of hospitality inhibits us from saying 'enough'. The good guest must know himself that the time for departure has come."

4. Open Door, Empty *Sofreh*

"Khomeini told us there were no borders in Islam and we believed him", Khodadad is standing in the doorway—an unlit cigarette in one hand and a glass of tea in the other. At almost sixty, Khodadad's

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[7] The quote attributed to a young Iranian woman was taken from a conversation with a group of students from Shiraz University in July 2014.

face is marked by a lifetime of small indignities interspersed with tragedy. In 1980 Khodadad joined the masses of Afghans fleeing across the western border into Iran. Expecting their first child, he and his young wife, Fahima, settled just across the border from Afghanistan in what was then the province of Khorasan.

Fahima describes those early months in the Islamic Republic, "We worked hard, picking crops through the season. At that time many [young Iranian men] were racing off to fight Saddam. There was plenty of work to be done and we [Afghans] were considered a blessing". The couple felt themselves embraced by a rural community that, in many respects resembled the home they had left behind in Afghanistan. "[The Iranians] were not [then] looking down on us", Khodadad explains, "If some man called out to me 'Hey, Afghani' it was not [spoken as if it was] a curse".

Within months, however, tensions began to arise between the extant Iranian community and the growing population of Afghan exiles. "Maybe you can say [we] Afghans were at fault. I don't know. There were too many rumours and too much unpleasant talk. Who can say what you should believe?"

Finding themselves shunned by their Iranian neighbours and under pressure to join the burgeoning war effort against Iraq. Fahima and Khodadad again fled.

Relocating to a large city in the south of Iran, brought a degree of anonymity. "Here we were two amongst a thousand [Afghans] and not just Afghans but Arabs [Iranian citizens, some of whom were of Arab ethnicity, who had fled those regions of the country under attack from Saddam Hussein's army] too".

In 1994 Khodadad and Fahima, along with their three Iranian-born children, returned to Afghanistan, under circumstances that may or may not have been voluntary. "I did not return to a country that I could recognise. Everything was destroyed. There was nothing left for us in Afghanistan".

Crossing back over the border into Iran after eight months of precarious living in Herat, Khodadad was picked up by Iranian border guards and severely beaten, before both he and their youngest daughter Golshan, were sent back to Afghanistan. Fahima pauses when she tells this part of the story, the pain of it still raw. "Do you know that nobody ever asked me about [Golshan]? They buried her on the border and when I returned [here] it was like she had never existed".

For Khodadad and Fahima the hospitality of the open door had given way to hostility. "Today, in [Iranian] eyes I am worse than an unbeliever. Less than a dog", Khodadad speaks bitterly, "I know this. I am called this [a dog] every day."

To be "less than a dog" is, quite simply, to have no inherent worth. "To Iranians I do not exist", Amir, Khodadad's adult son corrects himself, "If I exist, it is only as a dirty Afghan". His sister, Nazanin concurs, "We [Afghans] are the guest who stayed too long. They say "Go home" but this is the only home I can hope for".

Afghans living in Iran are familiar with the narrative of Iranian hospitality and indeed, have their own, overlapping, narrative of Afghan hospitality. At the same time, they have become expert at wielding this narrative in a way that highlights the multiple failures of Iranian hospitality over many decades. While official policy goes through cycles of tightening and relaxing restrictions against Afghan refugees, this has occurred against a backdrop of persistent hostility. At a day-to-day level, Afghans find themselves unwanted guests, at best.

5. Reading Derrida, Thinking Khomeini

Matei Candea (2012, p. S37) describes hospitality as a "boundary object". That is to say, hospitality is "an object which lives in multiple social worlds and . . . has different identities in each" (Star and Griesemer 1989, p. 409). Hospitality is "plastic enough to adapt to the local needs and constraints of the several parties employing [it], yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites" (Candea 2012, p. S37). Hospitality as a theoretical concept can equally alight on North African immigrants in France and Afghan refugees in Iran. Carried across multiple contexts, we begin

to recognise recurring patterns of hostility and hospitality. These patterns form substantive links between, in this case, Iranian hospitality and Derridean philosophy.

Derrida's thinking around hospitality emerged out of the fractious politics of immigration in France during the 1990s. Although he was deeply engaged with this politics, Derrida was, ultimately, less concerned with the language of rights that adhered to it, than with the "more basic idiom of the open house" (Shryock 2012, p. S22). Hospitality literature slips unselfconsciously between the homely domestic space and the nation space (see Ben Jelloun 1999; Derrida 2000a; Friese 2004). Ghassan Hage (1993, p. 79) notes that, "home, nation and family operate within the same mythic metaphorical field", in as much as they are perceived to provide virtually the same experience of comfort, familiarity and security. In this paper, I have made the same scalar shifts, between hospitality as a practice of the state—a practice wrapped up in questions of rights, citizenship and the juridical implications of migration—and hospitality as a domestic practice that occurs in the opening up of the homely space and the sharing of food.

For Derrida, the idea of the hospitable house is a contradiction: "There is no hospitable house. There is no house without doors and windows, but as soon as there are a door and windows, it means that someone has the key to them and consequently controls the conditions of hospitality . . . if there is a threshold, there is no longer hospitality" (Derrida 2000a, p. 14). If there is "no hospitable house" there is, equally, no hospitable nation. Borders, boundaries, passport controls and visa regimes all conspire to make the nation a hostile space. Yet, Iranians lay claim to hospitality as a national virtue and a characteristic of Iranian identity. In order to uphold this claim Iranians point to the "open door" policy of the early Islamic Republic.

Khomeini threw open the doors to Afghans at a moment of crisis, revealing a level of hospitality that, as Khomeini's successor, Ali Khamenei, notes, has rarely been emulated by the United States or Europe (Khamenei 2016). However, in stepping over the threshold, Afghans found themselves unwittingly complicit in the affirmation of the Iranian revolution which, for all its claims to universality, was (and remains) deeply nationalistic. The rhetorical negation of borders acted to affirm the imaginary of the Iranian nation as Muslim, revolutionary and hospitable. The narrative of Iranian hospitality—in part upheld by the presence of Afghans in the country from 1979 onwards—has hidden the very real hostility that defines and circumscribes Afghan life in Iran.

"Afghan people are our guests and they should be served" Khomeini declared in a 1982 speech to an audience of politically powerfully and socially influential Tehran merchants [*bazaari*] (Khomeini in (Tasnim 2016)). For almost forty years, the narrative of the Afghan as guest of the Iranian nation has persisted. However, in the context of prolonged exile, the hospitality that was once experienced as a generous and almost philanthropic response to a moment of crisis is transmogrified into something oppressive. As a guest, the Afghan refugee is reimagined as a burden and remains constantly indebted: a hostage, to the Iranian host. Bringing Derrida to bear on this sometimes fractious relationship between Iranian citizens and Afghan refugees, productively highlights the interface of nation and hospitality, revealing the way in which notions of national identity can be constructed as simultaneously hospitable (inclusive and welcoming of the other) and hostile (exclusive and acting to uphold the self).

For Derrida (2000b, p. 3) the question of hospitality is, at heart, "the question of the question". "Does hospitality begin", he asks "with interrogating the new arrival . . . Or else does hospitality begin with the unquestioning welcome . . . ?" In the context of the "open door" we can identify the "double effacement", that Derrida describes: "The effacement of the question *and* the name" (Derrida 2000b, p. 27).

The Iranian experience leads us to ask how Derrida's "pure hospitality", that hospitality that imposes no conditions and asks no questions, might be sustained, in practice, over decades of displacement. Having crossed the border without interrogation, Afghans now find themselves hostage to an ongoing narrative of guestness. This guestness is experienced as the violent assertion and reassertion of the host's power through myriad acts of hostility. Hostility towards Afghan refugees undoubtedly manifests itself in overt acts, but also in the quiet withdrawal of the welcome that

had once been extended and the failure to recognise and meet Afghans—not merely as components of the abstract category of guest, whose presence in the country upholds a mythology of Iranian hospitality, but as actual guests with their "inconvenient needs" and their uneven capacity to reciprocate (Pohl 1990, p. 21).

In Iran, it is the language of hospitality—communicated in the countless expressive acts of *ta'arof* and hedged in the idioms of guest and neighbour, door and *sofreh*—that circumscribes the relationship between Iranian citizens and Afghan refugees. Derrida questions whether language can ever be hospitable, suggesting that the very act of speech, of naming, is an act of hostility (Derrida 2000b, p. 27). "Language is not separable from reality . . . but shapes and is shaped by *ethos*" (Still 2010, p. 29). Reading Derrida in the Iranian space allows us to think about the various ways in which metaphors of hospitality are (or are *not*) made active in practice, in turn expanding our understanding of what hospitality *is*. A language of hospitality in Iran disguises an inherent hostility but also points to hospitality's potential. This potential might be realised around the *sofreh*. The metaphor of the *sofreh*, I suggest, can be productively brought to bear on questions of Iranian hospitality. By expanding the vocabulary with which we theorise hospitality we can begin to explore how actual practices of hospitality might be enacted. The *sofreh* is suggestive of a reciprocal and negotiated hospitality: a hospitality that is both right and gift; and an act that must be produced and reproduced on a daily basis. The metaphor of the *sofreh* leads us, in turn, to the object of the *sofreh* and to the possibility of new practices of Iranian hospitality, informed by the conviviality of the shared meal and acting to newly shape the hospitable relationship between Iranian citizens and Afghan refugees.

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Comment

Response to Yarbakhsh Elisabeth. Reading Derrida in Tehran: Between an Open Door and an Empty *Sofreh*. *Humanities*, 2018, 7, 21

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Abstract: This critical engagement with Elisabeth Yarbaksh's essay asks what Iran might be gaining from sustaining its particular form of (un-)hospitality. It considers whether Iranian dynamics of hospitality might be working to meet the specific political interests of the post-revolutionary "republic" and concludes with a comparison to classical Athenian migration (*metoikia*) politics.

Keywords: refugees; hospitality; Derrida; Afghans; Iran; metics

Afghans are the world's most numerous refugees and Iran is home to the second largest population of them. Yet, as Elisabeth Yarbakhsh observes in her essay in this issue, "Afghan refugees in Iran identify hospitality primarily by its absence" (Yarbakhsh 2018, p. 1). For Yarbakhsh, this predicament deserves some attention: A country that plays territorial "host" to millions of migrants fails to produce for its "guests" a lived experience of hospitality at the same time that it espouses a self-conception centered on, among other things, an excessive courteousness to strangers and an "open door" policy.

We soon learn that these commitments are part of a wishful Iranian self-conception. To make sense of the apparent contradiction that this vision helps sustain, however, Yarbakhsh turns to Jacques Derrida, who argues in *Of Hospitality* that hospitality (as absolute, universal, and utopian) is an ideal; on the ground, which is to say in political life, hospitality is always finite and conditional—it is actualized through practices of sorting and choosing (p. 3). To the extent that Yarbakhsh sets out to "juxtapose two hospitalities", which she calls "Iranian and Derridean" (p. 2), her essay aims to illustrate the power of Derrida's important insight that the limits attending every guest-host relationship do more than make "hospitality . . . the exclusive domain of the state" (p. 3). They exercise and manifest its power.

The essay seems to take Iran as a stark and therefore illuminating example of the irresolvable contradiction Derrida sees between these two intertwined iterations of hospitality. I was for this reason surprised when Yarbakhsh concludes that the "Iranian experience leads us to ask how Derrida's 'pure hospitality", a "hospitality that imposes no conditions and asks no questions, might be sustained in practice, over decades of displacement" (p. 12). The question seems to signal a retreat from her earlier acknowledgment that, for Derrida, the "law" of (unconditional) hospitality cannot be inscribed as such. I raise the point here not to claim that Yarbakhsh fails to capture Derrida's argument—she frequently elucidates his complex position that unconditional hospitality is unrealizable—but to ask what is foreclosed when she backs away from it. Might the closing injunction that Iranians ought to act more hospitably to refugees come at the expense of a more critical engagement with the material she not only opens up but also begins to read diagnostically? What if the question were not so much whether Iran could sustain a pure hospitality but how it gains from sustaining its *particular* form of (un-)hospitality? Might the "multiple failures of Iranian hospitality over many decades" be successes in another sense? What if they serve not simply an ideal but also a *specific* and hierarchical status quo that pertains not only to Afghan migrants but also, if not chiefly, to Iranian citizens?

These are questions for which Yarbakhsh seems to lay some groundwork, and I want to try in these reflections to make them and their implications more explicit. Yarbakhsh maintains that Iranian hospitality constitutes a (disavowed) trope of Iranian nationalism that establishes "equality amongst Muslims" (p. 7). Although Khomeini dismissed nationalism as "a manifestation of 'Euro-American culture,'" as Yarbakhsh explains, he championed an "Islamic community that extended across the region and beyond" (p. 8). As Yarbakhsh points out, "The rhetorical negation of borders acted to affirm the imaginary of the Iranian nation as Muslim, revolutionary and hospitable." The notion of the open door thus has a strategic role to play. The openness that is presumed merely to express (rather than secure) the founding myth of a border-less Islamic community unfolds "against a backdrop of persistent hostility" (p. 11) that also, we should note, masks divisions *among* Muslims, divisions which Iran is deeply invested in maintaining.

It is therefore worth asking in what sense Iranian dynamics of hospitality might be working to meet the specific political interests of the post-revolutionary "republic"? Yarbakhsh's discussion of the "prolonged exile" that Afghans experience might offer some clues (p. 12). In one regard, Yarbakhsh appears sanguine about the period of Afghan immigration to Iran in the early 1980s. "Khomeini threw open the doors to Afghans at a moment of crisis," she writes, "revealing a level of hospitality that, as Khomeini's successor, Ali Khamenei, notes, has rarely been emulated by the United States or Europe" (p. 12). But, she then adds, the hospitality extended at entry did not typically culminate in a practice of inclusive membership, even if de-privileged, for refugees.

The difference in state practices before and after arrival helps make visible and encode a distinction between arrival and integration or, perhaps better, between two types of movement, border crossing and immigration. What if the particularity of Iranian hospitality consists in maintaining a difference between visiting and residing? What if the distinction presumed between mobility and migration serves as a proxy for another set of more politically useful distinctions? The openness at the "border", pursued in the name of a pan-Islamic identity, does a kind of double duty. For once it finds expression within the interior, it mutates into a strategy of inclusion-exclusion that marks the continued importance of *national* difference (i.e., Iranian over Afghan) even in an "Islamic Republic" that claims not only to elide but also to be defined against the "national", as we saw earlier. But insofar as Iranians also constitute a citizenry, the state makes recourse to a definition of the people and to a membership criterion that privileges a notion of the "national" defined in terms of birth not religion.

When used to analyze the experience of *resident* foreigners (whether juridically recognized as such), we might say that the concept of hospitality, which stresses temporariness, obscures more than it illuminates. To put the same point differently, what strategic lines of thinking might the idea of hospitality be working to keep in place? "As a guest", Yarbakhsh notes, after all, "the Afghan refugee is reimagined as a burden and remains constantly indebted: a hostage, to the Iranian host" (p. 12). The discomfort and hostility that pervades this relation has something to do with the instability that Derrida elaborates in his discussion of *Oedipus at Colonus* (Derrida 2000, pp. 6–7, 34–47, 93–121). The guest-host relation is inherently unstable. The host (Theseus) fears the guest (Oedipus) because the guest can outstay a welcome, which is to say, hold the host hostage. Within this frame, any arrival constitutes a potential or latent invasion; any "guest" a disallowed citizen.

The unstable distinction between a guest and a disallowed citizen emerges as a problem specifically (because) of settlement. In fifth-century BCE Athens, the context for *Oedipus*'s production, migrants and their native-born children were assigned to *metoikia*, a legal category of free non-citizenship. While the metic/citizen opposition illustrates the political importance of marking two kinds of foreigners (residents and visitors), it also functions to establish two ways of living in a polis. Even if we grant that *metoikia* exemplifies the "limits" of hospitality—the concept of hospitality (*xenia*) may better pertain to visitors and asylum seekers than migrants in Athens; highlighting the *residence* of foreigners, or metics, directs our attention to the problem of policing membership, not entry (on this, see further Kasimis 2018). Athenian democracy granted citizenship on the basis of dual Athenian parentage. Metics were excluded from full political membership intergenerationally. Not unlike the case of Iran's

Afghan refugee, the metic's inclusion-exclusion works to entrench citizenship as an inheritable category, underscoring the importance of origins in the face of eroding socioeconomic barriers to inclusion.

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Learning from Past Displacements?[1] The History of Migrations between Historical Specificity, Presentism and Fractured Continuities

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"During the last decade it has become more than clear to historians working in the field of migration that this phenomenon has to be regarded as a normal and structural element of human societies throughout history." (Lucassen and Lucassen 2005, p. 9)

1. Introduction

In 2015, more than 890,000 people arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany, seeking refuge and asylum. In the same year, another 846,000 EU citizens moved to Germany as well. Almost 600,000 people (non-German citizens) left the country within the same year.[2] However, media coverage mainly dealt with the group of refugees and asylum seekers—people mostly fleeing from theatres of war in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Debates among Germans—pro and contra asylum—were concerned with a number of issues (and the list is not exhaustive): integration and assimilation, Islam and the Islamic State, terror, cultural difference, crime (sexual abuse in particular), reasons behind flight and migration, jobs and housing markets, escape conditions and death in the Mediterranean.

Discourse on flight and migration was by no means random. Expectations, prejudice and fears as much as aid built on past experiences (or, more precisely, on narratives of past experiences)—more recent and less recent ones. Germans, the media and politicians in particular, turned to history (and at times also to historians) in order to understand two things: (1) next to political, religious and economic aspects they became interested in historical reasons behind flight and mass migrations in the second decade of the twenty-first century; (2) they inquired into historical examples of migration, integration and/or assimilation. People from a great variety of social strata and with different educational backgrounds turned to 'the past' in order to understand the present.

However, can we understand present migrations through their historical 'making'? Can we compare present migrations with other, past migrations? And what can we learn from this?

2. Early Modern Migrations (1500s to Late 1700s)

Before I tackle these questions in a more systematic way, I would like to start with a brief analysis of early modern migrations from and within Europe, which is my area of expertise as a historian. I will then use these in order to answer the questions as introduced in the previous paragraph.

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[1] In following the editors of this special issue, I am opting for the term displacement in the title as it "allows for cross-historical perspectives" (Isayev and Jewell 2017). Throughout this paper, I will use the terms migration, refuge and asylum, sometimes interchangeably, which might "conflate" these terms. However, it is not always practicable to clearly distinguish between these phenomena in discourse (and practice). While—as analytical terms—they mean distinct phenomena, this is not the case with regard to (historical) migrations. See also text below, especially Section 3 and Lucassen and Lucassen (2005, pp. 10–17).

[2] (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees BAMF).

In the early modern period, people migrated for a number of reasons: wars (often causing temporary migrations (e.g., Oltmer 2008), natural catastrophes/disasters such as droughts or floods, earthquakes, climate change ("little ice age" between the early fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries, or the Dantean anomaly of 1309–1321 (Cowie 2007; Parker 2013; Brown 2014, pp. 251–54), epidemic plagues, scarcity of food and land, overpopulation, better economic opportunities elsewhere and persecution (more often than not for religious reasons). One of the largest migrations of the early modern period was forced: between the sixteenth and the early nineteenth centuries Europeans deported more than 12 million slaves from Africa to the Caribbean and the Americas to supply the rising plantation systems (on the so-called Black Atlantic e.g., (Gilroy 1995; Heywood 2007; Smallwood 2008).

Within and from early modern Europe, mass displacements were often triggered by the persecution of the religious 'other'. A common phenomenon since late antiquity, efforts to 'purify' state and society increased with the Reformation. The 'body of the nation' was to share one faith, it was not to be 'contaminated' (Terpstra 2015, pp. 74–132) by the (religious and racial) 'other'—it was supposed to be Christian and, after 1517, Catholic *or* Protestant. From the Reformation onwards, Christians not only persecuted and expelled Jews or Muslims, but Catholics and Protestants alike drove out Anabaptists (and later Mennonites), Protestants persecuted and expelled Catholics and vice versa.

With regard to Jews and Muslims, the early modern period saw a number of major periods of displacement, forced by state and church, or voluntarily—as staying would have resulted in forced mass conversions. In 1492, following the Spanish conquest of the Emirate of Granada, the last Muslim stronghold on the Iberian peninsula, the Alhambra Edict brought the expulsion of some 150,000 to 165,000 Sephardi Jews. Most of them went to Portugal, North Africa and more eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire (Gerber 1994, pp. 115–44; Benbassa and Rodrigue 2000, pp. 22–28).[3] Granada's Muslims left in smaller numbers, as they were not immediately expelled from the territories of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon. Deportation, resettlement and—for many—expulsion followed between 1609 and 1614 when some estimated 270,000 to 300,000 Moors (the so-called Moriscos) were forcibly moved from their settlements (Harvey 1990, pp. 331–35). In Portugal, mass conversion of Jews followed the Edict of Expulsion of 1497. From 1536, with the establishment of the Inquisition in Portugal, and from 1580, when Portugal came under the rule of Philipp II of Spain, larger waves of emigration followed. The Portuguese Jewish diaspora came into place. Many of these Sephardim re-settled in Bordeaux, Amsterdam, London, Hamburg and much of the forming Atlantic world (Benbassa and Rodrigue 2000, pp. 28–52; Lachenicht 2009, pp. 32–33).

Protestants persecuting Catholics and vice versa also entailed mass migration—as stated above. One of the largest occurred in France, that of French Protestants, Huguenots, first between the 1560s and 1629 and then from the late seventeenth century. In 1685, the Edict of Fontainebleau put an official end to Protestantism in France. This brought about the dispersion of 150,000 to 200,000 Huguenots (of 750,000 Huguenots in total; France had a population of 20 million people at the time). It confronted Europe with the need to accommodate refugees on a large scale (Lachenicht 2010, p. 197).

Other, sizeable religious migrations happened in the period between 1568 and 1648 when some 60,000 to 150,000 Protestant Dutch left the Spanish Netherlands (with a total population of 3 million people), during the Dutch Revolt, to re-settle in the United Provinces, England, the Palatinate and Brandenburg-Prussia (Esser 1996; Janssen 2014, pp. 55–57). With the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the emigration of Catholics and Protestants from German territories became more important as it solidified the *cuius regio, eius religio* and the *ius emigrandi* principle, already established with the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. This meant that a respective territory's prince or an imperial city council decided on his/their and all his/their subjects' Christian denomination. Those who were not willing to conform

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[3] While some scholars estimate 100,000 to 165,000 Jewish exiles (Israel 2002, pp. 5–6; Swetschinski 2004, pp. 56–57), more recent research establishes the number of exiles at some 80,000 (Terpstra 2015, p. 2).

had the right to leave the territory or imperial city. With re-catholicization in Bohemia the emigration of Protestants to Prussia and Saxony took shape (Schunka 2006, 2008). From the 1620s, English Puritans left England to re-settle in North America, followed by English Catholics in the 1630s and Presbyterians and Quakers from the 1650s onward (Bremer 1995; Garrett 2010; Hamm 2003). In the 1730s the Austrian Habsburgs and the Prince Bishop of Salzburg deported or expelled their crypto-Protestants from their territories (Wilson 2000; Walker 2000; Van Horn Melton 2008). Moravian brothers, the Herrnhuters, had to move from Saxony to Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and then onward to North America (Wellenreuther 2007). Between 1755 and 1763 Britain deported some 11,000 French Catholics from Acadia (today Nova Scotia) to purify its empire from the 'Catholic threat' (Hodson 2007, 2012).

Some of these refugee groups—from the more privileged estates and social strata—left escape accounts: refugees were able to flee with the help of trafficking gangs or illegal emigration networks—by sea on board vessels with the refugees often being packed in barrels or crates. Other escape routes led refugees on foot. Upon arrival in a place of refuge, they would be quartered in the households of the local population (for Huguenots see (Lachenicht 2010, pp. 69–80)). As with the Sephardi diaspora (Swetschinski 2004, p. 55), some of these refugees never found a permanent new home (Magdelaine 1985, pp. 26–37).

Would—and if so why—early modern states, empires, cities and provinces accommodate these refugees?

Studying early modern religious migrations in a comparative perspective (Lachenicht 2016a) shows that states, towns and cities, empires had specific motives for granting refugees asylum. One of the most important which comes up in many state and church-related sources of the sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries is Christian charity. It was Christian duty to relieve distressed brethren—not solely but preferably of one's own denomination. It ordered European states and empires to also grant asylum to Jews despite wide-spread anti-Judaism in early modern Europe (Lachenicht 2016a). Other motives were much more utilitarian in character: demographic reasons (increasing the number of a prince's subjects), colonization and civilization schemes (often related to the former), economic, military and confessional reasons. Epidemics and wars, high mortality rates (for children and mothers in particular) caused time and again major population losses in many of the European states. Increasing the number of subjects was meant to make good these losses. Demographic growth, however, was also considered a value *per se*, manifesting the potential economic and military might of the early modern state and empire. Colonization, internal and external, within Europe and overseas, required colonists who more often than not were recruited among refugees or people from other countries willing to emigrate and populate the newly subdued territories in the Americas, Asia and—in the later eighteenth century—Australia and New Zealand. We find the same refugee groups in colonization schemes of a variety of European imperial states: Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews in the British, Dutch, French and Russian empires, Huguenots within the Dutch, British and Russian empires, Moravians in the Dutch, British and Russian empires, Mennonites in the British, Dutch and Russian empires.

The accommodation of religious refugees was an important tool in the building of early modern empires. Colonization and the establishment of plantations were supposed to have a "civilizing" effect on indigenous peoples: in Ireland, Prussia and Russia or on the Balkans as much as in the Caribbean or the Americas. Economic reasons behind asylum and settlement privileges depended on a refugee group's reputation: some minorities such as Sephardi Jews were settled for their global networks of trade and commerce (Frijhoff 2002, pp. 27–52; Israel 1998, pp. 372, 655, 676, 1033; Kaplan 2002, p. 1; Po-Chia Hsia 2002, pp. 2–3). For Spain, Portugal, England, the Netherlands and France Sephardi or *converso* communities became 'agents and victims of empire' (Israel 2002, p. 1) who largely contributed through their networks to imperial and commercial structures as much as Quakers or Huguenots. Huguenots were also settled for their assumed knowledge in wine-growing, as well as the establishment of manufacturing and textiles (Lachenicht 2016b). Confessional reasons also motivated the settlement of religious refugees. Foreign Catholics or Protestants could increase the number of orthodox subjects: in Brandenburg-Prussia Dutch, Swiss and French Protestants were accommodated

to raise the number of Calvinist subjects. This was also the case in Ireland where a Catholic majority should have become (but never did) outnumbered by Protestant settlers who were to foster Ireland's loyalty to the British (Protestant) Empire. Settling refugees and migrants on the *frontier* of expanding early modern states and empires was meant to protect these frontiers against competing powers: in late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth century, Protestant settlers in Irish provinces such as Munster and Ulster were to defend English plantations against the Catholic Irish (Canny 1987). The same was true for German Lutherans in Georgia whose settlements were built on the frontier against the Spanish and American Indians (Wilson 2000, pp. 217–19), Mennonites and Moravians did the same within the Russian Empire (Gestrich 2000, p. 90).

Utilitarian reasons and great expectations behind the accommodation of refugees and migrants often clashed with realities. More often than not they were not met—at least not in the first place. Christian charity had its limits if the refugees did not fulfil the prince's or city council's expectations (Lachenicht 2016a, pp. 265–66).

Early modern states, towns, cities and provinces were by no means willing to or capable of sustaining refugees or displaced people on a large scale. While church(es) and state(s) supported refugee groups with offertories, refugee communities (called "stranger communities", "nations" or "refugee churches") (Pettegree 1986, p. 23; Lachenicht 2010, pp. 206–9) had to organize poor relief, accommodation, job opportunities, education and many other things. In other words: early modern laws allowed refugees to settle within the confines of a given state or province of a city but made sure that entire groups were settled as corporations that had to care for themselves. These ethnic or religious enclaves often established their own administration, social aid and educational systems, sometimes their own jurisdiction, and at the *frontier* of empires sometimes their own militia. Stranger communities had to swear an oath to the monarch (or republic) and were responsible for their members' offences against the state's, province's, or city's laws (Lachenicht 2016a, pp. 272–76).

As many of these groups had been persecuted for their faith, the leaders of refugee communities—pastors, rabbis, imams, military leaders, social elites at large—tried to (re-)create communities with strong and orthodox belief systems, a high degree of endogamy, and educational systems, which were supposed to ensure the survival of what people might want to call group identity. At the same time, stranger communities aimed at naturalisation or denization. Many displaced people, however, did not adhere to these stranger communities but opted for what we would call today acculturation or integration strategies, through intermarriage with other groups, economic cooperation and adherence to other religious communities (Lachenicht 2014).

With regard to perceptions of the 'other' we find many migrant group stereotypes, prejudices and xenophobia—on the part of the hosting societies as well as on the part of migrants and refugees. Huguenot refugees in seventeenth century Brandenburg-Prussia thought of German Lutherans as "uncultured oafs", as "stingy people", while Huguenots in England described the English as "degenerated", "unpatriotic" and "dishonourable". The Irish were considered an "idle", "papist" and "bigot nation". Huguenots also shared anti-Jewish sentiments—as was common throughout the early modern period (Lachenicht 2010, pp. 231–34). In sixteenth century England, Francis Bacon considered French Protestants (so Huguenots) to be unpatriotic and incapable of developing patriotic feelings for the English nation (Yungblut 1996, p. 36), while all strangers in late sixteenth century London were held responsible for the rising prices for food and housing, vagrancy and the corruption of morals (Luu 1995, p. 160). We find the same fears in late seventeenth century Halle or Berlin (Lachenicht 2010, p. 243). At the same time, petitioners in London exhorted "aliens" (so foreigners) to intermarry with Englishmen and share their competencies as craftsmen with English people (Luu 1995, p. 160). Numbers of refugees in the City were often exaggerated, rumours about crime spread through City and country. At the same time, we find descriptions of migrants as "poor refugees" in need of aid and relief (Lachenicht 2010, p. 242).

3. Presentism, Historical Specificity and (Fractured) Continuities

Many of the above developments sound familiar—too familiar perhaps. The apparent familiarity of narratives of the past often provokes simplistic comparisons or equations. Themes such as reasons behind displacements and the accommodation of refugees/migrants, myths and expectations among refugees and hosting societies, flight conditions, legal status, integration and assimilation, mutual prejudice all seem to be the general, universal categories connected with flight and migrations. However, these are not early modern but twenty-first century—our contemporary—categories, which we use as a lens to consider past displacements.

This *presentism* or anachronistic use of current concepts has often been criticized as a primary "fallacy" of historical work. One of the general assumptions is that presentism serves to validate present-day beliefs and moral judgements and neglects or even ignores historical specificity (Fischer 1970, pp. 137, 139). With his concept of "radical historicity", Michel Foucault went further and challenged the universality and teleologies of historical writing as much as the categories of analysis (Foucault 1994; more on this, see below). But can we do otherwise? Can we consider the past without using the lens of present concepts, present discourses?[4] In *Die anwesende Abwesenheit der Vergangenheit* Achim Landwehr suggests that we reflect on the "chronoferential" claims we make when establishing relations between the present and the past—when we project our present questions and categories into past times (Landwehr 2016, pp. 28–39). Landwehr reminds us to consider the diversity of opportunities of the present and the multitude of histories of the past, the plethora of *possible* histories. This requires us to ask why we look at certain aspects of the past (and why we neglect others) and how we look at them. We choose those histories (over others) by asking questions that, in the first place, have more to do with our present times than the past times we enquire into. This past no longer exists—it has elapsed, it is gone, it is no longer there (Landwehr 2016, pp. 32–33). Can we reconstruct "the remains of those traces, the habits, the manufacturing, the thinking, that is no longer present"? And how much "imagination" does the historian need? (Segatto 2017, p. 3) Past times, despite their absence, are present(ed) in a relational way: we constantly refer to them, we recontextualise material and immaterial objects from the past. We make claims about the past to understand our present times. The past and our relationship with it is a paradox (Landwehr 2016, pp. 40, 247).

Our inquiries into past times, as problematic as they might be, can bring about more reflexivity with regard to present times. This is what Landwehr and many other historians call "the critical potential of historical analysis" (Landwehr 2016, p. 248). Critical analysis comes with and produces uncertainties. Historical analysis understood this way does not produce or reinforce identities or certainties about present or past times (Landwehr 2016, p. 250). It triggers reflection with regard to the specificities of past and present times, with regard to (fractured) continuities, with regard to possibilities of what the past *could* have been about and what present times *could* be.

In projecting our contemporary categories on past flight and migrations and in comparing the latter to present-day displacements we might not only miss out on forgotten histories but also on historical specificity, on the radical historicity of past phenomena. Historical contexts—even more recent ones as evoked in Alessandro Petti's text (Petti 2017, pp. 6–10)—hardly resemble present-day contexts, either with regard to political, legal, social, cultural or situational contexts or with regard to discourses—so how people thought and spoke about the world, how they constructed their realities (Landwehr 2008, p. 67). In terms of context, early modern Europe differed significantly from today: weak states with weak institutions, no constitutions, no legal equality, no legal security. Today, European legal contexts provide human rights (including the right to asylum), state constitutions,

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[4] On discourse and historical discourse analysis see (Martschukat 2002, pp. 9–10; Landwehr 2008, pp. 65–78). Following Martschukat and Landwehr, I understand discourse as the thinkable, utterable and doable of/in historical situations/moments. Discourses thus always are also practices and vice versa.

legal equality and security as well as state institutions—depending on the European state we look into—responsible for the application of laws, social aid, healthcare, education and many other issues. While most European states include people from a variety of backgrounds, the legal framework of the constitutional state is supposed to guarantee each individual basic human rights, legal equality and safety, freedom of religion, freedom of thought and speech. These contexts, as much as the European Union's regulations and the UNHCR convention, provide a context for today's migrants and refugees arriving within the European Union that differs radically from past experiences. While some phenomena seem to allow comparisons or even equations—historical difference is the more important feature.

Despite historical specificity and/or the historicity of past displacements, the narrative on early modern religious migrations, as produced in section two, contains a number of issues that appear as 'fractured continuities'. By 'fractured continuities' I mean the products of individuals and groups who constantly relate themselves to past times, consciously or subconsciously—in other words as the product of a dynamic process of re-inscribing ourselves (also as historians or social scientists) into (historical and present-day) political, social, cultural, economic, environmental, situational contexts—as becomes also evident from Petti's text on refugee camps and how they are being compared to colonial and totalitarian contexts (Petti 2017, pp. 6–10).

Historical examples, comparisons—and terminology—are tricky. One of the most obvious examples of 'fractured continuities' comes with language, with the terms and concepts we choose. In using notions such as 'refugee', 'exile', 'displaced person', 'migrants' or 'asylum', people evoke a plethora of past migrations from Antiquity to the present day. Many of these notions are heavily loaded: with the term "refugee" both migrants and hosting societies might associate 'persecution', 'flight', 'rescue' or '(Christian) charity'—sometimes without a profound knowledge of the past displacements that have shaped these terms and the theological and ideological connotations that were once associated with them. As such, they (more often than not) subconsciously draw on the Jewish Diasporas as well as on other religious migrations—which are, however, different from modern ones. In some contexts today, the term 'migration' is associated with dehumanizing terms such as 'flood', 'crisis', 'spread', 'dispersal' or 'masses'. Depending on who uses these terms and for which purposes, the term 'migrant' can come across as profoundly negative: in Germany this is especially true for the term *Wirtschaftsmigrant* ('economic migrant') as it is associated with 'fortune seekers', 'profiteers' and 'adventurers' and seems to evoke individual and collective memories of some, not very well defined, but somehow perceived past experience. In the Canadian context of the 1930s and 1940s the term 'refugee' had negative connotations, while the term 'migrant' was associated with people who would enrich the young 'nation'. Again, vague 'memories of the past' had intense repercussions on expectations with regard to 'refugees' or 'migrants'.

However, these 'fractured continuities'—not only with regard to the language we use but also with regard to the practices that result from it—are highly problematic. The relationship between present and past contexts is never the same, re-inscriptions never reproduce the same realities but create new realities through the process of re-inscribing (e.g., Landwehr 2016, pp. 118–48). In his interpretation of Michel Foucault, Jürgen Martschukat reminds us of this radical historicity of every single moment, context or situation (Martschukat 2002, pp. 14–16)—which is at the same time the dynamic and relational product of our constant references to (lost) past times.

The first and most persistent fractured continuity is migration itself. As the introductory quote insinuates, humans have migrated and will always migrate. Migration as a "normal and structural element of human societies throughout history" is a continuity in human history indeed. However, using the term 'migrant' on the part of people on the move, or by those in receiving societies, obscures or ignores complexities, novelties, singularities, uncertainties, possibilities. Do people know—once they start moving—what their experiences will be? Whether they will be temporary or permanent refugees, pilgrims, migrants, seasonal workers, return migrants, adventurers, profiteers—or something else? Do hosting societies know whether the terms they use—'migrant', 'migration'—correspond with

the complex and uncertain situations of the people they qualify? 'Migration' as a term (especially with the various histories behind it) produces a set of associations and mental images that might have very little to do with the realities and lives of those who are being concerned. The term 'migration' comes with questions about the 'why'. People will ask for 'motives behind migration'. While the ones presented in section two are among the more obvious, others might occur (Lucassen and Lucassen 2005; Canny 1994; Moch 1992). Furthermore, more often than not, individuals and groups will leave their homes for more than one reason. Migration history as much as interviews with present-day migrants show that dichotomies such as forced versus voluntary migrations or migrants versus refugees do not really reflect the complex, multifaceted realities of displacement and how people would describe themselves (Lucassen and Lucassen 2005, pp. 11–17). As such, it has always been and will always be difficult to clearly identify the push- and pull-factors behind individual and group migrations. As motives for migration are complex and varied, we need to carefully reconstruct specific historical and situational discourses on displacements. No displacement equals another. Attempts to establish migration patterns and systems of migration are useful. At the same time, however, the stories and histories are historically (and individually) specific and unique, despite apparent parallels and resemblances (see also the concluding remarks).

The second 'fractured continuity' in the history of migrations is the persistent practice of constructing the 'other'. Migrants and hosting societies alike produce essentialising discourses about one another—they produce "cultural difference" (Bhabha 2011)[5]. According to Bhabha, situations of contact create a Third Space which is a "contradictory and ambivalent space of enunciation". Third Space makes evident that "the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricised, and read anew" (Bhabha 2011)—as some of the examples in Alessandro Petti's text clearly show (Petti 2017, pp. 4–5). Essentialising discourses deny the plurality and variety of possible enunciations of the construction of the 'self' and the 'other' in situations of contact. Some of these essentialising discourses, stereotypes and prejudice are rather old: anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim sentiment has a long history in Europe—as section two has shown. However, the histories of anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim discourses are never the same. They might build on past discourses. New and ever-changing contexts, however, produce ever-new varieties of religious and (at the same time) racialised discourse.

Third, linked to the construction of the 'other', and the production of cultural difference, is the question of whether migrants or refugees are considered 'good', 'bad' or 'ugly' (Lucassen and Lucassen 2005, p. 17). While some migrant groups seem to have always been treated or looked upon in one specific way, critical historical analysis makes clear that narratives on the 'good', the 'bad' and the 'ugly' migrant/refugee can change substantially—in the short, middle and long term. They depend highly on context and on political, economic, social, cultural discourses which do not only vary depending on time and space but on the situational as well. The example of the Huguenots in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is among the most striking: while in the early 1680s Protestant (especially Calvinist) states considered them 'ideal migrants', their arrival produced sentiments of unfulfilled expectations. Many Protestants European states closed their borders and refused further admission; anti-Huguenot sentiment rose in many of the hosting states. Through a process of integration (which included the integration of the story of their 'usefulness' into the national historiographies of the hosting countries), Huguenots are today (again)

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[5] According to Bhabha "cultural difference is a process of signification through which statements *of* culture or *on* culture differentiate, discriminate, and authorize the production of fields of force, reference, applicability, and capacity". Opposed to "cultural diversity" which "is also the representation of a radical rhetoric of the separation of totalized cultures that live unsullied by the intertextuality of their historical locations, safe in the utopianism of a mythic memory of a unique collective identity", "cultural difference" is a process of negotiation, it points to a Third Space where "culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People" is being profoundly challenged (2011).

considered a successful example of migration and integration—in all (former) countries of refuge (Lachenicht 2010, pp. 483–510).

Fourth: from the few examples provided for the early modern period, we can see—apparently—claims towards the acculturation, integration and assimilation *avant la lettre* of migrants and refugees. If, however, situations of contact produce cultural difference *ad infinitum*, if there is no "primordial unity or fixity" of culture(s) (Bhabha 2011) what do concepts such as acculturation, integration and assimilation mean? Hosting societies are far from homogeneous. Variety or multiplicity are normal features of every society, nation, ethnicity or whatever marker for collective identity or imagined community we might use (Lucassen and Lucassen 2005, pp. 22–23). So, what does it mean if we talk about acculturation, integration and assimilation—at present or in a historical perspective? In the history of migrations it would be vital to enquire into *specific discourses* of acculturation, integration and assimilation. In today's Europe is it about shared values, legal security and protection, about equality, about human rights? Who voices these claims? In which contexts? With what aims? How do those who are being 'summoned' react to these claims?

4. Conclusions

In his *Pour une histoire comparée* of 1928 Marc Bloch argued for two purposes behind comparison. According to him (Green 2005, pp. 58–61) comparisons can help understand (or, as I would put it, produce *more* understanding of) specific phenomena, they can draw our attention to the (more) specific and the (more) general of the past and present (Bloch 1983). Historians have argued that "the comparative approach yields contradictory processes of unification and diversification" (Bouvier 1988, p. 14). Nancy L. Green has opted to move toward "post-structural structuralism" in migration studies, which means "examining and reinterpreting the structures surrounding the migration process in light of individual choice and vice versa", "generality and difference" (Green 2005, p. 72). This needs to be done in a synchronic and diachronic perspective. We might not be able to approach "the (historical) truth" as such (Landwehr 2016, pp. 190–208). However, these seeming dichotomies, dualities or antagonisms between the specific and the general produce a tension field and thus the ground for critical inquiry. The latter might bring forth more understanding than simple equations, generalisations or unique particularities. In an attempt to integrate Bloch, Green and Foucault this means the following: as the specific reinscribes itself in discourses that produce realities, the specific is always part of the more general. Applied to the history of migrations and the question of what we can learn from it, I would suggest the following answers:

1. Present migrants and/or refugees always relate themselves to past migrations as much as home and hosting societies relate them to displacements of the past—consciously and subconsciously. While each case is specific and unique, it is always embedded in ever-changing, historically contingent discourses that produce realities. These discourses need to be analysed as fractured continuities—on the micro and the macro level.

2. Comparisons between present and past migrations need to be aware of our presentist perspective. While we use our concepts, our categories, we must critically assess that we project our presentist expectations into past phenomena. Furthermore, asking specific questions and using specific categories already implies a number of choices about what we are interested in and what we want/tend to ignore. Comparisons are about choice; they are never neutral; they always come with specific agendas on the part of the historian (Green 2005, p. 59). Thus, we leave aside a plethora of aspects coming with present and past migrations—and as such, historical specificity, too.

3. Following discourse analysis, it is vital to enquire into the following: (i). Who is inquiring into past migrations? (ii). For which reasons? (iii). What are its consequences? (iv). Which discourses yield our questions?

Approached in a more (self-)reflexive way, the history of migrations might not produce absolute certainties—which are not possible given the infinity of past histories, present and future stories. However, critical historical analysis will produce *more* understanding of the complexities of displacements. It will do *more* credit to the specific and explain how it is embedded into the more general. It also allows us to see the individual case as specific and general at the same time. Also, it will strengthen the individual and specific experience as it keeps enlarging our more general perspective.

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Historicizing Migration and Displacement: Learning from the Early Roman Empire in the Time of the Nation-State. Response to Lachenicht, Susanne. Learning from Past Displacements? The History of Migrations between Historical Specificity, Presentism and Fractured Continuities. *Humanities* 2018, 7, 36

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Abstract: My response to Susanne Lachenicht's thought-provoking article is a brief attempt to take up her call to write histories that lead not to absolute certainties but to more understanding of the complexities of the past. I focus on documentation, border control, and citizenship in the Early Roman Empire to illustrate some of the radically different ways these were conceptualized and practiced in a premodern multiethnic empire like Rome than in a contemporary nation-state today. Passports, for example, and border control as we know it, did not exist, and migration was not tied to citizenship status. But the account I offer is deliberately tentative and full of qualifications to emphasize the real methodological challenges the study of this subject poses on account of fragmentary literary and material records and the numerous difficulties of interpreting these. I conclude by pointing out both the benefits and the limitations of framing history as a discipline from which one can learn. On the one hand, understanding how seemingly universal categories such as 'citizen' and 'migrant' are dynamic and constructed rather than static and natural can nuance public debates in nation-states which receive high numbers of migrants (like Germany, Lachenicht's starting point) by countering ahistorical narratives of a monolithic and sedentary identity. On the other hand, knowledge of the past does not necessarily lead to moral edification.

Keywords: Early Roman Empire; mobility; displacement; passports; border control; migration; citizenship; documentation; nation-state

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   In her contribution to this volume, Susanne Lachenicht takes as her starting point discussions across German society about migration following the migrant 'wave' of 2015, and asks what we can learn from past migrations.[1] She draws from her own area of expertise, Early Modern Europe, to illustrate the complexities of looking to past migrations as a means of understanding contemporary phenomena. As a demonstrative exercise, she highlights some of the reasons for human movement in the past: political, social, economic, religious, and environmental, which she points out are all also causes for movement today. In so doing, she rightly cautions against easy equivalencies despite apparent parallels, and she warns against presentist historiography. One of her forceful conclusions is

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1   " . . . can we understand present migrations through their historical 'making'? Can we compare present migrations with other, past migrations? And what can we learn from this?" (Lachenicht 2018, p. 1). On the salience of aquatic metaphors and their implications, see (Jewell 2019) in this volume.

a call for critical, nuanced, and self-reflexive historical inquiries that do not necessarily lead to absolute certainties, but that lead to *more* understanding about the complexities of migration and to what is specific and what is universal (Lachenicht 2018, p. 9).

My response to Lachenicht will focus on my own area of knowledge, the early Roman empire, and will concentrate on three *differences* between the Roman and modern worlds:—to documentation, to border control, and to citizenship—to illustrate the fact that these very concepts (and the attitudes towards them) are *not* universal but rather historically specific, and are thus subject to change.[2] This knowledge, I argue, empowers us to play an active role in their transformation. At the same time, I will emphasize the challenges the study of ancient mobility poses and conclude by underscoring the difficulties (and indeed dangers) of framing history as a didactic discipline that is morally edifying or from which we can learn anything at all.

There is now a general consensus that mobility in Ancient Rome was a historical fact.[3] Still, defining migration, establishing precisely who moved and in what numbers, and determining the distances people tended to migrate in the early empire are all difficult tasks and the subject of heated scholarly debate.[4] The primary literary evidence spans multiple genres from satiric poetry to legal texts, while the material evidence ranges from epigraphy to bio-archaeology, and every form of evidence presents unique challenges to the scholar, who ideally must have mastery over all. Moreover, as Lachenicht herself points out, the very language, concepts, and categories that we use are anachronistic: 'migration', 'mobility', and 'displacement', although all Latinate, have a different semantic range today to their Latin analogues. Thus, any treatment of the subject should be sensitive to the actual vocabulary of human movement used during the period of study—in my case that of the early Roman empire—especially because this will more accurately reflect conceptions, attitudes, and experiences than our own presentist language.[5]

What emerges from a survey of primary and secondary scholarship on mobility and displacement in Rome is that, unlike modern nation-states, there were no systematic, uniform, universally-enforced laws governing human circulation, and any laws or norms that did exist were not static.[6] There were a variety of rules and regulations and documents, but these were inconsistently enforced, often on an *ad hoc* basis when the need arose. Moreover, unlike today, it was not only the state who controlled or regulated mobility; social networks and social institutions ('private' or 'civilian' people and groups) played an important role.[7]

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[2] Our own conceptions are sourced in assumptions linked with realities exerted by the nation-state, ideas simply not applicable to a pre-modern empire like Rome (Moatti 2004; Moatti and Kaiser 2007).

[3] As opposed to older models of a geographically limited, purely 'face-to-face' society. Horden and Purcell's (2000) ideas of connectivity are the pillars of this debate; de Ligt and Tacoma's (2016) introduction surveys the history of the study of migration especially with respect to Rome, and includes discussions of demographic data. Also valuable are the introduction and second chapter in (Isayev 2017a) (especially for ancient Italy); (de Ligt and Tacoma 2016), who trace and outline the scholarly interest in migration studies over the last 25 years; and (Lo Cascio et al. 2017). Outside of Classics, see (Lucassen and Lucassen 2005; Hoerder et al. 2007; Lucassen et al. 2010). Otherwise, the work of Claudia Moatti is indispensable, especially for the study of ancient mobility and documentation.

[4] Difficulties include theorizing different categories and definitions of migration; determining and interpreting demographic data (e.g., the numbers of people on the move as well as their gender, ethnic, economic, and other identities); determining the reasons and nature of movement; and understanding the distances involved (regional vs. long distance movement). For a full discussion see (Tacoma 2016; Woolf 2016). For demographic data, see especially (Scheidel 2004, 2005).

[5] (Lachenicht 2018, p. 6) where she cautions against the dangers of presentism in historical inquiry. She points out the negative flavor of *Wirtschaftsmigrant* ('economic migrant') in German ('fortune seeker'), and the differing attitudes in 1930s and 1940s Canada to 'refugee' (negative) versus 'migrant' (positive). As for the importance of studying Latin terminology, see especially (Moatti 2015), where she identifies key lexical items (e.g., *peregrinatio, hospes, viator*), discusses their definitions, and tracks their evolution as Rome transitioned from Republic to Empire. Isayev's (2017b) study of the language of outsiders (e.g., *peregrinus, hospes, alienus* and *ignotus*) in the comedies of Plautus similarly illuminates our understanding of Roman conceptions of identity at an early stage in Roman literature. One of her observations is that " … in the same way that there is no generic term for 'migrant' in Republican Latin, there is also no equivalent to the English term 'local'" (p. 142).

[6] (Moatti 2000, p. 928) " … aucune source, nous l'avons dit, ne suggère l'existence d'un contrôle global de la mobilité".

[7] (Moatti 2013, p. 6).

Thus, for example, consider passports. In the Roman empire, there was no lexical or institutional equivalent for a single state-issued document that established a citizen's identity, proved their citizenship, and permitted them to travel, as passports do today. This does not mean that no documentation to prove identity (or citizenship) existed, only that there were multiple different ways to do so, both 'official' (or 'state-issued') and 'unofficial' (designated by one's social-network), and the documents themselves did not necessarily constitute proof.[8] Sherwin-White, for example, mentions the requirement for Roman citizens to register their children at birth, upon which they received a wooden diptych as a certificate of citizenship. But this law was introduced by Augustus as late as 4 CE, and both Sherwin-White and Gardner's work underscore the unreliability of such documents.[9] Similarly with movement: there was no *one* specific document that 'permitted' a free person from within the empire to move in the empire, although there were a variety of documents that might be used depending on the identity of the person and the nature of their travel.[10]

This does not mean there was an absence of regulation or control; only that its reasons and modes differed from those today. Thus, although free people were able to move reasonably freely within the empire without ever having to produce 'documentation' such as passports or 'migration papers', nevertheless there were restrictions, and the exceptions tell us something important about the Roman world. The four most controlled categories of people in terms of movement were the elite, whose movement was regarded by the imperial government with suspicion, if not trepidation;[11] the military, who went where it was ordered; merchants, whose movement the government had a special interest in regulating to guarantee receiving taxes and customs,[12] and enslaved peoples, whose status meant that they were considered goods to be circulated at the will of their owners rather than humans with volition and agency. The elite and soldiers were by definition citizens; slaves, of course, were not. Merchants could be either.[13]

This list highlights the fact that in the Roman political system, control of movement was not divided along a binary axis of citizen and alien (as is the case in (and between) nation-states today): rather, control was contingent on *status*. In this light it is from our perspective ironic that non-elites, provided they originated from within the confines of the empire and were not soldiers, slaves, or merchants, could in principle move throughout the empire without molestation, controls, obstacles, or surveillance. Freedom of movement was thus not restricted by nationality, ethnicity, religious belief, or linguistic group, but by social status and financial limitations or logistical factors.[14] Conversely, this also meant

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8 Examples of 'private' documentation linked with one's social network: private letters of recommendation; tokens between parties that identify one another (the *tesserae hospitalis*, in Greek called σύμβολα); business contracts; and an oral declaration (the *professio*). Identity could also be determined by distinctive external clues such as clothes or jewelry (Moatti 2000, p. 929). For birth certificates, see (Schulz 1942).

9 (Sherwin-White 1973, p. 316; Gardner 1988). Gardner argues that documents themselves did not constitute the contract or proof, only evidence that a contract had been made; thus, the importance of witnesses (again, in a social-network) who can vouch for the validity of whatever a particular document might contain. Moreover, documentation was mostly important for the elite because of the public consequences (e.g., the financial or political implications) at stake in inheritance or in running for office; there was little incentive for non-elites to register or to obtain documents, and some presumably did not even know their age or citizen status. Nor is this an exclusive feature of the ancient world; my grandparents, peasants, illiterate, born in the remote highlands of Lebanon, do not know their date of birth, only the season they were born in, deduced by their parents from the flowers then in bloom.

10 Tokens for travel included the *legatio libera,* a *commeatus,* or a *diploma* (for Roman officials), or a *permissum* for foreigners. See (Moatti 2000, especially pp. 938–53).

11 Imperial control over elite movement was designed to minimize opportunities for the latter to conspire against the government. For the regulation of the elite, see (Drogula 2011), but also (Moatti 2000, p. 938ff); and (Tacoma 2016, p. 88).

12 (Moatti 2000, p. 945ff). Outside of customs and tax, one reason merchants were regulated was to prevent disturbances that may arise in connection with the exchange of goods (Moatti 2013, p. 9): "Finances, security, and the freedom to circulate were closely linked". See also (Moatti 2006, p. 124).

13 Different rules would have obtained for merchants from within versus from outside the empire, the latter who would have been subject to trade treaties between their state and Rome. On foreigners and movement in Rome, see (Moatti 2007).

14 No small point: the expenses of traveling may have been prohibitive and could have effectively served as a barrier on travel.

that the elite, military, and slaves can be meaningfully grouped together as categories subject to displacement—although the quality and degree of this differs significantly.[15]

This brings us to the next and related point: borders. Traditionally, Roman historians believed borders served a security function—keeping 'barbarians' and other enemies out; recently, however, some have come to view their purpose as chiefly one of economic control.[16] Whichever view one adopts, it is clear that there was no uniform 'border policy' across the empire, and there was no administrative equivalent to border control or border police. For the most part, entry and exit into and out of cities—including Rome—was unrestricted;[17] within the empire itself there were no borders between provinces to supervise, police, or restrict movement[18] (Egypt, and port-cities, being an exception);[19] while the nature of the imperial frontiers depended on the particular relationship with the border-people. But even these were often soft and porous, sporadic military installations notwithstanding.[20] A fair characterization of the reality on the ground is that the government of the early Roman empire had controls, but these were primarily concerned with collecting taxes and preventing acts of banditry and open warfare than policing migration.

The last difference I wish to highlight pertains to citizenship.[21] I have mentioned above that free non-citizens could move within the empire. This is another reminder that the meaning and scope of citizenship and its privileges differ over time, and just because citizenship, migration, and displacement are linked today does not mean that this was the case in the past (or indeed that it is inevitable for this to be the case in the present). It is undeniably true that Roman citizenship was highly valuable: even when the political meaningfulness and the prestige of citizenship began to wane, citizenship nevertheless offered vital rights, including the right to due process, the right not to be tortured, and access to the grain dole.[22] Still, it is also important to remember that mobility was *not* contingent on citizenship—only on one's status along the lines I outlined above. This meant that even people who were not full Roman citizens, for example those with Latin Rights, could generally move freely within the empire.[23] Moreover, although there were sometimes expulsions—i.e. displacements—of groups of people from Rome, and although these could be underpinned by ethnic prejudice, they were rare and not usually linked with citizenship or 'immigration status'.[24] Quite the contrary: during the Republic

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[15] The provincial elite, for example, were pressured to reside in Rome and to give up property outside of Italy, especially in their home provinces.

[16] For a recent return back to a more martial model, see (Symonds 2018); Moatti is a proponent for the economic control model. See (Whittaker 2004) for a variety of rich essays on the topic and (Breeze 2011) for a good overview of the debate; see also (Hirt 2019, pp. 2–3) in this volume.

[17] Philostratus, *Ap. T.* 4.39 tells us that there were sentries, but these did not necessarily grant or deny access to the city; quoted by (Moatti 2007, pp. 82–83); see also (Stevens 2017).

[18] Some border-towns had garrisons, but these were not universal and Trajan refuses Pliny's request for a garrison (Pliny *Ep.* 10.77-8).

[19] cf. Tacitus *Annals* 2.59, Cassius Dio 51.17, and Strabo 2.3.5 on restrictions for entry into and exit from Egypt; also (Lewis 1983, p. 16; Sidebotham, pp. 79–81; Moatti 2000; Tacoma 2016, pp. 88–90).

[20] For the border as depending on the relationship with the people, see (Moatti 2006, pp. 122–24; Moatti 2013, p. 9) on the Hermunduri (who could enter Roman territory without 'guardians') and the Quadi (who could not), mentioned by Tacitus *Germania* 41 and Cassius Dio 72.11, 73.2.4, respectively. (Whittaker 1989, p. 104) argues that frontiers were free.

[21] For a classic treatment of Roman citizenship, see (Sherwin-White 1973). See also (Peralta 2019; Gray 2018) in this volume.

[22] By 'political meaningfulness' I mean the capacity to participate in political life and to meaningfully vote on, or shape, policy—necessarily restricted in a monarchic (versus a republican) system. Access to the grain dole could be one motivation for people to move to Rome and to acquire (or indeed fake) Roman citizenship, and the contingency of citizenship for receiving the dole meant that some registration must have been necessary, but it is unclear how exactly that would have functioned (Tacoma 2016, pp. 85–91). Such a ('welfare') benefit is one aspect of Roman citizenship that might resonate with the exclusive advantages that citizenship confers today.

[23] (Kremer 2006; Sherwin-White 1973, p. 329ff; López Barja de Quiroga 1998).

[24] Religious groups could be targeted, especially Jews and Egyptians, but these were sometimes citizens rather than immigrants (thus problematizing for us the categories of 'Roman' and 'Other'). (Tacoma 2016, pp. 101–2) gives a list of the people who were sometimes expelled: " ... a rather odd collection: Jews, worshippers of Isis, astrologers, philosophers, magicians, gladiators, slaves for sale, male prostitutes ... ". He concludes that "Expulsions were not directed at migration as a phenomenon, nor targeted at specific migrant groups" (104). See also the chapter on expulsion in (Noy 2000, pp. 37–47). But cf. Suetonius, who reports that Augustus set limits on the bestowal of Roman citizenship and on manumission 'to keep the Roman people undefiled by any mixture with the filth of arrivants [*peregrini*] and of slavish blood' (*ab omni colluvione*

and afterwards in the empire, Rome was known for having inclusive citizenship laws (certainly when compared to other ancient polities), with several instances of mass enfranchisement, culminating in the *Constitutio Antoniniana* of 212 CE, which gave full Roman citizenship to all free men in the empire, and gave free women equal rights to Roman women.[25]

The differences I have highlighted between early imperial Rome and the modern world should serve as a reminder of some of the ways that the very terms of the debate—the categories, structures, processes, and definitions such as citizenship, foreigner, migrant, border, displacement, traveler, tourist—that seem natural, self-evident, or inevitable today are not: they are historical, and these evolve and transform over time.

They are also cultural. Given that even the very language we use betrays the systems in which we are embedded, and that even proximate, European, Latinate languages and traditions vary wildly in the semantic range of equivalent lexical items such as 'migrant', it is imperative that we recognize the profound and fundamental Eurocentricity of our entire vocabulary and the framework that it reflects, and so begin to interrogate even our most basic assumptions about mobility and displacement (itself a strange euphemism). This observation in turn opens up the possibility of exciting comparative work; of exploring how non-European traditions and languages have formulated related ideas and to ask whether they even had them at all. What does membership look like in Muslim communities—especially in transnational, Muslim cosmopolitanism?[26] How do (or did) pastoral-nomadic societies in Central Asia or the indigenous peoples of the Americas conceptualize borders?[27] And how about citizenship and community for those whom contemporary systems forget, ignore, marginalize, or erase: the stateless, the interned, and those who live in the limbo of 'camps', within the nation-state but excluded from it?[28]

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peregrini ac servilis sanguinis incorruptum servare populum, Life of Augustus 40.3). Such statements reveal the prejudice towards outsiders that can be found throughout Roman literature, but my suspicion is that this policy here reflects specific Augustan ideology and should be seen in the broader context of his 'conservative' moral agenda that included regulating marriage and enforcing sumptuary laws.

[25] Scholars (ancient and contemporary) have debated the motives behind this; Cassius Dio 78.9 saw it as a cynical move to raise the number of taxable people. Besson (2017) has recently addressed some of these scholarly debates, and Lavan (2016) explores the numbers of enfranchisement with a sensitivity to the difficult nature of the evidence. As for the rights of citizen women, as always, these depended on social status and time period. In general, citizen women had a diminished form of citizenship and were afforded what today we might call private rather than public rights. Their ability to participate in political or civic life, whether in the Republic or Empire, was restricted; they were never allowed, for example, to vote or hold office, but they could perform (important) religious functions, some of which had political implications (for example the Vestal Virgins). Women were also not entitled access to the grain dole, given that this was restricted to citizen men. On the other hand, they were permitted (independent) legal action, could own property, conduct business, and travel. For the rights of women, see especially the first and fourth chapters in (Gardner 1993).

[26] The irony of using the Classical term 'cosmopolitan' here is not lost on me. Examples of productive avenues of exploration are the concept of the '*ummah*' (sometimes translated as 'nation', but really the Muslim community)–whether in the Quran or Muslim theorists like Al-Farabi—and to consider its interface with the nation-state here (Orwin 2017) is especially rich. On Muslim cosmopolitanisms, see (Maclean and Ahmed 2012); for a subtle historiography about Islamic cosmopolitanism (particularly contact between the Indian subcontinent and Central and West Asia), see (Alavi 2015); for Southeast Asian Muslim Cosmopolitanism, see (Aljunied 2017).

[27] The sedentary~nomadic binary itself is an artificial, often rhetorical framework formulated by the 'sedentary' to describe and define 'Other' societies, despite the fact that sedentary civilizations too are fundamentally characterized by migration and movement (one need only think of merchants—or, today, academics). Still, this binary persists in historical and ethnographic texts from around the pre-modern world; in Herodotus' *Histories,* the Scythians in Book 4 are highlighted (and Othered) for their nomadism—despite the fact that he himself was famously itinerant. In the medieval Arabic world, Ibn Khaldun's theory of civilization is constructed along a similar sedentary~bedouin binary, and he too does not see himself as 'nomadic' despite the fact that he moved throughout the Islamic world from Spain, throughout North Africa, and in the Levant. On Ancient China and its Northern 'barbarians' (especially the nomadic Xiongnu), see Sima Qian's *Shi Ji* 110 and (Di Cosmo 2002). As an example of Comanche borders and empire, see (Hämäläinen 2008, pp. 3–4) (thanks to Adam Spry for this reference).

[28] For the notion of 'campzenship', see (Sigona 2015), with bibliography. On Palestinian camps, see (Dalal 2017; Maqusi 2017) in this special issue. According to the (UNRWA 2019), as of 1 January 2019, there are 475,075 registered Palestine refugees in Lebanon, half of whom live in camps—many since their expulsion from their homeland in 1948. Because they are not legally recognized citizens of any state, their rights in Lebanon are hugely restricted, including the right to own property or to work in a profession of their choice (https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon). In Bangladesh, over 900,000 Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority expelled from their homeland of Myanmar, are now stateless and live in camps, including the world's largest (UNHCR 2019). More recently, the removal in Assam of almost 1.9 million people from the National Register

In dispossessing ourselves of the illusion that the contemporary configuration is the only possibility, and in realizing that the categories we think in are features of a very specific world—*our* world, the world of the nation-state—we are forced to recognize that because all of these are historical, *all* are subject to transformation. We thus become free to study, analyze, and dream up other possibilities, and to take active, conscious part in determining how these concepts and frameworks can evolve. History thus can inspire us to imagine, and empower us to work toward, an alternative world, one that is informed by our understanding of the past.

This is especially crucial at a moment when the future of the nation-state is unclear: what looked like a clear trajectory towards globalization and transnationalism in the 90s has now been replaced with anxieties at the resurgence of ethno-nationalism and alarm at its implications for ethnic minorities and migrants the world over. In the context of Lachenicht's circumscribed framing (debates about migration in German society, which stemmed chiefly from anxieties about Muslim and African migrants), the study of Roman history can inform attitudes and indeed policies towards the EU, Schengen, and migration by challenging narratives that wish to draw cultural or migratory boundaries around Europe, since movement and exchange between Europe, North Africa, and West Asia—in *all* directions—have been ancient, continuous, and integral.[29]

Tacitus' *Germania,* for example, provides us with a perspective that challenges contemporary assumptions about any innate qualities that make Germany a desirable target for migrants by scoffing at the idea that anyone from Italy, North Africa or the Middle East would ever move there: "Furthermore, apart from the danger of the terrifying and unknown sea, who would have left behind Asia or Africa or Italy to seek Germany, hideous in its lands, harsh in its climate, depressing to cultivate and to look at—unless it is one's homeland?"[30]

Roman history also teaches us that *everybody* is a migrant, and that nobody is exempt from anti-migrant rhetoric: once upon a time, Germanic tribes, too, were considered barbarians, roving migrants at the gates of civilized Rome—and long held by scholars to have been the cause of its fall. Later, in the medieval period, came the *Ostsiedlung*: the settling of Eastern and Central Europe, from Estonia to Romania, by Germanic-speaking peoples from the Holy Roman Empire. Ideally, this kind of historical knowledge—indeed, historical consciousness—should favorably inflect attitudes to migrants today and temper vitriolic rhetoric against us.[31]

But although it is tempting to look to the past for help navigating contemporary problems, and although history can help us understand the differences between the specific and the general,

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of Citizens of India (on the pretext of not having the requisite documentation proving citizenship) has rendered them effectively stateless. These examples illustrate the limits of associating identity with citizenship and invite us to consider how the stateless and those living in the limbo of camps might define membership.

[29] Here I draw from (Lachenicht 2018, pp. 6–7) ideas about fractured continuities—specifically the ways people relate themselves to the past and re-inscribe themselves into its scripts, and am proposing a critical approach to narratives that frame Germans as sedentary non-migrants, or that view contemporary boundaries around Europe as monolithic, self-evident, or historical.

[30] *Quis porro, praeter periculum horridi et ignoti maris, Asia aut Africa aut Italia relicta Germaniam peteret, informem terris, asperam caelo, tristem cultu adspectuque, nisi si patria sit*? Tacitus, *Germania* 2. '*Cultu*' here can refer to agriculture (as I have translated it), but also to culture proper (the distinctive ideas, customs, and behavior of a people; see *OED* 7a). From Tacitus' Roman senatorial perspective, both are pathetic. Although I speak of Germania as 'Germany', note that we should be wary of equating the two, in part because this conflation gives the false impression of a cohesive people or a continuous, unified nation. See (Goffart 2006; Krebs 2011), cited below.

[31] For Germanic tribes and the fall of Rome, see for example (Ward-Perkins 2005). I am thinking here of the *Völkerwanderung* (the 'Migration Period'); the Visigothic sack of Rome in 410 under Alaric I; and the Vandal migration to North Africa (pointedly, a reversal of the directionality of migration today). For an overview, see (Halsell 2007); on the complexities of Roman (and Vandal) identities in the aftermath of the fall of Rome (Conant 2012); on the representation of Barbarian kings and kingdoms (Ford 2020). Our literary evidence comes almost exclusively from classical sources such as Tacitus and Procopius; the study of Roman history thus teaches us how to evaluate these literary portraits as constructs that reflect the specific rhetorical strategies of their authors and their cultural prejudices. Sensitive analysis of these sources in general is important in light of their (mis)use in the construction of national narratives at the dawn of the nation-state, and especially so for their centrality to German nationalism and, later on, Nazi ideology, for which see (Goffart 2006; Krebs 2011) respectively (the latter especially for the reception of Tacitus' *Germania*).

the conceptualization of history as a didactic enterprise is highly problematic. I have already indicated above just how difficult it is to speak with any certainty about so many aspects of ancient mobility, and have tried by means of my hedging, cautious language, my qualifications, and my long footnotes to drive home this point. In so doing, I have tried to issue a warning against cavalier statements about historical facts and thus to draw attention to how complicated it can be even for professional historians to derive any lessons from them.

But even when historical facts are *not* in dispute, serious questions about their utility remain. Whether to climate change or to migrancy, contemporary attitudes have shown us that people will accept whatever 'facts' suit their prejudices, regardless what professional historians or climate scientists assert—a salutary reminder that neither facts nor the experts who labor to share these necessarily have the power to persuade. Nor is knowledge of the past necessarily synonymous with moral edification: 'lessons' from history can easily be deployed by anyone also toward malignant ends. Thus, an understanding of the history of displacement does not then mean avoiding the actions that lead to it nor is it a guarantor of commitment to humane, liberal values or to social justice.[32] In fact, the opposite is equally possible: history, after all, has been instrumentalized to commit heinous crimes in the past, and is increasingly deployed by supremacists to justify their racist, nativist views today.

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32　This applies to migrant groups who themselves are anti-migrant.

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Article

Sharing Histories: Teaching and Learning from Displaced Youth in Greece

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Abstract: This paper reflects upon my experiences teaching and learning from displaced youth in Greece over a period of eight months in 2017. Following a brief examination of the current challenges in accessing formal education, I examine non-formal education initiatives, summarizing my work with two NGOs in Athens and Chios where I taught lessons in English on ancient Greek art, archaeology, history, and literature. In offering these lessons, my hope was to do more than simply improve students' language skills or deposit information: I wanted to examine the past to reflect upon the present, exploring themes of migration, forced displacement, and human belonging. Moreover, I wanted to engage students in meaningful connection, to the past and to the present, to one and to others, as a means of building community in and beyond the classroom, at a time when many were feeling alienated and isolated. This paper, therefore, outlines the transformational, liberating learning that took place, citing ancient evidence of displacement and unpacking modern responses by those currently displaced.

Keywords: archaeology; art; displaced youth; Greece; history; learning; Syria

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But come now, tell me about your wanderings:

describe the places, the people, and the cities you have seen.

Which ones were wild and cruel, unwelcoming,

and which were kind to visitors, respecting the gods?

King Alcinous to Odysseus
(Homer's *Odyssey*, 8.571–576)[1]

"What was the role of the imagination when tales, spread by the roaming story-tellers, forged ideas of the world?"[2] The Western world's earliest known story-tellers, the Greeks, imagined a world both cruel and kind: Homer's *Odyssey* gives us a snapshot of that world. I've read the *Odyssey* many times, on my own and with students, but only recently has this text come to resonate more profoundly with me on account of my own personal wanderings in Greece, where I worked with displaced Syrian youth. I wish to sing of the people and the places I have seen: how these experiences have compelled me to address the history of migration and forced displacement and to encourage other educators to bring this marginalized history to the forefront of teaching and learning, in ways that are both scholarly and sensitive.

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[1] This translation, and all to follow, from Homer (2018, trans. Wilson).
[2] Segatto (2017, p. 3) in this volume.

1. Prologue: My Odyssey in Education

Two years ago, I finished a three-year teaching-stream post in the Department of Historical Studies at the University of Toronto Mississauga. Facing an uncertain future, I decided to take time to apply my love for teaching classics in a very different way: I spent most of 2017 teaching displaced youth in Greece, first on the island of Chios and then in Athens. In Chios I developed a series of lessons and workshops related to ancient history and classical art and archaeology. In Athens, I led small groups of youth on tours of local archaeological sites and museums.

My decision to work with displaced youth in Greece was inspired in part by the experiences of other academics teaching and working with marginalized groups in vulnerable contexts, both at home and abroad.[3] In particular, I was stirred by the work of Richmond Eustis, a Fulbright Scholar who, in 2015, taught English to refugees at the University of Jordan using Homer's *Odyssey*.[4] Eustis recounts student responses to the text and how these responsive readings moved him by offering "a glimpse into another's vision and experience of the world". He also reflects on class discussions as a means of fostering personal connection: "Our lives could not be more different, and yet, strangely, I feel as though our fates are intertwined." (Eustis 2015)

I too wanted to utilize my expertise in a more meaningful way, furthering my efforts to affect change in education and social justice.[5] I was drawn to the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean for two reasons. First, I come from a family of migrants: my father and my grandparents on my mother's side emigrated from Italy to Canada, but they moved as free people without fear of persecution. My family was lucky, and thus I have been lucky. Second, I have studied classics all of my adult life, and although my research has focused on the representation of 'Others' and theories of agency and identity (Trentin 2015b, 2016b), I had never seriously thought about migrants as an identity category. As a burgeoning field of interest, I was keen to explore this ancient theme in a modern context.[6]

What follows, then, is an account of my teaching experiences in Greece, with insights into: (1) the value of teaching ancient history to highlight shared stories of displacement in unfamiliar lands, (2) the role of education in bolstering the wellbeing of displaced youth during times of trauma and upheaval, and (3) the learning and liberty that can be gained through collective knowledge exchange. Based on my experiences, I will explore the pedagogy of border liberation, and transformative learning theory, drawing on the works of Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux, bell hooks, and Jack Mezirow, examining the ways in which a 'problem-posing', critically reflective approach to education can nurture biculturalism and cultural synthesis. Citing ancient evidence of displacement and unpacking modern responses by those currently displaced, I will outline the transformational, two-way learning that took place between teachers and students.

To be clear, what follows is an authentic, reflective piece about my personal and professional self-actualization, made possible by the relationships formed as a student among students. I was wholly ignorant to the dominant discourses on the pedagogies of oppression and liberation when I departed for Greece but returned acutely aware of these critical pedagogies in action (see below, Section 9. **Learning from Displaced Youth in Greece**).

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[3] In particular, the efforts of classicists working through trauma with prisoners (Rabinowitz 2013, 2014; Skotheim 2015; Wright 2016, 2017) and war veterans (Meineck and Konstan 2014; Stewart 2015; Doerries 2016) using ancient texts. See also the *Ancient Greeks/Modern Lives: Poetry-Drama-Dialogue* program organized by the Aquila Theatre from September 2011 to May 2012: www.ancientgreeksmodernlives.org.

[4] Eustis (2015) and Battle (2015). See also the 2012 "Campus in Camps" initiative and the work of Isayev (2017).

[5] Throughout my academic career I have been dedicated to disability rights and women's rights in scholarship, service, and teaching (Trentin 2014, 2015a, 2016a).

[6] The subject is not new but has experienced a renewed interest of late: Columbia University recently hosted a conference on "Refuge and Refugees in the Ancient World", November 11–12, 2016; and Elena Isayev at the University of Exeter has led a series of Classics courses based on her research in migration, mobility, and belonging (2016–2018).

2. Action for Education: Greece

In Europe, eighty percent of displaced people arrive by sea; from the east, most land in Greece via the Aegean islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos, thereafter transferred to the mainland, either to Athens or Thessaloniki. Since 2015, over one million people have arrived on the Aegean islands, roughly half of whom under the age of eighteen.[7]

Among the numerous concerns raised by the migration crisis, the wellbeing of displaced children and youth is of utmost importance. Access to education is key to resilience-building, social integration and transcultural awareness, but the obstacles to full participation in formal education are considerable, especially for those between the ages of fifteen and eighteen, for whom education is not officially mandated.

Since the outset of the current migration crisis, the international community has recognized the value of education for displaced children. A number of international actors have been key driving forces in the right for formal education: UNESCO, UNICEF and the UNHCR. But perhaps the greatest efforts in the field of "creative engagement and [informal] education" has come from non-governmental organizations, or NGOs. In Greece, these include the Greek Council for Refugees, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children. NGOs on the ground have established ad hoc schools, providing safe and welcoming spaces, where children and youth can learn English and Greek, as well as essential social skills and school etiquette. Criticism of such schools has focused on the lack of professional teachers and formal evaluation of curricula, thus questioning the overall quality of education being delivered.[8] To be sure, though the education provided by NGOs varies, they offer immediate support and sustained stability for displaced people in uncertain times.

In the spring of 2016, the Greek Ministry of Education, Research & Religious Affairs spearheaded the "Refugee Education Project" and officially assumed responsibility for "the formal education of refugees": integrating refugee children under fifteen years of age in Greek schools and/or reception accommodation centres.[9] All NGOs involved in education initiatives were invited to be certified by the Ministry, based on evaluation procedures prescribed by the Greek Ministry and Greek Higher Education Institutions. Still in its early stages, and facing significant obstacles in timing, structure and mobilization, the project has yet to reveal its full impact. Many children and youth are still waiting to go to school.

It is not my intent here to comment on the merits of a formal versus informal education. Emergency situations require immediate action; informal education provides access to knowledge and skills in lieu of formal education. I do not know the Greek school system well enough nor the particulars of its program of integration for refugees. But I do know about the teaching and learning that took place at a school run by a small NGO on the island of Chios: I will use this paper to summarize the academic, psychological, and social transformations that regular schooling, committed teachers, and engaging lessons can bring about by nurturing curiosity and excitement in the classroom.[10]

3. Teaching Displaced Youth in Chios

The island of Chios, seven kilometers west of the Turkish coast and port town of Cesme, has been a short and long-term 'home' to 131,021 displaced persons since 2015.[11] The UNHCR records Chios island's capacity at Vial camp—the sole official camp—as 1300, though it regularly overflows with

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[7] 1,112,406 from 2013–2017. In 2017, 29,718 migrants arrived on the Greek islands, 42% of whom were Syrians: (UNHCR 2018). In 2016, 47% of Syrian refugees on the Greek islands were children, 11% of whom travelled alone: (UNHCR 2016a). Global statistics for the Syrian crisis: (UNICEF 2018).

[8] See the Greek Ministry of Education Research and Religious Affairs (2017, p. 73).

[9] Greek Ministry of Education Research and Religious Affairs (2017).

[10] On the vital role of curiosity in education, see Freire (1970, 2001); on building excitement in the classroom, see hooks (1994); on the transformative effects of education, see Mezirow (2000).

[11] In 2015: 120,804; in 2016: 33,969; in 2017: 6294; and as of January 2018: 119. UNHCR (2015, 2016b).

nearly triple that number: in June of 2017, 3853 people lived in Vial camp.[12] Of these individuals, 10 percent were minors.[13]

Amid the piteous conditions of camp life, there is hope, hospitality, and humanity enhanced by Greek solidarity groups and foreign-run NGOs.[14] The UK based non-profit charity 'Action for Education' has taken on the challenge of providing free, non-formal education for the large numbers of displaced people inhabiting the island.[15] Operating two schools (a primary and secondary school) and a youth centre, open seven days a week, and catering to children and youth between the ages of six and twenty-one years old, the schools provide more than an education: they are places of escape, offering safety and normalcy, beyond the camp.[16] Run by volunteers from different professional backgrounds (teachers, but also artists, nurses, social workers, writers, etc.), the schools are alive with creativity and enthusiasm brought into the classrooms every single day: a curriculum that teaches English, but also includes, and is not limited to: archaeology workshops, computer and software skills training, cooking programs, German and Greek (and other languages) lessons, music and dance classes, science labs, studio art, and more.

This unofficial curriculum is positively Euro- and Anglo-centric; but it is also truly liberatory, striving to find a common ground for all. Lessons are taught in English, by native and non-native speakers, some of whom are certified ESL teachers, and most of whom come from Britain and Europe, though some—-like me!—-from further west.[17] As the official international language of the EU and the UN, learning English is key for communication between displaced persons and foreign aid workers, thus students were eager to study English. But the methods of language instruction were not wholly traditional; staff were encouraged to test new and innovative teaching techniques, allowing greater freedom and flexibility in learning.[18]

During the five months I spent in Chios, I volunteered at the high-school teaching advanced English to (mostly Syrian) students between the ages of twelve and twenty-one. Together we read selections of Greek literature and myth (including parts of Homer's *Odyssey*), exploring topics of war, migration and displacement. I also ran a series of workshops on ancient art (Greek pottery-painting and Roman mosaic-making), archaeology (tours of sites and museums), cultural heritage (lectures on Syria's antiquities) and history (lessons on ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome).[19]

I was surprised by the students' interest in antiquity; their overwhelming positive response to a few introductory lessons on ancient history led to a series of themed activities that spanned over two months, with different activities geared to different age groups. By far, the most popular activities were those that involved hands-on construction or deconstruction: the art and archaeology workshops.

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[12] UNHCR (2017a), June 20. All of the Aegean island camps are overcrowded.

[13] Refugee Rights Data Project (2017a, p. 4).

[14] The UNHCR remains "very concerned at the situation of refugees and migrants" in the camps on the Greek islands (UNHCR 2017b, p. 41). See also Dalal (2017), in this volume.

[15] 'Action for Education' charity #1099682. From November 2016–January 2018 the schools and youth centre were run by the Swiss NGO 'Be Aware and Share'.

[16] At the time of publication, the primary school was passed to the Greek NGO Metadrasi.

[17] Volunteers from the refugee community, speaking Arabic and Farsi, also provided language and translation support.

[18] See the vision of 'Action for Education', accessible at: www.actionforeducation.co.uk.

[19] Perhaps colonial, these lessons aimed at exploring cultural unity through diversity. See Rohde (2017) in this volume. On (post-)colonial discourses in Classics, see Goff (2005).

4. Ancient Art and Archaeology

"Awareness, creativeness, inter-disciplinarity, imagination.

These engines drive mankind in formulating the "next step"."

—Segatto, *Quantum Notes on Classic Places*[20]

For the junior students (those between the ages of twelve to fifteen), the workshops on archaeology were most popular. The first activity organized was the creation and excavation of a layer-cake archaeological site.[21] Students were split into two teams: each team was assigned a site and given edible artifacts to "bury", recording the number of artifacts deposited in each layer, made of alternating cake and icing. The teams then switched sites and excavated, recording the number of artifacts discovered in each layer and describing key characteristics (shape, size, texture, etc.). Students learned the basic principles of stratigraphy and the importance of carefully "excavating" and describing discovered artifacts. They also loved that they got to eat cake, too! It was a messy activity, but well worth the mess.

The second activity organized was a sandbox dig (Figure 1).[22] Box sites were constructed using beach sand and dirt with "real" artifacts: replicas of ancient Greek coins, pottery, and statuettes. Students were divided into teams to share the responsibilities of excavation: taking turns digging, sifting, measuring, recording, cleaning, and bagging all artifacts discovered. Students learned more about the techniques of excavation and the importance of handling artifacts with care. One student, while cleaning a miniature bust of Homer, dropped it, breaking part of it—the student was so distraught until I explained that archaeologists sometimes damage artifacts, too, when excavating or transporting them. Students liked this activity because they got to dig in the dirt and find cool stuff!

Figure 1. Sandbox dig. Photo by author.

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20 Segatto (2017, p. 4).
21 This activity was modified from the "Simulated Digs" lesson plan via the Education Department of the Archaeological Institute of America: https://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/education/digs/Digs_layer_cake.pdf.
22 This activity was modified from the "Shoebox Dig" activity via the Education Department of the Archaeological Institute of America: https://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/education/digs/Digs_shoebox.pdf.

Also popular were the workshops on ancient art(-making). In a workshop on Greek pottery, students learned about the uses of different Greek pottery styles and practiced drawing pottery profiles as well as reconstructing pots from (replica Greek) pot sherds. They also made clay pots (small kraters) and painted them with geometric designs, according to ancient Greek pottery styles and techniques (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Greek vase-painting. Photo by author.

This workshop was paired with a class on Greek history, covering aspects of art, architecture, language and religion. Students were keen to learn the Greek alphabet and immediately tried to read signs in modern Greek. They were especially fascinated by my discussion of the Greeks' migration out of Greece in the eighth century BCE and were eager to learn more about the site of Pithekoussai where artifacts recovered from tombs suggest maritime trade between Egypt, Greece, Italy and the east, including Syria.[23]

These lessons culminated with a field trip—the school's and students' first field trip!—to the Archaeological Museum of Chios, which has an excellent collection of ancient Greek (Chian) pottery. The Director of Antiquities in Chios arranged a guided tour of the museum's collection provided by Dr. Maria Finfini, who encouraged students to really *look* at the artifacts, to ask questions, and to communicate their thoughts with her and with one another. The museum staff were delighted to have us and the students were jubilant to see real pots, and other artifacts (Figure 3).[24]

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[23] Example: North Syrian aryballos from grave 215, and Egyptian faience scarabs, both dated to the eight century BCE, Pithekoussai. See Buchner (1966, pp. 6–8).

[24] On museum engagement and refugee communities, see Skarvteit and Goodnow (2010).

Figure 3. Visiting the Chios Archaeological Museum. Photo by author.

5. Archaeology and Cultural Heritage

"Does the historian or the archaeologist

—beyond the necessary preparation, competence, determination and method—

need imagination to reconstruct the remains of those traces,

the habits, the manufacturing, the thinking that is no longer present?"

—Segatto, *Quantum Notes on Classic Places*[25]

The senior students (between the ages of sixteen to twenty-one) were involved in more analytical work, investigating cultural heritage and the history of archaeology at specific sites: Timgad in Algeria, Babylon in Iraq, Persepolis in Iran and Palmyra in Syria. Most students knew of these sites but had never been. Only one student, from Morocco, had been to the Roman site of Timgad and wrote a brief reflective piece about his visit, sharing this with the class and his peers as a means of visualizing the site.

An unplanned activity, arising from student interest, was a discussion about currency: students showcased their national currency, some of which honoured ancient buildings and sites, including the Roman Theatre at Bosra and the ruins of Palmyra, both in Syria. I took this opportunity to discuss the significance of commemorating historical monuments on money (a practice which dates back to the Romans). As a class we compared banknotes (Canadian, European, Syrian, etc.). What was represented and why?

During these discussions, students communicated concerns about the destruction of archaeological sites in their homelands, exposing varying degrees of emotional distress at the loss of their culture, their identity. When I showed students the controversial reconstructed Arch of Triumph from Palmyra, on display in London, they were bemused: why was it recreated? for whom? Having them research news articles about the reconstruction, they quoted Syria's Director of Antiquities, Dr. Maamoun Abdulkarim, as saying "We have a common heritage. Our heritage is universal—it is not

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25 Segatto (2017, p. 3).

just for Syrian people".[26] This was a message raising cross-cultural awareness, and, more important for my students, it was a testimony to the value of sharing their culture and preserving their identity in the West.

After these sessions, my advanced English class, composed entirely of young Syrian men, took an interest in Syrian art and archaeology and wanted to know more. I dug up as much information as I could find: students read about Idrimi, the 3500 year old refugee whose inscribed statue is on display today at the British Museum;[27] they explored the "Living History" of Syria through online videos from the 2016 Aga Khan Toronto exhibit, including works by contemporary Syrian artists in exile;[28] and they examined digital images of artifacts-turned-artworks from a 2017 exhibit at the Museum of Classical Archaeology in Cambridge titled "Lost", by Syrian-born artist Issam Kourbaj.[29]

The students had mixed responses to this material: they were surprised by the tale of Idrimi and ashamed that they had not known his story; they were fascinated by the ancient artifacts from their homeland and their modern adaptations but wondered why Canadians were so interested; and they were deeply disturbed by the plaster-dipped clothing belonging to migrants lost at sea. The pride in their country and its history, and the peril of their own journeys, were met with equal intensity.

These lessons gave students the opportunity to reflect on the complex history of their homeland: conquering peoples, forced displacement, the destruction of cultural heritage, and the connections between past and present in the construction of identity and reality. It also gave students a wider point of reference for understanding how the world beyond Greece was responding to the migration crisis, and how the voices of Syria remained alive, despite the country's great losses. They became aware, too, of the importance of *their* voices and the power of sharing *their* stories.

In highlighting the work of Syrians abroad, students were (if only temporarily) optimistic about the preservation of their culture, and the liberation of their people. But they were also plagued by common concerns which came up again and again: We are different. We are strangers here. We do not belong. Europe does not want us. And the question asked by all, "How can we integrate without losing what it means to be Syrian?" A question asked by migrants and displaced people throughout history, and one I could only begin to tackle by introducing students to ancient Greek literature.

6. Ancient Greek Literature

"I'm led to believe that, once upon a time, as much as nowadays,

those who move or are displaced from their land are led,

in turn, to activate sooner or later an imagination

that is beyond the necessities of migration and flight."

—Segatto, *Quantum Notes on Classic Places*[30]

With my advanced English students, I read selections of classical literature to unpack historical perspectives on 'Otherness' related to displacement, migration, refuge, and *xenia*.[31] While I could have examined any number of texts, especially from the corpus of Greek tragedy ripe with tales of foreigners in the Greek world (e.g., Hecuba, Medea, the Danaids, etc.),[32] I chose to examine a text about a (Greek) man's long journey home, and the foreign places he visits and people he meets en route: Homer's epic poem, the *Odyssey*.

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[26] *BBC News* (Turner 2016). On the destruction of cultural heritage and current debate about reconstruction projects (by whom? for whom?), see (Bond 2016; Munawar 2017).

[27] On Idrimi, see: https://blog.britishmuseum.org/idrimi-the-3500-year-old-refugee/

[28] On the "Living History" of Syria, see: https://www.agakhanmuseum.org/syria-living-history,

[29] On the works of Issam Kourbaj, see: https://www.classics.cam.ac.uk/museum/exhibitions/exhibitions/lost

[30] Segatto (2017, p. 3).

[31] In ancient Greece, *xenia* or guest-friendship, was defined by a mutual respect between stranger and host, whereby a host would provide hospitality to strangers in need. On the practice of *xenia*, see Herman (2002).

[32] See the recent work of Effrosyni Kostara (2016) on Greek drama and transformative learning theory.

The *Odyssey* recounts the Greek hero Odysseus' ten-year voyage home to Ithaca in western Greece—via the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas—after having fought for ten years at Troy (modern Turkey). Along the way, Odysseus meets friends and foes; his encounters reveal a great deal about the construction of Greek identity, through association with and opposition to the 'Other'. The story informs and warns readers of the complex cultural interactions that cannot be simply summarized as those between 'civilized' peoples, or hospitable hosts, and 'uncivilized' peoples, or hostile hosts.[33]

Fundamentally the *Odyssey* is a story about a migrant longing to return home and regain his identity. Odysseus' journey is lengthy and risky, with a great many barriers to his freedom of movement: he is detoured to unknown lands, facing an uncertain welcome. Arriving in the land of the Phaeacians, Odysseus asks, "What is this country I have come to now? Are all the people wild and violent, or good, hospitable, and god-fearing?" (*The Odyssey*, 6.119–121). His story is one to which my students, and all displaced people, could intimately relate: foreigners at the mercy of strangers, uncertain if they would be welcome, hoping to forge a new life, longing for a home.

But the *Odyssey* is not just about Odysseus' encounters with foreign people ('Others') in foreign lands, it is also a story about the ways in which those foreign people receive the stranger (Odysseus as 'Other'). Odysseus is a man of military age: he is a lethal warrior. When Nausicaa and her slaves meet Odysseus, naked (except for a leafy branch used "to cover his manly parts") and looking a wreck, all were "quite terrified" except Nausicaa who asks: "Why are you running from this man? Do you believe he is an enemy?" (*The Odyssey*, 6.129, 138 and 199–200) Is Odysseus to be feared? Can he be trusted?

My advanced English students were all young adult Muslim men: a critically vulnerable group who superficially 'fit' the profile of Islamic terrorists. President Donald Trump has expressed his fears that the "young, strong male refugees" entering the United States could be "the greatest Trojan horse of all time": a reference to Odysseus' master ruse which ultimately led to the destruction of Troy from within the city walls.[34] Are refugees to be feared? Can they be trusted?

Reading selections of the *Odyssey* with my students provided the opportunity to survey the fears and hopes of strangers and hosts in the ancient and modern Greek worlds, examining the ancient roots of *xenia* and the modern sources of xenophobia. We read only from books six through nine, about the Phaeacians and the Cyclopses, a civil nation versus savage beasts, skipping sections that were particularly gruesome: bodily dismemberment, cannibalism, and bloody violence were topics that could rouse trauma, and my intention wasn't to shock my students into understanding, but rather, to stress the limits and antonyms of *xenia* and the construction of the 'Other'.[35]

Though we read only a small part of the *Odyssey*—it took a great deal of time to get through the text as students faced considerable challenges with the English translation—students were nevertheless able to connect the themes of migration, displacement and *xenia* with their own experiences, having traveled from Syria to Turkey to Greece. A few times this generated heated debate and emotional outbursts when students addressed abuse or neglect by organizations (e.g., the Greek or Turkish police, the EU asylum service, etc.).[36] Other times our readings prompted sharing stories of comfort, hospitality, and generosity shown by strangers and 'ordinary' people (e.g., International volunteers, Greek solidarity groups and local citizens). Like Odysseus, these young men had met both friends and foes; these encounters not only shaped their view of the 'Other' but helped refine beliefs about the collective 'Other' and individual 'Others'.[37] And also like Odysseus—at once a hero, a warrior,

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[33] On the problematic and politically charged use of 'civilized' and 'civilization', see Beard (2018). On colonial and postcolonial discourses in Classics, see Goff (2005).

[34] Rhodan (2015) in *Time*.

[35] For current debate on the use of "trigger-warnings" see Godderis (2016); on addressing difficult topics in the Classics classroom, see Rabinowitz and McHardy (2014).

[36] For examples of abuse, see the Refugee Rights Data Project (2017b, 2017c).

[37] Gabriel (2003, p. 631): "As individuals, we may display hospitality, . . . But as members of organizations, hospitality does not enter our thinking. Borders are borders. They must be respected, defended, and patrolled with closed ears to the plight

a family-man, a trickster, a beggar and a migrant—these young men were negotiating their own layered identities.

The mysterious Homer, according to tradition, is thought to have been a blind bard from the island of Chios. As early as the sixth century BCE, a guild of bards were calling themselves the 'Homeridae', or progeny of Homer. Today, the island boasts of 'Homer's Rock', a spot just north of Chios town in Vrontados, where Homer supposedly sang and taught.[38] Towards the end of my time in Chios, I went in search of this rock with three of my former students: we sat and talked about Homer's *Odyssey*, while gazing across the Aegean Sea to Turkey, a route traveled by all of us, but only one (me) as a free citizen.

After spending five months in Chios, I returned home to Toronto: a safe place that I knew and loved, where I was warmly welcomed by family and friends. I returned to Greece briefly in July, and then again in October to end the year, this time working in Athens.

7. Teaching Displaced Youth in Athens

Building on the archaeology and ancient history lessons and workshops I ran in Chios, I was keen to expand this initiative. Having visited Athens briefly in July, I chose to spend the last two months of 2017 there, volunteering with the Khora Community Centre, where I worked once again with migrants and displaced youth.

The Khora Centre, a humanitarian co-operative, is a one-stop shop for the displaced in Athens: it operates a freeshop (distributing clothes and hygiene products), a family space (with a kids' play area), a communal kitchen (providing breakfast and lunch daily), a social café (with free wifi), an education space (for adult language classes), a library (for quiet study and reading) and numerous other resources and services (including legal, dental, and social assistance).[39] Run by international volunteers with extensive field experience in Calais, Serbia, Lesbos, and Athens, and from a diverse range of cultural and political backgrounds and traditions, the Centre provides a positive model of collective co-working. It has hundreds of service users from Afghanistan, North Africa, Iran, Iraq and Syria: it is a truly multi-cultural space where foreigners from around the world converge and collaborate.

I worked with Khora volunteers in the education space to evaluate student English levels and coordinate classes, teachers and scheduling. In my free time, I led tours for interested students, some former students from Chios, some new students from Khora, to archaeological sites and museums. Here I witnessed true intersections and connections of people from diverse backgrounds, traditions, and statuses, sharing their histories.

8. Greek Art, Archaeology, and Ancient History

Although students had spent much time in and around Athens, few had visited the city's ancient monuments or historical museums and thus had little knowledge of Athens' rich history and legacy. It at first seemed that students weren't interested in this legacy as it bore little connection to their own lives and realities. This would soon change.

Our first visit was to the National Archaeological Museum, home to many of Greece's most famous artifacts. An interesting, though not unexpected, response from students surfaced: the female Muslim students were embarrassed by the male nudity of Archaic Greek statues and felt uncomfortable looking; the male students were amused (I suspect uncomfortably so) and looked at length.[40] Viewing

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of the Other. Those outside the borders are kept outside—their voices ignored until they seek to test the borders, something we experience as a violation and a threat. Their stories are irrelevant. Unlike the Homeric boundaries which may be crossed under the tradition of hospitality, redefined or disregarded, ours appear impermeable."

[38] For the mythological evidence for Homer in Chios, see West (1999).
[39] See the Khora website for more information, www.khora-athens.org.
[40] This is not an uncommon response, even among students from western backgrounds. The nudity of Greek statues was recently explored at the British Museum's exhibit *Defining Beauty: The Body in Ancient Greek Art* (2015).

these artifacts raised questions about cultural customs and gender roles throughout time and place, from ancient Greece to modern Syria. Encouraging open, frank dialogue about these (dis)connections provided the opportunity to think critically about acceptable dress codes, gendered behaviour, and associated moral or ethical standards.[41]

Another site visited was the Acropolis Museum: students were intrigued by the use of colour on ancient art and dazzled by the architecture of the modern building against the ancient ruins of the Acropolis. Examining casts and originals of the Parthenon frieze, I discussed the history of the displaced marbles (the students had different opinions about the Ottomans), asking students to consider the debate of repatriation, using resources from the museum. What followed was an interesting conversation about the ownership and preservation of cultural heritage, including the destruction and reconstruction of historical monuments, the illicit trafficking of antiquities, and the display of looted artifacts in museums around the world.[42] By and large, students were, in theory, keen to have artworks from their homelands displayed elsewhere if that meant protecting them, but the reality of viewing these works in foreign lands brought both delight and distress.

Following our visit to the Acropolis Museum, we toured the Acropolis itself. From the top of the city, I spoke briefly about the Greco-Persian wars, the sack of Athens in 480 BCE, and the (temporary) displacement of Athenian citizens. Students were surprised by this aspect of Greek history (they knew more about its history under Ottoman rule) and were intrigued by the layered interactions between Greeks and foreigners in Athens. Focusing on the Parthenon, students were interested in its transformation from a pagan temple, to a Christian church, to an Islamic mosque. Discussion turned to the role of religion and the conversion of places of worship, but this was short-lived, as a few students became uncomfortable and reluctant to engage, deeming any religious discussion connected to Islam haram. This was somewhat troubling for me: I wanted to encourage neutral dialogue but also remain sensitive to others' feelings of unease (some feelings may not have been voiced), respecting conflicting religious beliefs.[43]

Other site visits included the Arch of Hadrian, the Roman Agora, the Athenian Agora, and the Temple of Olympian Zeus. Our site visits revealed points of connection and disconnection between "them" (the Greeks, or the Turks, or the Romans) and "us" (the Syrians). The Greeks were proud of their history and it was important for them to preserve it. The Athenians had experienced the ravages of war(s), with invasions that forced them to flee their city, at least temporarily. Athens' most famous ancient monuments had been pillaged and damaged, but later repaired and reinstated as icons of Greece's enduring history. Syrians too were proud of their culture and history, and hoped that it too would have a lasting legacy.

As the historical capital of Europe, Athens is the top tourist destination in Greece, with millions of international tourists visiting annually.[44] In the centre of Athens people from around the world converge, negotiating national identities, cultural hierarchies, and personal relationships to the past. In Athens, you can clearly witness the Greek custom of *xenia*: strangers welcomed, sharing stories, shaping history.

9. Learning from Displaced Youth in Greece

Before I departed for Greece, a dear friend introduced me to the work of Paulo Freire and encouraged me to read his seminal book *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed* ahead of my travels.[45] A year

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[41] On the wearing of headdresses, women's rights and religious freedom, see Ferrari and Pastorelli (2016).

[42] See above Section 5. **Archaeology and Cultural Heritage**. On the latest ban exporting antiquities from Syria, Iraq, and other states in the Middle East, see the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199 (February 2015) via the UNESCO website at: www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ERI/pdf/UN_SC_RESOLUTION_2199_EN.pdf.

[43] A thoughtful essay on teaching uncomfortable subjects with students of varying religious backgrounds comes from Strolonga (2014).

[44] The Greek Tourism Confederation projected 30 million tourists would visit in 2017; official data is not yet available.

[45] I am grateful to Joe Druce for gifting me a copy of Freire's book.

later, as I reflected on my teaching experiences, I would read Freire's *A Pedagogy of Freedom*, Henry Giroux's *Border Crossings*, and bell hooks' *Teaching to Transgress*. As a white, Western teacher, I set off for Greece (unknowingly?) following centuries of colonial repression of the very people I would teach; I returned having learned a great deal about the challenges and possibilities of a truly revolutionary, transformative pedagogy and about education as a practice of freedom.[46]

This paper has laid out a model for teaching ancient history, archaeology, and classical literature as a means of highlighting shared stories; this type of dialogical, engaged pedagogy can bolster the wellbeing of displaced children and youth by allowing them a space to reflect and share, a place where their voices are heard, and their presence is recognized and respected. In a classroom where collective knowledge exchange happens naturally, learning becomes truly liberating. That liberation facilitates a transformation in the self.

In offering these lessons, my hope was to engage students in the discovery of history, theirs and others' and our joint histories—to think critically about what it has meant to be displaced throughout history. In so doing, I wanted to problematize the distance and difference between "them" and "us"; on the flip side, I also wanted to emphasize diversity as an enriching element of cultural unity.[47] Working with small groups of students encouraged the sharing of personal stories, exposing similar and different experiences, transforming our understanding of these monuments and texts, and, more importantly, each other.

This learning environment was intimate and intense. My advanced English class in Chios was by far the most challenging and rewarding class I have ever taught in my entire career. No day was the same and there was no such thing as a typical lesson plan or structure. I could prepare a lesson with the hope of getting through a specific text and covering key English grammar or vocabulary, but so many things outside of my control could foil these plans. Students could be (and were) prevented from attending class if there was a security issue within the camp, an emergency that required medical attention (self-harm), meetings with lawyers or psychologists, or an interview with the asylum service. Students could (and did) arrive late, exhausted, hungry, and/or distressed because of an incident (abuse, theft, violence) in or outside of the camp. Students could (and did) become irritable in class, either disengaging or instigating arguments. On any given day, I couldn't predict the responses that students might have to a certain topic or text, nor could I prepare for the reactions that these responses might elicit in their peers.

And yet, they came. They arrived in (mostly) high spirits, enthusiastic and optimistic. They took care to listen to one another, to ask questions, to interpret or translate if the right word couldn't be found by one. We shared stories, joked together, cried together. When one student became agitated or aggressive, another student would try to mollify him; if two students disagreed about something (usually a translation!), another student intervened. Never once did I feel threatened or unsafe. In fact, quite the opposite: I felt truly connected. I was called elhaj-je (Arabic for old aged! = matron, respected one) Lisa.

Our classroom was one defined by *mutual* respect; we worked together to create a connected learning space, though this was not without its ongoing challenges. It took some time for me to convince the students that I was interested in their responses, their stories, their lives. It took time for them to trust me and one another. Likewise, it took time for them to get used to our non-traditional language class which focused as much on context as it did content, on responses as much as readings, on individual stories as much as collective histories. As the weeks passed and as trust grew stronger, we shared more: listening and learning from one another, restoring hope in ourselves and the world.

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46 hooks (1994, 2004), defines the pedagogy of liberation as "education as a practice of freedom" where teachers and students share in the intellectual and personal growth of one another, with an openness of heart and mind, building community and transgressing boundaries of body, mind, and spirit.

47 See Freire and Faundez (1989), "The rediscovery of the Other" (pp. 71–72).

This listening environment taught us all a valuable lesson: *sharing* personal stories is a sure way to establish mutual acceptance, tolerance and understanding. Knowing others helped us to know ourselves. By emphasizing our participation as individuals in an ongoing, collective discussion about e.g., migration and integration, human relations and human rights, and the impact of one('s) voice, students were empowered with agency to act about the situation that their displacement landed them in. Rather than being passive 'victims', they had the awareness to challenge their reality and assume their freedom as humans.

Indeed, by emphasizing the value of each and every person and by encouraging thoughtful, open dialogue in the classroom, students experienced a level of liberation, despite being confined to the island. Evidence of this came in their increased confidence in the power of their voices and sharing their stories more widely. One student became particularly active: on the one-year anniversary of the EU-Turkey deal, he gave a speech in Chios town square during a public demonstration (16/03/2017); he also gave an interview with the *Guardian* about his journey to Greece (28/04/2017); and, once he had been transferred to the mainland, participated in a workshop on "The Mental Health of Refugees" in Athens (25/06/2017).[48] Another student offered translation services and sewing lessons with the InterEuropean Human Aid Association in Thessaloniki; another student now acts as an Arabic cultural mediator in the Khora Centre in Athens. These students confronted the reality of their oppression, striving to rise above it. They did so not just to help themselves, but others too, working cooperatively with local and international communities.[49]

What struck me most about the youth I met was their resilience: despite the physical and psychological trauma they had endured, they came to school with open hearts and open minds, wanting to learn. There were no credits to be earned, no pass or fail grades. These were more than just students; I was more than a teacher; and the lessons we shared went far beyond art, archaeology, history, or literature. This was human connection that recognized our independence and interdependence through shared stories of courage, strength, vulnerability, and yearning.

10. Epilogue: My *Nostos* to Education

My pedagogical practice fundamentally shifted during my time in Greece: this was not a conscious development but rather one borne out of circumstance and context. In the traditional university classroom, I clung to the normative teacher-student hierarchy, asserting (as a young woman in the academy) my role as one who 'knows' and deposits my knowledge of the discipline to the unknowing student (the 'banking' system of education).

To be fair, despite this hierarchical environment, I *have* worked hard to develop undergraduate students' skills in critical thinking and communication: examining literary texts (like Homer's *Odyssey*) through the lens of characterization and 'Otherness', pressing students to consider constructions of identity in relation to themselves and the world in which we live (as privileged patricians attending a prestigious and internationally renowned institution of higher learning). I have always encouraged students to nurture their intellectual curiosity by asking questions, regardless of the answers that might (not) come (the 'problem-posing' system of education).

One could argue that forging authentic and meaningful personal connections (between students and teachers, or students and texts), in a lecture hall of 150 students, or even a seminar of 25 students, is near impossible. I don't know this to be true or not, yet. I do know, however, that my experience teaching small groups of six to ten students in a non-formal educational environment, casting aside the teacher-student hierarchy, the constraints of a fixed curriculum, and the pressures of formal evaluation, yielded a more fluid, free learning environment, where students weren't expected to memorize course content, but to interrogate it so as to access and assess their own realities.

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[48]   For reasons of anonymity and privacy, links have not been included here.
[49]   They became true border-crossers! See Giroux (2005).

I am brought back to Freire's assertion that "looking at the past must be a means of understanding more clearly what and who we are so that we can more wisely build the future."[50] The stories of those students in Greece and the collective history of displaced peoples will be woven into the global history of displacement and human belonging, but it is up to us jointly to expose these stories, and other marginalized histories, to combat xenophobia and promote intercultural awareness and acceptance in our changing world.

For readers keen to use their skills and passion for the ancient world in a similar context, I hope that this paper has highlighted the possibilities of such endeavours, outlining some of the approaches to doing this work and striving to ensure it is carried out in an ethical and sensitive way.

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50 Freire (1970, p. 65).

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On Well-Being, Activism and Ethical Practice: Response to Trentin, Lisa. Sharing Histories: Teaching and Learning from Displaced Youth in Greece. *Humanities* 2018, 7, 53

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Abstract: In this response to Lisa Trentin's article, I explore themes that bring together research and activism, through engagement with the past, and the ethics that concerns such endeavours. I demonstrate the overlaps with my own work into well-being and heritage and suggest that broadening out work to include mixed groups may increase the effects of reciprocity noted by Lisa Trentin. I argue that research, as well as teaching, which takes on the decolonizing principles that Lisa Trentin espouses, especially that which includes disenfranchised communities, needs to be done equitably and in ways that are ethical, compassionate and respectful.

Keywords: well-being; diversity; activism; ethics; social bonding

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Many ideas sparked in my mind on reading Lisa Trentin's article. Much resonated with my own work—cue scribbles of 'Yes!' in margins—and also made me reflect on my own practice in more depth. As such, I could write on numerous topics in response. I will, however, restrict myself to three themes: (1) engagement with the past as a route to well-being and (2) teaching, and research, as activism, and (3) how to ensure that practices in these areas are ethical.

The idea that engaging with the past in the present might be beneficial to well-being has a growing amount of supporting evidence (for a useful summary of projects, see (All-Party Parliamentary Group on Arts, Health and Welfare 2017; What Works Wellbeing 2019); on archaeology, historic landscapes and well-being: (Darvill et al.)). The additional element in my work, and in Lisa Trentin's work, is the nature of the communities with whom we are working: in her case young refugee communities in Greece; in mine, people of Middle Eastern heritage living in the UK.

In my own work to date I have used the What Works Wellbeing's categories and definitions in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of why hands-on approaches to heritage are beneficial for well-being. These categories are:

1. The personal dimension: confidence, self-esteem, meaning and purpose, increased optimism and reduced anxiety;
2. The cultural dimension: coping and resilience, capability and achievement, personal identity, creative skills and expression;
3. The social dimension: belonging and identity, sociability and new connections, bonding, reciprocity and reducing social inequalities.

Following a pair of workshops on felting Iraqi heritage in 2018, in collaboration with artist Karin Celestine, I asked participants to reflect on their experience in regards to these three categories of well-being. Ethical approval was sought for this project from the Royal Holloway ethics board and full consent, including optional anonymity, was sought from participants. A full account of these

responses is published in (Kamash 2019), so here I will summarise where there seem to be overlaps between my workshops and Lisa Trentin's work. Firstly, I should point out that, unlike Lisa Trentin's work, my groups were mixed and included British people, Iraqi people, both those recently displaced and those settled long-term, and British Iraqi people with mixed heritage. As will be seen this did result in some differences from Lisa Trentin's work around reciprocity and bonding, where this effect rippled more broadly through my work.

One of the striking similarities across our projects was the empowerment of the people we were working with (personal and cultural dimensions). In my workshops, Rana, Yasmin and Deema, for example, felt that expressing their personal identity through a medium other than words was "refreshing for [their] Iraqi identity". This space to explore difficult and anxiety-inducing experiences was also valued by Muna, who said it left her "feeling elated". Such empowerment was also encountered by Lisa Trentin's students, who "became aware, too, of the importance of *their* voices and the power of sharing *their* stories" (Trentin 2018, p. 8). My only critique of Lisa Trentin's work here is that I felt that those voices might be given more space to come through. There are, of course, extremely sensitive ethical and safe-guarding issues around what might be appropriate to share; guarantees of anonymity would be one way to mitigate this, while also amplifying the voices of people who have little or no platform for their expression.

Being able to share stories in these ways enables social bonding and reciprocity (social dimension). Lisa Trentin notes that the experience of working in small groups led to the sharing of stories and increased understanding of each other (Trentin 2018, pp. 12–13). This kind of reciprocity was also experienced by numerous people who participated in my workshops. Karen, for example, observed that after sharing experiences and stories with people with Iraqi backgrounds at a workshop, it "made Iraq . . . feel like more than just a place I hear of on the news (sort of 3D rather than 2D if you know what I mean)". This is where the power of having mixed groups seems to lie. In Lisa Trentin's work, it seems that she had that transformative experience, which in my workshops was able to ripple out into a wider group of people. This is not a criticism of Lisa Trentin's work—far from it—rather an observation of how such work might develop in the future. The intimacy of these situations also seems vital to their success in generating the trust and ease necessary for this kind of social bonding; yet it also poses a problem: how do we scale up such engagement and exchange of ideas to meet the needs of the many, many people who would benefit without losing the very element that makes it work? There seems to be no easy answer to that question.

Another issue related to both personal identity and reciprocity is how we talk about 'difference' and 'diversity'. This issue came up in Lisa Trentin's article, where the people she was working with expressed strong concerns about being different in the place where they now were, but also about not wanting to lose their Syrian identity (Trentin 2018, p. 8). Key for me here is that work aiming at building cultural understanding needs to strike a delicate balance. It is all too easy to assume that in order to build cultural bridges, we need to focus on our similarities as a way of bringing people together. This is, of course, important—people can always find a point of similarity, if they look hard enough—but it is not the whole story. We also need to acknowledge that we are different and celebrate that diversity. We need to find ways to be comfortable with similarity and difference co-existing. This may be where the power of the past lies: it is a space in which we can find both similarity and difference, which we can explore at a seemingly safe distance. This safe distance effect has also been observed in the 'Sex and History' project, where using objects from the past allows a less confrontational way in to tricky subject matter (Sex and History n.d.). It seems, then, that the past, accessed in multiple ways, Classical or otherwise, might provide us with tools to examine complex identities in the present, without the need to find exact equivalences. I feel this wish for acceptance of both similarity and difference lies at the heart of the anxiety expressed by the refugees in Lisa Trentin's piece. As a person of mixed heritage (both British and Iraqi), this anxiety resonates: I am neither one nor the other, but, crucially, I have come to realise that I do not need to be; I can be me, simultaneously similar and different to those around me. One of the most touching and rewarding parts of my own work has been seeing

the working out and acknowledgement of those similarities and differences by people coming to the workshops. I wonder here whether the displaced youth in Greece would have felt a similar building of reciprocity and so had some of their anxieties eased, if there had been possibilities for them to interact in similar workshops with people from a range of backgrounds and experiences; this might be an additional step to take in the future.

Of course making interventions in this way brings with it questions around ethics and responsibilities. As demonstrated by Lisa Trentin this can so easily go wrong, even if well-intentioned: for example, her students being "deeply disturbed" by the plaster-dipped clothing and their "bemused" reaction to the replica arch from Palmyra (Trentin 2018, pp. 7–8; see also Kamash 2017) on visitor responses to this replica arch that echo these responses). Misjudged initiatives such as these will continue to exist as long as no prioritisation is given to co-production and equitable partnerships (for guidance on equitable partnerships, see (Rethinking Research Collaborative 2018)). One of the strengths of Lisa Trentin's work in this regard is its sensitivity and humanity. She demonstrates the caution that needs to be exercised about the repercussions of discussing certain topics and the choices of material used so as to prevent any further trauma through engagement with them (Trentin 2018, p. 9). Rather than going for shock-value, Lisa Trentin found a way of working where difficult issues could still be confronted, but in ways that were compassionate and respectful.

Lisa Trentin very much views her work as teaching, and talks, quite rightly, in terms of an activist pedagogy (Trentin 2018, pp. 13–14). I cannot agree more that teaching decolonially in this way requires us to change ourselves, to break out of the supposed canons that we think bind us and to question whether we really are bound by them at all. What I would add is that this should permeate all parts of academic practice, so that we both teach *and* research decolonially as our everyday practice. The vital meeting point between my work and that of Lisa Trentin's in this regard is its adaptive approach that allows for participants to influence outcomes. This is empowering for those who have been disenfranchised. Crucially, that empowerment requires a relinquishing of power from the people and places where it traditionally resides, including ourselves as academics when we are tied into those power structures.

Collaborative work such as this has its best chance of success, if it sees a rebalancing of power. If the people and communities we, as academics, are engaging with are not involved from beginning to end in the shaping of projects, then at best the project will fail and at worse it could exacerbate difficult situations and potentially cause resentment and further feelings of powerlessness. For this to work, we, as academics, have to listen, keep listening and be open to hearing what people are telling us. Lisa Trentin did this, acknowledging where she got it wrong, for example in uncomfortable discussions around the role of religion. As Lisa Trentin shows us in her humility, we need to be open to hearing that we are wrong and then make the necessary changes to build and move in a more productive direction. We too need to be ready to learn. For that to work, there has to be trust i.e., the people who are our partners, have to know and feel that there will not be negative repercussions for them in, politely, pointing out mistakes or potentially more fruitful practices. This requires an investment, not just of time, but also of emotional energy; this, I felt, Lisa Trentin got right and I would welcome more work that takes these ethical, respectful and compassionate principles as its starting point.

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Article

Citizenship as Barrier and Opportunity for Ancient Greek and Modern Refugees

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Abstract: Some dominant traditions in Refugee Studies have stressed the barrier which state citizenship presents to the displaced. Some have condemned citizenship altogether as a mechanism and ideology for excluding the weak (G. Agamben). Others have seen citizenship as an acute problem for displaced people in conditions, like those of the modern world, where the habitable world is comprehensively settled by states capable of defending their territory and organised in accordance with interstate norms, which leaves very limited space for the foundation of new communities with their own meaningful citizenship (H. Arendt). This paper engages with these prominent approaches, but also with more recent arguments that, when handled and adapted in the right way, the practices and ideology of citizenship also present opportunities for the displaced to form their own meaningful communities, exercise collective agency, and secure rights. It is argued that the evidence from ancient Greece shows that ancient Greek citizenship, an early forerunner of modern models of citizenship, could be imaginatively harnessed and adapted by displaced people and groups, in order to form effective and sometimes innovative political communities in exile, even after opportunities to found new city-states from scratch became quite rare (after c. 500 BC). Some relevant displaced groups experimented with more open and cosmopolitan styles of civic interaction and ideology in their improvised quasi-civic communities. The different kinds of ancient Greek informal 'polis-in-exile' can bring a new perspective on the wider debates and initiatives concerning refugee political agency and organisation in the 'provocations' in this special issue.

Keywords: Refugees; exile; city-state; polis; Ancient Greece; citizenship; agency; cosmopolitanism

1. Introduction

Both ancient and modern refugees have suffered or enjoyed a very complex relationship with the ideal and practice of citizenship: citizenship has sometimes been a barrier to security or political participation, and sometimes an opportunity for exercising agency and rediscovering communal life. Since the European refugee crises of the mid-twentieth century, analysts of the refugee predicament have tended to concentrate on the problematic dimensions of citizenship for refugees. This trend in twentieth-century thinking is the subject of Section 2 below. Most influentially, H. Arendt stressed that their exclusion from national citizenship deprived twentieth-century refugees even of supposedly universal and unconditional human rights, which became meaningless without the protections and mutual obligations arising from citizenship in a settled state.[1] Arendt's arguments were developed and intensified by G. Agamben (e.g., Agamben 1995, 1998), in his argument that refugees exist in a state of 'bare life', excluded from the 'good life' of citizenship in a way which reinforces the privileges, security,

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[1] (Arendt 1943); compare (Arendt [1951] 1968, pp. 290–302). For recent analysis see (Douzinas 2007; Stonebridge 2011).

and self-understanding of citizen insiders at the expense of refugee outsiders.[2] In his view, citizenship is so intertwined with exclusion and oppression that refugees must lead the way in developing new, truly just forms of identity and interaction which transcend citizenship as a model altogether.

Recent work in Refugee Studies has underscored how treatment of refugees by settled citizens and states, even apparently benevolent granting of asylum or aid, often expresses and entrenches unequal power relations, including historical inequalities between different parts of the world.[3] There has, however, also been an interesting recent reaction in Refugee Studies against the dominant paradigm. Relevant new contributions do not downplay the challenges and exploitation which refugees face, but they do stress refugees' capacity to respond to them. The historical work of Gatrell (2013), for example, has brought into focus the degree of political agency and participation which many modern groups of refugees have succeeded in exercising, from German Jews to Palestinians, especially through imaginative and determined harnessing of their own cultural history and traditions.

Some political theorists have even called into question the uncompromising suspicion of citizenship which has been championed by Agamben. In reaction against Agamben's picture of the modern refugee camp as a depoliticised space, which deprives refugees of political agency, Sigona (2015) has argued that refugee camps can in fact be centres of complex forms of political participation and agency: he coins the word 'campzenship' to describe the new types of cosmopolitan, flexible quasi-citizenship possible in refugee camps.[4] For his part, Grbac (2013) even explicitly appeals to the ancient categories of *civitas* ('citizenship') and polis ('city-state') as metaphors to describe what he sees as the underestimated political complexity of some refugee camps.

These new theoretical models cohere with many of the practical examples in the other contributions to this collection, which discuss improvised political and communal activities on the part of contemporary refugees, who sometimes even adopt and adapt civic forms, even when subject to numerous severe pressures. The adaptations of citizenship norms and practices which are discussed in this collection include what Ligia Nobre and Anderson Kazuo Nakano (Nobre and Nakano 2017) call 'urban citizenship': the flexible adaptation of citizen activities among the varied residents of large cities, including refugees, in order to create new forms of democratic participation. They also include examples which fit very directly the new models of the refugee camp proposed by Sigona and Grbac: improvised shared institutions for regulating conflict and sustaining community life in Palestinian refugee camps. Alessandro Petti (2017) admits that the Dheisheh Refugee Camp in the West Bank is not a 'city', but insists that it has paradoxically still succeeded in becoming 'civic': the refugees live in a 'suspended condition', but have 'developed distinctive systems of civic management outside of state and municipal institutions', through which shared problems are resolved through 'informal processes and interpersonal negotiations'. These include 'constant internal debate' about shared problems, such as the building of houses and roads. Samar Maqusi's (2017) study of refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon also brings out this collective concern with the shaping of space and architecture within the refugee camp, partly as a way of asserting collective authority over shared space. This includes adaptation of the standard spatial models for a refugee camp stipulated from above. Such local initiative within refugee camps can lead, in Petti's (2017) words, to a distinctively 'civic form of cohabitation' among refugees with multiple identities. As the studies here make clear, these adapted civic forms cannot, of course, compensate fully for the lack of the protections and rights of regular citizenship; but they can provide opportunities for internal political participation and even redress, as well as an effective basis for claiming external recognition from powerful settled states.

This development in Refugee Studies also coheres well with recent trends in the study of refugees in Ancient History: recent studies have shown that refugees and other mobile groups

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2 Compare (Zetter 1991) for the way bureaucratic labels and procedures can serve to disadvantage, and constrain the agency of, the stateless; compare (Fassin 2010, esp. chp. 5).
3 See, for example, (Bhambra 2015); compare earlier (Said 1984).
4 Compare (Redclift 2013; Pasquetti 2015).

in the ancient Mediterranean were tenacious and resourceful in finding ways to retain or reinvent communal links or political agency.[5] To give some broad background to ancient Greek conditions, the focus of this contribution, the ancient Greek world was made up of a wide range of autonomous or semi-autonomous city-states (poleis).[6] This complex network of poleis took shape in the Archaic period (c. 750–480 BC). In that period, the partly voluntary, partly forced movement of Greeks from the Aegean around the Mediterranean, where they participated in new city foundations in (for example) Sicily and South Italy, was an important factor in creating and consolidating the polis as the dominant political and cultural form. The Mediterranean-wide network of Greek poleis, each with their own traditions and constitutions, was sustained through the subsequent Classical (c. 480–323 BC), Hellenistic (c. 323–31 BC), and Roman Imperial (after 31 BC) periods. Both the Hellenistic and Roman periods saw the polis model expand further beyond its traditional reach, including further into Asia, Africa, and Western Europe.

The exiles and refugees whose lives and activities can be reconstructed from our evidence for ancient Greece were usually former citizens of a particular city-state (polis) who had been driven out through war or civil war. The existence of a wide range of competing poleis led to incessant warfare between them, at least until the Romans established a single controlling authority across the whole Greek world (and beyond) to regulate disputes. Ongoing wars led to frequent large-scale displacement. Inter-city disputes in turn sharpened the intrinsic tendencies of many Greek cities to fission through civil war, which very often led to exiling of the defeated faction and its supporters.[7] To these man-made expulsions through war and civil war, it is necessary to add refugee crises resulting from natural disasters, which could create whole 'wandering poleis' of refugees.[8]

In this contribution, I explore how the ancient Greek evidence can provoke thought among, and offer complex practical precedents to, modern theorists and others interested in how those who have been displaced have through time developed their own political and cultural institutions and activities, seizing the opportunities of citizenship in order to overcome some of the barriers it presents. The ancient Greek exiles and refugees studied below (especially in Section 3) were particularly adept at harnessing citizen roles and institutions to assert power and agency. The ways in which they did so are very relevant to modern debates about the possible potential of 'campzenship' as a model for refugees, which can also point towards new forms of political life for non-displaced communities.

Some major differences between ancient and modern refugees should be borne in mind throughout the discussion. For example, non-Greek exiles and refugees are not at all prominent in our evidence for ancient Greek history. Refugees from beyond the narrow Greek world feature quite prominently in Greek myth and tragedy, whether as quite sympathetic victims of war (Euripides' *Trojan Women*) or as more dangerous outsiders (such as the Danaids, from Egypt, in Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women* and the other lost parts of its trilogy). However, their real-life counterparts, fleeing into the Greek cities from a different cultural or ethnic area, probably slipped relatively invisibly into the subordinate categories of metics (resident, registered foreigners) or even slaves in their host Greek cities, without leaving many marks on the historical record. The direct surviving evidence results from the efforts of Greek exiles and refugees who were sufficiently recognised and politicised to make a mark on interstate diplomacy or internal city politics. The groups discussed here, were, therefore, exiles and refugees who remained within a relatively homogeneous world, in which Greek ethnicity and language were dominant.

This meant that the exiles and refugees we can study in detail in ancient Greece did not have to confront a challenge faced by many modern refugees: that of gaining recognition and political agency

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[5] See, for example, (Garland 2014; Gray 2015; Isayev 2017b).

[6] For detailed evidence and an overview: (Hansen and Nielsen 2004).

[7] On expulsions of citizens of Greek poleis through war and civil war, see, for example, (Balogh 1943; Seibert 1979; Garland 2014; Gray 2015, chp. 5–6); on outsiders in the Greek cities more generally, see (Whitehead 1977; McKechnie 1989); on ancient literary representations of exiles, see (Gaertner 2007).

[8] See (Mackil 2004).

as a new ethnic and linguistic group living alongside a much more numerous and well-established ethnic and linguistic group (or several), membership of which is usually closely bound up with citizenship and political participation in the host nation. Nonetheless, the divisions even within the ancient Greek-speaking world should not be underestimated: each city had its own separate citizenship, representing membership of a particular descent-group with ties to particular gods, myths, and traditions.[9] Whether this can be compared to modern versions of 'racialised citizenship' is open for debate,[10] but the sharp divisions of identity between different Greek communities created similar potential as in modern cases for tensions between insider citizens and outsider refugees.

2. Ancient Greek Citizenship and the Refugee in Agamben and Arendt

Since Arendt and Agamben have drawn the most explicit links between ancient Greek citizenship and refugee crises, ancient and modern, it is worth exploring their arguments in detail, and how recent research in Ancient History can help to question and modify them. Agamben has probably done most among influential modern theorists to call into question the attractions of ancient Greek citizenship as a model or inspiration for modern refugees. He sees the ancient Greek polis, and ancient Greek political theory, at the root of the modern dynamics of exclusion through citizenship. He draws particular attention to Aristotle's idea, which is designed to capture wider Greek thinking, that, in order to qualify as a true polis, a community must be dedicated to the good life for all: it must enable all members to flourish through the kind of civic education which enables them to develop their aptitudes and virtues to the full. A polis may come into being for the sake of 'bare life' or mutual survival—mutual non-aggression and basic co-operation to secure the necessities of life—but it endures for the sake of the good life (Aristotle *Politics* 1252b27–30; 1280a7–1281a10). Agamben takes this position to have a sinister corollary, not spelled out by Aristotle: a good city has to be insulated against any sign of 'bare life', or basic humanity without the trappings of a privileged education and lifestyle.

According to Agamben, this category of 'bare life', or humanity stripped to its raw core, was represented in the ancient world by the outlaw, deprived of all the protections and shared bonds of communal life and condemned to roam in the interstices between cities. In the modern world, for Agamben, this category of 'bare life' is occupied by refugees confined to camps, whose practical and symbolic exclusion from mainstream society preserves the stability and privileges of the settled states which supervise the camps, usually through transnational organisations.[11] States and their citizens can define themselves against this 'bare life', confined to camps and stripped of dignity, identity, and civilisation, including any political identity or autonomy. The refugees in question suffer a degrading condition, but Agamben thinks that they can also help to develop a utopian future in which the status distinctions, exclusivity, and exploitation intrinsic to ancient and modern citizenship will be overcome.

Agamben's particular reading of Aristotle is open to question. Even though Aristotle clearly does value the collective pursuit of the good life over mere co-existence and survival, a true polis for Aristotle in fact comes into being in the first place for the sake of mere 'life'. It then builds upon, rather than merely excluding or denying, shared activities that are focussed on collective survival, such as military co-operation, agriculture, and trade.[12] However, Agamben's broader picture of the exclusivity at the heart of the Greek polis is difficult to dispute: even though ancient historians have recently stressed that status categories, including barriers between citizens and outsiders, were often more permeable in practice than previously thought,[13] Greek poleis tended to give centre stage and

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9   See recently (Blok 2017).
10 For a careful argument for the relevance of the modern concept of race (and racial exclusivity) to ancient Athenian citizenship, see (Lape 2010).
11 See (Agamben 1998); the 'Introduction' sets out the basic thesis, including the relevance of Aristotle.
12 Compare (Finlayson 2010, esp. pp. 106–16), developing this and other objections based on Aristotle's text.
13 See (Cohen 2000; Vlassopoulos 2007).

most political power to male citizens. This left at a disadvantage much of the resident population, including women, slaves, and immigrants, let alone transient refugees and other migrants.

Nonetheless, Agamben's uncompromising rejection of the whole tradition of Greek or Greek-inspired citizenship neglects the fact that Greek citizenship ideals and practices were double-edged: they could empower the incumbent male elite to organise themselves effectively to marginalise outsiders, but they could also, by the same token, enable those outsiders themselves to develop their own political and communal identities, activities, and institutions. For example, some scholars have stressed how those on the margins of polis life could find an alternative focus of co-operation, power and identity in the multiple voluntary associations of the Greek world, in which diverse people came together to worship a shared god. Such groups were often based on a shared identity, such as that of workers in the same trade or expatriates of the same origin living in a particular place. These associations could be composed of citizens of the host poleis or of immigrants; there was increasing mingling of the two groups within a single association after around the second century BC. Tellingly, these associations often imitated the institutions and the ideology of a polis in microcosm, including a decision-making assembly, officers who were appointed by the community, and collective practices, including cult and the honouring of benefactors. The resulting honours were often inscribed on stone, which makes the life of many of these associations accessible to modern historians.[14] Most of the rest of this article (especially Section 3) will explore how the basic approach developed by these associations—the co-option of polis ideas, institutions, and practices by outsiders as a source of power, protection, and pride—was also harnessed by ancient Greek exiles and refugees, who often formed their own informal 'poleis-in-exile', retaining agency and dignity, even in the most difficult conditions.

For her part, H. Arendt, Agamben's inspiration on refugee questions, was much more ambivalent about the Greek polis, recognising its double-edged, simultaneously emancipatory and exclusive character. Especially in *The Human Condition* (Arendt 1958), Arendt even sees the participatory Greek polis of active citizens as a model for the good society, a crucial corrective to the deficits of modernity: Greek citizens succeeded in engaging in true politics, by coming together in agora and assembly to act and deliberate in common and develop a shared understanding of the world, unconstrained by pre-conceived, fixed ideas or socio-economic interests. On the other hand, Arendt was also very sensitive to the exclusivity and injustices of the Greek polis world. Prefiguring Agamben, she argues in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (see Arendt [1951] 1968), that complex states, such as the Greek polis or modern nation-states, tend by their very nature to find it difficult to accommodate differences between individuals within the population. Such differences and marks of individuality are hallmarks of the private sphere, but they cannot easily be accommodated in the public sphere of equal citizens:

> The reason why highly developed political communities, such as the ancient city-states or modern nation-states, so often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they hope to eliminate as far as possible those natural and always present differences and differentiations which by themselves arouse dumb hatred, mistrust, and discrimination because they indicate all too clearly those spheres where men cannot act and change at will, i.e., the limitations of the human artifice. The "alien" is a frightening symbol of the fact of difference as such, of individuality as such, and indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy. (Arendt [1951] 1968, p. 301)

Like Agamben, Arendt thus sees the 'alien' as posing an existential threat to citizen-states, which can be partly defused through exclusion.

In Arendt's picture, the intrinsic exclusivity of citizen-states did not have such devastating consequences in the ancient Greek Mediterranean as in the modern world. According to her, much of even the accessible world was still open, unclaimed territory at the time of the ancient Greeks: it was

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[14] For detailed discussions of such voluntary associations, and their crucial role for outsiders, see, for example, (Arnaoutoglou 2003, 2011; Gabrielsen 2007; Ismard 2010).

possible for the excluded to migrate and establish a new community elsewhere, in which they could exercise the natural human propensity, recognised by Aristotle, to life in common in a polis, governed by speech and reason. They did so by forming so-called 'colonies' or 'homes-from-home' (*apoikiai*) in different parts of the Mediterranean.

However, in Arendt's view, things already began to change at the time of the Roman Empire. The Romans came to conceptualise their whole empire, spanning the Mediterranean and beyond, as almost an extension of the city of Rome itself, 'as though the whole world were nothing but Roman hinterland'. Arendt sees this as a result of conceptual differences between the Greeks and the Romans. Whereas the Greeks were prepared to entertain the idea of starting afresh on new territory, provided that they could build meaningful communal life there, the Romans saw themselves as inextricably tied to the soil of Rome:

> unlike the Greeks, they [the Romans] could not say in times of emergency
>
> or overpopulation, "Go and found a new city, for wherever you are you
>
> will always be a polis." Not the Greeks, but the Romans, were really rooted in the
>
> soil, and the word *patria* derives its full meaning from Roman history. The foundation of a new body politic, to the Greeks an almost commonplace experience, became to the Romans the central, decisive, unrepeatable beginning of their whole history, a unique
>
> event (Arendt [1961] 2006, pp. 120–21)

Like all such broad generalisations, Arendt's thinking here, as she traces the origins of notions of authority and tradition in her essay 'What is Authority?', can be questioned: it would be equally, or more, plausible to present the Greeks as often more fixated on particular territory occupied by a particular descent-group, and the Romans as more openly welcoming of wandering and the kind of mixed city population which results. Moreover, groups of Roman soldiers and citizens frequently established communities or *coloniae* around the Mediterranean, which were themselves partly microcosms of Rome itself.[15]

Nonetheless, there is a grain of truth in Arendt's analysis. There had never been quite so much free, unoccupied territory as Arendt's presentation implies: Archaic Greek wandering founders of new cities more often had to defeat or collaborate with a pre-settled non-Greek population. However, Arendt's narrative captures well the fact that it became much more difficult for wandering refugees to establish their own new cities *ab initio* once the Mediterranean and surrounding regions became more intensively settled by states militarily strong enough to deter new foundations on their territory by wandering refugees. The obstacles to new foundations by wandering Greeks on the model of the *apoikia* became even more unassailable once the Mediterranean and its hinterland became quite uniformly subject to overarching imperial control, first by the different Hellenistic kingdoms and eventually by the lone Roman hegemon.

For Arendt, Roman developments set European civilisation on a decisive path, which she spells out in her late (posthumously published) essay 'Introduction into Politics':

> Whatever Rome's limitations in this respect, there is no doubt that the concept of foreign policy—of politics in foreign relations—and consequently of the idea of a political order beyond the borders of one's own nation or city is solely of Roman origin. The Roman politicization of the space between peoples marks the beginning of the Western world—indeed, it first created the Western world as world. (Arendt 2005, pp. 189–90)

Although she does not spell out the development in the same work, Arendt probably saw this Roman legacy as one of the factors which led, in the very long term, to twentieth-century refugee

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15 On mobility as key to Roman identity, and the various consequences summarised here, see, for example, (Purcell 1990; Dench 2005; Isayev 2017a).

crises. In her much earlier work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt was clear that a large part of the problem lay in the fact that there was now no available territory in which the displaced could establish new communities. This deprived them of the opportunity to build the self-governing institutions necessary to make their 'human rights' practically meaningful, because they would create a space in which they could assert and exercise their 'right to have rights':

> We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one's actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation . . . The trouble is that this calamity arose not from any lack of civilization, backwardness, or mere tyranny, but, on the contrary, that it could not be repaired, because there was no longer any 'uncivilized' spot on earth, because whether we like it or not we have really started to live in One World. Only with a completely organised humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether. (Arendt [1951] 1968, pp. 296–97)

For Arendt, the lack of available space for new autonomous settlements leaves refugees reduced to their bare humanity, unable to adopt a meaningful political identity or exercise rights, unless they can gain acceptance in some pre-established community. This passage immediately provokes the objection that there had for a long time been no truly vacant ('uncivilised') territory for refugees to settle; earlier foundations had usually involved clashes with existing inhabitants. Nevertheless, the practical obstacles to twentieth-century refugees establishing their own independent states are clear.

Arendt's reflections in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* recall the argument which she originally developed at the height of the refugee crisis in 1943. She argued then that Jewish refugees in the USA were resorting, or having to resort, to one of two unsatisfactory identities: on the one hand, that of the 'parvenu', seeking to integrate passively into the host American society; or, on the other, that of the 'pariah', insisting on a separate Jewish identity. In the absence of political structures corresponding to such a separate Jewish identity, this latter approach was tantamount, in Arendt's view, to falling back on a claim to recognition on the basis of mere humanity. Such a reliance would always be problematic because human rights can never be more than formal or theoretical for those without citizen membership of a political community capable of upholding them. Arendt's own preference was that refugees should become an 'avant-garde' of their societies, crafting new ways of approaching life in common which would transcend the failed nation-state model, without lurching to the other extreme of purely formal cosmopolitanism.[16]

Arendt's diagnosis was partly a reaction to the particular situation of the 1940s, but subsequent studies have shown a similar dynamic in other modern refugee crises: the nature of modern citizenship often makes it difficult for refugees to find some middle way between, first, assimilation to a host society and, second, insistence on their lost or threatened ethnic-religious identity without the protection of corresponding political institutions with international recognition, which leaves refugees reliant on humanitarian support. Malkki (1995a, compare (Malkki 1995b)), for example, considers broadly similar contrasting options to be available to later twentieth-century Hutu refugees from Burundi who sought refuge in Tanzania: some Hutu refugees adopted mobile, fluid identities in the cities of Tanzania, where they had often had to give great weight to the dictates of instrumental economic rationality; but others settled in refugee camps, where they preserved and developed familiar Hutu rituals and customs which laid stress on purity.

Close empirical analysis of the evidence for ancient Greek exiles and refugees can help to allay some of the pessimism of Arendt, as well as the deeper pessimism of Agamben, about Greek-inspired citizenship as an inspiration for modern refugees. As noted in the introduction and earlier in this

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16 (Arendt 1943, especially the closing parts).

section, the explosion in Greek city foundations around the Mediterranean in the period c. 750–500 BC, which included foundations by groups of refugees,[17] was not so easily sustained after c. 500 BC. It became ever more difficult, in an increasingly densely settled Mediterranean of states with the military capacity to defend their territory from outsiders, for mobile groups to find unclaimed (or conquerable) economically sustainable territory on which to found a new independent city. As also noted above, the conquests of Alexander the Great in the second half of the fourth century BC launched a new wave of Greek city foundations, especially in Asia Minor, the Levant, and North Africa, but those were almost always under the supervision of the new large kingdoms, with their complex armies and administrative systems. This period after c. 500 BC when it was no longer straightforward for displaced groups to make spontaneous city foundations was also, not coincidentally, a period of intensification in interstate rules and structures, developed among densely packed states:[18] it was not, *contra* Arendt, the Romans who first established complex rules and institutions binding different states and created genuine interstate politics, even if the Roman imperial peace raised the integration of the Mediterranean to a new level.

These changes after c. 500 BC did not, however, curtail forever the capacity of the displaced to co-opt the ideal of citizenship in order to develop their own exile communities, with meaningful agency. In other words, this change did not force new refugees to choose between full assimilation in existing settled communities or a depoliticised identity as human beings in need. On the contrary, as explored in the rest of this contribution, Greek exiles and refugees found imaginative and effective ways to act and interact as 'citizens-in-exile' *even* when they were hosted on the territory, or sometimes in the urban centre, of a pre-existing polis. They developed improvised, flexible versions of civic institutions and activities, partly inspired by the voluntary associations introduced above, which they could sustain even while participating in their host community.

That is to say, ancient Greek civic models and institutions were not as monolithic and tied to territorial possession as Arendt, let alone Agamben, suggests: even when the displaced could not found their own new polis, and the interstate sphere was no political or institutional vacuum, they could still reproduce, adapt, and reinvent the polis template to suit their own needs. This made it possible for them to engage in political participation internally, resolving internal disputes and forging collective policy. Equally importantly, it enabled them to participate meaningfully in interstate diplomatic and religious structures; this gave them a political voice with which to claim powerful settled states' recognition and protection from below, rather than relying solely on benevolence from above. As in similar modern cases, these tendencies could not secure as many protections and entitlements as would be guaranteed by regular citizenship in a settled polis. However, they went some way in that direction, as well as opening up opportunities for new forms of political participation and agency in defence of entitlements. Contrary to what Arendt suggests, therefore, the usefulness of Greek citizen ideals and practices for the displaced was not exhausted once they could no longer relatively straightforwardly slip outside established state and interstate structures and found a new city; Greek citizenship also offered a rich resource to displaced Greeks in a much more comparable situation to many of the contemporary refugees who feature in this collection, with no option but to reside in pre-established states or camps, under the supervision of the more powerful and subject to established interstate rules and structures. In other words, ancient Greek citizenship has something to offer in refining models of 'campzenship' (compare Introduction).

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[17] Consider Thucydides 6.5.2 on the participation of a group of exiles driven out in civil war from the city of Syracuse, called the Myletidai, in founding another Sicilian city, Himera. Compare Herodotus 1.165–8, on the citizens of Phocaia in Western Turkey who fled their home city to escape the Persian commander Harpagos, after which some of them founded a short-lived new city in Corsica, together with some earlier Phocaian arrivals who had founded an earlier settlement there; after the failure of that first new settlement in war, some of the remaining refugees founded a new settlement at Hyele/Elea in South Italy.

[18] See, for example, (Low 2007; Mackil 2013).

3. Citizenship and 'Poleis-in-Exile' in the Classical Greek and Hellenistic Worlds

The institutions of a Greek polis could be endlessly adapted and revised in order to suit different communities. Settled poleis themselves could experiment with improvised, scaled-down versions of their institutions: for example, when the Athenians in the fourth century BC established a controversial cleruchy (a settler community of Athenian citizens with continuing strong links to Athens itself)[19] on the previously independent island of Samos, this new community was endowed with a Council of 250 members, a literal halving in size and structure of the central Athenian Council of 500.[20] Even within a settled polis local sub-divisions (for example, Athenian demes or 'villages') were often structured as a microcosm of the polis as a whole.[21]

In a phenomenon which is crucial for the argument here, communities of displaced citizens could craft their own adaptations of civic institutions to form 'poleis-in-exile', without any direction from a settled polis—and often even as a challenge to a settled regime at home. I have analysed this phenomenon, also identified by earlier scholars,[22] in detail elsewhere.[23] I try to offer here a summary of some of the most interesting cases, more accessible to non-specialists.

The densely packed Greek state system meant that exiles often had to form their 'poleis-in-exile' in the interstices between states, especially border regions or other marginal territory which could not easily be controlled by settled poleis. Their adaptation to these unpromising environments provides a striking case of Isayev's (2017b) 'compelled agency' by displaced people. Perhaps most famously, when a Spartan-backed oligarchy took power in Athens after Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War (404–3), some of the resulting Athenian exiles established a stronghold at Phyle, on the margins of Athenian territory, from which they fought against the incumbent regime, with quite rapid success.[24] Their internal political organisation is not very well recorded. However, after the re-establishment of democracy, the Athenians commemorated the Phyle-exiles as part of a broader Athenian '*demos*-in-exile' which had preserved the Athenian democratic spirit, and also some of its structures, while the city itself was in oligarchic hands.[25] As part of this broader movement, the larger community of Athenian democratic exiles in the Athenian port of the Piraeus probably held assemblies and raised funds collectively.[26]

Like the democratic Athenians at Phyle, exiles from other cities, oligarchic as well as democratic, are known to have exploited strongholds in marginal locations to attack a hostile incumbent regime, through raiding[27] or even siege.[28] Such groups could also demonstrate disciplined, complex organisation, on a civic model: oligarchic exiles from the city of Phlius in the north-eastern Peloponnese organised themselves, with Spartan help, into well-drilled communal dining groups, on the model of Spartan *syssitia* (common messes), which were crucial to the organisation of the settled Spartan polis. This impressed the Spartans to such an extent that they offered further aid.[29] In another example of oligarchic exile organisation on the margins, a band of mobilised oligarchic exiles from the island of Siphnos, roving the Aegean in the early fourth century, is known to have appointed formal magistrates-in-exile to lead a military attempt to recapture their home city.[30]

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[19] Compare (Moreno 2007, p. 94).

[20] See (Hallof and Habicht 1995).

[21] Compare (Osborne 1990).

[22] (Seibert 1979, pp. 312–14; Gehrke 1985, pp. 224–29).

[23] (Gray 2015, chp. 6, with many further details, including on earlier scholarship).

[24] Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.4.2–7.

[25] E.g., Rhodes and Osborne 2003 = Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 4; Plato *Apology* 20e8–21a2; Lysias 25 and 31, esp. 31.9; Demosthenes 20.48; Aeschines 3.181, 187, 208. Cf. (Forsdyke 2005, pp. 262–63).

[27] Thucydides 4.75.1 (pro-Spartan Samian exiles harrying their island polis from a stronghold on the mainland, Anaia); Diodorus 13.65.4 (anti-Spartan Chian exiles harrying the incumbent regime in their island polis, also from a stronghold on the mainland, Atarneus).

[28] Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.3.16–17.

[29] Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.3.17.

[30] Isocrates 19.38.

Other 'poleis-in-exile' on the margins are best attested for us from their recorded diplomatic interactions with favourable settled poleis, which themselves must have played a crucial role in securing the exile community's stability and wider recognition. For example, when the Athenians set up a new naval confederacy of poleis for mutual aid, concentrated around the Aegean islands and coastline, in 378/7 BC, they set up an inscription recording its terms and institutions, partly in order to stress that this was a less imperialistic venture than the fifth-century Delian League had been. The monument included a comprehensive list of the members of the confederacy. Among them were 'the Zacynthians on the Nellos', clearly a pro-Athenian dissident group which had broken away from the main island polis of Zacynthos (allied with the rival Spartans at this point) and established a competing stronghold in a place called the Nellos.[31] Their participation in the confederacy presupposes sophisticated political agency and organisation, though we have no further information about their precise structure. The Athenian reference to them as still 'Zacynthians' represents a rejection, presumably shared with the exiles, of any suggestion that they had lost their legitimate Zacynthian citizenship through their exile.

It was often the case that the tensions between settled city-states opened up opportunities for displaced groups to establish poleis-in-exile on territory which neither side could conclusively claim. A smaller-scale rivalry than that between Athens and Sparta was that between the neighbouring middling poleis of Ephesos and Priene on the west coast of modern Turkey and Samos on the nearby Aegean island. There lay at the intersection between their territories on the Aegean coast[32] a contested mountainous region known as 'the Karion', the subject of an interstate arbitration process between Priene and Samos in the second century BC. As the record of that arbitration process inscribed at Priene shows, it was in this interstitial location that, at the beginning of the third century BC, some Prienian exiles established a stronghold.[33] These Prienian exiles were dissidents hostile to an incumbent regime which was led by a certain Hieron, identified by his opponents as a tyrant. They are known to have constituted themselves as a polis-in-exile: they sent copies of their collective decisions (decrees), probably carried by envoys from their exile community, to the polis of Rhodes.[34] It was quite probably the same group of Prienian exiles who sent an embassy to the neighbouring polis of Ephesos around this time, which successfully secured help. The picture is, however, complicated by the fact that this latter development is recorded in a decree of Ephesos, which identifies these Prienian exiles as having successfully fought to secure 'the Charax' or 'the Fort' for the benefit of the Ephesians.[35] This does not, however, exclude the possibility that this is the same group; the Ephesians could even have been using their own distinctive name for what was otherwise known as 'the Karion', which would be a further indication that it was part of a contested landscape, claimed by different poleis, which by consequence offered a refuge for exiles. The Ephesians took pains to identify these exiles as still legitimate citizens, rather than exiles lacking in civic identity and entitlements: they were the 'citizens (*politai*) from Priene in the Charax'.

Another way in which 'poleis-in-exile' and other displaced groups could participate in Greek interstate relations, gaining recognition and credibility, was to make themselves visible at the great shared centres of Greek religious life, especially the sanctuaries and athletic festivals at Delphi and Olympia, which were themselves noted as places of refuge and asylum. Settled poleis and other states commonly used these sanctuaries and their activities as an opportunity to advertise their achievements, piety, and interests and to communicate with other states. Certain exile groups are known to have imitated these characteristic activities of settled states, successfully reintegrating themselves into

[31] (Rhodes and Osborne 2003 = Rhodes-Osborne, GHI 22, ll. 131–34; Seibert 1979, p. 117; Gehrke 1985, p. 198).

[32] On the importance of the Aegean coast, especially the mainland territories of the neighbouring island poleis (*peraiai*), as marginal territory hospitable to exiles, compare (Constantakopoulou 2007, pp. 250–51).

[33] (Magnetto 2008, pp. 34–45 (new edition of I.Priene 37, a record of the second-century Rhodian arbitration between the Samians and Prienians concerning the Karion), ll. 87–105, with analysis on pp. 113–18).

[34] (Magnetto 2008, pp. 34–45, ll. 95–98, 101–2).

[35] *I.Ephesos* 2001, ll. 3–5.

the interstate community, despite their otherwise marginal and interstitial position. Their activities included the establishment of monuments at Delphi and Olympia. The preserved inscriptions from those monuments offer rare direct glimpses into the political rhetoric and self-presentation of Greek exile groups.

In the fifth century BC, certain residents of Messenia, the neighbouring region to Sparta which had long been under direct Spartan rule, were forced into exile after attempting to revolt against Sparta, presenting themselves as the legitimate heirs of the ancient Messenians enslaved by the Spartans centuries earlier. The Athenians helped these exiles to establish a stronghold in the polis of Naupaktos, a position on the Gulf of Corinth strategically crucial in the fifth-century rivalry between Athenian and Spartan power. During the Peloponnesian War these Messenians at Naupaktos set up victory monuments, together with their Naupaktian hosts, at both Olympia and Delphi, with accompanying inscriptions, to celebrate successes over the Spartans and their allies. The Olympia monument included the famous 'Nike of Paionios', preserved in fragments which have been reconstructed by modern archaeologists.[36] The exiles styled themselves as 'the Messenians', in the same style as incumbent citizens of a home polis would do (e.g., 'the Athenians'), a strong and self-confident claim to legitimacy as citizens of a (not yet physically existing) polis.

Two centuries later (c. 220–217 BC), a similar intervention was made by a group of exiles from Achaia, a region in the north of the Peloponnese which was the traditional centre of a confederacy, the Achaian League,[37] quickly coming to dominate the whole Peloponnese. Like most of the other groups which have been mentioned so far, these exiles had been forced into marginal and contested territory: the region of Skiros or Skiritis in the disputed borderlands between Sparta and the region of Arcadia (now part of the Achaian League). Their home state, the federal Achaian League, was in these years at war with the rival powerful confederacy from north of the Gulf of Corinth, the Aetolian League. These Achaian dissidents set up a monument at Delphi, a centre of Aetolian power, to honour their Aetolian benefactor, called Simos:

[Κλεό]πατρος καὶ οἱ φυγάδες Σῖμον [Σίμ?]ου Αἰτωλὸν [ἐσ]τεφάνωσαν ἐν Δελφοῖς εἰκόνι χαλκῆι ὅτι τὸν [Σ]κίρον λαβὼν ἀπέδωκε Κλεοπάτρωι καὶ τοῖς φυγάσι [τ]οῖς ἐξ Ἀχαίας.	Kleopatros and the exiles honoured Simos, son of Simos, an Aetolian, with a bronze statue because, having captured Skiros, he gave it back to Kleopatros and the exiles from Achaia (*FD* III 4.239).

Though it is clear that these exiles were using the setting and interstate prominence of Delphi to gain recognition for their political identity, legitimacy, or even autonomy, their nature as a political group is much more complex and hybrid than in the other examples which I have discussed, where polis identity seems axiomatic. These exiles identified with a whole region, Achaia, rather than a single polis. They also gave special prominence in their self-presentation here to a single leader, Kleopatros, probably a rebel Achaian leader who had defected to the Aetolians' cause with some followers. This suggests that they were conscious of the model of a royal or mercenary army with a single unquestioned leader, as opposed to the civic model of shared command and collective sovereignty. It is also interesting that they explicitly acknowledged their dissident and marginal status: they did not style themselves as 'the Achaians in Skiros' (compare 'the Zacynthians in the Nellos' above), but rather as 'the exiles from Achaia'.

This does not, however, indicate that they were abstaining from staking a claim to represent the true interests of the Achaian League. It is striking that they claimed that Simos 'restored' to them (ἀπέδωκε) the region of Skiris. Since this is the formal diplomatic language of restitution of rightful territory,[38] these exiles were claiming to be legitimate recipients of disputed territory which, to their

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36 Olympia: *IvO* 259; Meiggs-Lewis *GHI* 74; Delphi: *FD* III 4.1; *SEG* 32.550. On these monuments and their contexts: (Luraghi 2008, esp. pp. 191–94). For a guide to epigraphic abbreviations such as those in this note, see the list published in the *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*.

37 On Greek federal states, see recently (Mackil 2013).

38 Compare [Demosthenes] 7.6, cf. 28, 35.

minds, rightfully belonged to the enlarged Achaian League (by now including Arcadia), of which they were legitimate representatives. Since the Achaian League by now had only one principal magistrate (*strategos*),[39] they could even have intended Kleopatros to be seen as a rival to the incumbent Achaian *strategos*: as the truly legitimate defender of Achaian interests. It is worth pointing out that the Achaian League was itself based on continuing ideals and practices of citizenship: individual member cities retained their traditional citizenships, but the model of citizenship was also co-opted and adapted at the larger federal level itself. This unusual exile group was thus itself, like the others discussed here, co-opting for its own ends a political identity and model that was based on citizenship—in this case, an already experimental and adapted form of citizenship.

There were, therefore, multiple ways in which Classical and Hellenistic refugees roughly corresponding to Arendt's first group—those who survived on the margins, insisting on the identity that was denied to them by others through exile—could adapt citizen practices and citizen identity to exercise agency and gain recognition. Interestingly, it was equally true for Classical and Hellenistic refugees approximately corresponding to Arendt's second group—those who found refuge in a host society in an urban context, assimilating to some degree to the host culture[40]—that citizenship offered an effective model for improvised adaptation. Indeed, displaced groups settled in the urban centres of host cities could exploit citizen models to preserve or develop a distinctive identity, as a basis for significant agency, rather than simply disappearing into the host environment. Such cases provide our best evidence for the complex internal organisation of 'poleis-in-exile'.

In most known cases, 'poleis-in-exile' in host cities involved fellow exiles and refugees from a single polis congregating in an improvised quasi-civic community in the new city centre, usually without the level of direct military mobilisation shown by the marginalised groups I discussed above, but generally with a similar level of political engagement. In 348 BC, Philip II of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, who was in the process of entrenching Macedonian power across northern Greece, destroyed the uncooperative city of Olynthos, the centre of a hostile confederacy, the Chalcidian League. The resulting Olynthian or 'Chalcidian' refugees were dispersed around the Aegean and beyond, but could still congregate in groups. One such group found refuge at Myrina on the north-eastern Aegean island of Lemnos, which at the time hosted an Athenian settler community (cleruchy) like the one on Samos (compare above). This exile community was sufficiently organised and recognised to receive a grant of land from the Athenian settler community, and to pass a decree in honour of a benefactor from that community:

[.................................. ἐ]πειδῆ καὶ ὁ δῆ[μος ὁ] Ἀθ[ην]αίων ὁ ἐ[ν Μυρ]ίνει οἰκῶν ἔ[δ]ωκεν χωρίον τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσιν, στῆσαι τὴν στήλην τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἐπιμελητοῦ καὶ ἀνειπεῖν τὸν κήρυκα Διονυσίων τῶι ἀγῶνι τραγωιδοῖς ὅτι Χαλκιδέες οἱ ἐν Μυρίνει οἰκοῦντες στεφανοῦσι τῶιδε τῶι στεφάνωι τὸν ἐπιμελητῆν Θεόφιλον Μελίτωνο[ς] Ἀλωπεκῆθεν ἀνδραγαθίας ἔνεκα κ[α]ὶ δικαιοσύνης τῆς εἰς τοὺς Χαλκι[δ]έας τοὺς ἐν Μυρίνει οἰκοῦντας.

Since the *demos* of the Athenians living in Myrina gave a plot of land to the Chalcidians, set up the inscription concerning the *epimeletes* [magistrate of the Athenian cleruchy] and let the herald announce at the contest for tragedies at the Dionysia that the Chalcidians living in Myrina crown with this garland the *epimeletes* Theophilos, son of Meliton, of Alopeke, on account of his virtue and justice towards the Chalcidians living in Myrina. (*IG* XII 8 4)

It was a characteristic practice of ancient Greek settled states, including confederacies as well as poleis above all, to pass honorary decrees for benefactors like this one, as a way of expressing shared ethical values and publicising incentives for civic contributions. The 'Chalcidians living in Myrina' thus successfully imitated one of the principal activities and forms of expression associated with ancient Greek citizenship, in order to assert political agency. It is interesting that, like the Achaian exiles which I discussed above, they tapped into a specifically federal (Chalcidian) identity, which was

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[39] Polybius 2.43.2.
[40] I have discussed in (Gray 2017) ancient debates about asylum and refuge and their modern resonance, citing there much earlier bibliography on this question; see earlier especially (Lonis 1993).

already an improvised adaptation of the civic model on a new scale and for new purposes. They also had close at hand another model of improvised, adaptable, and in this case mobile, citizenship: as noted above, the institutions and ethos of an Athenian cleruchy (like the one at Myrina) represented an experimental reproduction and adaptation of traditional civic institutions to suit new conditions.

A polis which had earlier suffered a similar fate to Olynthos was the city of Plataea in Boeotia in Central Greece, which was destroyed by the Spartans and Thebans after a long siege in 427 BC, near the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. The Plataeans had long been close allies of the Athenians. After their exile, the Athenians took the unusual step of extending Athenian citizenship to all the Plataeans who found refuge with them in Athens.[41] This must have strongly encouraged the Plataean community at Athens to assimilate to Athenian culture. Nonetheless, the Plataeans at Athens also maintained an identity and consciousness apart. When in the early fourth century a man called Pancleon was suspected of making an illegitimate claim to Athenian citizenship, his first line of defence was to claim to be one of the enfranchised Plataeans: he must have calculated on the jury's familiarity with apparent outsiders who turned out to be genuine Athenians by virtue of being Plataean. The community of Plataeans at Athens was, however, still sufficiently cohesive and organised to offer checks on such claims to membership.

The speaker of Lysias' speech 23, prosecuting Pancleon as an illegitimate citizen, claims to have undermined his credentials by checking with the Plataean community at Athens itself: first with a well-known Plataean elder, then with other Plataeans, and finally with the rest of the Plataean community, which, he was told, gathered on the last day of every month in the Athenian cheese market. One of the Plataeans who was present in the cheese market did, however, claim to have lost a runaway slave matching Pancleon's name and description.[42] Respectable Plataeans were thus expected to gather regularly as a collective body, with a distinctive Plataean identity and sense of Plataean civic community which they could combine with their new role as Athenian citizens.

It is impossible to tell exactly what happened at the monthly cheese-market meetings of Plataean exiles in addition to socialising, but it is suggestive that many settled poleis, like Athens itself, had an obligatory monthly meeting of the civic assembly (*kyria ekklesia*), at which the most important decisions were taken. A more unambiguously political assembly of exiles who had found refuge in a host polis comes from the third century BC: the citizens of Megalopolis in the Peloponnese, expelled from their polis by their traditional enemies, the Spartans, in 223 BC, held an assembly in their host city of Messene to reject Spartan peace overtures, a decision which was much praised by the second-century BC Megalopolitan historian Polybius.[43] This was a much more improvised assembly, not regularised like those of the Chalcidians and Plataeans, but it did represent the constitution of a more fleeting 'polis-in-exile' at the heart of a host polis.

The Chalcidians in Myrina, the Plataeans in Athens and the Megalopolitans in Messene formed their exile communities after the destruction of their home cities. It was, however, also possible for an exiled faction from a still existing city based in a host city's urban centre to take the more controversial step of forming an obviously temporary and provisional 'polis-in-exile' to deny the legitimacy of the incumbent regime at home. Legal speeches and historical accounts portray exiled factions with their base in Athens in the fourth century BC behaving in this way. Plutarch, a much later source, reports the community of exiles from Thebes resulting from the Spartan seizure of their city in 382 BC imitating and co-opting democratic institutions during their stay in Athens: they listened to speeches by their leading figure, Pelopidas, in an improvised assembly and took formal decisions by vote, as a settled polis would do.[44] Interestingly, these exiles succeeded in establishing a long-lasting democracy in

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41   See especially Thucydides 3.24; [Demosthenes] 59.104–106.
42   Lysias 23.6–8; compare (Garland 2014, p. 184).
43   Polybius 2.61.4–12.
44   Plutarch *Pelopidas* 7.1–8.1. Note the reference to an assembly (*plethos*) and to formal, polis-like decisions (τὰ δεδογμένα; ἔδοξε τοῖσ φυγάσι).

Thebes after their return home,[45] which was partly inspired by their exile experiences. In a source closer to the time, Aeschines reports in a speech of 343 BC that later exiles from Thebes' region of Boeotia held a meeting to elect advocates to speak on his behalf.[46] This is another interesting case, like those of the Chalcidians and Achaians, of an exile group forming improvised institutions based on a federal, rather than single-polis, identity. Perhaps federal identities and improvised federal institutions provided a source of unity for quite disparate refugees from the same region, among whom no single polis had enough representatives to construct a more particularist 'polis-in-exile'.

Classical and Hellenistic exiles' adaptations of civic institutions and community could also be more original than the imitation of polis or federal features by a group of fellow exiles from one polis or region who had found refuge together somewhere. Fellow exiles from the same place could also maintain connections at a distance, forming something that was closer to a 'diaspora polis' than a local 'polis-in-exile'. The early fourth-century oligarchic exiles from Siphnos mentioned above maintained lines of communication across different parts of the Aegean.[47] Similarly, the wide diaspora of Samian exiles dispersed around the Mediterranean by the Athenian capture of their island in 365 BC, the prelude to the establishment of the Athenian cleruchy (compare above), maintained a cohesive identity as a Samian *demos,* which they put back into practice on their return after 322 BC. The returned Samians collectively commemorated the services of benefactors in different parts of the Mediterranean to the '*demos* when it was in exile'.[48]

Perhaps an even bolder step, which chimes with some of the modern case-studies discussed elsewhere in this collection, was to adapt civic identity and institutions in a more cosmopolitan way: to imagine and construct quasi-civic communities which cut across traditional divisions of origin and status.[49] The original cosmopolitan thinkers of fourth-century Athens, the early Cynics and Stoics, included several displaced philosophers. These included Diogenes the Cynic, exiled from his home polis of Sinope on the south coast of the Black Sea for some offence, perhaps corrupting the city coinage for which he was responsible,[50] and his fellow Cynic Crates, a refugee from the destruction of his home city of Thebes by Alexander the Great in 335 BC.[51] These outsider philosophers devised the ideal of a literal 'cosmopolis' or world city, the natural home of all wise and virtuous men, who recognise that territorial and status distinctions are arbitrary and contrary to nature. To this way of thinking, no-one can become an exile merely through physical expulsion; true 'citizenship' depends on recognising nature's requirements of justice and virtue, and recognising one's affinity (across space and time) with like-minded people.[52] As well as developing these intellectual consolations for outsider status, these philosophers formed in practice a mixed, vibrant community of debate and critique in fourth-century Athens,[53] which gave birth to the long-lasting Cynic and Stoic schools.

Displaced and migrant Greeks who were not philosophers also experimented with forms of sociability which retained some of the meaningful communal interaction of the polis while embracing some of the openness of a cosmopolis. Plutarch, for example, alludes to a mixed community of refugees from war and unrest in the Greek mainland and islands who found refuge in third-century Alexandria in Egypt, where they benefited from funds passed on to them from the Ptolemaic government by the exiled Spartan king Cleomenes.[54]

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[45] See Plutarch *Pelopidas* 13; (Buckler 1980).
[46] Aeschines 2.142.
[47] See Isocrates 19.21–4, 40.
[48] *IG* XII 6 1 17–40 (cf. 42–43), with (Shipley 1987, pp. 161–64).
[49] Compare (Joly 2002) for a similar distinction between categories of modern refugees.
[50] Diogenes Laertius 6.20–1.
[51] Compare Diogenes Laertius 6.93.
[52] See esp. Diogenes Laertius 6.49, 63. On these fourth-century innovations and the tradition they launched, see recently (Murray 2004; Rohde 2011; Hamon 2011; Müller 2014).
[53] Compare the story of solidarity between Zeno of Kition and Crates of Thebes in Diogenes Laertius 7.2–3.
[54] Plutarch *Agis and Cleomenes* 53.5.

In this context, a crucial phenomenon was one already sketched in Section 2, which becomes increasingly visible through epigraphy in the course of the Hellenistic period: the tendency of migrants or visitors of mixed origins to form, or participate in, voluntary associations bound by cult or professional interests (compare above) in their host cities, sometimes in collaboration with local citizens.[55] In a way crucial to the concerns of this section, these cosmopolitan associations, with their quasi-civic institutions binding together individuals of different origins, could count exiles among their members. Around 300 BC, an exile from Olynthos in northern Greece (destroyed in 348 BC, compare above), resident and enjoying privileges at Athens, but still identified as 'Olynthian', played a prominent role as secretary in a cult association (*thiasos*) at Athens.[56] More thoroughly mixed quasi-civic associations in Hellenistic Athens included the heterogeneous, improvised communities of soldiers and mercenaries who came together at Athenian forts to honour their benefactors. One such community listed its disparate members in the inscription of an honorary decree. The list included a man called Theodoros whose ethnic affiliation ('Achaian') was erased.[57] Perhaps he wished to signal that he was declaring himself an exile from the Achaian League, with which Athens was at war at the time of the inscription (c. 235 BC);[58] he had found a new focus of civic membership and belonging in this more informal mixed community of fellow fighters.

These last examples of 'citizens-in-exile' came closest in the Greek world to meeting Arendt's challenge of achieving an 'avant-garde' refugee identity, which transcends traditional exclusive citizenship without moving to the other extreme of purely abstract, formal and impersonal cosmopolitanism. These examples are thus particularly well-suited to comparison with the experiments in status- and identity-crossing forms of improvised community that are discussed in contemporary refugee studies, including in Sigona's model of 'campzenship', and also elsewhere in this collection, especially in the discussion of cosmopolitan interaction within Dheisheh refugee camp by Petti. Members of such associations resident in major urban centres, such as Athens, must have been adept at mingling and balancing different identities and affiliations, something that was already evident in the case of the Plataean exiles who were naturalised at Athenians, but persisted in holding a monthly Plataean meeting in the Athenian cheese-market. Their host cities thus partly prefigured the pluralist modern cities, hosts to refugees (Johannesburg, Berlin), which Katharina Richter (2017) discusses in this collection.

The ancient examples reveal the opportunities offered by the citizen model to outsiders who wished to build their own, more open outsider communities, but also the tenacity of the exclusive citizenship regimes of their host cities. Indeed, it was partly the power inequalities and exclusions which resulted from strict rules of citizenship which provoked outsiders to develop these alternative models of civic community, defined in opposition to them. It might be thought that these cosmopolitan outsider communities simply brought consolation and a brake on outsiders' discontent, rather than exercising genuine political influence: cosmopolitan associations of philosophers and migrants could not influence the course of politics to the extent that the more traditional 'poleis-in-exile' from particular poleis did. It is true that there was no dramatic overthrow of traditional citizen exclusivity. Nonetheless, change over centuries is visible: it is striking that, by the later Hellenistic period and early Roman Empire, the citizenship regimes in Greek city-states did tend to become more fluid and open to outsiders.[59] The cosmopolitan ideas and practices of certain exiles and refugees can be counted among the many social and cultural factors which helped to bring this change about.

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[55] See especially (Ismard 2010, chp. 5); (Arnaoutoglou 2011).
[56] *IG* II² 1263.
[57] *I.Eleusis* 196, l. 117.
[58] Compare Plutarch *Aratus* 33–4.
[59] See the papers in (Heller and Pont 2012).

4. Conclusions

Citizenship was not merely a force of exclusion or oppression in the case of the displaced of ancient Greece; its processes and ideals could also be harnessed by the displaced themselves to build effective improvised communities in exile. It is clear from the examples in Section 3 that relevant displaced groups almost always relied on support from powerful settled states. Displaced groups' adoption of quasi-civic forms might sometimes have rendered them more susceptible to control from these outside powers; it also kept them embedded within the normative consensus, focussed on the polis as the best form of society, in the Greek civic world. Nonetheless, it is difficult to dispute that adoption and adaptation of civic forms also gave displaced groups agency and autonomy, especially when it enabled them to make interventions in interstate diplomacy and war as if they were settled states. Reproducing civic models in new forms also gave outsiders an alternative focus of pride, dignity, and community, as is particularly evident in the record of associations and communities of the marginalised at Athens.

This all suggests that the model of ancient Greek citizenship need not be straightforwardly rejected in search of entirely new models of political community (Agamben); ancient Greek citizenship was, in fact, double-edged rather than straightforwardly oppressive, since it could itself be a resource for outsiders. It is true, as Arendt argued, that the most spectacular examples of co-option of citizenship by the displaced were new foundations of cities by exiles, mainly attested for the Archaic Greek world (before c. 500 BC). Nonetheless, even after the exhaustion of new opportunities for spontaneous city foundation, in a densely packed world of states protective of their territory in which sophisticated interstate norms were in play, ancient Greek displaced individuals and groups still found new ways to adapt civic principles and institutions in improvised 'poleis-in-exile'. These phenomena encourage a re-thinking of modern citizenship, which is partly descended from the Greek form: in its roots it is much more flexible, mobile, and open to reinvention than often allowed, and need not be tied to any particular place or even ethnicity. A more complex and open-ended understanding of citizenship can, as in the ancient Greek case, open a rich variety of opportunities for political interaction and agency on the part of both the displaced and their hosts.

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From Exclusion to Inhabitation: Response to Gray, Benjamin. Citizenship as Barrier and Opportunity for Ancient Greek and Modern Refugees. *Humanities*, 2018, 7, 72

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Abstract: Spaces of refuge represent the paradoxical encounters between a series of governmental forces, disciplinary knowledge, aesthetic regimes and spatial conditions that tend to arrest, fix in time and space forms of lives. Considering the fact that camps are meant to be the materialisation of a temporal status, spatial and political, the proposition posed by Benjamin Gray's *Citizenship as Barrier and Opportunity for Ancient Greek and Modern Refugees,* to look at "citizenship-in-exile" practices in ancient Greece and their forms of "improvised quasi-civic communities", is welcome as it is refreshing. This short response engages with Gray's text, addressing two different but interconnected points: in one respect, I hope to rescue Agamben's work from its linear reading by commenting on the depoliticization of the camp and the critique of its exceptionalism; and, in another, I wish to provoke reflection around the universalising claim of hospitality and full assimilation, by introducing the disruptive terminology of inhabitation. This critical insertion aims to redefine an ethical relationship with the space, as a space of and for life, that Agamben sees as the basis for a new ethics, reversing its status as a productive and active force where the camp, in its paradigmatic reading, and the form of life it generates, helps to think beside the exceptional and move to inhabit such indistinctions.

Keywords: Agamben; Camp; Inhabitation; form-of-life

Spaces of refuge, shelter practices or camps, however you wish to define them, semantically represent the paradoxical encounters between a series of governmental forces, disciplinary knowledge, aesthetic regimes and spatial conditions that tend to arrest, fix in time and space forms of lives. As a simple starting point, the camp remains a rare object of study that can exist, simultaneously, in the realm of theory, in the space of materialisation and in the form of multiple agency. It is an ideological thought and a formal dispositive, one that antagonises the spatial precepts of modernism through its heavily loaded political semantics. Considering the fact that camps are meant to be the materialisation of a temporal status, spatial and political—a bare architecture justified by humanitarian intent and technocratic design to contain and control populations and offer convenient humanitarian management (Weima and Hyndman 2019)—the reflection posed by Benjamin Gray's piece to look at "citizenship-in-exile" practices in ancient Greece and their forms of "improvised quasi-civic communities" is welcome as a refreshing and critical look into refugeeness as a "depoliticised identity as human beings in need" (Gray 2018, p. 8). We know well that, paradoxically, camps are transcending their exceptional temporality, creating "the condition for its transformation: from a pure humanitarian space to an active political space, the embodiment and the expression of the right of return" (Petti 2015). As noted again by Petti in one of the Catalyst pieces of this Special Issue, "the perpetuation of legal exceptionality in Dheisheh camp has created a unique urban condition. The camp is not ephemeral, but it is not a city either. Refugees forced to live in this suspended condition have developed distinctive systems of civic management outside of state and municipal institutions. The camp exists in a limbo

where fundamental juridical categories such as public and private do not and cannot exist […] This has led to the development of an exceptional form of life in common: *al masha*" ([Petti 2017](), p. 3).

Therefore, the camp becomes a political fact in space and in time. In the short space available, I would like to stress two different but interconnected points: on one side, I hope to rescue Agamben's work from its linear reading by commenting on the depoliticization of the camp and the critique of its exceptionalism; and, on the other, I wish to provoke reflection around the universalising claim of hospitality and full assimilation, by introducing the disruptive terminology of inhabitation. These two points aim to support Gray's claim that a "a more complex and open-ended understanding of citizenship […] in the ancient Greek case, open[s] a rich variety of opportunities for political interaction and agency on the part of both the displaced and their hosts" ([Gray 2018](), p. 16) and his emphasis on the need to think about new contemporary forms of 'poleis-in-exile', respectively.

The Camp as Hyper-Political Paradigm Rather Than a Depoliticised Exception

Although frequently repeated, and often contested in its depoliticization and exceptionality, Agamben's suggestion that the camp is the *nomos* of our times remains a powerful idea. Not only as it stands for the ubiquity of camps as a preferred matrix to signify the space of refuge existing in parallel relationships of state violence and migration containments ([Weima and Hyndman 2019]()), but also as an original component of a wide-ranging disciplinary technology of governance (biopolitical or thanatopolitical) that controls and contains populations and life ([Turner 2005](); [Weima and Hyndman 2019]()). Agamben's work on exception, while rightly criticised by Gray in its "uncompromising rejection of the whole tradition of Greek or Greek-inspired citizenship, [which] neglects the fact that Greek citizenship ideals and practices were double-edged […] rather than straightforwardly oppressive, since (they) could (themselves) be a resource for outsiders" ([Gray 2018](), p. 15), might require further reflection, extending it to the notion of 'paradigm' and of 'whatever' – two fundamental concepts in the affirmative political ontology of the Italian philosopher. Gray's argument, claiming that "a more complex and open-ended understanding of citizenship can, as in the ancient Greek case, open a rich variety of opportunities for political interaction and agency on the part of both the displaced and their hosts" (ibid., p. 15), is visible in a variety of studies on 'the geographies of camps' ([Minca 2005]()) and on 'encampments' ([Agier 2002](), [2011](), [2019]()). It is also recognisable in the Catalytic entries of [Petti]() ([2017]()), [Maqusi]() ([2017]()) and [Dalal]() ([2017]()) in this volume, that expose some form of agency in how displaced populations "developed their own political and cultural institutions and activities, seizing the opportunities of citizenship in order to overcome some of the barriers" ([Gray 2018](), p. 3). What I want to suggest here, building on Gray's brilliant reflection on "improvised quasi-civic community" ([Gray 2018](), p. 18), is that, in order to re-politicise the exclusionary paradigm, there is the need to expand Agamben's political ontology with a more complex and longitudinal appreciation of his political work and thinking, as in the ancient Greek *poleis*, of camp as a form of exception not fixed and constructed solely by exclusion. Instead, we should consider how the camp bends and folds into the city in a variety of different ways. The point here is that, rather than think of the camp and the city as a simple duality, we should direct our attention to the multiple forms of 'encampment' as spatial tactics of control and the creation of docile subjectivities, but also as a form of indistinction, whereby the subject becomes a 'whatever' in Agamben's terminology. This will allow us to grasp in all the "overall configurations, 'landscapes' networks, and mechanisms at the regional and global levels extending their interpretative framework from spaces of exclusion and exception to a more complex in between, liminal, and transitory spaces" ([Agier 2019]()), and "productive political spaces where vital subjectivities" ([Weima and Hyndman 2019](), p. 33) are emerging. The camp and the city are not fixed in their specific categories but are rather in a "topological relationship" ([Sanyal 2012](), p. 468; [Boano and Martén 2013]()).

Several authors ([Agier 2002](), [2011](), [2019](); [Ramadan 2013](); [Sanyal 2012](), [2014]()) have made it evident that that camp is not a depoliticised space but actually an extra-political one. Gray himself seems to acknowledge only a partial view of Agamben's exceptionalism, not agreeing that in the context of the

camp, politics itself is concerned with the apparently unpolitical—'bare life'—and its abandonment by the political community, the implications of which reach beyond the singular abjection of the camps. Agamben posits very directly, that "if this is true, if the essence of the camp consists in the materialization of the state of exception and in the subsequent creation of a space in which bare life and juridical rule enter into a threshold of indistinction, then we must admit that we find ourselves virtually in the presence of a camp every time such a structure is created, independent of the kinds of crime that are committed there and whatever its denomination and specific topography" (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 174).

The response that Agamben gave to such indistinction—that Gray sees in the "double edged Greek citizenship" (Gray 2018, p. 16), both its oppressive and emancipatory capacity—is a search for a new politics. The response he suggests, the counter-figure to this 'bare life', is not *zoē* or *bios*[1] but the two brought together in intimate, indistinguishable proximity, which he calls "form-of-life [*forma-di-vita*] in which it is never possible to isolate something like bare life" (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 183). The concept of form-of-life is probably the central manifesto of Agamben's work (Kishik 2012; Boano 2017). In the essay that opens *Means Without Ends* (Agamben 2000), he foregrounds that "by the term form-of-life [. . .] I mean a life that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked life" (pp. 3,4). This is a life, as Salzani reminds us, without a "biological vocation, not determined by whatever necessities" (Salzani 2013, p. 135), but a life "in which the single ways, acts and processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all power" (Agamben 2000, pp. 3, 4). Conceived as pure potency, such a life is "for whom happiness is always at stake in their living, the only beings whose life is irremediably and painfully assigned to happiness" (Agamben 2000, pp. 3, 4), and thus eminently a political life. What seems to me very important to stress is that Gray discovers that in ancient Greece some "more flexible, mobile, and open to reinvention" (Gray 2018, p. 15) forms of citizenship, were—in Agamben's terminology—forms of life. Rather than tighten up citizenship into a positive aspect of the city and contrasting its exceptionality with the camp, Agamben had, in one sense, already suggested what Gray advocates, although not exactly in his words of "open-ended understanding of citizenship" (Gray 2018, p. 15). Agamben's extra political form-of-life cannot be given any attributes or qualities, existing in opposition to the biopolitical control of life. To give it attributes would be to isolate forms, splitting life from itself as one attempts to capture it.

Another important concept in Agamben's thought that ought to be considered is the notion of paradigm. Let's return for a moment to Agamben's epigrammatic statement made in *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, "today it is not the city, but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West" (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 181). Certainly, he does not mean returning to the specific historical moment that gave birth to the concentration camps. Rather, he thinks of a specific mode of production of territory, space and identity. The camp is for Agamben a paradigm at once embedded in a given historical situation and a tool for better understanding 'the present situation'. Agamben's goal "is to render intelligible a series of phenomena whose relationship to one another has escaped, or might escape, the historian's gaze" (ibid.). Therefore, a central gesture is to rescue such a political project and to understand the camp as an example, qua paradigm, thus making it "suspended" (Agamben 2010, p. 260) from its being "one instance of a class and, conversely, the class's supervening control of that example is deactivated" (Agamben [2005] 2009, p. 18).[2]

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[1] The incipit of *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* is worthy of pages of reflection. Agamben argues: "Greeks had no single term to express what we mean by the word 'life'. They used two terms that, although traceable to a common etymological root, are semantically and morphologically distinct: zoē, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods) and bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 1)

[2] For a discussion on the use of the paradigm in Agamben's ontology and its possible applications, see: (Boano 2016, 2017).

For Agamben, the camp is "the most absolute biopolitical space that has ever been realized"—a space in which "power has before it pure biological life [*la pura vita*]" (Agamben 2000, p. 41); however, for these reasons, it is the "paradigm of political space" in which we live, "the hidden matrix," and "the new biopolitical nomos of the planet" (ibid., pp. 41, 45). Therefore, when conceived as such, the camp and its excess of politics, both historically and spatially become a fundamental paradigm to interpret the present. Paraphrasing Agamben, a camp environment is the phantasm of camp legacies, the ungraspable materialisation of layered politics, economies and networks, operating in topologies that are claimed and reclaimed through the violence of the dispositive of the ban[3]. This is the camp nature, an image that is not fixed but still implacable and exceptional: "not the thing," as Agamben says, "but the thing's knowability (its nudity)" (Agamben 2010, p. 251).

Following other studies (Boano 2017; Salzani 2015), it is less important to focus on the camp per se, but rather on the diagram of the camp in the Foucaultian sense. In the fields of tension between camps and non-camps, a topological imagination can emerge that can envisage the inside and outside—norm *and* exception, terror *and* hope—in ways that are more complex and less binary while preserving the urgency of the critique of the camp. The truly political message of Agamben, not fully emergent in Gray's approach, is anticipated in *The Coming Community* (1998) where Agamben prompts us to imagine a "completely new politics—that is, a politics no longer founded on the exception of *bare life*" (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 11). Bare life is characterized by the spatial dimension of the threshold and indeterminacy, emerging in the translation of Walter Benjamin's *das bloße Leben* (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 65). *'Nuda'* means thus *'Bloß'*, which in German can mean 'naked,' but—and this is Benjamin's use—in the sense of 'no better than,' 'nothing but,' 'mere,' and as such 'bare'" (Salzani 2015, pp. 80–81). Pure Being and naked life are 'empty' and 'indeterminate' concepts and thus made perfect "the enigma of ontology and politics" (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 47). This is the ultimate trajectory that the *Homo Sacer*[4] seeks to follow: a search for means, ways, forms, and lives through which 'a new politics' can be arrived at, and it is this call that is heard, through one voice or another, on every page of his book. The search for this 'new politics' is, for Agamben, an unquestionably urgent one. For Agamben, such a transformation of our political life stripped bare is what the state of exception, that is rapidly becoming our rule, effects and what Agamben believes our every effort should strive to counteract. The counter-figure of such bare life is a "form of life [*forma-di-vita*] in which it is never possible to isolate something like bare life" (ibid., p. 183). In Agamben's terminology, such forms of life are new uses of bodies that frame an existence that is generic and imperfect. A possibility of life is also evident in other Catalyst papers in this issue. Ribeiro et al. (2017) describe the condition of informal urbanization in Brazil that suggests a positive agency of marginalised communities. The possibility, as Perego and

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3 The thesis in Agamben's masterpiece is that "the original political relation is the ban: the state of exception as zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion" (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 181). In order to illustrate this indistinction, in the second part of the book, Agamben starts providing an example: the werewolf. Here, the analysis goes to Hobbes and the different French and German visions of the literary and non-literary half-man, half-beast. The werewolf is the "monstrous hybrid of human and animal, divided between the forest and the city: the werewolf is, therefore, in its origin the figure of the man who has been banned from the city" (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 105).

4 With the publication of *The Use of Bodies* (Agamben [2014] 2016), Giorgio Agamben almost abandoned his Homo Sacer project after more then 20 years of research. The Homo Sacer project, now completed, is organized around the following schema where I have provided the double date of publication in both Italian and in English: Volume I: *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Agamben [1995] 1998); Volume II, 1: *State of Exception* (Agamben [2003] 2005), Volume II, 2: *Stasis: La guerra civile come paradigma politico* (Agamben 2015), translated into English by Nicholas Heron), Volume II, 3: *The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath* (Agamben [2008] 2011), Volume II, 4: *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government* (Agamben [2007] 2011), Volume II, 5: *Opus Dei: An Archaeology of Duty* (Agamben [2012] 2013); Volume III: *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive* (Agamben [1998] 2002); Volume IV: 1: *The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life* (Agamben [2011] 2013), Volume IV: 2: *The Use of Bodies* (Agamben [2014] 2016). In reviewing (Agamben [2014] 2016), de la Durantaye (2016) said "In the forty-five years since the publication of Agamben's first book, two things have been utterly uncontroversial: he is an unusually erudite philosopher and he is an unusually graceful writer, something that translation, of necessity, struggles to reflect . . . the story for Agamben is thus not about how far we have fallen, how lost we are, how remote the once bright fire of sacred speech, pure thought and incandescent experience. His is a story where there is no task that must be accomplished, no work that must be completed, no single spot, no sacred words, no special fire".

Scopacasa (2018) describe it to "alter the spectrum of what is possible within the bounds of the law" (p. 2), reworking the negative effects and "find their way to endure to repair and heal [...] themselves from the known and establish new relations, negotiating detours and make use of their very reality to craft new forms of lives and project themselves into the future" (Biehl and Locke 2017, p. 4). In such plastic indistinction, forms of life are emerging as "spatial violations"—in the language of Samar Maqusi (2017)—and thus demonstrating the multiple systems that are made by people, things and forces in which the displaced are acting with different degrees of agentive capacities in shaping the material condition of their space. This can also signify—as in the case of the "concrete slab" narrated by Nobre and Nakano (2017)—a dispositive of "what's yet to come" (p. 2) in the unfinished, indicting, generic and undomesticated conditions that emerge. Rescuing the camp as a form-of-life allows for a more complete and somehow affirmative reflection of Agamben's powerful political project (Boano 2017) and its dark exceptionality by stressing it as space and as terrain constituted "by the actual and the possible" (p. 25) and referring both to the histories that have shaped its urban trajectories, economy and the identities, habits and practices (subdivisions, informal exceptionality, popular construction, land subdivisions, migrant workers).

Thinking with the Disruptive Terminology of Inhabitation

If displacement is the defining characteristic of the era in which we live, hospitality does seem to be its diagram in space. Hospitality has become a tactic to differentiate people as 'other'. This is particularly evident in situations within territories that reveal the multiplicity of forced migration regimes operating historically and contemporaneously. Gray's exposure of non-static, non-monolithic forms of citizenship in ancient Greece, not tied to territorial possession, is very important. He brings to the present "ways to act and interact as 'citizens-in-exile' even when they were hosted on the territory, or sometimes in the urban centre, of a pre-existing polis" (Gray 2018, p. 8) through "improvised, flexible versions of civic institutions and activities, [..] which they could sustain even while participating in their host community [. . .]" and thus even open up a possibility of recognition and agency through "a political voice with which to claim powerful settled states' recognition and protection from below, rather than relying solely on benevolence from above" (ibid.). This affords us the possibility to spatialise such a form of recognition, which the Catalyst papers also seem to have acknowledged (Maqusi 2017; Petti 2017; Perego and Scopacasa 2018) and that I have here named inhabitation.

In this light, Martin Heidegger's question "what does it mean to dwell?" (Heidegger 1954) is still valid and pertinent. Dwelling is a microcosm in which such worldly affairs are condensed, transformed and enacted within the limits of daily life, occupation and use. While drawing the focus to the quotidian, this foregrounding of the materiality of the space of inhabitation is not a petition for the specific or the everyday. It is rather a call to open up the dwelling as a site that mediates between the particular and the systemic, a meeting ground in which intensive practices, materials and meanings tangle with extensive, financial, environmental and political worlds as recognised in the work of Nobre and Nakano (2017) and Ribeiro et al. (2017). Recognizing inhabitation connects well with Gray's excavation of poleis-in-exile and Plutarch's reference to "a mixed community of refugees from war and unrest in the Greek mainland and islands who found refuge in third-century Alexandria in Egypt, where they benefited from funds passed on to them from the Ptolemaic government by the exiled Spartan king Cleomenes" (Gray 2018, p. 14). This aligns well with the philosophical reflections of Donatella Di Cesare who posits that "the inhabitants of the world are necessarily eccentric [. . .] exile, ecstasy, exposure, existence, all that is distinguished by the outside, destined to the beyond, risks of being saturated by immanence" (Di Cesare 2018, p. 15).

For Di Cesare, it is crucial to bring in the ancient biblical model of the "resident alien" to illustrate the centrality of inhabitation in the discussion of hospitality. The term *ger*, from the Hebrew root gar, meaning "to sojourn", "to inhabit" refers to an alien, a stranger, or an immigrant relating the very meaning of stranger with the one of inhabitation, without owning: "the *ger* is the inhabiting stranger the one that dwells? in the furrow of the separation of the earth recognised as inappropriable without

being owned" (Di Cesare 2018, p. 218). A territorial perspective, a spatial outlook on integration casts cities, neighbourhoods and communities, not only as sites of refuge, but as spaces where rights can be produced—spaces where the 'struggle' for integration takes place. Spatializing integration means therefore speaking of cohabitation and city-making, so well depicted in Petti's analysis of Dheisheh (Petti 2017) and in Maqusi's reflection (Maqusi 2017) on the inherent spatial violations of such making. In the opening speech of the Academic Year in Rome, recently, Giorgio Agamben asked: "What could have been the historical *a priori*, the *arche'*, of today's modern architecture?" (Agamben 2019). In answering, he posits that "architecture exists because man is a dwelling entity, a dweller and an inhabitant" and therefore the connection between building and dwelling is the possible historical *a priori* of architecture and the condition of its possibility. Following his usual archaeological linguistic method, Agamben suggests with Benveniste that Indo-European culture has overlapped two definitions that are and should remain completely separated: on the one side, the "*casa abitazione*", the house as dwelling, which is intended as social entity (the Latin *domus*), the place of the family and the *gens*; and on the other the "*casa edificio*", the house as building (the Latin *aedes*). Even if the two notions can coincide in the space, they express two distinct realities. In Benveniste's words, "the usages of *domus* in Latin exclude all allusion to construction" (Benveniste 1973, p. 631) as *domi* means being at home but in the sense that characterizes *domus* as a family, a social and moral notion, and therefore more attuned to a form of building relations and belonging.

Agamben brings into the picture again Heidegger's *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* 1951 conference text, which somehow argues the opposite of Benveniste—that the real meaning of the German verb *bauen* (building) is to dwell and therefore building and dwelling cannot be separated. Building as dwelling, that is, as being on the earth, however, remains for man's everyday experience that which is from the outset "habitual"—we inhabit it. Why is this important for our reflection here? Agamben suggests that the historical *a priori* is the "impossibility or the incapacity" of dwelling for the contemporary human, and, consequently, for architects, it is impossible to break down the relationship between "the art of building and the art of dwelling" creating the conditions for the emergence of what Ivan Illich called "disabling professions" (Illich 1977, p. 12)—the act of monopolising an activity, expropriating an individual from their capacity, in this case of building inhabitations. This impossibility of building and dwelling is the essence of the camp. Recalling that Auschwitz was built by Karl Bischoff, an architect, who, in October 1941, drew up the first master plan for a facility designed to hold 97,000 inmates, with Fritz Ertl—a graduate of the Bauhaus—Agamben asks: "how could it be possible that an architect [. . .] built a structure in which under no circumstances was it possible to dwell, in the original sense of being at home [. . .] building the perfect place of the impossibility of inhabitation" (Agamben 2019). With this example, he portrays how "architecture at present is facing the historical condition of building the inhabitable" (ibid.). With no inhabitation, only building is possible.

Gray's critique of the camp as pure oppression and exclusion is pertinent in the light of the impossibility of inhabitation, but, at the same time, the improvised poleis-in-exile forms and the 'cohabitation' experiences in Petti's work suggest that the inhabitant then is being situated in a world in which multiple experiences of abandonment, refusal, but also emancipation, invention and experimentation play out. All gestures of concretization indicate that whatever does exist in 'urban' life points to something else. The necessity, then, with the disruptive introduction of the term inhabitation, is to redefine an ethical relationship with space, as a space of and for life. As I have argued elsewhere (Boano 2017), Agamben sees life as the basis for a new ethics, reversing its status as a productive and active force. Life is experienced as a threshold: between speech and noise, political life and nude life, human and animal. Gray's historical excavation and that of some Catalysts in the volume, rather than destroying or deconstructing oppositions between inclusion and exclusion, oppression and emancipation, citizenship and non-citizenship, formal and informal, and camp and non-camp, suggest a new ethics of the camp. This is found not by including forms of excluded life, but instead by "occupying—in law and language—the zone of indistinction where life is neither silent and passive, nor fully captured in language and actions" (Colebrook and Maxwell 2016, p. 95). The camp, in its

paradigmatic reading, and the form of life it generates, helps us to think beside the exceptional and moves to inhabit such indistinctions.

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Article

It's in the Water: Byzantine Borderlands and the Village War

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Abstract: This essay examines Byzantine military manuals created between the sixth to the tenth centuries for what they can reveal about Byzantine imperial attitudes toward the landscapes of war and those who inhabit them. Of foremost concern in these sources is the maintenance of 'security' (Greek: *asphaleia*) by commanders with the necessary quality of 'experience' (Greek: *peira*). Experience meant knowing how to best exploit the land, including the villages under Byzantine authority, in the prosecution of war. Exploitation in the name of security involved destroying villages, using villages and their inhabitants in ambushes, poisoning and seizing crops, evacuating villages, and using villages for the billeting of, at times undisciplined, soldiers. Villages were thus central to a Byzantine military strategy that is identified here as the 'village war,' a strategy that is analogous to security strategies evident in more recent conflicts. Through the juxtaposition of premodern and modern modalities of war, this essay intends to be a pointed reminder that the village war has deep roots in imperialist thought, and that the consequences of the village war profoundly reshape the lives of those caught up in its midst, particularly the peasantry.

Keywords: borderland; Byzantine empire; experience; Goths; imperialism; Islamic State; peasant; Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite; rural; security; Theophanes the Confessor; village; warfare

1. 'We Can Never Go Back to Our Village, or We Will Die'

By the beginning of August, 2014, Islamic State (IS) had taken the city of Sinjar and pillaged the surrounding villages in northwestern Iraq. The scale of this disaster shocked the world. As they stormed into Yazidi villages, IS fighters took thousands of women and children captive. Tens of thousands of Yazidi refugees fled their homes, squeezing themselves and whatever they could carry onto pickup trucks and tractors. These caravans of people fleeing crowded the roads across Kurdistan. Thousands sought refuge on the Yazidi holy mountain, Mount Sinjar. The mountain was barren; especially troubling was the fact that the only available water came from shallow streams. To quench the thirst of their children, it was reported that parents resorted to spitting in their mouths. Increasing numbers escaped into territory controlled by Kurdish militias only to find themselves living in makeshift camps. One thing was clear. Even as children begged to go home, they were met by the resignation of their parents. As one father said, 'We can never go back to our village, or we will die.' Meanwhile, fearing the collapse of nearby Erbil and the Kurdish bulwark against IS, President Obama authorized the delivery of relief by military aircraft: bombs for the militants and food for the refugees. More devastation followed. By summer 2015, one million people, many from this region, boarded rickety boats and crossed into Europe, and since then thousands of men, women, and children have died in the attempt.[1]

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[1] Quotation: Rubin (2014); US bombing campaign: Landler et al. (2014); Captives: Shefler (2014). Number of deaths: Missing Migrants Project (2013–2018).

Sinjar was an international story. The world watched in horror as journalists captured images of people gathered on this desolate mountain top and filed reports about the banality of massacre and slavery for IS militants as they moved their battle forces across the frontier zone between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. We want to believe that there is something essentially premodern and nonwestern about IS and its tactics. They are the new barbarians standing at the gates of the capitalist world system. But thinking thus is to engage in a sort of 'mnemonic myopia.'[2] In fact, this is an old story told through new media. Reflection on the past turns the specificity of the present horror into the sad recognition that these habits of degradation have haunted humanity for thousands of years. Interstate warfare is played out in borderlands, its theatre of combat focused on villages, its victims peasants, its signature streams of refugees. These displacements of war are, to borrow a phrase from a journalist covering more recent conflicts, part of the nervous system of people in war zones.[3] Moreover, the catalyst contributions for this Special Issue invite us to see that the displacements of war become an inheritance passed on from one generation to the next, a 'refugee heritage' that redefines what it means to say that you are home—a condition of being from places that you can not return to, and of living in places that are not your own.[4]

At the same time that IS fighters are being denounced as unthinkable barbarians, there has been a growing nostalgia for western imperialism. A chorus of apologists for the European empires of the past and the brutal machinery of colonial exploitation is becoming increasingly heard in public discourse.[5] The purpose of this essay is a reminder of the simple fact that imperialist and authoritarian regimes have always established their authority by controlling the countryside and its inhabitants. To illustrate this point, this essay looks for the displacements of war in the Byzantine borderlands, focusing roughly on the same region afflicted by IS and the ambitions of a long list of combatants that stretches from the present into the distant past: western Asia along the borderlands of the modern states of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. I would like to chart the difference between the perceptions that Byzantine imperial actors had of the borderlands and their inhabitants, and the consequences of these perceptions for the peasantry.[6] This investigation is particularly interested in how the deployment of ideologically charged words like 'strategy,' 'experience,' and 'security,' created the necessary conditions for the destruction of villages and the routine displacement of villagers from their homes.

The sources for this essay are a series of military manuals written by Byzantine army commanders first in the late sixth century and then again in the tenth century.[7] They are part of a long Graeco-Roman tradition of writing about strategy. In this sense, the military manuals are in places derivative and as a whole prescriptive, setting forth what ought to be done rather than describing particular situations. They were written in simple Greek prose and made for the practical instruction of those going into the theatre of war. They are not field reports, nor do they record the voices of those most affected by war—the peasantry. It is also worth pointing out that the Byzantine polity changed dramatically between the sixth and tenth centuries, as did its adversaries. These changes included the size of Byzantine territory, supplying the army, the recruitment of soldiers, the organization of provinces, and the challenges to the emperor's claims on territory, especially the establishment of Islamic polities in the seventh century along the Mediterranean littoral and the more or less permanent state of warfare

2   Zerubavel (2003, p. 92).
3   Prashad (2017b).
4   See especially the contributions by Petti (2017); Dalal (2017); Maqusi (2017).
5   Emblematic is the heated exchange between Niall Ferguson and Pankaj Mishra in the *London Review of Books*, 3 November 2011: https://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n21/pankaj-mishra/watch-this-man. More recently, the journal *Third World Quarterly* published and later retracted a highly flawed essay titled 'The Case for Colonialism.' See Prashad (2017a); Andrews (2016) and Tripathi (2018) report on the growth of colonial and imperial nostalgia in the UK. Colonial and imperial nostalgia is also percolating elsewhere, for example, in Turkey, the United States, and Russia.
6   The real and imagined frontiers between Byzantium and *dâr al-Islâm* has been discussed in Eger (2015, pp. 1–21). Further views of Byzantium, borderlands, and warfare in this period: El-Cheikh (2004, pp. 83–93).
7   See (Dain 1967; Dennis 1981, pp. 13–42; Dennis 1984, pp. vii–xxiii; Dennis 1985, pp. 1–7, 137–41, 241–44).

that ensued.[8] Despite the limitations of the sources and the many significant changes that affected Byzantine governance in these centuries, the military manuals are nevertheless consistent in showing that one of the primary concerns of combatants on either side of the Byzantine frontier were the villages of the homeland.[9]

2. Defending Romanía: Experience, Security, and Landscape

For Byzantine military commanders, the battlefield was a theatre in which reason and experience led to a successful performance of one's role as defender of the homeland. This homeland is described in different terms, but it is often portrayed as a territory with knowable boundaries, and subject to the sacred authority of the emperor in Constantinople.[10] The opening lines of the late sixth-century *Stratêgikon*, which is attributed to the emperor Maurikios, state that the work was undertaken through 'devotion to the *politeia*' (*pros tên politeian hormêthentes*).[11] In the tenth-century *Peri Paradromês* (On Skirmishing), the homeland is called Romanía; 'our regions' (*chôrai*) are specified as opposed to their *chôra*, and these regions have discernable 'boundaries' (*akra*).[12] Another manual points to 'those who dwell on the borders of the Roman realm (*akra tês Rhômaiôn archês*) and have our enemies as neighbours.'[13] Ringed about by neighbours like these, this latter-day Roman empire needed officers up to the task. The military manuals enumerate the best qualities that commanders should demonstrate. 'Inexperience' (*apeira*) leads to disaster while 'experience' (*peira*) is fundamental for acquiring better knowledge of tactics, success, and the landscapes of war.[14] Like other late Roman officials, the commander should exemplify justice and judgment through his simple mode of life and the deliberate ways in which he makes difficult decisions. According to the anonymous tenth-century *Peri Stratêgias* (On Strategy), 'the general should be courageous in his resolve (*andreion têi gnômêi*), naturally suited for command, profound in his thinking, sound in his judgment, in good physical condition, hardworking, emotionally stable.'[15] These qualities would allow the commander to successfully lead the army on campaign. But success, we are repeatedly told, was ultimately in divine hands. The battlefield was thus also a place where the slaughter of the enemy and the plundering of their territory was evidence of both the commander's experience and the favour of the Christian god and the Virgin Mary.[16]

For what follows, it is important to see the campaigning army as an officially sanctioned mobile population consisting of multiple battle units, a baggage train, slaves, and at times the family members of the soldiers, including children.[17] Indeed, the military manuals sometimes call the soldiers *oikeioi*: while on the march the soldiers (*oikeioi*) were thus considered as dependents within the commander's

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8   Haldon (1999) expertly surveys these changes. It is not my intention here to lay out with precision how these many fundamental changes in the constitution and deployment of the Byzantine army affected the treatment of rural populations inside and outside the borderlands of the empire. For discussions of these changes, see (Grosse 1975; Haldon and Kennedy 1980; Kaegi 1981, 1982; Haldon 1995a, 1995b; McGeer 1995; Treadgold 1995; Krsmanović 2008; Eger 2015).

9   McGeer (1991).

10 Kaldellis (2017).

11 *Stratêgikon* Praef. (Dennis 1981; Dennis 1984).

12 Romanía, 'our *chôrai*,' and theirs: *Peri Paradromês* 4, 7, 20 (Dennis 1985). Boundaries (*akra* or *akrai*) of themes: *Peri Paradromês* 2. Borderlands: *Peri Paradromês* 3, 6, 7.

13 [*Anônymou Biblion taktikon*] [28] (Dennis 1985).

14 *Stratêgikon* Praef.

15 For officials: Anon. *Peri Stratêgias* 3 (Dennis 1985); for generals: Anon. *Peri Stratêgias* 4 (adapted trans.).

16 *Stratêgikon*, Praef. Dennis (2001) strongly asserts that Byzantium waged war with extreme caution. In spite of references like this one, which discuss waging war in the name of the Virgin (e.g., Evagrius Scholasticus, *HE* 4.24), Dennis argues that Byzantines did not think of their wars as 'holy wars.' Of course this is a definitional problem subject to different interpretations. It is not my intention here to argue that the routinized forms of frontier maintenance reflected in the military manuals were thought of as somehow 'holy.' One can certainly observe that Byzantine religious ideology pervades the military manuals, energizing and justifying military action.

17 Children: *Stratêgikon* 5.1.

household (*oikos*).[18] As this military household and its *pater*-commander moved through a landscape dotted with villages (*chôria*), it was assumed that the soldiers would regularly need to find and procure food, water, and other supplies. This necessity was also included in the commander's performance of his knowledge and experience. According to the *Stratêgikon*, 'The general should know [*katanoeitô*] the country [*chôrion*] well, whether it is healthy or safe or unhealthy for his troops and inhospitable, and whether the necessities such as water, wood, and forage are nearby.'[19] Advice fills the manuals for how, and under which circumstances, to procure resources from friend and foe.

In this type of thinking, then, Romanía was a collection of *chôrai* and *chôria*. This suggests that the Byzantine polity and those imbued with authority at the local level, including commanders, viewed territory as a patchwork of privately held blocks of farmland (*chôrai*) and villages (*chôria*). While Byzantine law accounted for the fact that the countryside was a complex location of economic interactions, consisting of free peasants as well as landlords and their tenants, the military manuals depict them not so much imbedded in a functioning rural society as a simplified realm of villages and villagers dependent on Byzantine commanders.[20] Defining territory in these ways and assigning its defence to commanders with a set of qualities that emphasized above all 'experience' relegated the landscape and its inhabitants into the strategic category of 'security' (*asphaleia*). Villages, villagers, and farmland were material and human resources. As security matters, they were thus analogous to other matters of concern that attracted the same vocabulary of care (*asphaleia*) in the military manuals: the baggage train, the children of soldiers, the army, enemy deserters, the army camp, critical resources like water while the army is under siege.[21] In contrast, we are told that only inexperienced commanders and undisciplined blonde-haired barbarians like the Franks and Lombards neglected this regime of security (*asphaleia*).[22]

3. The Village War

Maintaining the security of villages and devastating those of the enemy meant that the village was the heart of the on-going conflicts between Byzantium and its neighbours. Targeting civilians in this way was not collateral damage, an unintended consequence of war; instead, we will see that the strategic centrality of villages in the prosecution of warfare constituted what I will call throughout this essay the 'village war.' This term, the 'village war,' emerged in scholarship on the American War in Vietnam, initially to describe the infiltration of villages by nationalist revolutionary insurgents fighting against the government of South Vietnam in the opening years of the 1960s. Just as the village constituted the source of support and ideological justification for the insurgency, U.S. advisors and military personnel likewise saw the village as the focus of counter-insurgency tactics. For all sides in this conflict, dreaming of victory necessitated protecting villages, relocating villages into defensible zones, or utterly destroying villages.[23] It doesn't take much effort to find analogous examples from other conflicts. For imperialists, securing the state and its colonies has often involved gazing into the countryside to see where dangers would emerge. When empires sense that they are crumbling in their borderlands, however borderlands are defined, peasants usually pay the bitterest price with their lives, livestock, and futures.[24] We will see that for Byzantine imperialists, like

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18 Soldiers as kin (*oikeioi*): *Stratêgikon*, 8.1.16, 8.2.75.
19 *Stratêgikon*, 8.2.75.
20 For Byzantine law and provincial society, see (Haldon 1990, pp. 125–72; Neville 2004).
21 *Stratêgikon*, 5.1, 7.B.12, 7.B.13, 8.1.34, 8.2.36, 8.2.56, 10.3.
22 *Stratêgikon*, 11.3.
23 As far as I know, Andrews (1973) coined the term 'village war' narrowly to describe the nature of the communist insurgency against the south Vietnamese government. Published in 1973, Andrew's *Village War* is partisan in decrying the communist 'village war' as a tyrannical attack against 'freedom.' Bergerud (2011), however, has widened the concept of the 'village war' to include the ideological and strategic importance of villages in the American war in Vietnam for all sides of the conflict.
24 Illuminating is Drohan (2017, pp. 81–113) on British brutality in the quelling of the Nasserite Radfan revolt in the colony of Aden in the early 1960s. Drohan dubs this the 'hunger war.' We will see that there are conceptual affinities between a 'village war' and a 'hunger war.'

the authors of the military manuals, villages were the location of military essentials, such as grain, livestock, and horses; they supplied manpower for ad hoc militias and the setting for ingenious traps; they were the source of intelligence on the movements of the enemy; and their endangerment and security exemplified Byzantium's message of imperialist benevolence. To be sure, Byzantine military commanders did not attempt to fundamentally alter peasant society by infiltrating villages, eliminating their leadership and replacing it with nationalist ideologues. However, Byzantine frontier strategy assumed a symbiosis between the military and the peasantry: the village supplied resources and subjected itself to the directives of the emperor and his representatives in exchange for security from predatory extra-territorial enemies. As we will see, security is in the eye of the beholder.

Let us first turn to the ways in which the Byzantine polity attempted to protect villages from its own military forces. The mobile household of the commander and his army demonstrated its care for the 'people of the villages,' their flocks, and property in a variety of ways. The manuals insist on the legal duty and strategic importance of protecting local populations against unintentional harm. The anonymous sixth-century treatise, *Peri Stratêgias*, states with utter confidence: 'The person who wants to wage war against an enemy must first make sure that his own lands [*ta oikeia*] are secure [*en asphaleia*]. By secure [*asphaleian*] I mean not only the security of the army but of the cities [*poleis*] and the entire country [*chôras*], so that the people who live there [*oikêtoras*] may suffer no harm at all from the enemy.'[25] The enemy was not the only concern. A major source of danger came from the army itself. The *Stratêgikon* mandates that soldiers who cause injury to the taxpayer (*syntelestês*) should be forced to pay fair compensation. In contrast to those legally tied to the land (*coloni*), these taxpayers were free property owners and enjoyed elevated status in their local communities.[26] These damages involved the illegal rustling of livestock or the unnecessary destruction of fields. Particular care should be taken, the *Stratêgikon* continues, for 'cultivated fields' (*geôrgêthentôn topôn*) of the 'taxpayers' (*hypoteleis*). Thus the commander should see to it that each of his divisions marched through the fields one by one. In this way, the 'security of the farmer' (*tou geôrgiou to asphales*) would be ensured.[27]

So much for unintentional harm to the rural population at the hands of Byzantine soldiers. The strategic importance of security, as defined in official discourse, also meant that Byzantine commanders intentionally caused harm or allowed villages and their inhabitants to be harmed. The military manuals abound in such situations. They reveal that the world of the 'people of the villages' was characterized by loss of property, death, and forced mobility, and not just because of the risks that regularly characterize peasant life, such as pests, drought, and food crisis.[28] Villages were prime targets in times of war, especially during the harvest season in late summer.[29] Securing villages and the ripening crops around them raised the possibility of displacing villagers. In some situations, villages (*chôria*) were notified in advance of an enemy assault. The tenth-century *Peri Paradromês* calls those tasked with organizing these emergency measures *ekspêlatores* (Latin: *expîlatores*). They were to direct the evacuees to take themselves and their animals to seek refuge in mountain fortresses or fortified cities.[30] But these evacuees could be turned away from the fortresses and fortified cities that were at least nominally there to protect them and their property. Those deemed 'useless' (*achrêston*) to the military campaign would be forced to continue their miserable journey and seek refuge elsewhere, depending on the amount of supplies on hand to support the soldiers. The 'useless' included the most vulnerable: women, the elderly, and children.[31] In other cases, there was no time to organize an evacuation. Commanders were therefore advised to shadow the hostile army, harassing it with feinted engagements, especially at night: 'In this way the enemy will be very much aware that the

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25 *Peri Stratêgias* 5.
26 Laniado (1996, pp. 30–32).
27 *Stratêgikon*, 1.9.
28 Garnsey (1988, pp. 8–39).
29 *Peri Paradromês* 7. See (Dennis 1985, p. 165, n. 1).
30 *Peri Paradromês* 2, 8, 12, 20, 22.
31 *Stratêgikon*, 10.3.

general is following them, and they will hold back and will not dare ride out at all and attack the villages [*chôriôn*]. By such procedures he will save the villagers from impending assault and from captivity, and they shall keep their freedom.'[32] This was the best possible scenario: no displacement, no death, no damage to property. Those who did lose their freedom were dragged back toward the frontier to be exploited for labour, ransom, and information.[33] When possible, these captives and their possessions were rescued as the Byzantine army pursued and ambushed the homeward-bound enemy.[34] At the same time, the care for locals was met with a degree of callousness. Locals would know if the Byzantine army was in the area. If some were captured by the enemy, that would be acceptable, for the enemy would come to know from these captive peasants what he was up against. The enemy might then become fearful and reconsider his assault.[35]

For Byzantine commanders and their enemies, villages could be the location of danger. Even a friendly village could harbour enemy spies (*kataskopoi*).[36] They could also be the location where commanders could demonstrate their skill. Although, as we saw above, the 'security of the farmer' was a strategic concern, their evacuated villages were another matter. They presented commanders with multiple opportunities for ambuscade, and thus the village became the proxy battleground for competing armies. This is most vividly described in the tenth-century *Peri Paradromês*, where the predominant concern of the treatise is small-scale, rapidly executed engagements with Muslim armies of the Hamdanid emirate of Aleppo.[37] Detachments of mounted soldiers—up to one hundred or so are recommended—were to hide in strategic locations outside the village. High places like hills and mountains were best, and patience was essential. From there, they could observe the enemy riding into a village. When the enemy had dismounted and began plundering the houses in search of food, coins, and other supplies, the Byzantine horsemen were to charge into the village and kill and take captive as many of the raiding party as possible. Furthermore, as the enemy took flight toward the emir's main encampment, they would encounter more Byzantine soldiers lying in wait, and more death would follow.[38] The same treatise assures the reader that this advice was born of 'experience' (*peira*), but adds the reminder that the commander's success was dependent ultimately on the favour of god.[39]

This use of villages as the site for predation, abduction, and ambuscade was routine for both the Byzantine army and its enemies. As the commanders moved through the Byzantine borderlands, exercising their 'experience and courage,' these dangers and displacements constituted the normal course of life for settled populations for whom these laudable qualities of leadership did not compensate for the loss of home, property, and life. In addition to being a source of booty, evacuated villages were used as ersatz camps for Byzantine troops, and their houses could be mined for essential resources. Thus the *Peri Paradromês* advises commanders to torch friendly villages, especially in areas where trees were scarce, to prevent their wooden roofs from being dismantled and used by the enemy.[40] Perhaps the most familiar form that the strategic destruction of village life took was the practice of intentionally ruining crops.[41] Building a fortress could have devastating local consequences. According to the *Stratêgikon*, 'If it is summer the crops in the vicinity should be burned, but if this is difficult to do, destroy them some other way.'[42] In areas surrounding fortresses, the aim was to draw as many resources as possible into the fortresses, thus turning a fertile landscape into a wasteland. Livestock was rounded up and Byzantine soldiers destroyed whatever remaining provisions were in

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32 *Peri Paradromês* 12.
33 Morony (2004) discusses population transfers in the sixth and seventh centuries.
34 *Peri Paradromês* 10.
35 *Peri Paradromês* 6.
36 *Stratêgikon*, 10.3.
37 See (Haldon and Kennedy 1980; Haldon 1999, pp. 176–81; El-Cheikh 2004, pp. 166–67).
38 *Peri Paradromês* 10–11.
39 *Peri Paradromês* 16–17.
40 *Peri Paradromês* 21.
41 Hughes (2014, pp. 152–56) strangely downplays the effectiveness of these forms of 'environmental warfare.'
42 *Stratêgikon*, 10.4.

the area, so that there was nothing left for the enemy to use.[43] Moreover, this view of the landscape as potentially treasonous was paradigmatic. The *Peri Stratêgias* points to Justinian's famous commander, Belisarios: 'When the enemy was so large that he was unable to face up to it, he would destroy the provisions in the area before they appeared.'[44]

Treating one's own landscape as potentially treasonous or the enemy's as potentially malevolent meant creating certain illusions. Whereas burned villages and fields were an obvious sign to the enemy that the landscape would be unyielding and the going difficult, there were less obvious ways of turning the landscape itself against the enemy—and of further endangering rural populations in the name of security. States and paramilitary forces have routinely employed officially sanctioned, if sometimes covert, forms of terrorism such as poisoning sources of water and crops. Today, this is denounced by the international community as chemical warfare, even as it continues into the present. But in the military manuals, the practice is chillingly both recommended and unremarkable. The *Stratêgikon* mentions this form of 'chemical warfare' twice. In the first instance, the treatise recommends employing the tactic while campaigning in enemy territory: 'The general must make plans to defeat the enemy not only by arms but also through their grain and drink [*dia sitiôn kai hydatos*], making the water unfit to drink and poisoning the grain. He must also know how we can protect ourselves against such measures and how we can avoid falling victim to them.'[45] While the treatise doesn't elaborate on how precisely to poison these resources, it does suggest how to determine if looted foodstuffs had been contaminated: 'Any wine or bread [*arton*] found locally should not be drunk or eaten before it has been tested by giving it to prisoners [*aichmalôtôn*] . . . Water from wells,' the author continues, 'should not be drunk for it will often have been poisoned [*pharmakois*].'[46]

This potentially lethal use of local captives in this way is mirrored in other forms of subterfuge involving the rural population. The *Peri Paradromês* describes an elaborate ruse led by a 'brave and very experienced man' (*andreion kai empeirotaton*) to draw the enemy into an ambush. He would assemble a team of up to twenty men. Some would be soldiers, some would be true farmers and shepherds, but all of them would be dressed as farmers, in particular as peasant watchmen (*oikophylakes*). This peasant masquerade required attention to detail. Their heads were to be uncovered, they would carry short staffs, and a few of them should be barefoot. The plan was for them to pretend to be non-combatants riding on horseback from village to village to round up cattle, horses, and mules and bring them to a fortified location. This stream of refugees (though some of the locals would have been refugees in actuality), and their precious livestock would draw the attention of the enemy. With the enemy taking the bait and charging in the direction of the ambush, the unarmed men dressed as farmers and peasant watchmen would lead the enemy right into the trap.[47] It is unclear from this example if such operations were common and what effect they had on the image of the farmer for Byzantine soldiers and their enemies. At least one of the other treatises recommends another similar masquerade, this one involving dressing soldiers as 'servants' (*hypourgoi*) and mixing themselves among actual servants.[48] Byzantine commanders did, however, endeavour to sow conflict within rural communities in enemy territory by turning peasants against local elites. According to the *Stratêgikon*, 'A way of arousing

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[43] *Stratêgikon*, 10.2.

[44] *Peri Stratêgias* [33].

[45] *Stratêgikon*, 8.2.99 (trans. adapted).

[46] *Stratêgikon*, 9.3 (trans. adapted). 'Captive' is also an acceptable translation for *aichmalôtos*, suggesting that these prisoners could well have been local non-combatants in enemy territory and not necessarily enemy soldiers. Here, the *Stratêgikon* also gives a historical example of when a Byzantine army was successfully duped into feeding barley, poisoned by Sasanian forces, to their horses with disastrous consequences. The *Chronicle* of John of Nikiu, chapter 96, elaborates on this episode.

[47] *Peri Paradromês* 21. It is unclear what is meant by *oikophylax* in this passage. Dennis translates the term as 'steward' and 'peasant steward.' Its usage here suggests not a village official or a free peasant household head, but rather a servant in charge of managing the day-to-day duties of an individual farm. For the *oikophylax* as a city official equivalent to an *oikonomos* in the epigraphy of Asia Minor, see Kern (1915). For the application of this title to a 'slave steward,' see Robert (1984, p. 484, n. 79).

[48] [*Anônymou Biblion taktikon*] [23].

discord and suspicion among the enemy is to refrain from burning and plundering the estates [*chôria*] of certain prominent men [*episêmôn*] on their side and of them alone.'[49]

4. 'The State of Affairs Was No Less Grievous Than Captivity'

The military manuals discussed here only provide the view that military officials had of the landscapes of war and the rural population. For these men, 'security' necessitated a predatory relationship with respect to the rural populations on either side of the frontier. What we lack is the peasant point of view. We find hints in other forms of writing that confirms the obvious: rural populations have always been wary of state institutions, policies, and actions, especially when policies directly intrude in village life in the ways described above.

While there is limited evidence that shows peasants could be enrolled and fight in local militias,[50] we are more often met with anecdotes and editorializing commentary that illustrate the point that those living in Byzantine territory sometimes experienced the presence of the Byzantine army as a hostile occupation, and that the knock-on effects of war in one region dramatically affected the lives of those living elsewhere. In the early ninth century, the Byzantine borderlands to the north were extremely troublesome. By 812/13, the Bulgar Krum (Greek: Kroummos) had succeeded in making deep raids into Byzantine Thrace. The recently inaugurated emperor Michaêl I (811–813) amassed thousands of troops along the Thracian border from the whole empire. This sparked discontent, according to the chronicle of Theophanes the Confessor, especially among those from the provinces (*themata*) of Kappadokia and Armenia. These discontented and displaced soldiers soon caused devastation to the settled population. Rather than attacking Krum's forces across the frontier, the emperor and his troops rambled through Byzantine Thrace, requisitioning supplies as they went. In the words of Theophanes, 'The presence of such a throng of our fellow-countrymen (*homophulôn*) who lacked supplies and ruined the local inhabitants (*egchôrous*) by rapine and invasion was more grievous than a barbarian attack.'[51] A few years earlier, even worse befell the locals throughout the empire. Theophanes reports that in 809/10 the emperor Nikephoros I (802–811) ordered a mass migration of people from Asia Minor to resettle in Macedonia and Greece in lands until then populated by Slavs. They were forced to sell their lands and property, resulting in misery. According to Theophanes, and allowing for embellishment, the effect for these officially sanctioned refugees was, again, worse than if they had been captured by the enemy: 'This state of affairs was no less grievous than captivity: many in their folly uttered blasphemies and prayed to be invaded by the enemy, others wept by their ancestral tombs and extolled the happiness of the dead; some even hanged themselves to be delivered from such a sorry pass.'[52]

The dislocations of war can be not only physical, psychological, and material, but they can also present themselves along a spectrum of difference. As hinted at above, Byzantine soldiers routinely campaigned alongside those from different regions of the empire. They also dealt with local populations whose religions and languages were distinct from their own. This was not always a welcome encounter. Though preceding the world evoked by the Byzantine military manuals and focusing on the occupation of a city and its hinterland, the Syriac chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite illuminates the pitfalls of hosting foreign troops in the name of security. The chronicle narrates the Byzantine occupation of his hometown Edessa in upper Mesopotamia (modern Şanlıurfa in southeastern Turkey) in 506. The emperor Anastasios amassed troops in this region to halt the advance of the Sasanian Persian army into the eastern frontier. For Joshua and the Syriac-speakers of Edessa, the Byzantine soldiers were foreigners: they were 'Romans' (*Rhomâyê*) and 'Goths' (*Gôṯâyê*).

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[49] *Stratêgikon*, 8.1.20.
[50] Theophanes, *Chronographia* AM 6201 (De Boor 1883–1885; Mango and Scott 1997). In this case, the peasant milita (referred to as *meta ... geôrgikou laou chôrikoboêtheias*) failed miserably, resulting in the Arab capture of the city of Tyana and the enslavement of some of its inhabitants. Discussed in Eger (2015, p. 251).
[51] Theophanes, *Chronographia* AM 6305.
[52] Theophanes, *Chronographia* AM 6302.

The 'Roman' soldiers forced locals to draw water for them; the 'Romans' forced bakers to bake hardtack and bread at their own cost; the 'Romans' had more food, drink, and clothing than the locals. Even worse was the unrestrained behaviour of the 'Goths.' The 'Goths' seized beds and stripped off clothing from people, rounded up cattle, and plundered stores of provisions, including olive oil, wood, salt, and vegetables. They raped local women, administered unjustified beatings, and even committed murder with impunity. These foreign soldiers occupied not just the city of Edessa, but also the surrounding territory where they were billeted in villages and monasteries. Here, they rounded up cattle and abused farmers who dared to harvest their crops. All of this contributed to Joshua's condemnation of his age as 'evil times.'[53]

These humiliations at the hands of Byzantine troops and their Gothic mercenaries were part of the storehouse of local memory. For Edessan Christians, this was just the latest example of foreign military saviours who brought destruction in the name of security.[54] Just as Theophanes characterized the presence of the Byzantine army as a barbarian captivity, Joshua tells the addressee of his chronicle: 'you must be aware that when those who came to our assistance ostensibly as saviours . . . , they looted us in a manner little short of enemies.'[55] The repetition of this sentiment in Greek and Syriac sources was perhaps drawn from a well of popular discontent that called into question the paternalism that pervades the Byzantine military manuals. While we have to rely on local elites like Joshua and monastic elites like Theophanes for reports on peasant reactions to Byzantine military operations, it is easy to find similar reactions among those who currently live in the shadow of foreign military bases and occupying forces. The recent opening of the massive US Army Garrison Humphreys just south of Seoul, South Korea has reignited decades-long protests against the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula. These protests have repeatedly been focused on the local cost of hosting an allied power in the name of security. As a Korean academic recently put it, 'Even if, at the end of the day, you think bases are there to provide stability and security—we think about national security, but what about human security or, at the very local level, what cost was it to have this large infrastructure in place? It's all part of the question of who defines peace and security.'[56] Taken together, these voices, though separated by circumstance and a vast chronological chasm, invite us to look for and imagine the ways in which peasants themselves thought of the landscapes of war differently than their masters and saviours.

5. The Beekeeper of Dohuk

One could conclude that *some* of what has been detailed above, especially the targeting of civilian populations in the name of imperial security, has to do with the type of extreme situations that the Geneva Conventions condemn. The Geneva Conventions were written with the assumption that war often results in the death and dislocation of civilians. These strictures, however, are only effective in highlighting (in a highly selective manner) the persistence of civilians being targeted by state and paramilitary armies. They rarely mitigate the ingrained habits of war that so often demand senseless violence against those ill equipped to resist soldiers with modern weaponry. Modern warfare, with its drones and precision bombs, has not spared villages and villagers. Indeed, even as I write these words, the village war continues without end. In the not so distant past in Algeria, Vietnam, and Bosnia; more recently in occupied Palestine, in the Kurdish regions of northern Syria and Iraq, in the Saudi-US war against the Shia rebels of Yemen, in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, in Niger and Somalia, and in many

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[53] Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite, *Chronicle* 39, 52, 54, 70, 77, 86, 93, 96, 101 (Wright 1882; Trombley and Watt 2000); Jones (1986, 1:629 n. 45) comments on Pseudo-Joshua's account of forced bread baking. Analogous is the report found in the Syriac *Chronicle of Zuqnîn* on the rapacious and destabilizing treatment by Muslim administrators of Syrian Christian villages in the last half of the eighth century (Harrack 1999, pp. 289–303).

[54] By the fifth century, Edessan Christians celebrated the legend of a local woman's ill-fated marriage to a Gothic soldier at the end of the fourth century. See *Euphemia and the Goth* (Burkitt 1913).

[55] Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite, *Chronicle* 86.

[56] Letman (2017).

other parts of the world. For those caught up in the violence, the response is to join others seeking refuge and flee the conflict zone.

In the historical period discussed here, the fragility and precarity of rural life was met with a sense of fatalism, but not with passive acceptance.[57] Pseudo-Joshua's chronicle is an extended lamentation: the sins of the people had brought down the heavy hand of divine wrath in the form of plagues, invasions, and humiliations at the hands of would-be Roman saviours.[58] Yet the chronicle also reports individual acts of resistance, such as a family protecting a Roman military official from a murderous band of Goths.[59] There were also other strategies of coping with inter- and intra-communal conflict. Peter Brown has drawn attention to the functioning of Christian holy men and women as arbiters of disputes in the relatively prosperous late Roman villages of the limestone massif in northern Syria, and to sorcerers and accusations of sorcery in the same context.[60] Along the Byzantine frontier, we also find in Sasanian Mesopotamia (what is now northern Iraq) that magicians began inscribing incantations on clay bowls for their clients in the sixth century and continued to do so into the seventh century when the practice fizzled out. The incantations were written in Aramaic, Syriac, Mandaic, Arabic, and Middle Persian, and they were used by Christians, Jews, Manichaeans, Mandaeans, and Zoroastrians.[61] One feature of the incantations is the inclusion of a story (*historiola*). These stories name demons as the source of troubles, and deal with the sudden loss of family members by appealing to angels. The imagery is saturated with the language of war: '[T]he phalanx of demons and the band of no-good-ones were in commotion, the troop of the *dêvs* and the band of the liliths were in commotion. The drum of rebellion groaned, the horn of destruction cried out. The cauldrons boiled over with rage, the great cauldrons of destruction boiled.'[62] The spells also issue threats in the language of war. In one, the evil spirit is told that its fate will be like that of someone displaced by conflict 'you evil spirit, they will ban you and break you and excommunicate you just as mighty fortified cities were broken.' And a few lines later, the evil spirit is ordered to 'be removed and be displaced and go away and depart and be abolished' from its victim.[63]

The incantation bowls and the presence in rural society of men and women charged with holiness as well as these more recent village wars teach us that we need to attune ourselves to how informal, non-state actors are often left with the responsibility of rectifying loss and resolving intra-communal conflict. To do so we need to return to the Yazidis of Mount Sinjar. When the Yazidis, who had managed to escape, began returning to their villages in Kurdish regions of northern Iraq in the winter of 2015, they found pits full of the remains of their families and friends hastily covered with dirt. IS had killed everyone they could, taking only women and children with them as they moved from village to village, eventually taking their victims into Syria.[64] More than six thousand women and children disappeared. With scant help from state actors or supranational and international bodies, the Yazidi survivors have organized their own efforts to locate and liberate the captives. They formed secret networks of spies, operations that have involved posing as door-to-door chocolate sellers and deliverymen for bakeries. In this setting, a beekeeper from the Yazidi village of Dohuk, Abdullah Shrim, found a new calling. His story shows the devastating consequences of village wars. Fifty-six of

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[57] For peasant strategies of resistance in the late empire, from indifference to invasion to revolt, see De Ste. Croix (1981, pp. 474–88); more generally, MacMullen (1974, pp. 1–27); Garnsey (1988, pp. 43–68) discusses peasant survival strategies; Neville (2004, pp. 119–64) the informal ways in which provincial society in the Middle Byzantine period regulated itself.
[58] Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite, *Chronicle* 33, 36, 38, 85–86. See Mazzarino (1966, pp. 58–76) on the 'judgments of God as an historical category.'
[59] Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite, *Chronicle* 94.
[60] (Brown 1970, 1971).
[61] Morony (2003).
[62] Shaked et al. (Shaked et al. 2013, p. 15: MS 2053/159).
[63] Shaked et al. (2013, p. 80: JBA 9, ll. 11, 15).
[64] Shapiro (2015).

his relatives were captured by IS. Since then, he has organized the release of more than three hundred of his fellow Yazidis, each of them requiring the payment of thousands of dollars in ransom.[65]

We will not be able to tell in detail the stories of the Byzantine beekeepers of borderlands that were shared, and contested by, Byzantium and Sasanian Iran or the Islamic polities of the early Middle Ages. But we have to assume nonetheless that peasants picked up the pieces of lives shattered by these regimes and their representatives. For the Byzantine polity, the necessity of maintaining 'security' required conceptualizing the landscape as a zone of possibility consisting of villages. For Byzantine commanders, the quality of 'experience' meant knowing how best to exploit this zone of possibility to forestall large- and small-scale defeats and to secure victory with the least amount of casualties. They did so in part by destroying villages, using them and their inhabitants in ambushes, poisoning and seizing their crops, evacuating them, and using them for the billeting of soldiers. Villages were thus central to a Byzantine military strategy that I have glossed as the 'village war.' Throughout this essay, I have juxtaposed premodern and modern modalities of war as a pointed reminder that the village war is in the water, so to say, of imperialist and nationalist thinking. Ignoring the village war in the past and the present, or attributing its prosecution to a barbarian Other, is to turn a blind eye to those displaced by war, to validate the justification of suffering in the name of security, and to participate in various forms of imperial and colonial nostalgia. To borrow an observation from the historian Santo Mazzarino, empires can be the 'object of infinite love as well as infinite hatred.'[66] This essay has asked us to imagine that the same was as true for those living in the borderlands of the Byzantine empire as it has been for those living in the shadow of empires of the more recent past.

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[65] Arraf (2018).
[66] Mazzarino (1966, p. 51).

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Comment

Comment on Moralee (2018). It's in the Water: Byzantine Borderlands and the Village War. *Humanities* 7: 86

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Abstract: This response to Jason Moralees' article comes from members and associates of the Êzidi (Yazidi) team working on *Sinjar Lives/Shingal Lives*, a community-driven oral history project funded by the UK's Arts and Humanities Research Council. They are all survivors of the Êzidi genocide committed by ISIS in 2014. They explore Moralee's themes of securitisation, imperialism and violence—especially the 'village war', its roots in imperialist thought and its consequences—from the perspective of those who call the village home. Beyond securitisation, they discuss borders both geographical and socio-cultural and the contemporary political significance of the elusive victim voice.

Keywords: Sinjar; Êzidi; ISIS; securitisation; genocide

This response comes from members and associates of the Êzidi (Yazidi) team working on *Sinjar Lives/Shingal Lives*, a community-driven oral history project funded by the UK's Arts and Humanities Research Council. Professor Moralee's article notes the 2014 genocide perpetrated by ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) against the Êzidis, an ethnoreligious community 300,000 strong living around Mount Sinjar (henceforth Shingal, in line with Êzidi naming convention) (Moradi and Anderson 2016; Travis Barber 2021). 3000 Êzidis were massacred and 7000 enslaved. Others perished attempting to escape, stranded on Shingal mountain itself. Almost all were displaced to IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) camps in the Kurdistan region over 100 km away. Facing numerous obstacles, few have been able to return home (Dulz 2016).

Our response consists of an overview of the current context of Shingal, followed by a conversation, conducted on 16 December 2021, between three poets, who are also close friends, from the Êzidi community in Shingal: Zêdan Xelef and Emad Bashar, field directors of the *Shingal Lives* project, and Jaff, a translator and psychologist who works under a mononym.[1] Whereas Zêdan and Jaff grew up in Shingal, Emad lived in Syria as a small child and returned to Shingal aged 11. In conversation with the international coordinators of *Shingal Lives*, Professor Christine Robins (University of Exeter) and Dr Alana Marie Levinson-LaBrosse (American University of Iraq at Sulaimani),[2] they explore Moralee's themes of securitisation, imperialism and violence—especially the 'village war', its roots in imperialist thought and its consequences—from the perspective of those who call the village home. Beyond securitisation, they discuss borders both geographical and socio-cultural and the contemporary political significance of the elusive victim voice.

Less than 10 km from Syria at its nearest point, Shingal Mountain stretches 100 km from east to west above the Nineveh Plain in Iraq, some 150 km north-east of Mosul by road. For Êzidis, it is a holy mountain, its crests and valleys dotted with shrines commemorating divine presence and interventions. Also inscribed on the landscape are narratives of flight and shelter, of Christians, Êzidis and others fleeing the massacres of the late Ottoman period and First World War, particularly after the Armenian genocide of 1915. The new

post-war map placed Shingal in an Iraq under British Mandate, looking out across French Mandatory Syria toward Atatürk's Republic of Turkey. Although the British authorities manipulated Shingali Êzidi leadership disputes, bombing 'rebellious' Êzidi villages,[3] it was in the 1970s that Êzidis felt the full impact of the twentieth-century nation-state, with the Arabisation policies of the Ba'ath régime. Villages were emptied, ecosystems destroyed and populations regrouped into collective settlements (*mujama'at*), whose resources were tightly controlled by the government. Meanwhile, Arabs were settled in non-Arab areas. Formally designated 'Ummayad Arabs', Êzidis were given a religious origin-story unacceptable to many, while Shingal remained a 'left-behind' region with low literacy rates and poor healthcare (Spät 2018, pp. 422–23).

During the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988), Shingal did not suffer the brutality experienced by the regions bordering on Iran; nevertheless, the Arabic-only schooling and media affected the culture of the Kurmanji (Northern Kurdish)-speaking Êzidis. Even after the Gulf War of 1991 led to the creation of the Kurdish autonomous region, Shingal remained under government control. After the Ba'ath régime's end in 2003, Shingal became a disputed territory, contested between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), who considered the Êzidis to be Kurds. Many Shingalis felt co-opted by the KRG as they had been by the Ba'ath, especially since the KRG thwarted their attempts to migrate to the Kurdistan region and benefit from its relative prosperity (Dulz et al. 2008). Meanwhile, security in Iraq deteriorated; Êzidis were persecuted as they travelled to work in Mosul; in 2007, two vehicle bombs in Shingali communities claimed hundreds of victims. Since 2014, reconstruction in Shingal has been delayed by the militarization of the entire zone. Strained relations exist between Iraqi People's militias, KRG *peshmerga* fighting forces and YBŞ (Shingal Protection Units)—Êzidi militias with connections to the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party from Turkey and its ally in Syria, the PYD (People's Protection Units). The situation is further complicated by airstrikes from Turkey, which considers both the PKK and the PYD national threats.[4]

We began with the question of *asphaleia* (security):

Christine: How would you define 'security'?

Zêdan: Security is independence. The state forces our dependence, by destroying our land, resettling us on others' land, resettling us where there is no water except what comes from the state: this way, we can never be secure without the state. But our oral traditions tell us that even before the modern nation-states, Ottoman soldiers did the same to nomadic Êzidi tribes. Êzidis are a small group that has been constantly targeted. I remember seeing Dawoud Bey's photographs from his exhibit, "Night Coming Tenderly, Black", which flipped the idea of dark as bad and white as good; people ran from slavery in darkness because they'd be seen in the light. Êzidis too, maybe all powerless or defeated people, have experienced that feeling that night is more secure than day. In 2014, as we hid [from ISIS] on the mountain, people said, 'Don't walk in big groups, you'll be seen!' We have no better survival skills than our ancestors; there's nothing new: we are still just bodies running, trying to survive.

Jaff: This term 'security' is confusing: secure, safe from what? From yourself, from others, from time, from death? When we talk about security, we should think about our own dignity, freedom and that of others. Where does our own freedom stop and that of others begin? . . . it's complicated. And why feel safe? What is the purpose of feeling safe?

Emad: To be honest, I don't feel safe and I don't think I'll feel safe in the future. In this region, anyone can feel he has the right to kill you based on your religion. You can't express your identity. As Zêdan says, Êzidis worked to be invisible. During my first year at Mosul university, students worked to develop their Arabic so they wouldn't be recognised as Êzidi and get attacked by Al-Qaeda. From 2003 until 2014, everyone going to Mosul put on Arab clothing; even among themselves, they spoke Arabic to further obscure their identity.

Christine: Quoting Theophanes, Professor Moralee describes the violence the Byzantine army inflicted on their own citizens in Thrace as 'more grievous than a barbarian attack.' (Moralee 2018, p. 8). What is your own response to this?

Zêdan: Where I come from, ruling has always been about terrorizing people. After Saddam fell, people thought the region would be de-tyrannized, but it was just tyrannized in a different way, through the Asayish [the Kurdistan Region's security police]. We should feel safe when we see an Asayish officer, or our parents, when they saw a Ba'athist policeman, but no one does. Once, as we played football in the street with my friends, a uniformed squad of red berets holding Kalashnikovs dragged off two of our cousins. Their faces were bleeding. They'd been reported as draft dodgers. But, of course, young people, conscripted, taken from their homes for months on end, forced to fight Iraq's war after war: of course, they ran from the draft. We all would.

Jaff: The Asayish are just a tool the authorities use, to say they're protecting us. As the article says, the authorities have a lexicon of abstract words like 'national security', which they say they protect, but which means nothing to ordinary people. The authorities say 'It's not a problem if many die, we still have our land'. The 'land'—Iraqis say "Iraq", Kurds say "Kurdistan"—is more important than people's lives. When I was about seven, I couldn't do my schoolwork, I was so afraid the Ba'athists would come and get me. The USA arrived and destroyed Saddam Hussein's statues, so I cut his pictures [out of] all our books and burned them.

Emad: As a child, I remember in every Syrian movie the French military said, 'We're here to keep you safe.' Later, in Iraq, I was told Saddam built the *mujamma'at* [collective villages] to give people electricity, schools and water; but I understand now that he wanted people as far as possible from Shingal mountain so he could control them. And then the US army destroyed Saddam and said, 'We're here to save you from the Ba'ath.' In Shingal, the KDP *peshmerga* [militia] forces and Asayish said the same, 'You're part of Kurdistan, we want to save you and protect you.' They promoted their ideology, controlling everything through the community leaders, the police, the checkpoints. In 2014, the PKK and YPG came to Shingal and helped us. Now they refuse to leave. You saved us from ISIS, thank you very much, but this is our home, leave us in peace! But they say, 'We saved you from ISIS, you should embrace our ideology'. Same thing in the IDP camps in the Kurdistan region—the KDP tell people they're protecting them but really they're just keeping them away from Shingal, so they vote in the Kurdistan region. Given Shingal's geographic location, I don't feel positive that it will one day be safe. This could also apply to the whole governorate of Nineveh, as long as Turkey claims the whole area as Turkish. Meanwhile it's a disputed territory within Iraq—the Kurdish government believes it belongs to Kurdistan and the Iraqi government claims it for Iraq.

Marie: So what's happening in the geography is playing out inside each person, who becomes the embodiment of the contested territory.

Zêdan: Even our geography represents the interests of colonial powers! It's not how the region is shaped in terms of identity. Before the modern borders were established, Êzidis travelled as nomads with their flocks, up to summer pastures in what is now present-day Turkey. But internal borders still exist within Shingal itself—families with different political views, the traditional Êzidi 'caste' system of social and religious classes who don't intermarry, and also long-standing segregation between southern and northern parts of the mountain.

Jaff: I don't want to judge only from a political perspective. For me, we can't separate Êzidis from Kurdistan, or from Muslim Kurds . . . but I think the Êzidi community has low self-esteem. People laugh at you if you give your daughter a Kurmanji name like Khunav—they prefer an Arabic name like Nada!

Zêdan: This is a symptom of being Arabized.

Jaff: Of course!

Zêdan: They're unaware of being Arabized because they don't know anything else—they're programmed this way. I grew up listening to Arabic music more than Kurmanji. I hated the Kurmanji *strans* [ballads] and stories! We were programmed like *rats in a lab*, as Charles Simic says—you don't have choice, you're educated the way the system wants.

Emad: For a person to make choices, they need to be in an environment where they have options. Authorities should provide this. But we Êzidis, we also have our own taboos—predominantly against conversion [to Islam], but also against wearing blue, fraternising with Arabs, even—in the past—going to school. Such strict taboos that people were afraid and couldn't disobey. So I don't blame anyone for making poor choices.

Jaff: Why might people want to be in the dark? They don't know how to do anything else. They don't know how to survive. They're waiting for a western country to protect them. They don't have any projects or plans. When someone faces danger, he has three options: fight, flight, or freeze. The Êzidis choose freezing—staying still, doing nothing.

Christine: With all this external and internal control, do you think that victims' voices are heard now? Bearing in mind the success of Nadia Murad[5] and others in speaking to the international community, have we seen a change in victim voices being heard?

Emad: This is something new. Those who compete for international attention need victim testimonies to make their propositions stronger. For example, after a long history of suffering, Kurdistan of Iraq has become a safe zone. So incorporating the story of the Êzidi genocide adds to the KRG's cause. When they approached the international community, they said 'Êzidi Kurds' genocide', not 'the Êzidi genocide'. But the genocide happened because they are Êzidi, not because they are Kurds! The KRG appropriated the victimhood to make themselves stronger—a new style of defeat within a new style of war.[6]

Jaff: The victim voices that survive are the voices of identity. For example, in *stran* [ballads], when the Ottoman army enslaves girls, the singers focus on Êzidi religion or identity, not on experience of slavery. Even now, survivors don't talk about what happened to them as a body, as a person—no, they'll say how painful for them it was to accept Islam. Some of them could have avoided torture or rape [by converting], but they didn't.

Zêdan: Survival as a group was what kept you alive. Many Ezidis lived to keep their religion and culture alive. Not to make money, or do business, just to transmit what they were told. Which is also a purpose, I think.

Jaff: It's always about identity. For minorities, between them and the majority, there are borders—meaning 'you are not me and I cannot be like you.' On this border, there is a kind of anxiety. We always feel unsafe.

Notes

1   Zêdan Xelef is a poet, translator, and culture preservationist who grew up in the Êzîdî community in Shingal. He is a co-creator of the Êzîdî oral history archive, Tew Tew. His work has appeared in Poetry, LARB, Word Without Borders, among others. His chapbook "A Barcode Scanner", was published by Kashkul Books in 2021. He attends the MFA program at San Francisco State University. Emad Bashar is a poet from Shingal. Born in Syria in 1992, he has published two books of poetry, *A Shadow* and *I and you are looking like you*. Jaff, writer and translator, was born in Shingal in 1994.

2   Christine Robins (Christine Allison) published her PhD research in 2001 as *The Yezidi Oral Tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan*. After working at SOAS, London and INALCO, Paris, she came to the Centre for Kurdish Studies at Exeter in 2007 She has worked alongside members of indigenous communities of the region whose culture is endangered, including Êzidis, Mandaeans and Syrian Orthodox Christians.Alana Marie Levinson-LaBrosse is a poet, translator, and assistant professor. She holds a PhD in Kurdish Studies from the University of Exeter. Her writing has appeared, among other places, in *Modern Poetry in Translation*, *World Literature Today*, *In Other Words*, *Plume*, and *Words Without Borders*. Book-length works include Nali's *My Moon Is the Only Moon* (2021) and Pirbal's *The Potato Eaters* (2023). She is Kashkul's Founding Director and a 2022 NEA Fellow, the first ever working from the Kurdish language.

3   For the uprising of Shingali leader Dawûdê Dawûd, see Fuccaro (1999, pp. 96–101); see Allison (2001, pp. 231–34) for an account by Dawûd's son, from Sulaiman and Jindy (1977).

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Recognizing the Delians Displaced after 167/6 BCE

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Abstract: In 167/6 BCE, the Roman senate granted a request from Athens to control the island of Delos. Subsequently, the Delians inhabiting the island were mandated to leave and an Athenian community was installed. Polybius, who records these events, tells us that the Delians left and resettled in Achaea in the Peloponnese. Scholars have tended to focus on Rome's motivations for siding with the Athenians rather than on what happened to the Delians. Furthermore, translations have tended to use the broad terminology of 'migration' to describe the Delians' movement. Comparatively, this contribution suggests that modern categories connected to 'displacement' can help us recover aspects of the Delians' experience. Particularly, a shift to the vocabulary of 'displacement' highlights the creative agency of the Delians in holding the Athenians accountable for their expulsion and in seeking recognition from Rome of their integration into the Achaean state. The application of these modern categories necessitates reflection on differences in the political, institutional landscapes that have shaped the experience of displacement in the ancient Hellenistic and modern contexts, as well as on variations in experience amongst the Delians. Ultimately, recognizing what these individuals experienced within the evolving third-party arbitration system of the ancient world leads us to think about the indirect violence of expanding political institutions in 'globalising' worlds, both ancient and modern.

Keywords: Delos; Delians; *koinon* of the Achaeans; Athens; Roman senate; Polybius; Hellenistic Mediterranean; third-party arbitration; international humanitarian organizations; migration; displacement; refugee; indirect violence; globalisation

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1. The Context of Displacement

After 167/6 BCE, the Delians were expelled from their homes. At the conclusion of what we call the Third Macedonian War, Rome approved Athens' request to control the island of Delos (see Figure 1). Subsequently, the Delians living on the island were mandated to leave.[1] Most scholarly attention to this historical moment has focused on reasons why Rome would curtail Delian independence. Regardless of motivations, however, possibly over one thousand individuals were separated from their homes and common civic institutions.[2] Our histories and translations tend to pass over what these people experienced. Here, therefore, we will pay witness to how the Delians reacted to their expulsion and how they negotiated the political structures that facilitated it.

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[1]   On these series of events, see Polyb. 32.7.1–5; Ferguson (1911, pp. 321–24); Roussel (1916, pp. 7–18); Habicht (1997, pp. 247–49); Buraselis (2016, pp. 149–51).
[2]   On the size of the population of Delos around 167/6 BCE, see Vial (1984, p. 20) and Müller (2017, p. 94).

Figure 1. Map of mainland Greece and Cycladic islands. Map Citation: Ancient World Mapping Center. "À-la-carte". (http://awmc.unc.edu/awmc/applications/alacarte/) (Accessed: 26 July 2018).

I have used the passive voice above to highlight the difficulties of assigning agency for what happened to the Delians. With hindsight, we understand the Delians' expulsion in the context of Roman imperialism expanding throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Rome likely granted Delos to Athens for reasons unrelated to Delian actions but instead related to the nearby island of Rhodes.[3] Translations of relevant passages of Polybius, who records portions of the Delians' experience, have phrased the Delians' movement in terms of 'migration', thereby further obscuring the agencies involved. Instead, if we shift to thinking about the Delians' experience in terms of 'displacement', we highlight the dynamics of agency and recognition in the Delians' response to being outside of a place of belonging.

In fact, the Delians located the cause of their suffering with the Athenians—not the Romans—at least for legal and political purposes. Focusing on this choice to hold the Athenians accountable helps us to understand more fully the roles that agency and recognition had in the Delian response. These two themes are prominent in this volume's Catalyst pieces addressing present-day displacements (e.g., Ribeiro et al. 2017; Maqusi 2017). Observations regarding how movement happens and how states attempt to categorize and control movement in the modern world can help us think through what is at stake to discuss the Delians' case in terms of forced displacement. I am not suggesting that we compare directly ancient and modern cases—they are not the same. Modern categories, such as 'displaced person' and 'refugee', do not have precise parallels in the ancient world, especially in the absence of international humanitarian organizations.

However, political structures and institutions affected movement in the ancient world as well as in the modern context. With attention to differences between the two political, structural landscapes, i.e., the third-party arbitration system of the ancient world and the current international humanitarian aid system, I propose that we can employ modern categories pertaining to forced displacement in our translations and histories in order to generate questions and reflections. However, in doing so, we must be attuned to flattening categories, such as 'displaced person' and 'Delian', and account for different outcomes among individuals negotiating similar contexts. The displaced Delians as a group, especially those individuals who became citizens of the *koinon* of the Achaeans, were relatively well-situated to pursue recognition and recompense for their economic and less tangible losses. Nevertheless, we can

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[3]   Scholars have proposed that Rome may have wanted to hurt financially the nearby island of Rhodes by making Delos a tax-free port, or they view the decision as a more broadly political one intended to limit Rhodes' reach and bolster Roman power. On financial reasons, see Roussel (1916, p. 8); Sippel (1985, pp. 97–104); Bruneau and Ducat (2005, p. 41). On broader political arguments, see Gruen (1984, pp. 106, 312); Reger (1994, p. 270 n. 48); Isayev (2017b, p. 278).

perceive possible stratifications among the displaced Delians as a whole. Ultimately, thinking about the ancient world through these modern categories prompts us to examine how 'globalising' or increasingly connected worlds can magnify inequalities among populations as well as enable and constrain the ways that individuals respond to indirect violence enacted within the expanding sphere of evolving political institutions.

2. Translating the Delian Experience

We have limited ancient sources that record what the Delians experienced. Polybius is our most detailed source for the Delians' expulsion, and we are almost exclusively dependent on his record of these events. Polybius was a contemporary of the second century BCE and was born in the Peloponnese in what is now the modern nation-state of Greece. He came from a family prominent in regional politics through the *koinon* of the Achaeans (also known as the Achaean League) and was taken to Rome as a prisoner around 167 BCE during conflicts between the Achaeans and Romans. In his *Histories*, he sought to explain how Rome came to dominate almost the whole world known to him. In doing so, his writing covers much of Mediterranean political history between the mid third and mid second centuries BCE.

One passage in Polybius' *Histories* is particularly central to excavating what happened to the Delians (Polyb. 32.7.2–3; Walbank and Habicht 2012, p. 269):

> τοῖς γὰρ Δηλίοις δοθείσης ἀποκρίσεως παρὰ Ῥωμαίων, μετὰ τὸ συγχωρηθῆναι τὴν Δῆλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, αὐτοῖς μὲν ἐκχωρεῖν ἐκ τῆς νήσου, τὰ δ' ὑπάρχοντα κομίζεσθαι, μεταστάντες εἰς Ἀχαΐαν οἱ Δήλιοι καὶ πολιτογραφηθέντες ἐβούλοντο τὸ δίκαιον ἐκλαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς σύμβολον.

> For after the cession of Delos to Athens, the Delians, having in response to an embassy been ordered by the Romans to evacuate the island, taking their personal property with them, migrated (μεταστάντες) to Achaea, and becoming Achaean citizens (πολιτογραφηθέντες) claimed that the procedure in suits brought by them against Athenians should be in accordance with the convention (σύμβολον) between Athens and the Achaeans. [4]

When translating ancient texts, we tend to mirror the language of ancient sources and to use more neutral terminology. The translation above reflects this tendency. Most notably, the translation employs the English verb "to migrate" to translate the Greek verb μεθίστημι, which broadly means "to change" but more specifically "to move from one place to another".[5] Similarly, an earlier English translation employs the phrase "to remove to Achaea" (Shuckburgh 1889, sct. 32.17, p. 460); a German translation renders the verb as "waren ausgewandert", meaning "had emigrated, migrated" (Drexler 1963, sct. 32.17, p. 1237); and a more recent Italian translation features the reflexive verb "si erano trasferiti", meaning literally "had transferred or moved themselves" (Mari 2005, sct. 32.7.3, p. 235).[6] Although technically, our modern word "migrate" and associated terminology reflect the ancient Greek text, talking about the Delians' experience in terms of 'migration' obscures what the individuals experienced. It also complicates the involuntary nature of the movement pointed to in preceding clauses. Instead, I propose that thinking about the Delian case in terms of the more specific terminology of 'displacement' can help us recover aspects of the Delians' experience.

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[4] The Greek text (the Büttner-Wobst text of the Teubner edition) and English translation both feature in the Loeb Classical Library 2012 edition, for which Frank Walbank and Christian Habicht revised W. R. Paton's 1927 edition. However, Walbank and Habicht (2012) appear to have made no changes to Paton's translation of this particular passage.

[5] *LSJ*, s.v μεθίστημι, A and A.II.3. Also, Polybius avoids using nouns to describe the Delians, and some scholars have followed his lead in writing about this historical moment (e.g., Walbank 1979, pp. 525–26; Habicht 1997, pp. 247–49). Instead, Polybius refers to them by the ethnic, Delians.

[6] Schick's (1988) Italian translation summarizes the content of this passage but does not translate it (p. 840). Dübner's (1839) Latin translation employs the verb "commigraverunt" (sct. 32.17, p. 92).

In what ways do modern categories or heuristics for movement challenge cross-historical analysis and in what ways do they facilitate new lines of thinking about the Delian narrative? The current 'refugee crisis' and the political environment in which it has occurred have intensified the implications of terms and categories related to movement. Particularly, international humanitarian organizations have contributed to the hardening of such categories as 'migrant', 'displaced person' and 'refugee'.[7] In the modern world, resources from the humanitarian aid regime are often at stake for a person to fit into one category versus another, thus affecting how they are applied and how people seek to categorize themselves (Malkki 1996). International organizations, such as the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), disseminate these resources, as manifested in the contributions of Dalal (2017), Maqusi (2017) and Petti (2017) to this volume. Such organizations thereby participate in structuring, and even dictating, the process of defining groups through these categories.

The existence of mediating international organizations in the modern world is arguably one of the most significant analytical differences in studying displacement in modern contexts versus ancient worlds. It is difficult to separate the existence of such organizations or previous lack thereof from ideals of *philanthropia* and humanitarianism, which have been acted on differently in ancient and modern societies.[8] However, in the absence of intermediary organizations in the ancient world, individual city-states and other state formations, such as federations of city-states, Hellenistic kingdoms or the Roman state, more immediately shaped the narratives as well as the experiences of particular displaced individuals. Decisions about granting resources to persons seeking asylum played out more exclusively through the institutions of local government rather than through non-governmental or intergovernmental organizations. Categories for movement did not need to translate as commonly across borders in order to coordinate resource allocation, as they do now.

If resources are not at stake, then what is at stake to refer to an ancient group as displaced persons or as refugees when we translate ancient sources and write about the ancient world? Despite differences in the institutional landscape, the process of categorization in the modern world highlights the power that categories have in shaping not only the experience of people outside a place of belonging but also the perception of displaced people. For instance, until recently, 'migrant' served as a relatively neutral term to refer to movement, even that taking place under duress. However, a shift in terminology has occurred in news sources away from 'migrant' and towards 'refugee' (e.g., Malone 2015 for Al Jazeera; Ruz 2015 for the BBC). When explaining why *Al Jazeera* would no longer use the term 'migrant' in relation to mass movements in the Mediterranean, Barry Malone (2015) assessed this shift:

> The umbrella term migrant is no longer fit for purpose when it comes to describing the horror unfolding in the Mediterranean. It has evolved from its dictionary definitions into a tool that dehumanises and distances, a blunt pejorative.

Given this assessment of the term's contemporary operation, should classical scholarship and translations of ancient texts follow suit?

Archives for the ancient world already perpetuate power structures and violence through their selective recording of events and experiences—largely those pertaining to individuals who were in a privileged situation to record their experiences. Therefore, given modern shifts in terminology and the greater context of what was happening to the Delians, I resist using our term 'migration', and even 'evacuation', to write about the Delians' experience. We could refer to the Delians as 'exiles' as some

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7   These frameworks largely depend on the concept of the modern nation-state, which tends to be more bounded and less porous than most ancient states. See (UNHCR 2017, pp. 56–57) for definitions of modern categories of forced displacement according to one of the most prominent international organizations pertaining to displaced persons. In practice, however, these categories are often more fluid. See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. (2014) for histories of the development of studies involving these terms and for case studies in forced migration.

8   On the concepts of 'humanitarianism' and '*philanthropia*' as they apply to the ancient Greek world and on moral and ethical attitudes towards refugees in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, see Gray (2016).

authors have done (e.g., Delians as "exiles" in Ferguson 1911, p. 324). However, the term 'exiles' refers to a wide range of situations in ancient studies, including, prominently, the expulsion of particular individuals from a city due to political stances or leanings (e.g., Gaertner 2007).[9] Based on Polybius' greater narrative, the Delians' movement seems to have been involuntary and does not seem to be a reaction to a position or attitude that they took. Arguably, translating and writing about the Delians' movement as 'migration' or even 'exile', terms which encapsulate so many different moments of movement, perpetuates aspects of the violence committed against them.

Talking about the Delians' situation in terms of 'displacement' rather than 'migration' aids in drawing our attention to what intervenes and goes unacknowledged in Polybius' narrative. For instance, we tend to conceive of migration as movement from one point to another versus displacement, which implies a sense of suspension and of being between places. The Delians likely experienced such a state of suspension before incorporation into the Achaean state: as long as ten years may have intervened between the Delians' expulsion and their enrolment in the Achaean state. Moreover, employing terminology associated with displacement in the modern world highlights three other elements of Polybius' narrative: (1) the creative agency that the Delians exerted in seeking recognition and recompense for being expelled from their homes; (2) the politics of the Delians' re-emplacement in the Achaean state; and (3) the structures and institutions, such as third-party arbitration, that shaped the Delians' experience of the increasingly connected second century BCE Mediterranean.

3. The Creative Agency of the Displaced Delians

Whereas the term 'migration' often suggests (sometimes problematically) agency in choosing to move, the term 'displacement' helps shift attention to how the Delians demonstrated agency in responding to an involuntary situation.[10] To understand the Delians' response to their expulsion from the island, we need to return to Polybius and unpack disparate sections of his narrative that address different moments in Delian history.

The dispossession of 167/6 BCE was not the first for the Delians. Athens had exercised authority over the island, which was an important trade hub, in the sixth to fourth centuries BCE, and the Athenians had expelled the Delians previously in 422 BCE (Thuc. 5.1).[11] In this earlier instance, however, the Delians were able to return one year later (Thuc. 5.32.1; Constantakopoulou 2007, p. 73; 2016, p. 127). Due to Athens' earlier hegemony over Delos, Polybius (30.20.3) recognizes that the Athenians had legitimate grounds for requesting that the Romans grant them the island. He criticizes them, though, for presenting Athens as a homeland for all people while displacing others from their homes (Polyb. 30.20.6). In going against their own civic philosophy, even if they had legitimate reasons, Polybius suggests that the Athenians made a mistake and paid for it. He reflects that the Athenians suffered from their embittered relationship with the Delians, since the Delians did not take the second expulsion lightly—he compares their reaction to wolves held by the ears (30.20.8–9).[12]

The Delians did not passively accept their second expulsion. Collective memory of Athens' previous domination of the island likely intensified Delian reactions.[13] Through their reactions, the Delians actively sought to hurt the Athenians, at least financially and diplomatically. For instance, evidence from inscriptions indicates that inhabitants of the island were repairing buildings a decade after the expulsion: the Delians possibly destroyed non-movable property before they left the island

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9   Garland (2014, chp. 5) employs the term "deportee" for similar situations.
10   On the importance of recognizing different forms of displaced agency in the ancient world, see Isayev (2017a).
11   Diodorus Siculus (12.73.1) records that the expelled Delians settled in Adramyttium on the coast of Asia Minor, in an area now located in Turkey.
12   Polybius (30.20.8) says that in taking authority of Lemnos and Delos, the Athenians were "according to the saying, taking the wolf by the ears" ("κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν τὸν λύκον τῶν ὤτων ἔλαβον").
13   Regarding earlier tensions between Delians and Athens while the island was under Athenian control, see Constantakopoulou (2007, pp. 73–75; 2016).

in order to avoid handing it over to the new authorities (Kent 1948, p. 314 n. 221; see *ID* 1416 B I, ll. 61–62 and B II, ll. 39–40; 1417 B II, l. 92 and C, ll. 30–98). In addition to material actions taken against the Athenians, the Delians successfully exerted agency within the contemporary legal context to hold the Athenians accountable for this second expulsion.

The Delians were aided in their campaign to hold the Athenians accountable by the people who provided them with asylum. After the Delians involuntarily left the island, Polybius (32.7.1–5) records that they settled in Achaea, where individual cities cooperated in a regional, 'federal state' structure called a *koinon*. Polybius specifies that the Delians were enrolled as citizens in the federal Achaean state (32.7.3: πολιτογραφηθέντες). Based on comparative evidence from other ancient federal states, the Delians may have received federal Achaean citizenship from the whole *koinon* and possibly chose the particular Achaean city in which they received civic citizenship (Aymard 1938, p. 113 n. 2; Walbank 1979, p. 525; Rizakis 2012, p. 32; Müller 2017, p. 94).[14] In the modern context, this process would be similar to someone receiving European Union citizenship from federal institutions and also choosing the member country in which they settled and received further benefits and rights.

By making the Delians Achaean citizens, in addition to citizens of individual member cities, the *koinon* of the Achaeans granted the Delians access to privileges available to all Achaeans. Notably, the Achaeans had previously established a *symbolon*, an agreement or treaty, with the Athenians earlier in the second century BCE (Gauthier 1972, pp. 173, 204; Walbank 1979, p. 526; Ager 1996, p. 387). Now as Achaean citizens, the Delians proceeded to sue the Athenians under this *symbolon*. It appears that the Delians had been told that they could take their personal property with them when they left Delos, but they may not have been able to take all of it in the moment. Some protection established in the *symbolon* enabled the Delian-Achaeans to sue the Athenians for the loss of this personal property (Larsen 1968, p. 486; Müller 2017, p. 95). As Benjamin Gray (2018) illustrates in other ancient case studies in this collection, citizenship was not necessarily a mechanism for excluding the displaced, but instead it opened up opportunities for the Delians to exercise collective agency.

In fighting the suit, however, the Athenians claimed that the *symbolon* did not apply to the Delians. Essentially, therefore, they contended that the Delians were not eligible for the full rights of Achaean citizens, at least those established before their enrolment. Ultimately, in order to settle the dispute, the Achaeans and Athenians sent an embassy to Rome in 159/8 BCE. Through the embassy, the Delians sought *rhysia*, or the right to make reprisals against Athens, more specifically, possibly the right to take property as compensation for what they lost (Polyb. 32.7.4; Ager 1996, p. 5; Larsen 1968, p. 486; Buraselis 2016, p. 150). The Roman senate upheld the right of the Achaeans to make arrangements regarding the Delians according to Achaean laws, including the *symbolon*. They seem to have recognized the Delians' ability to sue Athens as Achaean citizens and, by extension, to make the reprisals. Polybius does not record, however, how the affair was settled beyond this decision.

4. The Politics of Refuge

The Delians did not remain displaced, in the sense of being without a place, at least legally: they were incorporated into the Achaean state and were eventually recognized as fully, legally Achaean by an external state. Our general term 'displacement' does not encapsulate the re-emplacement involved in the ancient term μεθίστημι, which involves both movement away from a place and incorporation within a new place. Arguably, the Delians experienced something similar to what we now think of as refugee status during the process of becoming full Achaean citizens. Whether or not the modern category of 'refugee' applies technically to the ancient Delians, it can help us think about Polybius' limited narrative from new directions.

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[14] Aymard (1938) suggested that the Delians would not have needed to be enrolled in a member city in order to practice the rights of Achaean citizens, but Rizakis (2012), whom Müller (2017) follows, has opposed this claim. All agree, however, as pertains to the points made here, that the Delians were Achaean citizens in practice and that their enrolment was not simply honorary.

Attention to how the category of 'refugee' operates in the modern world prompts questions about the competing interests of actors involved in the Delians' situation. Indeed, Kostas Buraselis (Buraselis 2016, pp. 150–51) has recently described the Delians as "refugees".[15] In his analysis, he draws attention, seemingly for the first time, to the factors that drove the Delians' incorporation into the Achaean state. Since the term 'refugee' prompts reflection on where the person fleeing seeks 'refuge', the use of the term, whether consciously or unconsciously, draws attention to a previously overlooked aspect of the Delian narrative: why the Achaeans would agree to grant the Delians refuge. In the modern world, the competing interests of different political parties and nations shape the discourses surrounding grants of refuge and the recognition of refugee status. Likewise, the Delians' process of gaining citizenship in a new state was deeply political: it did not play out in isolation between one party seeking refuge/recognition (the Delians) and one party granting refuge/recognition (the Achaeans).

After the Battle of Pydna in 168 BCE, the *koinon* of the Achaeans and Athens were two of the more stable powers in the Greek mainland. They consistently positioned themselves against each other and played each other off against Roman authority. Polybius' narrative potentially masks the Achaeans' own investment in this process. Polybius has a general tendency to place the Achaeans in a favourable light and to avoid criticizing Rome for mass displacements (Gray 2013; Isayev 2017b, p. 287). Polybius' own brother Thearidas led the Achaean embassy on behalf of the Delians (Polyb. 32.7.1; Walbank 1979, p. 525), and the Achaeans may have financed the embassy to Rome through the federal treasury. The embassy may also have attempted to address the situation of over one thousand Achaean individuals, including Polybius, who were being held in Rome since 167 BCE.[16] Therefore, broader Achaean interests may have been at play in accepting the Delians. While claims to common mythical relations—the brothers Ion and Achaeos—may have facilitated the incorporation of the Delians (who could present themselves as 'Ionians') into the Achaean state, the Achaeans also likely acted out of self-interest in positioning themselves against Athens.[17] In particular, the Achaeans, or at least Polybius, may have been invested in presenting the Athenians as the agents of the Delians' suffering, since doing so suggested that the Achaeans were more open and welcoming to other 'Greeks' than Athens (Buraselis 2016, pp. 150–51). Moreover, they might also have held up their advocacy and support of the Delians as a model for the treatment of their own forcibly displaced individuals in Italy.

The factors that surround being recognized within the category of 'refugee' in the modern world help us better understand possible broader Delian motivations for the suit against the Athenians. Since the UN Convention of 1951, the term 'refugee' has been closely tied to processes through which individuals gain acknowledgement for what they have experienced and for what they are still experiencing while outside their home community of belonging. Obtaining refugee status has been a way of having losses recognized, as well as of refusing invisibility, and therefore of securing rights and resources (Feldman 2008; 2012).

In the absence of an international humanitarian aid regime in the ancient world that could grant recognition, the Delians deftly turned to an interstate legal option. Scholars have read a desire for economic reparations as lying behind the Delians' suit (Buraselis 2016, p. 149). While economic incentives certainly played a substantial role, a broader interest in having their situation recognized and in holding the Athenians visibly accountable may have also driven the suit. Through the arbitration process, the Delians seem to have successfully ascribed agency for their suffering to the Athenians, pursued the opportunity for retributions and sought recognition of the justice of doing so from external sources (see Müller 2017, p. 91). In doing so, the Delians demonstrated their continued capacity to act politically despite being disassociated from the home institutions—their own polis and related entities, *demos*, *boule*, etc.—through which they had previously defined themselves and made themselves visible.

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[15] Roussel (1916, p. 16) and Aymard (1938, p. 113 n. 2) also refer to the Delians as refugees in passing.
[16] On the Achaean prisoners, see Polyb. 30.13 and Paus. 7.10.6–12. See also Gruen (1976); Tagliafico (1995); Allen (2006).
[17] On this argument, see Buraselis (2016, pp. 150–1). On the relationship between Ion and Achaeos, see Hall (2002, pp. 25–28 including Figure 1.1).

Although incorporated into the Achaean state, the Delians may have fostered a continued sense of community by insisting on visibility and by gaining recognition of shared losses as a 'polis-in-exile' within the Achaean state.[18]

Therefore, thinking about the Delian situation through the category of 'refugee' helps bring the politicization of their re-emplacement and response into focus. In recognizing the politics of the Delians' re-emplacement, we gain the impression that it mattered that the Delians were incorporated into the Achaean state versus another state. Incorporation into the Achaean state gave the Delians increased access to resources and support for their suit within the evolving geopolitical situation of the Greek mainland. Relationships between states are not equal, and not all asylums are desired equally.[19]

5. Giving Depth to a Category

The Delians as a whole were relatively well positioned within Mediterranean politics, based on kinship ties and the status of the island as an important trading post, to pursue recompense and recognition for their losses. Ultimately, the displaced Delians were able to navigate the complex interstate structures of the second century BCE Mediterranean—a feat that required political know-how to appeal to the Achaeans and to Rome. It also necessitated the mobilization of political and economic resources (be they technically Delian or Achaean)—in the sending of embassies and requesting *rhysia*. The Delian case, therefore, can also point to how the category of 'displaced person' or 'refugee' can flatten variations in a certain situation and in experience between groups.

This variation extends to the level of individuals. In this volume, Dalal (2017) draws our attention to the social differentiation and cultural hybridity that can exist within the physically uniform refugee camp: what seems to be a relatively homogenous group according to categories of the humanitarian aid regime can mask differentiation in socio-economic status and cultural practices. Religious, economic, political, etc. differences exist within these groups and can affect how individuals experience violences of leaving a place of belonging or how they survive violences at home.

Likewise, the focus of Polybius' narrative and modern scholarship on the 'Delians' has a tendency to flatten the experience of the individuals who made up this group. Scholars estimate the number of Delian citizens inhabiting the island before the expulsion at over a thousand individuals (Vial 1984, p. 20; Müller 2017, p. 94). However, not all of these 'Delians', if we understand the term as indicating the Delian citizens living on the island, necessarily left. It was not uncommon in the ancient world for a new power to expel the elites of a community, while letting others remain, as a sort of social and political decapitation (Lomas 2006, p. 109). In the case of the Delian expulsion, we can ask whether the Delian population as a whole was expelled or whether a subset was.

5.1. Differentiating Experiences of Delians

We have limited literary sources we can turn to besides Polybius in order to examine the scale of the displacement. Later authors, who may themselves have drawn on Polybius as a source, refer to the transfer of authority over the island (e.g., Strabo 10.5.4). Notably, Pausanias (8.33.2), much later in the second century CE, recounts that Delos did not host Delian inhabitants but the people sent by Athens to guard the sanctuary. In addition to the literary record, we can also examine the epigraphic and material record. In the 150s BCE, a majority of individuals listed as renting land from Delos' temple of Apollo were Athenian (*ID* 1417, B II, ll. 78–167; Prêtre 2002, p. 236). Moreover, the island of Delos begins to reveal shifts in its material landscape after 166 BCE. Beginning in the late second century

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18 On the concept and practices of '*poleis*-in-exile', see Gray (2015, chp. 6; 2018). On the Delians as practicing such activities, see Gray (2015, p. 316, Table 6.1).

19 For a controversial reflection on such dynamics in the contemporary world and the ethics of the current system, which can be seen as incentivizing movement towards better-off asylums, see Carens (2013, pp. 203–17). However, historical and cultural ties between countries, as well as the location of family members—to name only a few potential factors—can also render particular asylums, often closer ones, more desirable than ones considered to have more financial resources.

BCE, particularly in the 130s BCE, dedications involving Athenian officials and Roman individuals populate the island (Dillon and Palmer Baltes 2013, p. 221). Significant demographic shifts seem to have occurred.

We have sporadic evidence for Delian individuals remaining or returning. However, these seem to be isolated cases and they would have become political outsiders within the new society that repopulated Delos (Roussel 1916, pp. 17–18; Baslez 1976; Habicht 1997, p. 248 n. 10; Buraselis 2016, p. 149; Müller 2017, pp. 94–96). Unfortunately, distinguishing Delians remaining on the island from foreigners or other non-Athenians inhabiting Delos after 166 BCE is challenging due to the varied categories into which they could become integrated. A few individuals attested before the transfer of the island appear on inscriptions dating after the expulsion with the qualification that they 'live on Delos' or with a connection to the nearby island of Rhenea (Baslez 1976, p. 359).

However, the difficulty that we have differentiating any remaining Delians from foreigners tells us something about the experience of remaining. Individuals who remained seem to have experienced a loss of belonging: not physical displacement per say, but civic displacement. They would not necessarily have been participant members of the *boule* (council) and *demos* (people/state) of 'the Athenians living on Delos', which mirrored institutions that existed in Athens and that now acted as the primary political bodies on the island.[20] A certain Nikandros, who seems to have remained on the island, became an Athenian citizen and enrolled in an Athenian deme (*ID* 1417, B II, ll. 95–96).[21] He therefore would have gained access to these imposed political institutions that made decisions for the newly constituted population of Delos. In fact, another Delian named Timotheos also appears to have become an Athenian citizen after 166 BCE and subsequently to have served as an official overseeing trade (*epimeletes* of the *emporion*) about two decades later.[22] Yet, individuals, such as Nikandros and Timotheos, who voluntarily or involuntarily became Athenian citizens—even though they could participate in the new political community on Delos—likely experienced some sense of compromise or conflict of self and of being suspended between old and new citizenships.

We encounter further difficulties when we attempt to discern why individuals like Nikandros and Timotheos remained on Delos. Was it a 'political decapitation'? Was there an opportunity to stay if one forfeited Delian citizenship? If movements were more individually determined, what factors most commonly dictated leaving and staying? Was return possible? We cannot answer these questions definitively given the percentage of individuals for whom we have evidence and the fragmentary nature of the evidence. However, these fragments can provide insight into possible factors that shaped individuals' disparate experiences.

Overall, our best insight into why particular Delians, including Nikandros, remained comes from rent records of the island's temple of Apollo. Nikandros seems to have been involved in agriculture, since he rented farmland on the nearby island of Rhenea from the temple. He also appears to have belonged to a branch of a prominent family of farmers who periodically had held political positions on Delos during the island's previous period of independence (Vial 1984, pp. 56–57). Thus, his income and his extended family's social prominence was founded on continual access to local land, which was limited in the islands.[23] His ties to, and knowledge of, local lands may have led him to stay

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[20] On the installation and institutions of this Athenian political community, see Migeotte (2014, pp. 590–91) and Müller (2017, pp. 95–96).

[21] On this Nikandros, see Vial (2008, p. 99) s.v. Νίκανδρος Ἀρησιμβρότου and *LGPN* I, p. 329 s.v. Νίκανδρος, no. 33. See also earlier notes: Roussel (1916, p. 18 n. 1); Kent (1948, p. 319 n. 243). However, Kent (1948) conflates two individuals of the same family that Vial (2008) notes as separate individuals. For a text, French translation, and commentary of *ID* 1417, see Prêtre (2002, pp. 199–238).

[22] See especially *ID* 449, B, ll. 22–25; 1416, B II, ll. 90, 117; 1419, l. 17; 1507, l. 17. On this individual, see *LGPN* I, p. 441 s.v. Τιμόθεος, no. 10; Baslez (1976, pp. 359–60); Vial (2008, p. 134) s.v. Τιμόθεος Νίκιος.

[23] On the relationship between land and social prominence on Delos, as well as the generally elevated socio-economic status of individuals who leased land from the temple (especially in the period of Delos' independence), see Osborne (1985, pp. 125–27); Osborne (1988, pp. 299–303); Prêtre (2002, pp. 238, 263). Although, in the 150s BCE, renters included slaves, perhaps managing the land for their owners: see Prêtre (2002, p. 236).

connected to Delos and to become an Athenian citizen. Ultimately, at the end of his lease, Nikandros had sufficient economic resources to guarantee others' leases. He possibly guaranteed the lease of Ktesonides, who likewise appears to be a Delian who remained on the island (*ID* 1417, B II, ll. 86–90).[24] If so, the Delians who remained may have fostered a network of support, perhaps facilitated by prominent individuals enrolling as Athenian citizens, which then helped them to navigate the island's new political reality under which renting processes and avenues of political participation had changed.

Remaining was not necessarily fully voluntary, nor straightforward. A fourth individual, a woman named Echenike, reimbursed the temple in 161/0 BCE for 2750 drachma, suggesting a very sizeable original loan, which would have required significant capital to procure (*ID* 1408, A II, ll. 39–40).[25] The record of her payment specifies that she was 'living on Delos' (see Baslez 1976); possibly, she remained in Delos because of her debt, non-movable investments or marriage ties. Along with Echenike, several of the others paying for themselves or their relatives were also Delians whom the Athenians may have required to remain on the island until they had paid their debts.[26] Echenike's situation and that of other debtors further suggests that we can understand the different movements of Delian individuals as reflective of a more complex web of personal factors than simply enforcement of a top-down directive carried out under a Romano-Athenian directive.

5.2. Comparing Corinth in 146 BCE

The variation that we start to perceive amongst the Delians raises the question: to what extent did socio-economic status influence movement (or lack thereof) in the ancient world, as it can in the modern world? Another case study helps us to question the role of socio-economic factors in differentiation among groups affected by the same event: the case of individuals displaced by the destruction of Corinth in 146 BCE. Power struggles between the *koinon* of the Achaeans and its member city Sparta had unintended consequences for its own population (see Gruen 1976). Rome decisively put a stop to Achaean aggression against Sparta by destroying Corinth, a major city of the *koinon*, and carted beautiful works of art off to Rome. We often talk more, however, about what happened to this art than to the living people who inhabited the city.[27]

Literary sources offer hints about what happened to these individuals, although they are all much later than the actual event. Pausanias (7.16.7), for one, records that most of the Corinthians fled the city before the Romans entered. Zonaras' epitome of Cassius Dio also recounts that the city was mostly empty when the Roman general Mummius entered and that Mummius sold off the remaining, surviving Corinthians as slaves after the battle (Zonar. 9.31 on Cassius Dio Book 21; see also Flor. 1.32.5).

As in the Delian case study, it is difficult to track particular individuals who fled Corinth. However, scholars have recently begun making conjectures. Benjamin Millis (2010) has traced Corinthian names in inscriptions found elsewhere in the Mediterranean around 146 BCE. Individuals whom he labelled as certain or likely to have lived around the time of the sack are attested in Egypt and Athens predominantly, with at least one at Rhodes and more on Delos. These individuals may have belonged to families that left Corinth earlier but continued to draw on their Corinthian identity, or they could be Corinthian refugees from the sack that travelled farther

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[24] On this individual, see Vial (2008, p. 87) s.v. Κτησωνίδης Ἀπολλωνίδου and *LGPN* I, p. 277 s.v. Κτησωνίδης, no. 7. Nikandros' patronymic and deme are almost completely restored in these lines based on line 98. On *ID* 1417, see Prêtre (2002, pp. 199–238). Nikandros also guaranteed the lease of a person from Tarentum who took over the land he had been renting (ID 1417, B II, ll. 95–98); it was not uncommon for the previous renter to guarantee the lease of his successor (Prêtre 2002, pp. 263–64).

[25] See *LGPN* I, p. 192 s.v. Ἐχενίκη, no. 3. On this individual as Delian, see Roussel (1916, pp. 17, 387); Baslez (1976, p. 345); Vial (2008, p. 70) s.v. Ἐχενίκη Παρμενίωνος. On the relatively large size of the original loan, see Vial (1984, pp. 3, 369–72); Migeotte (2014, p. 632).

[26] *ID* 1408. See Roussel (1916, p. 387) and entries for named individuals in Vial (2008). We do not have direct evidence, however, for how the Athenians handled debts during the island's transfer: see Migeotte (2014, p. 632).

[27] We witness the same phenomenon in scholarship regarding the sack of the Athenian Acropolis during the Persian Wars and in recent discussions of the destruction of Palmyra.

afield. Meanwhile, Sarah James (2014, p. 33) has suggested, based on evidence for continuity in ceramic and agricultural production at Corinth in the years around 146 BCE, that Corinthian potters and small-scale farmers remained in the surrounding area. Building on Millis' work, she suggests that Corinthian potters and farmers stayed in the area of the city around 146 BCE, but that wealthier individuals may have escaped to Athens, Delos, and farther abroad.

The cases of Nikandros and Ktesonides, who were likely engaged in agricultural production, may illustrate similar patterns in the movements of the displaced Delians. However, the cases of Nikandros and Echenike in particular suggest that, although access to economic resources may have constrained or enabled how one responded to displacement, we should not necessarily privilege wealth as a determining factor of whether people left or stayed on Delos. Other realities of people's livelihood, such as ties to and knowledge of local resources, the form of their wealth or less physical attachments, may have intervened.

For example, a fourth individual, Demetrios, who belonged to an Egyptian family that may have acquired Delian citizenship, was a priest at a Serapeum and remained on the island. He sought out permission from Rome to keep open the sanctuary, which a family member likely established, against Athenian objections (*ID* 1510).[28] Meanwhile, the family of Stesileos, who founded a sanctuary of Aphrodite on the island, disappears from the epigraphic record after 167 BCE, perhaps suggesting that family members left the island, or at least that the family was displaced from its prominence at the sanctuary, which continued to flourish (Durvye 2006, p. 101).[29] Potentially, Athenian attempts to close Demetrios' Serapeum or his Egyptian ties prompted or even enabled Demetrios to obtain a special order of the Roman senate to stay and continue his guardianship. Beyond socio-economic status, such factors might account for differences in experience between Demetrios and the descendants of Stesileos, who otherwise seem to have been similarly positioned.

6. The Indirect Violence of a 'Globalising' Hellenistic World

Intensifying interconnection within the second century BCE Mediterranean, which enabled Demetrios to obtain and implement a special decree of the Roman senate, exacerbated inequalities—financial or otherwise—between individuals. Ancient historians have been turning to the framework of 'globalisation(s)' in order to explore this increasing connectedness.[30] However, studies focused on applying 'globalisation' to the ancient world have had a tendency to prioritize connection and overlook moments in which connection meets resistance or breaks down, as we see in the case of the Delians. Comparatively, when we engage with the whole picture of 'globalisation' that we see playing out on today's world stage, we witness moments when increasing connection creates ruptures. As states become increasingly interconnected, the scales on which states conduct activities grow and, therefore, the possibilities for affecting violence and causing suffering grow as well (e.g., Hein 1993, p. 55; Farmer 2002; Devetak and Hughes 2008; Demenchonok and Peterson 2009).[31] Institutional changes that accompany 'globalising' processes can open up new possibilities for enshrining unequal power relationships, positioning particular individuals to respond to inequalities more successfully and making certain populations more vulnerable to suffering.

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[28] On this individual's case, see Roussel (1916, p. 17); Sherk (1969, pp. 37–39); Baslez (1976, pp. 353–54, 359); and Vial (2008, p. 51) s.v. Δημήτριος ὁ καὶ Τελεσαρχίδης. Tréheux (1992, p. 37) also includes Demetrios in his index of foreigners on Delos, s.v. Δημήτριος Ῥηναιεύς. Even if we question his Delian citizenship, the epigraphic record suggests that the Athenians attempted to displace him from the sanctuary but that he successfully circumvented this displacement.

[29] On Stesileos himself, see Vial (2008, p. 123) s.v. Στησίλεως Διοδότου.

[30] Morris (2003) explores the related concept of 'Mediterraneanization'. For globalisation and the Hellenistic period, see, for example, Isayev (2014) and Müller (2016). For globalisation and the Roman imperial period, see particularly Hingley (2005) and Pitts and Versluys (2014). A handbook on archaeology and globalisation (Hodos 2017) was published recently including chapters on the ancient Mediterranean.

[31] This scholarship includes work on 'structural violence', see especially Farmer (2002). Ancient legal systems could not always account for the operation of indirect violence. See Bryen (2013, pp. 54–55) on the lack of an understanding of 'structural violence' in Egypt under Roman power.

Such realities were not new in the mid second century BCE, when the Delians were displaced, arguably by a confluence of political and economic forces. However, the mid second century BCE has been pointed to as a relatively intense 'globalising' moment (e.g., Isayev 2014, p. 124), particularly as Roman authority expanded throughout the Mediterranean. As it did so, institutions that had developed in the particular context of Rome, such as the senate, promagistracies, and the patronage system, began to extend farther and to have effects on populations to which they had not previously pertained. Scholars of the ancient world have drawn attention to the increasing rate of direct violence in the Hellenistic period, such as what ultimately happened at Corinth in 146 BCE, as states grew in size and as groups came into increasing contact with each other (e.g., Chaniotis 2005; Eckstein 2006). But, we have been less explicit about considering the changing scales of more indirect forms of violence and the role of such political institutions in enabling indirect violence, such as that which the Delians experienced.

For instance, the third-party arbitration system that the Delians and Achaeans turned to was well established in the Greek world by the mid second century BCE (Ager 1996, 2013; Camia 2009; Magnetto 2015a). City-states that found themselves in non-violent conflict would turn to a supposedly neutral third party to help them settle the dispute. The third-party arbitration system developed in a world of relatively fragmented city-states that often chose to cooperate to pursue common interests. However, by the mid second century BCE, this system had begun to focus around Rome as arbiter, and Rome was not entirely neutral. Moreover, states like Rome, which had a strong military force to enforce decisions, had an increased capacity to compel entities to abide by the decisions made within an arbitration system that entities historically volunteered to enter (Magnetto 2015a). Increasing interconnectedness compounded power unequally: Rome benefited, while smaller entities did not necessarily and, in fact, often became more dependent on the patronage of larger states.

We tend to examine Rome's increasing involvement in third-party arbitrations with the benefit of hindsight, in order to explain how Rome, intentionally or unintentionally, expanded its power into the eastern Mediterranean (e.g., Camia 2009; Magnetto 2015b). However, when we consider the case of the Delians in the context of the third-party arbitration system of the Greek world, the Delians emerge not just as the "collateral damage" of Roman expansion (Buraselis 2016, p. 151). They emerge more broadly as individuals who suffered due to evolutions in local institutions that were part of an increasingly concentrated interstate system, the operation of which was shaped by perceptions of military strength and cultural hegemony.

Ultimately, in the historical record that survives for us, the Delians held the Athenians, instead of Romans, accountable for what happened to them. Regardless of whether or not the Delians conceived of Rome's more indirect role in their suffering, they needed to treat the violence as direct and name a perpetrator of the violence in order to seek redress and recognition regarding what happened to them within the contemporary interstate system. The Athenians were a more immediately accessible (and seemingly effective) group against whom to conduct suits and *rhysia*. Meanwhile, somewhat paradoxically, Rome, which created the conditions for the Delians' displacement, acted as the third-party arbiter that recognized the Delians' ability to seek redress from the Athenians for what Rome itself had arguably done. Similarly, it was also the entity that granted Demetrios the ability to retain guardianship of his sanctuary, when the new power on the island wanted to close it.

Rome's role in the Delians' experience ought to prompt us to reflect on the role of hegemonic states in modern contexts of displacement. The 'asylum' narrative of early Rome is often put forth as a touchstone for thinking about twenty-first century attitudes towards refugees. Editorials remind us of the Romans' policy of openness towards outsiders in order to challenge entrenched attitudes that associate citizenship with national borders (e.g., Bazelon 2015; Beard 2015; compare Jewell (forthcoming) in this issue). However, beyond discourse, the actions of Rome in shaping the Delians' experience is a touchstone for the modern context in unsettling ways. The displacement of the Delians happened due to Roman intervention, debatable how purposefully, in regional politics. Ultimately, the actions of Rome, which benefited from the Mediterranean's increasing interconnectedness, both accomplished the Delians' physical and civic displacement and

supported their ability to pursue recognition and recompense for their displacement. Too similarly, in the modern world, the actions of the major 'first-world' powers, which benefit from the unequal process of 'globalisation', create the conditions which prompt the mass movements of individuals from regions that have not benefited as directly from increasing interconnection. At the same time, these 'first-world' countries serve as the gatekeepers for resources dispersed by the international humanitarian aid regime. Through such actions and decisions, they mould the categories and definitions that shape the experience of displacement.

However, our reception of the Delians' experiences does not have to be entirely pessimistic. Knowing as we do now that Rome would go on to develop a pan-Mediterranean imperial system, we might suppose that Rome sided with the Achaean-Delian embassy because it aimed to keep any one state entity from gaining too much power and challenging Rome's rising authority in the region. Allowing the Achaeans and Delians to seek *rhysia* against the Athenians, who had benefited from Rome's earlier judgement, would prevent any one state from capitalizing on Rome's favouritism. But, what if it was not a fully strategic choice? What if the Roman senate perceived its own role in the Delian situation and felt an ethical imperative to acknowledge the Delians as fully participant citizens in their new state? In doing so, the senate would have recognized the Delians as political actors in their newfound state and granted them access to resources, which would have helped them resettle successfully in that state, away from a home from which Rome itself had removed them.

Abbreviations

ID	*Inscriptions de Délos* (multiple volumes)
LGPN I	Fraser, P. M. and E. Matthews, eds. 1987. *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names: Volume 1: The Aegean Islands, Cyprus, Cyrenaica*. Oxford: Clarendon.
LSJ	*Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon*

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Comment

Big Powers, Small Islands, Real Displaced People. Response to Gettel, Eliza. Recognizing the Delians Displaced after 167/6 BCE. *Humanities* 2018, 7, 91

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Abstract: Eliza Gettel's paper on the displacement of the Delians in the second century BCE does an excellent job of examining an ancient case study of displacement through the lens of contemporary conceptions of displacement and asylum. In this paper, I try, as a modern historian of asylum, to reflect on the applicability of modern classifications to a case study over 2000 years old. First, I discuss the compatibility of the ancient with the modern. Subsequently, I engage much more deliberately with the arguments Gettel presents in her paper. Finally, I introduce a contemporary case study involving the displacement of people from the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean that I argue shares some similarities with that of the Delians, with both cases highlighting the often-neglected agency of the displaced.

Keywords: displacement; refugee definition; Delians; Chagos Islands

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This Special Issue on the displacement of people from the ancient world to the present encourages authors to go beyond their comfort zones by attempting to "create dialogue across practices, disciplines and temporalities".[1] Eliza Gettel's paper on the displacement of the Delians in the second century BCE does an excellent job of achieving just that by examining an ancient case study of displacement through the lens of contemporary conceptions of displacement and asylum. In attempting to take up this baton, I try, as a modern historian of asylum, to reflect on the applicability of modern classifications to a case study over 2000 years old.

1. Ancient and Contemporary Understandings of Displacement

My research focuses especially on migration history after 1945. My teaching, however, is much broader, and one course I gave in the past was ambitiously entitled "Seeking Asylum: From the Bible to Boatpeople". After a couple of years of teaching the course, I felt that it covered too broad a timespan, especially since the emphasis lay on promoting students to use primary sources for their research papers. Therefore, I have since narrowed the course's focus so that students currently analyse how asylum has developed since 1900, with a particular emphasis on the role that refugees, NGOs and states have played in asylum's evolution. Reading Eliza Gettel's fascinating article and many of the other papers contained in this Special Issue on displacement and the humanities has made me think twice about such a change. The papers highlight how conceptions of displacement and asylum in the ancient world were often much closer to modern equivalents than biblical references from roughly the same time period and later conceptions of asylum from the medieval period. The Biblical origins of sanctuary in the Old Testament, for instance, classified "cities of refuge" as locations for those who committed manslaughter to be judged and potentially protected from blood vengeance by a member

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[1] https://www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities/special_issues/Manifestos_Ancient_Present.

of the victim's family (Carro 1985, p. 752).[2] In the early medieval periods, churches became (often temporary) refuges for those fleeing wrongdoings (Lambert 2017). These were not really sanctuaries for the displaced. In the ancient world, by contrast, people sought protection not just because of the consequences of their own misconduct but because of external occurrences beyond their control, as exemplified by Gettel's case of the Athenians' expulsion of the Delians. Furthermore, displacement in the ancient world more closely resembles contemporary conceptions because people sometimes fled to other political jurisdictions rather than only defined internal religious sanctuaries.[3] This meant that asylum could be political as well as religious (Price 2009, p. 14), as also applied to the Delians.

2. The Delian Case Study

In her paper, Gettel (2018, p. 2) clearly states that we should not "compare directly ancient and modern cases—[because] they are not the same". As Gray (2017, p. 196) notes, for instance, around 1000 city-states existed around the Aegean and the wider Mediterranean in the Classical period (c. 480–323BCE), and even more were established in subsequent centuries. This contrasts markedly with the contemporary global political structure. Nevertheless, Gettel contends that when one takes into account the notable "differences between the two political, structural landscapes", employing modern categories can help to "generate questions and reflections". For that reason, she discusses the Delian case in terms of "displacement" rather than "'migration" because of the "involuntary nature of the movement" (Gettel 2018, p. 3). The Guest Editors of this Special Issue broadly construe displacement as "the involuntary movement of peoples from a place of belonging, whether due to forms of conflict, famine, persecution, or environmental disaster".[4] In 167/6BCE, the Athenians, with the Roman senate's approval, expelled (most of) the Delians from Delos and replaced them with an Athenian community. This does appear to correlate with the broad definition put forward, since the Delians moved involuntarily from their place of belonging. Gettel (2018, p. 7) highlights the political nature of the Delians' reception by the Achaean *koinon*, which "likely acted out of self-interest in positioning themselves against Athens". This resembles the contemporary period. Loescher (1989, p. 5) and Jacobsen (1996, p. 660), for instance, also identify international relations and national interest as important factors in determining states' refugee policies today. The relationships that destination states have with states of departure may influence how welcoming they are to people in search of asylum. The United States, for instance, often welcomed dissidents from Soviet Europe during the Cold War, because it served to undermine communism and bolster capitalism.[5] Similarly, as Gettel argues, the Achaeans may have accepted the Delians to underline their supposed moral superiority over the Athenians.

Whether the Delians could be referred to as "refugees" according to contemporary definitions is more complicated, because Athens ordered them to leave; they did not, as far as we are aware, flee from persecution but rather from the threat of persecution if they remained. Gettel (2018, p. 8) notes that new powers often expelled the elites of a community in the ancient world, while allowing others to remain. The emphasis on individual persecution in the 1951 Refugee Convention for reasons of "nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group" means that elites fleeing Delos could be qualified as refugees according to modern definitions. For those not facing individual persecution,

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2   See, especially, Numbers 35: 9–28.
3   Gray (2017) notes that it was also possible in the ancient world to seek sanctuary internally at defined religious sites, for example, in the case of civil war.
4   Elena Isayev and Evan Jewell are the Guest Editors of this Special Issue on "Displacement and the Humanities: Manifestos from the Ancient to the Present". Their definition of displacement can be found at https://www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities/special_issues/Manifestos_Ancient_Present.
5   Carl Bon Tempo in his book about US refugee policy during the Cold War observes that the American decision to help Hungarian refugees in 1956 "was largely driven by foreign policy concerns. Specifically, the Eisenhower administration calculated that a commitment to Hungarians fleeing Soviet tanks was a strong and clear sign of support for the Hungarian Revolution that, at the same time, would not too greatly damage delicate American-Soviet relations or lead to a large superpower conflict". (See Bon Tempo 2008, *Americans at the gate: The United States and refugees during the Cold War*, p. 60).

applying refugee status may be more complicated. The examples Gettel (2018, pp. 9–10) provides of Delians who remained and attained Athenian citizenship suggest that their civic displacement may not have sufficed to demonstrate individual persecution. Considering Gettel's later global focus, it may be interesting to note that under the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention on Refugees, there would not be the same doubt over the Delians' status, since in addition to replicating the 1951 Refugee Convention, it also adds that

> ... the term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.[6]

The Delians left because of Athenian aggression and the Athenians' subsequent occupation of their island. Similarly, the nonbinding 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees in Latin America expanded the 1951 refugee definition to "persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order". The arrival and takeover of the island by a foreign power seriously disturbed Delos's public order, as evidenced by the fact that so many left.

3. Parallels with the Chagos Islands?

What struck me when reading Gettel's article were the parallels that I felt existed between the plight of the Delians and that of the Chagossians more recently. The Chagos Islands are situated in the middle of the Indian Ocean between Africa, India and the Gulf states. The Delians' plight took place against a backdrop of salient imperial and political change as Roman authority expanded into the Eastern Mediterranean. In the 1960s, the Chagos Islands formed part of British Mauritius, but following the end of the Second World War, independence of India in 1947, the Suez crisis in 1956 and decolonisation in Africa, Britain's interest and power in the area had started to wane. The islands by then represented a strategic location for the increasingly powerful United States. In 1943, Harold Macmillan first made the classical analogy that the British were "Greeks in this American empire" and expanded on this after the Suez crisis in 1956 when he commented that the Americans "represent the new Roman Empire and we Britons, like the Greeks of old, must teach them how to make it go" (quoted in Danchev 2003, p. 16). Although Britain's influence in the Indian Ocean had diminished, they wanted to retain some influence in the area through their "special relationship" (Reynolds 1985) with the Americans. In 1965, the British granted Mauritius independence but they demanded in return the surrender of the Chagos islands in exchange for a £3 million "indemnity". This enabled the British to "offer the use of Chagos to the US and triggered the forced clearance of the entire population" to Mauritius and the Seychelles (a British colony at the time) (Evers and Kooy 2011, p. 2). Kampmark (2019) described this as being another example of the British being "keen to be in the good books as Greek advisor to all-powerful Rome".

The British excised the Chagos islands from the British colony of Mauritius and established instead the British Indian Ocean Territory, the last colony that Britain created (Vine 2011, p. 32). The United States paid $14 million to the British to deport the Chagossians and establish a military base on the biggest island, Diego Garcia (Vine 2011, p. 33). The British barred Chagossians leaving for medical treatment the right to return to the islands from 1968 onwards and ensured that conditions on the islands deteriorated in order to encourage more to leave. When the Americans began to build their military base in 1971, they ordered the British to complete the deportations (Vine 2011, p. 34). By 1973,

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6   Article 1.2, 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa on refugees.

the British had expelled approximately 1600 Chagossians who had lived on the islands (Sand 2009, p. 317). Since the expulsion, Diego Garcia "has grown into what many consider the most important US military installation outside the United States" as it lies "within strategic distance from Africa and the Middle East to South Asia and Russia, Southeast Asia and China" (Vine 2011, p. 34). Today, between 3000 and 5000 troops and support staff are stationed on the island.

The Chagossians challenged their expulsion in a variety of courts. In 1982, a private action was taken against the British government from an expelled Chagossian (Allen 2011, p. 129). After it later became apparent that Chagossians were citizens of the UK and its colonies at the time of their displacement, it became possible for them to institute public law proceedings against their permanent expulsion (Allen 2011, p. 129). Olivier Bancoult, born on the islands and later denied re-entry after travelling with his family to Mauritius for medical reasons, challenged the decision to banish the Chagossians. The court upheld his claim in 2000, with the presiding judge stating that the islanders were "belongers in the Chagos Archipelago" (quoted in Jones 2009, p. 19). The British government first accepted the right of Chagossians to live on the islands, but later reneged on its decision to recognise Chagossians' right of abode on the islands in 2004 (Allen 2011, pp. 131–34). The House of Lords and the UK Supreme Court (2016) ruled in favour of the British government in later appeals (Bowcott 2016).

Whereas the Delians had turned to Rome as a last resort to attain compensation for their displacement, the Chagossians asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to decide on the legality of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius. The Delians had been supported in their endeavour by the Achaeans, who had provided them with asylum. Similarly, Mauritius, the country to which the British deported the majority of islanders, represented the Chagossians before the ICJ, which found in February 2019 that "the process of decolonization of Mauritius was not lawfully completed".[7] In May 2019, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favour of adopting a resolution to welcome the ICJ advisory opinion and demanded that the United Kingdom unconditionally withdraw its colonial administration from the area within six months.[8] The UK has since ignored the resolution, which is nonbinding, and insists that it retains sovereignty over the islands.[9]

The ongoing dispute involving the Chagossians and the UK and the Delians' attempts in the second century BCE to make the Athenians accountable for their own exile clearly demonstrates what Gettel refers to as "the creative agency" of the displaced, something which the literature on refugee studies has continually underplayed (Gatrell 2017; Isayev 2017). Gettel explains that the outcome of the Delian affair was not recorded. The end result of the Chagossian case is still in doubt. Nevertheless, the agency of the displaced is clear in the actions of the Delians and the Chagossians. The Chagos Refugees Group, established in the early 1980s to challenge what one of the cofounders, the aforementioned Olivier Bancoult, refers to as the "forced exile" of Chagossians,[10] has continually managed to embarrass the UK on the world stage. Indeed, one former British envoy to Mauritius claimed in early 2020 that defying the UN's highest court may jeopardise Britain's UN Security Council seat (Doward 2020). Not bad for a group that the Americans referred so disparagingly to in 1966 as a few "Tarzans or Men Fridays" (Kampmark 2019).

Bloemraad (2013, p. 41) contends that comparative research in the study of migration can "challenge accepted and conventional wisdoms" and "lead to innovative new thinking". Although Gettel cautions against comparing ancient and modern cases directly, she does make a convincing case

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[7] International Court of Justice press release, 'Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965', 25 February 2019 (available at https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/169/169-20190225-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf; last accessed on 30 June 2020).

[8] UN General Assembly plenary seventy-third session, 83rd & 84th meetings, 22 May 2019 (available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12146.doc.htm; last accessed on 10 February 2020).

[9] BBC, 'Chagos Islands dispute: UK misses deadline to return control', 22 November 2019 (available at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50511847; last accessed on 30 June 2020).

[10] See Olivier Bancoult's TED talk entitled 'Right to Go Home', 8 May 2018. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W88lXtRWkic (last accessed on 30 June 2020).

for the validity of introducing and reflecting upon contemporary conceptions when discussing ancient case studies because of how it generates refreshing and inventive ways of thinking about the past and the present. Scholars have to tread carefully when comparing across such vast expanses of time and space, and must be conscious of the specifics of each period when doing so—no easy undertaking. Nevertheless, when done with care and precision, such research can open up new ways of thinking for studies on ancient and contemporary displacement, which is an undertaking that should be welcomed.

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Article

The Agency of the Displaced? Roman Expansion, Environmental Forces, and the Occupation of Marginal Landscapes in Ancient Italy

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Abstract: This article approaches the agency of displaced people through material evidence from the distant past. It seeks to construct a narrative of displacement where the key players include human as well as non-human agents—namely, the environment into which people move, and the socio-political and environmental context of displacement. Our case-study from ancient Italy involves potentially marginalized people who moved into agriculturally challenging lands in Daunia (one of the most drought-prone areas of the Mediterranean) during the Roman conquest (late fourth-early second centuries BCE). We discuss how the interplay between socio-political and environmental forces may have shaped the agency of subaltern social groups on the move, and the outcomes of this process. Ultimately, this analysis can contribute towards a framework for the archaeological study of marginality and mobility/displacement—while addressing potential limitations in evidence and methods.

Keywords: Marginality; climate change; environment; ancient Italy; resilience; archaeology; survey evidence; displacement; mobility

1. Introduction: Approaching the Agency of the Displaced, Then and Now

The Catalyst papers suggested for this chapter by the Editors (Ribeiro et al. 2017, this volume; Nobre and Nakano 2017, this volume) go to the core of our research interest, namely: the agency of marginalized social groups, and the writing of alternative histories where non-élite agency is the guiding thread (see Perego and Scopacasa 2016a). Both Catalyst papers concern communities of marginalized people in modern-day Brazil, who settle in areas from which they constantly risk being evicted. Urban shantytowns developed in Brazil over the second half of the twentieth century, largely owing to the influx of migrants from rural areas where living conditions were poor and job opportunities scarce. These migrants were drawn to big cities in search of a better life, but had serious difficulty integrating once they arrived. Whilst the migrations have waned in recent years, shantytowns have persisted for various complex reasons, which include demographic growth, social inequality, the urban property market, and drug trafficking (see Perlman 2010 for a balanced assessment). Yet, what strikes us about the Catalyst pieces is how much the marginalized actively shape their own lives, rather than merely suffering the consequences of what the powerful choose to do. The Dandara community, for example, are not at the mercy of big business or the state; on the contrary, they make their own decisions, such as which space to claim for themselves; how their settlement should be built and how their community should be run (Ribeiro et al. 2017, this volume). They even appear to have

altered the spectrum of what was possible within the bounds of the law: in April 2017, they legalized their settlement, by turning their (originally) illegal occupation of private property into legal ownership through state intervention.

However, the Catalyst cases—and the Dandara piece in particular—also draw attention to the fact that agency is about more than human volition—be it the volition of the powerful or that of the marginalized. The Dandara people moved into an environment that presents serious challenges. Although the settlement is within the city of Belo Horizonte (one of the largest in Brazil), it was originally built on land devoid of basic urban infrastructure such as sanitation, running water, sewage, power and gas lines. Additionally, it sits on a steep hill where the terrain is muddy and uneven; streets and alleys are unpaved and prone to landslides—especially during the summer months of torrential rainfall that characterize the subtropical humid climate of south-eastern Brazil. These are common problems facing Brazilian shantytowns in general, which tend to be far less organized than the Dandara settlement (see Nobre and Nakano 2017, this volume). Like Dandara, shantytowns tend to develop in areas that are beset with environmental hazards, such as pollution and risk of landslides and/or flooding (Rosa Filho 2012; see also Bras et al. 2016 on Haiti). These environmental constraints seem to have a bearing on the trajectory of marginal social groups, who usually lack the means to deal with environmental challenges as effectively as they might do, if they had modern technology and urban planning on their side.

Human agents operate within existing social structures that both enable and constrain their actions (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Dobres and Robb 2000; Dornan 2002; Gardner 2004; Robb 2007, 2010; Perego 2011; Perego and Scopacasa 2016b). Environmental factors also play a role in shaping the possibilities and limits of human agency (Crosby 1986; Barad 2007; Latour 2007). In a way, non-human elements—such as soil, terrain, climate, vegetation and fauna—also possess agency, in the sense that they can also contribute to the shaping and transformation of reality. These are forces that interfere in the rate and direction of social change—not in an absolute or deterministic way, but as factors that operate alongside human agency. By factoring in non-human as well as human agents into the narrative, it may be possible to reach a deeper understanding of social change. This involves approaching the environment not as a mute backdrop to social relations and conflicts, but as an active and intrusive force (among others) in processes of migration, mobility and displacement.

Ultimately, the Catalyst papers for this chapter raise a set of fundamental questions: how, and in what circumstances, can human agency rework the negative effects of social and environmental constraints, and channel them towards unexpected ends? How can we address these issues in the past? What are the interpretative challenges posed by "imperfect" archaeological data? It is with these questions in mind that we turn to our ancient case-study of (potential) displacement in Republican-period Italy, as a counterpoint narrative that allows us to visualize patterns from a long-term perspective, in a context that seems to bear some resemblance to the Dandara experience.

We argue that, during the late fourth/third centuries BCE, drought-prone areas of southern Italy were occupied by incomers of possible non-élite status. This is indicated by survey and excavation evidence of the spread of small rural sites around the ancient city of Canusium and nearby Cannae in Daunia. These developments have been interpreted as demographic growth and/or agricultural expansion. In this paper, we hypothesize that the spread of small rural sites may indicate non-élite people's response to rising inequality and instability, by making the most of relatively poorer agricultural land, as well as their resilience to environmental challenges. We begin by arguing that the inhabitants of the small rural sites may have included people of potentially non-élite status. We then discuss how the infilled areas may have presented challenges to agriculture, such as thin soil layers and more difficult access to water (being further away from the well-watered Ofanto valley and urban centre of Canusium). Furthermore, climate data suggests that the infilling happened during a warming phase, which may have aggravated the challenges posed by the arid-prone areas occupied (although the timing and impact of this warming trend remain to be fully assessed). Lastly, the written sources show that these communities found themselves at the centre of major turning-points in history,

such as the Hannibalic War and the decisive battle fought near Cannae in 216 BCE. By putting the available evidence together, we aim to contribute towards a discussion of: (i) how socio-political and environmental forces may have shaped the agency of subaltern groups in the past; (ii) the relationship between environmental and socio-political developments in the Roman world. We also discuss the limitations and problems in the evidence and methods, defining directions for future research.

2. Republican-Period Daunia, c.325-150 BCE

The region of Daunia in ancient Italy (Figure 1) affords an interesting case-study on potential marginalization and displacement in the distant past. Recent archaeological surveys have produced a general picture of settlement patterns during the last six centuries BCE (for the latest results, see for example Goffredo 2006, 2010, 2011; Goffredo and Volpe 2006; Volpe et al. 2015; see also Compatangelo Soussignan 1999). Historical narratives shed some light on the socio-politica organization of Daunian communities and their relationship with Rome (below). Lastly, there is sufficient scientific data to estimate certain environmental conditions that may have been present in the region during the time of the Roman expansion in Italy (late fourth-second centuries BCE)—although the chronological resolution of the environmental data is relatively low, as we shall see.

Figure 1. Daunia in Italy (courtesy of C. Iaia, modified by R. Scopacasa with permission).

In the fourth century BCE, just before Roman encroachment began, the Daunian landscape was dotted with nucleated centres on average 20 km apart (Volpe 1990; see Volpe et al. 2015 on the nature of urbanism in the region). One of the major cities was Canusium in the Ofanto valley: its development as a nucleated centre began in the seventh century BCE, but it is only in the late fifth-fourth centuries that urbanization seems to take off (Volpe 1990, pp. 36–40; Goffredo 2010, p. 15). According to Livy, Canusium was one of the main cities in Daunia alongside Arpi and Teanum: these three cities probably competed for regional hegemony (Fronda 2006, p. 416). In 326 BCE Arpi made an alliance with Rome, most likely as a strategy to defeat Canusium and Teanum, which were conquered in 318–7 BCE (Livy 9.20.4-8; Diod. Sic. 19.10.2). From then on Canusium was probably a Roman ally, apparently retaining much of its autonomy as no colonies seem to have been founded in its territory, nor do we hear of any of its lands being confiscated (Volpe 1990, p. 50).[1] Nevertheless, Roman hegemony probably had some impact on local society, possibly creating new levels of inequality: certain pro-Roman families may have been favoured (see below). That some people in Canusium thrived in the context of the Roman alliance is suggested by material evidence of prosperity from the third century, such as the opulent chamber tombs or *hypogea* with south Italian amphorae (e.g., the "Barbarossa hypogeum": Volpe 1990, p. 226). The overall image of a prosperous and confident community is reinforced by evidence that the city was minting its own coins and conducting its own foreign policy (Fronda 2006, p. 409, n. 51). On the eve of the Hannibalic war (218 BCE) the city most likely boasted stone fortifications (Livy 22.52.7, 22.54.6; Fronda 2006, p. 410). Many of the neighbouring centres (including Arpi) defected to Hannibal in 216 BCE after the crushing Roman defeat at Cannae. Canusium, however, remained loyal to Rome, suggesting that the pro-Roman element in the city was powerful. The Carthaginians retaliated by ravaging Canusium's fields (Fronda 2010, p. 55). Whatever the impact of these devastations (see the discussion in Goffredo 2008, 2010, 2011), it seems that by the early first century CE Canusium had regained some of its economic standing: Strabo (6.3.9) mentions a thriving emporium on the Ofanto River banks, while Pliny the Elder (8.190) notes Canusium's eminence in wool production and trade.

3. Approaching Displacement and Mobility: The Archaeological Evidence

Survey and excavation evidence suggests a marked increase in small rural sites around Canusium at the time of the Roman conquest. This trend has been interpreted as evidence of demographic growth and/or agricultural expansion. An assessment of the data available suggests that the rural site boom may have happened in a context of social inequality, with people of potentially non-élite status settling further away from the urban centre and well-watered river valley.

In 2003–2004, archaeologists from the University of Foggia carried out intensive field-walking surveys of the territories around Canusium and Cannae—a smaller, most likely unfortified centre or *vicus* further down the Ofanto valley, which may have been controlled by Canusium, and the site of the major battle between Rome and Carthage in 216 BCE. Among the many important results of the Ofanto survey was the discovery of a sharp increase in the number of rural sites around Canusium and Cannae in the late fourth-third centuries BCE (Goffredo 2010, p. 20). A total of 119 sites most likely dating c.325–200 BCE were identified in the survey area (Figures 2 and 3).[2] According to Goffredo (2011, p. 103, n. 61), 62 of these 119 sites are securely dated to the late fourth and third centuries, while the remaining 57 sites probably date from the same period. Most sites were characterized by the survey team as rural houses (*case*) or "small farms" (*fattorie*) in view of their size and the surface finds; these generally consist of building materials (large *tufo* or limestone blocks, cut stone, plaster, brick, tile, and occasionally marble slabs), tools (loom weights and artefacts identified as millstones) and pottery

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[1]   See also (Scopacasa 2016) on the Roman expansion in Italy and (Goffredo 2011) on Canusium specifically.
[2]   Goffredo (2008, p. 288; 2010, pp. 20–21; 2011, pp. 102–3).

fragments, covering areas of around 300–1000 sq m.[3] The conspicuous presence of tableware among the surface pottery suggests these sites were more or less permanently settled (below).[4] Of the sites in use during the late fourth-third centuries BCE, only 33 seem to have been in use in the preceding period (c.600–325 BCE: Figure 2).[5] Most of the late-fourth and third century sites apparently continued to be frequented into the second century and later, as indicated by datable pottery finds such as later black gloss, grey and sigillata wares (Figure 4).[6]

Therefore, the number of known rural sites in the Canusium/Cannae countryside seems to nearly quadruple after c.325 BCE—or double, if we consider only the 62 sites that can be securely dated c.325-200 BCE (according to Goffredo 2011, p. 103, n. 61). Many of the new sites, as noted above, apparently remained in use throughout the third and second centuries BCE, and some survived, or were re-occupied, into the late Republican and Imperial ages, with the "houses" becoming larger and more complex in terms of number of rooms and internal spatial organization (Goffredo 2008). As such, the infilling of the Canusine countryside is similar to contemporaneous developments elsewhere in Italy, including the Biferno valley in Molise (Lloyd 1995), the Sangro valley in Abruzzo (Lloyd et al. 1997) and elsewhere in Italy and the central Mediterranean (Terrenato 2007). In all of these regions, small rural sites multiply from the late fourth century onwards. These developments constitute an overall trend towards the infilling of the countryside, spurred by demographic growth and the intensification of agriculture (Terrenato 2007; Goffredo 2011, p. 108 on Canusium; Goffredo and Ficco 2009, p. 38).

This familiar picture of the infilling of the Italian countryside is not normally approached as evidence for mobility or displacement. However, as regards our Daunian case, there are still some key questions that remain to be addressed more fully, such as who the incomers were, where they came from, what compelled them to move into these areas, and why some areas seem to have attracted more incomers than others. In this respect, the Catalyst papers offer an alternative framework for approaching the ancient evidence: they remind us that the infilling of land can be a complex issue connected with displacement, social inequality, ownership rights, environmental hazards and human agency (see also Terrenato 2007, pp. 18–19, for a discussion of such issues). The Dandara settlement in modern-day Brazil, for example, is evidence of community growth and land infilling, as well as aggravated social inequality. One way to approach these questions is by carefully charting the trajectory of specific communities and the different agents at work. By focusing on the micro-level, we may gain new insights that can contribute towards the overarching model.

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[3] (Goffredo 2008, p. 288; 2011, pp. 102–3). For the definition of "fattoria" and "casa" regarding the evidence under discussion, see (Goffredo 2011, pp. 68–69); "small farm" is used in (Goffredo 2010, p. 20); until the full dataset is published, we will employ the term "small rural site" as a general category.

[4] For the period under study, the pottery evidence consists mostly of black gloss; Gnathian and Apulian wares to a lesser extent: see (Goffredo 2011, pp. 209–305).

[5] Not all of these sites are shown individually in Figure 3; see (Goffredo 2011, pp. 102–3).

[6] 75% of the sites around Canusium appear to have remained in use; the greater disruption around Cannae may be connected with the devastating battle of 216 BCE: (Goffredo 2008; 2010, pp. 23–25); see also below.

Figure 2. Sites around Canusium (**top**) and Cannae (**bottom**) identified in the Ofanto survey, sixth-late fourth centuries BCE (adapted from Goffredo 2010 with permission).

Figure 3. Sites around Canusium (**top**) and Cannae (**bottom**) identified in the Ofanto survey, late fourth-third centuries BCE; circles indicate new sites in the Tavoliere (northwest) and Murge (southeast; adapted from Goffredo 2010 with permission).

Figure 4. Sites around Canusium (**top**) and Cannae (**bottom**) identified in the Ofanto survey, second-first centuries BCE (adapted from Goffredo 2010 with permission).

The people that moved into the Canusine countryside are anonymous social agents, unmentioned in the historical record. Yet, a combined analysis of the historical and archaeological records may provide some initial clues as to the social dynamics behind the increase in rural sites, although we

must stress the preliminary character of the survey evidence available. First, the nature and function of the new rural sites are not completely clear, and more excavation is needed. However, the noticeable presence of tableware in all of the rural sites, such as black gloss and occasionally other pottery types such as Gnathian pottery, suggests that these sites were settled in the late fourth and third centuries BCE.[7] Also consistent with settled communities is the presence of a small grave cluster among the rural sites.[8] More importantly, a stone-built house from the late fourth century BCE (with a tomb in the courtyard) was excavated at Madonna di Costantinopoli just east of Canusium (site CAN67, Figure 3 top; Corrente 1997; Goffredo 2008; 2010, pp. 20–21). It is also significant that most of the rural sites under consideration feature building materials (e.g., cut stone, tile, brick, plaster, and occasionally marble and paving) and/or farming-related artefacts (millstones, dolia and loom weights; the latter would indicate the presence of looms, which might further point to stable occupation). This material is of uncertain date, and some of it could be from later periods, since many of the sites remain in use after the third century BCE. This would mean that patterns in the distribution of these objects could reflect a mix of periods (see also below). However, building materials which characterized the Madonna di Costantinopoli rural house (e.g., accurately squared *tufo* blocks and roof tiles) also appear in many other surveyed sites dated to c.325–200 BCE.[9]

Overall, the available evidence seems to suggest that the small rural sites around Canusium and Cannae in the late fourth/third centuries may have included small farmsteads—although more data is needed to further confirm and refine this picture. The existence of rural houses or small farms elsewhere in the Canusine countryside and nearby areas has also been argued based on aerial photography and/or earlier survey work. For example, squarish and rectangular structures interpreted as small farmsteads have been identified at sites such as Ripalta, Pozzo Monachiello, Fontana del Bue and San Lorenzo (Compatangelo Soussignan 1999, pp. 111–13; Goffredo 2006, pp. 542–43; 2011, p. 213; Goffredo and Volpe 2006). While survey evidence (pottery, tiles, building materials) has afforded a preliminary dating of some of these contexts to the Republican period (e.g., Ripalta), further data are needed for a full chronological assessment of these sites. The size and multi-room organization of some of these structures may suggest a dating later than the fourth century BCE—or that relatively complex rural structures already existed in the area c.325–200 BCE.[10]

The apparent lack of imported or intrusive artefacts (Goffredo 2010, p. 20; 2011, pp. 209–305) could indicate that the people who frequented the rural sites were (mainly) local. Yet, material culture is a difficult basis for assessing cultural and/or ethnic identity, since "pots do not equal people" (Jones 1997; Scopacasa 2015 on ancient central/southern Italy). Also, only a few of the small rural sites have been excavated and studied in detail. We should not rule out the possibility that migrants were among the incomers to the Canusine countryside, given the historical evidence for mass migration in third- and second-century BCE Italy (see Isayev 2017). To take one example, in 177 BCE, 4000 Samnite and Paelignian families are said to have moved to the Latin colony at Fregellae (Livy 41.8.8; Isayev 2017, pp. 40, 44). Earlier in 199 BCE, the colonists in Narnia (Umbria) complained to the Roman senate that people of a different status (*non sui generis*) were entering the colony and passing themselves off as settlers (Livy 32.2.6). We also read about forced migration, such as the Roman deportation of 40,000 Ligurian families to southern Italy in 180–178 BCE (Livy 40.38.6).[11]

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7   (Goffredo 2008; 2011, p. 103), and the preliminary finds catalogue at 209–305 (Volpe et al. 2015).

8   These consist of five tombs from the late fourth/third centuries BCE: site CER16, Figure 3 top; (Goffredo 2011, p. 211).

9   (Goffredo 2008, pp. 288–89). The use of *tufo* blocks as building material in house foundations is attested in Canusium and its countryside since the late 6th century BCE (Goffredo 2008, p. 289). Artefacts pointing to stable inhabitation such as loom weights also appear in sites that seems to lack evidence dating later than the late fourth-third centuries BCE (according to Goffredo 2011; e.g., BAR49) although the challenges posed by survey data must be taken into account in this regard.

10   For example, the Ripalta building identified via aerial photography is 63 × 63 m and probably featured a portico; the surface finds also indicate a phase of use dating to late Antiquity—an enlargement of the original building might date to this later phase (Goffredo and Volpe 2006, p. 229; Goffredo 2011, pp. 300–1).

11   There are also numerous instances of human mobility resulting from Roman colonization schemes in Italy and overseas: see (Isayev 2017, pp. 42–46) for an in-depth discussion.

However, if migrants were among the newcomers to the Canusine countryside, they are currently indistinguishable in the archaeological record as we have it.

There is some indication that the rural infilling of the late fourth/third centuries took place in a context of high social inequality. By the Hannibalic war, Canusium was home to some exceptionally well-off families, such as that of the noblewoman Busa who reportedly fed, clothed and paid ten thousand Cannae survivors from the Roman ranks.[12] These élites seem to have adopted the city as their main area of activity, given the high level of investment in urban development and display during the late-fourth/third centuries.[13] These same élites probably derived their wealth from the exploitation of resources and labour in the local countryside, where the small rural sites were increasing in number.[14] Although the élites were apparently interested in residing in the city, it is quite possible that they controlled nearby lands where infilling occurred (Volpe et al. 2015, p. 490). If that was the case, some of the small rural sites around Canusium and Cannae could have been occupied by tenant farmers and sharecroppers—although we should not rule out the possibility that smallholding peasants were also present (see Terrenato 2007, p. 19, on the reorganization of power relationships between rural subordinates and élites in fourth-third century BC Italy).

If the Canusine élites adopted the city as their primary place of residence, this may have limited the options available for commoners as to where they might set up residence (Goffredo 2010). Indeed, the fact that the infilled areas of the Canusine countryside seem to have been sparsely occupied for most of the first millennium BCE until the late fourth century, might indicate that they were not seen as particularly attractive—although it is possible that earlier sites were present but are now inconspicuous in the survey record.[15] While few of the surveyed rural sites have been excavated, rural houses in the area might not have been as lavish as the élite urban structures—although not as precarious as the wattle-and-daub huts from earlier periods. A good example is the excavated house at Madonna di Costantinopoli, which was a one-room, stone-built house with simple layout, tiled roof, paved floors and an external beaten-earth courtyard (Goffredo 2010, pp. 15, 21). According to Goffredo, the building resembles contemporaneous rural houses elsewhere in Republican Italy.[16] On the other hand, some rural dwellings may have continued to be made of perishable materials.

Viewed from the vantage point of the Catalyst papers, the evidence from Canusium and Cannae raises a key question: does the infilling of the Canusine countryside indicate rising levels of prosperity across the social transect, and the democratization of land ownership through the claiming of new farmland by peasants? Or does it reflect growing social inequality and exclusion, with increasingly wealthy élites pushing people away from the city and the river valley, towards more distant (and potentially more challenging) lands, which now needed to be exploited as a means of survival for lower social segments, and/or because of new tributary demands by the élites (who may have owned some/most the surrounding lands)? How can we differentiate further between rural sites that were settled as farmsteads, and others that were possibly frequented on a less stable basis? And how can an in-depth, micro-level analysis of the Canusine case contribute to our understanding of similar developments in other regions? As we discuss below, one way to begin addressing these questions is by factoring in the environmental context.

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[12] Livy 22.52.7; Val. Max. 4.8.2; see below for further discussion.

[13] E.g., the lavish *hypogea*: (Volpe 1990); on the Canusine élites as city-oriented, see also (Goffredo 2010; Volpe et al. 2015).

[14] (Goffredo 2010, pp. 29–30; Volpe et al. 2015, pp. 489–91); a more thorough assessment will be possible once more sites have been excavated.

[15] Evidence from the Ofanto survey suggests a tendency for settlements to concentrate around the nucleated centre and the river valley (Figures 2 and 3). The start of urbanization might have influenced such a trend: see (Goffredo 2010); see below on the environmental characteristics of the infilled areas.

[16] The comparisons mentioned (Monte Moltone-Tolve and Mancamasone-Banzi) range between 150–200 sq m: (Goffredo 2011, p. 105); he also notes that sites identified as "case" in the Ofanto survey may have ranged between 100–150 sq m in size: (Goffredo 2011, p. 69). As noted above, the occurrence of cut stone, *tufo* or limestone blocks, tiles and pottery in the late fourth/third-century rural sites suggests that similar houses may have been present elsewhere in the Canusine countryside (Goffredo 2010, p. 21). On Republican-period farmhouses in Italy see (Terrenato 2007).

4. The Environmental Context

Like other social phenomena, mobility and displacement have an environmental dimension, and can be approached in terms of human-environment interaction. Recent studies have explored the role of climate and environmental changes in human mobility and migration (e.g., Black et al. 2011; Drake 2017). A similar approach is useful with regard to the late-fourth/third century infilling of the Canusine countryside, where incomers were occupying drought-prone areas that potentially presented challenges to agriculture (such as thin soil layers and more difficult access to water). Climate data suggests that this happened during a warming phase, although the intensity, timing and impact of this warming trend are still difficult to assess. In this section, we seek to place the infilling of the Canusine countryside in its environmental context by presenting a brief overview of some of the climate and environmental evidence available, while stressing the possibilities and problems of the data currently published.

The infilling of the countryside around Canusium and Cannae apparently involved arid-prone areas that are sensitive to climate shifts and might have been challenging to agriculture: the northern slopes of the Murge plateau, and the southern terrace of the Tavoliere plateau (Figure 3).[17] The Tavoliere was originally a raised seabed composed of gravels and clays; it is one of the driest areas in the Italian peninsula with an average yearly rainfall of under 500 mm, and is currently at high risk of desertification (Dipace and Baldassare 2005; Frattaruolo et al. 2008; Delano Smith 1996, p. 162). In summer the plateau becomes a suntrap, with temperatures occasionally rising over 40 °C (Small 1994, p. 544). Such propensity to extremes does not appear to be entirely the result of recent climate change: over the last ten thousand years the Tavoliere seems to have occasionally deteriorated into a dustbowl probably owing to variations in temperature and rainfall (Boenzi et al. 2002; Broodbank 2013, chp. 7; on rainfall unpredictability in modern-day Tavoliere: Delano Smith 1996, p. 162). There is evidence that such deterioration may have been happening to some extent in the third and second centuries BCE.[18]

On the other hand, the Murge is a karst limestone plateau where the soil layer can be relatively thin. While rainfall in recent decades has been moderate (with monthly rainfall averages ranging between 24 and 78 mm),[19] surface water is extremely scarce by current Italian standards—a feature that has affected agriculture in the Murge for centuries.[20] A study of droughts in twentieth century Apulia suggested that the Murge and Tavoliere were the two areas where the underground water table was most sensitive to decreases in rainfall, since both areas displayed the greatest drops in the water table in times of drought (Polemio and Dragone 2004). Although it is not clear to what extent these findings also apply to the third and second centuries BCE, the karst nature of the Murge may have made it a more challenging place for agriculture than the neighbouring Ofanto river valley. Any community seeking to settle in the Murge would have needed to reach the underground water table, which might have been contaminated to some degree by the infiltration of seawater, as seems to be the case nowadays.[21]

The Tavoliere and Murge have been breadbaskets in the past—for example, during the Middle Italian Neolithic (c. sixth millennium BCE: Whitehouse 2013) when the region was densely settled by farming communities (Skeates 2000; Whitehouse 2013). Similarly, in the Early Modern period (AD 1440–1530) the Tavoliere and Murge apparently yielded the largest quantities of grain in southern

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[17] (Goffredo 2010, p. 21); see below for a discussion of site location and inter-site distances.

[18] See below, and Perego and Scopacasa in preparation, for a more fair-grained discussion of climate oscillation in late prehistoric Italy.

[19] http://www.agrometeopuglia.it/opencms/opencms/Agrometeo/Climatologia/mappeClima (dataset covers the period 1951–2001).

[20] (Small 1994, pp. 544–45); see (Snowden 1986) on the dramatic social effects of drought in Apulia in the early twentieth century.

[21] (Polemio and Dragone 2004, p. 187); one exception is the relatively fertile area of the Murge known as the Fossa Bradanica, which is nonetheless c.50 km south of Canusium and is not included in the published results of the Ofanto survey: see (Small 1994).

Italy.[22] On the other hand, the Tavoliere in particular has also been vulnerable to desertification: over the last ten thousand years, the plateau seems to have shifted between a breadbasket and dustbowl depending on rainfall. An especially severe downturn seems to have happened in the Italian Late Neolithic, when a general drying of the Mediterranean climate seems to have coincided with an apparently drastic reduction in the number of farming villages in the Tavoliere.[23]

As regards our period of interest, the third and second centuries BCE roughly coincide with the start of the *Roman Warm Period* (RWP). This is recognized as a phase of warmer temperatures and possibly drier conditions in Italy and many parts of the Mediterranean and northern hemisphere.[24] The climate data for third- and second-century BCE Italy is fragmentary and often ambiguous, largely because of the low chronological resolution of the available climate records. At the present state of knowledge, it is dangerous to generalize. Nevertheless, the onset of the RWP has been identified in a number of proxy (approximate) climate records (see Manning 2013, pp. 134–35 with bibliography), including the GISP2 ice cores from Greenland (Finné et al. 2011, pp. 1867–68), lake level oscillations in central Italy (Giraudi 2014, pp. 941–42), marine sediment cores from the Adriatic (Piva et al. 2008), stalagmite records from northern Italy (Frisia et al. 2005, p. 451; Finné et al. 2011, pp. 3164, 3168), and Alpine glacier retreats (Holzhauser et al. 2005). Some specialists argue that temperatures in Italy during the RWP may not have been too different from those of recent decades (Giraudi 2014, pp. 941–42; see Sallares 2007, pp. 19–20 on other Mediterranean regions). If accurate, this could mean that the Tavoliere might have been facing a desertification threat to some degree in the third and second centuries BCE, as it has been in recent decades.[25]

While arable farming would still have been possible in the Tavoliere, farmers wishing to settle there in the third and second centuries BCE may have had to rely on a fine margin of climatic stability. Similarly, the karst plateau of the Murge, with its thin soils, may have exacerbated the effects of warmer temperatures and potentially unpredictable rainfall. Therefore, the onset of the RWP potentially made the area more vulnerable to variations in rainfall, as has been the case in recent decades (e.g., Polemio and Dragone 2004; above). The climate data seem to cohere with literary testimony suggesting that arid conditions prevailed in Apulia by the first century BCE (Horace's 'parched Apulia': *Epod*. 3.16; see also: *Carm.* 3.30.10–12). Yet, it was apparently in the context of the early RWP that both these drought-sensitive plateaus seem to have been occupied by small rural sites, which may have included farmsteads.

5. Occupying Marginal Landscapes?

The foregoing discussion suggests that the incomers to the Canusine countryside (Tavoliere and Murge) in the late-fourth and third centuries BCE included people of potentially non-élite status settling in drought-prone areas that might have presented challenges to agriculture (although, as noted above, much of the environmental evidence available is still difficult to interpret). In this section, we suggest the hypothesis that the spread of small rural sites around Canusium may indicate non-élite people's response to rising inequality to some extent, as well as their resilience to environmental

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[22] (Sakellariou 2011, pp. 232–33); it may be significant that this happened at the start of the Little Ice Age, a period of unusually cold/wet conditions in Europe: (Grove 2001).

[23] (Boenzi et al. 2002; Broodbank 2013); but see (Whitehouse 2013, pp. 72–73) for a critical discussion of the evidence and dating; she argues that the decrease in villages may have been caused by soil over-exploitation alongside climate change.

[24] (Lamb 1995, pp. 156–59; Sallares 2007, pp. 19–20; McCormick et al. 2012, pp. 174–75; Manning 2013, pp. 134–35). Both De Ligt (2012, pp. 27–30) and Isayev (2017, pp. 24–25, 183–84) envisage a potential one degree Celsius temperature rise in Italy c.300 BCE.

[25] But see (Harris 2013, p. 2), on how the RWP warming may have varied in intensity depending on the region: he notes that Pliny's description of his villa in Tifernum suggests a colder climate than currently; for further discussion of this point, see Perego and Scopacasa in preparation.

challenges—by making the most of relatively poorer agricultural land.[26] A preliminary examination of surface finds suggests that farming and textile production (possibly connected with sheep rearing) may have been important activities in the small rural sites, although this material is very fragmentary and difficult to date.

The rural infilling around Canusium and Cannae may have been connected with historical processes affecting the region, such as the Roman conquest of the late fourth century. Although one must avoid being Romano-centric in discussing evidence for social change in Republican Italy, Roman encroachment after 320 BCE probably had a bearing on local social dynamics in Canusium.[27] Families that were favourable to Rome may have received special treatment.[28] One potentially revealing example is that of the Canusine noblewoman Busa, who allegedly took in the Roman survivors of the battle of Cannae (216 BCE) and gave them food, clothing and money for their trip home.[29] Wealthy pro-Roman families such as Busa's may have thrived more than other Canusines who were less favourably positioned in the new power networks: these worse-off people may have been subjected to new forms of exploitation in the hands of the Roman-backed élites.

From this perspective, it is not implausible that the incomers to the Tavoliere and Murge may have included non-élite families that were compelled to move into, and remain, in lands that might have been regarded by the community as sub-prime. Seen from this angle, the increase in rural sites may to some extent indicate the movement of people away from the city and the well-watered river valley, perhaps to make way for larger estates.[30] Alternatively, people may have moved into the Tavoliere and Murge because they were motivated (or forced) to exploit a wider range of the local ecosystem. They may have done this to satisfy growing surplus demands (e.g., wine, meat and dairy products) from the urban élites, who may have experienced a boost in authority because they were now supported by a hegemonic power.

If the small rural sites were in lands belonging to an urban-based élite, the people who apparently lived in them would still have had to eke out a living. Patterns concerning the location of the rural sites, and the nature of the surface finds, might shed further light on the social dynamics at work, while also stressing some of the difficulties of the survey data available. The known late-fourth and third century sites closer to Canusium and Cannae tend to be situated closer together (on average 500 m/1 km apart), whereas contemporaneous sites further away from the centres are more spread out (on average 2–3 km apart: Figure 3). The greater distances between the remote sites might indicate the maintenance of larger lots, possibly to increase yields or to focus on animal husbandry in relatively poor land. To be sure, many of the Tavoliere sites are located on the edge of the plateau overlooking the river valley (Figures 3 and 4): this raises the possibility that people were building their houses on the plateau while farming the valley. However, the occurrence of sites further away from the edge (Figures 3 and 4) would suggest that some settlers were exploiting the poorer plateau land primarily.

As regards the surface finds, artefacts identified as millstones, loom weights and/or spindle whorls (Goffredo 2011) occur in sites closer to Canusium and Cannae,[31] as well as in those located

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[26] There are interesting modern parallels where incoming populations (refugees) are given poorer agricultural lands as part of state-led initiatives such the 'Self-Reliance Scheme' in twentieth-century Uganda (Betts and Collier 2017, pp. 145–55; E. Isayev pers. comm.). The potential of such comparisons for the study of mobility in pre-Roman Italy warrants further study.

[27] See (Woolf 2014) on the Romanization debate.

[28] See (Bispham 2007, pp. 53–55) on Roman support for local aristocracies against possible popular uprisings in the central-Italian Volsinii and Falerii in the mid-third century BCE.

[29] Livy 22.52.7; Valerius Maximus 4.8.2 notes that Busa managed to feed ten thousand Romans without damaging her fortune. But see (Fronda 2010, pp. 95–96) for a more nuanced assessment of the Busa episode: he notes that, according to Livy, the Roman survivors of Cannae were welcomed more warmly in Venusia than in Canusium; he argues that Livy's emphasis on Busa's generosity specifically, might indicate some unwillingness among other Canusine nobles to welcome the Roman soldiers as heartily.

[30] As noted above, (Volpe et al. 2015, pp. 491–92) argue that the peasant households around Canusium were probably dependent on the urban aristocracies.

[31] E.g., CAN6, CAN84–86 (Figure 3, top); BAR32–33, BAR37, BAR58–59 (Figure 3, bottom).

further away (c. 2km or more).[32] Bearing in mind the challenges posed by survey data, these patterns might suggest that farming and textile production (possibly connected with sheep rearing) were activities present in the small rural sites—including the more remote sites on the Tavoliere and Murge. One difficulty is that many of the survey sites remain in use after the third century BCE. In view of the preliminary data published to date, we cannot be certain that the farming-related artefacts in question date from the late fourth to third centuries. That millstones and loom weights may have been in use in the survey area during the late fourth and third centuries BCE is suggested by sites such as SF7, SF10, BAR32 and BAR49 (Figure 3, bottom). All of these seem to have been occupied during that period mainly, judging from the diagnostic pottery.[33] However, the uncertain chronology means that the patterns in object distribution may refer to the second-first centuries BCE or later.

Regarding the pottery, black gloss is widespread in the small rural sites under discussion: this may point to common consumption practices that were shared by the people who occupied these sites. The preliminary data available, however, do not allow further insights into social differentiation or status. To approach black gloss as an indicator of social status, an analysis of the incidence of the different types in a single assemblage/context would be essential. The overall regional and supra-regional context of black gloss use—as well as provenance—should also be considered in depth (Amicone and Heinze, pers. comm.; see also e.g., Amicone 2015).

Whatever the factors behind the infilling of the Tavoliere and Murge, it may be significant that the onset of the RWP (around third-second centuries BCE) does not seem to have discouraged people from frequenting these arid-prone areas. Rather, we might hypothesize that the RWP constituted an added factor in local communities' development of strategies to exploit the (potentially) agriculturally marginal lands they occupied—either willingly or not. In particular, the evidence around Cannae would seem to suggest that sites on the Tavoliere fared better than those closer to the valley and town, which seem to disappear after the late third century, probably in connection with the devastating battle fought there in 216 BCE (Figure 4, bottom). Resilience against the ravages of warfare was possibly strongest among the more remote rural communities: it is notable in this regard that we do not seem to have evidence for the re-emergence of sites around Cannae after the Hannibalic war.

If our assessment of the environmental context of the Tavoliere and Murge is accurate, the preliminary historical, archaeological and environmental data may suggest a scenario where ordinary people might have borne the brunt of socio-political as well as environmental changes. The resilience of the small rural sites in these areas (suggested by the fact that many of them survived into the first century BCE or later) probably depended on the development of innovative coping strategies. Potentially, such strategies involved the kind of risk-buffered farming that Halstead postulates for Neolithic Thessaly (Halstead 1989, pp. 74–78; 2008), where peasant households resort to new forms of cooperation, including the suppression of hostility, as a means of coping with hazards to agriculture. In the Ofanto valley, preference might have been given to the cultivation of crops that survived well in warm and relatively dry conditions such as olives and vines. There is literary evidence for both vine and olive cultivation around Canusium in the first century BCE (Varro *Rust*. 1.8, 2.6.5; also Goffredo 2010, p. 25). This practice may already have been developing in the late fourth-second centuries. In addition, many of the Murge sites seem to have been situated in areas where access to the water table might have been easier (Goffredo 2010, p. 23). This suggests that the newcomers were selecting the best places in which to settle—which, in turn, raises the question of whether and to what extent there was competition for the best areas.

Although it is likely that the newcomers to the Tavoliere and Murge practiced arable farming, pastoralism may also have been important, both for subsistence and as a surplus-generating activity. Varro's account of long-distance transhumance between the Apennines and Daunia suggests that

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[32] E.g., CAN37, CAN60, MIN16, CER10–11, CER17, CER32 (Figure 3, top); SF7, SF10, TR10 (Figure 3, bottom).
[33] See (Goffredo 2011, pp. 209–305); on the significance of the loom weights as indicators of stable occupation, see above.

the Murge and Tavoliere may have supported pastoralism on a seasonal basis (Varro *Rust.* 2.1.16). Although Varro does not mention Canusium specifically, Pliny (*NH* 8.190) notes that the city's wealth was mainly derived from the wool trade. Both Varro and Pliny are later sources, and it has been argued that Varro's "big business" transhumance would have been feasible only from the first century BCE onwards.[34] It is nonetheless possible that pastoralism was already significant in the late fourth, third and second centuries (see Whitehouse 2013, pp. 61–62; Robb 2007, pp. 146–47 on the Neolithic). Ultimately, the fact that the new sites may have been located in agriculturally marginal land does not necessarily mean that the incomers relied mainly on pastoralism. Pastoralism may have been a viable alternative to agriculture, especially in the sites further away from Canusium and Cannae, but it would not necessarily have been less risky or unpredictable. For example, late Medieval and Early Modern records suggest that herds in the Tavoliere were vulnerable to the severe climate (Delano Smith 1979, p. 246). Even if the newcomers of the late fourth-second centuries BCE practised pastoralism as an ecological strategy, we could still be looking at an instance where communities resorted to adaptable lifeways to exploit land that may have been considered sub-prime in previous centuries. This would have happened despite the unpredictability and/or potentially adverse impacts of prevailing environmental conditions (which remain to be assessed in more detail; further discussion of this issue is in Perego and Scopacasa in preparation).

6. Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Research

We began this paper with a question inspired by the Catalyst articles: how, and in what circumstances can human agency rework the negative effects of social and environmental constraints, and channel them towards unexpected ends. We now present some preliminary conclusions, based on the foregoing discussion about the agency of non-élite and potentially marginalized social groups in the distant past. In doing so, we highlight some issues regarding the strengths and potential limitations of an integrated approach to socio-political and environmental change in the ancient world, and outline some possible opportunities for future research.

Our discussion has shown that an integrated micro-level approach to past displacement—combining historical, archaeological and environmental data—might contribute to our understanding of wider historical processes, such as the infilling of the countryside in Republican Italy. The occupation of the Tavoliere and Murge may have resulted primarily from socio-political changes in Canusium from the 320s onwards.[35] Social change may have been connected with the start of Rome's interference, and the possible emergence of a local pro-Roman élite who may have prospered at the expense of other Canusine social groups. Possibly, some people had no choice but to move into the Tavoliere and Murge. The possible scenarios are that: these incomers were driven out of more fertile or prime areas, such as the city itself or the well-watered valley; or they were compelled—or actively interested—to exploit a wider range of natural resources, to satisfy growing demands for surplus by the urban-based élites. In other words, the Canusine case raises the possibility that other instances of rural infilling in Republican Italy also involved issues of social inequality, power dynamics and environmental vulnerability—in addition to currently debated themes such as demographic growth, agricultural expansion and higher living standards. More micro-level analyses may contribute towards an overarching model of social change in this key period.

On a related point, our discussion of potential displacement and mobility in the Canusine countryside might add to our understanding of the relationship between environmental and socio-political developments in the Roman world. Recent approaches to human-environment

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[34] (Dench 1995, pp. 121–22); on pastoralism as more pervasive than grain cultivation in Imperial-period Apulia: (Small 1994, pp. 545–48); a key historical reference to transhumance routes or *tratturi* linking Daunia and the Apennine mountains dates to AD 1447: (Gabba and Pasquinucci 1979, p. 129; Dench 1995, p. 122).

[35] But note that (Goffredo 2011) underlines continuity in view of some rural sites being already present in the sixth-late fourth centuries BCE.

interaction in the Roman Empire have explored how the onset of environmental unpredictability impacted negatively on the economic and political functioning of the system, ultimately contributing to the collapse of Roman hegemony in the West (e.g., McCormick et al. 2012; McCormick 2013). Political and economic instability during the Imperial era can be seen to coincide with deteriorating and/or unstable climate conditions in the Mediterranean and northern Europe. For example, a series of volcanic eruptions c. CE 235–285 seem to have caused a rapid cooling throughout the Empire, disrupting food production and possibly contributing to the late third century CE monetary crisis (McCormick et al. 2012, p. 186). Increased variability in the Nile floods during this period may have disorganized grain production in Egypt (the imperial breadbasket), which presumably had wider repercussions (McCormick 2013, pp. 76–81). Building on these approaches, the foregoing discussion has explored the potential of looking at aspects of human agency that may rework the negative effects of environmental factors. If we take the RWP into account, we may hypothesize that many of the people who moved into the Murge and Tavoliere might have had to make the most of a more challenging land, under less than ideal climatic circumstances. To be sure, it is important to distinguish between short-term or abrupt environmental changes, and slower ones which allow people to adapt successfully (McCormick 2013, p. 82). This article has arguably dealt with a situation where the lack of abrupt climatic shifts allows us to reflect on a wider spectrum of possible socio-economic and political developments.

To further refine our understanding of human-environment interaction in Republican-period Italy, a few initial steps seem clear. Firstly, we need more data, not only on environmental conditions but on social practices, too. In the absence of excavation, aerial photography and other non-invasive methods such as geophysical survey can shed further light on the nature and distribution of sites (for initial results regarding aerial photography see Goffredo 2006; Goffredo and Volpe 2006). Once the full finds catalogue is published, in-depth analysis of surface pottery and other small finds can provide a higher-resolution picture of the people who occupied the surveyed rural sites, and highlight potential variability at the micro-scale of the single farm (for some preliminary observations, see above). Full data publication might also afford a more detailed chronology of the sites.[36] Archaeometric analysis of the pottery might provide additional insights into provenance and production (e.g., Amicone 2015). In addition, a better understanding of the funerary sites in the Tavoliere (e.g., site CER16, Figure 3 top) can shed more light on the cultural identity of local communities. As regards coping strategies in the face of socio-environmental challenges, stable isotope analysis may offer an important tool to determine the water status of crops and strategies of water management (Wallace et al. 2015). More research is also needed into the archaeology of storage practices in Daunia (some preliminary data in Goffredo 2010), to identify crop storage capabilities and resistance to drought. Zooarchaeological data has the potential to reveal trends in animal husbandry: certain animals fare better than others in dry environments, so that any changes in the ratio of pigs to goats, for example, can be indicative of adaptive strategies to different or more challenging and arid environmental conditions.[37] Animal remains might also be considered for potential information about climatic conditions in the past—in view of recent research that explores the possible presence of climate signatures in ancient bones (Dillon et al. 2018). Another tell-tale sign of adaptation to aridity is the digging of deeper water wells, which normally suggests lowering water tables (e.g., Cardarelli 2010, pp. 469–70). Also important is an in-depth analysis of the location of each small rural site or farm, with an eye to river patterns and trajectories, not only in the present but in antiquity, too.

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[36] For a case-study on key issues concerning black gloss dating see for example (Lambrugo et al. forthcoming) forthcoming on rural fourth-century BCE Sicily.

[37] For example, the Terramare civilization in the Po plain witnessed an increase in goat faunal remains at the expense of pigs at a time of increasing aridity in the 12th century BCE (Cardarelli 2010, p. 469).

Whatever the resilience strategies of the people occupying the small rural sites near Canusium, they seem to have been successful in the long run: 75% of the sites that appear in the late fourth and third centuries seem to survive into the late first century BCE. Also, whatever may have been happening in the Tavoliere and Murge, the overall impression derived from the historical and archaeological records is one of economic growth rather than decline. In other words, the way in which the rural incomers seem to have responded to social and environmental pressures arguably led to the economic strengthening of the community as a whole, rather than towards its disintegration and decline. It is important to remember that Canusium found itself at the centre of what was perhaps one of the major crises ever faced by Rome and her allies: in 216 BCE, Roman hegemony hung by a thread after the battle at Cannae, just a few miles downriver from Canusium. Presumably, the support of allied communities such as Canusium helped bring about Rome's victory against Hannibal, which contributed greatly to Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean (Eckstein 2006, pp. 264–65; Fronda 2010, p. 330). Despite the possible existence of socio-political tensions within the community, which (as we saw) may account for the movement of people into the Tavoliere and Murge, Canusium managed to prosper and come to Rome's aid—as the story of Busa seems to suggest.[38] We could therefore be looking at a case where the everyday resilience of displaced common people may have helped secure Roman political and military supremacy. This is a hypothesis that would benefit from further exploration in future research.

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38 But see (Fronda 2010, pp. 95–96) for a more nuanced assessment of the Busa episode (above).

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Comment

Anthropocene Shiftings: Response to Perego, E. and Scopacasa, R. The Agency of the Displaced? Roman Expansion, Environmental Forces, and the Occupation of Marginal Landscapes in Ancient Italy. *Humanities* 2018, 7, 116

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Abstract: In this response to Elisa Perego and Rafael Scopacasa's article, I reflect on connections across time and space from an Anthropocenic perspective that is, by urgent necessity, open to the unexpected. In Ancient Italy, and contemporary Tuvalu and Brazil, it is possible to find similarly unexpected ends being achieved among populations that move, whose lives are lived on ground that cannot be assumed to be inert: earth has agency, and over time, it shifts, or is flooded, or buries things. When non-elites are moving into marginal places where life is tough, where earthly agency cannot be ignored, such people are also finding themselves at the centre of major turning points in history. Mobility and survival in marginal places can offer a way to live a less colonized life.

Who belongs to the Banaban soil that was dispersed across the New Zealand landscape?

Katerina Martina Teaiwa (2005), "Our Sea of Phosphate"

Some stories say our ancestors came from volcano stone
Lidrepdrepju—a basalt rock goddess rooted in reef
Today I keep a basalt rock on my bookshelf
What tokens of our land shall we/will we
store in our selves
inside our honeycomb of chest bones
the buzzing of a shore long gone

Kathy Jetñil-Kijiner (2017) extract from "Butterfly Thief"

Perego and Scopacasa (2018, p. 2) ask a question that is equally applicable in Ancient Italy as it is in contemporary Brazil and the Pacific Islands: "how, and in what circumstances, can human agency rework the negative effects of social and environmental constraints, and channel them towards unexpected ends?" Their piece, *Agency of the Displaced? Roman Expansion, Environmental Forces, and the Occupation of Marginal Landscapes in Ancient Italy*, offers an opportunity to look for connections across time and space, from an Anthropocenic method of inquiry that is, by urgent necessity, open to the unexpected. Issues of agency, place and mobility considered in a study of the rural lives of non-ruling populations of the Roman Empire, are in turn shaped by reflecting on agency in informal settlements in contemporary Brazil. And from Ancient Italy, the Anthropocene comfortably allows a turn towards the atoll islands of the Pacific, since all is now understood to be intricately interconnected:

> There is nowhere to stand "outside" of things, no objectively bound space from which to
> stand aside and document ... everything becomes humbled within the Anthropocene's vast,
> intensified realm of relationships. (Chandler and Pugh 2018, p. 4)

In the Anthropocene, space, time, and power are layering in complex ways as the Earth reveals itself to be both utterly vulnerable to human activity while also having agency that humans cannot entirely control (Hamilton 2017). With the Anthropocene upon us, archaeologists and historians have much to offer other disciplines, such as mine, human geography, that, except for historical geography, are often only casually tuned into the importance of the temporal. The notion of the dig, for instance, offers geography-rich ideas of material circulation and sedimentation, constitutive of constantly enfolding, unfolding histories and cultures. Geography' spaces and places, dynamic as they are, need to be more alive to the layers of time. So, if the Daunians "found themselves at the centre of major turning-points in history", might their rural shift be understood as a response to a sensed forthcoming existential upheaval (Perego and Scopacasa 2018, p. 2)? The age of the Anthropocene renders such questions relevant across time and space. While geographers have highlighted that the Anthropocene is not only a geological era but also a spatial system, "a human-dominated biosphere challenging the resilience of a livable planet" (Carpenter et al. 2019, np), history reminds geography to beware of snapshots. We are facing a new future in which humans may not exist, at our own hands, so we must rethink both what we know, and how we know it (Brondizio et al. 2016; Lövbrand et al. 2015). In Ancient Italy, and contemporary Tuvalu and Brazil, it is possible to find similarly unexpected ends being achieved among populations that move, whose lives are lived on ground that also cannot be assumed to be inert: it has agency, and over time, it shifts, or is flooded, or buries things. The unexpected is the self-sufficiency of everyday people, moving into marginal places where life is tough, where earthly agency cannot be ignored. Since rationalist, technocentric, often paternalistic approaches to problem-solving are failing at the global scale, it seems urgent and necessary to "become better attuned to material interruptions of common sense"—the unexpected—which may have "the potential to help those in privileged positions feel the urgency of what they cannot yet see" (Erev 2019, p. 16). Perego and Scopacasa (2018) present a case for unexpected resilience following mobility into areas possibly affected by unstable climate conditions, away from centres of power. In the current era of unsolved climate change, perhaps it is the elites who must learn from those who already are tuned into the coming catastrophe, and mobilizing in various ways, including to sites of survival.

There is an (externally created) common sense of what is happening in low-lying islands in the Anthropocene: These are islands that are entirely low-lying in the face of a warmed, encroaching ocean. They have no higher ground for retreat. People's homes will become increasingly waterlogged, lands will erode away, and crops and water supplies will become increasingly salty as the water moves in. In this type of account, very common in climate change narratives (Farbotko 2012), it is important that only water is accorded agency. People and their land are accorded surprisingly little. This matters because privileging the agency of water enables complex land–people relations to be conveniently reduced to one question in geopolitical debate: what will happen to 'climate refugees'? Without recognised agency of people or land, there seems little option for affected populations but to leave, destitute, arriving someplace else, as a "problem" for the international community to solve. This is a colonization of conceptual space that adds to the multiple colonizations of the Pacific Islands. Yet, there are other conceptualizations, where the agency of people and non-watery territory is acknowledged, particularly among the affected populations themselves (Suliman et al. 2019; Farbotko 2012). Central to many Pacific Island indigeneities is the ancient concept of *banua, meaning an inhabited territory which included the village and its population along with everything that contributes to the life support system of that community (Blust 1987). *Banua became, and remains, highly specific to particular places, for example, vanua in Fiji, fonua in Tonga, and whanua in New Zealand. But this particularity became possible because of *banua's mobility and adaptiveness, and its endurance over time. The ancient Austronesian people were highly mobile, travelling over a period of several thousand

years, through southeast Asia and, into the remote islands of the Pacific Ocean, taking *banua with them (Suliman et al. 2019).

Interruptions to the 'common-sense' account of sea-level rise take multiple forms among the activists, artists, scholars, spiritual leaders and others in the Pacific Islands, who argue convincingly for their own knowledges to be forefront in the advancement of sustainable Pacific futures (e.g., Duittuturaga 2017; Lagi 2017; Lumā Vaai 2017; Māhina 2008; Nabobo-Baba 2006; Thaman 2002; Trask 1991). Thus far, the potential in Pacific knowledge to enable Pacific people to survive the Anthropocene on their own terms has likely been far from fully realised (Duittuturaga 2017; Lumā Vaai and Casimira 2017; Long 2017; Māhina 2008). Just one example: unbound from the constraints of colonizing knowledge, Pacific poets and writers intimately know the connections between indigeneity and colonizing agriculture, distant in time and space but nevertheless connected through the colonized substance called phosphate, belonging to Banabans and Nauruans of the Pacific. Banabans and their phosphate-rich land were displaced and dug up from Banaba to ensure that farms were productive in Australia and New Zealand. Today, Pacific workers pick fruit in Australia alongside backpackers and undocumented migrants, doing work which residents of Australia find too difficult and too low paid (Howe et al. 2019). Australian horticulture would not thrive without Pacific people: their phosphate, their bodies, their mobilities, connections which colonial powers still cannot or will not see (Teaiwa 2005; Kihara 2019). Teaiwa (2005, p. 187) writes of the 'political and poetic resonances between the past and the present, and the very material or organic forms in which such resonances were embedded.' Teaiwa (2005) showed how, with phosphate, indigeneity moves and does not disappear across geopolitical boundaries, albeit with injurious impacts on rights to self-determination. Banaba itself is moving through colonial systems. This unboundedness of place enables the survival of indigeneity. Place moves in order for indigenous people to remain resilient in a world where the powerful find multiple ways to uproot people and exploit their land.

My own work in Tuvalu focuses on agency of the potentially displaced (e.g., Farbotko 2012). On my most recent study visit (an as-yet-unpublished data set) (Farbotko 2019), I observed a coherent movement of urban dwellers into a marginal, rural, coastal site—Funafala—accessible only by boat. Funafala is valued by those moving there as a place that enables indigeneity away from the busy capital. Urban–rural migration is not 'expected,' but is happening nonetheless. The residents of Funafala are well aware of both climate risks and climate geopolitics, but are choosing to move to a culturally important site in defiance of expectations of sea-level rise and lack of services or employment. Further, this is not the only movement observable in Tuvalu, and not all movement is of humans. Some is only detectable to local experts, some to scientists. Sand is being dredged from the lagoon in an attempt to protect and build up land. Dredging changes lagoon dynamics, creating new patterns of sand and water. Tuning into these dynamics, coastal geomorphologists and local knowledge holders on atolls have long known that atolls are dynamic configurations of land and sea, so any attempt to measure sea-level rise must take this dynamic into account (Webb and Kench 2010; Yarina and Takemoto 2017). Social life on atolls is embedded in this dynamism.

Land expansion, requiring continued maintenance, was conducted before colonial forces intervened. On Rongelap atoll in the Marshall Islands, human-produced land expansion halted when people were relocated following the use of their island for nuclear experimentation, and land reverted to its unexpanded form. This reversion of the land mass would appear "to the untrained eye or the unprepared scientist [. . .] to be erosion of an island and possibly the effects of global climate change" (Bridges and McClatchey 2009, p. 145). Traditional land boundaries, furthermore, are also redefined on atolls as land shifts, as productive land is rested, and as harvesting is moved to other areas (Yarina and Takemoto 2017; Bridges and McClatchey 2009). Social agency and land agency intermingle. None of this disproves climate change impacts, but rather serves as a reminder that, in the Anthropocene, multiple perspectives are necessary, and what we think we know is only ever a partial account of a larger, dynamic system that is unfolding over time as well as at multiple scales, from the micro to the global:

> An island is continuously being made and unmade, through human and non-human activities and processes that interact with the performances of sand. Therefore, there is no specific start or end point to the life of an island; what an island is—how it constitutes the lifeworlds of those living on it—is never complete but is continually under construction. (Kothari and Arnall 2019, p. 9)

But when this process of 'construction' involves acts of artificial land reclamation, this can also impact the agency of those living on the original land. Kathy Jetñil-Kijiner, an artist whose homeland is the low-lying Marshall Islands, is calling for new balms for the 'raw grief' being experienced about land reclamation as a response to sea-level rise. The artificiality of new land does not satisfactorily address the emotions wrought by climate change, as shared in her reflection entitled 'rituals for artificial islands':

> Building islands or even just elevating would mean ripping apart our land, and with it the roots of our culture, as well as displacing/uprooting thousands of people in the process, and using processes that could destroy precious reefs. It's extreme, and desperate. (Jetñil-Kijiner 2019, np)

It seems that reclaimed land, if it is to calm and not cause raw grief associated with climate change impacts, will need to be decolonized:

> No island was ever an island to begin with. Thus, no island is an island. Never was, never will be. At least this is how I cling on to islands in the advanced wake of their disappearance on account of rising waters. (Diaz 2011, p. 28)

Diaz's argument is that islands are colonial, continental constructs, as Dan-el Padilla Peralta (2019, p. 3) puts it, 'doomed never to be a piece of the continent, a part of the main.' For Jetñil-Kijiner, a 'basalt rock on a bookshelf' stands ready to remind of the loss of atoll place today and tomorrow, if artificial islands are not attentive to the culture and ancestry of people for which they are constructed. Land reclamation is occurring in the urban area that Funafala people are leaving. Island people are keeping close track of their indigeneity, wherever they go, and protecting it in unexpected ways.

Returning to the question of the shift to the rural in the time of possibly unstable climatic conditions in the Roman empire examined by Perego and Scopacasa, the unexpected has significant contemporary lessons. Among communities who find themselves at the centre of major turning points in history, an ability to survive in a marginal place is not only possible, but desirable, if it offers a way to live a less-colonized life. As in ancient Canusium, trade-offs in sustenance and other resources might be acceptable for freedoms gained from elites, colonizers, artificial—or marginalized, in the case of Daunia—land that does not feel like home, and other powerful forces. As the rest of humanity contemplates our ability to cause, but perhaps not prevent, our own demise, it might be useful to attempt to learn more about decolonized survival from those who were, as in ancient Canusium, or are, in the case of atoll populations, still tuned deeply into the earth's agency (Erev 2019).

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Article

Dalmatians and Dacians—Forms of Belonging and Displacement in the Roman Empire

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Abstract: Inspired by the catalyst papers, this essay traces the impact of displacement on existing and emerging identities of groups and individuals which were relocated to 'frontier' areas in the aftermath of conflict and conquest by Rome during the reign of emperor Trajan. The Dacian Wars, ending in 106 CE with the conquest of Dacia by Roman armies, not only resulted in the deliberate destruction of settlements and the society of the conquered, but also the removal of young Dacian men by forced recruitment into the Roman army, some serving the emperor in the Eastern Egyptian Desert. In turn, the wealth in gold and silver of the newly established Roman province of Dacia was exploited by mining communities arriving from Dalmatia. As a result of these 'displacements' caused by war and the shared experience of mining in the remote mountains of Dacia or guarding roads through the desert east of the Nile, we can trace the emergence of new senses of belonging alongside the retainment of fixed group identities.

Keywords: Dacian Wars; Trajan; recruitment; Roman army; mining; Dacians; Dalmatians; identity; frontier; Roman Egypt

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The term 'displacement' initially evokes wholly negative connotations; of loss, alienation, precariousness; it evokes televised images of deadly conflict, social and ethnic tension, economic and ecological collapse, of people amassing on boats and borders; images of sprawling refugee camps, ramshackle sheds, of dirt, disease and hopelessness. The catalyst papers, however, provide an angle which focuses not on the dynamic moments of forced migration and the causes. Instead, their emphasis is on the comparatively static consequences for refugees or those people refered to as economic migrants establishing themselves in new environments, be that through the assignment of space in ordered camps in Jordan, or through the self-directed occupation of land on the peripheries of Brazilian cities.

The example of the Dandara community (Ribeiro et al. 2017) near Belo Horizonte is thought-provoking: it established itself on vacant property as a result of the costliness of available living space in the city and far larger socio-economic dynamics still at play in Brazil. Most striking is the self-organization of this community, not only in terms of resistance against authorities, but crucially so in the establishment of a communal sense of belonging. This is expressed through the choice of a place name, Dandara, a female protagonist in the historic slave revolts of Brazil. Issues of belonging and community formation abound even more so in the case of the Zaatari camp in northern Jordan near the Syrian border (Dalal 2017). There, refugees from Syria are confronted with the social practices and habits of compatriots from different parts of the country. Whilst the commonality of being 'Syrian' and a refugee brings them together in their peripheral camps, there is also a recognition of diversity in the practices—a recognition often obscured by the perception of those seeking refuge being a homogenous group. Both examples concern the creation of a place, either by the common will of the displaced, or the assignment by the governing authority of a place to people who are displaced. The ensuing

(re-)negotiation of social positions amongst those party to these 'new' communities raise questions that make us sensitive to the predicament of people in new communities in earlier contexts, as those from the Roman world. The rich evidence particularly from Dacia (*c.* modern Romania) and Roman Egypt, allow for the further exploration of these issues, in relation to a different type of mobile community that often had to exist on the margins—that of the miners and soldiers.

The conquest of Dacia by the Roman army under emperor Trajan in 106 was the culmination of lengthy wars which began in the late 1st century CE. The integration of this region into the empire was accompanied by a significant movement of people in and out of the newly established Roman province of Dacia. In the case of certain cavalry and infantry soldiers from Dacia and miners from the province of Dalmatia, we can trace their relocation after 106 CE to the desert forts in the Eastern Egyptian Desert and to the gold mining district of Alburnus Maior in the Apuseni mountains of Romania, respectively, in the textual evidence (funerary epitaphs, votive altars, graffiti on rockfaces, letters or contracts written on pottery sherds, so-called *ostraca*, or wood/wax tablets). The perception that Dalmatians and Dacians were forcibly relocated or resettled does not arise necessarily from reading ancient texts in Greek and Latin, but derives from the scholarly interpretations of the written evidence: Stanislaw Mrozek, for instance, used the German verb 'umsiedeln', implying the resettlement or relocation of Dalmatians by the Roman state to a mining district far from home—and his view has proven rather influential.[1] Whether the arrival of Dalmatians at a remote mining district was orchestrated by Roman authorities is in need of further investigation. As for the Dacians drafted into the Roman army during and in the immediate aftermath of the war, many of them did not have a say, not least about the location they would be seconded to.[2] The term 'displacement' therefore certainly applies here, whereas the phenomenon of Dalmatians in Alburnus Maior might also be explored through the concept of labour mobility. The latter allows for individuals and communities from Dalmatia to relocate to the gold-mining district in Dacia out of their own will in response to economic push-and-pull factors.

What makes both phenomena comparable, and links them with the cases of the Zaatari camp or the Dandara community is the negotiation of identities in the formation of (new) communities in the aftermath of forced relocations to peripheral zones, be that the Apuseni mountains of Dacia, the Eastern Egyptian Desert, Jordan's northern border, or the urban periphery of Belo Horizonte in Brazil. Rather than undertaking a direct comparison of ancient and modern phenomena, both catalyst papers inspire the re-evaluation of archaeological and written evidence related to 'displacement' in Roman Dacia in the 2nd c. CE in the light of the same themes—forced relocation to, and identity formation on, the periphery.[3] As we shall see, the displacement, the confrontation with other people, and the shared

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[1] Mrozek (1969, pp. 141–42); Mrozek (1977, p. 99). Daicoviciu (1958, p. 260) has the Dalmatians being sent by Rome ("l'envoi par Rome"); Wilkes (1969, p. 173) has them "transported" to Alburnus Maior, the Nemetis (Nemeti and Nemeti 2010, p. 111) speak of "dislocation". Other scholars are a bit more careful in describing the movement of communities from Dalmatia to Alburnus Maior.

[2] During the period of expansion under emperor Augustus (27BCE–14CE) young men of a conquered people could be forced into newly created auxiliary units (often carrying the name of the people they were recruited from, e.g., *ala I Asturum* or *cohors I Cantabrorum*); these units often served distant from home. With the consolidation of territorial gains during much of the 1st c. CE, recruitment to auxiliary units shifted from these original sources of manpower to volunteers, conscripts, and substitutes (for conscripts) from within and beyond the garrison province, see Haynes (2013, pp. 95–102, 121–34). With the conquest of Dacia the 'Augustan' practice was seemingly revived, though some Dacians were dispersed in small groups to units in provinces distant from Dacia (see below).

[3] Use of the concept 'displacement' in this essay follows the definition set out in the introduction to this Special Issue. The terms 'relocation' or 'resettlement' are used here to describe a spatial movement and change of permanent residence by individuals, by a group, or a community; the terms are understood to be neutral, i.e. to be free of any implication as to rationale or impetus for this movement. For the use of 'identity' as describing a sense of sameness shared by a collective or group to which individuals associate themselves, or are associated by others, see Barnard and Spencer (2002, p. 292); Nünning (2005, pp. 71–72), with further bibliography. The term 'ethnic', in this essay, is very narrowly defined as a category of ascriptions or designations in Latin or Greek used by Greco-Roman authors and Imperial authorities for groups or 'peoples' (Gk. 'ethnē', Lat. 'nationes') and which are adopted/adapted as self-descriptive names by groups. We do not know whether or not terms such as Dacian, Dalmatian, Illyrian, etc., reflect group descriptions in non-Greek/Latin languages at all. For a general discussion of 'ethnicity' as a concept in ancient history and archaeology, see Jones (1997); Hall (2002); various contributions in McInerney (2014).

experience in an unaccustomed, if not hostile, landscape is instrumental in the emergence of a sense of commonality.

Even though geographically distant, both Alburnus Maior and the forts along the roads to the Red Sea are comparable in that they are within a 'frontier', a concept originally devised by Frederick Jackson Turner. Since its inception in a paper in 1893, this concept has been decontextualised and developed further to encompass comparable processes throughout the world of land grabbing and exploitation of natural resources.[4] Scholarly attempts at delineating the concept 'frontier' have not necessarily resulted in one handy definition: a 'frontier' is not simply something locatable on a map, it can also encompass dynamic social and economic processes. They unfold in a space of cultural interactions between two or more distinct societies in an asymmetric power relationship with one invading society coming from the outside often to the detriment of the invaded. These frontier processes are the result of private initiative rather than driven by the state.[5]

This definition is perhaps not adequate enough in framing the context in which the mining community at Alburnus Maior or the military society in the Eastern Egyptian Desert find themselves. The concept 'frontier', is not necessarily limited to a definable physical zone between two political or social entities but can entail an ecological dimension: Turner had already thought of 'mining frontiers' as a distinct category (Osterhammel suggests 'resource-extraction frontiers') and, more recently, 'frontier of settlement' has been used in terms of claiming agricultural land or the extraction of valuable resources from the wilderness on the periphery of settled and developed land.[6] It is this context the Dalmatians at Alburnus Maior find themselves in and which provides a specific socio-economic and ecological backdrop for the expression of identities. In this respect the Dacians in the forts east of the Nile valley found themselves on a 'frontier' in the more common sense of the term: it can also describe a void or zone which is not controlled or cannot be controlled by the state beyond an area or line of military defence and from which threats to the security and order can emerge (Osterhammel 2014, p. 328). As we shall see, this concept of frontier applies more adequately to the Dacians relocated to these forts, from where they watched over a transient community of merchants, camel drivers, quarrymen, along with their families or prostitutes travelling on desert roads between the Nile and the Red Sea—a constant ebbing and flowing of goods and people punctuated, according to ancient authors, by sudden attacks of the Bedouin seemingly out of nowhere. It is this specificity of geographical place, of the real or perceived remoteness from settled, agriculturally developed, and secure areas, along with the anxieties and hopes affixed to these places on the fringe of tamed and wild nature, which seems best captured by the concept 'frontier'.[7] In applying this approach to the inscribed evidence for Dalmatian miners in Alburnus Maior and Dacian soldiers in the Eastern Egyptian Desert this paper seeks to re-examine and provide a new interpretation of the known epigraphic material in light of displacement.

We shall first turn our gaze to Dacia and explore why Dalmatians established themselves at a remote mining site in a distant province, examine remnants of ethnic 'divisions' amongst them, whilst probing the epigraphic evidence for signs of an emerging sense of community. The absence of Dacians from inscribed monuments at Alburnus Maior raises the question of what happened to the

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4 Marx (2003, p. 125); Geiger (2009, pp. 13–19); Osterhammel (2014, pp. 324–27).
5 Lamar and Thompson (1981, pp. 3–13); Marx (2003, pp. 123–24); Osterhammel (2014, pp. 326–27); see also Osterhammel (1995, pp. 111–14).
6 Osterhammel (2014, pp. 328–29). For the use of 'frontier' as a concept to describe the grab for resource in the internal peripheries of the developing world, see Geiger (2009); Rasmussen and Lund (2017, pp. 390–93).
7 Alternatively, the term 'borderland' or 'border' could be employed; in its narrow sense, i.e., a zone connected with a border between two political entities, 'borderland' seems less applicable, whereas in the wider sense as a cipher for a 'social space where cross-group interactions take place' (Sanders 2002, p. 328) it is conceptually too vague to be of analytical use, because it excludes the sense of remoteness from settled and ordered society (Lamont and Molnár 2002, pp. 167–69; Reger 2014, pp. 115–16).

native population of the recently conquered province.[8] The little evidence we have points towards the enrolment of parts of their young men into the Roman army and their secondment to the Eastern Egyptian Desert. The effects of displacement on these men form the second half of my investigation. As we shall see, both Dalmatians in Dacia and Dacians in Egypt retained aspects of their identities whilst developing shared senses of belonging shaped by their new existence, remote from home.

The focus of this study is on texts written on stone, on pottery sherds, or on wooden tablets, as these sources offer a more intimate and immediate reading of the sense of difference or belonging an individual or a community could experience, than the examination of material evidence might allow for. The close reading of these different genres of textual evidence, however, is limited by social, religious, or legal conventions. The full name of a person including patronym and 'nickname' or an 'ethnic' self-designation, for instance, might only be relevant in the context of signing a contract or when inscribed on an epitaph. In other words, the personal or communal identities expressed in these texts might not be of importance in everyday encounters with others, where a 'nickname' might suffice. With this caveat in mind, let us turn to the evidence from Alburnus Maior.

1. *Alburnus Maior*, Roman Dacia

The grab for natural resources, which drove the exploitation of gold lodes at *Alburnus Maior* (Roşia Montană) in the Apuseni mountains of Romania, followed upon the bloody conquest of the Dacians in 106 CE by Roman armies under the emperor Trajan. The Dacians, unified under king Decebalus, were seen as threatening neighbours operating for some three decades to the north of the Roman Danube provinces. The repeated Roman campaigns under Domitian and Trajan were mainly a response to this external threat posed by the Dacian tribal federation led by, first, Diurpaneus, and then Decebalus. These wars ended with the incorporation of Dacia into the Roman empire in the absence of any viable alternatives (Speidel 2009, pp. 140–50; Strobel 2010, p. 89ff.).

Apart from the deployment of a provincial garrison with the dual task of securing the border and pacifying the conquered population (Piso 2008, pp. 303–12), Rome began to establish a legal and fiscal framework in this new province—an administration headed by a (military) governor (Piso 2008, pp. 308–9). As in other provinces created by Rome post-conquest, the provincial administration oversaw the (re-)assignment of territory, the establishment of new communities, and instituted control over the mineral resources of the land. The latter is evident in post-conquest Northwestern Spain, the short-lived Augustan *provincia Germania*, or in Britain, where dated ingots and archaeological evidence appear to indicate the commencement, if not the intensification of metal resource exploitation. Whether this was initially driven by the state or by private individuals (i.e. Roman citizens and/or individual provincials) is hard to fathom.[9]

This grab for natural resources is also evidenced in the new province of Dacia. At Ampelum (modern Zlatna), some 21 km southeast of Alburnus Maior, the administrative headquarters of the imperial procurator in charge of goldmining in Dacia seems to have been established soon after 106 CE.[10] More importantly, at Roşia Montană recent surveys and excavations have allowed us to trace Roman mining tunnels and shafts and the associated settlements. Finds of wooden beams, ladders, even segments of a waterwheel, provide dendrochronological dates for when the mines were in operation; it appears the mines were up and running soon after 106 CE (Damian 2003; Cauuet and Tămaş 2012, pp. 235–37). In the late 18th and early 19th century, miners found inscribed wooden

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8   It is entirely possible that the conquered Dacians did not adopt the habit of setting up inscribed monuments which might also partly explain their absence from the textual record.

9   Northwestern Spain: Florus 2.33.59 f.; Hirt (2010, p. 334), with further bibliography; Britain: *RIB* 2: 2404.31–6. 61–2; Jones and Mattingly (2002, pp. 66–77).

10   An Ulpius Hermias, an imperial libertus, a former slave manumitted by Trajan, is attested at Ampelum, serving as procurator for the Dacian goldmines under Trajan or Hadrian; *CIL* 3: 1312 = *ILS* 1593 = *IDR* III/3, 366, with Noeske (1977, pp. 296, 347, AMP 1). For the mining administration at Ampelum: Hirt (2010, pp. 126–30, 149–52).

tablets in some of these shafts. In and around Roşia Montană funerary epitaphs and votive altars were recovered (most of which date to the 2nd century CE).[11]

The vast majority of men and women mentioned in these inscriptions and documentary texts have non-Roman names. Their names in fact are 'Illyrian', that is, a fragmentary language (surviving in personal names and place names) assumed by modern linguists to have been spoken in the Western Balkans in the Roman province of Dalmatia and Pannonia, an area once identified as Illyria, that is, the 'home' of the Illyrians.[12]

1.1. Displacement or Labour Mobility?

The circumstances by which these 'Illyrians' from Dalmatia arrived in the new province are not quite clear. Eutropius, writing in the later 4th century CE, claims that "Dacia defeated, Trajan brought in countless masses of people from the whole Roman world to till the soil and inhabit cities."[13] He also suggests that "Dacia, in fact, had been exhausted of men."[14] The influx of people from other provinces to Alburnus Maior and other parts of the newly established *provincia Dacia* is explained as a settlement movement initiated by Trajan. In the case of the Dalmatian miners at Alburnus Maior, prevailing scholarly opinion presumes their presence to be the result of a forced relocation due to their mining expertise.[15]

The literary and epigraphic evidence certainly supports the notion of Dalmatians being directly involved in the exploitation of gold and other metals within their own province. Pliny the Elder notes that in Dalmatia during the reign of Nero gold was detected near the surface; in Statius' ode to Vibius Maximus, Dalmatia is again identified as a source of gold, as it is in one of Martial's epigrams.[16] Florus claims that after the Pannonian Wars the provincial governor, on the orders of the emperor Augustus, forced the Dalmatians to work in the goldmines; the zeal and diligence with which they exploited the deposits, seemed as if they were extracting it for their own gain (Flor. 2.25). Although Roman mining sites *per se* have not been unmistakeably identified as of yet, the scholarly consensus is that mining for mineral resources was surely undertaken during the Roman period as well—this is strongly suggested by literary and epigraphic sources.[17] We may therefore presume that, initially, some Dalmatians arrived with their own expertise in mining at Alburnus Maior.

As of yet, there is no clear literary or documentary evidence for a forced resettlement of Dalmatians. Although Florus tells of Asturians (in Northwestern Spain) and Dalmatians being forcefully relocated to exploit the gold deposits in their homeland, this pertains to the period in the immediate aftermath following conquest under Augustus (Flor. 2.25, 2.33.60). The relocation of Dalmatians to Alburnus Maior might have been prompted by the invitation of the emperor to come to Dacia, the promise of wealth, and the prospect of improving one's social status.[18] Whether or not this movement was facilitated by a decline of mining in Dalmatia or other push factors awaits a more profound study of mining sites there.

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[11] *CIL* 3: p. 921; according to X. Neugebauer, in the 'Josephigrube', St. Joseph mine, six tablets were found in 1791 "neben einem alten Mann, der sofort zu Staub zerfiel als man ihn anrührte", next to the corpse of an old man who immediately crumbled to dust when touched. For an overview of inscribed monuments, see Ciongradi (2009).

[12] Katičić (1976, pp. 154–88); Katičić (1980); Woodard (2008, pp. 7–8).

[13] 8.6.2: *Traianus victa Dacia ex toto orbe Romano infinitas eo copias hominum transtulerat ad agros et urbes colendas.*

[14] 8.6.2: *Dacia enim diuturno bello Decibali viris fuerat exhausta.*

[15] See p. 2 with n. 1.

[16] Plin. *NH.* 33.67; Stat. *Silv.* 4.7.14-15; also see 1.2.153 and 3.3.89–90.; Mart. 10.79.

[17] For a survey, see Škegro (2000); Škegro (2006, pp. 149–52). Much of the data provided, though, hails from publication of surveyors and mining engineers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late 19th century, detailing what they think are Roman vestiges. On this problematic complex, see (Mladenović).

[18] According to Cuvigny (1996, p. 145) the wages the miners at Alburnus Maior received, seems to be well above average pay for menial labour, an indication that specialist work such as mining was well rewarded.

1.2. 'Illyrians' in Alburnus Maior

The wooden tablets found in the mining shafts—twenty-five inscribed with texts in Latin (one in Greek)—concern various legal arrangements and contracts. The names of those either party to the contract or acting as witnesses, reveals a diverse make-up in terms of legal status and origins. Besides men with the full *tria nomina*, that is, men who according to prevalent scholarly opinion are Roman citizens, the texts also render the names of *peregrini*, i.e., members of non-Roman communities within the Roman Empire. The chronological range of these texts stretches from 131 to 167 CE, with the bulk dating to the 160s. The texts refer mostly to economic activity in and around Alburnus Maior and further afield (Russu 1975, pp. 165–256; Noeske 1977, pp. 336 ff.). These wooden tablets allow us to capture a segment of local society which would not necessarily appear in the inscribed funeral and votive monuments discovered on site, either because those mentioned were unable to afford funerary epitaphs, their presence in the goldmining district was only temporary, or they only had loose connections to the district (Noeske 1977, p. 336).

One such contract in Latin documents the sale of an enslaved girl by Dasius Verzonis to a Maximus Batonis and was signed on 17 March 139 CE at Kartum; here the information relevant arises at the beginning and end of the document:

> *Maximus Batonis puellam nomine | Passiam, sive ea quo alio nomine est an | norum sex* [above line: *circiter p(lus) m(inus) empta sportellaria*] *emit mancipioque accepit | de Dasio Verzonis Pirusta ex Kaviereti*[*o*] *| * ducentis quinque. . . . dari fide rogavit | Maximus Batonis, fide promisit Dasius | | Verzonis Pirusta ex Kaviereti*[*o*]. *Proque ea puella, quae s(upra) s(cripta) est,* * *ducen | tos quinque accepisse et habere | se dixit Dasius Verzonis a Maximo Batonis . . .*

> Maximus son of Bato has bought and accepted as a *mancipium* a girl by name Passia, or if she is (known) by any other name, m(ore or) l(ess) around six years old, having been bought as a foundling, for 205 (denarii), from Dasius son of Verzo, a Pirustian from Kavieretium. . . . Maximus the son of Bato asked to be given in faith, Dasius son of Verzo a Pirustian from Kavieretium promised in faith. Dasius son of Verzo said that he received and has for this girl, w(ho) i(s) w(ritten) a(bove), 250 denarii from Maximus son of Bato. Done at Kartum on the 16th day before the Kalends of April when (emperor) Titus Aelius Caesar Antoninus Pius and Bruttius Praesens were consuls (for the second time) . . . [19]

Our focus here is not on the legal implications of this contract, nor on the slave herself (which raises a wholly different aspect of displacement), but on those party to the contract. Dasius Verzonis (read as Dasius, son of Verzo) is understood to be an 'Illyrian' name, i.e. the name 'Dasius' as well as the name of his father (the patronym) 'Verzo' are both attested in the Roman province of Dalmatia. More importantly, Dasius Verzonis is identified as *Pirusta ex Kaviereti*[*o*], a man of the Pirustae, a *civitas* in the southern parts of Dalmatia, from *Kavieretium*.[20] Regarding Maximus son of Bato (Maximus Batonis), Maximus is a widely popular Latin *cognomen* and Bato an Illyrian name seems to be typical of Pannonian tribes in Dalmatia and in Pannonia.[21]

This contract over the sale of a slave girl also notes a host of witnesses to the contract.[22] We may presume that the witnesses to this document were present at the place where the contract was

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[19] *TC* VI, *CIL* 3, p. 936.6 (p. 2215); Noeske (1977, p. 392); ed. and trans. Meyer (2004, pp. 56–57).

[20] *TC* VI, *CIL* 3, p. 936.6 (p. 2215), *l.* 4: *de Dasio Verzonis Pirusta ex kavereti*[*o*]. It is not quite clear whether the toponym Kavieretium/k(astellum) Avireti(um) refers to a place in or near the mining district of Alburnus Maior or whether it needs to be sought in Dalmatia in the territory of the Pirustae, see Daicoviciu (1958, p. 263); Piso (2004, p. 293, n. 146); Ciongradi et al. (2008, p. 254, n. 35). Dasius, son of Verzo, is furthermore mentioned as party to a land sale or the exchange of a lump sum in *TC* XVII, *CIL* 3, p. 954, see Noeske (1977, p. 409); Piso (2004, p. 280 no. 71).

[21] For 'Illyrian' names noted in this text and footnotes see the Appendix A.

[22] The names of the witnesses were not appended in their own handwriting, but by the same scribe who wrote the main text next to the individual seals of the witnesses, see Th. Mommsen, at *CIL* 3, p. 922; Ciulei (1983, p. 14).

concluded and written, i.e., Kartum, which we suspect was within or near the mining district of Alburnus Maior.[23] Given the findspot of the tablet in a mining shaft, the involvement of the contractual parties and the witnesses—if not directly in the mining 'industry', then at least in auxiliary services (smelting, provisions, credit, etc.)—is highly likely. The witnesses listed are Maximus Veneti, a *princeps*; Masurius Messii, a *decurio*; Anneses Andunocnetis; Planius Verzonis from Sclaietae; Liccaius Epicadi from Marcinium; and Epicadus Plarentis qui et (also known as) Mico. Most have Illyrian names or filiations, indicating their non-Roman or 'peregrine' status and their origin, except for Masurius Messii.[24] He is noted as a *decurio*, a member of a local council (*ordo decurionum*).[25]

More of a surprise, though, is the designation of Maximus Veneti as a *princeps*, a 'first man' or 'chief'; this term resonates with the epigraphic evidence from communities in Dalmatia. Epitaphs note *principes* of the Delmatae and of numerous communities.[26] These men have been addressed as the aristocracy of Dalmatian tribes.[27] Whether Maximus Veneti had been *princeps* of a community back in Dalmatia, or whether he attained membership of the local elite and became *princeps* of a community in or near Alburnus Maior, is not easily decided. The backstory of Maximus Veneti might be very similar to another *princeps* called T(itus) Aurelius Aper who on a funerary monument from the late 2nd or early 3rd century CE at nearby Ampelum, is noted as a *Delmata* and *princeps adsignatus* from the town (*municipium*) of *Splonum* in Dalmatia.[28] Some assumed that Aurelius Aper, as *princeps*, was a member of the elite at Ampelum, having arrived there from Dalmatia under Septimius Severus and bringing his estate, including slaves, with him.[29]

The other witnesses with 'Illyrian' names do not provide much further indication of their social status beyond being *peregrini*.[30] To find Illyrian names in this contract is not a surprise at all: as already noted, the vast majority of epitaphs and altars discovered in and near Roşia Montană display 'Illyrian' appellations of men and women.[31] The case of the *princeps* Maximus Veneti, however, illustrates

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[23] For Kartum (or k(astellum) Artum?), see Russu (1957, p. 245); Daicoviciu (1958, p. 263); Piso (2004, p. 272 n. 11).

[24] For the 'Illyrian' names, see Appendix A. For the toponyms? *Sclaietae* and *Marcinium*, see Russu (1957, p. 248); Noeske (1977, pp. 277, 393); Piso (2004, p. 292), with further bibliography. Masurius and Messius might well be Latin names, but an Illyrian interpretation of their names has been suggested as well, see Alföldy (1969, pp. 98–99).

[25] The text does not specify which council he was part of, but a small community such as Alburnus Maior could have had a council as well. Noeske (1977, p. 275); Piso (2004, p. 300). Councils and magistrates are attested for *vici*, small settlements, as well, see Tarpin (2002, pp. 261–82); if Masurius were a member of a municipal *ordo decurionum* one would expect a Latin gentilnomen and tria nomina.

[26] Principes of Delmatae, see *CIL* 3:2776; of **civitates**, see *princeps Desit(i)atum* (1st half 2nd c. CE; Breza; *ILJug* 1582), *princeps civitatis Docl(e)atium* (ILJug 1853), *pri[nceps civ(itatis)] Dinda[riorum]* (mid/late 2nd c. CE; Skelani [Srebenerica]; ILJug 1544); of **municipia** (e.g., CIL 3:2774, mid/late 2nd c. CE, Danilo Gornje [Šibenik]) and of other communities, i.e., a *princeps k(astelli) Salthua* (2nd half 2nd c. CE?; Suntulija near Riječani [Nikšić]; *ILJug* 1853), a *princ[eps] caste[lli]* from the Upper Cetina valley (Milošević 1998, pp. 102–3), or a *princeps* of a hitherto unnamed *municipium S*[. . .]/mod. Pljevlja, which is thought to be within the territory of the *Pirustae* (2nd half 2nd c. CE; *AE* 2002: 1115 = 2005: 1183). Leaders of the Iapodes are known as *praepositus* (CIL 3: 14325), *praepositus Iapodum* (CIL 3: 14328), or *praepositus et princeps* (CIL 3: 14324, 1432) in inscribed votive monuments to Bundus Neptunus at Privilica near Bihać, see Džino (2014, pp. 224–25).

[27] Wilkes (1969, pp. 287–88); Alföldy (1965, pp. 176–77); Džino (2010, pp. 163–64).

[28] *CIL* 3: 1322 (late 2nd c. CE). Splonum has not yet been located, but the prevailing suggestions see it either in the territory of the Sardeates (see below) or of the Pirustae, see Alföldy (1962); Alföldy (1965, p. 158, near Šipovo, BIH); Wilkes (1965, p. 123, Plevlja, MNE); Bojanovski (1988, p. 255) = Barrington Atlas Map 20 (Vrtoče near Drvar, BIH); see also Piso (2004, p. 300, n. 216). Delmata here probably means the province rather than the *civitas* or tribe of the same name, see Piso (2004, p. 300 n. 216).

[29] Noeske (1977, pp. 342, 393). Patsch (1899, p. 265 n. 7) saw Aper as member of the civic elite at Splonum. Whether further Dalmatian settlers came or were brought in under Septimius Severus in order to renew gold mining operations is another issue, which is closely linked to the problem whether the mining district suffered from the Marcomannic Wars in the late 160s and early 170s or not. Noeske (1977, pp. 343, 369); Piso (2004, pp. 301–2) does not believe that the latest date attested on wax tablets (March 29, 167 CE) is a *terminus post quem* for a Marcomannic attack on Dacia, unlike Noeske (1977, pp. 336–37); Birley (1993, pp. 151, 252).

[30] Two witnesses Planius Verzonis and Liccaius Epicadi seem to be named together with their places of origin, i.e., Sclaies /Scalaietae and Marcinium, respectivly. Daicoviciu (1958, pp. 263–64 n. 28), Russu (1975, pp. 189–90), and Noeske (1977, p. 277) think these toponyms refer to localities in Dalmatia, indicating their *origo* or place of origin. Patsch (1899, p. 266) places them in the relative vicinity of Alburnus Maior. Piso (2004, p. 292, with further bibliography) suggests reading Sclaietis and Marciniesi as names of *gentes* or tribes.

[31] For a list, see Noeske (1977, pp. 329–47); Piso (2004, pp. 274–90).

that the community was not egalitarian, but stratified—an observation underpinned by the contracts which reveals further socioeconomic distinctions between employers and miners, landowners, bankers even—between have and have-nots.[32]

1.3. Internal Divisions?

A closer look at the place names, so-called toponyms, mentioned in the wooden tablets and the inscribed votive and funerary monuments reveal further fault lines within this mining community. The contract provides the place name *Kartum*. Toponyms also emerge in other writing tablets, adding to our knowledge of local geography of this Dacian mining district: one contract, for instance, for the sale of a house is signed at *vicus Pirustarum*.[33]

The place names emerging in inscribed funerary epitaphs and monuments devoted to deities deserve further scrutiny: at the cemetery of Ṭarina in the immediate vicinity of Roşia Montană, a recently published epitaph reveals the following text:[34]

> D(*is*) M(*anibus*) | *Dasas Liccai* (*filius*) | *Del*(*mata*) k(*astello*) *Starvae* | *vixit an*(*nis*) *XXXV* |[5]
> *pos*(*uerunt*) *Beucus* | *Sarius et DA*[. . .] | [. . .]*i heredes b*(*ene*) *m*(*erenti*).

> To the spirits of the dead. Dasas, son of Liccaius, Dalmatian, from the fortified settlement (*kastellum*) of the Starvae, lived 35 years. The heirs Beucus, Sarius, and Da[-] set up (this epitaph), well-deserving.

Apart from Dasas, son of Liccaius, being identified as Dalmatian, his home is given as *kastellum Starva*. Of interest is the toponym *kastellum Starva*, which appears in a further epitaph set up at Ṭarina.[35] The place name refers to a (fortified) settlement and, what appears to be an ethnonym, i.e., the name of a people called the 'Starvae'. That these people must be located in Dalmatia, is already indicated by the designation 'Delmata'. Luckily, an inscribed epitaph for a councillor, a *decurio*, of the *municipium Salvium* /Vrba (BiH), who is *natus Starve*, allows us to locate the Starvae more precisely within the territory of this municipality.[36]

Similar toponyms consisting of the term *kastellum* and ethnonyms are mentioned on other funerary stones and on votive altars: on 'Hǎbad' hill south of Roşia Montană three altars are dedicated either by a k(*astellum*) *Ansi,* or by k(*astellani*) *Ansi* or *Ansi*(*enses*), the inhabitants of the *kastellum*.[37] Two further altars clearly denote a k(*astellum*) *Ansis*.[38] These votives seem to derive from a sanctuary or sanctuaries on Hǎbad, which were excavated together with settlement remains and a cemetery (Damian 2003, pp. 121–57). Moreover, the cemetery yielded a funerary epitaph set up for Platino Verzonis of the k(*astellum*) *Anso* by her husband (CIL 3: 1271; Ciongradi 2009, no. 124). The same sanctuary on Hǎbad also received an altar commissioned by Dalmatians for the well-being of the *Maniates*. A k(*astellum*) *Man*(*iatium?*) might be noted on an altar to Diana found at the cemetery of Ṭarina.[39] On Carpeni hill at Roşia Montană a *genius* of the *collegium* k(*astelli*) *Baridust*(*arum*) receives a votive altar (AE

32 Funerary association: *CIL* 3, p. 924 ff.; loan receipt: *CIL* 3, pp. 930 ff.; loan contract: *CIL* 3, pp. 934–35; work contracts: *CIL* 3, pp. 933, 948–49; slave sale contracts: *CIL* 3, pp. 936 ff., 940 ff., 959ff.; house sale: *CIL* 3, pp. 944 ff.; deposit: *CIL* 3, p. 949; loan association: CIL 3, pp. 950–51.

33 TC VIII tab. 1 r *l.3*, *CIL* 3 pp. 944–45. (6 May 159 CE). Further evidence: a writ on dissolution of a funeral association was posted in Alburnus Maior *ad statio Resculi* (*TC* I *l.2*, *CIL* 3, p. 924 [9 February 167 CE]); a receipt details payment at *Deusara* (*TC* II tab. 3 r *l.2*, *CIL* 3, pp. 931–32 [20 June 162 CE]); a further slave sale contract is concluded in in the civilian settlement (*cannabae*) adjacent to the legionary camp of the XIIIth Gemina at *Apulum*/Alba Iulia (*TC* VII tab. 2 r *l.19*, *CIL* 3, pp. 940–41. [16 May 142 CE]); a second slave sale contract is concluded at the same site: *TC* XXV tab. 2 r *l.17*, *CIL* 3, p. 959 (4 October 140 CE). A contract for work in the gold mines was concluded at *Immenosum Maius*: TC X *l.11*, *CIL* 3, p. 948 (19 May 164 CE).

34 *AE* 2008: 1166; Ciongradi et al. (2008); Ciongradi (2009, no. 109).

35 *AE* 2007:1201= *AE* 2008:1167; Ciongradi et al. (2008); Ciongradi (2009, no. 119).

36 Wilkes (1969, p. 271 n. 4); Ciongradi et al. (2008, p. 253), with further bibliography.

37 *AE* 1990: 832, 835, 848; Ciongradi (2009, p. 14 and nos. 9, 10, 17).

38 *AE* 1990: 836, 842; Ciongradi (2009, p. 14 and nos. 20, 48).

39 *AE* 1990: 831; Ciongradi (2009, no. 79). k(*astellum*) *Man*(*iatium?*), see Ciongradi (2009, no. 12).

1944: 24; Ciongradi 2009, no. 64). We are thus left with a whole series of toponyms consisting of 'kastellum'+ethnonym (and in one instance 'vicus'+ethnonym, as in *vicus Pirustarum*).

A similar phenomenon is also observable for names of associations (*collegium*, sg.) and deities: altars from Drumuş near Roşia Montană mention a *Genius* of the *collegium Sardiatarum*; a *Genius Sardiatensium*; and a *collegium Sardiatensium* (AE 2003: 1487, 1488, 1491; Ciongradi 2009, nos. 22, 58, 85). A fragmentary inscription on an altar from Valea Nanului may render a *c*(*ollegium*) *Sar*(*diatenisum*/*diatarum*).[40] The ethnonyms 'Sardias', 'Sardiata', or 'Sardiates' are documented on inscribed altars and epitaphs, after personal names, such as Plator Sar(dias?) or Bisius Scenob(arbi) Sard(iata?) (Ciongradi 2009, 14 and no. 8). In two epitaphs the deceased, both with 'Illyrian' names, are noted as *Delmatae*.[41] What is more, an altar is dedicated to the divinity *Apto Delmatarum* at Valea Nanului, perhaps a water deity of the Dalmatians.[42]

As we observed already with the Starvae, these ethnonyms are not unknown to us: the term 'Pirustae'—which describes Dasius, son of Verzo, noted in the contract earlier—also appears in the place name *vicus Pirustarum* at Alburnus Maior. The tribe is noted as the name of a people by Julius Caesar in his 'Gallic War' and, in 54 BCE, is reported to have raided parts of the Roman province Illyricum nearest to them. Livy makes note of the Pirustae as part of the Dassaretii who receive immunity from tax liabilities and political independence in 167 BCE during the 3rd Macedonian War. The 'Peiroustai', confusingly, are counted by Strabo amongst the people of the Pannonians. Velleius Paterculus, who served under Tiberius during the Pannonian uprising, marks the Pirustae and Desidiatae as Dalmatian tribes, who, located in remote strongholds on mountains, are finally pacified. No mention of Pirustae is made by Pliny the Elder in his description of *civitates* in Dalmatia, whereas Ptolemy perceives them to reside in southern Dalmatia together with the Sikoulotai, the Dokleatai, and the Skirtones. Appianus, who wrote his *Roman History* (Ῥωμαϊκά) under Trajan and Hadrian, details the Roman wars in Macedonia and Illyria, but makes only brief mention of the 'Pyrissaioi' (Pirustae) in the context of a campaign against Dalmatian tribes in 33 BCE.[43] As for the region that the Pirustae inhabited, Geza Alföldy suggested northern Albania and the area north of the Albanian Alps.[44]

The Sardi/eates, who at Alburnus Maior seem to form an association of sorts and whose *genius* is evoked, are a people also located in Dalmatia: Pliny notes the Sardeates as one of the communities within the *conventus* of Salona.[45] The Sardeates are not mentioned prior to Pliny and Ptolemy in literary sources, which has been taken to suggest the formation of this *civitas* only after the Roman conquest.[46] They have been located near *Sarnade*/*Sarute* (in or near Pecka) or west of Jajce in the Pliva valley near Šipovo (BiH).[47]

The home of the Maniates may be sought near Salona, based on a mention of Μανιοί in the *Periplous* of Ps-Skylax from the late 4th c. BCE. Although they do not occur in literary or other epigraphic sources of the province, the ethnonym was still of relevance—provided the Μανιοί can be equated with the Maniates.[48] The Baridustae likely hail from Dalmatia and inhabited the area around *Bariduum*/Livno (BiH).[49]

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40 *AE* 2003: 1492; *CIL* 3: 1266; Ciongradi (2009, no. 16) = *AE* 2003:1508.
41 *AE* 2008: 1166 (Panes Bizonis), 1167 (Dasas Liccai); Ciongradi et al. (2008); Ciongradi (2009, nos. 109, 119).
42 Ciongradi (2009, no. 4); for *Aptus* see Piso (2004, p. 298).
43 Caes. *B Gall.* 5.1; Livy 45.26.13; Strabo 7.5.3; Vell. Pat. 2.115.4; Plin. *HN.* 3.139-14; Ptol. *Geog.* 2.16.5.; App. *Ill.* 4.16. Alföldy (1963, pp. 190–91); Alföldy (1965, pp. 56–59); Bojanovski (1988, pp. 51–52, 90–91); Džino (2014, p. 223).
44 Alföldy (1965, pp. 59, 176) assumed that in the early Principate their territory was broken up into the smaller territories (*civitates*) which is why Pliny makes no mention of the Pirustae but notes the *civitates* of the Scirtones (Skirtari), the Ceraunii, and the Siculotae instead (*HN.* 3.143).
45 Plin. *HN.* 3.142; Alföldy (1963, p. 189); Alföldy (1965, pp. 52–53).
46 Ptol. *Geog.* 3.16.5; Alföldy (1965, p. 53); Ardevan (2004, p. 595).
47 *Sarnade*: It. Ant. 269.3; *Sarute*: Tab. Peut.; Alföldy (1965, p. 53, near Pecka); Wilkes (1969, p. 170, west of Jajce), followed by Piso (2004, p. 294); Ardevan (2004, pp. 594–95).
48 Ps-Skylax 23–24; Shipley (2011, pp. 2–3, for date); Alföldy (1965, p. 99); Wilkes (1969, pp. 3, 5); Ardevan (2004, p. 594); Piso (2004, p. 295).
49 *ILJug* 3: 2775; *Baridustae*: Ardevan (2004, p. 593); Piso (2004, p. 293); Ciongradi (2009, p. 16); *contra* Wilkes (1969, pp. 184, 244).

The Delmatae, noted in two epitaphs at Alburnus Maior, could refer to the province of Dalmatia in general, or perhaps more likely, to the large *civitas* of the Delmatae within the *conventus*, the assize, of Salona (Plin. *n.h.* 3.142). Though not noted explicitly in our written sources, the *municipium Salvium* (and thus the Starvae) also falls within the *civitas* of the Delmatae.[50] The Ansi appear to be a people from provincia Dalmatia; their territory might be sought around the town of *Ansium*, located somewhere to the northeast of *Corinium* / Karin Gornij (CRO) within the *civitas* of the Liburni (Plin. *n.h.* 3.139 f.).[51]

What emerges from this brief survey of the relevant inscribed epitaphs and altars is the provincial landscape of Dalmatia being replicated here *en miniature* in the *kastella* and *vici* in the gold mining district of Alburnus Maior or in its vicinity. We know of the *kastella Ansis, Starvae, Baridustarum*, and (*Maniatium*?); of a *vicus Pirustarum*; and a *collegium Sardiatensium/Sardiatarum*, which might hint at the existence of a *vicus* or *kastellum* of the same name, as there is also a *collegium k(astelli) Baridustarum* (see above). Scholarly opinion overwhelmingly locates these *kastella* and *vici* in or near Alburnus Maior.[52] This opinion is certainly justified for the *vicus Pirustarum*, which is given as a place where a contract was concluded, and for the *kastella Ansis* and *Baridustarum*. *Kastellum Ansis* not only follows upon a personal name in a funerary inscription and thus renders the origin of an individual buried at Alburnus Maior; it is also named as a community sponsoring votive altars for a variety of deities at Alburnus Maior. And the existence of associations (*collegia*) of the *kastellum Baridustarum* and of the *Sardiates* certainly puts those groups in or near the mining district. In the case of the toponyms *kastellum Starvae* or *Kavieretium/k(astellum) Aviereti(um)* it remains uncertain whether they are to be sought near Alburnus Maior or in Dalmatia.[53]

The latter two toponyms aside, the mention of these settlements illustrates the fragmentation of these people arriving from Dalmatia into different 'tribal' communities: the existence of an association (*collegium*) of Sardiates and of Baridustae, the evocation of a *genius* of these groupings, and the indication of the *kastellum* in votive inscriptions indicates that divisions along these lines may have endured. This reinforcement of distinctions between these Illyrian groups could have been driven by their respective assignment to different parts of the mines, but there is no evidential basis for this.

1.4. Shared Experiences

How persistent these initial differences were is difficult to discern. After all, the Illyrian men and women, were either directly or indirectly connected with the unifying purpose of the district seemingly centred at Alburnus Maior—the mining of silver and gold lodes, its processing, the logistics and management of these work procedures, financial services, and other related activities. This and the fact that these people were inhabiting a place remote from the population centres of this new-ish province, a 'frontier', must have helped shape a sense of community beyond these internal sub-divisions.

Echoes of this might be identifiable in the divine entities addressed in the votive altars throughout the mining district. These fairly elaborate, if somewhat crudely executed, votive altars were not

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[50] Alföldy (1965, pp. 158, 178); Wilkes (1969, pp. 264, 269–71); Ciongradi et al. (2008, p. 253); Ciongradi (2009, p. 16).

[51] Daicoviciu (1958, pp. 262–63); Alföldy (1965, pp. 84, 201); Wilkes (1969, p. 211); Ardevan (2004, p. 593); Piso (2004, pp. 294–95, with n.164); Ciongradi et al. (2008, p. 252).

[52] Daicoviciu (1958); Noeske (1977, pp. 276–77); Ardevan and Crăciun (2003); Piso (2004, pp. 292–95); Ardevan (2004, p. 593); Ciongradi et al. (2008).

[53] In Roman funerary or votive inscriptions, the origin or *origo* of a person is usually provided if he/she is not from the settlement where his/her tombstone or altar is erected. If the inscription only provides the name of a *kastellum* or *vicus* of the deceased, we may presume that the place is located relatively close by and within the confines of the same *civitas* (an overarching territorial body and community which included other settlements). If the person in question hails from outside a *civitas* (or *colonia* or *municipium*), a geographical or ethnic determinant (e.g., *Delmata, Dacus, Breucus, Pirusta*) is often provided in addition to, or instead of, the name of the settlement. A comparative sample is provided by inscriptions from Northwestern Spain and Portugal, where members of civitates/tribes in the Northwest move to distant mining districts and have their origins indicated on the funerary stones, see Haley (1991); Sastre Prats (2002); Holleran (2016).

just symbols of a cultic rite, but were also an act of economic choice.[54] In light of the costs of an altar, the choice of divinity to which it would be dedicated was deliberate and freighted with meanings specific to each group or individual commissioning this work. Given the location of the altars in sacred areas within a mining district and the likely occupational background of the devotees, the reading of these votive monuments is informed in part by the local context and, in part, by the scholarly aggregation and ordering of 'function(s)' of a specific god, evoked by ancient literature and iconography. Given the wide range of facets ascribed to some ancient deities, the teleological reading of their veneration at Alburnus Maior as closely linked with mining has to be taken with a grain of salt. Other interpretations, of course, remain possible.[55]

With this in mind, the extraction of subterranean resources in a remote part of a new province may be mirrored in the veneration of chthonic deities by those involved in mining at Alburnus Maior. Terra Mater, for instance, the goddess of the fertile Earth, often referred to in mining districts, is dedicated altars by men with Illyrian names.[56] Aeracura and Soranus, both documented only once so far on altars set up at Alburnus Maior, also pertain to the underworld.[57] Surio Sumeletis, who had an altar set up to Terra Mater, also commissioned one for Neptune (*AE* 1990: 845). Neptune might have been called upon due to the regular occurrence of ground water in underground mining; two further altars to Neptune were commissioned by a Roman citizen and by two *peregrini*, respectively.[58] Perhaps Maelantonius and Naos/n both could be addressed as 'aquatic' deities as well.[59] Given the dangers of underground mining and the processing of ore, dedications to Asclepius must be expected as well.[60]

Illyrians also set up altars to Diana and Apollo; as astral deities, Diana/Luna and Apollo/Sol represented silver and gold, respectively.[61] This particular reading of the Apollo- and Diana-altars is warranted by the *metalla*-coinage minted under Trajan and his successors, where Apollo and Diana, together with Mars, depict the metals of gold, silver, and iron.[62] Dedications to Liber Pater, a god associated with nature, fertility, and wine, may also pertain to the richness of the earth in metals, as may 'Sidus', but this is not a given.[63] The altars set up to Mercurius, perhaps as god of commerce or as saviour and guarantor of new beginnings? (under Augustus) could reflect the flourishing commercial activities documented in part in the contracts on writing tablets at Alburnus Maior.[64] For the Dalmatians and others coming to Alburnus Maior the aspect of Mercurius as guarantor of

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[54] The altars dedicated by three soldiers, all *beneficiarii consularis*, are produced and the letters carved with a bit more finesse than the other votives, revealing the military's social status and wealth. By contrast, the altars dedicated by civilians are less elaborately executed, see Dészpa (2012, pp. 28–29), with the catalogue in Ciongradi (2009) for individual altars.

[55] The resulting interpretations are associative and, at best, offer a flavour of the hopes and anxieties individuals and communities shared and required the support of divine beings for.

[56] *AE* 1990: 844 (Batonianus); *AE* 2003: 1498 (Dasius Sta(–) [qui et?] Durius); *AE* 2003: 1509 (Surio Sumeletis). On Terra Mater, see Gesztelyi (1981, pp. 447–48); Dušanić (1999, pp. 132–33); Piso (2004, p. 296).

[57] Piso (2004, p. 296, with n. 175). *Aeracura*: *AE* 1990: 841; W.A. Roscher, *s.v.* 'Aeracura', in: *LexMyth* 1/1, col. 85-86; Wissowa (1912, p. 313); Dušanić (1999, p. 132). *Soranus*: *AE* 1990: 832; Wissowa (1912, p. 238); G. Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Soranus pater' in: *LexMyth* 4: col. 1215–16; Dušanić (1999, p. 132).

[58] *AE* 1990: 830 (Nasidius Primus); *AE* 2003:1507 (Valerius Niconis and Plator). Nemeti (2004) made the suggestion that behind Neptunus there is perhaps a Dalmatian god of water springs, Bindus or Bindus-Neptunus.

[59] *Maelantonius*: *AE* 1990: 831; *Naos/n*: *AE* 1990: 839.

[60] *Asclepius*: *AE* 2003: 1493 (M. Ul(pius) Cle(mens?)); *Asclepius Augustus*: Ciongradi (2009, p. no. 42, Fronto Plarentis); Wissowa (1912, pp. 306–7).

[61] W.A. Roscher, s.v. 'Planeten', in: *LexMyth* 3/2: col. 2532–34. *Diana*: *AE* 1944: 21 = *IDR* 3.3: 387 (Panes Epicadi qui et Suttius), *CIL* 3: 7822 = *IDR* 3.3: 385 (Celsen(i)us Adiutor), AE 1965: 42 = *IDR* 3.3: 386 (Dassius). *Apollo Pirunenus*: *AE* 2003: 1502 (Macrianus Surionis), for Pirunenus, see Piso (2004, pp. 297–98). *Apollo*: *AE* 1960: 236 = *IDR* 3.3: 384 (Panes N[o?]setis), *AE* 2003: 1456 (Plator Implai), *CIL* 3: 7821 = *IDR* 3.3: 383 (Implaius Linsantis), *AE* 2003: 1495 (Verso Dasantis qui et Veidavius).

[62] Dušanić (1999, p. 132); Woytek (2004a, p. 44), with further bibliography; Woytek (2004b).

[63] *Liber Pater*: *IDR* 3.3: 396 (Atrius Maximi); *CIL* 3: 7826 = *IDR* 3.3: 397 (?); *AE* 2003: 1506 (Suttis Panentis f.); *Liber et Libera*: AE 2003: 1497 (Beucus Dasantis). On function, see Wissowa (1912, pp. 297–304); Dušanić (1999, p. 132); Piso (2004, p. 296, with fn. 175). **Sidus**: *AE* 1990: 849 = *AE* 2003: 1510 (Aelius Quintus); on deity, see Dušanić (1999, p. 132); Piso (2004, p. 296, with fn. 179).

[64] *Mercurius*: *AE* 1990: 829 (Nasidius Primus); *AE* 2003: 1479 (Plator Implei), 1485 (Verzo Platoris), 1494 (Beuc(us?) Sut(tinis?)); on Mercurius see Wissowa (1912, pp. 305–6); Combet-Farnoux (1981).

new beginnings may have been attractive as well: the attraction of goldmines lie not only with the economic returns mining offers but perhaps also the hope of social mobility.[65]

The deity Diana also represented a 'liminal' quality as demarcating the line between 'inside' and 'outside', between the wilderness of nature and the order of the *civitas*; she also invokes connotations with the hunt and animals and can be venerated by soldiers on the frontier.[66] As god of forests, agriculture, and guardian of the border between nature and culture Silvanus appears as the dedicatee on some seven altars at Alburnus Maior; few are commissioned by Dalmatians, although the *kastellum Ansi* appears to set up an altar to Silvanus collectively.[67] The two altars for the Nymphs, female *daimones* of nature, of water, trees, mountains etc., allow for a variety of interpretations.[68]

The invocation of deities of border and nature may well express an inherent unease about the 'frontier' position of this unique community, distant from the settlements of legionary camps or *coloniae* and *municipia* created elsewhere in Dacia. Perhaps the high number of altars set up by soldiers and Dalmatians to Iupiter Optimus Maximus, the god of the state to whom the emperor was likened, and the altar to Iupiter Depulsor, the god who kept the barbarians at bay, might have occurred in response to these anxieties and expressed the dependency on the emperor and the imperial administration—not only for the provision of security, but for the legal framework, and, more importantly, the right to mine.[69] The propensity for what appears to be 'Roman' gods by the Dalmatians has also been read as a sign for their self-imagination as 'Roman' in a wild and unknown environment (Dészpa 2012, p. 32).

1.5. Polyonymy

The shared experience in a frontier setting and in a unique socioeconomic environment fostered a sense of communality further affirmed by the regular and lasting contacts between members of initially distinct groups. The wax tablets are not the only indication of an intricate web of business and social interactions at Alburnus Maior. The phenomenon of polyonymy may also provide a refraction of a community emerging from diverse groups. A number of individuals with Illyrian names are also known under a different name, and thus have multiple names: Dasas Loni qui et [-]; Dasius Sta(–) (qui et ?) Durius; Epicadus Plarentis qui et Mico; Panes Epicadi qui et Suttius; Planius Baezi qui et Magister; Titus Beusantis qui et Bradua; and Verso Dasantis qui (et) Veidavius.[70] In most cases all names, that is, name, patronym, and agnomen are Illyrian, except with Titus Beusantis qui et Bradua, whose name Titus is Latin (Piso 2004, p. 280, ns. 59, 60.). In the case of Planius Baezi qui et Magister, the byname 'Magister' seems to refer to a profession or office he (or an ancestor) held within the community.[71]

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65 Whether the altar to Fortuna (*AE* 2003: 1492) must be interpreted in the same vein, is open to speculation, see Kajanto (1981). The veneration of Asclepius must be a stark reminder of the health risks involved in mining, see AE 2003: 1493 (M. Ulpius Cl[-]); Ciongradi (2009, p. 59, no. 42, Fronto Plarentis).

66 Wissowa (1912, pp. 247–52); Dušanić (1999, pp. 130–31); J. Scheid, s.v. 'Diana', in: *Brill's New Pauly*, consulted online on 26. 03. 2018, http://dx.doi.org.liverpool.idm.oclc.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e316670.

67 *Silvanus*: *AE* 1960: 235 = *IDR* 3.3: 403 (Varro Scen[-], Aelius Be[-]); *AE* 2003: 1496 (Dexter and Martialis); *CIL* 3: 7827 = *IDR* 3.3: 402 (Pla[-] Baotius?); *CIL* 3: 12564 = *IDR* 3.3: 404 (Rufi(us) Sten[-]); *IDR* 3.3: 407. *Silvanus Augustus sacer*: *IDR* 3.3: 405 (Hermes Myrini). *Silvanus Silvestris sacer*: *AE* 1944: 19 = *IDR* 3.3; 406 ([-] Annai(?)ius); *IDR* 3.3: 405a (Varro Titi). *Silvanus sacer*: *CIL* 3: 7828 = *IDR* 3.3:408 (k(astellum) Ansi). *Silvanus Domesticus*: *CIL* 3: 7828 = *IDR* 3.3: 408 (Sameccus). On Silvanus, see Wissowa (1912, pp. 213–16); Dészpa (2012); Perinić (2017, pp. 1–15, with further bibliography).

68 *AE* 1990: 846 (Implaius Sumeletis); *AE* 2003: 1508 (Ael(ius) Mes[-]). H. Herter, F. Heichelheim, s.v. 'Nymphai', in: *RE* 17, col. 1581–99; Wolfgang Speyer, s.v. 'Nymphen', in: *RAC* 26, col. 1–30.

69 *Iupiter Optimus Maximus*: *CIL* 3: 1260 = *IDR* 3.3: 390 (M. Aur. Maximus, *legulus*); *IDR* 3.3: 391 (M. Aur. Su[pe]<r>atus und M. Aur. Supe[ri]anus); *AE* 2003: 1488 (Dasas Loni, collegi Sardiatensium); *CIL* 3: 7823 = *IDR* 3.3: 392 (Implaius Lisantis); *AE* 1990: 837 (C. Iucundius Verus, bf. cos.); *AE* 1990: 827 (Q. Marius Proculus, bf. cos); *AE* 1990: 828 (C. Calpurnius Priscinus, bf. cos.); *AE* 2003: 1499 (Panes Stagilis); *AE* 2003: 1481 (Platius); AE 1990: 843 (Tritius Gar[-]); *CIL* 3: 7825 = *IDR* 3.3: 393 (Ve(r)z(o) Pant(onis)); *IDR* 3.3: 395. *Iupiter Depulsor*: *AE* 2003: 1482 (Platius Turi). On Iupiter, see Fears (1981); Kolendo (1989). The altars to *Iuno* (AE 1990: 834, 838) may fulfil a function similar to Iupiter, see Wissowa (1912, pp. 181–90). *Venus*: *AE* 2003: 1483 (Beucus Daieci)

70 TC XX, *CIL* 3, p. 956: Dasas Loni qui et [-]); *AE* 2003: 1498; Dasius Sta(–) (qui et ?) Durius; TC VI, *CIL* 3, p. 939: Epicadus Plarentis qui et Mico; *AE* 1944: 21: Panes Epicadi qui et Suttius; *CIL* 3: 1270: Planius Baezi qui et Magister; TC X, *CIL* 3, p. 948; TC XI, *CIL* 3, p. 949: Titus Beusantis qui et Bradua; *AE* 2003: 1495: Verso Dasantis qui (et) Veidavius.

71 See *OLD* s.v. *magister*.

The use of *agnomina,* bynames, by *peregrini* has been the subject of considerable research, but only recently more has been done in trying to explain why these were in use. In Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt the use of two names, i.e. a Greek and an Egyptian name, suggests the confrontation of distinct ethnolinguistic groups, a dichotomy the navigation of which made having a name for each language advantageous. On rare occasions, that is, when unambiguous identification was desired or required (for legal reasons or in a funerary context), we learn both the Greek and the Egyptian name of one individual (Broux 2015, pp. 291–93; Coussement 2016, pp. 209–10). Similar phenomena of polyonymy can also be detected in communities in Asia Minor, where the use of a Greek and Latin name is indicated in the epigraphic sources (Van Nijf 2010).

The use of two names also appears in official documents from Alburnus Maior. The names, though, do not indicate the movement of the individuals between two linguistically different groups—both names connected with the phrase 'qui et' are Illyrian. Thus, some Illyrian inhabitants of Alburnus Maior seem not to have chosen a second name as a result of their contact with people speaking a distinct language (although they inscribe texts in Latin), but may have received this 'nickname' due to cohabitation with men and women of a similar linguistic background. One might postulate dialectal differences prompting this, but it is equally possible that, in the confrontation with groups from different parts of Dalmatia settling in this newly established community at Alburnus Maior, individuals with the same name required an alternative name for purposes of distinction. These names derive from the same linguistic stock or express a current or former profession or function within the community (e.g., *magister*). The need to note both names in legal texts and funerary inscriptions, as with the development of family names in medieval Europe or Greek and Egyptian names in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt, is likely driven by legal requirements of legal contracts and other documents prevalent in this mining district. These practices are also reflected in inscriptions on funerary monuments where apparently the identification of the deceased must be clear.[72]

What did these men, women, and children of different socio-economic backgrounds and origins experience when confronted with distinct social practices and habits? Perhaps they recognized commonalities in their origin—most hailed from the same province, Dalmatia—and in their shared fate in a remote part of the Roman empire, facing the hardships and promises of underground mining in an environment perceived as hostile, but also full of promise. Would they have recognised in their displacement any similarities to the people who inhabit the camp of Zaatari in Northern Jordan?

2. Krokodilo, Eastern Egyptian Desert

What is striking about the written evidence from Alburnus Maior is the absence of any Dacians, which raises the question Eutropius' report suggests, that is, "Dacia, in fact, had been drained of men" (8.6.2). Emperor Julian, too, in his satire *The Caesars* has Trajan boast that he "removed" or, more likely, "destroyed" the Dacians, named Getae (327 D).[73] Similarly, in the scholia to *Icaromenippos* of Lucian of Samosata, the tale of the complete destruction of the Getae bar forty men, based on the *Getica* by Statilius Crito, is presented as fact.[74] The two Dacian wars of Trajan certainly took a heavy toll on the people of Dacia, but perhaps not to the extent later sources appear to suggest: Lactantius claims a *census* took place on conclusion of conquest, which would suggest the survival of a significant remainder of the population.[75]

Men and women with Dacian names are almost absent from the epigraphic evidence, that is, they are not noted on inscribed funerary epitaphs, votive altars, and honorary statue bases found throughout the new province of *Dacia Traiana*. Only on some six inscribed monuments from Dacia and in military diplomas pertaining to auxiliary units garrisoned there have Dacian names been

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[72]   For example, at medieval Basel: Mischke (2015, p. 16).
[73]   The translation is dependent on the reading of the word ἐξεῖλον.
[74]   *Scholia in Lucianum* [ed. Rabe] 24.16; Ruscu (2004, p. 75 ff.); Strobel (Strobel 2005/2007, p. 93); Strobel (2010, p. 283).
[75]   Lactant. *De mort. pers.* 23.5, with Piso (2008, p. 298).

discovered.[76] Moreover, soldiers with the indication of origin (*natione Dacus*) are enrolled with the *equites singulares Augusti*, the 'horse guard' of the emperor at Rome, arriving from units based in Dacia (Dana and Zăgreanu 2013, p. 156). This scarcity of Dacians attested in the province post-conquest (mostly in military contexts) cannot be taken as corroborative evidence for the total annihilation of the Dacians. What is more, the archaeological evidence appears to suggest the deliberate destruction or clearance of central settlements, hill-forts, and so-called 'tower houses' in AD 106, leaving behind a landscape of villages.[77] It seems that the local elites were forcefully removed, disrupting the continuation of established social hierarchies; even so, Dacians of lower status appear to have remained (Strobel 2010, pp. 292–93).

Alongside these destructive measures, there is good evidence for the (forced) recruitment of Dacians into Roman auxiliary units, as is attested in the military diploma issued on the honorary dismissal from service. Typical Roman practice in the immediate aftermath of the conquest was to remove young men from subjected communities by drafting them into auxiliary units, as was the case in Asturia and Cantabria after the end of hostilities around 15 BCE.[78] Similarly, Cassius Dio relates that after the subjection of Raetia in 15 BCE the potential of revolt by the large population of males was reduced by deporting the strongest men of military age, seemingly to be drafted into auxiliary units.[79] The impact of (forced) relocation on those recruited, of leaving a family and community ravaged by war behind can only be imagined. Our sources remain silent on the issue.

This certainly applied to Dacia as well where male youths of communities which had no choice but to submit to the Roman conquerors found themselves recruited into the Roman army.[80] We know of an *ala I Ulpia Dacorum*, a *cohors I Ulpia Dacorum* as well as *cohors II* and a *cohors III Dacorum* which may initially have been formed out of Dacian tribesmen who had sided with Rome already during the Dacian Wars.[81] After 106 CE Dacians were recruited into existing auxiliary units distant from their place of origin and sent to their garrison, on occasion together with their family members. One military diploma from 31 July 131 CE, handed to an auxiliary soldier in the province Mauretania Caesariensis on his honorary dismissal (*honesta missio*) from twenty-five years of military service, confers Roman citizenship to a Diurdanus, son of Damanaeus, and his children and *conubium* (the right to marry) to his wife, all with Dacian names. One of his sons even carried the rather conspicuous name Decebalus, the name of the Dacian king who fought against Rome (Eck and Pangerl 2005; Strobel 2010, p. 294 with n. 7).

2.1. Dacians in the Desert

A significant number of Dacian names appear on *ostraca*, i.e. official and private letters, accounts, and receipts written with ink on pottery sherds, and on inscribed monuments found in the Eastern Egyptian Desert. This extraordinary assemblage of written evidence allows for unique insights not only into the life of these frontier garrisons but, more importantly, the life of Dacian soldiers truly displaced on the order of the emperor. They were stationed temporarily at the forts of Mons Claudianus and Kaine Latomia, guarding the imperial quarries there; along the desert roads out to the quarries; and the

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[76] Dana and Zăgreanu (2013, pp. 157–58). On the linguistic identification of Dacian names, see Dana (2014, pp. LXVII–LXXV) with further bibliography.

[77] On settlement types and density in the Late Iron Age/La Tène and Roman period see Oltean (2007, pp. 210–11); Oltean (2009, p. 92).

[78] Haynes (2013, pp. 106–8, with further bibliography).

[79] Dio 54.22.5; K. Dietz, in: Czysz et al. (1995, pp. 43–44).

[80] This already appears to be the case *during* the Dacian Wars with Dacian tribal groups siding with Rome and being included in newly established units such as *cohors I Ulpia Dacorum civium Romanorum* in 104 (relocated to Syria, according to a military diploma from 22 March 129, see Eck and Pangerl (2006b, pp. 221–30, no. 4) and *cohors II* (Ulpia?) *Dacorum* in 101 CE (see diploma from 9/10 December 125/6 CE in Eck and Pangerl (2006a, pp. 102–4). We also find single Dacians assigned to units in disparate provinces such as Lower Germany, Britain, or Africa Proconsularis already before 106 CE, see Strobel (2010, p. 295).

[81] See Strobel (2010, p. 294, with further bibliography).

road to the harbours of Myos Hormos and Berenike on the Red Sea at forts like Krokodilo, Maximianon, or Didymoi, for instance.[82]

The Dacians here seem to have belonged mostly to cavalry *alae* or infantry cohorts with a cavalry wing (*cohortes equitatae*), and thus were experienced horsemen. Given their recruitment into equestrian units, Karl Strobel assumed that these young men had belonged to the aristocratic elite of Dacian tribes, siding with Rome or subjecting themselves to Roman rule in time in 106 CE (Strobel 2010, p. 294). According to the lists of military personnel in which our Dacians are mentioned, they did not serve in ethnically homogenous units but together with men bearing Thracian, Roman, or Greek names. Within these lists, though, the Dacians are mostly grouped together.[83] This reflects established Roman administrative practice; the Roman military administration listed recruits from distant provinces and their ethnic backgrounds with the aim of preventing the creation of auxiliary units or legions based in Egypt consisting solely of men recruited locally.[84]

Ostraca are not the only genre of texts in which Dacians emerge. A rockface near the military fort of *Krokodilo* / el-Muwayh was inscribed with the following text (in Figure 1):

Figure 1. Tracing of the 'Dida' inscription at al-Muwayh by A. Bülow-Jacobsen©, dimensions: 3.09 m long, 0.60 m high, see *AE* 1996: 1647; Bülow-Jacobsen et al. (1995, p. no. 1).

[1] *Dida Damanai filius nationis Daqus* |[2] *eques alae Uocontiorum turma Maturii* |[3] *armatum*(!) *feci stationi* (!) *me(n)ses quinque* |[4] *pro salute{m} imperatore* (!) *feliciter*[85]

I, Dida, son of Damanaus, born in Dacia, cavalryman in the wing of the Vocontii, squadron of Maturus, stood five months under arms on post. Long live the emperor! Good luck!

The fact that Dida, son of Damanaus, *eques* of the *ala Vocontiorum*, calls himself *Daqus* or 'Dacian' in the inscription is remarkable. The commonality of being identified as 'Dacian' by the Roman army may have fostered a stronger sense of shared origin and fate, which might have overlaid previous, more divergent self-definitions based on specific tribal groups or communities within the tribal confederacy the Romans identified as 'Dacian'.[86] 'Dacus' or 'Dax' was used by others in the Eastern Desert as a distinguishing term as well: a prostitute girl (κοράσιον), on rejecting the advances of another man, declares on an ostracon (pot sherd) that she is in love with 'the Dacian' (φιλεῖ τὸν Δάκα), even imploring her 'pimp' to give her to 'the Dacian'.[87] Two further unpublished ostraca in Greek, one from

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[82] Dana (2003, p. 183). For some of these Dacians we know the units they were enrolled in: *ala Apriana* and *cohors I Flavia Cilicia equitata* at Mons Claudianus or *ala Vocontiorum* at Krokodilo. Dana (2003, p. 183, with n. 83).

[83] Dana (2003, p. 183); lists with Dacians: *O. Claud.* II 402, 403, 404, 405; *O. Claud.* inv. 29, 392, 1076, 1209, 1239, 1412, 1693, 1792, 3027, 8362. Dana (2003, s.vv. Aptasa, Blaikisa, Dekibalos, Diengi, Diourpa, Diourdanos, Dotos, Dotouzi, Eithazi, Geithozi, I-/Eithiokalos, Natopor, Petipor, Thiais, Thiaper, Titila, Zouroblost(-)); *O. Did.* 64;

[84] *ChLA* 10: 422, see Speidel (2009, p. 233, with further bibliography).

[85] l.3: read *armatus* instead of *armatum*, *statione* instead of *stationi*; l.4: read *imperatoris* instead of *imperatore*.

[86] Strobel (2010, pp. 422–33).

[87] *O. Krok.* inv. 244, see Dana (2003, p. 183); Dana and Matei-Popescu (2006, p. 201).

Krokodilo, the other from *Kaine Latomia* / Umm Balad document the use of 'Dacus' as a descriptive term for individual soldiers.[88]

In this respect, one ostracon stands out: in early 109 CE, a private letter from Dekinais at fort Persou reaches Kaigiza/Kaikeisa at the fort Krokodilo:

Δεκιναις Καικεισα τῷ ἀδελφῷ χ(αίρειν). | ἀσπάζου Ζουτουλα καὶ Πουριδουρ. | ἐρωτῶ σε, Καικισα, σκύλητει | πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπὶ χρίαν σου ἔχω· |⁵ ἐρωτῶ σε, ἔρχου ὡς πρὸς ἐμέ· | ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ὅτι πάντες οἱ Δάκες | ὑπάγουσιν μετά τοῦ ἡγεμόνος | ἰς Ἀλεξάνδ(ρειαν)· ἐὰν εἰδῇς ὅτι ὑπάγου|σιν ἰς Ἀλεξάνδ(ρειαν), γράψον ἰς Κόπτον |¹⁰ ἵνα ταχὺ ἀναβῇ. | ἔρρωσο.

"Dekinais to Kaikisa, his brother, greetings. Greet Zoutoula and Pouridour. I beg you, Kaikisa, move yourself and come because I have need of you. I beg you come and join me. I heard saying that all the Dacians are going with the prefect of Egypt to Alexandria. If you learned that they are going to Alexandria (with certainty), write to Koptos so that he(?) may hurry to go up(?). Farewell."[89]

Both men have Dacian names, as do two further soldiers at Krokodilo, Zoutoula and Poridour, whom Dekinais extends his regards to. Dekinais asks Kaigiza to join him and writes that he has heard that all Dacians are required to join the prefect (governor) of Egypt in Alexandria.[90] The letter throws light not only on the network of Dacian soldiers in the Eastern Desert of Egypt, but also the fact that they communicated with each other in written Greek.[91] Given the date of this and other letters, some of the Dacian soldiers and cavalry men must have acquired Latin and Greek language and writing skills soon after they were enrolled in the auxiliary units in Egypt.[92] The letter also reveals the relevance of ethnic categories to the prefect of Egypt in this instance, and in the administration of the army in general: the rumoured call for Dacians to assemble in Alexandria on the orders of the governor might be connected with formation of an *ala Ulpia Dacorum*, which was to serve in Trajan's Parthian War (Strobel 2010, p. 294).

Being registered as 'Daci' and grouped together in lists by the authorities; identified as 'Dacian' by fellow soldiers and civilians; describing oneself as 'Dacus' and maintaining contact with other Dacians serving in the Eastern Desert—all this could be read as indicative of a close-knit, perhaps even isolated, group within this fluid 'desert society', made up of merchants and caravans, soldiers and officers, imperial slaves and officials, quarrymen and prostitutes travelling through or residing temporarily at forts or quarries in the desert. This notion is somewhat misleading as the ostraca certainly attest men with Dacian names in correspondence with soldiers or civilians who do not share their place of origin: a Diurpanus (a typical Dacian name), for instance, is greeted in a letter written in Latin by Numosis sent to a Claudius (Dana 2003, p. 183). A Dida is noted in letters (concerning debt) sent from the fort at Persou by an Ischyras to Zosimos and Parabolos at Krokodilo.[93]

2.2. Shared Experience

As the lists of soldiers indicate, the Dacians served together with soldiers of other ethnic backgrounds and performed the same duties as everyone else, for instance, as couriers for official

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[88] *O. Krok.* inv. 503; *O. Ka. La.* inv. 37; Dana (2003, p. 183); Dana and Matei-Popescu (2006, p. 201). Perhaps one might add a letter in Latin (*O. Did.* 417) found at the fort of *Didymoi*/Khashm el-Minayh, written by a Numosis in which he greets a Crescens as his compatriot (*conterraneus*). Dana (2014, p. 262 s.v. Numosis) thinks Numosis was perhaps a Dacian name (?).

[89] ed. and trans. Cuvigny (2005, p. 167).

[90] *O. Krok.* 98

[91] For further evidence of correspondence amongst Dacians, see *O. Did.* 392, 435, 439; *O. Krok.* inv. 610, see Dana (2003, p. 176 s.v. Dida, Diernais)

[92] Dana (2003, p. 183) with *O.Krok.* inv. 610, 872; *O. Did.* 392, 435.

[93] *O. Krok.* inv. 563, 576; Dana (2003, p.176).

messages between forts, such as Kaigiza, Dida, or Auizina.[94] One long text from Krokodilo, the 'amphorae of barbarians', attests the death of a Damanias, horseman of the *cohors II Ituraeorum*, based at the desert fort of Patkoua, who lost his life during an attack on the fort by sixty barbarians in 118 CE.[95] It is perhaps this shared risk and fate which underlies the identification of soldiers with their respective unit, apart perhaps from the daily military routine. The graffito left by Dida, son of Damanaus, at Krokodilo not only sees him referring to his military function as cavalryman (*eques*) and his unit, the *ala Vocontiorum*, but also to the squadron, the *turma,* and its respective commander, a certain Maturus. First and foremost, the description as *eques* or *hippeus* is repeated throughout in the journals and letters found at Krokodilo and it is noted in reports referring to the deaths of soldiers, their secondment, or assignment to a task.[96] Both the cavalry *ala* and, even more so, its sub-division, the *turma*, were highly important in identifying soldiers—so much so that they become a quintessential part in self-identification, as expressed in votive inscriptions written on rock faces or on funerary epitaphs.[97]

The power of daily military routine, of common culinary, hygienic, and dress habits, of shared combat and religious experience, moulded those of divergent backgrounds into something resembling a unit—and distinguished them from the civilian travellers, merchants, camel drivers, prostitutes, quarrymen, and Bedouin around them (Haynes 2013, pp. 165–88). The recovery of faunal remains, for instance, at military sites such as Mons Claudianus, Krokodilo, Maximianon, and other places in the Eastern Desert do reveal a typically military diet.[98] A further feature is the existence of baths at remote outposts such as Maximianon or Mons Claudianus, highlighting a practice not exclusive to the Roman army but predominantly pursued by military personnel who probably also shaved on a regular basis—something not necessarily done in the Eastern Desert.[99] The Latin inscription left by the cavalry soldier Dida, son of Damanaus, at Krokodilo is just one expression of integration into the army and his unit. Equally the employment of Greek in correspondence even by Dacian horsemen writing amongst themselves is indicative of a swift integration in the army and the embrace of their local practices.

There is no epigraphic evidence that Dacian soldiers kept their distance or were excluded from cult rituals and religious practices of their respective units; if so, the participation in rituals strengthened identification with the unit they served in and reaffirmed their loyalty towards the emperor. Dida's *graffito* at Krokodilo in celebration of being relieved from his station at the desert fort, is *pro salutem imperatoris*, for the well-being of the emperor (Haynes 2013, p. 216).

2.3. Decebalus!

Despite their full integration into the auxiliary units during and after the conquest of Dacia, the retention and popularity of the name Decebalus is striking; it is the name of the last Dacian king who had led the Dacian tribal confederation in the wars against Rome and committed suicide to escape Roman captivity (see Dio 68.14.3).[100] Numerous soldiers attested in the second century CE ostraca from the Eastern Egyptian Desert carry the name Decebalus as their name or patronym, and the name remains popular with soldiers based in other provinces throughout the second and third centuries CE (Dana 2014, p. 117).

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94 Kaigiza: *O. Krok.* 1 (AD 108 or earlier). Dida: *O. Krok.* 11/12 (AD 108), 24 (AD 109), 30 (AD 109), 36 (*c.* AD 109). Auizina: *O. Krok* 71 (c. AD 109).

95 *O. Krok.* 87.

96 See Cuvigny (2005, p. 203 s.v. ἱππεύς).

97 For *ala* or *cohors* in documentary evidence from the Eastern Desert, e.g., *O. Krok.* 6, 14, 87; for *turma*, e.g., *O. Ber.* passim (τύρμη); *O. Claud.* 177; *O. Krok.* 6, 14, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 47, 74, 102; *O. Claud.* 177. For *turma, centuria* and *ala/cohors* in votive and funerary texts, see *IGR* I.5: 1247, 1249, 1250; *I. Ko.Ko.* 19, 77, 92, 133; *I. Pan* 48

98 Leguilloux (2006); Van der Veen (1998).

99 Baths: Brun and Reddé (2006); Peacock and Maxfield (1997, pp. 118–34, 137–38). On shaving, see *O. Claud* 176.

100 Diurpaneus, who waged war against Domitian (Oros. 7.10.4; Jord. *Get.* 76, 78) is also a name attested in the ostraca of the Eastern Desert, see Dana (2014, p. 145), but remains far less popular.

The name of Decebalus appears to be a deliberate choice not without significance: the military diploma noted earlier (31 July 131 CE), issued to an auxiliary soldier serving in Mauretania Caesariensis, notes the name Decebalus for one of his sons.[101] Evidently, after being recruited into the Roman army in 106 CE the soldier awarded one of his sons the name of the unfortunate king. Whereas Dacian slaves (presumably) could receive the 'historical' name Decebalus from their Roman masters in commemoration and, perhaps, perpetuation of Roman victory over a hostile enemy,[102] the deliberate choice of the name by Dacian soldiers or their parents must call for a different explanation. The allusion to the Dacian king was surely intended, but whether it was just another way of evoking 'Dacian' commonality, or pride in once being formidable 'barbarian' opponents of Rome and now highly skilled horsemen or foot soldiers in the service of the emperor, or perhaps even a form of 'resistance' against Roman subjugation (perhaps like the choice of *Dandara* for the new community at Belo Horizonte)—the range of possible explanations remains wide open.[103]

3. Conclusions

The evidence from what I have termed 'frontier' societies highlights the hardships not only of the process of displacement itself, but also in the formation of new communities, and the discord that may accompany it: some Dacians might have found it hard to integrate into their unit and deserted, or internal strife may have erupted amongst Dalmatian miners at Alburnus Maior; one can imagine miners absconding from their work, returning home, or coming to blows with Roman officials or with the Dacian natives remaining in the province. Our sources, however, are silent on these issues.

What our evidence on the Dalmatian miners at Alburnus Maior and the Dacian cavalrymen in the Eastern Egyptian Desert does illustrate is the mid- to long-term impact of forced relocation on individuals and communities as a consequence of war and conquest in Dacia. In the case of Alburnus Maior, the evidence suggests that the shared experience in mining gold and its auxiliary 'industries' impacted on the formation of a sense of community. Such group formation processes are observable in early modern and modern mining frontiers: in the mid-1500s CE, indigenous people from various parts of Mexico were drawn to Zacatecas to work in the silver mines owned by the Spanish, forming new communities across ethnic divisions; and, during the gold rush of 1849 CE, miners in California, despite different backgrounds, found conformity in dress and expressed a 'powerful sense of identification as a group', further shaped through the toils of mining.[104] These and other examples are highly suggestive that similar processes were unfolding at Alburnus Maior. What is more, the remoteness of this mining community in the Apuseni mountains bred anxieties about the wilderness and the real or perceived threat of attacks from beyond the reach of Roman control, both of which helped overcome initial 'tribal' distinctions (still present in the toponymy of the district in later decades).

A similar process may apply to the Dacians displaced to the Eastern Desert, although the Roman authorities were inclined to emphasize ethnic difference for military purposes. The practice of naming their offspring Decebalus might just be an expression of the warrior pride the Roman authorities did little to suppress. Sharing in the fate of their fellow soldiers fostered the formation of a further public persona of these Dacians—that of the Roman cavalry soldier. The stark confrontation with a new and alien environment further reinforced the sense of a shared experience and outlook. It also exposed the

[101] Eck and Pangerl (2005); Strobel (2010, p. 294 with n. 7).

[102] That the use of historical and mythological slave names is a symbolic expression of Roman dominance over the conquered and victory over an external threat, is suggested by names such as Arsaces, Pacorus, Mithridates, Tigranes, Tiridates, or Pharnaces, eastern kings, most notably of Parthia and Armenia, who posed or pose a direct threat to Roman rule, see Solin (2003, pp. 240–44); Dana (2007, p. 46).

[103] In the case of a child named Decibal[us] recorded on a third century tombstone from Birdoswald (RIB 1920), Haynes (2013) has suggested that the name Decebalus, together with the Dacian *falx* sword (on *falx* see pp. 289–92), seems to have become almost a cultural relic or regimental tradition, rather than the young boy being the son of a Dacian recruit (p. 133). The idea of the 'martial race' in docile service to Rome certainly permeates the description of Batavi and Tungrians by Tacitus in his narration of the battle at Mons Graupius (Tac. *Agr.* 35.2) or of the Batavi in his account of German tribes (Tac. *Germ.* 29).

[104] On Zacatecas: Velasco Murillo (2009, pp. 53 ff.); on the 49ers: Rohrbough (1997, pp. 152–53).

necessity of dependence, by Dacians and other soldiers, on the Roman state and the emperor. They depended on them for almost everything, from clothing, kit, horses, and food, to pay, promotions, and legal privileges. It is this same dependency on the Roman state for protection, security, and for the legal framework, which at Alburnus Maior may have been expressed in the altars set up to 'state gods' like Iupiter Optimus Maximus or Iupiter Depulsor. Revisiting the epigraphic evidence in light of the themes and approaches raised by the catalyst papers offers enticing prospects. Although the available data only offers us snapshots of the well-established 'frontier' communities at Alburnus Maior and in the desert between the Nile and the Red Sea, it does provide a useful basis to explore the dynamics of how people who have been displaced retained 'old' identities, whilst responding to contexts that demand a reconsideration of belonging.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

Abbreviations

AE	*Année Epigraphique.*
ChLA	*Chartae Latinae Antiquiores.*
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.*
IDR	*Inscriptiones Dacicae Romanae,* Bucarest.
IGR	R. Cagnat et al., *Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas pertinentes,* Paris 1906–1927.
I. Ko. Ko.	A. Bernand, *De Koptos à Kosseir,* Leyden 1972.
ILJug	*Inscriptiones Latinae quae in Iugoslavia inter annos MCMII et MCMLXX repertae et editae sunt,* Ljubliana.
ILS	H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae,* Berlin 1892–1916.
O. Claud.	*Mons Claudianus. Ostraca Graeca et Latina,* Cairo.
O. Did.	Cuvigny (2012).
O. Ka. La. inv.	unpublished ostraka from Kaine Latomia (Umm Balad).
O. Krok.	Cuvigny (2005).
O. Krok. inv.	unpublished ostraka from Krokodilo (al-Muwayh).
LexMyth	W.H. Roscher (ed.). *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie,* Leipzig 1884–1937.
RAC	*Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum,* Stuttgart.
RIB	*Roman Inscriptions of Britain.*

Appendix A

'Illyrian' names[105]

Anneses Andunocnetis: *Anneses*, see Krahe (1929, p. 7); Mayer (1957, pp. 46–47); Piso (2004, p. 276, no. 21, with n. 39). *Andunocnes*, see Krahe (1929, pp. 6, 153); Mayer (1957, p. 45); Piso (2004, p. 276, no. 21, with n. 40).

Batonianus: Krahe (1929, p. 20); Mayer (1957, p. 82); Piso (2004, p. 276, no. 47, with n. 47).

Beucus: Ardevan (2004, p. 594); Piso (2004, p. 278, no. 49 with n. 48).

Beucus Daieci: *Daiecus*, see Krahe (1929, p. 33); Mayer (1957, p. 104); Alföldy (1969, p. 184); Piso (2004, p. 276, no. 51 with n. 49).

Beucus Dasantis: *Dasantis*, s.v. 'Dasas Liccai'.

Beuc(us?) Sut(tinis?): *Suttinis*, s.v. 'Suttis Panentis'.

Dasas Liccai: *Dasa(s)*, see Krahe (1929, pp. 34–35); Mayer (1957, p. 109); Alföldy (1969, p. 185); *Liccai*, s.v. Liccaius Epicadi.

Dasas Loni qui et [-]: *Dasas*, s.v. 'Dasas Liccai'; *Lonus*, see Krahe (1929, p. 68); Mayer (1957, p. 212); Piso (2004, p. 280, no. 68 with n. 58).

Dasius Sta(–) [qui et?] Durius: *Das(s)ius*, see Krahe (1929, pp. 37–38); Mayer (1957, pp. 112–14); Alföldy (1969, pp. 185–86); Katičić (1976, p. 181); Piso (2004, p. 280, no. 72 with fn. 61). *Durius*, see Piso (2004, p. 280, no. 70 with fn. 60); he suggests it could be an Italian name also.

Dasius Verzonis: *Dasius*, s.v 'Dasius Sta[-]'. *Verzonis*, s.v. 'Verso Dasantis'.

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[105] For a full list, see (Piso 2004, pp. 274–90).

Epicadus Plarentis qui et Mico: *Epicadus*, see Krahe (1929, pp. 47–49, 155–56); Mayer (1957, p. 139); Katičić (1962, pp. 100–3); Alföldy (1969, pp. 193–94); Piso (2004, p. 281, no. 81, with n. 65). *Plares*, see Krahe (1929, p. 92); Mayer (1957, p. 272); Alföldy (1969, p. 267); Piso (2004, pp. 281, no. 81, with n. 66). *Mico*, see Mayer (1957, p. 231).

Fronto Plarentis: *Fronto* is a Roman byname. For *Plarentis*, s.v. 'Epicadus Plarentis'.

Implaius Linsantis: *Implaius*, see Mayer (1957, p. 171); Piso (2004, p. 281, no. 88, with fn. 69). *Linsas*, see Piso (2004, p. 281, no. 88, with n. 70).

Implaius Sumeletis: *Implaius*, s.v. 'Implaius Linsantis'. *Sumeles*, see Ardevan and Crăciun (2003, p. 232); Piso (2004, p. 287, no. 151, with n. 110).

Liccaius Epicadi from Marcinium: *Liccaius*, see Krahe (1929, p. 67); Mayer (1957, pp. 210–11); Alföldy (1969, p. 230); Piso (2004, p. 282, no. 99, with n. 73). *Epicadi*, s.v. 'Epicadus Plaerntis'.

Macrianus Surionis: *Macrianus* is a Roman byname. *Surionis*, s.v. 'Surio Sumeletis'.

Maximus Batonis: Maximus, is a Roman byname, but has been argued to possibly be 'Illyrian' too, see Alföldy (1969, pp. 10, 242–45). *Bato*, see Krahe (1929, pp. 17–20); Mayer (1957, pp. 80–82); Katičić (1965, p. 70); Alföldy (1969, pp. 163-164); Piso (2004, p. 276 no. 18 with n. 37).

Maximus Veneti (*princeps*)**:** *Maximus*, s.v. 'Maximus Batonis'. *Venetus*, see Krahe (1929, p. 125); Mayer (1957, pp. 356–57); Alföldy (1969, p. 323); Piso (2004, p. 283, no. 110, with n. 82).

Nasidius Primus: Nas(s?)idius, see Mayer (1957, p. 239); Alföldy (1969, p. 102); Piso (2004, p. 295 with n. 173).

Panes Bizonis: *Panes*, see Krahe (1929, p. 84); Mayer (1957, p. 255); Alföldy (1969, p. 258); Katičić (1963, pp. 271–72); Katičić (1976, p. 180); Piso (2004, p. 284, no. 118, with fn. 88). *Bizo*, see Krahe (1929, p. 22); Alföldy (1969, p. 165); Ciongradi (2009, p. 69, no. 64).

Panes Epicadi qui et Suttius: *Panes*, s.v. 'Panes Bizonis'. Epicadus, s.v. 'Epicadus Plarentis'. *Sutti(u)s*, see Krahe (1929, p. 109); Mayer (1957, p. 327); Katičić (1963, p. 277); Katičić (1976, p. 180); Piso (2004, p. 287, no. 153, with n. 111).

Panes N[.]setis: *Panes*, s.v. 'Panes Bizonis'. *N[.]ses*?, see Piso (2004, p. 284, no. 119, with n. 90).

Panes Stagilis: *Panes*, s.v. 'Panes Bizonis'. *Stagilis*, see Piso (2004, p. 285, no. 120, with n. 91).

Pla[-] Baotius?: *Baotius*?, see Piso (2004, p. 285, no. 122, with n. 92).

Planius Baezi qui et Magister: *Planius*, see Mayer (1957, p. 272); Katičić (1968, p. 106); Piso (2004, p. 285, no. 124, with n. 94). *Baezus*, see Krahe (1929, p. 14); Mayer (1957, p. 73); Katičić (1963, p. 263); Piso (2004, p. 285, no. 124 with n. 95). For Magister, s.v. 'magister' *OLD*.

Planius Verzonis from Sclaietae: *Planius*, s.v. 'Planius Baezi'. Verzonis, s.v. 'Verso Dasantis'.

Platino Verzonis: *Platino*, see Krahe (1929, p. 92); Mayer (1957, p. 273); Katičić (1963, p. 274); Piso (2004, p. 285, no. 127, with n. 96).

Platius: *Platius*, see Krahe (1929, p. 94); Mayer (1957, p. 275); Alföldy (1969, p. 267); Piso (2004, p. 285, no. 128 with n. 97).

Platius Turi: *Platius*, s.v. 'Platius'. *Turus*, see Krahe (1929, p. 94); Mayer (1957, pp. 346–47); Katičić (1963, p. 260); Alföldy (1969, p. 315); Piso (2004, p. 285, no. 130 with n. 98).

Plator: Krahe (1929, pp. 92–94); Mayer (1957, pp. 273–74); Alföldy (1969, p. 267); Katičić (1963, p. 259); Katičić (1968, pp. 91–94); Piso (2004, p. 286, no. 131 with n. 99).

Plator Implai: Plator s.v. 'Plator'. Implaius, s.v 'Implaius Lisantis'.

Sameccus?: origin of name unclers, see Piso (2004, p. 286, no. 141 with n. 105).

Sarius: Krahe (1929, p. 100); Mayer (1957, p. 294); Alföldy (1969, p. 117); Ciongradi (2009, p. 88, no. 109).

Surio Sumeletis: Surio, see Mayer (1957, p. 325); Piso (2004, p. 287, no. 151, with n. 109); *Sumeletis*, s.v. 'Implaius Sumeletis'.

Suttis Panentis: *Suttis*, see 'Sutti(u)s'. *Panentis*, s.v. 'Panes Bizonis'.

Titus Beusantis qui et Bradua: *Titus*, see Krahe (1929, p. 116); Mayer (1957, p. 340); Alföldy (1969, pp. 312–13); Piso (2004, p. 288, no. 158, with n. 113). *Beusas*, see Krahe (1929, p. 21); Mayer (1957, p. 85); Alföldy (1969, p. 165); Ciongradi (2009, pp. 71–72, no. 72). *Bradua*, see Mayer (1957, p. 94); Piso (2004, p. 288, no. 158, with n. 114).

Tritius Gar[-]: *Tritius*, see Krahe (1929, p. 118); Mayer (1957, p. 344); Alföldy (1969, pp. 313–14); Piso (2004, p. 288, no. 159, with n. 115).

Varro Titi: *Varro*, see Krahe (1929, p. 123); Mayer (1957, p. 354); Alföldy (1969, pp. 321–22); Piso (2004, p. 289, no. 168, with n. 118). *Titus*, s.v. 'Titus Beusantis'.

Verso Dasantis qui (et) Veidavius: *Vers/zo*, see Krahe (1929, p. 126); Mayer (1957, p. 358); Mayer (1959, p. 124); Alföldy (1969, pp. 325–26); Piso (2004, p. 289, no. 172, with n. 122). *Dasantis*, s.v. 'Dasa Liccai'. *Veidavius*, see Piso (2004, p. 289, no. 172, with n. 121) who suggests Davius.

Verzo Platoris: *Verzo*, s.v. 'Verso Dasantis'. *Platoris*, s.v. 'Plator'.

Ve(r)z(o) Pant(onis): *Panes*, s.v. 'Panes Bizonis'. *Panto*, see Krahe (1929, p. 85); Mayer (1957, p. 257); Katičić (1963, p. 272); Katičić (1976, p. 180); Alföldy (1969, p. 259); Piso (2004, p. 289, no. 173, with n. 123).

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Response to Hirt, Alfred. Dalmatians and Dacians—Forms of Belonging and Displacement in the Roman Empire. *Humanities*, 2019, *8*, 1

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Abstract: Taking a cue from Hirt's paper, this contribution is mainly focused on contemporary juridical debate on the movement of people, and the legal status of foreigners in the Nation-State and the implications in terms of legal guarantees, of the conceptualization of the principle of dignity in historical perspective. The distinction between labor migration and forced migration gained importance through the centuries and played a significant role in the gradual emergence of the regulation of mobility and population flows in the Western countries. Geo-territorial circumstances (as remoteness, physical isolation due to mountains or deserts, and harsh weather conditions) have always been, and still are, strategic drivers of amalgamation of different social groups and solution of potential conflicts. In turn, the administrative procedures and practices and the concrete circumstances produced by public authorities affecting the settlement of migrants, foreigners and ethnic groups deserve particular consideration in the light of the principle of human dignity and its relationship with the concept of identity.

Keywords: migration; forced and labor mobility; displacement; human dignity; identity; legal concepts; modern day concern

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In his paper, Alfred Hirt tackles the issue of the displacement and relocation of Dalmatians and Dacians to new 'frontier' areas of the Roman Empire—the gold and silver mines of the Apuseni mountains of Dacia and the remote forts of the Eastern Egyptian Desert. He makes a wide ranging argument in favor of the significant impact of the displacement experienced in such frontier areas, in terms of group identity and new senses of belonging. Considering the comparison between ancient and contemporary experiences of frontier communities (and their formation as a consequence of displacement, relocation or movement of different groups of people) sketched out by Hirt, this response will be focused more on the divergences in terms of mobility, legal frameworks, perception of dignity and assimilation.

Both Dalmatian miners and Dacian soldiers experienced, in fact, "the negotiation of identities in the formation of new communities in the aftermath of forced relocations to the peripheral zones" (Hirt 2019, p. 2). The Dacian Wars and the incorporation of Dacia into the Roman empire resulted in the grab for natural resources and the exploitation of gold mines (under the supervision of imperial officials; Popescu 1998). In regard to the Dalmatian presence in Alburnus Maior, Hirt cites Mrozec's interpretations of the written evidence, that "it was the result of a forced relocation due to their mining expertise" (Hirt 2019, p. 5). However, since Dalmatia was often identified as a source of gold, one may presume that Dalmatian expertise in mining was the reason for the initial mobility of some qualified Dalmatian miners towards Alburnus Maior. In this regard, Hirt stresses that "shared experience in mining gold and its auxiliary 'industries' impacted on the formation of a sense of community" (Hirt 2019, p. 18), while concerning the Dacians he suggests that "shared risks and fate (...) underlies the identification of soldiers with their respective unit" (Hirt 2019, p. 17). Finally, he comes back to the concept of 'frontier' community and identity at the end of his analysis.

The author's argument raises many important issues, which strongly resonate with contemporary debates about people's movement and dignity, and it is these which I would like to reflect on here. The first issue is whether the circumstances under which some Dalmatians arrived in Alburnus Maior can be framed as displacement or labor mobility. In the initial stage, we may assume that the likely combination of multiple push factors makes it particularly difficult to distinguish, in practice, labor migration (rather common in ancient times; Braudel 1999, Carli et al. 2009) from forced migration. Later, the forced relocation by the Romans was consistent with their policy of populating the conquered areas. In the modern world, on the contrary, the distinction is crucial in terms of the definition of the legal status of the foreigner in the Nation-State. Its conceptualization historically dates back to the decades of the nineteenth century when the idea of Immanuel Kant gained currency (Kant [1781] 1912). He framed the topic of hospitality and asylum according to what current terminology would define as a "rights-based approach" (Bast 2011): the natural (cosmopolitic) right of the foreigner not to be treated in a hostile way by another foreigner because of arrival on other people's soil and the possibility for the latter "to reject him if this can happen without his ruin" were recognized. The meaning was extended to include the right to obtain unconditional protection (not subject to discretionary power of the host state) against political or religious persecution and not to be extradited to the country from which one had fled (in practice it includes, among others, the experience of Lenin in Zurich, Marx and Mazzini in London, Manin and Herzen in Paris). By the end of the century it became an integral part of the embedded liberalism and a common legal principle of the Western countries (Torpey 1998; Bade 2018; Sciortino 2018). At that time, rules prohibiting the extradition of refugees were adopted in France (1832), Belgium (1833), Holland (1849), the United Kingdom (1870), the United States (1875) and Switzerland (1892). The number of refugees seeking protection was in any case small and the legal requirements of visa, passports and labor authorization, were very limited. From the Russian Revolution (1917) onwards, displacement became for the first time a mass phenomenon: wars, revolutions and state formation were the main causal explanations of forced migration and mobility (Gatrell 2013). As a consequence, the regulation of population flows (visa, asylum, immigration policies) and State controls over national borders became pervasive. Originally adopted (at the beginning of the First World War) as temporary measures, a set of procedural and substantial rules gradually formed the twentieth-century refugee regime. When those numbers increased and the first social legislation came into the public debate, the regime was a consolidated, shared regime.

After World War Two, with the modern, so-called "administrative state"—equipped with welfare benefits and democratic guarantees for an increasing part of its citizens—it became clear that the regulation of population flows is only effective when coordinated among several states (preferably neighboring states) and not unilaterally adopted (i.e., the 1986 inter-German agreements between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany requiring the transit visa for Tamil groups, see (Greenhill 2010)). On the side of labor mobility, at the international level, charters and declarations of human rights, like the UN, do not include any right to immigrate, or to enter a foreign state for jobseekers. Furthermore, national interest has worked against the competitiveness of foreign workers in the domestic labor market of Western countries: numerous strict requirements, lower wages and other measures are provided to make Welfare State benefits less appealing (Halfmann 2000; Lanza 2016). On these premises, the definition of refugees and international protection is narrowly interpreted and applied (i.e., tailored on an individual basis, no longer for ethnic groups). In ancient contexts, there was no need for such strict legal definitions and on this ground current distinctions were unknown. This is the most prominent divergence between ancient and contemporary implications of different mobility phenomena. In his contribution, Hirt frames it in broader terms, pointing out that the relevant sources of evidence are few and unclear. The possession of specific competence in mining, the perspective of an economic gain, together with the likely decline of mining in Dalmatia, might have been the main push factors of the initial selective, spontaneous migration.

A second issue is connected to territory (and nature) as a dimension of power (exercised also by institutions) (Amilhat Szary and Giraut 2015). Old and new forms of colonization reveal the

importance of "frontiers" and "borders" not only for public institutions and authorities like the state, but also for individuals within social dynamics. Hirt's analysis is focused on certain ecological and socio-economic circumstances—such as remoteness from *civitates* (urban centers, which are "settled, agriculturally developed and secure areas") and proximity to wild nature or desert—that facilitate the emergence of similarities in language and habits among individuals in mixed communities and therefore solutions to related social conflicts. Still, in recent times, the sense of physical isolation of each population and the timing and length of that process of gradual emancipation from the state of nature, which is civilization for Romans, depend on the geo-climatic characteristics of the place of settlement. For a long time, depopulated, mountainous and frontier areas have been the target spaces of movement control policies set by central powers, often by means of the amalgamation of different ethnic, language or social groups (minorities and the majority). It happened, for instance, after the First World War in southern Tyrol (so-called the Italianization of Alto Adige and its toponomy): the region became officially part of the Kingdom of Italy (in force of the Treaty of Saint Germain, 1918) and people from the Southern areas of the peninsula were pushed (by economic incentives or soft power) to move to Bozen mainly to compensate for the lack of Italian-speaking workers and specific professional skills (Grote and Obermair 2017). Most recently, during the so-called migration crisis (since 2015) positive experiences of co-habitation between migrants and the local population happened in some remote areas of Italian mountain regions, as in Molise, Piemonte and Valle d'Aosta. In such contexts, the fear of isolation, harsh weather conditions and external dangers are strategic drivers of amalgamation, reciprocal trust among different groups and solutions for potential social conflicts (or the integration of minorities; Caroli Casavola 2020). In depopulated areas, like the small village of Ripabottoni, where migration is a challenge and an opportunity, the local community takes action, promotes petitions and organizes street protests against the closure—decided by central authorities—of the local migration center, gaining the attention of the international press (amongst others, CNN, Mezzofiore 2018, and Le Monde, Saintourens 2018; about the case, see Darboe 2018). Hirt insightfully outlines other relevant aspects of these dynamics such as administrative organization, functions, procedures, resources and actors, to understand reciprocal implications and phenomena (such as divergences and convergences) related to the specific fields under scrutiny (movement, security or borders control, procurement and contracts).

Central to both issues is the question of what is indeed identity? What is the *proprium* that makes us, Romans, Dacians or Europeans? Is it more related to the past or to the future of the people of the same group? Values and beliefs or traditions (individual rights and correlative obligations and duties), in fact, are kept certain more in the perspective of a "community of destiny" of mankind (Morin 2015), than according to a territorial, political or historical paradigm of identity. The legal requirements of contracts, such as names of the parties (to the contract) and of the witnesses, which Hirt explores (Hirt 2019, p. 6) are relevant here. These contractual requirements are due to the precise intention to inform the local community that, as a result of the contract, certain goods are recognized as the property of the Illyrian members of that community (*peregrini*) and therefore to avoid future disputes ("Sao ke kelle terre, per kelle fini que ki contene ... ", Placiti Cassinesi). Similarly, nowadays the recognition by the state of destination, of migrants' education, qualifications and skills for employment purposes (that is, legal requirements of labor contracts) are explicitly granted by supranational and international law (e.g., art. VII of the Lisbon Recognition Convention, approved on 11 April 1997, implemented in Italy by law n. 148/2002, art. 26, c. 3 bis of the Italian legislative decree n. 251/2007). Such provisions aim at getting economic migrants and seasonal workers out of the black labor market and therefore making it easier for them to reach a regular status and full social integration (on legal integration, Smend 1968; on its interpretation, Pomarici 1982). In the Eurozone, the illegitimate status or irregularity of foreign workers is, in fact, a serious challenge to national legal orders: it leads to lower labor prices which fuel hatred of immigrants and coincides with the rise of radical, populist and 'sovereigntist' parties (Ambrosini et al. 2019; Cassese 2020).

Identification is an ongoing process of change (the *construction incessante*, to say it with Montaigne; on this, Bencivenga 1990) in which affirming one's own subjectivity might require one to step out of any identity received or to step into a new identity (see Appiah 2018). From this perspective, migration or mobility always has a profound impact on this process, be it individual or collective. Such an impact is, however, more disruptive to human beings as much as the push or pull factors that degrade their dignity. Dignity is, for example, compromised when displacement or eviction happens under circumstances that exclude any respect for individual self-determination, achievements (track record) or human relations, e.g., unexpected departure, without notice, by force or separation from relatives, friends and loved ones. In Hirt's examples, this was a consequence of the war for the Dacians, as the ostracon related to the two Dacian brothers shows (Hirt 2019, p. 16). In the recent EU experience, this was a consequence of the lack of political will and inter-administrative coordination among the EU partners in the execution of asylum-seekers or migrants' relocation (from Greece and Italy) and resettlement (from third party countries) humanitarian programs (Brekke and Brochmann 2014; Savino 2017; De Lucia and Wollenschläger 2019; Angeloni 2019).

In law, identity and dignity have followed different pathways. Identity is an ambiguous concept: it has for centuries been incorporated into 'status', used to distinguish and thus degrade the person (for example, the legal status of slave, serfdom, illiterate, poor, Jewish, woman, immigrant). Legal statuses have been codified to harm what we now call 'fundamental freedoms'. After the Second World War, identity has become a measure of exaltation, not degradation of the person. Its ambiguous meaning however still survives and any categorization based on identity requires careful consideration in the light of modern constitutional principles. First and foremost, the principle of dignity. It is at the heart of the concept of mankind as Kant described it: "Man must not be a means but an end" (Kant 1997). Dignity is a polysemic word too. Nevertheless, as a concept referring to mankind, it has been always recognized by political regimes based on individual rights. Those regimes that harmed it are the 'totalitarianist' regimes (Arendt 1951). For jurists, human dignity is the basis of the juridical meaning of 'person' (Rodotà 2012, p. 184) and therefore condenses the personalist principle. Together with the principle of equality, it "supports the great building of contemporary constitutionalism" (Silvestri 2007). Michael Rosen, for instance, qualifies constitutions according to whether or not they codify the principle of human dignity (Rosen 2012). A great contribution to clarify the implications of dignity came from contemporary political philosophy and theories of justice. Ronald Dworkin distinguishes two dimensions of human dignity: that of self-respect (moral dimension) and the ethics of dignity (Dworkin 2011; on the interpretation, Khurshid et al. 2018). The former is objectively, not only subjectively important and it implies to show respect to humanity by respecting yourself. The latter means accepting a personal responsibility for identifying what counts as success in your own life. The paradox about the foundation of human rights is that no actor can carry out a personal project outside the economic, political and social context (and constraint) of the organized community. However, the latter is sometimes itself a dangerous trap for life and human dignity. This is the case when the circumstances produced by sovereign powers deny legal guarantees not only of respect for and the protection of the person, but also of the promotion of their development to the highest possible degree. In the light of contemporary constitutionalism, dignity is the structural paradigm for any possible identity classification, meaning that the latter needs to proceed from it. Therefore, its proclamation in the constitutional charters and the European Convention on Human Rights is not superfluous, but has become an important guarantee.

From this perspective, the comparison with the present phenomena for several aspects is hazardous, but very interesting. It is hazardous because of the fraught interpretation of push and pull factors through the few and unclear glimpses into the ancient context provided by our sources. Nevertheless, it is interesting because the groups under consideration (Dalmatians and Dacians) were mainly forced migrants, but the latter (Dacians) experienced a much more serious condition of the deprivation and degradation of dignity than the former (Dalmatians). Dacians suffered the interruption of the continuity of their pre-established social hierarchies as a consequence of the defeat of war (Hirt 2019, p. 14).

The deliberate destruction of settlements and the displacement of young men by forced recruitment correspond to the logic of preventing any residual attempt at reaction and encouraging the emergence of a new society. In this new society, the actors were the 'new Romans' who, as Julius Caesar had understood beforehand, had to be both Romans and barbarians at the same time (Marchesi [1927] 1979; Azzara 2016). The conqueror and the conquered peoples could thus both leave their mark still legible. Such survivals of myths, gods and even the fundamental notions of the legal, political and social order are one of the main elements of European civilization and those inspired by it. On the other hand, the public authority represented by the imperial procurator (Hirt 2019, p. 4) and the prefect (Hirt 2019, p. 16) in selecting specific groups, and the lists of soldiers registered by ethnic categories, deserve consideration. The Empire was able to count on a dense administration, hierarchically ordered and completely dependent on imperial will. It was a fundamental element and an essential characteristic of its authority. The army, finance, organization and functioning of the imperial provinces and justice were strategic in making Dacians and soldiers of other conquered peoples totally dependent on the Emperor and the Roman State (Gaudemet 2002). Administrative (military) procedures and practices gained importance at the time.

In the cases of both Dalmatians and Dacians, we see the uprooting, the grouping in communities of origin (with the formation of lists in the case of soldiers), their location far from urban networks, in an unusual peripheral context and the induction to the cohabitation of different ethnic groups that were thus forced to find a new unity in the only one that became possible. The recognition by the authority (e.g., prefect) and the importance of the ethnic grouping in military formations and auxiliary units, the use of specific names in legal or official documents as well as the use of a common language of communication other than the native one, all manifest a complex process of integration and amalgamation.

The great effort that Hirt puts into this essay deserves appreciation. He tries to draw from archeological and epigraphic evidence concrete historical examples of how 'old' identity is retained by displaced people and offers interesting 'snapshots' of frontier communities' everyday life. Even though by virtue of the evidence, several questions are left unanswered—there is much to be gained from the emphasis he places on the situation of 'frontier' experiences (remoteness, isolation, mobility) and individual and groups' diversity (names, ethnic characters, deities, activities and more).

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(Re)moving the Masses: Colonisation as Domestic Displacement in the Roman Republic

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Abstract: Metaphors move—and displace—people. This paper starts from this premise, focusing on how elites have deployed metaphors of water and waste to form a rhetorical consensus around the displacement of non-elite citizens in ancient Roman contexts, with reference to similar discourses in the contemporary Global North and Brazil. The notion of 'domestic displacement'—the forced movement of citizens within their own sovereign territory—elucidates how these metaphors were used by elite citizens, such as Cicero, to mark out non-elite citizens for removal from the city of Rome through colonisation programmes. In the elite discourse of the late Republican and early Augustan periods, physical proximity to and figurative equation with the refuse of the city repeatedly signals the low social and legal status of potential colonists, while a corresponding metaphor of 'draining' expresses the elite desire to displace these groups to colonial sites. The material outcome of these metaphors emerges in the non-elite demographic texture of Julius Caesar's colonists, many of whom were drawn from the *plebs urbana* and freedmen. An elite rationale, detectable in the writings of Cicero, Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and others, underpins the notion of Roman colonisation as a mechanism of displacement. On this view, the colony served to alleviate the founding city—Rome—of its surplus population, politically volatile elements, and socially marginalised citizens, and in so doing, populate the margins of its empire too. Romulus' asylum, read anew as an Alban colony, serves as one prototype for this model of colonisation and offers a contrast to recent readings that have deployed the asylum as an ethical example for contemporary immigration and asylum seeker policy. The invocation of Romulus' asylum in 19th century debates about the Australian penal colonies further illustrates the dangers of appropriating the asylum towards an ethics of virtue. At its core, this paper drills down into the question of Roman colonists' volition, considering the evidence for their voluntary and involuntary movement to a colonial site and challenging the current understanding of this movement as a straightforward, series of voluntary 'mass migrations'. In recognising the agency wielded by non-elite citizens as prospective colonists, this paper contends that Roman colonisation, when understood as a form of domestic displacement, opens up another avenue for coming to grips with the dynamics of 'popular' politics in the Republican period.

Keywords: Roman colonisation; colonists; waste; metaphors; plebeians; freedmen; elite; non-elite; Julius Caesar; Cicero; Roman oratory; displacement; domestic; migration; Romulus; asylum; penal colonies; convicts; volition; popularis; marginality; land distribution

1. Introduction: Moving (the) Masses, Then and Now

The mainstream media, liberals and Hollywood are pitching a super-sized hissy fit over President Trump's decision to protect the fruited plain from blood-thirsty jihadists. They seem to think we are under some sort of moral obligation to allow *refugees to flood into the*

country without vetting and pray that nobody gets blown up . . . spare us your righteous indignation.[1] (Todd Starnes, 30 January 2017, *Fox News*).

Those whom disgrace or crime had driven out of their homes, *like wastewater*, these men had *flowed together* at Rome.[2] (Sallust, *The War of Catiline* 37.5)

And it is no wonder that this is what was said in the senate by this tribune of the plebs: that the urban plebeians are too powerful in the Republic; that *they must be drained*; indeed this is the word he used, as though he were speaking about *some wastewater* and not about a class of the best citizens.[3] (Cicero, *On the Agrarian Law* 2.70)

Aquatic metaphors—'flood,' 'flow,' 'influx,' 'tide,' 'tsunami,' 'waves', among others—have predominated in the news media since the 1990s to express the 'mass' number of refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants (RASIM), attempting to enter the European Union and other states of the Global North.[4] More recently in the USA, the negative stereotype of the 'anchor baby'—a child born of non-citizens within USA borders—is itself predicated on the understanding of the child "as a tool to secure immigrant families so as not to be swept away by the ever-retreating waters of migrant movement."[5] Still, the aquatic metaphor appears in contexts as far removed from each other on the political spectrum as the highly pejorative usage by the conservative commentator Todd Starnes, in the epigraph above, to the title of a New York Times Magazine feature, *Scenes from a Human Flood* (Anderson 2015). Even in Ai WeiWei's (2017) controversial, if lauded, documentary, the metaphorical title, *Human Flow*, while evoking a softer image than, say, 'human flood' or 'human tsunami', still attributes certain amorphous, inevitable, and inhuman qualities to its human subjects. In the documentary itself, the titular metaphor is frequently reinscribed by its visual corollary, as above-air drone shots offer us a bird's eye view of displaced peoples 'flowing' across land and sea in long, winding and wending movements, analogous to a river.[6]

Some scholars have pointed out how these aquatic metaphors have not always been used in a pejorative sense, and that they do, in some cases, aim to heighten the call for action and humanitarian aid by conveying the enormity and urgency of the 'crisis'.[7] Yet as Lena Kainz has persuasively shown, these metaphors are also loaded with a sense of danger, carry "calamitous connotations" akin to natural disasters, and ultimately, "metaphorically dehumanise" people.[8] This has had an impact on public sentiment, translated into political opinion about these displaced people, and subsequently has led to, or shored up, political policies that seek to 'stem the flow' or deport those who have already arrived.[9]

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1 Quoted in Bhatia and Jenks (2018, p. 11). Emphasis mine.
2 Sall. *Cat.* 37.5: *Primum omnium, qui ubique probro atque petulantia maxume praestabant, item alii per dedecora patrimoniis amissis, postremo omnes, quos flagitium aut facinus domo expulerat, ii Romam sicut in sentinam confluxerant.* Text: Kurfess (1957). All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
3 Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.70: *Et nimirum illud est, quod ab hoc tribuno plebis dictum est in senatu, urbanam plebem nimium in re publica posse; exhauriendam esse; hoc enim est usus, quasi de aliqua sentina ac non de optimorum civium genere loqueretur.* Text: Clark (1909).
4 Böke (1997, pp. 175–83) on Germany; El Refaie (2001, pp. 359–61) on Austria; Van der Valk (2000, p. 234) on France; Resigl and Wodak (2000, pp. 26, 59) on Germany and Austria; Pickering (2001, p. 172) on Australia; Charteris-Black (2006, pp. 570–75); Gabrielatos and Baker (2008); Baker et al. (2008, p. 287); KhosraviNik (2009, pp. 486–87); Parker (2015, pp. 7–8); Kulicka (2017, p. 268); Lazović (2017, p. 204) on the UK and EU; Bhatia and Jenks (2018, p. 12) on the US media in relation to Syrian refugees.
5 Lederer (2013, p. 255). See also on the instantiation of these and other negative metaphors in the USA: Santa Ana (1999) and, especially (Santa Ana 2002), on "the brown tide"; Cisneros (2008) on "immigration as pollution".
6 For the documentary as a form of 'dark tourism', see Tzanelli (2018, p. 528), and for critiques of his work, see Brooks (2017), including WeiWei's response: "I am a refugee, every bit ... Those people are me. That's my identity."
7 For the neutral or even positive aspect to these metaphors, see KhosraviNik (2009, pp. 486–87), though we should note that the metaphors he studied appeared in the somewhat (now) unique context of the 1999 NATO conflict in Kosovo and were applied to Kosovar refugees.
8 See Kainz (2016) for a critique of the use of these aquatic metaphors, and Petersson and Kainz (2017, pp. 58–59) for proposals on how to reframe or entirely replace these pejorative images.
9 For the impact of such metaphors on politics and policy making, see, for example, Cisneros (2008, pp. 590–93) on the US and Charteris-Black (2006) on the 2005 UK election campaign.

In the European Union (EU), where these metaphors have long proliferated, a recent shift in political opinion has led to the removal—the continued displacement—of displaced people from EU territory. On 18 March 2016, the EU entered into an agreement with Turkey, which essentially permitted the deportation, euphemistically termed a 'return', of displaced Syrians from various Greek islands back to Turkey, in exchange for EU funding and easier visa access for Turkish citizens, which has continued into 2018.[10] Metaphors, then, can play one role in larger political debates, intentional or otherwise, by moving citizens toward political positions that would effect the removal—the displacement—of 'Othered' people.

The view from Republican Rome is no less subtle or complex when we begin to examine how a particular variety of aquatic metaphors were applied by Roman elites to a group of people marked out for political vilification, and ultimately, as a means to effect their displacement from the city of Rome. Their targets, terms of expression, and political ends differ markedly from those found in the contemporary context of the Global North and its frequent rejection of people seeking to enter their borders, including displaced persons. At Rome, the waters were tinged by a further figurative element—waste. These metaphors, like those voiced by Sallust and Cicero in the epigraph above, were drawn from the terminology applied to the refuse of the street, the dregs at the bottom of your cup, or the bilge water at the bottom of a ship. Instead of applying these images to a perceived external 'threat' of incoming foreigners or non-citizens, the Roman elite used these metaphors to circumscribe a broad swath of their fellow, non-elite citizens for removal from Rome as a threat to the political status quo. Yet as this study contends, despite their clear differences, the Roman and contemporary contexts bear some resemblance in their shared method of mobilising metaphors with a view to building support for political policies and elite actions of displacement.

If we look to the Catalyst pieces from Brazil in this Special Issue (Ribeiro et al. 2017; Nobre and Nakano 2017), we can fine-tune the parallels to contemporary contexts even more usefully through the lens of displacements occurring *within* a community. Here we encounter a less obvious, but more comparable form of displacement that we might term "domestic displacement".[11] Unlike the more common factors driving displacements of people beyond the borders of their (most recent) home country, such as inter-state warfare, the Dandara community in Belo Horizonte and the concrete slab constructions of São Paolo grew out of communities and individuals displaced *within* the borders of Brazil. Effected by the socio-economic and often, racial, discriminatory actions of Brazil's elite, these same elites would seek to continue to displace these communities—pushing them into the expanding urban periphery—as the demand for prime real estate in these cities grows.[12] Adjacent to the sphere of liquid waste in Roman contexts, metaphors of "dirt" (*sujo*) have long been used to mark out members of these communities for removal, both in terms of their blackness and their association with manual

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[10] See European Council (2016). In a further turn for the worse, many of these Syrians have then been deported from Turkey back to Syria: Di Bartolomeo (2016), Tunaboylu and Alpes (2017), Alpes et al. (2017), Human Rights Watch (2018).

[11] In using the term "domestic displacement", I take inspiration from Barbara Arneil's (2017, pp. 23–24) recent monograph on "domestic colonies" in the modern colonial era. The heuristic of "domestic displacement" has only been sporadically applied in other fields, referring, for example, to the influence of the displacement brought about by the British penal colonies on poets such as Wordsworth (O'Brien 2007, pp. 122–23) or the role of the arctic territory in Iceland's economic policies (Ingimundarson 2015, pp. 83, 94). In the field of Ancient History and Classics, however, "domestic displacement" remains as yet an unconsidered heuristic category. I adopt it instead of the more common "internal displacement" (as per the UNHCR), since the designation of "domestic" allows for greater emphasis to be placed on (a) the notion of the displacement being tied specifically to a polity's domestic politics (rather than due to outside forces causing internal displacements), and (b) less on the strict notion of displacement as something occurring within a state's borders, which does not pertain to the Roman context. Rather, like modern colonies, Roman colonies became extensions of the polity, but because they geographically separated groups of citizens from the same polity, they differ from internal displacements where the physical 'separateness' imposed by geographical distance or a topographical feature (i.e., a body of water) is often less pronounced. Even so, there are problems with comparing Roman colonies to modern colonies under this model, as is discussed below in Section 4.

[12] On the interconnectedness of race and inequality in contemporary Brazil, especially in urban contexts, see Telles (2004); Lima (2010); and Silva and Reis (2011). I am especially grateful to Luciana de Souza Leão for suggesting relevant scholarship on this point.

labour.[13] So while metaphors of waste have also been applied to groups of non-citizen, displaced people seeking entry into the Global North, what Brazil and Rome share is the domestic context in which such metaphors operate—citizens configuring fellow citizens with inhuman materialities.

The particular Roman instantiation of "domestic displacement", here treated, refers to the forced movement of one group of citizens by another, on the basis of certain criteria, to a locale outside of the *urbs*. Devoting most of its attention to the better-documented contexts of late Republican and early Augustan Rome, this study proposes to partially reinscribe the Roman phenomenon of colonisation as a domestic displacement of citizens by citizens. In this scenario, the Roman elite—understood primarily as senators and the wealthy, namely *equites*—viewed colonies (*coloniae*) as places to which they could displace their fellow citizens from the city. These citizens were marked out for 'removal' primarily on the basis of their socio-economic class and legal status, that is, the 'poor' and newly minted citizens—freedmen—all of whom often fell under the non-descript category of the 'mass'. While Roman colonisation has received considerable scholarly attention for its impact on non-Roman populations, especially in the context of debates about the 'Romanisation' or mass deportation of these people, historians have shied away from asking how voluntary the decision to join a colony actually was. The seemingly benign terms of 'migration', 'emigration', or 'resettlement' applied by scholars to the movement of citizens caused by Rome's colonial programmes has implicitly assumed that this movement was largely voluntary.[14] The lens of displacement, however, prompts us to acknowledge a situation in which some colonists may not have willingly chosen to join a colony, but were forced by various factors beyond their own control.[15] On this view, the terminology of 'migration' unnecessarily effaces the entire question of the colonists' volition in the matter, collapsing the different types of movement arising from colonisation into a monolithic category of voluntary movement.

My recovery of the displacements masked by these 'migrations' moves through four distinct, yet interlocking sections that broadly correspond to the causal process of displacement in the contemporary world sketched above. The metaphors of waste that marked out certain groups for removal via colonisation (Section 2) form my starting point. Moving from this figurative means of displacement to its material implementation (Section 3), I consider the evidence for the demographic texture of some of the citizens sent out to Rome's colonies, as attested in Julius Caesar's colonies (59, 49–44 BCE), and whether this parallels the groups marked out by the metaphors examined in the previous section. At a more abstract, yet fundamental level, I then turn to the ancient political theory underpinning the elite rationale for colonisation as a method of domestic displacement (Section 4). Here the reception of Romulus' asylum is considered in two instances—the political commentary on today's asylum seeker 'crisis' and 19th century British justifications for the penal colonies in Australia. These case studies are then juxtaposed with my more emic reading of the asylum as a pragmatic model of Roman colonisation based on the principle of sending out marginalised people to populate

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[13] See Degler (1971, p. 161), Vargas (2004, pp. 458, 467 n.27). Cf. Cisneros (2008) on pollution metaphors used to describe 'immigrants' in the USA.

[14] The terminology is pervasive in the scholarship, most prominently among historians of Roman demography, such as: Brunt (1971, pp. 159–65); Hopkins (1978, pp. 64–74); Scheidel (2004, pp. 10–12); De Ligt (2012, pp. 184–87); and now, Hin (2013, chp. 6).

[15] Thus, I have attempted to test and build on the brief suggestions of a few scholars. Most recently, Woolf (2017, p. 35) submits that: "Arguably some Republican period colonization represents a variation on this process [of forced foundations of cities in Greece and the Near East], the main difference being that decision making was not taken by a monarch, and that a large part of the settlers were apparently volunteers. This second proposition is traditional wisdom but might be questioned. The testimony on mid-Republican colonies suggests frequent failures, many manifested in colonists leaving their new settlements. The involvement of non-citizens in some foundations also raises questions about how far settlers were entirely free to choose." Hin (2013, p. 214) also briefly considers colonisation as 'forced migration', though she does not delve into any details and prefers to consider a few macro push and pull factors affecting colonisation initiatives. Purcell (1994, pp. 654–55) also approaches the broad outlines of what follows, but without going so far as to see Roman colonisation as a forced movement of the *plebs* and freedmen. Harris (1979, p. 65), writing of colonies in the Middle Republic, comes closest to considering the socio-economic factors which I discuss in this paper, but still refers *a priori* to their popularity (and ergo, the voluntary participation of colonists): "There may have been some compulsion, and if the ordinary colonists were people who were previously sunk in poverty, their freedom of choice was limited; none the less the colonies could not have worked unless they met a popular need."

the margins of empire. Finally, the historiographical accounts of early Roman colonisation in two Augustan era historians, Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Section 5), and one particular example, the foundation of Velitrae, open up opportunities to consider both how colonisation was focalised in ancient historiography as a form of displacement and the real mechanisms which could compel colonists to join a colony. From the legislative and magisterial powers used to send Latin colonists back to the colonies they had abandoned during the second century BCE to less formal 'push' factors, such as restrictions on the grain dole in Caesar's Rome, this final section canvasses what we know about the volition of colonists and the forces mediating it.

Central, then, to what follows is the volition and political agency of the (potential) colonists. The deprivation of colonists' volition implies their displacement, and in so doing, their inability to participate as citizens in the political life of the city—to join in the 'mass' politics of the *urbs*.[16] This study therefore works at the crossroads of a number of current debates in Roman studies and offers new ways forward through the avenue of domestic displacement. On the one hand, I return to older views that focused on the domestic reasons for Roman colonisation, but shift away from approaches which, for instance, take the rationalising commentary in ancient historiography as real evidence for the intentions behind the founding of colonies in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE.[17] Instead, my study focuses on how the discourse in oratory and historiography discussing colonisation is a product of late Republican and Augustan intra-elite consensus about the function of colonisation, that is, as a powerful tool for the maintenance of their hegemony in popular politics.

In view of this, the role of non-elite citizen agency in colonisation offers us a new route into examining 'popular' politics in the late Republic. The fact that the elite of late Republican Rome were so intent upon displacing non-elite 'mass' agency through colonisation initiatives demonstrates the real agency of this group and the threat it posed to the political status quo. In this sense, my conclusions, although derived from a study of primarily elite texts, draw on what is at times referred to as the 'democratic' school of scholarship that has emphasised the political agency of the non-elite, as well as resonating with the Marxist approach of G.E.M. De Ste. Croix (1981).[18] Still, when successfully enacted, colonisation as a displacement of non-elite political participation also speaks to more sceptical analyses of popular sovereignty in the Roman Republic. From this angle, colonisation can be read as one institution, alongside others, such as the *comitia centuriata*, utilised to curb the political agency of non-elite groups in the city.[19] In short, the lens of displacement opens up new ways of seeing how Roman colonisation—and by extension, Roman imperialism—was deeply tethered to the domestic conflicts which unfolded in the *urbs* during the last century of the Republic. In methodological terms, it underscores how the seeds of such domestic displacements ultimately can be found both in the dehumanising metaphors and political theories of the elite which marked certain groups of people out for removal from the physical and political space of the Roman community.

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[16] Colonists could, of course, participate in the political life of their colony and Roman colonists were enrolled in voting tribes at Rome, but Roman citizens who became Latin colonists lost their right to participate in Rome's voting assemblies. The physical distance of many colonies from the *urbs* also meant that many Roman colonists likely did not cast their votes in the assembly or participate in other key political venues, such as the *contio*.

[17] See, for example, the studies of Pais (1931, pp. 109–31); Bernardi (1946); Tibiletti (1950); now revived somewhat by Bradley (2006) and Patterson (2006).

[18] Best represented in Millar's (1998) monograph, Wiseman's (2009) collection, and Courrier's (2014, pp. 427–582) exhaustive study of the collective action of the *plebs*. Note, however, that all three authors approach the 'democratic' element in very different ways, Millar more forcefully than all others. The future direction of the field is perhaps signalled by Steel et al. (2018), who acknowledge the real role of ideology in 'popular' politics and its inseparableness from political institutions; see also Rosillo-López (2017). In all of these treatments, colonisation has not been taken as an instrument of elite intervention in 'popular' politics—as an institution which served elite ideological needs—beyond discussions of land distribution as *popularis* or 'popular' proposals designed to curry favour with the Roman people. See also the qualifications and overview of the debate provided by Logghe (2017), who restates the 'democratic' case by focusing on discrete areas of plebeian agency.

[19] Hence, on the other side of the debate, Mouritsen's (2001, 2017) arguments about the restrictions on popular sovereignty would also be well served by viewing colonies as another institutional circumvention of this sovereignty.

2. 'Drain the... Plebs!': Metaphors for Moving the Masses in Late Republican Rome

Metaphors inspired by the gutters and sewers of Rome seem to have been staples of elite discourse when talking derogatively about the 'masses' of the city, in particular a subset of this group defined by their familial descent and spatial identity—the *plebs urbana*, or city-dwelling plebeians.[20] The *plebs urbana* could also include former slaves, so that freedmen and freedwomen were subsumed into the 'masses'—in fact they may have formed a significant majority of this group. In the late Republic, this combined group of freeborn and freed citizens was highly visible in the city and likely numbered in the hundreds of thousands.[21] A brief tour of the semiotics of the sewer reveals a fertile source of social and political metaphor that collected a broad register of signifying terms designed to figuratively shore up these socio-economic and legal status divisions. Dan-el Padilla Peralta's (2017, pp. 118–19) recent preface to a future study of the "semiotics of ordure" enjoins us to think similarly about its liquid cousins—wastewater, dregs, and the like; for "to do full justice to the forms of privilege and oppression that cluster around waste relief will entail pushing past the diagnostics of humor, given the range of strategies ancient and modern for plotting waste disposal and management along status, class, and gender lines."[22] The prejudices of our discipline have thus far stymied such a serious consideration of how waste metaphors can perform the work of oppression; this section makes one attempt to remedy this injustice.[23]

For lines of class and status are clearly inscribed in the vast majority of waste metaphors that connect the *plebs* to their 'lowly' social position vis-à-vis an implied relation to the 'lowly' elements of their urban environment. While the racist connotations of *sujo* are activated when applied to a person of colour in modern Brazil, *caenum*, also meaning "dirt", could be applied to the entirety of plebeians in a political struggle over control of the consulship at Rome in 297 BCE; the targets and underlying ideologies may differ, but the metaphorical vehicle is unsurprisingly similar.[24] The "dirtiness" of the

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[20] For a philological study of some of these metaphors, see Kühnert (1989), who confines her study to Cicero and does not link these metaphors to the common theme of waste, nor, as we shall see, colonisation initiatives. By contrast, Càssola (1988, p. 9) offered an incisive, if brief, snapshot of the evidence, but not the extended analysis and framework I offer below. Gowers (1995, pp. 29–30) *tour de force*, though more concerned with the genre of satire, also lit the way for a semiotics of sewerage tied to Roman politics. Most recently, Courrier (2014, p. 495 n.253) too easily dismisses these terms as simply "moral" in character and lacking any socio-economic quality: "Les qualificatifs tels que *perditi, egentes, sentina, faex* et *sordes* ne relèvent pas d'une sphère socio-économique mais uniquement morale, tout comme les qualificatifs *infimi* et *inferiores* (toutefois nettement moins péjoratifs)."

[21] The debate over the number of freedmen and rates of manumission will likely never be resolved, in the absence of better evidence; but we can at least say that manumission was common in the period under consideration here, and that freedmen were likely numerous—perhaps numbering more than 100,000. For the latest discussion and the problems with our evidence, see Mouritsen (2011, pp. 120–41). If we can trust Suetonius, the number of citizens who received the grain dole numbered 320,000 under Julius Caesar (see Sections 3 and 4 below), which may be somewhat indicative of the magnitude of the *plebs urbana*. We do not, however, know if this number included only male citizens, or their families too. In what follows I adopt the standard parlance of "freedmen", but in so doing it is not my intention to efface freedwomen from this history; hence, freedwomen should be assumed to be included in this grouping, though we lack the specific sources to link them to colonial foundations in the same way that we can for freedmen, for example, in the epigraphic record at Corinth.

[22] Compare his contribution in this volume (Padilla Peralta forthcoming) on what he terms "copropolitics" and the imaging of the foreigner as a waste product. On the use of metaphors of dirt to vilify certain individuals and social groups in Athenian (and more broadly Greek) society, see Lindenlauf's (2004, pp. 98–99) insightful analysis, especially with regard to Aristophanes.

[23] Cf. De Ste. Croix's (1981, p. 355) earlier critique of ancient historians who accepted consciously and unconsciously the Roman elite's derogatory views of the non-elites as historical reality, especially in terms of the metaphors considered in this section. Indeed, the prejudices of the field during the twentieth century are underscored by one British school 'Examiner' (1943, p. 58), who anonymously advocated, in the well-respected journal *Greece and Rome*, that these Roman metaphors be used to make parallels to the British unemployed: "In the background [to Rome's civil strife], as the raw material of this anarchic and brutal era there is the 'mob', *sentina urbis, faex Romuli* (most schoolboys can quote these two tags). A proper subject for moral judgements, as it has been from the days of Juvenal and earlier, it serves for many a neat parallel with our pre-war unemployed, with the corn dole as a counterpart to the Unemployment Assistance Board. It is this 'mob' which was at last won to ignoble quietude with the bread and circuses of the Caesars, the high-water mark of popular degeneracy."

[24] Livy 10.15.9: *orare ut ex caeno plebeio consulatum extraheret maiestatemque pristinam cum honori tum patriciis gentibus redderet*. That Oakley (2005, p. 195) notes how "this episode probably has little basis in fact, resting almost entirely on annalistic invention" strengthens the possibility that Livy was drawing on an image common to his own day (or his sources'). Compare its use at Cic. *Vat.* 17 and 23 to describe Vatinius' obscure origins, like the application of *conluvio* to Gabinius below at n.30.

plebs and their popular leaders was also marked with the adjective *sordus* or noun *sordes*, while their proximity to the ground is frequently marked with the adjectives *infimus* or *imus*, "lowest".[25] As the persistence of these metaphors into the imperial period and their currency in the literary genre of satire seems to attest (Gowers 1995; Gillies 2018), such late Republican mudslinging left a thorough stain upon a large swathe of the Roman citizenry in the realm of elite discourse. In the visual sphere, it is probably not a coincidence that sculptures of beggars and other non-elites (drunken women, fishermen, hunchbacks) from the Hellenistic and Roman worlds often represent their subjects in proximity to, or sitting directly on, the ground.[26] Even as sculptures originally formulated in the Hellenistic period, the acts of conquest, copying, imitation, appropriation, and adaptation that brought them into distinctly Roman contexts could give visual expression to discourses already present in other forms, such as the metaphors assessed in this section. Take for instance this early first century CE Roman bronze figurine (Figure 1) depicting a girl begging that doubles as a coin bank (*thesaurus*).[27] A playful example of form following function, she is not 'emaciated' or suffering from a disease, as some other representations of non-elites seem to suggest.[28] Yet she is still positioned, with legs crossed, on the ground, hand outstretched, presumably adopting a pose not unfamiliar to the Roman street—amidst its dirt, dust, and liquid waste.

Moving from dirt into more aquatic territory, *conluvio* (or: *colluviēs*, *colluvium*) carries the sense of muck or filth that has washed up together—as though in a channel or gutter.[29] *Conluvio* labels the crowd of people who followed around the tribune of the plebs in 91 BCE, Marcus Livius Drusus, but it also circumscribes the alleged low social origins of Cicero's political enemy, Gabinius; in each case, it signals the figurative substance where seditious elements gather or originate.[30] It is especially telling that in the generation after Cicero, the historian Livy would apply this metaphor to a group of 4000 men whom the consul of 214 BCE, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, deported from the Sicilian town of Agathyrnum across to Rhegium in Italy during the Second Punic War.[31] These men, a "disorderly mob", are explicitly framed as an indeterminate, but dangerous substance—the "stuff of revolution" (*materiam novandis rebus*):

> [they were] mixed from every sort of bilge (*ex omni conluvione*), exiles, debtors, those convicted
> of a reckless crime, for the most part, when they had lived in their own communities and

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25 *Plebs infima*: Cic. *Mil.* 95 (mass), *Leg.* 3.20 (leader), *Att.* 4.1.5 (mass); Livy 10.6.4 (mass), 24.23.10 (mass). For similar usage in the imperial period, see: Pliny *NH* 19.54 (mass), Sen. *Controv.* 10.3.5 (mass), Suet. *Otho* 7.1, Tac. *Hist.* 2.38, 2.91. *Infimus populus*: Varr. *Ling.* 5.7.2. *Plebs ima*: Iuv. 8.47. On the connection between this metaphor and the living conditions of Rome, see Blonski (2015, p. 62). Courrier (2014, p. 347) on the *plebs summa, media,* and *infimus* as socio-economic gradations.

26 See Bremmer (1991, pp. 25–26) and Trentin (2015, p. 76) on the self-degradation implied in figures seated on the ground, namely beggars. Most famously, Myron's *anus ebria*, sometimes interpreted as a beggar woman, is seated directly on the ground. Furthermore, Trentin's (2015, pp. 104–8) study of sculptures depicting hunchbacks includes a whole category of seated figures—all of which appear to be sitting on the ground, not on furniture.

27 See Mattusch (2014, pp. 48–49, fig. 25). Compare Trentin (2015, pp. 74–75) on hunchback beggar figurines, but note that her examples do not have the explicit gesture of the outstretched arm. For a standing Ethiopian bronze 'beggar' figurine from the Cleveland Museum of Art, but not without the problem that its hand and begging bowl are restorations, see Stewart (2014, p. 236, fig.141). A full study of 'beggars' in the visual arts of the Hellenistic and Roman periods remains to be undertaken.

28 Of course, as a coin box, she could never be too 'thin' in size, otherwise it would render the functionality of the box redundant. That such an object was also owned by someone who was clearly not in the socio-economic position of the girl depicted further reinforces how visual representations could reinforce elite discourses about the non-elite. On emaciation, visual depictions of 'beggars', and the attendant problems with the ancient terminology and its visual corollaries, see Bradley (2011). Note that he does not consider issues beyond the terminology and visualization of poverty through flesh(iness), such as posture or proximity to the ground. Other approaches tend to focus on literal representation—compare Rose (2018) on these 'emaciated' beggar figurines as actual representations of people suffering from skeletal tuberculosis.

29 See the specific figurative senses at: *TLL* s.v. *colluvio* III, 1666, 41–57; *OLD* s.v. *colluviēs* 3b: "applied to a conglomeration of worthless people."

30 See Cic. *Vat.* 23 (*in conluvione Drusi*), *Sest.* 15 (Gabinius' origins: *ex omnium scelerum conluvione natus*), *Har.* 55 (P. Clodius imagining the "pollution and subversion of the community" [*conluvionem ... eversionem civitatis*] when speaking on the *rostra*). Cf. Cic. *Sen.* 84 on death as an escape "from this crowd and muck" (*ex hac turba et conluvione*).

31 See Livy, 26.40.14–18, 27.12.4–5.

under their laws, and afterwards, due to various reasons, a similar fate had heaped them into a mass (*conglobauerat*) at Agathyrnum, eking out a life through robbery and rapine.[32]

Figure 1. Roman coin bank. Bronze with copper inlay. 25–50 CE. 12.2 × 13.5 cm (4 13/16 × 5 5/16 in.). J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, USA. Inv. 72.AC.99. Digital image courtesy of the Getty's Open Content Program.

Metaphorical putty in the hands of Livy, comparison with the Greek historian Polybius' earlier (though fragmentary) account seems to suggest that Livy rendered these men far less favourably, in the socio-political imagery of his day.[33] The pull of Livy's political world is especially felt in the phrase, *res novae*—revolution.[34]

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[32] Livy, 26.40.17–18: *quattuor milia hominum erant, mixti ex omni conluvione exsules obaerati capitalia ausi plerique cum in ciuitatibus suis ac sub legibus uixerant, et postquam eos ex uariis causis fortuna similis conglobauerat Agathyrnam per latrocinia ac rapinam tolerantes uitam. hos neque relinquere Laeuinus in insula tum primum noua pace coalescente uelut materiam nouandis rebus satis tutum ratus est, et Reginis usui futuri erant ad populandum Bruttium agrum adsuetam latrociniis quaerentibus manum.* Text: Conway and Johnson (1953).

[33] The power of displacement ascribed to the consul by Livy's choice of verbs (*transvexit, locatum erat, traducta*) is entirely absent in Polybius' (9.27.11) treatment of the episode. His consul "persuaded" (ἔπεισεν) the men to "withdraw" (or, even, "emigrate": ἐκχωρεῖν, *LSJ* s.v. A) to Italy by offering them specific material incentives: pledges of security for their persons (this may have had real consequences in the midst of a warzone where enslavement was always an imminent threat); pay (or rations: μέτρημα) from the Rhegians and pillage from the Bruttians—all of which are tellingly absent from Livy's account and have not been acknowledged by scholars. Walbank (1967, p. 161) cites Livy's account without drawing any contrast or comparison; Prag (2007, p. 77), also citing Livy, only categorises the men in pragmatic terms as *auxilia externa*, seemingly eliding the different types of men, including the Roman deserters, whom Livy lists. Cf. Isayev (2017a, p. 283), who rightly places them in the broader context of coerced movement during the Second Punic War. Translators of Polybius also supply a noun for the men where none is provided in the text, ostensibly under the influence of Livy's account: Schuckburgh (1962, II.587): "refugees"; Walbank and Habicht's revision of Paton's (2011) translation: "fugitives". Compare the very faithful translation of Drexler (1961, I.672) who refrains from characterising the men as anything other than "<der aus Agathyrna Vertriebenen>" ("those expelled from Agathyrna": his additions are carefully indicated by the brackets) and impersonally as "sie" ("them").

[34] *Res novae* was a particularly potent catch-phrase in late Republican political language, for which see: Romano (2006a, 2006b); McGushin (1977, p. 173), "The phrase *res novae* may have formed part of the traditional vocabulary of historiography ... but it was particularly prevalent in the late Republic"; in Greek and Roman historiography, specifically Sallust and Tacitus: Spielberg (2017); more generally, as an expression of 'revolution': Finley (1986, pp. 49–50).

Yet in his use of such metaphors, Livy was merely following the lead of earlier Roman elites, namely Cicero and Sallust. In early June of 60 BCE Cicero famously wrote to Atticus about his senatorial colleague, Marcus Porcius Cato, opining that:

> ... I have as warm a regard for him as you. The fact remains that with all his patriotism and integrity he is sometimes a political liability. He speaks in the Senate as though he were living in Plato's *Republic* instead of Romulus' cesspool (*faece*).[35]

A potent catchphrase, the *faex Romuli* likely recalls a tradition about the asylum of Romulus, inasmuch as Livy and Plutarch, among others, describe the 'undesirable' men whom Romulus gathered together to increase the population of a still-nascent Rome.[36] We will consider the tradition surrounding Romulus' asylum later, below (see Section 4). For the moment, we must acknowledge that Cicero's playful critique of Cato's political naïveté turns on a powerful metaphor that exposes an elite perception and anxiety: that the *faex* of the city have outsized influence in the politics of the day.[37] Even though the metaphor is here applied to describe jurors who mostly hailed from the elite, its field of reference can be understood more broadly. For the political agency of the 'popular' *faex* emerges at a number of moments in Cicero's public and private political discourse and seems to speak to their staying power as a source of political anxiety for the elite, not least Cicero.[38] The off-hand, almost mundane application of a metaphor like *faex* to the *plebs* and its collocation with other terms for filth, such as *sordes* and *infimus*, also underscores how the semiotics of liquid waste and dirt were neither mutually exclusive nor exceptional.[39] Built into this metaphor and the others above, however, is the implication that such influence could be disposed of—or displaced—like refuse, washed down Rome's great sewer, the *Cloaca maxima*.

Only one metaphor, though, both aligns its target with liquid waste and proposes its explicit removal in one and the same figuration. 'Drain the dregs', the combination of *sentina* and *exhaurire*, as quoted in the Ciceronian epigraph to this paper, appears to have been deployed in the service of rhetoric advocating for the creation of new colonies (via land distribution) that would remove non-elite groups, such as the *plebs urbana*, from the city. As we will see, the metaphor's appearance in Sallust, Cicero, and later, Livy, suggests its specific role in the elite discourse of the late Republic and early Augustan period. More immediately, the political context of Cicero's utterance is crucial to our understanding of the metaphor. Speaking before a public meeting of the people (*contio*) as consul in 63 BCE, Cicero made his case against the land distribution bill spear-headed by one of the tribunes of the *plebs* for that year, Publius Servilius Rullus. One of Cicero's strategies in the speech relies on quoting Rullus' own words back at him, twisting them to undercut his ideological credibility before a popular (mostly non-elite) audience.[40] At one point, while asserting that Rullus' legislation would buy

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[35] Cic. *Att.* 2.1.8 = SB 21 (June 3(?) 60): *Nam Catonem nostrum non tu amas plus quam ego; sed tamen ille optimo animo utens et summa fide nocet interdum rei publicae; dicit enim tamquam in Platonis* πολιτείᾳ*, non tamquam in* Romuli faece*, sententiam.* Text and translation: Shackleton Bailey (1965).

[36] Following Dench (2005, pp. 15–16) and Ayer (2013, p. 86). See below, Section 4 for further analysis.

[37] For similar usage, see Cic. *Att.* 9.10.7 = SB 177 (March 18, 49 BCE), where Cicero quotes a letter of Atticus' in which he calls ruling Rome with Caesar (during the civil war) "the future sink of iniquity" (*futura colluvie*).

[38] See: Cic. *Att.* 1.16.11 = SB 16 (July, 61 BCE): Cicero wrote that his position with the "filth and dregs of the city" (*sordem urbis et faecem*) had much improved, while also describing them a few lines later as, "that public-meeting attending leach on the treasury, wretched and starving rabble" (*illa contionalis hirudo aerari, misera ac ieiuna plebecula*). Cic. *Q. Fratr.* 2.5.3 = SB 9 (March, 56 BCE): Pompey had become unpopular "among that most vicious and lowest swill of the people" (*apud perditissimam illam atque infimam faecem populi*); Cic. *Pis.* 9 (55 BCE): Cicero complains that under Piso the *collegia* had been reinstated and that innumerable new ones arose out of "all the servile dregs of the city" (*ex omni faece urbis ac servitio*). See also Cic. *Fam.* 7.32.2 = SB 113 (February or March 50? BCE).

[39] See above note for these collocations.

[40] See, for example: Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.13 for his derogatory characterisation of Rullus' *contio* speech; 2.19 for his explicit critique of Rullus' earlier claim (in a *contio*) to be *nobilis* with Jewell (2018, p. 270); 2.79 for his quotation of an earlier moment, likely at a senate meeting, where he questioned Rullus. Cf. Manuwald (2018, pp. 150–51, 341, 357) for Rullus' senatorial oratory; Morstein-Marx (2004, pp. 248–53) on the contional audience's reliance on the *contio* as a source of 'information' about what was said in senate meetings.

up uninhabitable land for the *plebs* to colonise, Cicero connects this to what Rullus had allegedly said in his speech to the senate on the same bill:

> And it is no wonder that this is what was said in the senate by this tribune of the plebs: that the urban plebeians are too powerful in the Republic; that they must be drained (*exhauriendam*); indeed this is the word he used, as though he were speaking about some bilge water (*sentina*) and not about a class of the best citizens.[41]

In a move that today recalls infamous incidents of politicians caught speaking derogatively about the 'masses'—in the USA, Mitt Romney's "47%" remark or Hillary Clinton's "basket of deplorables" come to mind—it is clear that Cicero thought he could undermine the popular credentials of Rullus by parting the curtain between *curia* and *contio*, acting as the 'hot mic' for his contional audience.[42] This was but one of the many rhetorical nails Cicero hammered into the coffin that eventually became Rullus' failed land bill.[43] Nevertheless, voiced in the senate among his peers, Rullus' metaphor gives expression to a broader elite desire to displace the agency of the 'mass'; it is no outlier in the elite discourse of this time.

Beyond Cicero's selective quotation of Rullus' speech to the senate, the *sentina* metaphor seems to have existed as a mainstay of elite discourse about how to deal with the problem of the *plebs* and their aspiring leaders.[44] This discourse crystallised in the Catilinarian conspiracy of 63 BCE, the same year that Rullus proposed his land bill. In his breakdown of the groups who supported the consular aspirant, Lucius Sergius Catilina (hereafter, Catiline), Sallust asserts that the conspiracy, while led by members of the elite, drew the support of the "entirety of the plebeians" (*cuncta plebes*), who were "eager for revolution" (*novarum rerum studio*).[45] A sentence later, when Sallust singles out the *plebs urbana* as the principal (*praeceps*) segment of these plebeians, we encounter the metaphorical *sentina* again—"those whom disgrace or crime had driven out of their homes, like wastewater (*sentina*), these men had flowed together to Rome."[46] The conspirators themselves were also branded as *sentina* in Cicero's first Catilinarian oration, as he exhorted Catiline to leave Rome, since his followers, "the Republic's great destructive slop (*sentina*) of your companions will be drained (*exhaurietur*) from the city."[47] The next day, after Cicero's rhetoric and threats had successfully displaced Catiline from the city, he again would exclaim before the people in a *contio*:

> O fortunate Republic, if it shall have thrown out this bilge (*sentinam*) of the city! By Hercules, with Catiline's removal (*exhausta*) alone I think the Republic has been relieved of a burden and created anew.[48]

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41 Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.70: *Et nimirum illud est, quod ab hoc tribuno plebis dictum est in senatu, urbanam plebem nimium in re publica posse; exhauriendam esse; hoc enim est usus, quasi de aliqua sentina ac non de optimorum civium genere loqueretur.*

42 On this 'revelatory' strategy, see Morstein-Marx (2004, pp. 243–58). For analyses of the political exploitation of the perceived elitist nature of Mitt Romney's (Landler 2012) and Hillary Clinton's (Chozick 2016) comments to stoke 'populist' ire for electoral gain, see, for example, White (2016, p. 274) and Fuchsman (2017, pp. 37–38).

43 For Rullus' bill and Cicero's speeches against it, see the essential treatments of Hardy (1913); Jonkers (1963); Drummond (2000); and now, Manuwald (2018).

44 Note that I translate the term *sentina* in different ways throughout this paper, namely to demonstrate its capacious and indeterminate quality, encompassing various kinds of liquid waste, from bilge water in a ship to dregs, filth, scum, wastewater, and sewerage. Thus, I follow the figurative possibilities offered by *OLD* s.v. 2: "the scum or dregs of society", rather than the more literal reading of others, such as Ramsey (2007), who referring to its use at Sall. *Cat.* 37.5, translates it as "bilge of a ship". Cf. McGushin (1977), who allows for the possibility that "it is often used as an alternative to *colluvies*, to mean filth or dregs."

45 Sall. *Cat.* 37.1: *Neque solum illis aliena mens erat, qui conscii coniurationis fuerant, sed omnino cuncta plebes novarum rerum studio Catilinae incepta probabat.*

46 Sall. *Cat.* 37.5: *Primum omnium, qui ubique probro atque petulantia maxume praestabant, item alii per dedecora patrimoniis amissis, postremo omnes, quos flagitium aut facinus domo expulerat, ii Romam sicut in sentinam confluxerant.*

47 Cic. *Cat.* 1.12: *sin tu, quod te iam dudum hortor, exieris, exhaurietur ex urbe tuorum comitum magna et perniciosa sentina rei publicae.*

48 Cic. *Cat.* 2.7: *O fortunatam rem publicam, si quidem hanc sentinam urbis eiecerit! Uno me hercule Catilina exhausto levata mihi et recreata res publica videtur.* Cf. Morstein-Marx (2004, p. 219 n.67), "The audience must have appreciated Cicero's application to Catiline's fancy followers of an insulting phrase that the urban plebs rightly suspected was often used of them."

It cannot be a mere coincidence that Rullus' choice of metaphorical language to describe the displacement of the *plebs* and their agency—*exhaurire*, with *sentina* added by Cicero[49]—happened in the same year as the Catilinarian conspiracy. The defeat of Rullus' colonisation programme may have contributed to support for Catiline's electoral platform and both clearly sought to address the 'problem' of the urban 'mass'—in different ways, of course. Regardless of whether the two politicians coordinated their efforts, they point in the same direction: to elite anxieties about the growing power of this non-elite group in late Republican politics.[50]

Even with the defeat of Rullus' land bill and Catiline's movement in 63, land legislation arose again in 60 with a bill from another tribune, Flavius; this, too, would fail.[51] But this time Cicero chose to support the bill. Crucial for our purposes, he reveals his intra-elite solidarity for the bill in a letter to Atticus on March 15, 60 BCE, when he himself deploys the metaphor of 'draining the dregs' to describe the potential effects of the legislation. There Cicero explains how Pompey is set on passing Flavius' bill and that he has been assured that the private land holdings "of the wealthy" (*locupletium*) will not be threatened by the land distribution. Instead, Cicero claims that he is meeting Pompey and the *populus* halfway by allowing land to be purchased (through the revenues coming from Pompey's eastern military campaigns)—precisely the method he had opposed in Rullus' land bill. For present purposes, however, what Cicero views as the upshot and undergirding purpose behind the law is of greater interest:

> As for the populace and Pompey, I am meeting them (as I also want to do) by way of purchase.
> If that is properly organised I believe the dregs of the city can be cleared out (*sentinam urbis exhauriri*) and Italy repeopled.[52]

To Cicero's thinking at least, then, Flavius' land programme, and the colonies that would result from it, could achieve a double objective—drain the city of the *plebs urbana* and repopulate Italy.[53] The revelation that what Cicero said in public (against Rullus) does not reflect what he expressed in private (to Atticus) is no great revelation at all, but it does mean that we now have a clear rationale for late Republican colonisation twice expressed through the same pejorative metaphor.[54] Moreover, when Cicero wrote to Atticus a few months later about the *faex Romuli*, it is not irrelevant that a discussion of Flavius' *lex agraria* immediately precedes this image of the grubby political wheeling and dealing of the day.[55] Evidently, Rome's 'waste problem' was on the minds of the Roman elite at this critical time.

The fact that we also encounter the metaphor in Livy's narration of the Second Punic War in Sicily suggests that 'drain the dregs' had acquired a special currency among elites when they spoke to each other about removing non-elites from the city and its politics. Like the *conluvio* at Agathyrnum, these men, a group of Roman deserters and auxiliaries, are cast as desirous of *res novae* and their departure

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49 *Contra* Purcell (1994, p. 655), "the phrase is Cicero's". Cf. Manuwald (2018, p. 341), "[Cicero] does not attribute this further word [*sentinam*] to Rullus, but the context insinuates that it too might be his."

50 On the indirect causal relationship between Catiline's and Rullus' efforts, see Gruen (1974, pp. 395–96, 403).

51 See Rotondi (1912, p. 386); Gruen (1974, pp. 396–97); Flach (1990, pp. 76–78). The failure of these bills also demonstrates that while colonisation served some elite aims, it could be perceived as a threat to elite, landed interests (i.e., through land distribution) and hence these initiatives were often thwarted or saw success more because of senatorial and equestrian opposition or support, than popular opposition or support. See Mouritsen (2017, pp. 113, 149) on this point.

52 Cic. *Att.* 1.19.4 = SB 19: *populo autem Pompeioque (nam id quoque volebam) satis faciebam emptione, qua constituta diligenter et sentinam urbis exhauriri et Italiae solitudinem frequentari posse arbitrabar.* Translation modified from Shackleton Bailey's (1965). On this letter see, especially, Morstein-Marx (2004, pp. 210–12).

53 See also Dio, 37.50.1 with Shackleton Bailey (1965, I.336) on the intent of Flavius' bill to grant land not only to Pompey's veterans, but the citizenry at large.

54 On the disjunction between Cicero's public and private statements on this matter, see Jonkers (1963, pp. 110–11); Shackleton Bailey (1965, p. 337); and Morstein-Marx (2004, pp. 211–12, 253). Cf. De Ste. Croix (1981, p. 624 n.14), "It is interesting to see how Cicero, in a speech delivered to the populace in a *contio*, could pretend to be shocked when recalling how his opponent, Rullus, had referred to the urban plebs...".

55 Cic. *Att.*1.21.6 = SB 21: mention of Atticus' previous correspondence about the agrarian law (*quod de agraria lege scribis*) marks the beginning of the discussion. Although the remark directly bears on the matter of jurors taking bribes, one could argue that Cicero here draws on the *faex* metaphor because of its more regular application to the *plebs urbana*.

from the city of Syracuse is described as a 'draining' of the 'dregs'. [56] Yet this figurative language was not simply a facile catchphrase or a shorthand way of speaking about the *plebs urbana* and other marginalised groups in the city, as most scholars have supposed.[57] This metaphor articulated one of the elite intentions driving colonisation programmes—programmes that, as we will see, would displace tens, even hundreds of thousands of Rome's citizens. It is to the practical outcome of these metaphors—from figurative to physical displacement—that my analysis now turns.

3. Displacing the *Plebs Urbana* and Freedmen from Caesar's Rome: The Creation of a 'Gutter Empire'?

When the biographer Suetonius described the *result* of Julius Caesar's colonial foundations across the Roman Empire, it seems deliberate that he chose the verb that was integral to the elite metaphor for colonisation from the very period he was describing—*exhaurire*, 'to drain off'. For according to Suetonius' brief account, Caesar's colonisation plans as dictator (49–44 BC) had seen some 80,000 citizens sent to overseas colonies, leaving the crowd of the *urbs* "drained" (*exhausta*). Rome was apparently so depopulated that, quite ironically, this caused Caesar to engage in further social engineering, as he passed a law with measures ostensibly aimed at stabilising the male citizen population by preventing their departure from Italy.[58] Caesar had apparently succeeded where other elites had failed—he had 'drained' Rome.

The intra-elite solidarity on display in the discourse we have examined above was therefore not simply a series of empty sentiments, voiced from time to time in the safe space of the senate or in the private correspondence of a few elite men. On the contrary, although this discourse painted a large group of Roman citizens with broad brushstrokes, leaving little room for the distinctions within the non-elite citizenry that scholars have sought to recover, it seems to have translated into real political actions directed toward removing that catch-all group.[59] This section traces, then, how the *intentions* embedded in the elite discourse about 'draining' the *plebs urbana* came to be realised as *demographic outcomes* in the contemporaneous colonial foundations of Julius Caesar in 59 and 49–44 BCE. The evidence for the early life of these colonies is not always clear or consistent. But what information we can glean from our sources about the demographic character of their colonists indicates that, to some extent, they hailed from the lower socio-economic and legal strata of Roman society.

Beginning perhaps with the failure of a land distribution bill (the *Lex Plotia*) in 70 BCE, the 60s saw a distinct uptick in the proposal of agrarian programmes, ostensibly to satisfy both Rome's landless citizens and the veterans returning from the campaigns of its latest 'big man' general, Pompey the Great.[60] Success did not arrive on this political front, however, until Julius Caesar's first laws (*lex Iulia*, *lex Campana*) on land distribution were passed during his consulship of 59 BCE. Writing three centuries after the fact, Cassius Dio framed Caesar's initiatives in terms almost akin to those we have just seen Cicero use to describe Flavius' land bill in 60:

> Caesar wanted to ingratiate himself with the masses, so that he might make them his own all the more. ... The excessive multitude of the city, which was being riven by discord, would thus be turned toward labour and agriculture; and the majority of Italy, now desolate, would

[56] Livy 24.29.3: *nam et illis, quod iam diu cupiebant, nouandi res occasio data est, et hi sentinam quandam urbis rati exhaustam laetabantur.* Text: Briscoe (2016).

[57] To take but a few examples, compare the passing treatments of Kühnert (1989, pp. 439–40); Purcell (1994, p. 655); Gowers (1995, pp. 29–30); Morstein-Marx (2004, p. 253); and Courrier (2014, p. 13).

[58] Suet. *Jul.* 42: *octoginta autem ciuium milibus in transmarinas colonias distributis, ut exhaustae quoque urbis frequentia suppeteret, sanxit, ne quis ciuis maior annis uiginti minorue †decem, qui sacramento non teneretur, plus triennio continuo Italia abesset, neu qui senatoris filius nisi contubernalis aut comes magistratus peregre proficisceretur.* Text: Ihm (1908). On this and earlier measures restricting movement, see Isayev (2017a, p. 47).

[59] On the problems involved with the terminology deployed by elite authors to describe the 'poor', see Morley (2009, pp. 25–27) and, especially, Ayer (2013); on the problems arising from the ambiguous terms used to describe the *plebs urbana*, see Courrier (2014, pp. 7–16, 485–86, 493–96).

[60] On the agrarian initiatives in this period, see Brunt's (1971, pp. 312–19) and Gruen's (1974, pp. 387–404) treatments.

be colonised again, so that not only those who had endured hardship on the campaigns, but all the rest as well, would have sufficient subsistence.[61]

While Dio may be parroting back the rhetoric of his sources, we still gain the impression from his account and others that at least some of Caesar's colonists came from the politically problematic slice of the 'excessive' urban population we have already encountered as the 'dregs'. Indeed, Suetonius (*Iul.* 20.3) brings some clarity to this picture, reporting that Caesar settled 20,000 colonists who each had three or more children on land in Campania, as well as the Stellan plain. Later, in his *Life of Augustus*, and only in passing, Suetonius describes how the *lex Iulia* distributed land in Campania to the *plebs*; no other group is named, not even veterans.[62] Even closer to the actual event, the Tiberian author, Velleius Paterculus, also reports the same details, although he specifies that all 20,000 of the *plebs* were settled at Capua.[63] Appian's later account even provides a rationale—the land distribution was designed not just for any of the *plebs*, but more specifically "for the relief of the poor" (ὑπὲρ τῶν πενήτων)—and adds that Capua, a particularly fertile district, was the centrepiece of the initiative.[64] All of Plutarch's mentions of Caesar's land distributions explicitly link them to relief for the poorest citizens.[65] The sum of these later accounts therefore fills out a relatively consistent picture of the socio-economic aim of Caesar's colonies, whereby a large number of the urban poor were likely resettled in Campania.[66]

The person we would expect to be our best contemporary witness for Caesar's colonisation program in 59, beyond Caesar himself, Cicero, has actually left us far less in the way of general information than some of the secondary accounts. Yet in two important letters he penned to Atticus in 60 and 59, Cicero reveals some of the aims and limits of Caesar's proposal and the political calculations involved in 'draining the dregs' through such a plan. For in 60, as Cicero runs through his political options in the context of Caesar's land land bill, he explicitly links his potential support for the bill to "peace with the mass" (Cic. *Att.* 2.3.4 = SB 23: *pax cum multitudine*) for *himself*. Even from Cicero's self-interested perspective then, we detect the power of the 'mass' as a driver for the political support behind Caesar's initiative. In the following year, Cicero then argued that since the land allotted in Campania cannot support more than 5000 colonists, Caesar and his backers would lose the support of "all of the leftover masses" (*reliqua omnis multitudo*).[67] For our purposes, Cicero's pre-emptive critique of Caesar's ambitious plans may in fact be the most significant piece of evidence that emerges from this episode. The more conventionally understood notion that colonisation was a powerful way of building bases of political and military support, or client-relationships, as Zvi Yavetz once argued, perhaps lies behind Cicero's critique, and is an idea more explicitly expressed in Cassius Dio's account—but this is only one facet.[68] Even more noticeably, Cicero's comment underlines the political agency of the 'mass'

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[61] Dio, 38.1.1, 38.1.3: ... ὁ Καῖσαρ τὸ σύμπαν θεραπεῦσαι πλῆθος ἠθέλησεν, ὅπως σφᾶς ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον σφετερίσηται. ... [3] τό τε γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπέρογκον ὄν, ἀφ' οὗπερ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἐστασίαζον, πρός τε τὰ ἔργα καὶ πρὸς γεωργίας ἐτρέπετο, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῆς Ἰταλίας ἠρημωμένα αὖθις συνῳκίζετο, ὥστε μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις τεταλαιπωρημένους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας διαρκῆ τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν ... Text and trans. Cary (1914) modified.

[62] Suet. *Aug.* 4: ... *agrum Campanum plebi Iulia lege divisit*.

[63] Vell. Pat. 2.44.4: *In hoc consulatu Caesar legem tulit, ut ager Campanus plebei divideretur, suasore legis Pompeio. Ita circiter viginti milia civium eo deducta ...* .

[64] App. *B Civ.* 2.10. On Caesar's colonists settled at Capua under a *lex Iulia*, see also Caes. *B Civ.* 1.14.4.

[65] Plut. *Pomp.* 47.3, *Caes.* 14.1, *Cat. min.* 31.4.

[66] So Gruen (1974, p. 399). Cf. Brunt (1971, pp. 313–19).

[67] Cic. *Att.* 2.16.1 = SB 36 (Formiae, 29 April or 1 May, 59 BCE). As Flach (1990, p. 81) has cogently argued, the total of 20,000 listed in other sources is the total number of colonists, their wives, and three children, while Cicero's number represents only the male colonists themselves.

[68] Yavetz (1983, pp. 142–43) specifically dismisses a straightforward reading of Dio's reported social reasons for Caesar's colonies: "in an age of power politics such a 'naïve' intention may not be acceptable." Yet we should be cautious about the true power of these client connections. One of the first places that Pompey's forces levied troops was from among Caesar's very own colonists at Capua, as told in his own words at Caes. *B Civ.* 1.14.4. Cf. Gruen's (1974, pp. 393–404) reading of the general social purposes of agrarian legislation in this period, which I largely follow. On *clientela*, see most recently Mouritsen (2017, pp. 94–95), who seriously doubts that those from the lowest socio-economic strata of society had direct access to these networks.

in Rome, both foregrounding the elites' desire to displace this group to Campania, but also the threat which the disgruntled 'leftovers' could still pose to the political order.

The 20,000 urban poor, who were moved to Campania and the Stellan plain in 59 and the following years, have not left any of the distinctive material traces of their presence which we as historians would hope to find, nor do the literary sources take us beyond the generalities already canvassed.[69] Yet we do possess much better, if still patchy, evidence for the colonists who were sent out to populate Rome's growing empire overseas under the auspices of Caesar's second colonisation programme. This programme saw Rome 'drained' of some 80,000 or more people beginning in 49–44 BCE, but primarily executed in the triumviral and early Augustan periods.[70] We can say with confidence that some of the colonists sent out to at least three sites—Urso (Spain), Corinth (Greece), and Carthage (Tunisia)—were landless or low-status citizens, a mixture of the freeborn (*ingenui*) and freedmen (*libertini*).[71]

The evidence for ascribing a non-elite character to the founding colonists of these colonies mostly derives from a mixture of literary and epigraphic texts. At Urso, the name of the colony, *Colonia Genetiva Urbanorum*, as preserved by Pliny the Elder, seems to denote the origin of the founders of the colony, that is, the *Urbanorum* ("of the urbanites"), points to the *plebs urbana*.[72] While scholars have also underlined the presence of veterans in the early life of the colony, this does not preclude a strong plebeian contingent, or for that matter, the presence of freedmen. Two clauses from the colony's foundation charter (c. 45 BCE), the famous *Lex Ursonensis*, make important provisions for freedmen (*libertini*), allowing them to hold magistracies within the colonial government and, perhaps even more crucially, asserting that a decurion on the town council could not be impeached on the basis of his freed status.[73] That such provisions are present in the constitutional document of the colony strongly suggests that freedmen formed a significant part of the first party of colonists.[74]

Looking to two cities which had seen utter destruction at the hands of the Romans, but were now given new life as Caesarian colonies, Carthage and Corinth, here too we find a mixture of plebeians and freedmen attested at both sites. Appian (*Pun.* 136) claims that Caesar sent colonists to both of these sites, drawing them from the 'homeless' since they were demanding land (τῶν ἀπόρων αὐτὸν ... περὶ γῆς παρακαλούντων), with 3000 being sent to Carthage, combined with recruits from the surrounding area. Taken alone, we might have reason to doubt the applicability of Appian's account to Corinth, since the fates of these two cities were so often entwined in the Roman mind-set, but a bounty of evidence from other texts and the site itself suggests otherwise.[75] It is notable that the Augustan era geographer, Strabo (8.6.23), went to the trouble of being so specific about Corinth's colonists, reporting that Caesar restored the city due to its favourable situation, "sending colonists mostly from the class of freedmen" (ἐποίκους πέμψαντος τοῦ ἀπελευθερικοῦ γένους πλείστους).

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69 We do, however, hear about the pejorative character of the colonists whom Mark Antony had settled in Campania alongside Caesar's colonists under a *lex agraria* of June 44 BCE, but only in the context of severe invective and thus needs to be read with caution: see Cic. *Phil.* 2.101 (mimes) and *Phil.*8.26 (actors, gamblers, pimps and two notorious centurions, Cafo and Saxa) with Ramsey (2003, p. 310).

70 Vittinghoff (Vittinghoff 1951, pp. 1272–79). See also Yavetz (1983, pp. 144–49) more generally for an assessment of Vittinghoff's scholarship.

71 Cf. Brunt's (1971, pp. 234–61) treatment. For example at pp. 256–57, *contra* Vittinghoff (1951, pp. 1301–2), he prefers to see the colonists sent to Buthrotum as the rural *plebs*, since they are described by Cicero (*Att.* 16.16c.2 = SB 407C) as *agrarii* and "one can hardly believe that many urban dwellers from Rome wished to become peasants in Epirus." Note, however, that some doubt remains, since Cicero then describes the colonists twice as "land seekers" (*agripetas*) at Cic. *Att.* 15.29.3 = SB 408 and 16.1.2 = SB 409. Cf. Strabo 7.7.5, who describes them only as "Roman colonists" (ἐποίκους ... Ῥωμαίους).

72 Pliny, *NH* 3.3.12: *Urso quae Genetiva Urbanorum*.

73 For the right to hold magistracies, see *lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae* 18 = Coles (2017) L2. For freed status as a protected category in the holding of magistracies, see *lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae* 105 in Crawford (1996, pp. 409–10) = Coles (2017) L3. These magistrates may have even held a limited form of *imperium*, as a new fragment of the Urso charter seems to attest: Coles (2017, p. 198).

74 See Vittinghoff (Vittinghoff 1951, p. 1290); Treggiari (1969, pp. 35, 63); Brunt (1971, p. 256); Crawford (1996, p. 446); Mouritsen (2011, pp. 74–75); and now, Coles (2017, pp. 184–85, 196). For the intersection of the colony with the violence of the civil wars, see Osgood (2006, pp. 145–46).

75 Wiseman (1979, pp. 492–93 with n.196) and, especially, Purcell (1995).

A likely contemporary of Strabo's, the Augustan era poet Crinagoras of Mytilene, whose epigrams survive in the *Palatine Anthology*, also singled out the servile roots of Corinth's colonists. The pejorative character of the city's new inhabitants forms the entire subject of one of his epigrams, in which he bemoans Corinth's (and Greece's) unlucky fate, since the site has been "given over wholesale to such good-for-nothing slaves" (τοίοις διὰ πᾶσα παλιμπρήτοισι δοθεῖσα).[76] On the ground, we do find some corroboration in the biographical traces left behind by the first colonists in the material record. Anthony Spawforth (1996) has shown through his persuasive onomastic study of the 42 names attested for the city's *duoviri* in their numismatic output and epigraphic texts that a large proportion of these magistrates—and therefore the colonial elite—hailed from servile heritage. These men were likely the freedmen of many of the leading families in Rome, including Mark Antony and Julius Caesar himself, as well as traders (*negotiatores*) who had long been operating in the region.[77]

The plebeian and freed character of (some of) the colonists who founded Urso, Carthage, and Corinth is uncontroversial among most scholars, and we could add several other colonies to their number, especially those which have freedmen attested as magistrates in the first few decades after their foundation.[78] But as P.A. Brunt (1971, p. 256) once noted, we need not divide Caesar's colonies into "veteran and proletarian settlements"; they were most likely mixed, especially in areas where no immediate military need had presented itself. Still, one other basic, yet rarely stated fact argues for viewing even Caesar's veteran colonists as possessing a socio-economic character not dissimilar to the 'proletarian' colonists. If, by this point in its history, we accept that the Roman army was increasingly recruiting from the landless poor, the *proletarii*, then we must acknowledge that this was the very same group who could be said to correspond to the metaphorical 'dregs' which Cicero and company were all so eager to dispose of.[79] To be sure, military service endowed these men (and their families) with another set of attributes, but we should not ignore their prior socio-economic identity and the potential for cross-association with their fellow *proletarii*—akin to a class-based intersectional identity—even as veterans who may have accumulated considerable wealth from the booty taken on campaign.[80] What Caesar's colonies achieved then, as the subtitle of this section suggests, was not simply the 'draining' of Rome's 'masses', but their displacement across the Mediterranean to form what we might dub—to deliberately recall the derogatory metaphors of the elite—Caesar's 'Gutter Empire'.[81]

4. Towards an Elite Theory of Roman Colonisation: From Romulus' Asylum to the Fatal Shores of Australia's Penal Colonies

What is all the more remarkable about the elite metaphor of 'drain the dregs' and its implementation through Caesar's colonisation programmes, is that all the while the Romans were telling themselves that their city had been founded out of the archaic equivalent of these same

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[76] Crinagoras, *Ant. Pal.* 9.284.5. Text: Gow and Page (1968, I: 220). See Gow and Page (1968, II: 247–48) for commentary. For Crinagoras' biographical details, see Dueck (2000, p. 141) with Strabo 13.2.3.

[77] See the work of Millis (2010, 2014) and Coles (2017, pp. 185, 192–93, 196–97), who each build upon and add nuances to Spawforth's (1996) study and other earlier scholarship.

[78] See Vittinghoff (Vittinghoff 1951, pp. 1279–307); Brunt (1971, pp. 234–61), and now, on freedmen magistrates at Julian and Augustan colonies such as Dion, Narona, and other sites in addition to those treated above, Coles (2017). See Hanse (2011, pp. 89–90) on freedmen at Buthrotum.

[79] On the 'proletarianisation' of the army, once thought to have begun in the second century BCE, see Gabba (1976), and more recently, De Ligt (2007). However, see now De Ligt (2012, pp. 175, 184–85) and Keaveney (2007, pp. 23–28) who rightly cast doubts on speaking of anything more than an increase in the number of recruits from the *proletarii* after Marius opened up recruitment from the *capite censi* in 107. On the situation just after the Second Punic War, see Erdkamp (2011, pp. 115–17). More generally on veterans as colonists, see Broadhead (2007), and specifically on Caesar's veteran colonists, Keppie (1983).

[80] The implications of such intersectionality are under explored in the scholarship, but for brief mentions, such as Erdkamp (2011, p. 113); Cf. Keaveney's (2007, p. 25) reservations. The evidence gathered by Phang (2008, pp. 77–78, 224, 271) for recruitment standards and the stereotypes attached to soldiers from the *plebs urbana* during the imperial period demonstrates the potential for this approach. See also De Ligt (2004, pp. 743–44) on the reasons why the 'poor' may not have started to join the army in greater numbers until land distribution became tied to service under Marius in 107 BCE, since the *stipendium* was so low, the cost of military outfitting so high, and the odds of war booty so variable from war to war.

[81] Thus, I follow Vittinghoff (1951) and Gelzer (1968, pp. 287–88) in seeing Caesar's colonies as part of a concerted effort to reduce the number of *proletarii* in the city.

'dregs'—the *faex Romuli*. The blueprint for this scheme of forming colonies by displacing the urban *faex* lies at the core of Livy's account of Romulus' asylum, a number of whose elements correspond to the elite rationale behind colonisation in the late Republic. Most obviously, and as we have already briefly noted (in Section 2), Livy (1.8.6–7) tells us that "the entire crowd" (*turba omnis*) assembled by Romulus had fled from the neighbouring areas and that there was no discrimination on the basis of legal status—free or slave. The mob, the fugitive, the criminal—that Romulus' asylum, and, ergo the *urbs*, grew in size because Rome's founder took in these 'undesirable' people seems to have been a well-established tradition by the time of Livy's generation (at the latest).[82] This is clear enough from the fact that the disreputable character of Romulus' 'crowd' is repeated with some abbreviation in another Augustan author outside of the genre of historiography—the geographer Strabo (5.3.2) describes them as "a mixed up mob" (ἀνθρώπους σύγκλυδας)—but is also disputed by Livy's historiographical contemporary, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who instead sees the asylum seekers as a more noble group of political exiles from Greece.[83]

Most crucially, like the late Republican *plebs urbana*, in Livy's version, Romulus' asylum seekers were "eager for revolution" (*avida novarum rerum*).[84] It is telling that some have read this key phrase without its usual negative connotations of political upheaval, but rather, recalling the modern 'asylum seeker', it has been rendered positively, almost in an aspirational light. In an academic context, we encounter the translation "eager for a new start", while in a 2015 New York Times op-ed, another author, deploying Rome as an ancient example in advocating for an open asylum seeker policy, offers an excerpt from Livy where the phrase appears as "eager for new conditions".[85] Yet the pejorative tone of *res novae* cannot be ignored or effaced through some semantic sleight of hand. Before they had even put down roots in Romulus' asylum, these marginalised and displaced people were characterised as latent revolutionaries in the political discourse of the late Republic.

It seems especially jarring, then, to invoke Romulus' asylum as a way of thinking about Rome as "a culture with [asylum] as its founding mythology", as Mary Beard has, in contrast to contemporary approaches (the EU's "hostility to migrants"). This mythology actually reveals more about Rome's domestic politics—that an unruly mass, "eager for revolution", had always been the beating heart of the body politic—than its 'open' stance towards outsiders.[86] Emma Dench's (2005, pp. 10–11) warning should be heeded still more now:

> ... readings of *aspects* of Roman society ... might at first sight make Rome appear a worthy model for aspirational European 'multiculturalism' at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We need, however, to be very careful. ... It is also salutary in this context to note that Rome's 'openness' or 'race-mixture' has been idealized in distinctly non-liberal contexts within recent history.

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[82] For earlier sources, see Bruggisser (1987, pp. 166–71) and Rigsby (1996, pp. 575–79).

[83] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.89.1: he rejects the characterisation of early Rome as a "refuge for barbarians and fugitives and homeless people" (βαρβάρων καὶ δραπετῶν καὶ ἀνεστίων ἀνθρώπων καταφυγὴν). Cf. Plutarch's (*Rom.* 9.3) characterisation, which is even more extreme and unapologetic than Livy's.

[84] The same issue arises a little later in Dionysius' narrative: in his telling (*Ant. Rom.* 2.62.3–4), Numa implemented land distribution to deal with the problem of the "the homeless and wandering poor" (τοῦτο ἀνέστιον καὶ πτωχὸν ἀλώμενον), who had not been provided for by Romulus, and were on the brink of revolution (νεωτερίζειν ἑτοιμότατον).

[85] Academic context: Lee-Stecum (2008, p. 75). Opinion piece: Bazelon (2015). See also Stem (2007, p. 451), paraphrasing with "fresh start". For the pejorative reading see: Cornell (2001, p. 51 n.42), "Most translations miss the pejorative sense of *novae res*, which is surely meant here"; Dench (2005, p. 19) "His mob is potentially revolutionary in its eagerness or hunger for 'new things': it reminds us of his treatment of the popular element in the work as a whole, an intrinsic part of what Rome is, but prone to disputes with the upper classes and to particular character traits". See also Ayer (2013, pp. 88–89). On *res novae* see above n.33.

[86] Beard in Begley's (2015) interview; Beard's (2015a) op-ed in *The Wall Street Journal*. See also Beard (2015b) in *The Guardian*. Compare (Padilla Peralta's (forthcoming) treatment of the asylum in this volume. The fact that scholars such as Van Dommelen (1997, 1998, pp. 15–33) and De Angelis (1998) have already shown how the early scholarship and archaeology of Greek and Roman colonisation was heavily influenced by the colonial project of the imperial powers in which these disciplines were formed—and vice versa by Terrenato (2005)—only further underlines the risks involved when attempting to invoke an ancient phenomenon as a model for contemporary issues.

In point of fact, Livy's account becomes all the more removed from an ideal notion of 'asylum-as-open society' if we consider the rationalisation he provides for Romulus assembling such a motley crew to fill Rome's empty space:

> Then, lest the vastness of the city be vacant, for the sake of increasing the mass of people Romulus resorted to an old plan of city founders, who by assembling together a shady and abject mass to themselves, they used to falsely claim that their children had been born of the earth.[87]

Putting aside Livy's cutting allusion to the Athenian claim to autochthony, it is unclear precisely where Romulus' "old plan" (*vetus consilium*) comes from.[88] To be sure, in the Greek world, many cities, among them colonies (*apoikia*), claimed that they had been founded by exiles or refugees and this is usually understood as his source of inspiration.[89] Further to the point, both Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus understand Rome as an Alban colony of sorts. Livy reports that when Romulus and Remus first conceived of founding Rome, it was founded out of the "mass" (*multitudo*), as well as the herdsmen of Alba and Lavinium.[90] Unlike Livy, Dionysius does not ascribe agency to Romulus and Remus and instead explicitly frames Rome's foundation as a colonial initiative on the part of the new king of Alba, Numitor, who wanted to both displace his political enemies and the city's surplus population.[91] He also notes that the largely "common stock" (δημοτικὸν γένος) of the foundation was typical for new city foundations, even if he is careful to include some Trojan aristocrats among the founders (*Ant. Rom.* 1.85.3). If, therefore, we understand that these writers conceived of Rome's foundation as a *colonial* foundation, then Livy's rationalisation of Romulus' asylum seems to be an elaboration of this process.[92] In particular, it speaks to two interconnected features of Roman colonisation: (1) the challenge of establishing a colony in a far-flung, hostile, or environmentally unappealing place—that is, the risk of it being abandoned and reverting to that "vacant" (*vana*) state in which Romulus' asylum had begun; and (2) that the best solution to this problem is to rely on the marginalised in Roman society—the desperate, criminalised, and poor—to populate such an empty space and found a new city.[93]

Livy's brief exposition of this interlocking theory behind city—or rather, colonial—foundation brings into sharper focus similar ideas that we have already seen at work in Cicero's discourse about the colonisation proposals of his own day. When Cicero wrote to Atticus that Flavius' land distribution plan in 60 BCE was a way to simultaneously "drain the dregs" of the city *and* "repopulate Italy", he was giving voice to the same notion at the heart of the "old plan" guiding Romulus' asylum.[94] Again, in his *contio* against Rullus' land bill, Cicero explicitly connected (*et nemirum*) Rullus' rhetoric of 'draining' the *plebs urbana* to the fact that one of the two types of land available for Rullus' purchase-plan was that deemed uninhabitable:

[87] Livy, 1.8.5: *Deinde, ne vana urbis magnitudo esset, adiciendae multitudinis causa vetere consilio condentium urbes, qui obscuram atque humilem conciendo ad se multitudinem natam e terra sibi prolem ementiebantur* ... Text: Ogilvie (1974).

[88] For one connection to Athens and its intake of refugees, see Serv. ad *Aen.* 2.761 with Bruggisser (1987, pp. 163–86) and Rigsby (1996, p. 575 n.5).

[89] See, for example, Ogilvie (1965, pp. 62–63); Cornell (2001, p. 51); and Lee-Stecum (2008, pp. 69–70). On this method of city foundation in the Greek world, see: Dougherty (1993, pp. 16–18) on the literary record; Rigsby (1996, pp. 575–77) on *asylia* as a Greek influence on Roman articulations of what was originally called *inter duos lucos*, not *asylum*. On Greek exile (individual and collective), see more recently, Garland (2014); Gray (2015, 2018) in this volume.

[90] Livy, 1.6.3: *Et supererat multitudo Albanorum Latinorumque; ad id pastores quoque accesserant.*

[91] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.85–86; note that he applies the term *apoikia* multiple times to Rome at 1.86.1–2.

[92] Thus, I am building on the suggestion made by Isayev (2017b, p. 89) that "The refugee story of Aeneas and that of Romulus' asylum are, equally, versions of foundation myths with similar undertones of displacement. Through them, Rome could be presented as an open city that was welcoming to refugees. At their most basic, however, these are narratives of colonization."

[93] Cf. Stem (2007, p. 450), "Misrepresentation is thus presented as inherent to the very process by which a city's first citizens become citizens, and Livy is not being critical of these dissimulating city-founders, but simply characterizing them as doing what city-founders do in order to establish the population of their cities. The necessity that a city survive its earliest years inherently justifies a certain amount of pretense in securing that survival."

[94] See n.52.

> The other type of lands, uncultivated because of barrenness, vacant and deserted due to their pestilential environment, will be bought from those who, if they do not sell them, see that they must be abandoned by them. And it is no wonder (*et nimirum*) that this is what was said in the senate by this tribune of the plebs: that the urban plebeians are too powerful in the Republic; that they must be drained (*exhauriendam*).[95]

Cicero goes on to ask his audience whether they would prefer to stay in the *urbs* with all of its benefits (*commoda*), or leave everything behind, including the *res publica*, and with Rullus as their colonial founder (*Rullo duce*), settle "in the sands of Sipontum or the swamps of Salapia".[96] Along with another colony in a far-flung place, Buxentum, Sipontum was reported as abandoned in 186 BCE and a new group of colonists had to be sent out to repopulate the two sites (Livy, 39.23.3–4). In the case of Salapia, a Daunian city in Apulia, the inhabitants asked a certain Marcus Hostilius if they could move to a better location due to the pestilential nature of the original site.[97] Cicero, then, appealed to extreme, but clearly well-known examples from the collective memory and knowledge of his audience, which likely did not figure in Rullus' list of places to buy land.[98] Yet what emerges from his rhetorical strategy of dissuasion is that same link between the 'emptiness' of the land and the 'desperate' type of people who could be induced to live there.[99]

Indeed, as we have seen, some parts of the senatorial elite clearly thought that the colonists of their day truly were the lowest members of the citizenry. So, while he may have castigated Rullus for his 'draining' metaphor, speaking to the senate on the same land bill, Cicero had also described Rullus' followers and prospective colonists as a band of "hobos and criminals" (*Leg. Agr.* 1.12: *egentium atque improborum*). We have already seen in the previous section how Caesar's colonists were sometimes indiscriminately classified both by Cicero and later authors not only as plebeians, but also as the urban 'mass', freed slaves, the homeless and the destitute. Some confirmation of the perceived criminal character of some colonists also comes to us from Cicero's *Pro Caecina* in 69 BCE. A speech disconnected from Cicero's later, more politicised rhetoric—it concerns a property dispute—we can rely on it for a less politically laden statement of opinion. What is most illuminating for our purposes arises when Cicero explains why Roman citizens sometimes join Latin colonies—despite losing their Roman citizenship as a result: they do so either due to "their own free will" or "legal penalties, which if they had wished to suffer [the penalty], then they could have remained in the community."[100] We will consider the plausibility of Cicero's claim about the "free will" (*voluntas*) of Latin colonists in the following section, but with respect to the latter reason, in the realm of legal reasoning at least, then, this seems to have been an uncontroversial explanation for why some citizens forsook the *urbs* and joined a colony with reduced citizenship status (Latin, not Roman).

Still, we should note how this example pertains to *Latin* colonies. What of Roman colonies, or colonies more generally, regardless of their status? Livy's contemporary, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, offers one striking answer. At a marked pause in Book 4 of his *Archaeologia*, Dionysius addresses the Roman practice of manumission and the risks of incorporating freedmen into the Roman citizen body.

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[95] Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.70: *Alterum genus agrorum propter sterilitatem incultum, propter pestilentiam vastum atque desertum emetur ab iis, qui eos vident sibi esse, si non vendiderint, relinquendos. Et nimirum illud est, quod ab hoc tribuno plebis dictum est in senatu, urbanam plebem nimium in re publica posse; exhauriendam esse.*

[96] Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.71: *Vos vero, Quirites, si me audire vultis, retinete istam possessionem gratiae, libertatis, suffragiorum, dignitatis, urbis, fori, ludorum, festorum dierum, ceterorum omnium commodorum, nisi forte mavultis relictis his rebus atque hac luce rei publicae in Sipontina siccitate aut in Salpinorum pestilentiae finibus Rullo duce collocari.*

[97] Vitruv. 1.4.12. with Sallares (2002, pp. 264–66) on malaria in the region and the various dates proposed for the town's change in location (second century BCE to the Augustan period).

[98] Cf. Morstein-Marx (2004, pp. 72–77) on 'civic knowledge' in these speeches, though he omits mention of Cicero's references to Salapia and Sipontum.

[99] Cf. Isayev (2017a, pp. 365–66), in the context of the debate in Livy Book 5 over the potential move to Veii, on how "the construction of place is socially dependent".

[100] Cic. *Caec.* 98: *Aut sua voluntate aut legis multa profecti sunt, quam multam si sufferre voluissent, tum manere in civitate potuissent.* Cf. Patterson (2006, p. 206).

It is here that we abruptly encounter what is perhaps the most explicit statement of the theory behind the elite discourse we have been tracing thus far. For Dionysius asserts that the best way to monitor the quality of the citizen body is for the censors or consuls to make a detailed census of the freedmen, and then those deemed "worthy of being citizens" (ἀξίους τῆς πόλεως ὄντας) can be enrolled in the voting tribes, while the magistrates "should cast out the rogue and foul class [of the unworthy freedmen] from the city, making up a specious name (εὐπρεπὲς ὄνομα) for the act—a colony."[101] Such a bald statement about a theoretical function of the Roman colony should not be dismissed as the idle musing of Dionysius; taken seriously, his polemic makes explicit what we have already seen in the figurative discourse deployed by Livy and, in the generation prior, by Cicero, Rullus and Sallust.

Dionysius was acutely aware of being an outsider looking in—a Greek in Augustan Rome—but also clearly ran in elite Roman circles and observed Roman political life with keen interest. Dionysius may have even witnessed the implementation of the remainder of Caesar's colonial foundations after his assassination and could offer such a statement, stripped to its most basic, literal status-based prejudice.[102] But it is significant that Dionysius' statement arises in a discussion of the risks of Roman manumission practices to the Roman citizen body *in the city itself*. In part, he may have been reacting to Augustus' policy of limiting manumissions—what Suetonius describes in familiar figurative language as an attempt "to keep the citizen body clean and unsullied by all the muck (*conluvione*) of foreigners and servile blood".[103] It also recalls the special attention paid by his fellow Greeks, Strabo and Crinagoras, to the role of freedman colonists in Caesar's re-foundation of Corinth. If we look back to the term which Crinagoras used to describe the servile nature of Corinth's new inhabitants, that is, the type of slaves who were "sold time and again" (παλίμπρατος: *LSJ* s.v. A) due to their perceived uselessness, one can see how Caesar's colonial recruits provided a ready-made rationale for Dionysius' notion of sending 'unworthy' freedmen off to the colonies.[104]

In fact, the pejorative view of freedman colonists espoused by these Augustan era Greek intellectuals marks a striking shift from the view taken by another outsider, the Macedonian king, Philip V, in 214 BCE. At the time, the Larisans were attempting to rebuild and repopulate their city after the Social War of 220–217 BCE, but they had revoked the citizenship of Thessalians and other Greeks living there. In an inscribed letter to the Larisans, the king exhorted them to look to Rome's example of freeing slaves as a positive model of civic growth, since it had allowed them to found almost 70 colonies (*apoikia*), presumably by sending out these freedmen as colonists.[105] Attention usually centers on issues other than the fact that this inscription represents the earliest attestation of freedmen as (Roman? Latin?) colonists.[106] Not only does this document call into question how exceptional

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[101] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.24.8: τὸ δὲ μιαρὸν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον φῦλον ἐκβαλοῦσιν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εὐπρεπὲς ὄνομα τῷ πράγματι τιθέντες, ἀποικίαν.

[102] See Gabba (1991, pp. 190–216) on Dionysius' place as a Greek in Rome and his Augustan context. On this passage, see specifically p. 210, though he offers no comment on Dionysius' focus on colonies. Cornell (1991, p. 62) also ignores the colonial aspect to the passage, instead pointing to the problem posed by Dionysius' status as a non-citizen (who, in his view, wanted to be a Roman citizen) and his disparagement of freed Roman citizens as a prime example of "status dissonance".

[103] Suet. *Aug.* 40.3: *Magni praeterea existimans sincerum atque ab omni colluvione peregrini ac servilis sanguinis incorruptum servare populum*.

[104] Cf. Yavetz (1983, p. 148), who alone seems to rightly note that Dionysius' statement "may reflect the prevailing atmosphere [i.e. Caesar's colonisation programme] ... We know who gained from it. Were there also victims?". For Yavetz, however, the victims were people like Atticus, who almost lost his land in Buthrotum as a result of one of Caesar's colonial foundations; no mention is made of the *plebs* or that Dionysius' polemic exclusively refers to freedmen. Purcell (1994, p. 655), referring to Rullus' plan in 63 BCE, but commenting on freedmen, views the ability for freedmen to join them in a benevolent light: "it was generous but prudent to allow freedmen to take part in them." Yet considering statements like Dionysius' and the long history of the practice, it is difficult to see the inclusion of freedmen as intended to be generous, when it served other elite aims.

[105] *SIG*³ 543, ll.31–33: καὶ οἱ Ῥωμαῖ | οἱ εἰσιν, οἳ καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ὅταν ἐλευθερώσωσιν, προσδεχόμενοι εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων με | [ταδι]δόντες.

[106] Pelgrom (2013, p. 81 n.63) appears to be the only exception. Most scholars focus on the citizenship of these freedmen, rather than their role as colonists: Masi Doria (1993, pp. 232–33); Ando (1999, p. 19); Klees (2002); Weiler (2003, pp. 172–75); Erdkamp (2011, p. 139). On the number of colonies (70) as a symbolic number designed to recall the number of cities founded by Alexander the Great: Dench (2003, pp. 294–95); as an illustration of the permeability of Roman citizenship:

Caesar's colonies were by including freedmen as part of the colonists, but it also underscores how Dionysius' line of thinking was not simply a hypothetical function of colonies—it had been observed by other outsiders since the third century BCE and posited as a key ingredient in the recipe for Rome's successful imperial expansion.

From the explicit statements of Cicero and Rullus to the resemblances we see in Livy's rationalisation of Romulus' asylum and Dionysius' own thoughts on the near-eugenic ends of colonies, it is now possible to approach the emic outlines of an elite colonial theory. This theory held that the colony functioned to displace the poor, the criminal, the freed, and more generally, the 'masses', and in so doing, their political agency as citizens from the *urbs*. Understood as an Alban colony, Romulus' Rome was not particularly exceptional in its foundational form and the asylum was simply another tool in the process of its successful foundation—a prototype for future Roman and Latin colonies. So while we today may be immediately drawn to Romulus' asylum as a quasi-model for, or remonstrance to, the modern nation state's policies about asylum seeker intake, this approach ignores the fact that the ancient reasons behind the 'openness' of Romulus' asylum were far more pragmatic—even sinister—and less 'humanitarian' than our own rendering of it.

As a counterpoint, it is even more telling that Romulus' asylum served as a fertile source of colonial discourse for articulating another colonial project in our own not-too-distant past—the penal colonies of Australia.[107] As early as the late 17th century, Roman colonisation had been idealised as a model for British colonialism, particularly colonial plantations, whereby they could serve, among other purposes, as a home for dissident citizens, religious non-conformists, and anyone who could not make a livelihood in England.[108] A century later, England had undergone profound socio-economic change and London in particular was thought of as an overcrowded and crime-ridden city. In response, the Georgian elite embarked upon a campaign to criminalise the poor and displace them to the colonies as convicts.[109] As Robert Hughes (1986, p. 25) so sharply summed up the longer historical process at work, "Georgian fear of the 'mob' led to the Victorian belief in a 'criminal class'. Against both, the approved weapon [*sc.* the colonies] was a form of legal terrorism."

It is perhaps not too surprising then that comparisons between Romulus' asylum and the convict colonies of Australia transpired and, eventually, abounded in the 19th century as commentators sought to predict the promising future of the colony through the example of Rome's successful past, born of its 'criminal' origins. We encounter one of the earliest analogies in 1803, when the British Lieutenant Tuckey, as a participant of the expedition to Port Phillip, wrote of the founding of the (ultimately failed) first convict settlement there—what would eventually become the city of Melbourne. After explicitly contrasting the "civilised man" (that is, the white British man) with "the savage[s] he came to dispossess", Tuckey proclaimed of the foundation at Port Phillip: "I beheld a second Rome rising from a collection of banditti."[110] Towards the late 19th century, founders of colonial cities, such as John Batman and John Fawkner at Melbourne, were even directly compared to Romulus and Remus, while the first governor of New South Wales, Arthur Phillip, was hailed by the Reverend Sydney Smith

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Dench (2005, pp. 94–95). All scholars appear to dismiss Philip V's claim in the same inscription that freedmen also became magistrates, most recently Mouritsen (2011, p. 66 n.5), and the inscription is not cited in Coles (2017) recent analysis. To be sure, the proposed reading of με | [ταδι]δόντες is not certain. Still, if the reading is correct, it is significant that such an idea could be circulating at this time and that Philip would or could even make such a claim in 214. Even if it was not actually happening in practice, he deemed it credible enough to use as an admonitory example for the Larisans.

[107] For broader context and an adjacent analysis of the comparisons drawn between the Roman and British empires in the historiography produced during the Victorian period, see Vasunia (2005).

[108] See Robbins (1969) on these views, particularly those of the English intellectual and whig, Walter Moyle (1672–1721), and especially pp. 621–25 for his invocation of Roman colonisation as a model.

[109] On the historical context, legal and penal developments, and living conditions of the time, see the invaluable chapter in Hughes (1986, pp. 19–40), and for proto-penal colonies in the 16th and 17th century England as a failed 'solution' to vagrancy, see Beier (1985, pp. 146–70).

[110] Quoted in Haskell (1943, p. 80).

in 1803 as "the Romulus of the Southern Pole ... a superintendent of pick-pockets".[111] Nineteenth century authors in journals and newspapers particularly capitalised on the comparative potential offered by the 'criminal' aspect of the men who gathered at Romulus' asylum, as the following three excerpts loudly attest:

> Rome was founded by a band of outlaws. English outlaws are every whit as good material for founding an empire as were the followers of Romulus.[112] (October 1872)

> The primitive history of Australia, like the foundation of Rome, is a tale of intrepid and adventurous buccaneering. Its Romulus and Remus were nurtured at the dugs of Convictism, a fiercer wolf than the *alma mater* of the Tiber.[113] (January 1888)

> Would he not class the whole thing [*sc.* Australia] as a fable, a latter-day imitation perhaps of the tale of Romulus' Asylum? We ourselves are inclined to believe that Romulus must have been a kind of primordial Captain Arthur Phillip, and his Asylum as much a reality as the landing at Sydney Cove, just one hundred and sixty years ago.[114] (January 1894)

Not all commentators on the Australian colonies were necessarily sold on the validity of this comparison, however. In 1848 an advocate for the role of the railways in colonisation responded in *The Railway Record* to an editorial in the *Times* which had cited Livy's account of Romulus' asylum in support of Lord Ashley's proposal that year to send 1000 "ragged" boys and girls to Australia.[115] The author of the rebuttal acknowledged that "the Greeks and Romans set us the example of forming colonies by the systematic expatriation of crime" and, that "the foundation of Rome *may have been* laid by a horde of robbers", but that these models should be entirely abjured in future colonies; the railroads and other industrial advances would, in his view, usher in a more dignified type of colony free of convict labour.[116] Almost contemporary with this debate, another raged in the pages of the *Colonial Gazette* between a David Burn and the Editor, the former seeking to defend the honour of the colonies of New South Wales and Van Dieman's Land (today, Tasmania), which he felt had been stigmatised for their convict origins in a recent speech by Archbishop Whatey of Dublin, and that they would therefore suffer from a lack of fresh emigration from Ireland.[117] One of the key sticking points in this exchange was whether the fact that Rome was founded by "robber-shepherds" really offered a precedent whereby a penal colony could become "respectable"; in the Editor's eyes it did not, since "in those days all men were robbers, more or less, ... consequently, the first inhabitants of Rome were not degraded in their own esteem, or in that of their neighbours."[118] Nevertheless, the fact that Romulus' asylum featured in such public debates only further underscores the currency of the Roman model for those seeking to make the Australian penal colonies not only legible, but also justifiable in terms of the classical past.

The comparison even seeped into a more popular strain of literature of the time. A regular serial of *The Monthly Mirror*, entitled "History of Rome" by the pseudonymous "Punch a la Romaine" (sic),

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[111] See, for example, comparisons between Romulus/Remus and Batman/Fawkner in early histories of Melbourne and the colony of Victoria McCombie (1858, p. 18) and Westgarth (1864, p. 27). For further discussion, see Davison (1978, p. 241); Davison (1990, p. 99); Carter (2003, p. 17) and Ferguson (2004). For Governor Arthur Phillip as the "Romulus of the Southern Pole", see Smith (1845, p. 23), originally published in the *Edinburgh Review* of 1803.

[112] Bledsoe (1872, p. 307), in the context of a discussion of the settlement of Tasmania.

[113] Duffy (1888, p. 4).

[114] Birch (1894, p. 219).

[115] See Delane (1848, p. 4). The *Times* editorial does not name Romulus, but in yet another striking passage, the editor refers specifically to Livy: "Honest labourers, industrious mechanics, helpless orphans, desolate foundlings, ragged ragamuffins, all to the same capacious receptacle [*sc.* the colonies]! It must, however, be said, that colonies and new states, since the beginning of the world, have been composed of much the same doubtful materials. If Livy tells true, the original material of Rome was not purely heroic; and the Mediterranean colonies were founded by pirates, by outcasts, by starved-out populations, or by the offspring of adultery and concubinage. The best will generally stay at home."

[116] Robertson (1848, p. 570).

[117] Burn (1840).

[118] Burn (1840, p. 33) for quote; see also pp. 32, 39 for further references.

retold the story of Romulus' asylum, followed by didactic comprehension questions, in its issue for 6 July 1844. The serial's chosen word for Romulus' followers? "Convicts".[119] Even more striking, in the same year, 41 years after Lieutenant Tuckey had set foot on the shores of Port Phillip, another Tuckey, this time the convict John Tuckey, penned a novel which followed the life of its eponymous convict character, *Ralph Rashleigh*. Uncannily, Tuckey echoed the Lieutenant's prophecy in an epigraph to the chapter which heralds Rashleigh's arrival in Australia as a convict:

> The band of Romulus, it is most certain,
>
> Were ruffian stabbers and vile cutpurse knaves;
>
> Yet did this outcast scum of all the earth
>
> Lay the foundations of the Eternal City.[120]

At least one convict, then, re-appropriated the elite discourse on Romulus' asylum, originally deployed to justify his own displacement, and turned it to his own aspirational ends. His language—"it is most certain"—even echoes the language of certainty invoked in the contemporary debates about the suitability of ancient Rome as a model for the British penal colony.[121]

In some ways, the exercise of comparing nascent Rome and the Australian penal colonies, as well as the discourse that arose from it, may have had more merits to it then than the tendency to invoke Romulus' asylum in entirely different political commentary today. It certainly coincided with other discourses which drew on Rome's foundational story to chart their own emerging narratives as new nations, such as post-revolutionary Haiti.[122] To be sure, we have seen how both the Roman and British elite shared the same desire to displace the non-elites of their respective cities and characterised these people with a similar set of pejorative terms; and Cicero's *Pro Caecina* does speak to the 'criminal' colonist in a Roman context. Yet the latter example throws into sharp relief a stark point of contrast between the Roman criminal-cum-colonist and the Australian convict: the convicted Roman criminal could *choose* to leave Rome and his citizenship behind for a new start in a Latin colony, whereas the Australian convict had no such choice.[123] If anything, the British elite took the Roman example to a new extreme with the invention of the penal colony—the wholesale displacement of a class of people through their systematic criminalisation.

The exercise of moving from the ancient theory of colonisation to its reception in the more recent colonial project thus aptly demonstrates the limits and dangers of comparison. It prompts us to return to the anchor of the ancient context; the contrasts offered by contemporary asylum policies and 19th century penal colonies only further force us to recognise what was particularly Roman about Romulus' asylum and Roman colonisation more generally. In line with this approach, in the final section we now turn to the ancient historiographical accounts of Roman colonisation and the window this opens onto both the issue of colonists' volition in the colonial endeavour and its ramifications for their political agency in the community.

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119 Punch a la Romaine (1844, p. 29).

120 Tucker (1952, p. 68). See Argyle (1972, pp. 60–83) for further discussion of the novel.

121 Cf. nn.112–114 for the discourse which engaged with the *probable* certainty about the nature of Romulus' asylum ("We ourselves are inclined to believe", "if Livy tells true..."; "Romulus' asylum may have been...").

122 Compare a former slave's re-appropriation of Romulus and Remus in Emeric Bergeaud's ([1859] 2015) novel, *Stella*, which narrates the history of the Haitian slave revolution. Note, however, Bergeaud's ([1859] 2015, p. 17) acute—and prescient—awareness of the problems of drawing any direct analogy: "The sons of the African woman—whom we introduce in this chapter under the names of *Romulus* and *Remus*, less with the thought of establishing an analogy with these men and the historic twins and more because they were brothers ...". On the use of the Roman brothers as models and sources of metadiscourse in this novel, see Ndiaye (2009, p. 8) and Daut (2015)—although the novel remains to be analysed in the field of Classics. On the other end of the spectrum, compare Finaldi (2009, pp. 262–72) for the problematic role of classicism in Italian colonialism, as well as Dench (2005, pp. 10–11) for Italian and South African imperialist and racist appropriations of the 'open' or 'unifying' example of Rome.

123 *Pace* Arneil (2017, pp. 23–24), whose study problematically takes the "domestic dimension" of Greek and Roman colonisation as a direct precedent for modern external colonies with domestic aims without corroborating her claim to continuity between the ancient and modern colony; nor does her study grasp how the 19th century invocations of Greek and Roman colonisation served as justifications for their establishment of European penal colonies.

5. Displacing Plebeian Agency: Volition in the Historiography of Roman Colonisation

Colonisation as the physical removal of Roman citizens to land that they may not want to live upon—due to environmental, geographic, or security reasons—appears as an aspect of the historiographical commentary on many of the earliest colonial foundations. Reading Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus we can catalogue the early history of Roman colonisation down to the early third century BCE as a series of attempted and successful displacements of plebeians and their political agency (see Table 1). This catalogue can be broken down into categories reflecting the focalisation of political struggles connected to colonial foundations from either elite (senatorial) or non-elite (plebeian) perspectives. From the perspective of the elite, early colonial foundations are rationalised in one of two ways: either as a means of 'unburdening' the city of its idle (and ergo, restless) masses, or, closely linked to this, by acting as a safety valve for defusing (potential) plebeian agitation (*seditio*, στάσις). When focalised through plebeian eyes, just as Cicero spoke to the sentiments of a popular audience in his *contio* against Rullus' land bill, colonisation emerges as a form of "banishment" (*relegare*, ἀπελαύνειν)—due to the detrimental environment, military threats, or distance from Rome—either explicitly or implicitly through their resistance to the colonial proposal.

Table 1. Plebeian displacement as a historiographical rationale for early Roman colonization.

Colony	Date (BCE)	Characterisation of Displacement	Focaliser	Source
Circeii and Signia	Regal period	Unburdening (*oneri*)	Elite (King Tarquinius Superbus)	Livy, 1.56.3.
Velitrae	494	Safety valve (against στασιάζον)	Elite (Senate)	Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.43.1
Antium	467	Banishment (πᾶσι τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πένησι ... ἀπελαυνομένοις τῆς πατρίδος)	Non-elite (Plebeian)	Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.59.2.
Unnamed (proposed site in Volscian territory)	395	Safety valve (*multiplex seditio cuius leniendae causa coloniam*) Banishment (*relegari plebem*; ἐκβολὴν)	Elite (Senate) Non-elite (Plebeian)	Livy, 5.24.4 Livy, 5.24.4; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7.14.4.
Satricum	385	Safety valve (*haud procul seditione res erat ... leniendae causa*)	Elite (Senate)	Livy, 6.16.6
Cales	334	Safety valve (*ut beneficio praevenirent desiderium plebis*)	Elite (Senate)	Livy, 8.16.13.
Luceria	314	Banishment (*relegandis tam procul ab domo civibus*)	Non-elite (Plebeian)	Livy, 9.26.4.
Sora and Alba Fucens	300	Unburdening (*exonerata*) Safety valve (*plebs quieta*)	Elite (Senate)	Livy, 10.6.2.
Sinuessa	296	Banishment (*in stationem se prope perpetuam infestae regionis, non in agros mitti rebantur*)	Non-elite (Plebeian)	Livy, 10.21.10

A number of scholars have noted a negative correlation between the absence of colonial foundations in the mid-fourth century BCE and the increase in reports of plebeian exploitation (debt, usury) during the same period.[124] While this correlation may point to a historical pattern, Livy and Dionysius wrote their accounts not only in the language of the late Republic, but the rationalisations they provide for colonial foundations have been doubted frequently as later inventions.[125] Comparison between Livy's first and third to fourth decades, particularly their notices of colonisation, at least demonstrates how differently Livy himself treated the phenomenon as his work progressed; in the latter, the rationalising commentary, centering on domestic strife driving colonisation, is absent.[126] We could simply put this down to the nature of Livy's sources, in that, as scholars have argued for other aspects of his first decade, the more distant past allowed for greater historiographical license and anachronism than more recent and better documented history.[127] Regardless of its historicity, as the following analysis of the fifth century BCE colonial foundation of Velitrae reveals, the rationalising commentary of these authors may reflect on-going debates—otherwise not present in our sources—about colonial recruitment down into the late Republic. Ultimately, the debate over Velitrae's foundation in Dionysius' narrative prompts us to consider the other, scattered, yet contemporary evidence for colonists' volition and to focus on two moments of colonisation during the Republic where forces beyond the prospective colonists' control may have deprived them of their volition.

"Specious Compulsion": Velitrae and Other Forms of Forced Colonisation

Dionysius' account (*Ant. Rom.* 7.13–14.) of the various reasons proposed for the (second) foundation of Velitrae[128]—likely in 494 according to Livy's (2.34) comparatively quiet report—brings several of the 'rationalising' justifications catalogued above together. But it also quite uniquely forces us to tackle the problem of whether colonists were recruited willingly or not. For according to Dionysius the Volscian city of Velitrae fell into Roman hands due to a severe plague that the Volscians were experiencing, which compelled them to offer the city up to the Romans. In light of this offer, the Romans decided to found a colony there for a number of reasons (*Ant. Rom.* 7.13.2–4): (1) to "remove" (μετασταίη) part of the citizenry to alleviate the effects of a famine at Rome; (2) and in so doing, head off the "sedition rekindling" (ἡ στάσις ἀναρριπιζομένη) again; and (3) from the plebeian point of view, the colony promised them relief from the famine and fertile lands. Nevertheless, according to Dionysius (*Ant. Rom.* 7.13.4), the plebeians changed their minds once they realised that they were going to settle in a city which had been ravaged by a plague—that they might become its next victims. As a result, far fewer citizens than the required (unspecified) number signed up to found the colony, and even those who had already volunteered now wanted to back out of the venture. In response, the senate decreed that all Romans had to draw lots for enrolment in the colony and imposed harsh (unstated) penalties on those who refused to leave (*Ant. Rom.* 7.13.5), a detail

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[124] Oakley (1993, pp. 18–22); Cornell (1995, pp. 330–33, 393–94); reiterated in Patterson (2006, p. 197); Bradley (2006, p. 170); Pelgrom and Stek (2014, p. 29).

[125] For sceptical, yet judicious views, see MacKendrick (1954); Ogilvie (1965, pp. 392, 683); Brunt (1971); Càssola (1988). Oakley specifically finds the rationalisations for two colonies in Table 1 problematic, if not implausible. On Cales: Oakley (1998, p. 583), "One should not imagine that L. had any good evidence for the Roman motivation which he reports in this section." On Luceria: Oakley (2005, p. 317) again rightly rejects readings that would take this "as an authentic record of the feeling of the fourth-century Romans". For more positive views, that take these accounts as possessing some relation to the real historical period they purport to describe, see Cornell (1991, pp. 58–59); Patterson (2006, p. 197); and Bradley (2006, pp. 163–64, 169–71), who revive and refine an older approach represented in continental scholarship by Pais (1931, pp. 109–30); Bernardi (1946); and Tibiletti (1950). For an overview of this broader tradition, especially in the Italian scholarship of the twentieth century, see Pelgrom and Stek (2014, pp. 26–29).

[126] As noted by Oakley (1998, pp. 586–87), who also accepts the few notices of this basic information in the first decade as largely accurate, so too in terms of the *triumviri* (Oakley 1997, pp. 52–53) and the colonial foundations themselves (Oakley 1997, p. 62).

[127] Càssola (1988). Cf. Cornell (1991, pp. 58–59) and Bradley (2006, pp. 163–64, 170).

[128] Note that his account is confused, since he already records Velitrae's foundation at *Ant. Rom.* 6.43, so too Livy 2.31. However, Livy (2.34) brings some clarity, whereby the Romans sent out more colonists to Velitrae and founded a new colony at Norba at the same time that the plague was affecting the Volscians.

which appears again in Plutarch's later account (*Coriol.* 13.3). Recalling his own opinion about ridding Rome of its 'unworthy' freedman citizens through a "specious" (εὐπρεπεῖ) colony (*Ant. Rom.* 4.24.8), Dionysius closes off the story of Velitrae's colonial foundation by rather matter-of-factly stating that "this expedition, then, was dispatched to Velitrae, having been recruited by some specious force (εὐπρεπεῖ ἀνάγκη)."[129]

Dionysius clearly had no qualms about highlighting the dark side to Velitrae's foundation and his account stands out as the only detailed evidence for the forced recruitment of colonists. Yet modern scholars have often ignored the question of volition in recruitment or made claims for which evidence simply does not exist.[130] In one of the earliest attempts to explain colonial recruitment, Ernst Kornemann claimed that if volunteers were lacking, then the requisite number was "formally levied, and indeed, as for military service, by lot and according to the series of tribes, separated into *equites* and *pedites*."[131] However, Kornemann's seemingly clear understanding of forced colonial recruitment soon falls apart upon closer inspection of his evidence, since it relies entirely on the example of Velitrae for the notion of a quasi-form of colonial conscription.[132] So too, E.T. Salmon (1969, p. 24) supposed that colonisation functioned much like the military draft, but offered no evidence to support such a crucial claim. While Claude Moatti follows this general notion of colonial recruitment resembling military conscription, he ultimately admits that, on the point of compulsion, "we do not know".[133] Daniel Gargola, on the other hand, tentatively posits that prospective colonists were volunteers, since Cicero, Livy, and later sources describe the process by which a list of potential colonists was drawn up with reference to a formulaic phrase—"to give a name" (*nomen dare*). In his view, the formula implies that citizens usually had a choice as to whether they wanted to "give their name" and join a colony, though only Cicero in the *Pro Caecina* and Seneca qualify the act as one undertaken willingly.[134] Still, Gargola concedes that since the *nomen dare* phrase is also used of military conscription, the voluntary nature of the recruitment "may not have always been the case".[135] On one reading then, the senate's decision to compel by *senatus consultum* enrolment in a colony at Velitrae may be the exception that proves the rule.

We do have evidence, however, for forced colonisation that is not shrouded in the uncertainties of the fifth century BCE, but rather arises in the comparatively more reliable annalistic narrative for the first quarter of the second century BCE. For over a period of some 30 years in the late third to early second century, colonists were abandoning Roman and Latin colonies in droves. As we have seen, abandonment was reported at the Roman colonies of Buxentum and Sipontum in 186 BCE.[136] From 206

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[129] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7.13.5: οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ στόλος εἰς Οὐελίτρας εὐπρεπεῖ ἀνάγκη καταληφθεὶς ἀπεστάλη. Text: Jacoby (1885).

[130] In addition to those noted at n.14, scholars such as Smith (1954, p. 19 n.15) and Piper (1987, pp. 48–49) specifically examine the terminology of recruitment (*adscripti, nomina dare*: considered below), but not the issue of volition.

[131] Kornemann (1900, p. 571): "... so wurde förmlich ausgehoben und zwar, wie zum Kriegsdienst, losweise und nach der Reihe der Tribus (Dionys. VII 13. 28. Plut. Coriol. 13. Liv. XXXVII 46. Cic. de lege agr. II 29), getrennt in equites und pedites (Ascon. in Pison. p. 3 K.-S.)."

[132] So too, Moatti (1993, pp. 11–14) repeats this argument to some extent, despite acknowledging how little we know.

[133] Moatti (1993, p. 13), "Y eut-il des cas où l'enrôlement se fît sans ce consentement, quel contrôle les autorités exerçaient-elles sur les volontaires, à quelles vérifications soumettaient-ils leurs listes? <u>Nous n'en savons rien.</u>"

[134] Gargola (1995, pp. 64–67, 213 nn.69–70) with citations of *nomen dare* at Livy 1.11.4, 10.21.10, 34.42.6; Cic. *Dom.* 78 (for Latin colonies); Festus p.13L (those who had given their names for the colonies were called *adscripti*). Along with Cic. *Caec.* 98 (cited at n.100), Sen. *Helv.* 7.7 (*libentes nomina dabant*) particularly suggests the "willing" disposition of colonists—and refers specifically to overseas colonies (*trans maria*); that Seneca had to qualify the colonists' act of "giving their names" as "willing", may actually suggest that this was not the norm. On the other hand, note that Gargola omits a key reference at Livy 3.1.6, in which the shortfall of colonists "giving their names" (*nomina dare*) did not result in compulsion by lot, but rather the addition of local non-citizens to the colony—perhaps suggesting that compulsion was not the norm.

[135] Gargola (1995, p. 213 n.70). On the equivalence between colonists and soldiers, from the language used to describe them to their manner of marching out, see Salmon (1969, p. 166 n.9) and Erdkamp (2011, p. 113).

[136] We might also view the numerous reports of requests for supplementary colonists to join pre-existing Latin colonies, beginning in 206, as similarly indicative of high rates of attrition in the colonies. So too the controversy over the Ferentinates claiming Roman citizenship in 195 may have arisen because they were included in a Roman citizen colony due to a shortfall of Roman citizen recruits, as cogently argued by Piper (1987).

to 177 BCE at least four Latin colonies reported depopulation and requested supplementary colonists from Rome (Broadhead 2008, p. 461); the problem of land lying uncultivated and returning to a 'vacant' state became a clear concern.[137] Most notably, in 187, the Latins sent a joint deputation to Rome to complain that too many of their Latin citizens had emigrated (*commigrasse*) to Rome and enrolled in the census there (Livy 39.3.4–6). Twelve thousand were subsequently compelled to return (*ut redire eo cogeret*) to their Latin homes and Livy (39.3.6) specifically comments that "the city was weighed down by the mass of immigrants" (*multitudine alienigenarum urbem onerante*)—the same language he uses to describe the 'burden' imposed by the *plebs* in the context of proposing early colonies.[138] Ten years later, another Latin delegation made the same complaint, and Rome responded with yet another edict of return, but even by 173, another such edict indicates that Latins were still residing in the city.[139] We are even reminded of Dionysius' fears about freedmen becoming citizens and the role of colonies in displacing the 'unworthy', since Livy (41.8) reports that some Latins even resorted to selling their own sons into slavery on the condition that they be manumitted and thus made Roman citizens.[140] Perhaps it is in this context that we should read the jurist Gaius who, although much later than most of our sources, refers to an older time (*olim*) when colonies were set up in Latin territory (*in latinas regiones*) and seems to imply that parents could order (*iussu*) their *in potestate* children to join a colony.[141] While these issues of colonial retention primarily concern Latin colonies, it should be borne in mind that a good number of colonists who joined these foundations probably had been Roman citizens when they signed up.

In these cases, then, clearly thousands of Latin colonists—perhaps many originally Roman citizens—were the victims of colonial displacement effected through magisterial *edicta*, *senatus consulta*, and *leges*.[142] Thus when Cicero claimed in the *Pro Caecina* that Roman citizens joined a Latin colony either to escape a criminal punishment or did so "of their own free will" (*sua voluntate*), this and other statements about 'willing' colonists mask the possibility that many may not have felt displaced until they arrived at the colonial site and experienced its disadvantages first-hand. Colonists may have been 'willing' in Rome at the time of enrolment, but their perception of being displaced might not have occurred until well after they had settled at the colonial site. Like Velitrae, Salapia, or Cicero's rhetorical portrait of Rullus' proposed colonial sites, one of the reasons why Placentia and Cremona claimed in 190 that their number of colonists had been severely depleted was partly due to an unforeseen factor—disease (Livy 37.46.10: *aliis morbo absumptis*). We may also wonder, however, whether Dionysius' account of a fifth century colonial foundation draws on his (or his sources') contemporary understanding of the legislative avenues and magisterial prerogatives available to the senatorial elite when recruitment for a colony fell short.

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[137] In 206 BCE the fear of 'vacancy' is expressed by Placentia and Cremona at Livy 28.11.11 (*infrequentes se urbes, agrum vastum ac desertum habere*). In 177 BCE, the 'vacancy' of the towns and fields is linked to their inability to furnish soldiers for Rome at Livy 41.8.7 (*ut deserta oppida, deserti agri nullum militem dare possint*).

[138] See Table 1.

[139] See Livy 41.8.6-12, 41.9.9-12 with Broadhead (2008, pp. 460–62), and more generally on these issues Broadhead (2001, pp. 88–89) and Broadhead (2004), but without reference to the compulsion at work here as a form of forced colonisation.

[140] This therefore seems to speak against Purcell's (1994, p. 651) assertion that the Latins were not "turning their backs on their home towns, but rather just shifting the centre of their activities to Rome as they forged chains of family and professional ties right across the region."

[141] Gaius, *Inst.* 1.131: *Olim quoque, quo tempore populus Romanus in latinas regiones colonias deducebat, qui iussu parentis in coloniam latinam nomen dedissent, desinebant in potestate parentis esse, quia efficerentur alterius civitatis cives.* The passage presents several problems which cannot be dealt with here, but here at least we should note the clear potential for (parental) coercion in the service of colonial foundation.

[142] For the legislative and magisterial measures, Livy's language is fairly clear. Two instances involving colonists from Placentia and Cremona saw *senatus consulta* leading to consular *edicta*: first in 206 BCE at Livy 28.11.11 (*consules ex senatus consulto edixerunt*), and again in 198, when consular coercion continued to be used: 32.26.3 (*cogendis redire in colonias*). Later, in 187, a praetorian edict, prompted by a *senatus consultum* is implied at Livy 39.3.5. Then in 177 again we encounter a *senatus consultum* leading to a consular edict and *lex*, as well as a further *senatus consultum* regulating manumission for the purposes of citizenship at Livy 41.9.9–11: *legem dein de sociis C. Claudius tulit <ex> senatus consulto et edixit. ... [11] ad legem et edictum consulis senatus consultum adiectum est, ...*

At least in the near contemporary case of Caesar's colonies, it seems that less direct mechanisms may have been sufficient to force Rome's non-elite 'masses' to join his colonies. Whatever the precise number of colonists, the order of magnitude for Caesar's colonial programme suggested by Suetonius' number of 80,000 colonists implies an enormous feat of political persuasion on Caesar's and his supporters' part. A key question about Caesar's colonies therefore remains: Were all of Caesar's colonists truly willing participants? Or was their *voluntas* influenced or coerced? What factors could induce so many citizens to join in the first major transmarine, Roman colonial project? Unlike the vague proxy afforded by a failure, such as Rullus' land bill and what we can deduce from Cicero's oratory about it, we cannot as easily point to the probable reasons or means behind Caesar's success. That Caesar had to prevent further departures from Italy with legal restrictions on the movement of males aged 20–40 years might actually speak to a certain overenthusiasm among Roman citizens for his overseas colonies and, most obviously, the allure of land.[143] Freedmen, for their part, may have been enticed by the access afforded to magistracies in the colonies.[144] Caesar was also fairly popular among the *plebs* and soldiery and thus, combined with his dictatorial powers, convincing so many citizens to leave Rome might seem more achievable in light of these more idiosyncratic factors.[145] Unlike the situation at Velitrae or the Latin colonies, we certainly do not possess any reports of resistance to the colonisation programme or the forced enrolment of colonists through legislative or magisterial powers. Yet nor do we hear much about the colonists' acquiescence to or zeal for their new transmarine fate.[146]

The success of Caesar's project may have depended upon economic desperation, rather than any formal compulsion, pushing many of the poorest citizens to abandon Rome by removing one of their main sources of subsistence. For Caesar had reduced the number of citizens eligible for the grain dole down from 320,000 to 150,000 and the resulting 170,000-person deficit may in fact be the true crux of the matter.[147] Furthermore, freedmen were apparently entirely excluded from *congiaria* (handouts, often monetary) under Augustus, and perhaps even under Caesar.[148] The deprivation of a source of food that these policies imply could have become a real push factor for the permanently 'poor' ('structural poverty') to join Caesar's colonies—the tipping point between 'poverty' and 'destitution'. Even for those who could, usually, but not always make ends meet ('conjunctural poverty'), the pull of a land grant may have loomed large in their decision making process.[149] Hence, in considering

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[143] See above n.58.

[144] As well suggested by Jehne (1987, p. 296). However, he struggles to rationalise the lack of any opposition to the colonies from the *plebs urbana*, since they had expressed such antipathy for Rullus' proposal, only suggesting that the mere lack of compulsion was sufficient for Caesar's initiative to go unopposed. This ignores, of course, a whole host of factors that might play into plebeian enthusiasm.

[145] On Caesar and the *plebs*, see: Yavetz (1969, pp. 38–82); Jehne (1987, pp. 286–331).

[146] For example, in Cicero's extended correspondence (*Att.* 16.16a-d = SB 407a-d, 15.29 = SB 408, 16.1 = SB 409) detailing his advocacy on Atticus' behalf against Caesar's foundation of a colony at Buthrotum (Butrint, Albania), there is no hint about the process of volunteering or conscripting colonists. Yet the fact that they are twice described as *agripetas* may indicate some volition. See also, Sen. *Helv.* 7.7, cited above at n.134 for his characterisation of transmarine colonists as "willing" (*libentes*). Yet Seneca, along with Cicero's testimony, only constitute the opinions of elite non-colonists and they might be expected to express only a positive account of the colonists' volition. So, while Moatti (1993, p. 13) may call this a legal fiction ("Le volontariat n'était parfois qu'une fiction juridique."), I would rather call it an 'elite fiction'.

[147] Suet. *Caes.* 43.1. Building on an implied point made by Brunt (1971, p. 257) that "by fixing a maximum number of corn-recipients Caesar was obviously doing something to prevent its future increase" and Garnsey's (1988, p. 217) passing, but adroit, reference to "Caesar's draconian solutions (a drastic reduction of the list of recipients coupled with the dispatch of colonies abroad)". For further discussion, though again not concerned with the direct causal connection between Caesar's grain reforms and colonial programme, see Prell (1997, pp. 281–84), who only characterises Caesar's plan (p. 252) as state sponsored "mass migration" ("Massenabwanderung").

[148] See Suet. *Aug.* 42.2 with Mouritsen's (2011, pp. 121–22) judicious discussion. Slave owners had apparently begun to manumit their slaves after Clodius' introduction of the free grain dole to citizens in 58 BCE such that their freedmen could give their share to their former masters: Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.24.5; Dio, 39.24.1.

[149] See Garnsey (1991, pp. 67–68) for the distinction between 'structural' and 'conjunctural' poverty; Morley (2009, p. 29) on the difference between 'poverty' and 'destitution'. See Prell (1997), and now, Scheidel (2009), for questions of economic stratification and quality of life.

the relation of one Caesarian policy to another, we need to be open to an inverse scenario of causality, whereby cutting the grain dole made the colonisation programme possible, rather than vice versa.[150]

While we must also acknowledge that Caesar's colonies from 49–44 BCE were of necessity transmarine colonies, since so little land remained in Italy for distribution or sale (Roselaar 2010, p. 288; De Ligt 2012, p. 187), they still placed a body of water between the colonists and Rome. Even though the Mediterranean was a highly connected space and its inhabitants' mobility was facilitated by its well-developed sea routes, the distance, risks, and costs of sea travel may have discouraged (but not precluded) some colonists from returning to the *urbs* and cemented their displacement all the more.[151] This assumption seems to be at play in a letter from July of 44 BCE that Cicero penned to his friend Lucius Munatius Plancus, who was charged with leading colonists from Rome to Caesar's new colony at Buthrotum in Epirus. Caesar, he says, did not want to upset the pre-existing landholders at Buthrotum, including Cicero's close friend, Atticus, and so he promised them "that once they [*sc.* the colonists] had *gone overseas* he would see to it that they were settled on some other land."[152] The *cum*-clause here betrays Caesar's not-so-benevolent intentions. Across the sea—this, it would seem, was a critical goal of Caesar's colonies.

The preceding survey of the issue of colonists' volition has thus revealed a complex, multi-layered historical problem. At one level, the ancient historiography portrays the issue as a very old one and articulates colonisation as a form of displacement from both elite and non-elite perspectives. Whether this resembled historical reality is less of a concern here than that this historiographical discourse overlaps with themes encountered in Cicero's rhetoric against Rullus' proposed colonies, but also in the more reliable annalistic narrative describing the problems facing colonies in the second century BCE. At another level, the contrasting examples of the Latin colonies and Caesar's colonies present two different ways to assess the question of compelled colonisation: directly, through legislative and magisterial powers (*senatus consulta*, *edicta*, *leges*), or indirectly, through socio-economic policy.

6. Conclusions: Towards a More Complex View of Colonisation in the Roman Republic

The foregoing discussion has sought to articulate the domestic phenomenon of displacement—citizens displacing citizens—within a Roman context, but place it in conversation with the mechanics of displacement observed in contemporary contexts. Distinct differences do separate the Roman and contemporary phenomena, not least that potential Roman colonists had different factors mediating their agency, especially in comparison to, say, contemporary Syrians who have been deported from the EU to Turkey. Still, the causal chain of an elite metaphor, political theory, and programme of Roman colonisation is not so alien to the links between metaphor, political opinion, and the policy decision to remove a group of people to alleviate pressure on domestic politics or serve the certain socio-economic agendas, as represented in the EU–Turkey deal or the struggle for real estate in contemporary Brazil. As a result, this paper has taken a decidedly domestic turn in its analysis of Roman colonisation with a view to shifting the way we think about one of its overlooked historical agents—the colonists themselves. Placed within this revised understanding of colonial recruitment qua displacement, Walter Scheidel's (2004, p. 12) benignly termed "four migrations", corresponding to four periods of intensive Roman colonisation, likely conceal many episodes of displacement driven by an elite with less than benign intentions. According to his tally, the numbers involved in these four

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[150] *Pace* Billows (2009, p. 242), "He did this [*sc.* cut the grain dole] in part by removing from the list men who had no real need for free grain from the state, but above all thanks to his colonization programme." We do not know precisely when these two policies were enacted during Caesar's dictatorship, but the fact that most of Caesar's colonies were not yet founded at the time of his death (e.g., Buthrotum) favours my argument for his grain policy preceding his colonisation programme.

[151] For the mobility facilitated by the Mediterranean in relation to colonies, see Horden and Purcell (2000, pp. 395–400), especially at p. 396: "The Mediterranean colony is a direct manifestation of the maritime *koine*: it is always part of a seaborne network, a bridgehead of the easily navigable world in a different social medium ...". See also now on sea routes, Isayev (2017a, pp. 74–78, 214).

[152] Cic. *Att.* 16.16a.3 = SB 407A (July 4 or 5): *cum autem mare transissent, curaturum se ut in alium agrum deducerentur.* Emphasis mine.

periods of colonisation "may well have exceeded one million migrants", highlighting how the terms we impose on the complex 'mass' movement of people and its causes have the potential to efface a history of colonists' agency and its deprivation.[153] This is not to say that all colonists were 'displaced', or that none were 'migrants'; just as such categories are fraught today, many probably fell into other categories, or, beyond clear-cut taxonomies, fell somewhere on a spectrum between varying degrees of 'forced' and 'voluntary' movement (cf. Gettel 2018, pp. 4–5, 7 in this volume). While this study has aimed to propose 'displacement' as a viable lens for thinking about colonisation, it only represents a starting point for this endeavour. A number of critical questions still remain.

Since the ostensible beginning of this story of domestic displacement—entrenched economic inequality, class warfare, and status-based discrimination in Roman society—has been told frequently, I have refrained from rehearsing it again here. Still, we should underscore that Roman elites, such as Cicero, created, or at the very least, perpetuated the existence of the very '*sentina*' they sought to displace. Writing to his friend Atticus, Cicero could be just as nonchalant about 'draining the dregs' as he could about his own exploitative activities that contributed to the precariousness of life in the city for its more humble inhabitants. Thus in 44 BCE, Cicero claimed to be unfazed by the sudden collapse of two of his poorly constructed *tabernae*, such that "not only the tenants, but even the mice have moved away (*migraverunt*)".[154] It was once thought that the wealthy elite separated themselves from those 'below' by living on the hills of Rome, much like the Palestinian elite at Rawabi highlighted by Mufreh (2017) in this volume, or that certain neighbourhoods became 'plebeian' strongholds, similar to the Dandara community in Brazil. More recent work on the archaeological record of mixed housing at Rome in the Subura and on the Aventine Hill has begun to dispel these commonplace views as oversimplifications and ideological constructions.[155] In the probable reality, the elite could not always avoid the various segments of the 'poor', whether they chose to self-segregate by living apart in ostentatious *domus* or escape to their secluded suburban *Horti* and countryside *villae*. From this perspective, we begin to realise how the elite metaphors of 'draining' liquid waste applied to the non-elite 'mass' that inhabited the city not only reflected a profound disgust for and discomfort about their fellow citizens, but that the very living conditions of these citizens likely inspired the metaphors used to dehumanise them.[156]

Beyond discourse, the precarious realities of non-elite life also have a critical role to play in our understanding of the extent to which Roman colonisation can be characterised as a domestic 'displacement' of citizens, rather than a 'migration'. Cicero's tenants "moved away" (*migraverunt*) after the collapse of their rented homes, presumably to a similarly exploitative situation in the city. Yet, considering that this happened in 44 BCE, they also might have decided to forsake the city and its hazards for a new life and land in the Caesarian colonies. Hence, at different points in this paper, I have repeatedly returned to the question of volition—*voluntas*: Did Roman citizens willingly join a colony? We can and should take this further to solicit a materialist reading: If Cicero's tenants had a choice, what material factors might have influenced their decision to leave Rome for the colonies?

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153 Granted, many had described Roman colonisation as a form of 'migration' before Scheidel, most prominently, Brunt (1971) and Hopkins (1978), who frequently call movements of Roman citizens due to colonisation either "mass migration" or "mass emigration"; but none had done so in Scheidel's systematic fashion and with his focus on mobility.

154 Cic. *Att.* 14.9.1 = SB 363 (Puteoli, April 17, 44 BCE): *... non solum inquilini sed mures etiam migraverunt.* Translation my own.

155 On the Subura, see Andrews (2014, pp. 76–77); on the Aventine, see Mignone (2016) and more generally on urban space, neighbourhoods, and the poor in Rome: Mignone (2017).

156 For these conditions, see Scobie (1986), but note that he often takes the rhetoric of the elite sources at face value about the filthy conditions of Rome—and in some cases we should; however, see the objections of Laurence (1997, pp. 10–14) and Courrier (2014, pp. 104–15) who also draw attention to Rome's important public works as a counterbalance. For followers of Scobie's bleak 'dystopian' portrait, see Scheidel (2003) and, specifically on the Republican period, Davies (2012), whose study shows that the majority of the major improvements in sewerage works only came with the breakdown of the Republic, and therefore, for our purposes, only then would Rome have been a cleaner place with less *sentina*, *faex*, and *conluvio* from which to draw analogies to her citizens. For a stimulating analysis of the intersection of living conditions, occupations connected to dirt or other pollution, and discourses about this in ancient Greek contexts, see Lindenlauf (2004).

Future studies would do well to consider this question and here I can but sketch a few of the factors at hand in what could be a comprehensive checklist.[157] While we do not (currently) possess the evidence to speak beyond a few individual instances with any great authority, what has emerged from the patchwork of evidence is that a combination of push and pull factors were probably in play during the decision making process for any prospective colonist—at least when that decision was nominally available to them.[158] On the balance, the push factors appear to outweigh, or to inform, the pull factors (e.g., a desire for land could be tied to the calculated desire for a livelihood perceived as *better* than existing conditions in the city). In specific cases, such as Caesar's colonies, the sudden disappearance of a key source of daily subsistence (e.g., the grain dole) may have given prospective colonists no other choice but "to give [their] names" (*dare nomina*).

The hidden costs to different colonists and their personal circumstances should also be considered. Were the citizen 'dregs' who joined a colony ever given any start-up capital, or logistical support for their sometimes long and dangerous journey? How much capital did they need to make a new colonial life viable? At least one group of people was given money and transportation by the state to facilitate their own deportation. The 40,000–100,000 non-citizen Apuani who in 180 BCE were explicitly deported from their homes in Liguria, 450 miles away to the *Ager Taurasinus* in southern central Italy, stand out for the detail Livy offers about the money and transportation they received.[159] Livy also notably frames the Apuanian resettlement in terms akin to a colonial foundation or viritane land assignment.[160] By contrast, we are in the dark as to whether such state support existed for the colonists at Luna and Lucca who would colonise the land that the Apuani had been displaced from.[161] Perhaps we only know of the Apuanian example because it was just so exceptional for non-citizen groups. But any sustained practice of the state supporting colonists beyond military means is currently unattested.[162]

Nothing in our literary sources suggests how well- or ill-equipped non-veteran colonists were to make the journey to a colonial site and construct their new home. We know that even as late as the colonial foundation at Buthrotum in 44 BCE the colonists encountered local resistance and engaged in some sort of skirmish; yet, again, we hear nothing of their material means or access to the capital

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[157] Beyond the material factors considered below, one might also consider: the colonists' ancestral connection to the city and family tombs (How many generations had lived and died in the city?); the number of dependents in a prospective colonist's *familia* (Would the amount of land offered support the size of the *familia*?); the issue of capital, debts, or credit tied up with one's physical presence in the city; gender (Did *sui iuris* women and their *familiae* join colonies?); occupation (Could their business find a market in the colony and its surrounding trade networks?); health and age (Were they able to travel and withstand the challenges of colonial foundation?).

[158] Thus I build on Hin's (2013, p. 214) brief observations about push and pull factors, but refrain from the terminology of 'migration' that she uses.

[159] Livy 40.37–38: 150,000 denarii and the (unspecified) costs of travel were covered. On this, Briscoe (2008, p. 507) rightly underscores how this was a "paltry sum" for such a large population and Walsh (1996, p. 159) concedes that "the relatively small sum indicates that it covered mere short-term subsistence rather than materials for building." Cf. Barzanò (1995, pp. 187–88). See also Livy, 40.41.3–5: for the deportation of an additional 7000 in the summer of that year by boat and land. On this episode more generally, see Salmon (1967, pp. 310–11); Barzanò (1995); Luisi (1995); Patterson (1988, pp. 125–27) and (2013, pp. 16–28); Torelli (2002, pp. 70–71, 130–32); Pina Polo (2004, pp. 219–23) and Pina Polo (2006, pp. 185–88); Boatwright (2015, p. 127); Scopacasa (2015, pp. 156–57); Isayev (2017a, pp. 20, 181). The number of Apuani is debated. 100,000, including women and children: Briscoe (2008, p. 507); 40,000 including women and children: Roselaar (2010, p. 314 n.71). Cf. Patterson (2013, pp. 24–25).

[160] Walsh (1996, p. 159) notes in light of the absence of any mention of captives and booty that "the deportation takes on the complexion of the foundation of a colony". But as Briscoe (2008, p. 507) points out, colonies always had three commissioners, such that this may rather resemble a viritane allotment of land. In any case, the language chosen by Livy also recalls colonial foundations: 40.38.2 (*deducere*); 40.38.7 (*agro dividendo dandoque iidem*). Hence Barigazzi (1991, p. 66) calls the Apuanian example "a middle way between deportation and colonisation" ("una via di mezzo fra la deportazione e la colonizzazione").

[161] See Patterson (1988, pp. 126–27) and Patterson (2013, pp. 18–21) on the foundation of colonies at Luna and Lucca in relation to the deportation of the Apuani.

[162] Thus *pace* Gardner (2009, p. 64), "Among the overseas colonists there were, in addition to veterans, civilians (including freedmen, who were allowed to hold office in some colonies), not only urban proletarians but probably also Italian peasants, people for whom, without such *state-organized assistance*, emigration would hitherto have been unattractive or impractical." My emphasis.

required to just up-and-leave from one's home in Rome.[163] No doubt some of Cicero's rhetoric in his *contio* against Rullus' colonial proposal relied precisely on this sticking point. Certainly, not all colonists were created equal upon signing up: Livy's fourth decade reveals that, at least by the end of the Second Punic War, in Latin colonies the size of an individual land grant was relative to the military class of the colonist.[164] In this regard, taking into account differences in the capital, liquidity, and credit available to colonists, as well as their pre-existing skillset, some of the structural inequalities of the *urbs* were likely replicated in her colonies. Did some colonists face financial ruin, give up, and return to Rome—displaced again by the adversity of their circumstances? As we have seen, at least in the second century BCE, many colonists were clearly unsatisfied with their lives outside of Rome and attempted to return.

Yet other colonists also displayed resilience and found new agency in their displacement. This story should be given equal ink, too. We can point to the example of one freedman, Marcus Caelius Phileros, who was likely a colonist at Caesarian Carthage, where he became aedile (c. 30/29 BCE) and tax prefect, then went on to become *duovir* at Clupea (also in Africa), and finally, *Augustalis* at Formiae in Italy; he may have even brokered an agreement between the colonists and citizens of the Marian colony of Uchi.[165] Evidently, the transmarine strategy of Caesar's colonies did not inhibit his mobility—he, at least, made it back to Italy. His career, and not least his physical and political mobility across the Mediterranean, thus speak to his resourcefulness, despite the challenges of forging a new life in a colony that we have considered above. Other freedmen at Corinth, for instance, came from some of the leading households of Rome, and hence they may have been better equipped for the colonial venture—in terms of skills, sources of capital, financial and social networks—than some members of the *plebs urbana*. The archaeological remains of early colonial foundations also tell another story about the prosperity, hardships, and dynamism of such colonists.[166] Colonists therefore likely had the potential either to remain displaced or to emerge from their displacement and find a new sense of 'place' in their colony—a new emplacement. Along with the local, non-Roman people whom colonial foundations frequently displaced, the lives of colonists, post-arrival, when understood as displaced persons with their own agency, thus represent another part of this story that remains to be told in future histories.[167]

Within its deliberately constrained scope, this paper has trained its focus on the earliest stages of the colonisation process—at the interstices of prospective colonists' agency and the forces influencing, coercing, and negating it—to foreground the opportunities for domestic displacement to occur through this process. Aside from legislative measures, magisterial powers, and socio-economic factors, the best

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[163] Cic. *Att.* 15.29.3 = SB 408: *agripetas eiectos a Buthrotiis*; *Att.* 16.1.2 = SB 409: *agripetas Buthroti concisos*.

[164] After Tibiletti (1950, p. 222): Thurii Copia (193 BCE): Livy 35.9.8 (20 iugera: *pedites*); 40: *equites*); Vibo Valentia (192 BCE): 35.40.6 (15 iugera: *pedites*; 30 iugera: *equites*); Bononia (189 BCE): 37.57.8 (70 iugera: *equites*; 50: *ceteri*); Aquileia (181 BCE): 40.34.2 (50 iugera: *pedites*; 100 iugera: *centuriones*; 140 iugera: *equites*). On this issue (but without the data), see Pelgrom (2008, pp. 360–61). The shift in Livy's reporting may reflect either a real change in land distribution practices or simply a change in his sources; Pelgrom prefers the former option, seemingly because it aligns with the archaeological survey evidence. Cf. Tibiletti (1950, pp. 221–25). See also Walbank (1997, p. 105) on these inequalities at Corinth; Hillard and Beness (2015, pp. 138–40) on plot sizes at Aquileia.

[165] See *CIL* 10.6104 (M. Caelius Phileros' career) and 8.26274 (M. Caelius Phileros mediates between the colonists and local Uchi) with Luisi (1975); Gascou (1984); Le Glay (1990, pp. 623–25), but especially Osgood (2006, pp. 149–51) and Coles (2017, p. 190).

[166] The archaeology of the Caesarian colonies is too extensive to detail here and much works remains to be done on the archaeology of the non-elite, rather than public buildings, especially material indicators of wealth (e.g., pottery and other domestic finds). Some starting points: Keppie (1983, pp. 114–22, 127–33) on colonial structures from Caesarian and Augustan foundations; Bergemann (1998, pp. 16–73) and Hanse (2011) on Buthrotum; Walbank (1997) emphasises the difficulties of early colonial life at Corinth. The papers collected by Friesen et al. (2014) on Corinth also offer some insights, especially Sanders (2014, pp. 116–20), who specifically tackles the issue of non-elites, their invisibility, and subsistence in the early colony; and also James (2014, pp. 33–36) on the continuous use of humble cooking wares between the pre-Roman and Roman periods. Osgood (2006, p. 160) interestingly suggests that Strabo's (8.6.23) story about the freedmen digging up treasure from the old tombs of Corinth might be "perhaps literally true". But even if this is an invention created out of anti-freedman bias, it suggests the lengths that contemporaries believed these freedmen would go to in order to flourish at the colony.

[167] On the agency of the displaced, see Isayev (2017b).

way to assess non-elites' awareness of their own displacement is, perhaps, through the proxy of the elite discourse itself—the metaphors with which this paper began. That Cicero could report Rullus' use of the 'draining' metaphor in the senate to rile up the contional crowd and invoke memories of failed colonies, while Livy and Dionysius could report plebeian resistance to early colonial initiatives with noticeable regularity, all suggests that in the late Republican and Augustan periods colonisation held the potential to be construed as a form of elites displacing non-elites. At the same time, the very same elite texts attest to the fact that an elite desire to remove the 'masses' and their political agency from the *urbs* appears to have been a pillar of intra-elite solidarity. This is the flipside to the more familiar elite discourse about the tyrannical dangers of land distribution. As we continue to recalibrate our understanding of 'popular' politics and sovereignty in the Roman Republic, the history of colonisation as a practice of displacement, and not simply 'migration', has much to teach us. The consensus of elite fears about popular sovereignty that ultimately translated into colonial proposals and foundations should be taken as another, and hardly insignificant, proxy for the perceived, if not real, latent power of the 'masses' at Rome.

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Comment

Response to Jewell, Evan. (Re)moving the Masses: Colonisation as Domestic Displacement in the Roman Republic. *Humanities* 2019, *8*, 66

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Abstract: This response engages with Evan Jewell's article on 'Colonisation as Domestic Displacement in the Roman Republic'. It supports his argument about the relationship between the conduct of politics in the ancient world and the use of aquatic metaphors to target specific groups for displacement, adding that similar relationships unfolded in more recent times. His emphasis on 'domestic displacement' also resonates with twentieth-century projects that displaced people in large numbers in pursuit of what has come to be called 'development'.

Keywords: refugees; metaphors; Roman colonisation; development-induced displacement

I read with great interest Evan Jewell's sweeping and informative article about metaphors of displacement and how metaphors, like human beings, travel across time and space. I also applaud his invitation to relate metaphor to the changing contours of politics and how these contours informed the use of metaphor. He does this by invoking classic statements by Cicero and others who supported the displacement of 'surplus' non-elite populations from ancient Rome in order to help colonise other parts of the Roman Empire (Jewell 2019, p. 1). I hope Jewell's article gains a wide readership beyond a specialist audience interested in the social and political history of ancient Rome.

Two metaphors stand out in particular: the notion of 'waste' and the concept of 'drainage'. But these metaphors did not float freely: as Jewell argues, they were linked to practice, and specifically associated directly with Julius Caesar's colonisation programmes.

Jewell ends with some remarks about contemporary attempts to marshal classical ideas of asylum, suggesting instead that we should pay closer attention to the less than 'humanitarian' origins of Rome, which has sometimes been interpreted as a city that offered hospitality towards exiles including outlaws and convicts.

Rather than separate metaphor and practice, I shall likewise connect my remarks about metaphor to the relationship between rhetoric and practice in modern statecraft.

Jewell is right to say that the circulation of aquatic metaphors in current debates is not confined to those who wish, as they would put it, to 'stem the tide of migration'. Those who support the rights of migrants and refugees are also apt to couch their advocacy in aquatic terms. In addition to the example of Ai WeiWei, the work of Jason deCaires Taylor is also couched in such terms. Specifically, his 2016 installation, Museo Atlántico, located on the sea bed off Lanzarote, was a powerful meditation on the risks faced by migrants. But it was also troubling in so far as it largely sidestepped the contextualisation of displacement.[1] Other installations repeated the theme of being submerged. As his website explains:

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[1] According to his website, 'The works create a strong visual dialogue between art and nature. They question the commodification and delineation of the world's natural resources and raise the alarm of the current threats facing the world's

The Raft of Lampedusa carries 13 refugees towards an unknown future. It draws its inspiration from Théodore Géricault's *Raft of the Medusa* which represents the vain hope of shipwrecked sailors. Despite being able to see the rescue vessel on the horizon, they are abandoned to their fate—much as refugees are today. Even as raft after raft of refugees is lost beneath the waves of the Mediterranean, as the bodies of children wash up on European shores, Fortress Europe has withdrawn rescue operations, built barriers, turned away. Taylor cast refugee Abdel Kader as the figurehead of *The Raft of Lampedusa*. Kader comes from Laayoune, the largest city in Western Sahara, and made his own perilous journey by boat to Lanzarote 16 years ago when he was only 13 years old. *The Rubicon* features 35 people walking towards an underwater wall, unaware that they are heading to a point of no return. They look down or look at their phones, in an almost dreamlike state. This is a recurrent theme in Taylor's work—that we are sleepwalking towards catastrophe, unable to take stock of our own impact on the natural world and therefore our own survival.

Nevertheless, the aesthetic quality of the installation is what sticks in the mind. The other figures are not referred to by name. Nor do we learn of Kader's subsequent fate.

The work of artists such as WeiWei and Taylor made me think of the remarks of anthropologist Liisa Malkki, who highlighted the widespread tendency of aid organisations and others to focus on the pure suffering of victims who lacked a name and whose motives remained hidden from view through this kind of de-politicised discourse (Malkki 1996).

Not everything is de-politicised, of course. Opponents of mass migration often argue that the risks faced by migrants who take to flimsy boats would be greatly reduced if they were deterred by firmer measures on the part of destination countries.

Like Jewell, I have been struck by the widespread deployment of aquatic metaphors to describe contemporary mass migration. Opponents of migration might express sympathy for those who drown at sea, but they are more preoccupied with the prospect that 'native shores' are at risk of being inundated. Henry Berénger, the chief French delegate to the Evian Conference in 1938 spoke of France having 'reached, if not already passed, an extreme point of saturation as regards the admission of refugees' (quoted in Ahonen 2018, p. 144).

Historically, other metaphors circulated too. During the First World War, observers of the sudden displacement of civilians from the western borderlands of the Russian Empire to the interior spoke not only of flood and being 'deluged', but of 'earthquake', 'avalanche' and 'volcanic lava'. The metaphor of 'swarm' also circulated, to characterise the crisis as one in which Russia faced imminent disaster from a plague of locusts. It was sometimes easy to forget that one was talking about human beings: admittedly not, in this context, citizens with rights, but nonetheless people who might expect a degree of protection from the emperor to whom they were subject (Gatrell 1999, p. 200). These metaphors coexisted with other invocations of real or potential disaster—think, for example, of the way in which Hutu extremists in 1959 described the Tutsi population of Rwanda as 'cockroaches', or the Nazi discourse of Jews as 'unhealthy elements', 'fungus' and 'vermin'. But it is the aquatic metaphor that, so to speak, takes pride of place (Bauman 1989, pp. 66–72; Gatrell 2013, p. 232). In one atrocious instance, British Conservative MP, Bill Cash, speaking in the House of Commons in September 2015, described Syrian refugees as a 'tsunami' that threatened to 'swamp Europe'.[2]

However, Jewell is less concerned with the implications of aquatic and other metaphors as a means of characterising the consequences of mass displacement than he is with their deployment as

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oceans. The installations highlight the social and political divisions within today's society.' https://www.underwatersculpture. com/?doing_wp_cron=1569435902.8521459102630615234375).

2   https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/tory-mp-describes-syrian-refugees-as-a-tsunami-that-could-swamp-europe-10503565.html. Inexcusably, and at exactly the same time, Amin Awad, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Bureau of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, used the terms 'avalanche' and 'tsunami' to dramatise the 'crisis'. https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/09/509742-syria-un-cites-utter-desperation-behind-tsunami-refugees-europe.

part of the armoury of inflicting harm, in other words how they serve to target individuals or groups. In Republican Rome, Cicero and others deployed the dehumanising rhetoric of 'waste' (as in waste water) and 'dregs' to justify driving people from their homes and to pave the way for a concerted drive of colonisation across the Mediterranean. In this reading of the sources, Jewell reframes displacement as the result of intense pressure applied by Roman elites on the plebeian population (who lived in close proximity) in order to sustain and enhance their hegemony. Jewell's interpretation thus also opens up space for discussing the politics of 'domestic displacement', namely the elite's attempt to nip in the bud any political assertiveness on the part of non-elite groups, including freedmen.

Julius Caesar intended colonisation as a form of poor relief that would provide the urban poor with cultivable land in the colonies and help buy their support or at least acquiescence. Thus the colonisation drive was not simply undertaken in order to reward military veterans but also as a strategy to negate potential plebeian protest, particularly at times of dearth in Rome and its environs. At times, such as during the reduction in the government grain dole, Romans had little choice but to migrate elsewhere. So 'push' factors certainly came prominently into play.

At the same time, Jewell's discussion of the prospective settlement of Romans in the plague-ravaged Volscian city of Velitrae indicates that their acquiescence could not be counted on. Despite facing penalties for refusing the offer of resettlement, some Romans objected to the proposition. Those who took up the offer subsequently abandoned the colonies when conditions worsened. Although some may have been more or less willing recruits for resettlement, they soon became aware that its opportunities had been greatly exaggerated.

This kind of 'domestic displacement' reminded me of attempts by the Indian government after 1947 to settle Partition-era refugees on swamp-infested land, and their resistance to these attempts. To be sure, Indian planners were faced with an acute refugee crisis, and in the ensuing years. Whereas elite refugees were able to create self-settled refugee 'colonies', non-elite refugees were organised into dedicated camps. A particular source of pride to the new Indian government was the Dandakaranya Development Authority in Orissa, which was conceived in 1958 as a means to resettle refugees from East Pakistan in 'a sort of backwater that the tides of modern civilisation passed by'. With the help of overseas agencies such as Church World Service, trees were felled and new villages were established, having been 'planned to the last detail'. Lutheran World Relief described how its 'Project Daya' ('mercy' in Bengali) would contribute to the 'rehabilitation of these uprooted, plundered, profaned and disinherited people—re-establishing them in responsible social positions'. Dandakaranya, it added, was expected to provide unreclaimed land 'inhabited largely by small groups of aborigines'. It was, in essence, envisaged as a project to modernise Indian society and to cement the commitment of refugees to the new state (Gatrell 2013, pp. 162–63).

Dandakaranya was, however, only a qualified success from the government's point of view. Refugees—prompted by the Communist Party's tactics of undermining the ruling Congress Party—rejected it in favour of the Sundarbans, the reclaimed mangrove swamps of the Bay of Bengal whose environment was more familiar to them, or opted for the Andaman Islands (Ghosh 2000). Here, as emerges to some extent in Jewell's account, displaced persons were able to exercise a degree of agency.

What took place in ancient Rome is akin to the politics of what is today called development-induced displacement. Jewell refers to contemporary Brazil, where the new government of Bolsonaro energetically supports the interests of urban elites at the expense of the urban (and racialised) poor. Many of these issues have of course been central to broader debates in anthropology and human geography, as in the classic work of Colson (1971, 2003) and more recent contributions (Bennett and McDowell 2012). The Dandara piece published in this collection is a further reflection on such issues from the perspective of Brazil's Landless Peasant Movement (Ribeiro et al. 2017, in this volume). What emerges is the contempt that developers and planners have shown towards those targeted for dispossession and displacement, and the social and psychological consequences inflicted upon them. Without going overboard (to adapt another aquatic metaphor), it is worth pointing to

the connection—metaphorical and material—between the doctrine of engineering development and designing 'improvements' to society that rely upon the excision of unwanted 'elements' (Weiner 2003).

To be sure, displacement cannot be written in a single register. Reflecting on the abrupt dislocation that followed the construction of the Tarbela Dam that began in 1976, Olivia Bennett and Christopher McDowell found that their informants lamented that 'no-one knows us' in the new townships located in Punjab and Sindh. At the same time, they detected some evidence that displacement allowed villagers to free themselves from exploitation by Pathan landlords. Furthermore, displaced people were ready to acknowledge that the development project provided them with electricity and other utilities. Nevertheless, the overwhelming sense from this personal testimony was one of loss. In discussing the lives of people directly affected by the ambitious and costly Molika-liko Dam Project in Lesotho designed to ease the supply of water to South Africa, one informant summed up her experiences in the words, 'we are nothing'; another asked, 'what else can we do?'. In a familiar refrain, speakers described their profound unease at having to relocate to unfamiliar surroundings where money spoke louder than customary practice and networks of mutual obligation. Poignantly, they feared that they had 'betrayed' their ancestors as well as the next generation (Bennett and McDowell 2012, pp. 37–65, 151–57).

Jewell ends with a series of reflections on the scope for further research, including the need to pay some attention to the economics of displacement. I agree, although there is quite a substantial a body of existing work on this topic (Rao 1954; Keller 1975; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013; Bauer et al. 2013; Charnysh 2019; Bharadwaj and Mirza 2019). There is an opportunity here for scholars working on the ancient world to engage with this literature, even if the challenges of collecting the necessary data, for example on incomes and wealth over the course of several generations, may be insurmountable.

To his injunction to pursue other avenues, I would add that oral testimony of the kind already mentioned provides at least some scope for the voices of the displaced to emerge alongside the official record which is often bland and lofty in tone. In this respect, one can only endorse his remark about the agency wielded or reasserted by non-elite groups, including refugees who resisted outright or who might be able to deploy the weapons of the weak (Scott 1985). Whether, as Jewell implies (p. 31), vulnerable people demonstrated 'resilience' is, however, a moot point: this somewhat patronising term has become a buzzword among aid workers and others, and its conservative connotations need to be unpicked quite carefully (Evans and Reid 2014). Nevertheless, at the very least, scholars should be careful not to assume that refugees lacked the resources to exercise agency, whether they found themselves in refugee camps or in less confined settings.

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Article

Citizenship's Insular Cases, from Ancient Greece and Rome to Puerto Rico

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Abstract: Engaging equally with ancient Greco-Roman and contemporary Euro-American paradigms of citizenship, this essay argues that experiences of civic integration are structured around figurations of island and archipelago. In elaboration of this claim, I offer a transhistorical account of how institutions and imaginaries of citizenship take shape around an "insular scheme" whose defining characteristic is displacement. Shuttling from Homer and Livy to Imbolo Mbue and Danez Smith, I rely on the work of postcolonial literary critics and political theorists to map those repetitive deferrals of civic status to which immigrants and refugees in particular are uniquely subject.

Keywords: Citizenship; Insular Cases; nesology; Homer; Livy; refugees; asylum

1. Introduction

"No man is an island," the seventeenth-century poet and cleric John Donne memorably mused (*Meditation* 17). The modern banalization of Donne's insight has tended to obscure the imaginative work entailed by equating islands with humans, even if only for the purposes of disavowal. Yet Donne's presumption of island insularity would not pass muster among contemporary practitioners of what has come to be known as the new thalassology, for whom the very notion of the island as a self-contained and bounded entity—shorn of any connective ligatures—is dead on arrival; "only connect" is the principle to which many students of island networks nowadays subscribe.[1] Taking root in the gap between these two models, this article locates an unusually felicitous transubstantiation of the paradoxical island in the institution of citizenship, especially as experienced by immigrants. From a transhistorical perspective, it is this institution that sublimates, and in the process mystifies, the myriad human transits from one insular civic body to another. The migrant's suspension between welcome and rejection in the course of these transits is apparent not only during the initial exodus across expanses of water (or desert) but through the compulsive repetition that forces the differentiated citizen to remember their difference. To lift an image and a model from the Caribbeanist critic Antonio Benítez-Rojo, the island is ceaselessly repeated (Benítez-Rojo 1992). The dance of repetition commences at the very moment of arrival on the liminal shore, where the migrant—naked, Odysseus-like, before the searching gaze of a prospective host community—has to earn the polity's trust. This dance's choreography is describable both as a historical process and as an ideational phenomenon; the opening section of this article briefly considers the affordances recoverable from each.

2. The Island Condition

My title for this essay alludes to a series of legal opinions and court decisions that, in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War (1898), marked a decisive shift in the United States' practice of what

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1   See (Horden and Purcell 2000) for a classic exposition; cf. (Purcell 2016) for an update on the new thalassology and (Ceccarelli 2012, p. 2) for comment on the disjuncture between the island as insular isolate and the island as high-interaction zone.

has come to be termed "differentiated citizenship." This jurisprudence, which sought to clarify the civic statuses and prerogatives of the United States' new island dependencies, spurred not only the reconceptualization of citizenship under the sign of empire, but a fresh articulation of the relationship between territoriality and insularity—at the same time that those indigenous communities still standing after the genocidal violence of the country's westward expansion were being subjected to the internal insularization of the reservation system. To retrieve the significance of differentiated citizenship for this historical conjuncture and for its more contemporary permutations, I turn first to Rogers Smith, the historian who has perhaps done the most to catalogue the concept's manifold dimensions:

> In those [insular] cases, as in others of the Progressive Era (including ones scrutinizing race and gender classifications), the US Supreme Court upheld legislative powers to create what scholars have come to call 'differentiated citizenship.' Several of the most important forms of differentiated citizenship then sustained have since been repudiated as systems of unjust inequality.

> But in the twenty-first century, many are contending that various contemporary forms of differentiated citizenship are necessary to achieve meaningfully equal membership statuses. These include distinct forms of territorial membership. And though all claims for particular types of differentiated citizenship are in some respects unique, they also make up a more general pattern that controversies over territorial membership can illuminate. That is because here—perhaps more starkly than in any other area of modern American citizenship laws—some of the most basic, enduring, and still unsettled questions of civic equality are again being explicitly contested.[2]

Smith's summons to attend to the complex interactions of differentiated citizenship and territoriality has become newly relevant in the wake of Hurricane María, which leveled Puerto Rico's infrastructure on its way to killing nearly 3000 people. The public recognition that Puerto Rico's residents are profoundly unequal before the law of American citizenship has received weekly confirmation with every news report on the ineptitude and paltriness of relief efforts on the island, and with every exhibition of callous disregard from senior federal officials who are intent on minimizing the scope of the devastation. These officials take their cue from an American president who shrugged off criticisms of the relief effort's sluggishness with the comment that Puerto Rico is "an island surrounded by water—big water, ocean water."[3]

From its initial formulation in the era of the Insular Cases, the structural relationship between American mainland and island colony can be tracked across several discursive formats. The searing and alarming cartoon "School Begins," published in *Puck* in 1899 and therefore contemporaneous with the Insular Cases (Figure 1), speaks with the force of a thousand words, titrating into visual form several lessons that are worth spelling out clearly. In illustration of Tat-Siong Benny Liew's recasting of Miguel De La Torre, this classroom is "a room of class,"[4] with its explicit interpellation of the newest American colonial acquisitions within the matrix of race and class being fused to the visual-spatial hierarchies of an idealized public-school classroom. The function of this hegemonic classroom as a site for the racial assignment and subjection of the externally and internally colonized is exposed in all its glory: the ambiguously aged and exaggeratedly racialized colonies occupy the naughty bench; the African-American janitor, Native American autodidact, and Asian immigrant on the threshold ring the margins. But most relevant for my purposes is the cartoon's figural rendering of a style of imperial governance that unites all exploited and exploitable subjects under one discursive rubric. Those who are being sternly lectured by Uncle Sam are presumed incapable of governing themselves: in the tradition of great empires, the United States brandishes its right to educate the black and brown

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2   (Smith 2015, pp. 103–4).
3   As quoted in (Hernández et al. 2017).
4   (Liew 2017, p. 242 with n. 24).

communities until these are deemed capable of exercising autonomy. Except that, of course, this autonomy is granted only within the force field of subjection; those island communities under the thumb of American hegemony will taste freedom only when they fully internalize the justice of their territorial domination. Only then, and provided they adopt the appropriately complaisant mien and deferential deportment, will they be permitted to migrate to the back of the room; yet the fantasy of shedding their racial assignment and assimilating to the gold standard of single-desk whiteness might still prove to be merely that, a fantasy. On this reading, the island colony is doomed never to be a piece of the continent, a part of the main.

Figure 1. "School Begins" (*Puck* 1899). Image source: Library of Congress (https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2012647459/). Public domain.

Interacting with the cartoon's colonizer semiotics is a related discourse with a shared genealogy: empire's aptitude for the generation and cultivation of difference. Proceeding from the principle that imperial power is rooted in "the politics of difference,"[5] one might scale up from the cartoon itself to a more sweeping synopsis of empire's dialogues with constructs of differentiated citizenship, pinpointing instances in the historical record where the articulation and bestowal of differentiated citizenship become salient as a technology of penality and subjection. Here Greco-Roman antiquity has something to offer students of the Insular Cases and of twenty-first-century Puerto Rico, if the *fons et origo* of differentiated citizenship is traceable to an ancient Mediterranean imperial formation that experimented early and often with mechanisms for the practice of civic demarcation. It is important not to lose sight of that "if": with groundbreaking research into the global variety of civic institutions in premodern and modern cultures taking off in recent years,[6] there is no need—and certainly no ethical

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[5] (Burbank and Cooper 2010) offer a highly original survey.
[6] See (strictly e.g.) (Kuhrt 2014) on first-millennium BCE Mesopotamia; (Gopal Jayal 2013) on citizenship in the Indian subcontinent.

justification—for aprioristically privileging the Greco-Roman Mediterranean as a point of departure for the history of differentiated citizenship.

Studies of the history of citizenship have long accorded prominence to the Roman emperor Caracalla's extension of Roman citizenship to all free residents of the Roman Empire in 212 CE (the so-called constitutio Antoniniana).[7] Excluded from this grant were the unfree—i.e., slaves, of which there were millions in the Roman world—and a class of individuals who were afforded a measure of freedom but denied the full franchise (the dediticii).[8] Despite these exclusions, Caracalla's grant of citizenship has long been lionized as a transformative act that opened the door to a universal model of citizen status by untethering the legal protections that came with being a civis Romanus from ethnic origin, languages spoken, and religious observance. On a more meticulous and less triumphalist reading, however, other dimensions of the declaration come into view. The grant itself was the outcome of a multi-century process that had seen the imperial state continuously recalibrate citizenship as a device for social and imperial control. Rome's deployment of civic status as an instrument for surgery on the polity had commenced in earnest over five centuries before Caracalla arrived on the scene, in the period of mid-republican Rome's imperial expansion. On the march from central Italy, the bellicose city-state had imposed in 338 BCE a settlement on those communities that had rebelled from its alliance system. This settlement's consequences would leave a lasting mark, and not only on the life course of the Roman Republic.

The settlement can be easily summarized.[9] In the first rank were communities that, while kept under Rome's thumb, were allowed to practice self-governance and were granted full Roman citizenship. In the second were communities that, even as they were forced to give up land to the Roman state for distribution to Rome's citizens, were granted rights of intermarriage and commerce with Rome; however, these communities were not allowed to strike relationships with other communities except through the direct mediation of Rome. Still other communities were granted partial citizenship, the notorious civitas sine suffragio: this "benefit" came with full liability for military service but no right to vote or hold office at Rome. In this fashion, differentiated citizenship was born—and it was not long before tensions materialized in its wake. By the last decade of the fourth century, the communities being threatened with forcible incorporation into the Roman imperial state equivocated as to whether to accept or defy an invitation to join Rome's alliance under unequal terms. In 306 BCE, the Hernici, a tribal configuration in central Italy, declined Roman citizenship. Shortly afterwards, another community joined them in resistance, voicing in response to Roman demands its collective conviction that citizenship would amount to punishment. According to the Roman historian Livy:

> . . . *temptationem aiebant [sc. Aequi] esse ut terrore incusso belli Romanos se fieri paterentur; quod quanto opere optandum foret, Hernicos docuisse, cum quibus licuerit suas leges Romanae civitati praeoptaverint; quibus legendi quid mallent copia non fuerit, pro poena necessariam civitatem fore.*

> . . . The Aequi responded that the demand was patently an attempt to force them under threat of war to suffer themselves to become Roman: the Hernici had shown how greatly this was to be desired, when, granted the choice, they had preferred their own laws to Roman citizenship. To those to whom the opportunity of choosing what they wanted was not granted, citizenship would of necessity be a type of punishment.[10]

This episode brings into focus a concern that has not lost its edge in the millennia since Livy wrote: under what conditions does the state's assignment of second-class citizenship do double work as a

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[7] The Antonine Constitution as a watershed in European and global histories of citizenship: the essays in (Ando 2016a). This paragraph's sally against triumphalist readings of Roman citizenship owes much to Ando's (2016b) critique of the conventional "emancipatory story."

[8] Modeling the number of imperial residents whose lives were affected by the Antonine Constitution (Lavan 2016).

[9] Which is not to say that our knowledge of every single particular is complete: for an overview and discussion of the settlement, see (Sherwin-White 1972), a précis of his magisterial monograph on Roman citizenship.

[10] Liv. 9.45.7–8 (tr. Ando 2011, p. 88; for more on this incident, see Ando 2016b, p. 178).

species of punishment? For the Aequi, the punishment inheres in the denial of choice, the obstruction of their *copia legendi*.[11] The sentiment would not be unfamiliar to Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait communities in Australia, or other Indigenous and First Nation communities elsewhere throughout the settler-colonialist world whose agitation for genuine opportunities to practice self-governance and self-determination is regularly met with velvet-gloved denials of choice.[12]

The ramifications of this repetitive denial for civic subjects (especially but not only second-class subjects) inform this essay's interest in one metaphorical representation of denial as a design principle of citizenship. Even though the Aequi were on Rome's radar some decades before the Roman first state applied itself to projecting power over the sea, the metaphor I have in mind is a maritime one. This essay will execute its trans-temporal and trans-spatial toggle between the ancient Mediterranean and modern Puerto Rico, and between the classical Aegean and the Black Aegean,[13] by leveraging one proposition: that imaginaries of citizenship work to nest individual and communal identities within figurations of island and archipelago. As a complement to new histories of citizenship that discern in ancient Greece and Rome the contours of a heterodox civics,[14] I will propose an ideational insular scheme that has less to do with the actual presence of islands or with their (ancient and modern) status as sealed-off spaces for the sequestration of luxury and wealth than with a fantasy of connectivity across distance that takes shape around the sign of the island—understood here as a mode of opening up and closing off, of welcoming some and denying others at real and hyperreal ports of entry. Athar Mufreh's Catalyst piece for this volume drew attention to the "spatial governmentality" of the private citizenship now being enacted within the suburban communities of Palestine even as Palestinian statehood itself is continuously thwarted.[15] What I have in mind is a scheme for mapping the territories of spatial governmentality that are traversed by the migrant, with the metonym of the island as my guide.

The historical and contemporary magnetism of islands as sites for the determination of admissibility to the polity would seem to warrant an engagement with citizenship that rigorously probes its "discursive production of insularity"—its nesology—all the more so now, as the purposing of islands into carceral pens for the forcibly displaced makes regular headlines.[16] From Manus Island to Winston Ntshona's *The Island*,[17] the insular landscaping of citizenship calls out for assessment. Driven to the islands of notional or presumptive or partial citizenship, the aspirant to civic incorporation is soon confronted (tantalized, even) by the possibility that the true and final island might be somewhere else. Off they go in pursuit, on a never-to-be-completed journey of displacements and deferrals. The Cyclopean terror in store for the traveler who embarks on the journey of citizenship is not the destruction of *nostos* but the prospect of never-ending repetition, the closed loop of inconclusive tests for fidelity. Framed in these terms, citizenship takes its rightful place as one of the most potent and resilient means for the mystification of human displacement ever devised. Under the penumbra of this mystification, movement is re-inscribed simultaneously as the liberating exercise of freedom and (more ominously) as an unruliness to be policed and corralled.[18]

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[11] The Livian representation of "differentiated citizenship" as implicated in a reward-or-punish scheme may be anachronistic: thus (Stewart 2017), proposing an alternative model. But his text would still at the very least mirror the concerns of the period in which he wrote; for the imprint of Augustan Rome on Livy's work, see the conclusion to Section 4 below.

[12] The lead-up to and aftermath of the 2017 Uluru Statement from the Heart in Australia (Wahlquist 2018).

[13] "The Black Aegean" (Goff and Simpson 2007), thus christening the space of productive tension in which African and African-American adaptations of ancient Greek texts have unfolded.

[14] For one such history, see (Gray 2018a).

[15] (Mufreh 2017), for whom spatial governmentality and private citizenship are also co-implicated in the turn of (some) Palestinians towards the "global market citizenship" of neoliberal consumption. For the regimentation of movement as a technology of citizenship, note also (Kotef 2015).

[16] On "nesology", see Balasopoulos' (2008) study of postcolonial geopoetics. Australia's notorious offshore processing site for immigrants (Harrison 2018); for writing from this carceral site that lifts its gaze from islands to mountains, see (Boochani 2018). Denmark's recently announced plans to warehouse "unwelcome foreigners" on an offshore island (Sorensen 2018).

[17] For a study of this text, see (Goff and Simpson 2007, chp. 6).

[18] (Kotef 2015) is excellent on this paradox.

For cracking the code of mystification, few figures are as good to think with as "the perpetual immigrant," the protagonist of Demetra Kasimis' trenchant examination of the place of the metic in classical Athenian democracy.[19] There is much one might say—and much that still needs saying—about citizenship's shape-shifting in response to the unique demands and opportunities of maritime encounter, and not only with respect to classical Athens. If the history of chattel slavery is bound up with the sea, and if the history of citizenship is bound up with chattel slavery, it would stand to reason that the history of citizenship is bound up with the sea as well.[20] But this essay will not attempt either a historically comprehensive demonstration of this fact pattern or a sociological exposition of its structural underpinnings; several generations of Caribbeanists have been hard at work on both fronts.[21] The intuition guiding my essay meanders more poetically, conditioned by the same sensibility that inspired the poet Kamau Brathwaite to open the "Islands" section of his 1973 trilogy with James Baldwin's haunting image of a messenger arriving to tell a long-suffering soul that "a great error had been made, and that it was all to be done again."[22] My meander will take me across disciplinary lines in recovering the civic nesology that organizes migrant subjectivity, with particular attention to labor and anxiety as the twin poles around which the compulsive repetition of citizenship as island-hopping ordeal is organized.

With the term "nesology," I follow Antonis Balasopoulos in destabilizing the boundary between geographical ways of thinking and textual modes of ordering the world—and in foregrounding the island as a unit of spatial knowledge that is "epistemologically volatile".[23] By "labor," I designate the hard and grinding slog of striving towards civic incorporation, for oneself or for one's community, in the teeth of those mechanisms of Othering that motor at their highest gear to obstruct and delay; it is the uncompensated labor of home-building in hostile surroundings, all while girding oneself for the prospect that another journey and another expedition in home-building await. Finally, by "anxiety," I mean not only the state famously defined by Freud as "expecting the danger or preparing for it" but the psychic anguish of never feeling quite completely at home because of the steady and ineluctable whir of those gears—and because of those reminders, always there to greet the traveler from one island to the next, of their irreconcilable and insurmountable difference from those host communities that cloak themselves in the fictions of permanence and stability.

Attentive to the quilting of these strands within the fabric of citizenship, this essay will move from a brief overview of frustrations with the terminology and baggage of Euro-American citizenship (Section 3) to a recuperative reading of the "repeating island" paradigm as voiced separately by a Homeric refugee and by a Roman historian (4) and finally to a closing exercise in psycho-biography and autoethnography that shuttles between the lessons of contemporary fiction and poetry on one end and the lessons of personal experience on the other (5).

3. Definitions of Citizenship: Binary and Bimodal

What are the advantages of characterizing citizenship as an insular scheme? By way of indirect answer, we could do worse than entertain some of the modern objections that have been raised to citizenship as an institutional form. Dissatisfaction with the concept and practice of citizenship is swelling, especially (though by no means solely) in the twenty-first-century United States. From blog posts advocating the retirement of the word "citizen" to the popularization of alternatives such as "denizen,"[24] the terminology of civic belonging has come under increasing scrutiny of late. In

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[19] (Kasimis 2018). I reference one of her more pointed insights into the heuristic value of the metic below.
[20] For pithy comment on chattel slavery as "sea-centered and seaborne phenomenon," see (Shaw 2017, p. 49), with (Fynn-Paul 2009) on maritime regions and "slaving zones." The interrelatedness of Greek notions of freedom (a sine qua non for the exercise of citizenship) and chattel slavery (Finley 1981, chp. 7).
[21] For trailblazing studies of the "birthing" of modernity in the islands of the Black Atlantic, see the essays in (Márquez 2010).
[22] (Baldwin 1998, p. 63, quoted at Brathwaite 1973, p. 160).
[23] (Balasopoulos 2008, p. 9).
[24] (Petty 2017) for the former; (Solnit 2017) for an illustration of the latter.

recent years, frustration with the term "citizen" has intensified. This frustration has received a boost in American and global contexts from those who—taking a page from political theorist Judith Shklar—contend that, much as historically "[t]he value of citizenship was derived primarily from its denial to slaves, to some white men, and to all women" in the years before "the four great expansions of the suffrage", so too contemporary citizenship remains fixated on restriction and denial.[25]

Even if the rejection of citizenship in favor of lexical and conceptual alternatives were to continue gaining traction, it is not clear that Americans long accustomed to trumpeting their democratic experiment as a Whiggish narrative of progressive expansions of the franchise will ever come to grips with the fact that the continuing refusal of the franchise to those designated as non-citizens—or as second-class citizens before whom barriers and impediments to the right to vote are swiftly erected and doggedly maintained—is the imaginative and structural foundation for their enjoyment of certain civic privileges. Along the twentieth- and twenty-first-century axis of the color line, the ordering of citizenship remains predicated on insularizing racial exclusions. Writing on the eve of the United States' entrance into World War II, the novelist Richard Wright hitched insular metaphor to racial subjection: "The word 'Negro', the term by which, orally or in print, we black folk in the United States are usually designated is not really a name at all nor a description, but a psychological island ... "[26] Maritime imagery has been repeatedly tapped by Black Atlantic writers, for many of whom the legacies of the transatlantic slave trade's forced displacement across the water retain their force not only in the contemporary civic protocols of the Global North but in the linear pseudo-progressivism of what Michelle Wright has termed Middle Passage epistemology.[27]

A vast scholarly literature has sprouted around the histories and dilemmas of citizenship. If only to plot some coordinates for the nesologies of Sections 4 and 5, let me first set out a template for historicizing citizenship that stands at the very opposite end of this essay's hermeneutic sequencing: the political theorist Michael Walzer's succinct and influential periodization of the institution's evolutionary arc.[28] For Walzer, there are "two different understandings of what it means to be a citizen," one developed and modeled in Greco-Roman antiquity (Walzer privileges the "Greco" side of the hyphenated clustering) and another formulated and honed in the early-modern period. The first and quintessentially Greco-Roman model "describes citizenship as an office, a responsibility, a burden proudly assumed; the second describes citizenship as a status, an entitlement, a right or set of rights passively enjoyed. [...] The first assumes a closely knit body of citizens, its members committed to one another; the second assumes a diverse and loosely connected body, its members (mostly) committed elsewhere."[29] Walzer insists that the latter and not the former structures twentieth- and twenty-first-century experiences of the civic, although the galvanizing force and romantic allure of the former do resurface from time to time.

In charting the transition from antiquity's versions to the modern Euro-American dispensation, Walzer decides against a linear narrative that begins with ancient Greece and Rome, opting instead to open his treatment in medias res with the early-modern and specifically French revolutionary moment whose call for dramatic and violent social transformation was premised in part on the resuscitation of antiquity's civic paradigms. The zigzags of citizenship's imperialization—already discernible in classical Athens but taken to new heights as the Mediterranean was violently absorbed into Rome's *imperium*—would complicate any linear emplotment, hence, the turn to the reception of Greco-Roman

25 Quotations: (Shklar 1991, p. 16).
26 (Wright 1941, p. 30).
27 (Wright 2015). On the appeal of maritime metaphor to Afro-Atlantic thinkers, see (Gilroy 2019).
28 (Walzer 1989), commenting on several features of citizenship that had been previously singled out for scrutiny in (Walzer 1970, chp. 10). Though cited regularly by political theorists, Walzer's handling of citizenship in these and other publications has come in for heavy criticism: see, e.g., (Honig 2001, pp. 82–86) on the immigrant myths that subtend his account. Kasimis (2018, p. 168, n. 2) usefully pinpoints the genealogical debts of Walzer's encounters "with Athenian political thought." Alternatives to the Walzerian approach include a more robust application of the positive/negative freedom model: for engagement with the rapidly proliferating literature on this front, see (Campa 2018).
29 (Walzer 1989, p. 216).

paradigms in European early modernity. For Walzer, the meaning of the French revolutionary moment, and of the predecessor and contemporaneous neoclassicizing projects spanning a whole range of disciplines that fueled its fire, was that it brought to the fore the nasty side of recreating an ancient civic ethics (in this specific case a *republican* ethics) within the early-modern nation-state. Whereas the ancient Greco-Roman city-state had been populated with citizen bodies for whom public life was organically all-consuming, those "moderns" desirous of a return to that fully immersive model of high-spirited civic engagement had to give careful thought to how best to impress that commitment upon the minds and hearts of the nation-state's citizens. The Jacobin solution was violence, not only of the externally focused martial variety but of the family-defying and disavowing variety. It is not exactly a shocker that eighteenth-century French neoclassical art fixates on exemplary instances of civic virtue lifted from the Roman tradition, such as Horatius killing his sister (Figure 2). For such enthusiastic public devotion to become the paramount affective attachment of each and every single citizen, what would be required was nothing more and nothing less than a species of psychological violence capable of permanently sundering the citizen's attachment to any domain previously parceled off as private or domestic. Thus, in Walzer's distillation of the lessons of revolutionary Jacobinism, "There is no road that leads back to Greek or Roman citizenship except the road of coercion and terror . . . "[30]

Figure 2. Louis Jean François Lagrenée, *Horatius Killing His Sister* (1753). Image source: Wikimedia Commons (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lagrenée_Horace_venant_de_frapper_sa_soeur. jpg). Public domain.

Walzer briskly somersaults from the eighteenth-century paroxysms of North Atlantic modernity to the crisis of the twentieth-century nation-state with scarcely any consideration of intermediate inflection-points or contrapuntal genealogies. To name only one conspicuous oversight, one would be hard pressed to identify in his essay any anticipation of Dipesh Chakrabarty's summons to provincialize

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30 (Walzer 1989, p. 213).

Europe (Chakrabarty 2000). In executing his somersault, Walzer does propose a secondary distinction between ancient Greco-Roman and modern Euro-American flavors of citizenship, this one having to do with the rhythms of intense civic participation. With rare exceptions, he notes, efflorescences of a single-minded 24/7 investment in public activism on the part of citizens of modern liberal nation-states tend to be of relatively short duration and to occur within narrow temporal windows. As capitalism and the liberal-democratic system steered individuals towards cultivating niches of privacy that were partially or fully secluded from the view of others, it became progressively more challenging to sustain intense involvement in public life. The enticements of privacy—and the impediments to public-facing individual agency, mainly though not exclusively in the form of the financial capital needed to enter the political arena and the social and psychological capital needed to maintain one's equipoise while in it—were enough to choke off this intense involvement in the long term. Nowhere, according to Walzer, is this wax and wane more apparent than in the history of those movements that fought to expand access to citizenship: "The labor movement, the civil rights movement, the feminist movement have all generated in their time a sense of solidarity and an everyday militancy among large numbers of men and women. But these are not, probably cannot be, stable achievements; they don't outlast the movement's success, even its partial success."[31]

One obvious inference is that it is tiring to pursue around-the-clock civic exertion, although Walzer is not clear on the institutional and structural factors that make the performance of political action in neoliberal democracies so exhausting.[32] In any case, if we augment his list—tacking on the abolitionist movement at the front and the LGBTQIA, environmental, disabilities, and immigrant and refugee rights movements at the back end—the roll-call of projects to diversify the franchise might incline us towards a different conclusion: in the life course of a liberal-democratic state such as the United States, there is *always* a non-insignificant group of citizens beyond those holding office or those casting the vote who are engaged in the practice of a citizenship that is more akin to the all-consuming ancient variety than its more detached early-modern iterations. Not easily reconciled to Walzer's scheme is the prominence of non-citizens in the most labor-intensive work of civic agitation and renewal, from the undocumented of Euro-America to the Dalits of the Indian subcontinent; I will circle back to this observation shortly.

For now, one takeaway is that the texture of citizenship is never—and arguably has never been—uniform across the polity. To improve on Walzer, we could revert to the nesological cartography introduced earlier and envision citizenship within any polity as a network of islands: of communities seeking greater political visibility and of allies fighting on their behalf, of individuals and communities improvising a politics-on-the-move in the course of their displacement from one island to the next.[33] On its own merits, Walzer's account is too monochromatic to yield a fine-grained civic mapping, although to his credit he anticipates this line of criticism by cautioning that "Dualistic constructions are never adequate to the realities of social life."[34] The plotting of an ancient conception of citizenship as *succeeded* or *replaced* (or even just occluded) by an early-modern innovation is a variation of that well-worn dialectic strategy according to which the modern credentializes itself *as* modern: as coming after and in the process displacing the ancient. The tidiness of such an arrangement regularly conceals the other types of displacement—epistemic, political, historical—that are experienced by those constantly on the move in search of the security and protection that come with full civic status. It is these types of displacement, and their instantiation under the auspices of differentiated citizenship, that I visit next.

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[31] (Walzer 1989, p. 218).
[32] For a full explanation one would need to turn to an assertively *marxisant* critique of political labor and socioeconomic inequality, to which Walzer is allergic.
[33] For agency and politics within the spaces of "displaced agency", see (Isayev 2017).
[34] (Walzer 1989, p. 216). The limits of this dualism are coming into clearer view thanks to scholarship on citizenship in the Hellenistic *polis*: see (Gray 2018b).

4. The Repeating Island and the Repetitive Refugee

As a first step in devising a lexicon for citizenship that faithfully captures its dependence on experiential and cognitive displacements, one could do worse than center the emotion of anxiety. I am interested in the production of anxiety as a sign and symptom of those psycho-dialogic processes whereby communities construct and triangulate civic relations with the migrant Other seeking admission to their ranks. This anxiety comes in two primary colors: on one hand, the anxieties generated within civic communities by the perceived or actual attributes of the migrant or refugee or asylum-seeker (I will not, in what follows, observe hard distinctions between these categories, without denying the reality on the ground that such disctinctions have); on the other, the anxieties experienced by the migrant as she negotiates the bureaucratic and procedural obstacles through which the anxiety of the receiving or host community is translated into targeted oppression.[35] These anxieties are wired into the reproduction of citizenship as a form of *différance* that patches together difference and deferral. Of course, these anxieties do not assume quite the same forms in the civic regimes of Greco-Roman antiquity as they do in twenty-first-century modernity. In the midst of an epochal transition on the part of the nation-states of the global North away from imperial settler-colonialist projects of scientific cartography and towards those xenophobic populisms that fetishize complete control of borders and the bodies that cross them, we would do well to remember that premodern states were for the most part far less fixated (and far less technologically equipped to fixate) on outsiders who entered their territories; the more terrifying prospect for ancient polities was the likelihood that the outsider would enter the citizenship rolls. But even this distinction, and the assignment of historically and contextually specific civic anxieties to each side of the ancient and modern divide, is less straightforward than it might seem at first blush.[36]

As my own autobiographical experience of these anxieties and of the labor required to manage them is so viscerally embodied, I have increasingly gravitated towards interpretive models that privilege the body as a location for the production of civic knowledge. The theoretical scaffold of "copropolitics" has proven exceptionally sturdy in this respect,[37] not least because my self-fashioning and that of multiple generations of migrant Americans has been mediated by Emma Lazarus' iconic poem "The new Colossus," inscribed on the Statue of Liberty's pedestal. This poem is not only about the ethical urgency of receiving the foreigner, but about the importance of receiving the foreigner who has been hailed *as waste product*, forced from their country of origin to the maritime margins. Here are the relevant lines:

> "Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she
> With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,
> Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
> The wretched *refuse* of your teeming shore.
> [. . .]" (vv. 9–12; emphasis mine)

The term *refuse* marks the migrant as discard, as excrescence, as effluvium; but from whose perspective?[38] Animating this section's exploration of the psychosocial scripts through which the figure of the migrant is variously narrated and pathologized as garbage, as abject, and as criminal is the hunch that such scripts thread through the long history of citizenship's interplay with the notion of sanctuary, and that we would do well to confront these scripts and their tenacious hold on the present openly. In some of these scripts, the institution of sanctuary performs a kind of alchemy, turning trash into gold and the asylum-seeker into a "good" citizen; but the success of this alchemy hinges on command of the

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[35] For interrogation of the term "migrant", see (Gettel 2018) in this volume.
[36] See, e.g., (Padilla Peralta 2015b)—but note the reservations at n. 53 below.
[37] Programmatic sketch in (Padilla Peralta 2017a).
[38] I thank Phiroze Vasunia for first opening my eyes to this reading of Lazarus's poem.

proper formulas, the speech-acts by which asylum-seekers credentializes themselves as deserving of the receiving state's beneficence.[39] With Emma Lazarus' verse as our guide, I want to spell out several of the presumptions that underlie this representation of civic welcome as an ennobling act through which the extension of a home to the degradedly abject becomes a means of societal self-glorification. The evocation of the "teeming shore" brings the foreigner's seaborne transit to the forefront of the poem's imaginative ecology, grounding migrant wretchedness in the spatially liminal zone next to the waters—over which the foreigner is fated to journey in their quest for the purification of civic inclusion. On arrival, their "welcome" will afford the receiving community a chance to pat itself on the back for its generosity—*even as* it simultaneously directs its new members into the second, metaphorically maritime circuit of the deferred citizenship whose orchestrated unattainability will compel immigrants to question the very justice of citizenship itself.[40] For them, there is plenty of cathexis but no final catharsis, largely because their exclusion from full citizenship is a precondition of the institution's continuing existence.

The complexity of this phenomenon has not been fully accounted for in recent treatments of migration and asylum. Not even Linda Rabben's thoroughly researched 2016 history of the idea and institution of sanctuary, with its nimble progression from primatological research into the reception of strangers among apes to the status of sanctuaries in medieval and early-modern conflicts between church and state,[41] locks its sights on one specific discursive task of sanctuary as concept and practice: to incubate those propositions about the likely attributes of human beings in desperate flight that slowly and ineluctably replace complex multi-dimensional lives with spectral conjurations of the asylum-seeker as victim and/or criminal.[42] The singular and uniquely pernicious perversity of this process is that asylum-seekers are compelled into ventriloquizing these ghosts. Like the children seated in Uncle Sam's classroom, they must internalize their own subjection in order to be made legible as (potential) civic subjects. This internalization demands regular and uncompensated physical and emotional labor, from the daily work of presenting oneself as unthreatening before the collective gaze to the lifelong slog of self-indoctrination in the belief that she has chosen her host correctly.[43] If only to clarify the operations of this psychic process through the magic of defamiliarization, let me propose one ancient Greek and one Roman text as emblematic of the metaphorical island-hopping that is required to navigate both the arduousness of sanctuary-seeking and the never-ending postponement of civic incorporation for the displaced—with the important and necessary caveat that neither the pre-*polis* backdrop of the Greek text nor the imperial substrate of the Roman one corresponds neatly to the civic architecture of the twenty-first-century nation-state.

On the Greek side, my port of call will be Homer: not the *Odyssey*, although its portrayal of island-hopping created a powerful and durable spatial model for the migrant striving of interest to this essay;[44] but rather the *Iliad*, whose dramatization of sanctuary-seeking shines an even brighter light on civic nesologies. By Book 9, the devastating consequences of Achilles' continued withdrawal from the fighting following his quarrel with Agamemnon have become plain. The Greeks are being slaughtered right and left, as the Trojans and their allies come ever closer to incinerating the Greeks'

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[39] For two bracing perspectives on the tragic consequences of not commanding this speech-act, see (Mbue 2016) (fiction) and (Luiselli 2017) (non-fiction); I revisit the first below.

[40] For some pertinent comments along similar lines, see (Alexander 2018). On the anguish experienced by those immigrants who recognized in the monumentalization of (an ideal of) civic inclusion, their own endlessly reiterated estrangement from citizenship, see (Song Bo 1885), written in response to the fundraising for the Statue of Liberty's pedestal.

[41] (Rabben 2016) builds on several foundational studies of asylum's sacro-legal pedigree; one of the more important, because of the meticulousness with which it charts the involvement of church structures in the medieval institutionalization of asylum as practice, is (Ducloux 1994).

[42] For a snapshot of this framing (and awareness of its limitations) in the United Kingdom, see (Bagelman 2016, pp. 17–19).

[43] This self-indoctrination is a correlate of the "drama of election" through which the host country continuously re-enacts its claims of merit on the backs of those immigrants who choose it; see (Honig 2001) on the Book of Ruth for a sketch of the discourse's basic components.

[44] The narratological imprint of Homeric island-hopping in authors such as Lucian (Mossman 2009). On the debts of Derek Walcott's island poetics to Homer, see (McConnell 2013, chp. 3).

ships and wiping out their beach encampment. Yielding to necessity and to the belated recognition of his own catastrophic shortsightedness, Agamemnon finally sends an embassy of Greeks to Achilles, with the hope of persuading him to give up his anger and re-enter the fight as the fates and lives of his fellow Greeks hang in the balance. Unmoved by the embassy's entreaties and indifferent to the gifts with which Agamemnon seeks to entice him back into the Greek fold, Achilles declares his intention to return home. It is at this tense juncture that another voice pipes up: Achilles' mentor Phoenix, to whom Achilles offers the option of staying with the Greeks after the hero departs home for Phthia with his Myrmidons. Phoenix's speech smuggles into the epic a capsule autobiography of a sanctuary-seeker who is now being forced to recapitulate his social difference in a moment of acute personal and collective crisis:[45]

Therefore apart from you, dear child, I would not be willing	ὣς ἂν ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ σεῖο φίλον τέκος οὐκ ἐθέλοιμι
To be left behind, not were the god in person to promise	λείπεσθ᾽, οὐδ᾽ εἴ κέν μοι ὑποσταίη θεὸς αὐτὸς
he would scale away my old age and make me a young man blossoming	γῆρας ἀποξύσας θήσειν νέον ἡβώοντα,
as I was that time when I first left Hellas, the land of fair women,	οἷον ὅτε πρῶτον λίπον Ἑλλάδα καλλιγύναικα
running from the hatred of Ormenos' son Amyntor,	φεύγων νείκεα πατρὸς Ἀμύντορος Ὀρμενίδαο,
my father; who hated me for the sake of a fair-haired mistress.	ὅς μοι παλλακίδος περιχώσατο καλλικόμοιο,
For he made love to her himself, and dishonoured his own wife,	τὴν αὐτὸς φιλέεσκεν, ἀτιμάζεσκε δ᾽ ἄκοιτιν
my mother; who was forever taking my knees and entreating me	μητέρ᾽ ἐμήν: ἣ δ᾽ αἰὲν ἐμὲ λισσέσκετο γούνων
to lie with this mistress instead so that she would hate the old man.	παλλακίδι προμιγῆναι, ἵν᾽ ἐχθήρειε γέροντα.
I was persuaded and did it; and my father when he heard of it straightaway	τῇ πιθόμην καὶ ἔρεξα: πατὴρ δ᾽ ἐμὸς αὐτίκ᾽ ὀϊσθεὶς
called down his curses, and invoked against me the dreaded furies	πολλὰ κατηρᾶτο, στυγερὰς δ᾽ ἐπεκέκλετ᾽ Ἐρινῦς,
that I might never have any son born of my seed to dandle	μή ποτε γούνασιν οἷσιν ἐφέσσεσθαι φίλον υἱὸν
on my knees; and the divinities, Zeus of the underworld	ἐξ ἐμέθεν γεγαῶτα: θεοὶ δ᾽ ἐτέλειον ἐπαρὰς
and Persephone the honoured goddess, accomplished his curses.	Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια.
Then I took it into my mind to cut him down with the sharp bronze,	ἔνθ᾽ ἐμοὶ οὐκέτι πάμπαν ἐρητύετ᾽ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμὸς
but some one of the immortals checked my anger, reminding me	πατρὸς χωομένοιο κατὰ μέγαρα στρωφᾶσθαι.
of rumour among the people and men's maledictions repeated,	τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ βούλευσα κατακτάμεν ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ:
that I might not be called a parricide among the Achaians.	ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτ ν παῦσεν χόλον, ὅς ῥ᾽ ἐνὶ θυμῷ
[...]	δήμου θῆκε φάτιν καὶ ὀνείδεα πόλλ᾽ ἀνθρώπ ν,
Then I fled far away through the wide spaces of Hellas	ὡς μὴ πατροφόνος μετ᾽ Ἀχαιοῖσιν καλεοίμ ν
and came as far as generous Phthia, mother of sheepflocks,	[...]
and to lord Peleus, who accepted me with a good will	φεῦγον ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπάνευθε δι᾽ Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόροιο,
and gave me his love, even as a father loves his own son	Φθίην δ᾽ ἐξικόμην ἐριβώλακα μητέρα μήλων
who is a single child brought up among many possessions.	ἐς Πηλῆα ἄναχθ᾽: ὃ δέ με πρόφρων ὑπέδεκτο,
He made me a rich man, and granted me many people,	καί μ᾽ ἐφίλησ᾽ ὡς εἴ τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ
and I lived, lord over the Dolopes, in remotest Phthia,	μοῦνον τηλύγετον πολλοῖσιν ἐπὶ κτεάτεσσι,
and, godlike Achilleus, I made you all that you are now,	καί μ᾽ ἀφνειὸν ἔθηκε, πολὺν δέ μοι ὤπασε λαόν:
and loved you out of my heart...	ναῖον δ᾽ ἐσχατιὴν Φθίης Δολόπεσσιν ἀνάσσων.
	καί σε τοσοῦτον ἔθηκα θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ᾽ Ἀχιλλεῦ,
	ἐκ θυμοῦ φιλέων...

Phoenix's flight across Hellas will have taken him over land and sea, exposing him both to the maritime fragmentation of the Greek landscape and the more figurative island-hopping of searching for a new home. As he reminds his sullen ward Achilles, he had fled his home and traveled far "through the wide spaces of Hellas" after provoking the rage of his natal family. Responding to an act of supplication, he had attempted to stand up for his mother and in the course of that defense compounded his father's wrong with a wrong of his own. Lacerated to the point of (verbalized) castration by his father's curses, he had been goaded into almost killing his old man out of anger. What had held him back? A divine force, reminding him of what would happen if he had been forced to live life as a parricide; the shadow of Oedipus creeps into the mythological background here. Nonetheless, his mind turbulent with emotions, Phoenix could not stay home any longer and took off, on the journey

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45 *Il.* 9.444-63, 478-86 (tr. Lattimore); I quote from the Munro-Allen Oxford edition. Lattimore (1957) followed the lead of editors who placed 458–459 after four lines that were first obelized by the Hellenistic scholar Aristarchus and that I have therefore italicized (see n. 38); as the placement of 458–459 is not important to my argument, I have omitted their translation. At 478, Lattimore's rendering of εὐρυχόροιο as "wide spaces" assumes that this choral adjective's choral resonance had given way to conflation with εὐρύχωρος already in the period of the epic's composition, but we have no way of confirming this: see (Hainsworth 1993 *ad loc*).

that finally brought him to the domains of Achilles' father Peleus; only there was he, a deracinated and family-less man, not only received with good will but loved as a father loves his son. So beloved was Phoenix in Phthia that, even after being deprived by his father's curses of the opportunity to raise his own children, he came to be entrusted with the rearing of Peleus' son. That trust empowered him to become a full member of the community at Phthia, and to invest himself in the nurturing of the prodigy that Achilles eventually became.

Phoenix's story-telling builds up to a seemingly unobjectionable lesson: Achilles, set aside your anger and reconcile yourself to Agamemnon, before it is too late. But the exhortation to transcend one's anger for the sake of the community's well-being is imparted by a sanctuary-seeker turned mentor, a sanctuary-seeker with a shady past. Phoenix claims not to have killed his father, but we only have his word that he did not go ahead with the deed. In fact, one of the most distinguished ancient interpreters of Homer was so horrified by the possibility that Achilles might have received advice from a near-parricide that he proposed deleting the lines in which Phoenix admits to his murderous designs against his father.[46] In any case, despite his past of wrath, Phoenix had nonetheless been given a second chance, making full use of it to be the father to Achilles that his father was not to him. Yet to discharge his obligations as a father figure and to instruct Achilles in the limits and complications of wrath, Phoenix has to plumb the depths of the migratory past that had haunted him even after his successful incorporation into the community of Phthia and the household of Peleus. "The point of this autobiography," Jasper Griffin has claimed, "is to show Phoenix as having no other love but that for Achilles."[47] The more stirring and relevant point for this essay is that this love, and with it all the talents that were flexed towards nurturing the young Achilles, is the gift of an immigrant who flees home under dubious circumstances, consigning himself to a life of marginality in the process—only then to luck out with the one host and the one host community whose willingness to receive him in good will had unlocked Phoenix's own special capacity to be the father and mentor that he had never had. The felicitous pairing of host and exile was not a foreordained outcome: the reference to flight across "the wide spaces of Hellas" (διʼ Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόροιο) decorously veils multiple episodes of rejection, at the hands of those communities that refused their hospitality to the cast-off Phoenix. It was only after his reception at Phthia, whose fertile soil—nourished by the manure of its flocks—synecdochically cues its social generosity,[48] that his previously inert capacity for attachment was reactivated. Such was the success of this reactivation that Phoenix would find himself one day leaving his new home in order to accompany his specially gifted charge on another journey over wide spaces, this time across the waters of the Aegean to Troy. What we learn not from the *Iliad* but from the greater Trojan mythic cycle is that Phoenix never sailed back to his adoptive home.

The social re-integration of 'criminals' turned refugees is a Homeric commonplace: among the most conspicuous examples involves another person in Achilles' tent during that fateful Book 9 exchange: Patroklos.[49] I focus on Phoenix because his self-disclosure is uncomfortably reminiscent of contemporary anxieties about welcoming the Other who happens to trail a criminal history, as voiced by those anti-immigrant zealots who have succeeded not only in branding many immigrants with the stigmata of criminality but in forcing all immigrants, as a condition of their acceptance into their new polities, into the question-and-answer protocol of forswearing any link to crime whatsoever. One response to this discursive framing has been to insist on the benefits that ensue from receiving

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46 Aristarchos' position on these lines: Plut. *De aud. poet.* 8.
47 (Griffin 1995, *ad* 9.447ff).
48 Lattimore's translation of ἐριβῶλαξ as "generous" unrolls the compressed signification of the verse—whether by choice or by accident (cf. Carne-Ross 2010, chp. 5 on Lattimore's practice as translator). The "probably formular" (thus Hainsworth 1993 *ad loc.*) collocation ἐριβʼ Ἑλακα μητέρα μʼ⟩λων capitalizes on the synergy of flock-keeping, manure collection, and fertility; see (Padilla Peralta) for more extensive commentary on this feedback loop in archaic and classical Greece.
49 For a list of "obligatory exiles" in Homer, see (Hainsworth 1993 *ad* 9.479–84). The interweaving of criminality and sanctuary is showcased in another textual production of the Iron Age Mediterranean and Levant, the Hebrew Bible: see Joshua 20 for the Israelite "cities of sanctuary".

immigrants with open arms; in this spirit, we might take Phoenix's speech as an invitation to reflect on the good that comes out of providing sanctuary to the foreigner and entrusting him or her with the secondary responsibilities that flow from full acceptance in the community. But matters are not so easily settled. There is, for starters, Phoenix's admission to having done something wrong and his further confession that he was prepared to do something still more wicked. While Phoenix's autobiography is not styled as a confessional report, the (calculated?) transparency of this self-disclosure as a criminal is wired into an archaic and classical Greek expectation that the sanctuary seeker was guilty of some crime and therefore a likely candidate for recidivism, whether advertent or inadvertent;[50] it also anticipates sanctuary's coupling to the confession of crime in the European medieval period.

Nor does Phoenix's opening up about his own past actually tip the scales of persuasion, since Achilles remains stubborn in his resolve. The rift between Achilles and Agamemnon is not healed until Patroklos's death goads Achilles into a fury without analogue or precedent in the autobiography of his favorite mentor. If Achilles does learn anything from Phoenix's speech, it is that the figure of the immigrant is forever shrouded in disgrace; this knowledge comes to the surface in Achilles' complaint that Agamemnon had treated him as if he were some "dishonoured *metanastes*," a word properly translated not with Richmond Lattimore's "vagabond" but with Bryan Hainsworth's "refugee."[51] The advice delivered by the sanctuary-seeker who had matured into the ideal mentor has apparently no other effect besides stamping him as a former (and always?) criminal and activating within Achilles's mind the association of the refugee with criminality. Shrouded in that past, Phoenix is confined to the insularizing enclosure within which that past is never forgotten. Moreover, the association of the refugee with crime creates near-perfect conditions for denying and deferring the Other's full incorporation into a new community—or, at a minimum, for forcing the reperformance of that association as a requisite for being granted legitimate standing within that community.

The stereotyping of the immigrant as a vector for crime hardly stops with the *Iliad*. Its persistence across the millennia is apparent not only in the xenophobic language nowadays embraced by the populist nationalisms of late-stage capitalism,[52] but in the application protocols of immigration systems around the world that interrogate immigrants extensively about their criminal histories and presume that they will be dishonest about their pasts unless compelled into truth. In response to the impositions of this contemporary dispensation, it has proven tempting for some classicists to press into service texts and practices from the Greco-Roman Mediterranean that offer some glimpse—however ephemeral—of the possibility of a more radically inclusive civic paradigm; sometimes these efforts produce little more than platitudinous paternalism.[53] The classical text that is most often adduced as exhibiting a commitment to this species of inclusion turns out on closer inspection to be riddled with ambivalences. I am speaking of the Roman historian Livy's account of the origin-story for the asylum, the institution whose historical and cultural legacies would already in antiquity become a wrestling-ground for Greeks and Romans.[54] The Janus-like duplicity of the Romulean asylum comes through forcefully in A. de Sélincourt's amusingly free and revealingly tendentious translation:[55]

> *Deinde ne vana urbis magnitudo esset, adiciendae multitudinis causa vetere consilio condentium urbes,*
> *qui obscuram atque humilem conciendo ad se multitudinem natam e terra sibi prolem ementiebantur,*

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50 Perhaps the most infamous episode is the tragedy of Adrastos: Herodotus 1.35. On classical Greek tragedy's handling of this theme see (Isayev 2017, pp. 80–84).

51 *Il.* 9.648 with (Hammer 2002, pp. 94–95) on *metanastes*. Achilles' complaint is quoted to suggestive effect at Aristotle *Pol.* 1278a37, in connection with metics; on this passage and the phenomenology of "immigrant passing" in classical Athens, see (Kasimis 2018, chp. 2).

52 For the rhetorical practices of these nationalisms, see (Müller 2016); on the background to the contemporary "age of anger," (Mishra 2017).

53 See, e.g., (Beard 2015), as critiqued by Jewell (2019) in this volume. I have succumbed to this temptation, or at the very least failed to subject my own flirtations with it to more searching examination: compare (Padilla Peralta 2015b, 2017b).

54 Dench (2005) covers the complex entanglements of asylum with Roman identity.

55 Liv. 1.8.5-6. Note, e.g., de Sélincourt (1971) rendering of *obscuram atque humilem* as "homeless and destitute"; or the defanging of *avida novarum rerum* as "wanting nothing but a fresh start."

> *locum qui nunc saeptus descendentibus inter duos lucos est asylum aperit. Eo ex finitimis populis turba omnis sine discrimine, liber an servus esset, avida novarum rerum perfugit, idque primum ad coeptam magnitudinem roboris fuit.*

> In antiquity, the founder of a new settlement, in order to increase its population, would as a matter of course shark up a lot of homeless and destitute folk and pretend that they were 'born of earth' to be his progeny; Romulus now followed a similar course: to help fill his big new town, he threw open, in the ground—now enclosed—between the two copses as you go up the Capitoline hill, a place of asylum for fugitives. Hither fled for refuge all the rag-tag-and-bobtail from the neighbouring peoples: some free, some slaves, and all of them wanting nothing but a fresh start. That mob was the first real addition to the City's strength, the first step to her future greatness.

Much has been made of this passage's glorification of the migrant presence as foundational to Rome's future attainments, and of the historian's insinuation that, in a deep sense, all claims of civic autochthony and communal rootedness in the soil are simply a sleight of hand—a rhetorical transmutation of a motley assortment into bona fide citizens. All this and so much more can be slotted with little difficulty into Andersonian schemes of imagined community.[56] My objectives in citing this passage, however, are rather different.

If make-believe is essential to the construction of that kinship whereby the refuse "from the neighbouring peoples" metamorphose into citizens, it is noteworthy that the fiction proceeds from the assumption that those on the move must be (at best) mediocrities. The assumption is contradicted by the historical record, not least in the Roman annalistic tradition's preservation of stories about the migration of elites; those fortunate enough to hop from polity to polity tend to have some resources, at least relative to those who are left behind.[57] But the ideological work veiled by this assumption hums along regardless: "they don't send us their best." Common both to the self-report of Phoenix and to the Livian representation of the asylum is the encoding of mobility and those on the move as inherently suspicious; the only redemption available to immigrants lies in the stabilizing action of the host community that with its offer of welcome also assigns them a role. The darker side of that welcome, however, is the prospect that those marked with the scarlet letter of desperate flight will from that first moment of entrance in the community be interpellated as riff-raff.

The myth of the asylum could and almost certainly did function as a device for justifying the direction of the state's normative gaze towards those individuals and communities who in Livy's own lifetime were being menaced with discipline and punishment: first Julius Caesar and then Augustus had some firm ideas about how to order, regulate, and quantify the civic body.[58] Seen in this light, the Livian asylum was a fiction for negotiating those anxieties about aspiring members of the civic body that could not simply be willed away or dismissed out of hand, given that these anxieties had to be sustained if the state was to carry out its work of assigning every person a place. The labor involved in sustaining these anxieties would in ancient Rome come to rely increasingly on an imperial management strategy that repetitively strung out past and future candidate communities for citizenship into islands of unequal status. On one level, the legend of the asylum enacted the illusionistic trick of yoking the rough crowd to the triumphal procession of Roman greatness. On another level, the legend re-authorized the application of Roman power to demarcate, circumscribe, and grid different communities through the imputation of criminality and backwardness. The success of this feat of

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56 (Anderson 2006). For the extraordinary multi-disciplinary impact of this work, see (Bergholz 2018).

57 E.g., Attius Clausus and the Claudii: Liv. 2.16.5; Dionysius of Halicarnassus *AR* 5.40.5. For the historical mobility of elites in archaic and Republican Italy, see now (Terrenato 2019).

58 The literature on this subject has metastasized; of recent publications I have found (Eberle 2017) exceptionally good to think with. For imperial recourse to *denaturalization*, see the remarks of (Ando 2016b, p. 185). On the imprint of the Caesarian and Augustan colonization/forced resettlement programs in the construction of Rome's civic imaginaries, see Jewell (2019) in this volume.

mystification was conditional on selling members of these communities on the fantasy that those who had migrated from difficult or unsavory circumstances would one day become bona fide citizens just like everyone else—even if, in the end, they could never be.

5. The Fever Dream of Civic Belonging

To the extent that the noble simplicity and calm grandeur of the state is presumed to reside in fixity and permanence, the human body in motion is seen either as a disruption of its glacial stability or as an outcome of the state's determination to will this stability into being. As the Livian asylum story exemplifies, that stability is rooted not in the soil of autochthonous timelessness but on certain controlling fictions. By reading against the grain, we can recover from Livy's text an alternative script for narrating the anxieties of those immigrants in the grip of twenty-first-century displacements. Their hope is to find a place of succor, a place between the tree groves; but what is to be done when the materialization of that hope hinges on an act of ventriloquism, namely the substitution of one's own inner sense of self with the psychic projection of the state? In modern settings, this projection works through the carrot-and-stick (or bait-and-switch) of populating the immigrant's mind with a set of mythic narratives that exalt their host state and with a set of anxieties about the Scylla and Charybdis of that state's bureaucracy and carcerality.

Sometimes occluded in contemporary debates about immigration and civic belonging is the question of whether as a general principle, the institutions of civil society have an affirmative moral obligation to protect the most vulnerable from the blunt-force administration of anxiety, and if so under what circumstances. Among the strategies through which the carceral-immigration systems of the modern Global North perfect their grasp on the minds and bodies of immigrants is the propagation of terror, which takes the form not only of the active and unavoidable paranoia about being rounded up for detainment and deportation but of the crushingly relentless rituals that are staged to make the immigrant "feel like a problem."[59] Perhaps this anxiety is simply one branch of the generalized insecurity through which the (post)modern state manages the polity, as Jacques Rancière has detailed.[60] Be that as it may, the highly specific and quite regularly racialized anxiety of being made to feel like a problem inflicts devastating harm on the minds and bodies of immigrants.[61] Among the many forms that this anxiety takes is the sensation of never standing on *terra firma*, of always feeling condemned to life as "a small and rotting boat/A frightened boat—without a paddle and unmanned . . . "[62]

The state's game of indefinitely deferring the arrival of marginalized communities on the shores of full citizenship through the weaponization of anxiety depends partly on co-opting as gatekeepers those individuals who have journeyed successfully to the final destination. The most arresting depiction of this process that I have come across is not in a Greco-Roman text (though much remains to be said about imperial Rome's recruitment of new and aspiring citizens into its militarized exploitation of borderlands) but in a recently published novel: Imbolo Mbue's *Behold the Dreamers*, which follows a Cameroonian immigrant couple on their harrowing pursuit of legal status in the United States. Early in the narrative, the protagonist Jende receives some words of consolation and exhortation from his bumbling lawyer Bubakar after the family's first asylum application is rejected:

> We'll keep on trying our own way, and you keep on sleeping with one eye open, eh? Because until the day you become American citizen, Immigration will always be right on your ass, every single day, following you everywhere, and you'll need money to fight them if they decide they hate the way your fart smells. But Inshallah, one day you'll become a citizen, and when that happens, no one can *ever* touch you. You and your family will finally be able

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[59]   (Bayoumi 2008) on Arab-Americans, channeling W.E.B. Du Bois.
[60]   The postmodern state's weaponization of insecurity (Rancière 2010, chp. 8). Cf. (Jameela 2018) on the weaponization of whiteness and black and brown "movements through trauma."
[61]   See (purely, e.g.) (Cornejo Villavicencio 2017) on the psychological costs.
[62]   (Boochani 2018, p. 133).

> to relax. You'll at last be able to sleep well, and you'll begin to really enjoy your life in this country.[63]

This gruff wisdom is unmasked over the course of the novel as a spectacular deception, trotted out by Bubakar—himself an immigrant—in an attempt to keep the spigots of his customers' payments turned on. At every turn, Jende and his spouse Neni are tantalized by the specter of that ever-elusive adjustment to legal status; meanwhile, the experiences of the novel's secondary characters undermine the notion that citizenship will open the door to a shimmering future of anxiety-free stability. The best-case scenario in store for them is the "citizenship in question" that has lately elicited comment from political theorists.[64] But Jende and Neni are denied even this. With no happy ending to the couple's migratory travails and no redemptive culmination to years of waiting and praying and bureaucratic maneuvering, they are eventually forced back across the Atlantic to Cameroon.

I am a formerly undocumented immigrant from the Greater Antilles for whom the saga of Jende and Neni speak equally to those nesological properties of citizenship that guide my professional work and to the dreams of citizenship that have shaped my identity. Citizenship is constantly on my mind because I have lived for twenty-seven of my thirty-four years in a country that denies me the name of citizen, and because the conditions that act to suppress biographical narratives like mine from public visibility are structurally akin to those that work towards the effacement of the internally colonized, from Puerto Rico to the projects.[65] The most effective counter I have been able to muster to my adoptive country's denial is to seek out and construct models of citizenship that eschew repetitive denial in favor of radical inclusion, often with the help of texts that receive and reformat Greco-Roman antiquity. In its most upliftingly irenic incarnation, this radical inclusion would be co-extensive with that limitless expanse of welcome that has been freshly summoned into verse by the poet Danez Smith:

> do you know what it's like to live
> on land who loves you back?
> no need for geography
> now, we safe everywhere.
> point to whatever you please
> & call it church, home, or sweet love.
> paradise is a world where everything
> is sanctuary & nothing is a gun. ("summer, somewhere") [66]

With so many journeys over land and sea menaced (when not halted) by violence, from Phoenix's flight through Hellas to the tear gassing of Central American asylum-seekers, how will the migrant body in motion reach the peaceful security of land that loves it back? How may I—a brown body whose perpetual Brownian motion is regulated and funneled by biometric surveillance regimes—stake a claim to value and dignity in the teeth of multiply encoded gestures of disrespect and devaluation? "Think," Smith commands the reader while mourning the trivialization of black and brown humanity:

> . . . once, a white girl
> was kidnapped & that's the Trojan War.
> Troy got shot
> & that was Tuesday. are we not worthy
> of a city of ash? of 1000 ships
> launched because we are missed? ("not an elegy") [67]

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[63] (Mbue 2016, p. 74).
[64] Exemplary for their exposition and interrogation of this concept are the papers in (Lawrance and Stevens 2017).
[65] (Padilla Peralta 2015a).
[66] (Smith 2017, p. 8)
[67] (Smith 2017, p. 68)

The only adjustment one might make here in accommodating Danez Smith's verse to the vertigos of contemporary human mobility is to note that for the immigrant 1000 ships have in fact been launched, many bristling with the operatives of the immigration-carceral complex. Smith's plaintive "are we not worthy" has another resonance for those of us contemplating the valuation of immigrants and *our* valuation as immigrants: at what stage on the journey will we be finally recognized as deserving—or is the postponement of that recognition part and parcel of the axiological conceits by which the civic exploitation of migrant minds and bodies is endlessly justified?

Pivotal to the reproduction of these axiological conceits is the demand that immigrants constantly perform their worth. With enough time and island-hopping, the demand is successful at inscribing itself into the immigrant's subconscious. During my adolescent years, when I first came to terms with what it might mean to grow up as an undocumented immigrant in the United States, I was often visited by a recurring nightmare in which I would awaken from my slumber to find myself back in the New York City homeless shelters where my family had spent a year of my childhood. Although I would come to awareness in the dream as my eight-year-old (soon to be nine-year-old) self, inhabiting the body that accompanied my family on its entrance to the shelter system in the summer of 1993, I was cursed with foreknowledge: I knew that we would be confined in the shelter system for a year, and subjected regularly to the verbal questioning and physical prodding of social workers, medical personnel, and teachers; that my mother would continue exploring how to legalize our family's stay in the United States, experiencing frustration at every turn; that we would be placed out of the shelter system and into new neighborhoods; that I would be admitted to an independent private school where I would study Latin and ancient Greek, seeking in the prestige economy of these languages a deliverance into civic integration; that I would carry the secret of our immigration status with me on my weekday commutes to school and on the journey to college; and that I would be absolutely powerless to effect any change to this itinerary that might result in a materially better outcome for my family. This was the nightmare that chased after me for years and years, adding fresh layers to the sedimentation of delay as my family crawled to legal immigrant status.

Even the acquisition of differentiated citizenship, first in the form of permanent residence and then (in my mother's case) naturalization, did nothing to dispel the regularity of the nightmare's visitations. Carlos Aguilar has recently sounded the call for an "undocumented critical theory" that attends more faithfully and flexibly to the psychosocial contours of the undocumented experience.[68] For the purposes of this contribution, I close with an appeal to my own undocumented psycho-biography in order to foreground the extent to which the insular case of imperfectly realized citizenship is a head case: the Sisyphean labor of having always to retrace one's journey across uneven terrain and fragmented domains, made all the harsher and unremitting by the bludgeoning of those accosting voices who insist that all the immigrant must do is perform the proper rituals and wait in line.[69] Now, it may be objected that to speak of insular cases or nesologies as a psychic phenomenon (as I have done) or to specify an ontology for the process that begins prior to "the birth of territory"[70] (as I have also done) is a misbegotten enterprise. Or some readers may grumble, as one anonymous referee did some years ago in response to an essay that was conceived in a very similar vein to this one, that "the author's personal information is inappropriate in a work of historical scholarship." But the leveraging of the personal is, in the first instance, a tactic for resisting the signature imposition of insular citizenship on the bodies of the marginalized: the shattering realization that one is a "disposable subject,"[71] liable to be cast away on a moment's notice into the deep blue sea. To resist this imposition is also to resist the

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[68] (Aguilar 2018).
[69] On the nature of these rituals and the insidiousness of their psychological encroachments, compare (Padilla Peralta 2015c, 2018).
[70] See (Elden 2013) for an audacious and sweeping genealogy.
[71] For the concept of the "disposable subject" and the artistic strategies that emerge in conscious resistance to its interpellating manifestations see (García 2019).

reproduction of those imaginary cartographies by which black and brown bodies are commanded (through acts of racist prestidigitation) to "return" home, to that *outre-mer* envisaged as their only appropriate abode. In defiance of these acts and of the mental maps that underpin them, this essay has endeavored to provide a transhistorical rendering of citizenship's torments that, in contradistinction to citizenship itself, does not confine itself to borders or shores—of linearity, historicity, and most of all disciplinarity.

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Response to Padilla Peralta, Dan-el. Citizenship's Insular Cases, from Ancient Greece and Rome to Puerto Rico. *Humanities* 2019, *8*, 134

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Abstract: Dan-el Padilla Peralta's exquisite exploration of citizenship and displacement across two millennia draws on sources from ancient Greece and Rome as well as modern empires, including the U.S., and proposes two creative heuristic devices—the "insular scheme" and "radical inclusion"—that enable us to better understand both the marginalizing experience and the animating possibilities of immigrant citizenship. In my response to his piece, I assess the relevance of these ideas to the history of Puerto Ricans in relation to the United States. Puerto Ricans, caught in the "insular scheme" of U.S. citizenship since American citizenship was imposed on them in 1917, are the most obvious exemplars of "differentiated citizens" in the nation and have struggled in multiple ways with the question of inclusion as citizens. I examine the ways that Puerto Ricans have used the language of recognition as a way to explain the aspiration of equitable citizenship, a vision of belonging in the nation that sounds much like Padilla Peralta's "radical inclusion."

Keywords: citizenship; migration; displacement; recognition; empire; Puerto Rico

We tend to think of citizenship as a fixed position—a place of safety, one to which the luckiest of immigrants may eventually cross—and we may also assume that, as a long-established set of rules and practices, it rests on a stable historical foundation. But citizenship, as both a historical idea and a civic condition, is more accurately described as a moving target. When I was writing a book about how Puerto Ricans in the U.S. navigated their political status in the 20th century, I got bogged down in mapping a genealogy of ideas about citizenship in the modern nation state. It was an enterprise that, as Dan-el Padilla Peralta notes in "Citizenship's Insular Cases, from Ancient Greece and Rome to Puerto Rico," zigzagged through an assortment of experiments with empire, and connecting those dots yielded less insight than I'd hoped as I tried to track Puerto Ricans' political goals as citizen-immigrants.[1] So I changed course, deciding to "follow the things" that mattered to people—in this case, ideas about status defined not by the state, but by the people who lived in a particularly odd place, legally speaking, on its margins.[2] I will say more below about this historian's journey into political theory—landing at the politics of recognition, a more concrete thing, in many respects, than citizenship itself—and will explain that journey's notable parallels with the "ideational insular scheme" that Padilla Peralta traces here as a metonym for citizenship, especially as it pertains to migrants.[3] First, though, I want to reflect

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[1] I sometimes refer to early Puerto Rican migrants in the U.S. (between 1917 and about 1945) as "citizen-immigrants" because, although they were U.S. citizens after 1917, they experienced their lives in the U.S. much like other immigrants did when they migrated to the U.S., adjusting to an unfamiliar language and culture and being treated as foreigners. This presumption and experience of foreignness shifted after the massive mid-century migration from the island; the majority of migrants continued to land in New York City, where they could settle into well-established communities of other Puerto Ricans, diminishing some of the impact of cultural foreignness.

[2] This phrase is borrowed from Arjun Appadurai, "Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value" in Appadurai (2011, p. 5). Mine is a loose adaptation of Appadurai's directive, since he was concerned with objects, not ideas, as "things."

[3] Because I use both "migrant" and "immigrant" in this essay—in a way that is intentional but may seem haphazard—I'll offer some explanation of my usage. "Migrant" is a general term that describes both people who move from one region to another

on how Padilla Peralta's essay leads us towards a precise assessment of the transhistorical dynamics of citizenship and what actually happens to those who pursue it from outside.

1. Differentiated Citizenship

In his meandering account of citizenship spanning 2500 years, Padilla Peralta emphasizes the dynamics of citizenship—the process and the relationships involved in the creation of insiders and outsiders—-rather than locating citizenship as a status, a static base of civic personhood. He argues for regarding citizenship as an "insular scheme," in part because it is open to some and closed to others, producing an endless reaching for shore, "a fantasy of connectivity across distance." This scheme entails the sorting of people into a chain (archipelago) of statuses depending on each group's value and relationship to the metropole, and has done so for millennia. Padilla Peralta tells us that certain communities in the Roman empire were granted "partial citizenship," which required military service but no right to vote or hold office at Rome. "In this fashion," he writes, "differentiated citizenship was born—and it was not long before tensions materialized in its wake."[4] If we were to substitute here "Puerto Rico" for "certain communities" and "the U.S." for "Rome," this passage could hardly provide a more accurate summary of how the U.S. laid the foundation of its new empire at the turn of the 20th century.

Another key feature of citizenship that interests Padilla Peralta is its endless repetitions, as both a historical and an ideational phenomenon.[5] Padilla Peralta asserts that the continually bounded nature of citizenship makes its "insularity" more than a metaphor. In laying out his argument, he invokes the Caribbeanist literary scholar Antonio Benítez-Rojo, whose book *The Repeating Island* stands as the reigning manifesto of the Caribbean's fractal geographies and historicity. Benítez-Rojo describes his investigation of the Caribbean's "historiographic turbulence" as part of a "never-ending tale"; the parallels Padilla Peralta draws between ancient Rome and Puerto Rico bear out this claim. Indeed, Puerto Rico's 20th-century experience with citizenship repeats elements of a case from 306 BCE, described by the Roman historian Livy, wherein a community refused the offer of Roman citizenship on the grounds that " … citizenship would of necessity be a type of punishment."[6] Luis Muñoz Marín, one of Puerto Rico's early nationalist leaders, made precisely the same point 2222 years later (in 1916) in testimony before the U.S. Congress: "My countrymen, who, precisely the same as yours, have their dignity and self-respect to maintain, refuse to accept a citizenship of an inferior order, a citizenship of the second class, which does not permit them to dispose of their own resources nor to live their own lives nor to send to this Capitol their proportional representation."[7] Padilla Peralta ends his description of the Roman case with a question whose relevance has not faded over two millennia and that Puerto Ricans have been asking since before they were yoked with U.S. citizenship in 1917: "Under what conditions does the state's assignment of second-class citizenship do double work as a species of punishment?"[8]

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within a country *and* people who move across an international border, from one country to another. (Two U.S. examples of the former are "Okies", poor farmers—mostly White—leaving the Dust Bowl during the Depression and looking for better opportunity in California, and African Americans who fled the violence and poverty of the South during the early 20th century Great Migration to the North and West.) Many migrants who move across international borders may be accurately called "immigrants", a term that implies a voluntary move from one country to another; but, if the migrants are fleeing their homeland, they are "refugees" or "asylees", depending on where and how they declare their need for asylum. Despite these distinctions and for the sake of simplicity, I use "immigrant" in this essay as a general term to describe foreign-born people in the U.S., even if some of those people may be actually refugees or asylees. Finally, Puerto Ricans who move to the mainland U.S. are migrants, not immigrants, since they do not cross an international border; however, as I explain in the first footnote, I sometimes refer to early 20th century Puerto Ricans as "citizen-immigrants" as a way to signal their unique experience as U.S. citizens who were also considered foreigners.

4   (Padilla Peralta 2019, pp. 4–5).
5   (Padilla Peralta 2019, p. 1).
6   (Benítez Rojo 1996, pp. ix, 3; Padilla Peralta 2019, p. 5).
7   (*Congressional Record* 1916, p. 7472).
8   (Padilla Peralta 2019, p. 5).

Padilla Peralta explores how the punishments that outsiders and Others experience within the citizenship regime is delivered via a continual process of displacement, deferral, and exclusion, taking examples from ancient Greek and Roman sources, mid-century American author Richard Wright, and from Padilla Peralta's own life. The migrant embarks on what turns out to be an endless quest to "earn the polity's trust," to win the elusive equality promised by citizenship. For Puerto Ricans in the early 20th century, before the Jones-Shaforth Act settled the question in 1917, deferral was the only option. Bernardo Vega, a Puerto Rican labor leader who migrated to the U.S. from Puerto Rico as a young man in 1916, recounted in his memoirs his bewilderment at the process of seeking the protection of U.S. citizenship. Attending evening classes to learn English, Vega asked his teacher, "How can I become an American citizen?" "Just follow the steps," she told him; she had explained the bureaucratic procedures of applying for citizenship to students from many different nations. But Vega knew there were, then, no "steps" that Puerto Ricans could follow, since the question of Puerto Rico's legal and territorial relationship to the U.S. remained unresolved.[9]

After 1917, the experience of displacement and deferral for 1,250,000 Puerto Rican islanders and about 15,000 Puerto Ricans living in the United States continued, though in different form. Congress extended what they called American citizenship to Puerto Ricans, though it was in fact a partial citizenship: residents of the island could be drafted into the U.S. military but could not vote in federal elections, and their representation in the U.S. Congress was not proportional nor equal to that of other U.S. citizens.[10] Puerto Rican migrants in New York—who supposedly possessed the same rights as their mainland neighbors—began to deploy their U.S. citizenship to demand sovereign status for their island and to protect themselves from the increasingly visible prejudice they confronted in their neighborhoods and workplaces. They engaged in what Padilla Peralta refers to as a "politics-on-the-move" of a dispersed and displaced people, trying to generate greater political visibility by creating belonging within "a network of islands" to counter the boundedness and exclusions of the citizenship they were reaching for. Anthropologist Michel Laguerre refers to such networks as "diasporic citizenship," wherein migrants bring their distant preoccupations into the metropole and try to leverage their location there to influence both "the politics of here" and the politics of home.[11] In this way, Puerto Ricans in New York worked to get their East Harlem Congressional representative to support independence for their island in the 1920s; they organized protests against their exclusion from Home Relief and employment programs in the city during the Depression; and in the 1940s, many enlisted in the military, expecting that fighting on the side of democracy and liberty would give them a louder voice in the debates over worldwide decolonization, including Puerto Rico, that exploded during the war. Yet, by the time a massive postwar migration began bringing 50,000 migrants a year from Puerto Rico to New York, it was clear to residents of the diaspora that three decades of differential citizenship had yielded only deferred aspirations.

2. Recognition and 'Radical Inclusion'

By the 1950s, after repeated episodes of articulating rights-based claims to equal protection as American citizens, and confronting over and over the denials of what historian Rebecca Scott has called "the dignitary components of citizenship," Puerto Ricans in the U.S. tired of arguing over what their citizenship was supposed to do for them.[12] Instead of chasing the elusive dream of equal citizenship, civic leaders began to speak in terms of claims for recognition. What did that mean? "Recognition"

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9   Until 1898, Puerto Ricans were Spanish colonial subjects; between 1900 and 1917, they were defined as U.S. nationals; in 1917, they became United States citizens. See (Iglesias 1984, p. 27).

10 This remains the case. Puerto Rico's Resident Commissioner serves as the island's single representative in Congress, representing 3.2 million constituents—compared to about 700,000 in the average U.S. congressional district—and is not allowed to vote on final versions of bills on the House floor.

11 (Padilla Peralta 2019, p. 9; Laguerre 1998, pp. 8–13). On the "politics of here", see (Thomas 2010, p. 36).

12 (Scott 2005, p. 256). On the "institutionally embedded social practices" of citizenship, see also (Somers 1993).

sounds less concrete than citizenship as a goal of civic life; but looking more closely, we understand that the social and interpersonal dynamics of recognition—and the politics of pursuing it—are at least as real and specific as any everyday experience of "citizenship." When writer and activist Jesús Colón noted in the mid-1950s that "the community is struggling to express itself more forcefully, to unite itself, to gain recognition and the rights it is entitled to, in the city at large," he referred to a series of actions.[13] After residents of El Barrio, in Puerto Rican East Harlem, exploded in a riot following protests against police violence in 1967, a young community organizer named Ted Vélez spelled out to a journalist the result of aspirations deferred: "Violence comes out of frustration, nobody listening, not having organizations effective enough, not having recognition, respect, dignity," he explained.[14]

These were not invocations of a theoretical approach. They were sharp articulations of experience, descriptions of responses to "the shattering realization that one is a disposable subject," as Padilla Peralta puts it.[15] Puerto Ricans, migrants and children of migrants, knew by mid-century that their citizenship did not protect them from invisibility and disposability, and demanded what G. W. F. Hegel, the 19th-century philosopher of history, had identified as human agents' need for "intersubjective recognition." Invoking recognition, Colón and other political leaders insisted on being acknowledged as "full partners in social interaction" (Nancy Fraser) and heard as they recounted "the collective experience of violated integrity" (Jürgen Habermas); Vélez and his cohort of community organizers laid out the "grammar of social conflict" (Axel Honneth) and called attention to the consequences of "misrecognition" as a form of oppression (Charles Taylor).[16]

It is important to note here the wide range of possible outcomes of "misrecognition" and "violated integrity"—to acknowledge, that is, that the silencing of a group's collective voice is different from, though connected to, the many forms of violence that may be inflicted on group members in a society marked by racism and xenophobia. While the racism African Americans experience in the U.S. is unique, distinct from that encountered by foreign migrants, Black and Brown people—and Asian Americans and Indigenous people—have shared the differentiated citizenship designed to prevent them from being heard when they describe how the schema of exclusion actually operate in their lives. Writer James Baldwin wrote in many places about the violence that both preceded and resulted from the "misrecognition" that continued to plague African Americans after they became U.S. citizens; among his last words on the subject were found in the notes he made for an unfinished book, *Remember This House*: "You cannot lynch me and keep me in ghettos without becoming something monstrous yourselves. And furthermore, you give me a terrifying advantage. *You never had to look at me. I had to look at you. I know more about you than you know about me*."[17]

One crucial element of actualizing recognition is the acknowledgment of violence done to marginalized groups in the past—both real, physical violence and the violence of silencing their histories.[18] "In order to be knowingly in each other's presence we must somehow share each other's past," wrote anthropologist Johannes Fabian on the eve of the formation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a nation that had passed through a post-colonial transition as Zaire following its independence in 1971 from Belgian colonizers, whose brutality had been pointed out by a few White

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13 (Colón 1955).

14 (Kihss 1967, p. 20; 1960; Thomas 2010, p. 13).

15 (Padilla Peralta 2019, p. 19).

16 (Hegel [1910] 2003, pp. 106–9; Fraser 2000, pp. 107–20; quote from pp. 113–14; Habermas 1994, pp. 108, 110, 113; Honneth and Fraser 2003, pp. 137, 208). Note that Honneth borrows the phrase "moral grammar of social conflict" from Hegel; see (Honneth 1995); see Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in Taylor (1994, pp. 26–36).

17 These materials for Baldwin's book in progress were compiled and edited by Raoul Peck under the title *I Am Not Your Negro*; see (Peck and Baldwin 2017, p. 103). Emphasis added.

18 Such acknowledgement is one of the primary goals of the dozens of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) that have been convened around the world in the last forty years to address histories of state-sponsored political and racial violence in the 20th century as well as genocide against indigenous peoples and other racial or ethnic minority groups. Most TRCs' approach to restorative justice relies on the principles outlined by theorists of recognition. See, for example, (Yashar 2012).

observers but almost entirely excised from their historical record until the late 20th century.[19] Fabian was born at the start of World War II in a German town that was soon occupied by the Soviets before it became part of Poland after the war, and his personal experience must somewhere underlie his conviction that, in order to understand any nation's past, we need to be able to track how intersubjective recognition operates to connect the psychic (memory) and the societal (history) into a living story in which every person can locate themselves. Padilla Peralta's investigation insists on the necessity of tracing such connections. We cannot understand differentiated citizenship, he says, without acknowledging the immigrant's subconscious and thereby seeing how their experience is shaped by not just their role within the state—as citizens or non-citizens—but by the vision they assemble of the nation itself.

Padilla Peralta describes his own experience as an immigrant to illustrate his concluding argument that "the insular case of imperfectly realized citizenship is a head case: the Sisyphean labor of having always to retrace one's journey across uneven terrain and fragmented domains." In the course of this brief "undocumented psycho-biography," Padilla Peralta notes that he embraced the opportunity to study Latin and Greek in high school because he understood how such knowledge and the prestige it lent could lead him toward the possibility of civic belonging in the U.S. Surely he has been asked why a Dominican immigrant in the U.S. studies ancient Greece and Rome, the assumption being that immigrants and other marginalized people who gain entry into the academy will primarily "study themselves."[20] Padilla Peralta answers that freighted question in his essay, showcasing the wisdom and necessity of connecting far-flung stories by tracking the transhistorical conditions—interpersonal, societal, historical—that work to erase biographical narratives like his.[21]

In the final segment of his essay, titled "The Fever Dream of Civic Belonging," Padilla Peralta argues for replacing differentiated citizenship, the reigning model for 2500 years, with a citizenship model based on what he calls "radical inclusion," the best way he can see to push back against the repeated denials he and other immigrants experience in their adoptive country.[22] We can discern two meanings of *radical* here, the first coming from its Latin origin and pointing to the idea that inclusion is supposed to lie at the root of the social experience in the United States. Puerto Rican writer Jack Agüeros addressed the failed promises of this foundational ideal in a 1971 account of his 1940s New York childhood titled "Halfway to Dick and Jane: A Puerto Rican Pilgrimage." Agüeros described encounters with police who herded dark-skinned children off street corners and surveilled their play in city parks, demanding, "'What are you kids doing in this neighborhood? Why don't you kids go back where you belong?'" Agüeros recalled his 10-year-old outrage, tinged with the irony of understanding that his rhetorical questions were dangerously naïve: "Where we belonged! Man, I had written compositions about America. Didn't I belong on the Central Park tennis courts? Couldn't I watch Dick play? Weren't these policemen working for me too?"[23]

Agüeros let that last question fall without comment, though it crackled at the time of his writing with outrage over a suspected police murder of a Puerto Rican man, imprisoned in Manhattan's municipal jail—"the Tombs"—in late 1970. I imagine Agüeros and Padilla Peralta and so many thousands of others reflecting on this question today and summing up their grim response: *differentiated citizenship is deadly.* This answer underscores the urgency of the second meaning of radical, upending the order of the status quo, a figurative play on the Latin meaning that emerged in the early 19th century. Radical inclusion would mean providing undifferentiated protections to eradicate the violent exclusions of the insular scheme of American citizenship. The possibility may seem as remote now as at the dawn of Reconstruction, when the 15th Amendment guaranteed full U.S. citizenship to all

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[19] (Fabian 1999, p. 68); see also (Fabian 1983, pp. 34–35, 177).
[20] (Judt 2010, p. 15).
[21] (Padilla Peralta 2019, p. 17).
[22] (Padilla Peralta 2019, p. 17).
[23] (Agüeros 1971, p. 94).

Americans regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; or, nearly a hundred years later, when the passage of both the Voting Rights Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965 suggested the federal government's willingness to challenge the old exclusions of U.S. citizenship. Some degree of cynicism is the only logical response to this history in 2020, as the public lynchings first publicized by Ida B. Wells in the 1890s have morphed over a century into something different but related, and as the suppression of Black and Brown voters and the imprisonment of immigrants at our southern border stand, 55 years after the 1965 watershed, as among the most pressing issues in our domestic politics. Still, upholding and fighting for the ethics of radical inclusion is a powerful way forward. It is the only way to ensure that democracy—whose Greek root reminds us of its true meaning, the sovereignty of the people—will actually work for all of us.

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Article

Ancient Wandering and Permanent Temporariness

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Abstract: To move towards an understanding of displacement from within, and the forms of its overcoming, the following chapter brings into dialogue the ancient experience of wandering and the 21st century condition of permanent temporariness. It explores whether these are the same or different phenomena, and whether the latter is a uniquely modern experience. In particular, it is interested in the turning points that lead to the defiance of the condition and its regime. It traces modes of existence that subvert the liminal state and allow for possibilities of living beyond the present moment through returns and futures that are part of everyday practices, even if they are splintered. Such actions, it is argued, allow for the repositioning of the self in relation to the world, and thus the exposition of cracks within the status quo. The investigation confronts experiences that appear to be uniquely those of the present day—such as non-arrival and forced immobility. In its exploration it engages current responses to de-placement by those who have experience of the condition first hand. It is a dialogue between the work of such creators as the architects Petti and Hilal, the poets Qasmiyeh and Husseini, and the community builders of Dandara, with ancient discourses of the outcast that are found in Euripides' *Medea*, the experience of Xenophon and such philosophers as Diogenes the Cynic. In so doing, it seeks to expose the way seemingly exceptional forms of politics and existence, instead, reveal themselves as society's 'systemic edge'.

Keywords: wandering; permanent temporariness; forced migration; immobility; displacement; de-placement; asylum; refugee camp; exile; Medea; Xenophon; Diogenes; Euripides

"What is important to clarify is that the condition of permanent temporariness is imposed on us. It is a regime that exists today, and is manifested of course in refugee camps as an extreme, but is diffused into many other spheres with all sorts of precarities. After recognizing that the condition of permanent temporariness is not a choice, the question then becomes how to challenge it, how to overcome its regime. The answer cannot be permanency. It is unbearable when you don't have access to rights that citizens nominally have, and the path to permanent citizen becomes the only way to obtain these rights. But we know that this is an illusion, and unachievable promise: first, because the very system of the nation state and citizenship is collapsing; and second, because the "integration" it requires suppresses individual qualities, and is never fully achieved for many categories of people—they will never be accepted as equal. So, what is left if we don't want to succumb to the regime of permanent temporariness and see neither permanence nor temporariness as salvation?"

From *Permanent Temporariness* by Sandi Hilal and Alessandro Petti.[1]

1. Introduction

Permanent temporariness was bared to me not as a concept but as a lived experience while I was hosted as a guest by scholars, artists, architects and other creators in contexts of displacement when invited to think together within and beyond the refugee camp about the challenges expressed in Sandi and Alessandro's emphatic statement above. What I brought with me to the table were stories from the ancient world, and it is the enquiries

made of that distant world which also interested my hosts and helped drive our search. We used ancient discourse to expose and inform problematics of space and time in the now. Our joint hopes were that it would be a site for alternative imaginaries, defying the fixation on impossibility and crisis, without diminishing the searing reality of present-day precarity and violence, which my hosts and others who have been forcibly displaced endure. By exploring the condition across the *longue durée,* our aim was to understand the possibilities of challenging it and the extent to which its nature was part of the world and its past, rather than an exception to it. It is a way of thinking not about endings but turning-points that allow for a repositioning of the self in relation to the world. Wandering became an ever more present subject within these exchanges, as did the questions about its relationship to permanent temporariness within and beyond the camp.

The paper that follows is the beginning of an investigation into this relationship, presented as a continuation of the dialogue with my hosts, and particularly those who are the Catalyst contributors for this volume: especially Sandi Hilal, Alessandro Petti, Yousif Qasmiyeh, Beatriz Ribeiro, Fernando Oelze and Orlando Soares Lopes of Dandara.[2] Their work and experience from within displacement is my starting point, and the motivation for my choice of ancient perspectives to focus on. These ancient contexts, as I outline below, are not intended to be 'inspirational' or comparable, but ones that allow for diverse approaches to understanding the relationship between the condition of forced wandering and that of permanent temporariness,[3] and to address such questions as: What convergences might there be in the way they are borne, narrated, resisted and operationalised? Is each a reference to the same phenomenon by different names but thousands of years apart? Or is permanent temporariness today something that is beyond wandering? Is it a uniquely current-day experience, resulting from the geo-political configuration, which creates conditions deemed exceptional and yet are endured and challenged by people whose collective absence from their countries would form an emptiness larger than any one of Europe's nations? The intention is not to ignore the vast wealth of knowledge in theoretical discourse, but to foreground the condition of wandering and permanent temporariness from within its experience by those who not only witnessed it, but felt it on their being.[4] It draws on diverse forms of testimony of individual and collective agency, and especially that expressed through art practice, making no claims to representation, but rather to the spectrum of possible understanding and confrontation across lives.

The ancient testimonies will be taken from the surviving corpus of the Mediterranean region of the last five hundred years BC, in particular from the ancient Greek world of competing city-states of the 5th–3rd centuries. The exploration will primarily draw on three ancient perspectives of forced wandering: within Euripides' Greek tragedy *Medea*, Xenophon's historical narrative of the march of the ten thousand mercenaries, and the accounts of exiled philosophers such as Diogenes the Cynic of Sinope. These ancient contexts do more than reveal ways in which forced displacement and the protracted condition of temporariness engenders precarity, trauma and violence across time. Their testimonies portray crucial turning-points—transitions, triggered by the recognition that one's seemingly temporary state of wandering has become permanent. This knowledge serves as a form of resistance and subversion, driving that re-positioning of the self in relation to one's predicament and the world. Such a release changes the role of the observer and thus, directs the lens away from that which is considered exceptional onto the 'cracks' in the status quo—the configuration of states and citizenships. It allows for a move against the waiting for a resolution from a world that excludes, and its imposed suspension of existence 'in the meantime', towards a resolution on one's own terms.

Each of the three ancient contexts in dialogue with the Catalyst contributors provide an opportunity to consider stages that relate to such turning-points, the potential of their outcomes to subvert the condition, as well as to allow for challenge and the emergence of alternatives to the status quo. *Medea* encapsulates the individual character at the pinnacle of such a moment of turning within herself, on the realisation that no change will come from the outside. Xenophon's reflections present the build up towards multiple turning

points within a collective struggle, which result in intermittent, everyday subversions of the wandering state that, despite it, allow for ways of being political. In the case of the wandering philosophers and that of Diogenes the Cynic in particular, the focus shifts to the nature of existence that follows such a turning-point, depicting modes of repositioning that critique polis-society and advocate for cosmopolitan ideals.

Bringing the world of ancient wandering into the context of the 21st century, and vice versa, is not to draw comparison across the chronological distance as much as to allow for strange clashes to emerge.[5] In working across any historical divide, there are necessarily limitations. The nature of the ancient sources from this early period means that the experience of wandering is largely mediated through an elite male (re-)envisioning of it,[6] and it will not be possible within the scope of this paper to address the full richness of the evidence concerning such issues as gender and class.[7] But, these narratives, in combination with our fragmentary historical sources,[8] do allow for a perspective of the condition beyond the protagonists themselves that not only give insight into the realities of destitution and precarity but also into the forms of their overcoming. Furthermore, whether presented as first-hand historical experience and testimony, or from the realm of myth and fiction, there had to be authenticity to the sentiments expressed for ancient audiences to relate to these works. The voices presented do not speak for all, but in their diverse perspectives as individuals and groups, they give insight into what is conceivable within and beyond such states of endurance.

Concerning the relation of this material to the present day, there is no equivalent historical testimony from the ancient world to that of the contemporary figure of the refugee, nor are there spaces comparable to the intergenerational refugee camps of today, as I came to realise through investigations on hospitality and agency in displacement (Isayev 2017b, 2018). This does not mean that we should not draw on ancient sources, but rather that the scope of our categories needs to be flexible and that they have their limits. The sections that follow in Part 1 will provide a setting for modes of understanding the experience that underlies the terminology, both historic and current, before proceeding to engage these in dialogue in Part 2 to expose the possibilities for challenge and subversion of the condition/s they represent. Part 1 will first address the disparity and convergences of outcast time and its spaces, zeroing in on the im/possibility of home and futures between non-arrival and non-return, before a more detailed discussion of the emergence of terminologies of wandering and permanent temporariness.

Part I

2. Outcast Time and Its Spaces

Today, for many forcibly displaced people, the condition of permanent temporariness ensues from the convergent necessity of a movement out-of and the impossibility of a movement in-to any place. The resulting short-term strategies of marginalisation and containment, such as the refugee camp—constructed with the anticipation of its rapid cessation—have increasingly become a regime of precarity and exclusion stretching into perpetuity. The situation exposes an immediate divergence between the chronological settings of antiquity and today. In the ancient world, barring the place one was exiled from, rarely was it impossible to physically move into a place, nor were there spatiotemporal containers equivalent to today's camps. While other sociopolitical boundaries existed, there were no bordering regimes of the kind engineered by today's territorially bounded nation-states. This critical difference of territoriality, as the basis for determining citizenship, rights and protection was a fundamental point already addressed by Arendt (1943) when considering the predicament of refugees of the past and in our own time, and which Gray (2018) reflects on in this volume. In the ancient world, space, citizenship and belonging were more relationally conceived (Isayev 2017a). Circumscribed territory that could be mapped as absolute space was primarily reserved for private holdings. The ancient cities may have had walls but they did not act as physical barriers to civilian movement in

times of peace as national borders do today. Neither did they encompass all the land that was used by the community of that city-state—*polis*. Unlike today, therefore, the space of exclusion was much smaller than that of possible inclusion. The exception was if a person committed such a heinous blood crime that s/he was hounded and prevented from sheltering in any community. Another key distinction is that one of the biggest drivers of displacement in these past societies was enslavement. A phenomenon that is situated differently within societal structures to that of modern slavery, incarceration and detention, which would require its own in-depth investigation and that is beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, the focus here will be more narrowly on the experience of (free) people who were forcibly displaced due to exile or expulsion rather than enslavement. It is such social borders, as those between slave and free or citizen and non-citizen, which were most difficult to cross, rather than those that were delimited in space.

Ancient land that comes closest to being imbued with that almost magical property of the nation-state belonged to the sanctuaries of the gods.[9] These religious sites were inviolable, and hence those seeking asylum could find brief reprieve there under divine protection. Our most extensive depictions of how they operated appear in Greek tragedies, such as Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women* and Euripides' *Children of Heracles*, who cast their suppliant protagonists—primarily women and children[10]—not as pitiful victims but in defiant roles with strong voices. The tragedians chose the predicament of those who are displaced as sites of discourse on sovereignty and the balance of power between the *demos* (people) and their leaders.[11] What we know of historical seekers of asylum at sanctuaries, is that their stays were short, as such sites had little capacity to hold large groups of people awaiting a response to pleas for asylum (Isayev 2017b, 2018). Decisions were made quickly either to host or not. A negative decision could lead to death, enslavement, dispersal or a moving on to try pleading at the threshold of another community. However, we hear of few instances where groups ended up in such protracted conditions for extended periods of time, even if a return to their place of origin may have not been possible.[12] The circumstances within these sanctuaries were not such as to engender the kind of states of forced immobility as are prevalent most extremely in today's detention centres and camps.

The different spatialities mean that ancient exiles, unlike refugees and asylum seekers today, had more opportunities for finding refuge elsewhere and avoiding the extremes of privation. This is despite the fact that ongoing barriers to becoming full members of a community may have remained and thus the accompanying limitations on modes of inhabiting and continuing precarity. There were constraints on how the city itself was used, and restrictions, for example, on non-citizens entering such public arenas as the Agora. While the extent to which this would have been enforced is questionable, it shows that there were attempts for space to be reserved for the inner group of civic members (Gottesman 2014, pp. 26–43). The better known status of the *metic* in Athens, which was held by a substantial portion of its population, designated those who were resident aliens, but without citizenship and without the right of land ownership. It provided certain privileges to adult male *metics*, yet still meant perpetual instability due to exclusion from full rights and protection.[13] Such constraints on membership and inclusion contributed to the disorientation and de-centering associated with ancient wandering, meaning that finding other places to inhabit did not necessarily bring reprieve to the loss of home and a sense of belonging.[14] Wandering in ancient narratives is applied, therefore, not only to describe the state of those who are constantly on the move, but also to those living in one place—a host-city for example—but who have not yet arrived at, or returned to, a state of settledness and belonging. In this sense, we may find affinities in the way that permanent temporariness can also be used to capture both of these states, but with a stark difference. We struggle to find in the ancient context the kind of spatial constraint and suspension of movement, which create a uniquely devastating state of in-betweenness for those forced to endure today's regime of permanent temporariness.

In-Betweenness

Many have pointed to the hypocrisy of a system that does not allow for spaces and existence to be defined outside the confined units of the nation-state, while complicit and fully aware of millions of people whose lives are made in-between. The sculptural work *Stateless Nation* by Hilal and Petti (2018, pp. 75–87)—consisting of a series of Palestinian passports, each several metres high, situated in-between the National Pavilions of the 2003 Venice Biennale—encapsulates this in-betweenness, while questioning the liminality of those having to endure it. In capturing this state, the artists further articulate the possibilities for its rejection: "To the regime of "temporariness" (the condition of spatial and temporal transience in the camps), we never opposed a project of permanence or citizenship. We chose instead to embrace destabilization," (Hilal and Petti 2018, p. 42). To embrace and to operationalise a condition that is meant to debilitate is a form of its rejection. The in-betweenness itself can be made into more than an absence of settledness. To this we can add the challenge that Gabiam and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2017, p. 732) pose to the dichotomy between homeland and host-state. In their research on Palestinian spaces of activism and uprising, they trace the way such spaces—as Palestinian refugee camps, Arab host-states and Arab countries—become part of broader Palestinian identity: "because Palestinianness is shaped not only through attachment to place, but also through particular experiences that are associated with Palestinian identity". The temporal in-betweenness is an aspect of this particular identity-shaping experience—a striving to find a mode of living in the 'meantime'—a 'meantime' that can take over a whole lifetime, or even several life-times, becoming a perpetual deferral in a kind of suspended present, which can stretch from one generation to the next.[15] It creates an existence seemingly beyond history, where histories are nationally defined, while futures constantly recede. But, how to resist the denial of presence in the now, the past and future? This is a question that we will return to time and again in the second part of this paper. The investigations of the poet Yousif M. Qasmiyeh (2019b) address this from within the extremes of this condition—the way it infuses and disorients to make one feel perpetually never present, never there. Perhaps most explicitly in the final stanza of his poem, *Time,* published in this volume:

> Where is time?
> And what happened to the wind to take them with her
> Where is time at this time?
> When it remains
> When it dies
> When it does not return even after a while
> Listen
> (They listen)
> Listen to what is coming
> Beyond what is called silence
> Listen
> (They listen)
> Let time go back to where it was
> The journey shall begin.

And in the opening, introducing *At the Feast of Asylum* (Qasmiyeh 2016b):

> "[Man] is the being who has to grasp his being" (Levinas 2000, p. 25). But what or who do refugees, or placeless people, grasp? When within what is now deemed normality, their bodies lie bare and afloat only to announce their coming but never their presence. From afar, they might think of time, a place, and above all

gods, not knowing whether it is time for them to ascend, descend, or stay still. In the end, they never arrive.

For clarity's sake, I talk on behalf of no one, let alone myself, my brothers-in-asylum and my only mother. Here, a stone's throw away, languages, or murmurs, are a mere coincidence and so are faces (more or less). They meet (or even contest one another) to claim the body, the body that is "a swelling" (Nancy 2013, p. 29).

In these fragments, asylum, refugeeness, nonarrival, my mother, her cracked heels in particular, death, time and the body march together, notwithstanding with heavy feet, toward one thing: "the shadow of the place".

Between Non-Return and Non-Arrival

In-betweenness, which we will see is distinct from experiences of de-centering, takes a different form in the ancient world. Its topographies of wandering are inevitably shaped by its particular geo-political system. The only kind of person whose presence in an ancient state could be classed as being 'illegal' in peacetime is one who had been specifically exiled from it, usually by decree, as, for example, Xenophon. As such, in the ancient context, it was primarily the exile's home-state that perpetrated the individual's ongoing condition of wandering by preventing the possibility of return. It is this fact of the displacement being forced that is of importance for the purposes of this investigation, rather than its specific triggers, which differ significantly across the cases considered here and which are beyond the scope of the paper. From the surviving evidence, we know most about circumstances relating to exile and civic discord that forces opponents to leave and hope for a more stable moment in which to return, often petitioning from abroad.[16] Such a collective expulsion can lead to what have been termed *poleis*-in exile, as we will see below. An arrival at another city, even inclusion in its community, however, was not necessarily enough for wandering to be brought to an end. Even if one was no longer technically on a journey or stateless, in the absence of return, the exile continued. Medea's situation, as that of Xenophon's mercenaries, exposes a particularly complex relationship between their wandering state and their home. The focal-point of their suffering is that of *non-return*, a fixation on what is being moved away from—as in Xenophon's unreachable home—rather than the host destination.[17]

In current contexts of displacement, we would ask then: has the point of focus shifted to *non-arrival*? For the millions of men, women and children who continue to be forcibly displaced in the 21st century, by wars, discriminatory ideologies and climate change, a state of wandering—including forced immobility—continues, not only due to the inability to return, but the inability to find anywhere that is more than a refuge from imminent violence or death. The survival experience of individuals who, seeking asylum, were taken to Moria Refugee Camp on arrival in Lesvos, shows that these sites may not even be a haven from such physical threat.[18] Where reluctant asylum is given, also outside refugee camps, it is often limited and temporary, focusing on the necessities of bodily survival, with little prospect of a meaningful life beyond it. Instead it places restrictions on making one's own livelihood, thus enforcing states of dependence, which are resisted. This is despite the awareness that possibilities for return are either non-existent or will be a long time coming. Still, there are crucial instances where the site of origin that is unreachable remains the focus of responsibility. The non-return endures as an unhealable trauma for the expelled Palestinian people, who have now for generations continued to lobby and fight for the right to return. Qasmiyeh (2014) provides an approach to this experience at eye-level in *Thresholds*: [19]

'Non-arrival—after Derrida'

The moment I arrive, I want to come back. I never knew why reaching a place has always meant the end of my place. Whether I walk, travel by bus or train, or fly, I would only be there to mark the occasion of coming back. Non-arrival, I suppose, can also be another occasion.

The discourses of non-return and non-arrival converge in the Camp, a temporary solution whose ending seems impossible to foresee. It is especially acute for people in camps who have been forcibly disenfranchised and/or have no country of origin. The Camp is absent, for example, in the UNHCR durable solutions to refugee status: repatriation, resettlement and local integration (Black and Koser 1999; Turner 2016, p. 142). This is particularly incongruous in relation to the case of Palestinian refugees, for whom, as Ramadan (2013, p. 66) articulates, these traditional solutions are inaccessible.[20] Whether striving for a return or arrival, as these are persistently deferred and the confidence in them recedes, so permanent temporariness takes hold. A perseverance that allows strength and meaning of belonging to exist within such a condition comes with a necessary reformulating of home and return. Hilal and Petti (2018, pp. 44–45), from their experience of Refugee Camps in Palestine, outline the mechanisms of this in their discourse with practitioners and educators in Bahia, Brazil, during their joint project *The Tree School*, which began in 2015:

> Petti: "There isn't a single return, but many possible returns. Our task is to reopen the imagination on how returns could take place. It should not be understood as a messianic event, but rather as a multiplication of acts of profanation of borders and separations . . . .it is about, for example, a series of gestures that carry in themselves the meaning of free and self-determined acts . . . "

> Hilal: "In Bahia they told us: 'Every time I plant a baobab in Brazil, I feel like I'm going back to Africa'. Thresholds are necessary for identification. Borders mark differences and safeguard one's own identity and story, but the threshold is a mobile space to inhabit together while inventing rules and codes".

In their reconfiguration of the return there is also a reimagining of the future, which allows for it to be brought within grasp, breaking free of its hegemonic hold by outside powers. In response to Weizman's observation about battling against a receding future, and the immediacy of their built architectural creations, Petti provides the following reflection on futural discourse (Hilal and Petti 2018, pp. 141–42):

> "I'm against this discourse about the future, because we've found a much more effective way to think political transformation than messianic Marxism. We understood decolonization as an endless struggle, one that is happening right now, right here. There are already fragments of futures in the present. You imagine something, and at the same time live it. It is liberating to understand political transformation without being trapped in the idea that one day everything will be solved and we will all live happily. The work that we have been doing in refugee camps is already the future; it is already something that deals with people that live outside the nation state. Working within and against the condition of permanent temporariness means opposing two fronts at the same time: the perpetuation of the status quo, that imposes an unbearable condition of precarity on people, and normalization, trying to put all the broken pieces of the nation state back into its box".

The possible extent of such reimagining of futures and return, whether as splintered and embedded in multiple daily acts, or through other modes of being, is what we will probe by drawing on the ancient discourse of wandering.

3. Terminological Contexts
Wandering

The settings between ancient and modern described above, attempt to expose the nature of the condition that is encapsulated in the terms of 'wandering' and 'permanent temporariness', neither of which are stable. Their meanings change over time, and depending on context, the condition they describe has affinities with others, captured by terms such as exile, expulsion, *apolis* (without polis-city, community), *atimia* (without society,

disenfranchised),[21] statelessness, liminality, precarity, displacement and de-placement.[22] In ancient Greek, wandering is most commonly expressed by *planaomai* and *alaomai*, and in Latin by *errare*. The Latin puts greater emphasis on a movement that errs, that is, misses the mark. Still, of the variety of ways that wandering has been understood in ancient contexts, at its core is a movement outward, or away from, which is ongoing and divergent.[23] It is not only physical but can also refer to a physical and a mental state—as in wandering of the mind or madness. Key to understanding the position of wandering in society, and the importance of the outcast's gaze in the ancient Greek context, which will be the main focus of this study, are the works of Montiglio (2005), *Wandering in Ancient Greek Culture*, Garland (2014), *Wandering Greeks*, as well as Gray's (2015) embedding of exilic discourse within his exploration of *Stasis and Stability*. They demonstrate the wide range of causes that could lead to a wandering state, historical and imagined: crime, ideological or political confrontation, civic unrest, threats to personal well-being or externally triggered conquest and destruction of one's place of home.

More generally in ancient contexts, wandering is associated with disorientation, de-centering, unsettledness and non-belonging, which affects a subject who is simultaneously the actor and the one being acted upon. The potential for agency persists, and with it the possibility for challenging one's state from within. This is especially evident in Greek writings, which express wandering in the middle passive voice, thus allowing for agency to remain ambiguous and multiple (Montiglio 2005, p. 26). This is materialised in the myth of Io, the maiden driven into seemingly ceaseless wandering by a gadfly, at the behest of jealous gods who turned her into a heifer. Io is presented as a figure of sympathy in Aeschylus's tragedy *Prometheus Bound* (562–95), and, just as many other wanderers of ancient narratives, she is used to embody the extremes of misery. But, she is not only that—rarely are wanderers depicted as mere pitiful victims. Rather, their predicament is used to explore possibilities for subversion from the margins of society, questioning their own marginality in the process. Aeschylus' dramatic exploration, just as Euripides' *Medea*, forms a critique of the world that compels these figures to their state in the first place. Diogenes the Cynic is to have famously rebuked the unsolicited pity of Alexander the Great by telling the great general to "move out of his light".[24] Ancient testimonies of such sociopolitical outcasts—as exiled philosophers, objectors, prophets or women refusing forced marriage—critique the world that compels these figures to their state in the first place. Their actions transform the sufferings of privation, humiliation and vulnerability into rallying calls for alternative forms of social existence.

Wandering has a particular role in the lives of ancient philosophers and to some extent also poets. It is associated with gaining knowledge, which for the infamous 4th century exiled philosopher Diogenes the Cynic, begins with a movement out.[25] For the Stoics and Neoplatonists (representing philosophical schools), wandering was an expression of the life journey with its unexpected turns, the *homo viator*—itinerant man—was central to their philosophies. Within Stoicism the journey of life is presented as an ongoing movement towards a destination, wisdom, whose nature is clear but which is, in practice, never reached and whose temporal end (death) has no special significance. While drawing on aspects of Cynicism, the Stoics did not glamorise homelessness and non-belonging as they were committed to engagement in family and community life, though combined with an independent, reflective perspective.[26] The Neoplatonists take a different approach in their perception of man being perpetually in transit on earth, as the true home is elsewhere. For them wandering is portrayed as paradoxically imbued with both helplessness and higher power simultaneously. By the time of the Roman Imperial period, the relations and tensions between polis and cosmos (the world/universe) find their expression in exile-writing. In this empire setting exilic language is harnessed to express issues of cultural identity—an era labelled the Second Sophistic (Johnston 2019; Whitmarsh 2001). Such exilic texts present different perspectives on the condition; novels such as the 3rd century CE romance *Aethiopica* convey less a spirit of cosmopolitanism than of disorientation, anxiety and flight (Montiglio 2005, pp. 223–26).

A sophisticated discourse has developed on the way ancient wandering and especially its key aspects of exclusion and privation are operationalised or misused. For the ancient wandering philosopher, it was not only the mobility itself, or rather the separation from home, that was important for reaching profound knowledge and understanding, but also the ability to endure hardship, privation and exclusion, which become almost a precondition for the role. Such experience is believed to afford a perspective that can only be achieved from the outside, both physically and outside of protection and membership, thus giving weight and authenticity to their expounded philosophies and societal critique. Well into Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, phases of wandering and poverty, often forced, continued to be perceived as essential experiences for bishops, monks and other clergy.[27] To present these observations here in the context of hosts and readers who today may be experiencing the severity and extremes that such a condition brings is in no way to negate the reality of that lived experience. It is by no means to indulge a wandering state, but to recognise that such a framing, as we will see, has arisen as a form of resistance itself by displaced people who were also philosophers and poets.

Qasmiyeh's 21st century poetic voice is of a world carved out in crucially different ways to that of the ancient philosopher. What Qasmiyeh's methods share with this ancient figure is in the way their perspective becomes a kind of subversion by consciously reversing the lens so as to have the outcast in the role of the observer rather than the observed, as here presented from the collection *Thresholds* (Qasmiyeh 2014).

'Anthropologists'

1. I know some of them. Some of them are friends but the majority are enemies. Upon the doorstep you observe what they observe with a lot of care. You look at them the way they look at you, curiously and obliquely. You suddenly develop a fear of imitating them whilst they imitate you. You worry about relapsing into one of your minds while sharing mundane details with them. Sometimes I dream of devouring all of them, and just once with no witnesses or written testimonies.
2. All of us wanted to greet her. Even my illiterate mother who never spoke a word of English said: Welcome! After spending hours with us, in the same room, she left with a jar of homemade pickles and three full cassettes with our voices.

Subversion comes from owning one's state without accepting it. The exiled philosopher is the historical figure who most directly confronts, even critically embraces his condition. In his predicament, wandering is instrumentalised to make bare the cracks within society, to challenge its myth-making and to become a proposition for alternative ways of being. Charted across diverse treatises (and audio cassettes), the outcast voice seeks to convey the experience beyond mere physical privation that such a wandering state engenders.[28] Through murmurs, bold speech and screams—impossible to unhear—it lays bare the effects on the de-centred body in space, the difficulty of its presencing, the suspension of time, and with it, of home and the future itself. In its reverberation, the voice reveals itself as belonging to one who is not separate from, but of the world, which attempts to exclude and silence.

Permanent Temporariness

Wandering is a term that is rarely used today by people in reference to their own displacement, nor by those who consider themselves external to it, to describe the condition of others. Perhaps it is too romanticising for the visceral and painful experience of forced migration and flight[29], or is it that such a term conveys unceasing movement and restlessness that drives it, while people who are displaced today are often forced into immobility. This forced sedentism is not just due to the suspension of a functional civic status, but physical confinement within boundaries—either of nation-states, camps

or detention centres. Such lives have been increasingly designated as being in a state of permanent temporariness, as indicated by the recent use of this term (as recent as a decade ago), in relation to people who have been forcibly displaced. Therefore, I include here a brief summary of the trajectory of its application and its elaboration in English language publications over the last decades.

Initially, in scholarly literature, the term was not applied to articulate the experience of people who are forcibly displaced but to that of migrant workers. Designating their condition as one of permanent temporariness allowed scholars to highlight the unsettled-ness and precarity of their lives, disciplined by temporary contracts, which may not be renewed.[30] The use of such terminology is intended as a critique of employment conditions that are favourable to the State, which profits from a productive sector of its inhabitants to whom it does not owe equal rights, benefits or protection, resulting in a regime designed to limit their inclusion in the host society. The condition for such migrant workers, often on low-pay, most of which is sent home as remittance, means that their real lives and futures are still to be lived 'elsewhere', while their present is a transient moment before a return. The 'moment' however, extends across a whole lifetime. This combination of being static and the controlling power of a temporary status is what Bailey and others term 'permanent temporariness', in reference to Salvadoran temporary migrants in the US.[31] Their study, importantly, also reveals strategies of resistance to temporality's disciplining power over bodies, families and the social field, which include: visibility and pursuing forms of permanence beyond those denied by the host-state through education, marriage and a refusal to leave. These mechanisms are also foregrounded in other studies that investigate the condition in the context of migrant workers, including those that become internally marginalised.[32]

There is a wide spectrum of difference between the situation of migrant workers and people who are forcibly displaced, especially people whose displacement is in refugee camps. One is about non-inclusion in a society while having the free will to return, while the other is about severely compromised mobility and the impossibility of return. Where there are convergences, both within the diverse groups of migrant workers and between them and people who are forcibly displaced, is a shared unsettledness and ongoing precarity, enforced by regimes that keep lives in a state of suspension and in-betweenness. The term 'permanent temporariness', by capturing these aspects of the condition, has come to be increasingly used to articulate the experience of those who have been exiled and forcibly displaced.[33] Whether it is endured in host-communities, which continuously delay decisions on status and membership with an impending risk of deportation, or in camps from one generation to the next, it describes the condition of people whose recourse to temporary solutions in a moment of crisis have been enforced as permanent states of being. Displacement has led to de-placement. Qasmiyeh's (2019a) writings reveal the incomprehensibility of what such a state entails in relation to refugee camps, in *There it is: the camp that is yet to be born*:

> Find me a place whose meaning is that of its absence.
> Find me a place where nothing is not exactly nothing but its equivalent.

The severed anticipation of a return or incorporation into a host-society has resulted in a group of people who are deemed to be seemingly beyond incorporation. It is in reference to such exclusion that we find some of the earliest uses of the term in the context of displacement, as for example by Yiftachel (2009, pp. 343–44) in his analysis of the marginalisation of the Bedouins in the Negev of Palestine/Israel. Increasingly, it has been employed in relation to multi-generational displacement contexts and especially refugee camps.[34] A critical discourse has developed around the conceptualisation of the condition that is increasingly referred to as permanent temporariness—characterised by alienation, non-belonging and the endless postponement of justice and equality, along with everyday struggles that result from job precarity and lack of access to public services. To recognise

this is not to relegate lives under such circumstances to indefinite liminality or to a state of suspension in a temporal stagnation.[35] Applied to more specific circumstances, the issue, as articulated by Ramsay (2017, p. 517) is that "approaching the displacement of refugees uncritically as a liminal condition implies a linearity of experience whereby resettlement, by virtue of providing refugees with a recognized national identity, then resolves the 'problem' of their displacement".[36] Although the protraction of life in displacement means that daily lives are unable to be directed towards a predictable future, still as Ramadan, among others, has shown, "the lives of refugees are not totalistically reducible to the times and spaces of the present tense" (Ramadan 2013; Ramsay 2017, p. 518). Rather, it is precisely the hardship that persists as part of the daily rhythm, and the recognition of its presence, that motivates new future imaginaries.[37] These allow people to work towards futures other than those subscribed to by nation-state actors, or the limiting solutions of humanitarian regimes.[38]

These critical observations are dependent on knowledge shared by those who have direct experience of challenging and living beyond such limiting solutions of external regimes. Shared through multiple acts, including that of poetry and the artistic practice of Hilal and Petti, which is dedicated to exposing the condition from within the refugee camp. Here, I draw directly on their statements and their Catalyst contribution for this volume, which forms part of a wider work on *Permanent Temporariness* (an excerpt from which introduces this chapter).[39] Emerging in the 2000s, from what came to be known as DAAR (De-colonising Architecture), their earliest interventions are explorations and actions "within and against the condition of permanent temporariness that permeates contemporary forms of life" (Hilal and Petti 2018, back-cover). One such work is the life-size Concrete Tent positioned in the liminal space of the Dheisheh refugee Camp in the West Bank, Palestine. It is one of the sites where the conversations leading up to this chapter began, when a group of us came together in 2015 to re-think place, heritage and belonging through ancient counter-cartographies.[40] In reflecting on the creation of the Concrete Tent, Petti states that "permanent temporariness is a critique of the actual condition, but also the physical and conceptual terrain from which to challenge the status quo by opposing both normalization (becoming a citizen) and the perpetuation of temporariness (remaining refugees)" (Hilal and Petti 2018, p. 60).

Through this and other works they counter the perceived uniqueness of the refugee camps in the Palestinian context and the association of such conditions primarily with refugees. While they emphatically point to the disempowered condition of exile, they also expose how the experience of the camp shapes both inhabitants, the ones inside and those outside the camp: "Our task for the future is to understand the camp not as an isolated condition, but as an extreme manifestation of a form of government—of temporariness—now being extended across the globe".[41] Repositioning the camp in relation to the world, therefore, creates a continuum between the diverse ways that lives are lived; it also refuses to negate time under such conditions as life, and for it to be seen only as suspension (Hilal and Petti 2018, concepts—exile):

> Rather than being in a constant state of postponement—delaying action until a particular time has come—exile can be mobilized as an operational tool to transgress borders and forced dislocation . . . a political community of exile is built around the common condition of non-belonging, of displacement from the familiar. As a political identity, exile opposes the status quo, confronts a dogmatic belief in the nation state, and refuses to normalize the permanent state of exception in which we live. Exile demands to be thought as a radical, new foundation for civic space.

Through their practice-based interventions they challenge dominant collective narratives. They re-appropriate the camp and its history, conceptually and practically, leading to the production of new political imaginaries and with them the formation of civic spaces.[42] The momentum of these actions encapsulates a transformative moment, in which a recog-

nition of one's condition is coupled with a refusal to succumb to its inevitabilities. It is this repositioning of the self which we go on to explore in the ancient discourse on wandering.

<div align="center">Part II</div>

4. Medea beyond Wandering

Of the many ancient myths that centre on wandering in the Greco-Roman canon, we open not with Homer's *Odyssey*,[43] nor Vergil's *Aeneid*,[44] but with the story of Medea and her exile in consequence of her aiding Jason and his companions, the Argonauts, in their quest for the Golden Fleece. The myth, already noted in Homer's *Odyssey* (12.70), exists in multiple versions that explore diverse episodes either during the return voyage of the Argo, their ship that set off from Iolcus, or the events that followed. Of the retellings that survive, the *Argonautica,* written by Apollonius of Rhodes in the 3rd century BC provides one of the most complete narratives of the voyage in four books.[45] Yet, it is Euripides' dramatisation of one episode in the wake of that journey, his tragedy, *Medea*, which has left the most deep and lasting impact over the millennia.[46] Despite being awarded 3rd place when it was first performed in Athens in 431 BC, it has had numerous revivals, imitations and representations, including Ennius' version of the play in the early 2nd century BC, *Medea Exul*, one of the earliest writings of the Latin corpus that still remain.[47] *Medea* has been read as an exploration of the wider experience of being a *phugas*-refugee (Kasimis 2020), and that of being a *metic* woman in 5th century BC Athens (Kennedy 2014, p. 49).[48] The ongoing popularity of the story may be due to the shocking and uncompromising version that Euripides created, which draws in the audience not only to behold but to viscerally experience the struggle for agency from within a position of victimhood.

The divergent trajectories of the myth's two main protagonists, Jason and Medea, provide an entry point for examining the way wandering and permanent temporariness interlink and diverge. The tragedy of *Medea* encapsulates the meaning of non-arrival, the effects of the ensuing intolerable condition and the endurance it demands. Yet it does more than reel from this state. It calls for it to be recognised and accepted, but without being surrendered to. This is what *Medea* takes as its challenge by claiming rights and demanding justice. Thus, by forcing the recognition that her state, and the severe acts of violence she is driven to, are of the world's making, she exposes the cracks in the status quo—the society which the audience of the tragedy inhabits. *Medea* disdains and pities those who give mere sympathy, while consigning her state to one of exception, without the possibility of incorporation, settledness, rights and protection. It may be surprising that Medea is presented as a character deserving our sympathy at all,[49] but not if we recognise the tragedy's appeal to understanding the right of her claims and severe acts, from within the constraints of her condition, brought on by the self-serving interests and ambitions of gods and men.

Non-Arrival

Euripides' *Medea* centres on the protagonist in the wake of her estrangement from her Colchian home and family, following the return of the Argonauts to Greece, and now as Jason's wife recently arrived in Corinth.[50] It is here that Jason chooses to take another bride, the daughter of the Corinthian king Creon, thus spurring on the action of the play. Although the characters are all members of elite royal households, their predicament crosses class lines, which are not in themselves given attention by the playwright. The ancient audience would know Medea's condition was the result of divine intervention, forcing her to fall in love with Jason while she was still a maiden, which leads her to defy her father, murder her brother and commit further blood-crimes in aid of helping Jason to gain the Golden Fleece and power. Acts, which despite their violence and uncompromising horror, are portrayed as being driven by gods and men *through* Medea, rather than *by* her, making her, too, their victim deserving pity. Still, she later owns them as fatal errors that have left her *apolis*—without community.[51] Any prospect of a new home recedes as

Jason's promise of marriage and protection are a long time coming, and eventually broken. Euripides' Medea asserts she was carried off as booty (*Medea* 253–58). Both of the main characters are on journeys, some of which intertwine. Yet, Jason's wandering with the Argonauts, despite the obstacles, has a foreseen trajectory for return in a way that Medea's cannot. Her coming to Greece is a non-arrival. While she continues to move from one community to another, neither settledness nor inclusion or protection are available to her. At times she is able to find a haven and habitation, but not a home. A combination of a lack of home and the threat of ensuing helplessness is captured by the play's Chorus of Corinthian women, in their fear of such a state of absence (Euripides, *Medea* 642–54):

> "O fatherland, O house, may I never be bereft of my city, never have a life of helplessness, a cruel life, most pitiable of woes! In death, O in death may I be brought low ere that, bringing my life's daylight to an end! Of troubles none is greater than to be robbed of one's native land".

Medea's condition is characterised by moments of hope and brief pause before she again finds herself in a state of wandering, which becomes perpetual. Even when Jason is in need of refuge, which he and Medea seek together in Corinth, he is not presented as an outcast. This is not only because within the logic of the myth Jason is Greek while Medea is barbarian, but as Euripides' play reveals, her condition is also due to the societal constraints of her sex.[52] It increasingly becomes questionable which terminology is appropriate to express her state beyond wandering, as it is neither wholly that of anti-hero nor victim.

As scholars have recognized, it is notable that Euripides' framing of Medea is in the familiar terms of honour (τιμή-*timé*), resolve and action—even if subverted—which are usually reserved for Greek male heroes. For the tragedian Sophocles, the heroic characters such as Achilles and Ajax encapsulate its meaning.[53] Medea is furthermore consistently characterised as clever, even by her enemies, but not in the guise of some foreign barbarian sorceress.[54] In the opening scene of the tragedy the nurse, the first to speak, presents Medea as "an exile loved by the citizens to whose land she had come, and lending to Jason himself all her support" (Euripides, *Medea* 13–15).[55] In Euripides play it is only Jason who refers to Medea as barbarian, negating her agency by assigning her actions to a woman scorned, neither acknowledging what she has done for him, nor taking any responsibility for his own role as oath-breaker. Rather, Jason dares to present as an act of generosity, his persuasion of Creon to allow Medea to remain in Corinth, while he takes the king's daughter as a new bride. In an act of twisted logic Jason tries to position himself as a model Greek upholding the laws: "you now live among Greeks and not barbarians, and you understand justice and the rule of law, with no concession to force" (Euripides, *Medea* 536–40). Yet the women of the Chorus, although Corinthians, do not subscribe to such a characterisation. Instead, they sympathise with Medea's wronged state, acknowledging the inability (or unwillingness), of those in power to bring about change.[56] They are accepting of her judgement of Jason and reasons for her decision to act, if not the culminating violent deeds themselves.[57]

Claiming Rights

The tragic action that engulfs Euripides' play is triggered by Jason's primary act of betrayal—the taking of a new bride in Corinth. For Medea, Jason's broken oath and with it the collusion of Corinth's royal house, which sends her into further exile (Euripides *Medea*, 70–73), confirms that she can no longer hope for others to act faithfully, nor for the dishonour and injustices wrought upon her to be addressed. In the context of the play, we would not expect a direct reference to rights and citizenship, the possibilities and meanings of which are discussed more directly by Gray (2018) in this volume. Still, there is engagement in the tragedy with the wider discourse of justice and with what today may be referred to as claiming rights, through her appeals to promises made by oath (Euripides, *Medea* 17–25):[58]

> "Poor Medea, finding herself thus dishonoured, calls loudly on his oaths, invokes the mighty assurance of his sworn right hand, and calls the gods to witness the unjust return she is getting from Jason".

Claiming rights, as articulated by Isin and Nielsen, entails 'responsibilizing' the self, that is, making oneself responsible for, and capable of, taking action.[59] It is this that we can ascribe to Medea who both recognises and challenges the societal limits forced upon her as a woman and an outsider, with no home to return to for protection and under threat of imminent exile. In her powerful speech to the Corinthian women's Chorus on the position of their sex in society, she emphasises their differences, despite their shared experiences of existing in a male dominated sphere (Euripides, *Medea* 253–58):

> " . . . your story and mine are not the same: you have a city and a father's house, the enjoyment of life and the company of friends, while I, without relatives or city, am suffering outrage from my husband. I was carried off as booty from a foreign land and have no mother, no brother, no kinsman to shelter me from this calamity".

Medea's recognition that no external forces will bring a change to her state is a juncture that forces a turning within herself and reliance on her own devices. Euripides presents her as choosing allies, negotiating and dictating terms in the way she supplicates Aegeus the king of Athens, who swears an oath to give her protection, although prior to knowing the severity of her predicament (Euripides, *Medea* 708–60).[60] Most tragically, the Medea of Euripides resigns herself to committing irreparable acts that bring new agony to Jason and herself. Her grief-stricken murders lead not only to the death of Jason's new bride, by the gift of poisoned robes which consume Creon as well, but in this tragic account also to Medea's reluctant killing of her children.[61] Yet it is not out of blind rage that her revenge is formulated. Euripides chose to capture the searing pain that leads to Medea's resolve in carrying out her plan through a monologue that presents a divided self, voicing the impossibility of a continued existence within such constraints and the consequences of their rupture. The play ends with Medea triumphant in the chariot of her grandfather, the sun-god Helios, in the role of *deus ex-machina*—god from the machine, a dramatic technique reserved for a divine entrance that puts a stop to the action on stage.[62] Her final lines to Jason are the closest there is to an expression of hope for some justice, though in the hands of gods not men: "What god or power above will listen to you, who broke your oath and deceived a stranger?" (Euripides, *Medea* 1391–92). Medea's refusal to succumb to the inevitable conclusion of living in an oppressed state does not come with the illusion that there will be reprieve or a transformation of the system within which she exists. Her condition is instead used by Euripides to expose the cracks in society. The venerated polis-society of his own day, encapsulated in the Greek Corinth of the tragedy, he reveals not as the epitome of civilisation—which Jason contrasts with Medea's estranged barbarian homeland—but as corrupt and oppressive.[63]

Reversing the Lens

Through the eyes of an outcast, Euripides' *Medea* unsettles the world that positions itself as the norm. It has captured imaginations through centuries, not least because of the conflicting sympathies that its anti-hero engenders. A woman scorned seeking revenge is but a superficial reading of the forces at play that drive the actions of such a character as Medea. Building on the more sympathetic reactions to these tragedies of an exiled outsider, perpetually rejected, are the feminist readings from the twentieth century onwards. These emphasise her determination to make home and take control of a life that seems no longer her own; they show how her actions subvert and critique the status quo of a patriarchal society.[64] Agamben, in his challenging work, *Homo Sacer*, articulates such a position in relation to modern refugees, who "represent such a disquieting element

in the order of the modern nation-state . . . above all because by breaking the continuity between man and citizen, *nativity* and *nationality,* they put the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis," (Agamben [1995] 1998, p. 131). Looking through the lens of exile and refugeehood unsettles the status quo, as Bashir and Goldberg (2014, p. 92) note in their work on Israel/Palestine: "An empathetic view of the refugee disrupts the validity of the foundations of the political order that created her in the first place and now abandons her to her fate". In particular, the existence of the refugee camp and lives lived within it, act as a magnifying glass for the global forces of social change. Its role is akin to what Sassen refers to as the 'systemic edge': "the extreme character of conditions at the edge makes visible larger trends that are less extreme and hence more difficult to capture" (Sassen 2014, p. 211).[65] This interdependence between one who is expelled and the other who is incorporated, which we will return to towards the end of the paper, is foregrounded by Qasmiyeh. Cracks appear in his poetry, and explicitly in these excerpts from *In mourning the refugee, we mourn God's intention in the absolute* (Qasmiyeh 2018):

> How can there be a camp apropos a world?
>
> We repeat the repeated so we can see our features more clearly, the face as it is, the cracks in their transcendental rawness and for once we might consent to what we will never see.
>
> . . .
>
> The eternal in the camp is the crack. "The crack also invites".

The essential role of the outsider in making the inside visible and coherent, has been increasingly highlighted in critical investigations.[66] Yet, Qasmiyeh takes this further, in his words introducing the poem, *The Jungle*, he reveals the continuum that brings into question the inside–outside dichotomy itself (Qasmiyeh 2016a):

> As we write about the Self, the image of the refugee always floats nearby. It floats palpably and metonymically, as both its own entity and marker. At this moment in time, the refugee has become the conceit of bare survival, the naked survivor whose corpus is no longer a corpus, but its non-elliptical sacrifice. Thus, in writing alone, the refugee can stare at his body (properly) as it disintegrates only to record his own fading and the world's.

The camp is more than an exposition of the fissures in the status quo, it is also a mode of challenge and a reaching to alternative futures beyond it (Hilal and Petti 2018, p. 52):

> A great lesson in this sense can be learned from refugee camps, in opposing permanency while at the same time creating a space for a life in common, one that exists beyond the idea of a nation state. These are not utopian places, but places of endless struggle for justice and equality. The very existence of Palestinian camps is a reminder of the violent power of exclusion inherent within, and an existential threat to, nation states. It is a crack in the regime that shows both its limitations and its possible overcoming.

The limitations of the regime signal others inherent within the system of sovereign states, beyond refugeehood. Some of these are addressed by Greene (2018) in his scrutiny of permanent states of emergency, and the extent to which state power can be constrained by law. Within Euripides' *Medea*, we are confronted with the way society's cracks are exposed by the victims of the concessions it makes to a dysfunctional justice. Medea encapsulates a condition characterised by constant precarity, lacking a path into a different future within the constraints of a world-order she seemingly inhabits in a liminal way, and outside of its history. In this sense it perhaps comes closest to that of permanent temporariness. Although she endures her predicament, she does not accept it, but finds ways to act against

it, forcing the recognition of her state not as exceptional to the world-order, but part of its making.

5. Xenophon's *Anabasis* of Splintered Returns

The finality and starkness of the acts of resistance and challenge which engulf *Medea* are the prerogative of myth. In historical contexts, the means of endurance and overcoming are more elusive, multiple and protracted. We recognise them in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, a narrative of exile rather than refugeehood. Yet, it still speaks to refugeehood in the way that it exposes possible modes of politicalness beyond the polis-state, and in its recourse to splintered futures and returns. Such mechanisms are also recognisable in the experience of those enduring the condition of permanent temporariness. In his autobiographical narrative, Xenophon recounts the march of ten thousand mercenaries gathered by Cyrus the younger in 401 BC for what culminated in a failed campaign against the Persian Empire. Cyrus's death on campaign left his troops hundreds of miles into Persia, leaderless and purposeless. Xenophon, who was one of Cyrus's recruits, depicts, from personal experience, the men's condition on their long and tortuous wandering route homeward.[67] It should be noted that, although the focus is on the men, as in most narratives concerning mercenaries, these vast military groups often had extensive entourages that could incorporate not just servants and traders, but also entertainers, courtesans and the mercenaries' families.[68]

On the initial realisation of their desperate state, surrounded by enemies, abandoned by some of their number and without access to provisions or means by which to keep going (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.1), "[they] lay down wherever they each chanced to be, unable to sleep for grief and longing for their native states and parents, their wives and children, whom they thought they should never see again. Such was the state of mind in which they all lay down to rest". The initial succumbing to their state leads to ongoing debate of whether to find a means to stay where they are or to harness energies in seeking a return (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.2). In making decisions, they incrementally begin to resemble a polity as they proceed to carve out a route back, with assemblies, councils and elected leaders, with Xenophon among those chosen (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.2–3). This, they continue through their protracted state away from home—what we might refer to as unceasing collective strandedness. Xenophon also charts the underlying tensions resulting from diverse individual aspirations for life-trajectories, seeking to overcome a condition, which increasingly resembles that of permanent temporariness.

The stress on group identity in displacement is a key interest of the *Anabasis*, which brings into question the possible nature of polity 'in the meantime'. This is most poignantly expressed in an early speech put in the mouth of the Spartan leader Clearchus (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.3):

> "For I consider that you are to me both fatherland and friends and allies; with you I think I shall be honoured wherever I may be, bereft of you I do not think I shall be able either to aid a friend or to ward off a foe. Be sure, therefore, that wherever you go, I shall go also".

Their diverse practices extended into aspects of life beyond mere inner organisation, and affected external perception and recognition of them as a single body: they receive ambassadors and even organise games and processions.[69] Still, this was not a replacement for a home-polity but a means of reaching it. After months of wandering, forcing their way or negotiating for passage and provisions through desert and mountains of eastern Anatolia, a moment of hope comes as they catch sight of the Black Sea (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.7). It is not unlike the experience conveyed by storytellers of the mythical wandering Argonauts, that moment when all routes are visible and thoughts turn to home (Apollonius of Rhodes, *Argonautica* 2.541-6). At the sea, the mercenaries glimpse the possibility of a return, which fuses a common vision. Their joyous Greek cry of *Thalatta Thalatta*—The sea! The sea!—captures the energy to persevere towards all that is longed for just when it seems to be fading (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.7.24).[70] This powerful exhalation has made its way into

the works of writers over millennia, employed for emotional effect by the Romantics,[71] and subverted by those who, like Joyce, recognised the darker qualities of the moment intended by Xenophon.[72] It is not a reflection on false hope but rather a questioning of the attainability of the sought after homecoming. It is a challenge to the possibility of any single and definitive or—to borrow Petti's phrase—'messianic' moment of return (Hilal and Petti 2018, pp. 44–45).

The sought-after arrival comes in and out of focus throughout the *Anabasis*, at times appearing only as an illusion, testing the men's resolve to persevere. In part, this was due to the sheer necessity of provisions required to keep such a large group alive, while traversing the vast physical distance, across others' lands, where one's very presence signalled threat and aggression. Yet, beyond overcoming the needs of survival, there was a further obstacle to a return. These men may have had no welcome waiting at the longed-for place of home, as many of those on campaign were expelled from their native Greek cities. The exiles included the makeshift leaders themselves, such as the Spartan Clearchus (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.1, 2.6) and even the Athenian Xenophon (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 5.3.6-7). It is well known that exiles often made up the troops of the prolific mercenary armies of the 4th century BC. They were perceived not only as a threat by those they fought, but also by fellow compatriots in their home regions, with good reason.[73] This is captured a generation later by the Greek orator and rhetorician Isocrates, in his *Philippus* (346 BC), advising Philip to employ the roaming mercenaries to bring the Persian Empire to heel, and then by settling them in foreign land, thus also keeping them away from Greece:

> "If we do not stop these men from banding together, by providing sufficient livelihood for them, they will grow before we know it into so great a multitude as to be a terror no less to the Hellenes [Greeks] than to the barbarians. But we pay no heed to them; nay, we shut our eyes to the fact that a terrible menace which threatens us all alike is waxing day by day. It is therefore the duty of a man who is high-minded, who is a lover of Hellas, who has a broader vision than the rest of the world, to employ these bands in a war against the barbarians, to strip from that empire all the territory . . . to deliver these homeless wanderers from the ills by which they are afflicted and which they inflict upon others, to collect them into cities, and with these cities to fix the boundary of Hellas, making of them buffer states to shield us all".[74]

Such attitudes to mercenaries would have been familiar, and although there is little interest in them shown in the *Anabasis,* the notion of home is constantly scrutinised. Continuously there are halting pauses towards it to reconsider the best way to proceed, whether separately, jointly or alternatively cease seeking a route back altogether. At a poignant moment at Calpe Harbour, those with a determination for return even refused "to encamp on the spot which might become a city," (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 6.4) in case this would forever block their path homeward. Unlike in myths and tales of Odyssean *nostoi*—on the circuitous journeys home—for many of the men on the march, this was not the outcome. Instead, they continued in their state of wandering, interspersed with hopeful moments when they dared to project into future memory retellings of the expedition and heroic acts.[75] Yet, for many, these only added to the realisation of loss, becoming ungraspable opportunities for settlement or return.[76] If there is resolution in the *Anabasis*, at best it is splintered, as is made explicit in the final book of the narrative. It recounts how some mercenaries do manage to make their way back to their native cities, others find new places on the march to call home and settle, while many make the journey itself a kind of home on the move, especially those who go on to join other mercenary campaigns (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 7.2):

> "As for the troops, to return home was what they also desired. As time wore on, however, many of the soldiers either sold their arms up and down the country and set sail for home in any way they could, or else mingled with the people of

the neighbouring Greek cities. And Anaxibius was glad to hear the news that the army was breaking up; for he thought that if this process went on, Pharnabazus would be very greatly pleased".

Xenophon himself returned to Greece in 394 BC, continuing to fight as a mercenary under the Spartans, while still exiled from Athens. In his first-hand narration, he captures how such circumstances lead to a re-imagining of home, futures and the meaning of return, not as a celebratory moment of collective arrival, but through multiple and diverse acts of inhabiting.

Polity in Strandednesss

Through Xenophon's historical, if moralising, reflections, we witness wandering transition into a state of permanent temporariness. A singular common return that might have been the vision in the cry of *Thalatta Thalatta,* or the unity presented by Clearchus, is exposed as but an apparition. As Ma (2004, pp. 335–36) observes, in analysing the problematics of homecoming in the narrative, resolution and return are constantly deferred:

> "the whole story ends with no real escape, but only a starting over again. The *Anabasis* is about repetition: nested structures of obstacle and escape towards other obstacles. . . . the constant movement is corrosive of certainty; it subverts certainty about where one is going, except into a succession of trials where survival and loss are present in equal measure. . . . [For Xenophon himself] one escape from danger leads to another situation where return is impossible; one exile leads to another".

This summary captures the impact of an unceasing strandedness endured by Xenophon, the men on the march and, by extension, could potentially be applied to Medea. However, it allows no space for resistance to such a condition except seemingly an acceptance of the fate it brings with it. This, as we saw, is not the case in *Medea*, where the recognition (rather than acceptance) of such a state, allows for agency and subversion—even if that does not in itself bring reprieve. In Xenophon's *Anabasis*, we witness it in the way the mercenaries reform to re-create the *polis* through practice—they elect leaders, bring fellow soldiers to justice, hold assemblies and make collective decisions. It fits what has been referred to as the 'Nakonian'—non-territorial—conception of polis as a collection of people and practices (Gray 2015, pp. 372–73). Here may be a *polis* on the move that seeks to overcome the impossibility of its existence in a moment of transience, even if it too is ravaged by conflict where the ideal dissipates, leading again to fragmentation.[77] The resolution, or 'escape', as Ma refers to it, is also reframed—the story is also one of encounter and communication.

If there cannot be a single moment of return, then it is to be found in diverse and daily acts—as Hilal and Petti also recognise in the Camp— through remembrance and a striving for unity, within which are also practices of the common (Ma 2004, p. 331). Through these, the mercenaries' actions as (if?) a *demos*—the free-citizen populus—destabilise the importance placed on the ideals of rootedness of the *polis* identity and, in Athens especially, the exclusivity of its citizen body. As we will see, this approach also has an affinity with that subscribed to by such exiled philosophers as Diogenes. It does not just extend the possibilities inherent in the lived experience of citizenship, which is more flexible than its idealised form, as Gray's (2018) paper in this volume showcases.[78] A flexibility that could also be marginalising of certain citizen groups, as Jewell's (2019) paper in this volume demonstrates. Instead, there is an inadvertent enactment of the cosmopolitan ideal, as embodied within the very diversity of the ten thousand,[79] and with it, a reimagining not only of home but also of the good citizen, even if they are *apolis*—without a state, or outside it.

The trigger for such practices in a state of unsettlement may be a coping mechanism, as suggested by Baragwanath, for whom the account of the march is as much about creating

home as what is lost (Baragwanath 2019, p. 111). Xenophon's dream narrative about his ancestral home—*oikos* (τὴν πατρῴαν οἰκίαν)—can be read as part of such foregrounding of homemaking (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.1.11). Yet, it is no substitute for the longed-for home, but rather an exposition of the limits and fragility of the basis on which the societal archetype of fixity is constructed. Ideals of a fixed home-state are brought into tension with the reality of being unsettled and an outcast, whose belonging and allegiance are tenuous and untethered. Xenophon, in his other work, *Memorabilia*—a collection of Socratic dialogues—reflects on the condition of being an outcast and the extent to which it could be a choice. In it, as a response given to questions by Socrates regarding the ruler and the ruled, Aristippus states: "I do not restrict myself within a community (*politeia*), but am a guest-stranger (*xenos*) everywhere" (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.1.13).[80] This is read as a rejection of politics,[81] with a persistent questioning of the glamorization of the wandering state, which we return to below. The *Anabasis* depicts possibilities for making home even if the longed for one is not in reach, a home that does not deny the striving for a return, but allows for a meaningful existence in the meantime, through splintered futures embedded in daily acts.

6. Defiance of the Wandering Philosopher

The diverse experiences of wandering ancient philosophers, whether glamorised or used to illustrate the depths of human misery, provide insight into how such a condition can be owned, which allows for challenge, subversion and the repositioning of the self in relation to the world. Here we will consider this in relation to cosmopolitanism and the modes of being political notwithstanding the polis. It is about pushing the boundaries of possibility for agency from within the condition, and the rejection of the victim label, while still holding to account those responsible for victimisation, and society more broadly. Of the ancient exilic figures, the Cynic, Diogenes, embodies the archetype of the wandering Hellenistic philosopher. We know of him and his views not from his own writings, but through reports of his teachings from others. Outcast from Sinope on the Black Sea, he ends up in exile in Athens and, eventually, in Corinth. From the multiple apocryphal stories of him, many recorded in the writings of a much later biographer Diogenes Laertius, two in particular demonstrate his approach to his circumstances. The first is using a *pithos* (large wine storage jar) as his abode, showcasing the severe privation that his condition engenders. The second—in defiance of such an existence of base survival—is his haughty response to Alexander the Great who stood in front of him casting his shadow, and asked if there is anything he can do—Diogenes the Cynic allegedly replied that he "can move out of his light" (Diogenes Laertius 6.38).[82] The statement is a refusal to be defined by victimhood and dependence. Describing his own condition, the Cynic is said to have appealed to the words of tragedy as: "Citiless (*apolis*), homeless (*aoikos*), without a country (*patridos*), a beggar, a wanderer (*planetes*), living life day by day" (Diogenes Laertius 6.38). It was not by choice that Diogenes ended up in this state—he was forcibly expelled from his home of Sinope—yet he makes it into a chosen role. He inverts his position: "'The Sinopians condemned you to banishment from Pontus,' Diogenes the Cynic replied: 'But I condemned them to stay there'" (Diogenes Laertius 6.49; Plutarch *On Exile* 602a; [Diogenes letters 1.1]). His privation may perpetually increase, but what he claims to gain is freedom, both from bodily wants and from being under the authority of others. We need to recognise that such a defiant stance, even when associated with one who is often ridiculed for extreme life-ways, is cast against the severe suffering and exclusion that is tangible in every aspect of daily life. While Diogenes' condition may appear as willful stubbornness to onlookers, it is rather an exposition of their own complicity arising from their trapped state of tolerance of the status quo.

Cosmopolitanism as Subversion

The Cynic Diogenes' challenges are not directed at negating his own condition, nor are they appeals to authorities with the expectation of bringing about a change to his

circumstances. In this sense they differ somewhat from the consolations on exile written by such later philosophers as Teles, Musonius and Seneca. Diogenes' reproaches, in his position as an outsider, demonstrate to the polis-society the extreme consequences of its exclusionary framework and show how these are at odds with ways of being in the world. Such a premise has affinities with the way Medea's actions are presented by Euripides, yet with Diogenes, there is a move beyond exposition, towards the possibility for alternative modes of being. In repositioning himself and the polis, like many of the exiled philosophers, Diogenes formulates a discourse that draws on cosmopolitan ideals,[83] which also act as an antidote to a wandering state that becomes permanent. *'Kosmopolites'* was Diogenes' response on being asked where he came from, literally translated as 'I am a citizen of the cosmos (world)': a cosmopolitan (Diogenes Laertius 6.63).[84] The notion could be differently expressed. For example, we may find affinities with Aristippus's reflection on his own condition of being a *xenos* (guest-stranger) everywhere, intending the further meaning that he has freedom from power, being neither ruler nor ruled (as reported by Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.1.13).[85] The intent, however, within each expression is not the same. Cosmopolitan ideals are at the root of both statements, as is an underlying abstention from politics, but where they differ is in their association with what is alien. Aristippus's foreignness—or untetheredness—is not an instrument of freedom as it is for Diogenes, but an expression of inner poverty and dependence rather than self-sufficiency (Rappe 2000, p. 295; Montiglio 2005, p. 187).

The fluidity of the meaning and practices associated with ancient cosmopolitan ideals, which were expansive and inclusive, allow for its mobilisation in such a discourse of subversion. They can be read negatively as undermining the authority of particular poleis, or positively as a universal community in fellowship, whether as citizens or otherwise.[86] This is encompassed in Diogenes expression that "the only true commonwealth (government) is one which extends to the universe" (Diogenes Laertius 6.72). It was not just that one should have the right to access and be part of the cosmos, but, especially for Diogenes, that no single polis deserved his special affection, thus challenging notions of a single site of belonging. In Hellenistic Athens, this vigorous discourse led to the setting up of the Cynic and Stoic Schools. Within these schools, the exhortations of another exiled philosopher, Zeno of Kition, founder of Stoicism, could be interpreted as critiquing his fellow expatriates in Athens for recreating polis structures, instead of taking the opportunity of their migrant state to work towards a cosmopolitan ideal, as he himself was doing (Diogenes Laertius 7.33).[87] Zeno's appeal draws on an exile's outside perspective, which, by turning the lens onto the 'inside', allows for a privileged position of seeing the whole and thus affords opportunities for critical analysis and reflection on the very foundations of the polis. The engagement of cosmopolitan ideals does more than critique. It, too, breaks down the insider–outsider dichotomy and reconfigures the state of the exile as one that is not an exception to, but rather part of the world that attempts to expel. Sassen's (2014, p. 211) 'systemic edge' is another way it can be read, which as noted above refers, to the extreme nature of conditions on the perimeter that exposes widespread trends, which appear more moderate, and thus less palpable.

7. Politicalness Notwithstanding the Polis

Cosmopolitanism as presented within Cynic and Stoic discourse, questions the exclusivity of the relationship between citizenship and politicalness. Gray's paper in this volume addresses this most directly by bringing together diverse forms of ancient outcast and exile sociability, which combine elements of polis and cosmopolis in harnessing citizenship and institutional structures (Gray 2018, p. 15):

> "These outsider philosophers devised the ideal of a literal 'cosmopolis' or world city, the natural home of all wise and virtuous men, who recognise that territorial and status distinctions are arbitrary and contrary to nature. To this way of thinking, no-one can become an exile merely through physical expulsion; true

'citizenship' depends on recognising nature's requirements of justice and virtue, and recognising one's affinity (across space and time) with like-minded people".

These were not only intellectual consolations for one's excluded state, but could lead to cosmopolitan associations, some of which formed in collaboration with local citizen allies. They are both a subversion of the polis and also a refusal to be alienated from it, or rather what it represents—the possibility of politicalness (Gray 2015, p. 294).

Ancient exiles orchestrated opportunities for being heard on one's own terms, the extremes of which are exemplified by Diogenes the Cynic. These are a form of claiming rights, in choosing how to communicate, when and with whom, as in selecting one's own allies, or creating alternative platforms to the ones available to the citizen at home. Below we will see how this is harnessed today, through the acts of The Black School and Dandara. In the ancient context of collective action, this is exemplified through the endeavours of the so-called *poleis*-in-exile.[88] The Plateans represent one version of this during their first period of refuge in Athens, where they continued to have assemblies, and in the end had spent a long enough period to intermarry and create local links.[89] The collective resistance of the Athenian fleet is another example. The men of the fleet refused to succumb to the oligarchic coup, which had overthrown the democratic government in Athens in 411 BC during the Peloponnesian war. Instead, they had stationed themselves in Samos as though they were a *polis*-in-exile. Their organising efforts and role have many affinities to those described by Xenophon in relation to the ten thousand mercenaries on the march. The Athenian fleet too, while in Samos, held assemblies and chose leaders and received ambassadors from other poleis, such as Argos, and even from the so-called Four Hundred—the oligarchs against whom they took their stance. Thucydides, the historian of the Peloponnesian War, reports on their perception of themselves: that it was not they who had revolted from the polis, but rather the polis had revolted from them (Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 8.76 and esp. 8.76.4).

We know of another example of collective action, directly from the people of Entella in Sicily, in the account of their plight inscribed on bronze plaques, which they raised after their eventual return.[90] These Entellans were driven from their home after the Carthaginian takeover of their city in the 3rd century BC. The plaques record decrees of thanks and honours to all the poleis which helped them continue their existence during what they refer to in these texts as their wandering—*eplanometha*. Within this story of a successful return is another which captures the fragile balance between forced dependence and autonomy, which the Entellans embody in their ability to survive as a collective and to maintain dignity by 'choosing' allies to draw on. We may note that, as outlined at the start of this paper, the different nature of the ancient geo-political context means that in today's nation-state world, the 'choosing' of allies is more difficult, with often little choice of where, physically, refuge may be negotiated. A further complication, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is who is allowed to take part in the negotiation and articulate its terms—to what extent does the agency of the asylum seeker or the excluded become veiled.[91]

The balance between dependence and autonomy also concerns the experience of people who, in today's society, are technically part of the civic community, but are treated as if they are outsiders. One case in point is The Black School, based in Harlem New York, USA,[92] which in its aims has affinities with those of Campus in Camps in Palestine.[93] The Black School uses art practice to propose radical alternatives to the current systems of injustices, using those endured by its own community as a starting point for wider societal change.

"Building on the principles of the Freedom Schools of the Civil Rights movement and The Black Panther Party's Liberation Schools during the Black Power movement, The Black School will use a socially engaged proactive practice to educate Black/PoC students and allies on how to become radical agents of social and political change".[94]

Embedded in their statement are turning points on which they build to bring about change, including an explicit reference to 'allies'. They choose who these are and the form of their alliance and solidarity.[95] This recognition of the need for support, or rather joint-action, is acknowledged from a position of power rather than dependence.

Another case is that of Dandara, presented as a Catalyst in this volume (Ribeiro et al. 2017). It exemplifies the possibilities for being political, despite exclusion—as encapsulated in the ancient term *apolis*, in the way Diogenes uses it in reference to his condition. The community that came to call itself Dandara arose from an intersection of internally displaced people, such as those from the 'Landless Peasant Movement', coming together in the thousands to occupy a disused site in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, and demand to be recognised as a community. Orlando Soares Lopes, one of its elders—while pointing to the celebrations around us—described how they had succeeded in resisting eviction physically and through lobbying municipal authorities with the support of chosen allies, such as student groups, urban planners and lawyers. He also stressed that it was the women who protected the neighbourhood while the men were working away from home. Refusing to concede the status of illegal outcast, they continued to build houses, churches, lay streets and be part of society by insisting, for example, that their children be accepted into local schools. One of these young people showed me around the neighbourhood (with such street names as Rua dos Palestinos), and took the opportunity to practice his French, since I spoke no Portuguese. During the eight years of daily threats of eviction, the people of Dandara did not wait to be accepted; they persisted in creating their own people's assemblies, choosing leaders and making their own policies. Their actions refute any sense that to allow or disallow politicalness, was in the gift of governing authorities, whose policies were responsible for people being forced into states of wandering and privation in the first place.

In Dandara we witness the moment after a turning-point, the coming together and drawing on one's own strength, choosing allies and deciding to continue to exist according to self-determined rules, even while still in a position of unsettledness. Here, it became possible to challenge the imposed regime of permanent temporariness, resulting from internal displacement, within which disparate groups and individuals had existed, even before the threat of eviction was paused, with the right to remain on the occupied site. For the ancient context which we have been drawing on—a world without nation-states—the term 'internal displacement' would have little meaning. However, if we consider the case more broadly as that of a marginalised or an excluded group that seeks equal access to resources, protection and livelihood, challenging its marginalisation, then we can draw affinities with the ancient cases considered here. In drawing strength from the case of Dandara, it must be recognised that the community was one of internally displaced citizens. Had they been non-citizens, what means would they have had to draw on, and on which allies, to counteract the risks of increased precarity, internment or deportation?

It is arguable that the politicalness expressed in the case of Dandara, just as that articulated by other Catalyst contributors, and within the ancient contexts presented here, challenge the categorisation of their actions as a politics of exception.[96] Such a framing does recognise that groups and individuals can be political actors and create alternative forms of meaningful sociability outside of polis norms. However, by exceptionalising these actions, there is a danger of further consigning such actions to the fringes beyond society, rather than seeing them as being something that, although born of exceptional circumstances, is part of society and extends possibilities of being political. Arendt (Arendt [1951] 1968) had dedicated a life's work to exploring the im/possibilities of being political despite not having functional citizenship. Gray's paper engages directly with these issues, and Arendt's assertion "that refugees should become an 'avant-garde' of their societies, crafting new ways of approaching life in common which would transcend the failed nation-state model, without lurching to the other extreme of purely formal cosmopolitanism".[97] Malkki's work, drawing on her research conducted with Hutu refugees from Burundi living in Tanzania, continues to challenge the depoliticised space within which the refugee

exists as a pure victim, showing the consequences of the inadvertent construction of the refugee as an "ahistorical, universal humanitarian subject" by the international institutions and the humanitarian regime. She argues that "in universalizing particular displaced people into "refugees"—in abstracting their predicaments from specific political, historical, cultural contexts—humanitarian practices tend to silence refugees" (Malkki 1996, p. 378).

The diverse forms of being political have been intensely scrutinised in relation to today's Camp context, with debates spurred on by the work of Schmitt ([1950] 2003) and its development by Agamben (2003). The exceptionalism that they ascribe to the Camp in their work, has prompted numerous reactions. That discourse, which is captured in the dialogue between Gray's (2018) and Boano's (2019) papers in this volume, is indicative of a more profound understanding of such contexts, but also of the transformation in the nature of camps over these last decades. The new perspectives on, of and from within the camp bring into question the analytical capacity of Agamben's influential conceptualisation of the camp as a space of exception.[98] At the core of these new understandings of the nature of camps and camp-like institutions is the way that the camp is a space of human agency for those who inhabit them despite their exceptionalism. These expose the variety of interactions and social relations within the camp and between the camp and its surrounding settlements, the city and the state, even as a kind of intersection of 'cosmopolitan roads', as Agier refers to them (2014, p. 19). They articulate the strategies that people who inhabit them develop in their everyday lives to claim rights and membership. Sigona draws on such findings in his ethnographic research in Italian 'nomad camps' for Roma refugees (in the 2000s), and brings them together with Isin's (2002) work on the relationship between citizenship and being political, in proposing the concept of 'campzenship' (Sigona 2015, p. 1):

> "to capture the specific and situated form of membership produced in and by the camp, the complex and ambivalent relationship of its inhabitants with the camp and the ways the camp shapes the relationship of its inhabitants with the state and their capacity and modes of being political".

These new understandings are about recognising the camp for the life that has been lived in it over generations, while still challenging *tawtin*—normalization. They are a way of owning and subverting the camp's regime of permanent temporariness, by positioning the camp as part of a continuum of forms of settlement and sociability that look to the future (Hilal and Petti 2018, p. 33):

> "Today, refugees are re-inventing social and political practices that improve their everyday lives without undermining the exceptionality of the camp. Camps have become semiautonomous zones where different social, political, and spatial structures have emerged; a fragment of a city yet to come".

While not the same, it is a perspective that has affinities with ancient uses of cosmopolitanism and *apolis* politicalness as a way to reposition and subvert the privation of a wandering condition.

8. Conclusions

The aim of this exploration was to better understand the condition of permanent temporariness and the possibilities for its challenge in displacement. It sought to do this in extending the time frame of the discourse, by investigating what past experiences of wandering may bring to addressing such urgent questions as the one posed by Sandi and Alessandro at the start of this paper (Hilal and Petti 2018, p. 52):

> "So, what is left if we don't want to succumb to the regime of permanent temporariness and see neither permanence nor temporariness as salvation?"

The ancient contexts addressed here, while not comparable to that found within the 21st century world of nation-states—especially in regard to its forced immobility and

exclusionary spatial practices—have, at their core, actors for whom this question too would have been meaningful. It is this which allows us to bring them together in dialogue, by foregrounding ways that such challenges have been addressed. The investigation has drawn on research and practice conducted by people who have experience of the condition from within and in particular that of the camp, along with surviving ancient accounts from such positions, to gain an exceptional perspective through a redirected lens. These testimonies provide powerful examples of how people who have been forced into states of wandering and permanent temporariness can subvert their condition, even if the outcomes for most are still unknown or unknowable. The ability to even begin to confront such a state, it has been argued, requires first its recognition for what it is—an externally imposed regime that forces one to endure a state meant as a temporary coping mechanism of survival in response to calamity, beyond a single moment, into perpetuity. The searing pain of such recognition, which we witness in Euripides' *Medea* and within Qasmiyeh's poetry, can be a turning point—a repositioning of the self in relation to the world.

The witness statements presented here are critical explorations of modes in which meaningful lives can exist within conditions of precarity and exclusion, while not negating the struggle for incorporation or return. They represent a delicate balance between refusing imposed victimhood, but without exempting or obscuring the victimisation and forced precarity. More than that, they expose the 'cracks' in the status quo and challenge the exceptionality of their state, instead revealing it as society's 'systemic edge'.[99] As the case of Dandara shows, this can be as much the prerogative of those who are marginalised within civic society as those without. A repositioning of the self in relation to the world is the turning-point from which a different existence emerges, even if external forces prevent a change in the condition itself. But what does it take to reach such a point of turning? Is it always a possibility? And how is endurance to be seen in light of it? This paper does not address these questions directly.

As a way into an answer, I draw on the following observations from Feldman's (2015) critical and sensitive analysis of the situation in the refugee camps of Lebanon, where there is no political resolution in sight. The underpinning question of her inquiry is whether endurance is a politics of precarity. She focuses on the discourse around mental health between the refugees and the MSF workers whose project seeks to address the chronic conditions resulting from everyday stresses of life in the camps, through professional therapeutic interventions. There are wider issues here concerning the humanitarian regime's focus on the suffering body and consolation and, increasingly, resilience,[100] as well as the danger of undermining strategies of coping that have been developed by the refugees themselves that are expressed through such terms as *sumud*—meaning steadfastness, the ability to suffer and yet persist (Feldman 2015, p. 443). "At the limits of the humanitarian imaginary, these projects seek to enable people to find different ways of imagining their existence: not changing their conditions, but living differently with them" (Feldman 2015, p. 430). The line that runs through the generations of people who inhabit the camp is endurance. For Feldman this way of moving forward implies optimism, in conditions that enforce suspension disallowing the possibility of thriving and future, making endurance itself a political act.

It may appear that the cases focused on here, ancient and modern, largely do not bring reprieve through an externally transformed world. What change there is, for those who are forced to endure the privations of wandering and permanent temporariness, seems driven from within themselves, whether through collective action, or by transforming visions of home and finding ways into splintered returns and futures, rather than having them remain perpetually out of grasp. This is despite finding ways to be heard on their own terms and to enlist allies. Perhaps it is that such external transformations may be difficult to capture in relation to individual experiences due to their disparate nature and slow rate of change. Yet, to resign to such an outlook is to deny the appeals of our witnesses for, and their exposition of, the interconnectedness of the *cosmos* to which all have access. They go further by providing models for alternatives, such as those considered in the discourse on

cosmopolitanism and politicalness. More starkly, as only those who have gone out into the world can know and alert us, they warn that without a change in the status quo, that which is deemed a state of exception will seep in to become the norm.

This paper has tried to understand, by looking through the redirected lens, the nature of endurance within unceasing wandering and permanent temporariness. Without a definitive resolution as to whether one is the extension of the other, it has highlighted variance and explored convergence in the experience of the two conditions, as well as possibilities across time for their overcoming. In this initial investigation, already there are signals that the regime of permanent temporariness in the current age has more sophisticated barriers to its cessation, ones that perpetuate the condition across generations. Such longevity is not apparent in the ancient context outside of enslavement. The ancient fixation on the place of exile, rather than of potential refuge and new sites of inhabiting, is the result of vastly greater possibilities for the existence of the latter. The prospects for return, however, are precious few in both contexts. That is why they both share the suffering of non-return, yet, permanent temporariness is further characterised by non-arrival. Such non-arrival exposes another paradoxical feature of the current world system—forced immobility—a kind of tethering and enclosure that is difficult to find among the world of the ancient *poleis* for those who were deemed free. Given this paradox and the interventions in this volume that engage and challenge the Humanities, the question is: Where do we go from here with this knowledge? How do we enlist the humanities to bring it back to the level of the human? The recognition of these wider trends does not in itself capture the ongoing struggle, with its colours and sounds, its own future imaginaries—which are allowed to roam only to be pulled back, and yet are not abandoned. Its complexity is rather revealed through the dialogues with the individual testimonies recorded here, and in the response by Aref, a young poet-philosopher, to a question about a photograph he sent on Whatsapp 17 November 2019 from Athens, Greece, where he had been several months, after years in the Lesvos refugee camps of Moria and Pikpa:[101]

> Lena: Is that a spaceship? Have you given up on this planet?
>
> Aref: It's a library, but yeah I haven't found my way in this planet yet, everyday I run after something new. I'm lost in fake happiness, in vanished dreams, acting like knowing everything yet naive, scared of lost future and being towed away from myself by giant truck of personality-ness to seek out the face in front of lost faces.
>
> It seems every thing is staged the time and the place.
>
> Only the actor is unconscious of the scenario.

joint critical readings have been precious, not least his encouragement for strange historical clashes, reminiscent of Walter Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History'. Finally, for exploration of the possibilities of journeying as knowledge I could not do without Staffan Müller-Wille.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes

1 Hilal and Petti (2018, p. 52). NB—all page references, are from the digital edition of the volume.

2 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities/special_issues/Manifestos_Ancient_Present (accessed on 21 April 2021).

3 Throughout the chapter, I use wandering to indicate 'forced wandering', unless otherwise specified.

4 See Tony Kushner's (2016) article which addresses the issues of self-representations by those who are displaced, with a particular focus on the people who arrived at Lampedusa.

5 Inspired by those of Walter Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History'.

6 Studies that have the high-profile exile as their focus include those by Balogh (1943) and Seibert (1979) on political refugees; Forsdyke (2005); Garland (2014); Lonis (1988); McKechnie (1989), on outsiders and exiles more generally.

7 Kennedy (2014) and Kasimis (2020) are studies that cautiously and creatively explore aspects of ancient society by considering gender and foreignness together, particularly in relation to Medea.

8 See, for example, Rubinstein's (2018) investigation of the experience of displacement in 4th century BC Greece, which draws on the fragmented historical evidence of policies, practices and attitudes towards displaced people by their potential hosts.

9 For ancient asylum and role of sanctuaries see: Isayev (2017b, 2018). For 'magical' qualities of the soil of nation-states: Magee et al. (2019).

10 For the presence of women and children, as a significant proportion of those seeking asylum, see Rubinstein (2018).

11 For a discussion of displacement as a site of discourse, Isayev (2017b) more specifically within Ancient Greek writings, and situating autochthony: Kaplan (2016).

12 The most well known ancient instances of group pleas for refuge are those of the Plateans to Athens upon the takeover of their city by enemies, recounted by Isocrates, *Plataicus*; in dramatic contexts, the issues are addressed by Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women* and Euripidies' *Children of Heracles.* For a discussion on ancient refuge and hospitality in the perspective of modern contexts see: Isayev (2017b, 2018). More generally on Suppliant Tragedy see Tzanetou (2012).

13 For the position of metics in Athenian society Kennedy (2014), pp. 26–67; Sosin (2016). For an in-depth extensive study of the figure of the metic as a site of discourse, see Kasimis (2018).

14 The tragic figure Orestes may have found a place to live in his foster parents' place, but is still depicted as a fugitive wanderer; he embodies the misery of one who has been banished from home: Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1282; Euripides, *Electra* 130–34. The later Roman poet Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, written from Tomis—where he spent his exile when expelled from Rome—became the model of expressing the pain of an exiled life and being away from home, to which he was never allowed to return.

15 The reference is to lives lived in camps and to people who, over generations, have been prevented from returning home and who have been unable to gain meaningful citizenship elsewhere.

16 For factionalism—*stasis,* see Gray (2015).

17 For further discussion of these issues, see Montiglio (2005, p. 5).

18 The writings, photos and experience of practitioners who were residents of Moria on Lesvos is included in the following co-created volume on *Inhabiting,* as part of the *Collective Dictionary Series*: http://viewalmaisha.org/collective-dictionary-inhabiting/ (accessed on 1 April 2021).

19 The discussion is taken further here: Qasmiyeh (2016c).

20 Ramadan (2013, p. 66) articulates this incongruity in relation to the case of Palestinian refugees: "The three traditional durable solutions to refugee status . . . are inaccessible to Palestinian refugees: voluntary repatriation to the country of origin (rejected by Israel), local integration in the country of displacement (rejected by those countries and by most Palestinians themselves), and resettlement in a third country (a de facto strategy pursued by many Palestinians, often illegally). Refugee status has become a permanent-temporary reality for millions of Palestinians awaiting resolution of their situation. Refugee camps have become permanent-temporary landscapes of exile, spaces of Palestine in liminality, drawing meaning from Palestine of the past and future".

21 Literally, *atimia* means without honour or value. It is often taken to mean civic death.

22 De-placement refers to situations in which individuals and communities are made placeless. This could be the result of a transformation of the physical site, causing a disjuncture between the memory-place and the material fabric that embodies the memory (overwriting it). Alternatively, de-placement could result from the transfer of people to in-between sites, such as refugee camps. These ideas were explored in the project *De-placing Future Memory* (2008), funded by the AHRC: https:

23   //web.archive.org/web/20160923100307/ and http://projects.beyondtext.ac.uk/deplacingfuturememory/index.php (both accessed on 1 April 2021).

23   The most common expressions of wandering are discussed by Montiglio (2005, p. 2), with other terms in Perkell (2013). For a discussion of the Latin *errare* along with its metaphorical meanings, as mistakeness, literally to wander from a path see: Short (2013, p. 140).

24   Diogenes Laertius 6.38 = 88.F.4 *TGF* (Snell et al. 1971–1985).

25   For the discourse on the relationship between philosophy, knowledge and wandering: Montiglio (2005, pp. 180–81); Whitmarsh (2001, p. 281).

26   On Stoicism and Cynicism: Gill (2013); Desmond (2008, chp. 5, pp. 199–207). On Stoicism, exile, cosmopolitanism and wandering: Montiglio (2005, pp. 183–87, 211–13); Gray (2015, pp. 306–10); Schofield (1999, chp. 3, pp. 69–32).

27   See for example: Hillner et al. (2016); Barry (2019). There is also a Clerical Exile Database: https://blog.clericalexile.org/ (accessed on 1 April 2021).

28   A milestone work on voice, representation and silencing is: Clifford (1988, p. 21ff). See also Malkki (1996).

29   It may even be too romanticising for those who end up in the condition by choice or accident, as for example those we might refer to as wanderers by choice, such as the *Eurostars*, who are the focus of Favell's (2008) research. Interestingly, the way they describe their state, of protracted absence from home, if not directly wandering, has affinities with the characteristics of permanent temporariness. In his final observations from their testimonies, Favell (p. 211) exposes how even for those who end up wandering by choice, "Mobility can get to be a burden, a pathology, even a disease. A life without norms can also be a life adrift, in fragments, with no social or spatial coherence; a shadow of the society around you, a ghost passing by".

30   Cohen (2015), in her study of what she refers to as permanent semi-citizens in the US case, looks at the exploitative political economy of immigrant time.

31   Situating this against the backdrop of Anderson's (1991) and Appadurai's (1996) imagined communities, their aim was to understand how deterritorialisation and re-territorialisation operate in the context of transnationalism: Bailey et al. (2002).

32   The use of the term permanent temporariness within scholarly literature in reference to the condition of migrant workers also includes such theoretical discourse, as in Boersma (2019), who articulates how the experience of temporal, or circular, migration affects the 'lived time' of Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong. Boersma focuses on how the disciplinary mechanism of temporality informs people's everyday life decisions and employer negotiations. Cities have a particular place in such temporariness as Collins (2011) investigates in his study of the urban social field, which consists of multiple arrivals and departures, of temporary populations many of whom are migrant people on permanently temporary status. Futhermore, in relation to accessing the city, the way national policy can exacerbate precarity of even an internal-migrant labour force, has been considered in the context of such vast states as the Soviet Union and China, where controlling mechanisms tie rights and privileges to one's place of origin. These include a study on vagrancy and homelessness in Soviet Russia, by Höjdestrand (2009). It traces the way systems of documentation and restrictions, the *propiska*—a compulsory registration of a permanent address—was linked to the obtainment of passports, which brought together obligatory work, access to housing, and restrictions on movement. She notes (on p. 23) that the system was "a socialistic variant of serfdom that disappeared only in the 1970s". Swider (2011), explores China's hukou system—a family registration program that regulates urban–rural migration in particular—as another way of restricting internal movement, controlled by "an internal passport system that links citizenship rights and welfare benefits to an individual's local place of birth" (p. 143). He notes that, in China, migrant workers made upto a quarter of the workforce in 2000, observing that "the dominant employment form of mediated employment results in a state of 'permanent temporariness' in which migrants are neither strongly tied to their home communities nor integrated into their host communities" (p. 139).

33   It has affinities with Agamben's ([1995] 1998) characterisation of the refugee state as that of indefinite liminality.

34   Examples specifically in the context of the Middle-East include: Hilal and Petti (2018); Megalit (2010); Bier (2017); Kedar et al. (2018); Crooke (2011).

35   This is confronted by such works as: Malkki (1992); Ramadan (2013); Ramsay (2017); Hilal and Petti (2018).

36   On the problems of referring to refugees as stateless: Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016).

37   Bringing together key critical analyses on the subject in a study of the predicament of the Ugandan refugees: Ramsay (2017). Other key studies include: Mbembe and Janet (1995); Feldman (2015); Griffiths (2014); Malkki (1995); Rotter (2016).

38   Ramadan (2013, pp. 66–69) articulates how the three usual humanitarian solutions for refugees to resolve their condition are not open to Palestinian refugees.

39   Hilal and Petti (2018, p. 52). as noted above—all page references, are from the digital edition of the volume.

40   The discussion was part of the invitation to Campus in Camps in November 2015, to hold a workshop on *Place, Heritage and Belonging: Livy and Cicero*: http://www.campusincamps.ps/projects/place-heritage-and-belonging-livy-and-cicero/ (accessed on 1 April 2021).

41   Hilal and Petti (2018, p. 63); Picker and Silvia (2015).

42 Hilal and Petti (2018, p. 63). They and other practitioners explore this in the creation of *The Collective Dictionary*, a multi-volume investigation as part of Campus in Camps: http://www.campusincamps.ps (accessed on 1 April 2021). The possibilities for this repositioning, and re-imagining I was fortunate to experience first hand as part of both: the workshop on *Place, Heritage and Belonging:* http://www.campusincamps.ps/projects/place-heritage-and-belonging-livy-and-cicero/ (accessed on 1 April 2021); and the collective reading and critique of Fanon for the Palestine of today workshop: http://www.campusincamps.ps/projects/reading-fanon-in-palestine-today/ (accessed on 1 April 2021). These resulted in the founding of a collective initiative Almaiesha, with Isshaq Al-Barbary and Diego Segatto and myself, which continued this dialogue and contributed to the Collective Dictionary series, exploring the meanings of such terms as *Xenia* (hospitality) and *Inhabiting*, from the perspective of the camp: http://www.campusincamps.ps/skill/collective-dictionary/ (accessed on 1 April 2021) and http://viewalmaisha.org/collective-dictionary-inhabiting/ (accessed on 1 April 2021).

43 The *nostos*—long journey home—from Troy, of Odysseus (its heroic protagonist), written down some 2800 years ago.

44 A tale of found refuge by Aeneas, who fled from the destroyed city of Troy, composed in the 1st century BC.

45 Translated by Loeb Classical Library 1, *Argonautica, Apollonius Rhodius*, Edited and translated by William H. Race 2009. For discussion see: Montiglio (2005); Montiglio (2019, p. 95); Klooster (2012, p. 64); Thalmann (2011).

46 All passages and translations from Euripides' *Medea* are from the Loeb edition: *Euripides*, *Cyclops. Alcestis. Medea.* Edited and translated by David Kovacs, Loeb Classical Library 12, Vol. 1. Harvard, 1994.

47 Later Latin versions include those by Ovid and Seneca: for discussion see for example Walsh (2012, 2019). Among the many more recent versions, one that is interested particularly in homelessness—transposing the play to the setting of the Irish midlands—is Marina Carr's 1998 production of *By the Bog of Cats*. For the way that Greek tragedy has been used to think about displacement, see, for example: Wilmer (2017).

48 For the questioning of whether there is a *polis* in *Medea*, focusing on a narrower reading of *polis* and the metic experience: Perris (2017).

49 Kasimis (2020, p. 397) articulates it more extremely by stating that "Medea . . . may be violent, willful, strategic, and complicit in producing her own homelessness but her need for refuge is still genuine". Kasimis's exciting work on the subject of Medea the refugee, touches on similar grounds as this exploration although with different aims; I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of my own piece for alerting me to its publication.

50 "Of my own accord I abandoned my father and my home and came with you to Iolcus under Pelion, showing more love than prudence. I murdered Pelias by the most horrible of deaths—at the hand of his own daughters—and I destroyed his whole house. And after such benefits from me, O basest of men, you have betrayed me and have taken a new marriage, though we had children". Euripides *Medea*, 483–90.

51 On the owning of these critical errors and on being *apolis*: Friedrich (1993, esp. p. 228).

52 For an in-depth exploration, see in particular Kasimis 2020.

53 Medea's resolve is exemplified in her final moments of deciding on her actions: "Let no one think me weak, contemptible, untroublesome. No, quite the opposite, hurtful to foes, to friends kindly. Such persons live a life of greatest glory (τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων εὐκλεέστατος βίος)". Euripides *Medea*, 791–810. For critical readings of Medea's heroic persona: Easterling (2003); Foley (2001, p. 264); Friedrich (1993, pp. 222–25); Knox (1979); Zeitlin (1996); Zerba (2002).

54 Consider, for example, the Corinthian king Creon's statement, who poistions her cleverness as a threat: "you are a clever woman and skilled in many evil arts, and you are smarting with the loss of your husband's love". Euripides *Medea*, 285–86. "A hot-tempered woman—and a hot-tempered man likewise—is easier to guard against than a clever woman who keeps her own counsel". Euripides *Medea*, 320–23. She acknowledges this herself: "for since I am clever, some regard me with ill will," Euripides *Medea*, 302–3.

55 The first lines delivered by the chorus also acknowledge the friendship they have had from her: Euripides, *Medea* 131–37.

56 See especially Euripides *Medea*, pp. 266–68; 419–35.

57 Kennedy (2014, pp. 49–51), in reading *Medea*, against the experience of Athenian metic women, furthermore demonstrates that it is Jason's behaviour—desiring wealth and kingship for personal gain—that is threatening to the citizen body, rather than the character of Medea who acts within the bounds of a metic.

58 The Chorus, too, acknowledge the severity of the broken oaths: "Having suffered wrong she raises her cry to Zeus's daughter, Themis, goddess of oaths, the goddess who brought her to Hellas across the sea through the dark saltwater over the briny gateway of the Black Sea, a gateway few traverse". Euripides *Medea*, 205–12.

59 "If people invest themselves in claiming rights, we are told, they are producing not only new ways of being subjects with rights but also new ways of becoming subjects with responsibilities, since claiming rights certainly involves 'responsibilizing' selves" (Isin and Nielsen 2008, p. 1; Isin 2002).

60 Easterling (2003, pp. 193–95); Fletcher (2012, pp. 182–88); Kasimis (2020, p. 19).

61 There is ongoing debate about whether it was Euripides' innovation to have Medea murdering her own children or whether he drew on a version of the myth that already included this element, as opposed to other versions, which included their accidental

62 death as Medea tried to make them immortal, or their murder at the hands of the Corinthians. For the debate see: Ewans (2007, p. 55); McDermott (1985, p. 10ff).

62 Konstan (2007) even suggests that there are elements of the play that indicate her divine status to follow, and her wandering perhaps as that of a god. Later adaptations of *Medea*, as Seneca's do away with Aegeus—furthermore suggesting that she transcends into divinity, as Walsh's (2019, pp. 790–91) reading suggests.

63 Medea, in her own words to Jason, traces these cracks: "Respect for your oaths is gone, and I cannot tell whether you think that the gods of old no longer rule or that new ordinances have now been set up for mortals, since you are surely aware that you have not kept your oath to me. O right hand of mine, which you often grasped together with my knees, how profitless was the suppliant grasp upon me of a knave, and how I have been cheated of my hopes!" (Euripides, *Medea* 492–98). This is then further strengthened by the words of the Corinthian women of the Chorus: "The magical power of an oath has gone, and Shame is no more to be found in wide Hellas: she has taken wing to heaven (Euripides, *Medea* 431–35).

64 For the multiple ways of reading and adapting Medea see: Foley (2012); Kasimis (2020); Mossman (2011); Macintosh (2007); Williamson (1990); Sorkin Rabinowitz (1993); Ewans (2007, pp. 56–60).

65 See also Agier (2014); Picker and Silvia (2015).

66 For example, Soguk's (1999, p. 51) observation of the way the figure of the refugee both threatens and stabilizes the nation state, by being its 'constitutive outside'. Developing the argument in relation to refugee camps: Turner (2016, pp. 139–40). In terms of refugee agency: Isayev (2017b).

67 Xenophon, *Anabasis* Loeb edition. Translated by Brownson, C. L. (1922) revised by Diller, J. (1998) Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. For overviews and key themes on the *Anabasis* and Xenophon: Flower (2012, 2017); Lane Fox (2004); Harman (2016).

68 For discussion and further bibliography see: Chaniotis (2002); Isayev (2017a, 2017b, pp. 296–306); Loman (2005, pp. 359–65); Trundle (2004).

69 When they reached the territory of the Tibarenians Xenophon, *Anabasis* 5.5. For ambassadors, also see 6.1.

70 "Now as soon as the vanguard got to the top of the mountain and caught sight of the sea, a great shout went up. . . . they heard the soldiers shouting, "The Sea! The Sea!" and passing the word along. Then all the troops of the rearguard likewise broke into a run, and the pack animals began racing ahead and the horses. And when all had reached the summit, then indeed they fell to embracing one another, and generals and captains as well, with tears in their eyes".

71 As the 19th century poet Joseph Brownlee Brown in his poem "Cry of the ten thousand":

"I stand upon the summit of my life:

Behind, the camp, the court, the field, the grove,

The battle and the burden; vast, afar,

Beyond these weary ways, Behold! the Sea!

The sea o'erswept by clouds and winds and wings,

By thoughts and wishes manifold, whose breath

Is freshness and whose mighty pulse is peace. . . . "

72 A subversion, for example, appears in Book 1 of James Joyce's 1922 novel (pp. 4–5) *Ulysses*. Buck Mulligan gazes over Dublin Bay: '"God", he said quietly, "isn't the sea what Algy calls it: a great, sweet mother? The snot-green sea. The scrotum-tightening sea. *Epi oinopa ponton*. Ah Daedalus, the Greek. I must teach you. You should read them in the original. Thalatta! thalatta! She is our great, sweet mother. Come and look". A rather different imagining pervades Iris Murdhoch's 1978 novel *The Sea The Sea.* The diverse re-imaginings of the moment and its metaphors are most intricately studied by Rood (2005).

73 This is noted by the author and tactician Aeneas 'Tacticus', in his *Poliorketika* 12 (c. 356/7 BC) on siegecraft, which includes warnings to poleis of the dangers of employing mercenary troops—their ability to take things into their own hands and plunder. For discussion of exile turned mercenary, and questioning the threatening destitute masses image of these mercenaries: Buxton (2018, pp.157–61).

74 Isocrates, *Philippus* (*Discourses 5. To Philip*), 120–23: Isocrates, *To Demonicus. To Nicocles. Nicocles or the Cyprians. Panegyricus. To Philip. Archidamus*, Volume I, Loeb Classical Library 209. Translated by George Norlin. Harvard 1928. For context of this passage and in relation to Xenophon, see: Van Soesbergen ([1982] 1983).

For the poor conditions of those who enlisted into the mercenary armies, thus making them unable to live in their own cities, see Isocrates *Panegyricus* 146, specifically on the mercenaries employed by Cyrus for his campaign. For an alternative view of the mercenaries as seeking to find ways of supporting their families at home: Xenophon, *Anabasis* 6.4.8. He also notes that some of those who joined Clearchus' cotingents served under order of their polis, *Anabasis* 2.6.13.

75 The self-conscious interest of being remembered into the future: (2.1.17-8; 6.5.24). On echoes of Homeric epics and future memory, here used to spur on the troops: Baragwanath (2019, p. 119 note 3). On the *Anabasis* itself acting as a memory monument in lieu of memory places of commemoration: Flower (2012, pp. 3–38).

76   For realisation of the impossible task of return: Xenophon *Anabasis* 1.3.16; 2.1.11; 2.4.5-7; 2.5.9. For discussion about the nature of the *Anabasis* between that of *nostos*—a return journey home—and that of the founding of cities: Harman (2016, pp. 141–45).

77   On the problematics of the polis on the move: Ma (2004).

78   For a more extended discussion, see Gray, B. 2015. *Stasis and Stability: Exile, the Polis, and Political Thought, c. 404–146 BC*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chp. 6, pp. 293–379.

79   Xenophon's reshaping of home in the context of cosmopolitanism, *Anabasis* 4.6.10; 8.62, may even be read as a reconfiguration of pan-Hellenism, rather then any specific polis as home: Baragwanath (2019), pp. 117–18.

80   I do not restrict myself within a community (*politeia*), but am a guest-stranger (*xenos*) everywhere—οὐδ᾿ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι.

81   For context see: Montiglio (2005).

82   Diogenes Laertius 6.38 = 88.F.4 *TGF* (Snell et al. 1971–1985).

83   For cosmopolitanism and wandering see: Montiglio (2005, pp. 180–87); Konstan (2009); Moles (1996). Cosmopolitanism, as understood in this ancient context, was more a reaction to exclusive polis-based citizenship, rather than the physical mobility itself (the main restrictions on mobility being into the place from which one was exiled). It is distinct from the 17–18th century discourse, of which Kant was a key figure, that centered on cosmopolitanism and the values associated with free movement. Within it, justifications of mobility, in terms of colonial ventures and expanding empire, developed alongside sovereign entities' exclusionary policies, which eventually became the antithesis to free movement. For early modern cosmopolitanism and mobility in a wider context, see: Benhabib (2004, pp. 27, 40); Kant (1983).

84   *Asked where he came from, he said, "I am a citizen of the world* (kosmopolites)"-ἐρωτηθείς πόθεν εἴη, "**κοσμοπολίτης**," ἔφη.

85   For discussion: Montiglio (2005, p. 186).

86   For the overview of the negative and positive readings of cosmopolitanism, see: Desmond (2020), chp. 28). For reflections on the negative reading: Schofield (1999, pp. 141–47). For the most prominent positive reading: Moles (1996).

87   With discussion in Gray (2015, pp. 371–72).

88   For poleis-in-exile, see: Forsdyke (2005); Garland (2014, pp. 5–78); Gray (2015, pp. 300–8).

89   These they pointed to in later (failed) appeals for asylum, being once again displaced, this time due to their homes being besieged by Theban forces in the 370s BC (Isocrates 14, *Plataicus*). See also the discussion on the Plateans and their second attempt at refuge followed by their destitution by Rubinstein (2018, pp. 9–11).

90   For the tablets see Ampolo (2001, pp. xii–xiv); with further discusssion by Mackil (2004, pp. 503–4).

91   While this needs much further consideration I have touched on these issues in Isayev (2017b).

92   The Black School, Harlem, NY, USA: https://theblack.school/ (accessed on 1 April 2021).

93   Campus in Camps, Palestine: http://www.campusincamps.ps (accessed on 1 April 2021), and see above for examples of initiatives.

94   From the outline of its principles, https://laundromatproject.org/project/the-black-school-harlem/ (accessed on 16 April 2020).

95   I am grateful for the wonderfully charged conversations and inspirations on this topic that we were able to have with Joseph Cuillier and Shani Peters of the Black School and our Almaisha team with Diego Segatto and Isshaq Al-Barbary during the workshop at the Parliament of Schools for the 100 year Anniversary of Bauhaus in Dessau: http://viewalmaisha.org/parliament-of-schools/ (accessed on 1 April 2021).

96   This is continuing the critical discourse on states of exception that is taken forward in Agamben's work. For some of the challenges in framing displaced people in that way, see the discussion between Gray's (2018) chapter and the response to it by Boano (2019), both in this volume.

97   Discussion by Gray in this volume (2018, p. 7) on Arendt (1943).

98   Examples include the work of Qasmiyeh, Hilal and Petti, for which see notes and bibliogrpahy throughout this paper. Other examples include studies by Agier (2014); Feldman (2015); Sigona (2015); Turner (2016).

99   Sassen's (2014, p. 211) terminology. See also Agier (2014); Picker and Silvia (2015).

100   Fassin and Richard (2009). On issues of precarity and resilience: Muehlebach (2013).

101   I am grateful to Aref Husseini for the many conversations and for his generosity in sharing his knowledge, poetry and friendship. This message is reprinted here with Aref Husseini's permission. For a prolonged dialogue with Aref and another poet Paul Magee: Magee et al. (2019).

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Comment

Non-Return and Non-Arrival in Aboriginal Australia. Comment on Isayev (2021). Ancient Wandering and Permanent Temporariness. *Humanities* 10: 91

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Abstract: This dialogue constitutes an engagement with Elena Isayev's article, "Ancient Wandering and Permanent Temporariness". It focusses on concepts Elena has marshalled for the analysis of ancient and contemporary experiences of displacement ("non-return", "non-arrival", "permanent temporariness") within what are largely international political frameworks. The point of our response is to see what happens when we apply these concepts to Aboriginal people's experiences of displacement *within* the Australian nation—a country that did not even count the indigenous as citizens until 1967. Some striking parallels emerge, in relation to how a people can be forced to live in a temporary state, their lives "made in between". Our response took the form of a conversation and was recorded on 6 December 2021. We choose to speak and transcribe these thoughts, rather than write them, as a way to maintain the dialogic mode (a.k.a. "yarning") in which Aboriginal intellectual work has flourished for millennia now. Towards the end of the exchange Paul Collis suggests that not only Aboriginal people, but the land itself, suffers from a kind of "permanent temporariness".

Keywords: permanent temporariness; internal exile; Aboriginal Australia; suffering of country

PAUL MAGEE: Elena's article starts with a long quotation from Sandi Hillal and Alessandro Petti. The quotation is about the idea of "permanent temporariness". Hillal and Petti begin by noting that "the condition of permanent temporariness is imposed on us. It is a regime that exists today and is manifested of course in refugee camps as an extreme, but it's diffused into many other spheres" (Hillal and Petti 2018, p. 52, qtd in (Isayev 2021, p. 1)). Elena is going to talk about it as a state of "non-return". You're not allowed to go back to wherever it is that you're in exile from. But she'll also say that it's a state of "non-arrival" (Isayev 2021, p. 3). There's nowhere you're allowed to get to. You're stuck in that camp, that detention centre, that whatever sort of place. Your temporariness becomes permanent.

She also talks about the hypocrisy of a system that, "does not allow for spaces and existence to be defined outside the confined units of the nation state, while complicit and fully aware of millions of people whose lives are made in between". Theirs is "an existence seemingly beyond history, where histories are nationally defined" (Isayev 2021, p. 5).

We're talking about people "whose collective absence from their countries would form an emptiness larger than any one of Europe's nations" (Isayev 2021, p. 4). According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, there are 82.4 million displaced people in the world today—maybe three and a half times the population of Australia.

To come to the stuff that we're going to chat about, the people whose plight Elena is theorising, and wanting us to ameliorate, are obviously in a different situation to Aboriginal people in Australia. But then again, towards the end of the article, Lena starts talking about landless people in Brazil, who have reclaimed land in the Dandara region, and even set up civic institutions there, in spite of the risk of eviction. In other words, the things that characterise life in international refugee camps and detention centres, with all their

"permanent temporariness", might characterise the life of internally displaced peoples within nations like Australia, as well.

I thought maybe we could start in terms of the forms of "permanent temporariness" experienced by Aboriginal people in Australia today. I am wondering how applicable you think this concept is to Aboriginal Australia.

PAUL COLLIS: I think, apart from a very small number of Aboriginal people, generally the Central Desert mob, people from the Kimberley, perhaps, Yolŋu, people Alice Springs-way, Uluru, apart from them, the rest of us have been temporarily removed from our country. And that's unlikely to change. Well, it won't change in my life time. Land rights has not been delivered to Aboriginal people. The sorts of places that we can claim are on land that nobody else wants—nobody else wants them and it doesn't look like they'll have any use for the public good in the foreseeable future. Swamps, deserts, those kinds of places.

PAUL MAGEE: You mean because of the 1993 Native Title Act, which held that native title applied in Australia, but only on places where there was continuous indigenous occupation? In other words, it didn't apply in places you guys had been kicked out of.

PAUL COLLIS: Yes.

We don't really have land rights. I think Aboriginal people who come from places like Bourke, who've lived in communities like I have, would generally agree that we are not welcome on our traditional lands. So we are nowhere near a kind of traditional behaviour or lifestyle.

PAUL MAGEE: That'd be this idea of "non-return"— you can't go back. Even if you maybe can, to visit, you can't go back and live there. It's not being allowed, to live that way.

What about this idea of "non arrival"?

PAUL COLLIS: Non-arrival is interesting, isn't it? It's a terrible term, but it's very succinct. It's exactly what refugees and other displaced people suffer.

I was born in Bourke and I grew up in Bourke. We generally didn't go too far outside of the town. That's because outside of the town is owned by white people: big station owners. There'd be signs. Some Aboriginal people would go shooting for a kangaroo, or an emu, or something like that. They'd go out in a car, they'd get onto the floodplains, chase one down. Sometimes they'd have to cross private property, a station owner's property. The station owners had signs—I still remember the signs quite clearly, from when I was a kid—"YOU TRESSPASS, I SHOOT". They were protecting their land (our land, really) with guns, and they were not afraid to use them.

We know from experience that when an Aboriginal person's been shot, or run over by a car, or something like that—and there's generally no witnesses, or not many witnesses—white people can say virtually anything. "I didn't see him, it was dark. He jumped in front of the car. He threatened me with a knife". All too often, the prosecution of Aboriginal people is flawed.

So I didn't venture outside the town much, when I was a kid. I'd go down the river.

Along the river, we were free, really. No one owned that land, because it was the river banks. But there were places we wouldn't go, because they were sacred places, or women's places. Down past the Catholic church, for example, round the bend from that big structure down near the wharf, about 400, 500 m around the bend, there's a women's birthing site. I asked Gertie and Margaret, last time I was home, "Did boys go down there and swim?" And Gertie said, "No, generally they were pretty good. They'd stay away from where they knew there was women's business".

PAUL MAGEE: So you grew up in Bourke. Is there a way in which Bourke was a place you'd arrived at? Or did it have a feeling of temporariness about it, too?

PAUL COLLIS: Very temporary. If you have a look at the cemetery in Bourke, you'll find a lot of kids from the 1960s, dead before they were ten years old.

PAUL MAGEE: Oh fuck. I hadn't meant temporary that way.

PAUL COLLIS: Yeah. Very fucking temporary. Kids dying of whooping cough, polio, those kinds of things. Generally preventable diseases. Those kids were dead well before

they were ten. The next gap was people who were dead before they were 21. The older brothers and sisters. I don't know what the numbers are like now. But I know that the Aboriginal youth suicide rate is the highest in the world. We're very temporary.

We know that cops and other people don't like us. We know that if we're walking around at night, going from one place to another, we might be talking, couple of cousins or something, our voices might be raised—people ring the police on us. They ring the police, thinking that we're trying to break into their house.

You're under constant surveillance. That kind of pressure—I reckon it's one of the reasons those kids end up so fragile as well. Not the only reason.

And that's pretty typical of most bush towns.

When you and I went to Mudgee that time, it took us a while to find any black faces. When I asked the Aboriginal youth worker, "How do youse get on with whitefellas?", she said, "It's all right, because a lot of us are like me". She pointed to her skin, which was a really light tan. "They don't give us a real hard time. But we stay away. We stay out of town, mostly". And that's their country.

So we're very temporary.

I was fighting other boys in the school yard when I was 11. The police drove me home one time, and warned my parents that'd be no second chance. Next time round, I'd be charged. This is another aspect of that temporariness. They meant that I'd be sent away to Mount Penang, or somewhere like that. I wouldn't have come back for at least 18 months. You'd come back at 13, but by that stage, you'dve missed out of on a hell of a lot of family life, and a hell of a lot of town life. You don't fit back in very well. And once you do a sentence, cops are all over you, they let you know that they're watching you—this kid of shit. I've seen cousins that I went to school with—Trevor and Barry are the same age as me—they started doing Cobham and Mittagong when they were ten years old.[1] Up until then, they were fairly regular at school. Barry lived out of town, so he didn't come to school much. But Trevor was fairly regular. I'd go every day. He wouldn't some days—he didn't have money to get food. Once Trevor started going to those boys' homes, I only saw him at school twice.

So we're very temporary.

People say this is a fair country.

PAUL MAGEE: You were talking before about not being able to leave Bourke. We usually associate that kind of restriction on movement with places that have a wall around them: prisons, detention centres, certain kinds of camps. But what you described had me thinking that that sort of restraint on movement can come about through fear of likely consequences, as well.

PAUL COLLIS: Yeah. My grandfather was born at Mount Gundabooka, near the caves I took you to in 2018. I'd never been to those caves until I went out with you blokes. I was in my fifties.

PAUL MAGEE: You hadn't been there before?

PAUL COLLIS: No. That station had been private property. It was handed back over to Parks and Wildlife about 15 years before we went out there —there's an Aboriginal Management Body that's supposed to look after it.

I'd never been there.

People'd ask me, "You been out to Gundabooka, Paul?"

I'd always say, "Yes".

I was embarrassed to say that I hadn't seen the place.

When Grandfather came to live in Bourke, after the station-owner said, "You'll have to go Arch, we can't afford you anymore"—this was in 1967, when equal wages came in, and the talk around the place was that no black man was worth the same as a white man. So the black men had to go—when he came into town, my grandfather was really quiet for a long time.

One day he was drunk and he said, "I'll never go back to my country".

I said, "Why, grandfather? I won't always be small, I'll have a car one day. We can go back".

He said, "No. No whitefella's gonna tell me to get off my country. Stick it in their arses".

That heartache really crushed him. He worked until he was 65, retiring age, and then got a job as a truck-driver. And this other old truck-driver was his off-sider.

He was dead at 70, not very old really.

PAUL MAGEE: Do you think maybe he never went back because he wanted to keep the country alive in his mind, alive in the way he'd known it?

PAUL COLLIS: I think so.

He was about 44, or 45, when he came from that station to Bourke. His kids were raised in Bourke. Previously, he would come in once a month, give Nan money and spend the weekend with them. Nan and the kids were on the Reserve.[2] Technically he wasn't supposed to visit them because he had the Certificate of Exemption, which meant he was exempt from being Aboriginal.[3]

PAUL MAGEE: Oh. Jesus.

So if he was still classified as an Aboriginal, he wouldn't even have been able to leave the Reserve, to work on the land. But now he had an exemption, he wasn't allowed to be on the Reserve, wasn't mean to be with Aboriginal people at all.

PAUL COLLIS: Yeah.

But by that stage, they'd kind of turned a blind eye to those things. The kids were really happy to see him, as kids can be. Nan was struggling hard with nine kids. She had ten, but one baby died. Nine kids she raised, virtually without him.

So those first forty years, he lived on that station. He was born there.

In my PhD, I wondered who would have suffered the most from that absence: the country, or him? I came to realize that they both suffered. Because after the Aboriginal men had gone, the station no longer had them there to say, "You can't farm there". They used to keep the whites away from sacred places. We were looking at those cave paintings at Gundabooka, back in 2018. Round the other side, they're much grander. But they're also more accessible to the public. So Parks and Wildlife put a fence around, to stop people getting in and sleeping there, rubbing against the cave paintings. Their sweat was taking stuff away, so they fenced it off. They were round there shooting, as well, roo-shooting at night, putting holes in the roof and stuff like that. Pretty irresponsible.

PAUL MAGEE: Something I think a lot of white people don't realize is that in many parts of Australia, indigenous people had their land taken away, but they also stayed on it, labouring for others. They hardly earned anything. But that allowed them to maintain contact with the land, and to have some control over it. It's one of the really sad parts of Australian history, just to think what it must've been like, to be in that situation: working for the people who stole your land, so as to stay close to it.

PAUL COLLIS: I think he started work round about the time he was ten, or 11 years old. His brothers would have then gone to the war. Some of them came back, some of them didn't. There was a shortage of men. Black men knew that country better than anybody else, they worked twice as fucking hard. You've got a horse to ride, that wasn't yours to own. You've got a saddle to use, but it wasn't yours to keep. He became the head stockman. In those days, going on droving trips, he would have driven 800 sheep from the Queensland border to Bourke. It might take you eight days or something, just depending on how hot it was and how slowly you were going. And how many other drovers you had. If you're out for three months, each drover would need probably eight horses. And you might have eight stockmen. 64 horses. He'd break all the new horses. Saddle-break them: take the saddle off, just mount them lightly so they respond to the reins, and then turn them out again. He wasn't afraid of work. I guess he didn't like the sadness of seeing himself age, and the country deteriorate.

PAUL MAGEE: He sounds extraordinarily proud—that decision to just leave and not go back, because he didn't want to be in the position of someone who gets knocked back from his own land.

PAUL COLLIS: He would have been the boss Aboriginal guy on that station, and he was our elder as well.

He only had two sons and they both worked there on the station, straight from school. Robert, the eldest one, stayed. He got called, "Boy". Uncle Crow went droving with Frank Dyneton. He was about 14 when he went. Never seen him much. Boy worked down there and so did most of grandfather's nephews. So all these Barkindji[4] guys were working on that station. And when the referendum and equal wages came along in 1967, most of them were sacked.

PAUL MAGEE: I want to connect the situation you're describing with your grandfather, and your uncles—Aboriginal people managing the land that had been taken away from them, in this very precarious position, but nonetheless managing to look after sacred sites— I want to draw a link between that and Albert Namatjira in Central Australia in the 1950s. I remember once you saying about Namatjira that he was doing paintings that appealed to whites, but he was doing ritual through those paintings as well.

PAUL COLLIS: It isn't well known. But when he was painting Hidden Valley and other places, Aboriginal men in Alice Springs weren't allowed to leave Alice Springs. They were under lock and key, because they were on Reserve. He was a postman. He would be on camels, he might be gone for three, four weeks. When he was going through these sacred places, he was painting them for the men stuck in Alice Springs, to show them where they would have been going through law. A very impressive man.

PAUL MAGEE: He was doing a kind of virtual initiation?

PAUL COLLIS: He was preparing the land for them, doing ceremony there by himself, then bringing those paintings back to show them in Alice, in the months before he exhibited them.

I don't think there was any end that Aboriginal people wouldn't have gone to, to maintain their contact with the country.

I remember Wendy Sommerville telling me—it must have been four or five years ago, when she started her PhD—about a piece she'd written about her mother and her uncle, who were born on a mountain, down on the South Coast. That mountain was their home, and it then became a reserve —whitefellas put a fence around it. But in the 70′s, the government was closing the reserves, and said, "You have to leave this mountain and move to Nowra".

Wendy said, "I've never seen my mother so upset, and so quiet. Same with my uncle". You never recover from that stuff.

If you have a look at some of the oral histories about the 1960s, *Wiradjuri Stories*, for instance, you'll see people speak about the reserves with rose colored-glasses. "Weren't we better then? We didn't have all this money and all these jobs, we looked after each other".

That is true, but it's not completely true. They didn't have much to look after each other with. If you think of the high morbidity rates with the kids, it was terrible. There wasn't a lot of food to go round. But women still say, "Oh, it was great".

What was great was being close to a more natural environment. In Bourke, I'll show you next time we go up there, there's a pound yard. It's a round yard, where any stray horses would be put. This is going back to the fifties and sixties, when horses were prevalent. If a horse or donkey got away, they'd put it in that pound yard. You'd come down and pay 2 pound ten, or whatever it was, to get your horse out, and off you'd go.

PAUL MAGEE: Like a pawnbroker.

PAUL COLLIS: Yeah, but it's to the shire.

Aboriginal people were put in that fucking pound yard too. My Nana lived there for a while.

PAUL MAGEE: Living there?

PAUL COLLIS: Yeah, they put us in the pound yard. I think they did it because it was land that was already destined to be occupied by animals. So the blacks wouldn't take up any of their land.

They were that spiteful.

PAUL MAGEE: I think the whites in Australia have always been very reluctant to see black people as the same as them, because then they'd have to face up to the fact of theft.

PAUL COLLIS: That's right.

PAUL MAGEE: It's so obvious and so undeniable.

PAUL COLLIS: It sure is. You don't like to talk about it.

If I did a vox-pop on any street, I reckon, any part of Australia, and you asked those white people, "What are Australians?", you'd hear, "We're good. We're bloody good people. We stand up for our mates. We're there in a fight. We're generous".

None of that's come Aboriginal-way—not without a whole lot of effort.

The great "heroes" of this country, like Lang Hancock, say, "Those half-caste ones, they're the ones that are bloody no good. I would put stuff in the water to sterilise them. So they'd eventually die out".

That's what he used to say. He's not the only one who said it.

Go back and have a look at John Pilger's first film, *The Secret Country*. There's a scene up in Moree. He was following Charlie Perkins and the students doing freedom rides. In Moree, you see an old white guy, an old cigarette-stained bastard, you know: "Those bloody blacks. 'Eh won't work. 'Eh no bloody good".

Everything's based around this idea of work. And you have other white people saying, "Oh yes, they've gotta work. They've gotta work, just like everybody else".

PAUL MAGEE: Yeah, that's a common phrase: "Just like everybody else".

PAUL COLLIS: You've got to work like everybody else, but you won't get paid the same. They didn't like paying Aboriginal people wages: "They'd only drink it. They don't know how to manage money".

Maybe Aboriginal people didn't know how to manage money because they didn't have enough of it to manage, and because they didn't have a bank book. When the referendum came through in 1967, it meant that you could carry your own bank book. It meant that you could go into another town without getting permission off the police.

PAUL MAGEE: So Aboriginal people weren't just allowed to have citizenship in 1967, which is what most people think 1967 means: it also brought them more freedom of movement.

PAUL COLLIS: Yes.

But white people are still nervous when they see black people walking around after dark. Thinking that we're the Bogeyman, murderers, rapists, robbers.

There have been Aboriginal people who have robbed and fought, but generally that's not the case. Bourke's got a really high crime rate for a small country town. But much of that crime rate is for summary offences: swearing and stuff like that, being drunk on the street. I looked into this, when I was doing my PhD: there have been two or three murders in Bourke in the last 100 years. And yet the *Sydney Telegraph* had on the front page, "Bourke, Biggest Crime Rate in the World".[5]

It's often for driving without a license. An Aboriginal guy got sick of seeing his nieces and nephews getting pinched for unlicensed driving, so he started a learn-to-drive course. It dropped the crime rate by 70%.

Why didn't the cops do it?

PAUL MAGEE: About halfway through Elena's article, there's another set of quotations from the architects, Hillal and Petti. Petti is referring to refugees returning to their homelands, and he says at one point, "There isn't a single return, but many possible returns". Hillal adds, at that point, "In Bahia, they told us, 'Every time I plant a Boab tree in Brazil, it feels like I'm going back to Africa.'" (Hillal and Petti 2018, pp. 44–45, quoted in (Isayev 2021, p. 7)). Even though those Bahians are way over in Brazil, as a result of the slave culture that forcibly migrated them there, they tell Hillal they return to Africa through

the act of planting a boab tree. I'm wondering whether this might relate to the poems that you've been writing in Barkindji language. Do you think there's a kind of return, when you're writing in Barkindji? Is it a way of going back?

PAUL COLLIS: I think you're right, there was a return through writing those poems—but not to the place that I knew, not to those barbed wire fences, and those signs. It was more connected to my grandfather, who's passed away, than it was to that country. I became more interested in the country as I got into places that he knew. And then, when I was writing in Barkindji, it was like the distance between me and the country shrunk. It's just like those words: *wita witalana*: "to look out over". When we went out to Gundabooka—like I said, I'd never been there before—but I knew every part of that road, and every bit of that rock.

PAUL MAGEE: I thought you must have been there before. You were guiding us.

PAUL COLLIS: I dreamt all that stuff. I could see it as clear as looking at you on this screen.

PAUL MAGEE: Paul, the last time we did one of these zooms—that lecture we did for my students in lock-down—I asked you, "Is writing home?" I'll read you your response: "I think for me, it is. It's the only home I've got. It's the only sense of place that I understand, that I return to. I live in a flat, but that is not permanent. It's not stable. Sometimes I sleep in my car. Where I am is not home. Writing is. It's a returning to, it's a place where I'm always at".

So when you're writing in Barkindji—

PAUL COLLIS: Yeah, I'm not here when I'm doing that. I'm sitting here, sometimes at this desk, but my head isn't.

In the last year of the drought,[6] when the river was completely empty, I must've written ten poems and all around the dying river, the drying river, and the desecration of guys on motorbikes riding up and down the river bed. "Haven't you got any fucking respect?" Of course, they don't know the story about the Rainbow Serpent. They think, it's good flat country, great for tearing up with those knobby tyres on their bikes. That stuff was really stressing me out.

By writing in Barkindji, I'm also keeping something back from white people. They don't know the meaning.

PAUL MAGEE: If we go back to this phrase "permanent temporariness", there's a kind of permanence to writing, isn't there?

PAUL COLLIS: There can be, if it's what you choose to keep doing. You may have little breaks in between, bouts of ill-health, things like that, but generally, writing is there. It's there when you're feeling good and it's there when you're not feeling so well, either.

PAUL MAGEE: The writing will still be there after those tire tracks have worn away. And the writing provides us a model, a world for us to come back to, maybe?

PAUL COLLIS: I hope so.

Red Room Poetry asked me to go out to Broken Hill, and teach Aboriginal kids Barkindji. I said, "I don't know enough Barkindji, those kids'd know more than me".

They said, "You'll be okay. It's what you do with it".

Anyway, in the end, I didn't go, it was too far and I didn't have enough time in between the semester to get out there. But Red Room was really significant in getting me engaged with Barkindji.[7]

When I was 11, I asked Grandfather, "Why don't you teach me how to speak Barkindji, Grandfather?"

He says, "Who would you talk to, when I'm gone?"

It was like that. Very matter-of-fact.

"Who would you talk to, when I'm gone?"

He would have been, probably, about 60 years old, and he could speak Barkindji fluently, and those other eight surrounding languages—not as fluently, but almost. And he could speak English, and write as well. I'd call him pretty gifted. But he wouldn't. He'd say that was how everyone used to talk. We could all speak each other's languages, because

we were interacting. A lot of those languages were similar—some words were the same. If there were 254 languages across the country at the point of contact with whitefellas, it would have been 1800, 1900 dialects, easily. I think it was in the language, that's how they were keeping the country invigorated, alive, and sacred.

Later, identity was—it wasn't going anywhere—but it wasn't being taught either. It had gone into hiatus. Because the people that could speak the language were working on stations, railways. And they weren't trained teachers.

Grandfather grew up in traditional society. He would have probably seen the last Barkindji-led corrobboree in that area, before he was ten. He was born into that traditional life, but started to grow out of it. He and the others had no doubt that Barkindji had been shattered. But because they could still speak it, they felt they had some sense about them of Barkindji.

They didn't teach kids like me any of these languages at school. In High School, the two languages they taught were Japanese and German.

PAUL MAGEE: In Bourke?

PAUL COLLIS: No, in boarding school. I was in the A class. I was picking up German fairly easily. Japanese—I was starting to hear the language. The German teacher, who was an Englishman, didn't like me, I don't know what I did, but he kicked me out into the B Class. I had to go and do fucking farm mechanics, and learn how to weld. I was certainly not interested in welding and that kind of stuff because that's what they did on stations. "Do your own work, you bastards". I wasn't going to work for them.

PAUL MAGEE: I want to take you back to this phrase, "permanent temporariness". We've been using it to characterise the experiences of exile that Barkindji people like you and your grandfather have had within your very own country. But what about in traditional times? Were they all about permanence? Or was there a way in which temporariness might have been seen as the natural state of being back then? Maybe settling in a place for a while, moving around on the land?

PAUL COLLIS: Yeah. But it was also in the culture.

You are a boy for a little while, temporarily. And in your boyhood, they would separate you from girls, round about age 8 or 9—when boys are starting to get boisterous, running through their community, slapping girls and stuff like that. They'd put them into a men's camp. That's when your training out of boyhood really begins. Your main disciplinarian, if you were a Yolŋu for example, would be your mother's brother. He'd be the bloke that'd chastise you. He'd also be the bloke who's there when you get initiated. So he, and probably your father, would take you into the bush, after you got cut, if they were doing those things. They'd do hunting from there and look after you while you heal. They'd wait for two or three weeks to bring you back.

PAUL MAGEE: Did people's geographical location shift much?

PAUL COLLIS: Before white people came here it wouldn't have shifted that much. But there'd be change in your place in the culture. The story they tell you when you're eight or ten would be different to the story they tell you after you come out of initiation. You might be 11 or so when you do your first initiation. You'd do another one a couple of years later, three years, might be four. Meantime, you're growing up, gaining responsibilities. Once you go through law, you're allowed to carry weapons. They announce that you're initiated. Everybody knew that anyway, because you're in the community.

When they took the boys away, they'd put them on the other side of the camp. Same with the girls, they separated them too. Their training then began: how to be Barkindji, how to be the best Barkindji you could be in the world.

When I was fighting, at age 11, Grandfather took me down to the river, and he pointed to a brown kite circling over it, "See that one?"

I said, "Yeah".

He said, "That's me", and pointed to himself. "That's my meat, my totem. That's yours too. Do you know that?"

I said, "Yeah".

"Do you know anything else about it?"

"No".

He started to tell me about the totemic relationship: how from the earliest time he could remember, he was always told that that bird was his totem and how special it was. Then he pointed to a Gidgee tree and said, "Do you know why I'm not cutting that one down?"

"No".

"That's you. When you die, your kids can come and speak to that tree. They can speak to you. Your spirit's in there".

PAUL MAGEE: So people are the temporary vessels for this permanent spirit culture that moves through them.

PAUL COLLIS: Yeah.

When Wendy showed me that story about her mom and brother having to move off their land, into Nowra, I said, "Do you know, Wendy, all places have memory".

She said, "Yes, I know. That mountain is suffering as well".

If you go to places like the one I just mentioned, you can almost feel an emptiness. It's something quite strange and unnerving.

There's a back road that goes up from Dungog to Gloucester. John Heath, his wife, Louise, and Louise's old aunt, who was an old traditional woman, a Bundjalung woman, drove up that mountain. Louise started to haemorrhage, and to be sick. She was saying "Please, take me back. Take me back".

So halfway up the mountain, John turned around and drove her back down to Newcastle. As he got back down to the flat part, she stopped vomiting. The old woman was singing traditional songs in the back. John couldn't hear what she was saying, but it calmed Louise down.

About 30 Aboriginal women and kids were pushed off that cliff by [British] redcoats. That's the official figures. But Aboriginal people—Biripi people—say there's more like 60 to 80 people who were pushed off.

All these places have memory. A lot of places I won't go to, because the memories are like that.

PAUL MAGEE: It's just not a white way of thinking.

PAUL COLLIS: No.

The country's alive with the spirit.

Where I went through law,[8] up the other side of Cessnock, coming round the road, you go down over this creek, and come out on the other side into this huge amphitheatre. It might be 200, 300 feet high. And it's all around you. Soon as you enter, the birds just go mad. Cockatoos, parrots, galahs, they just scream. They're happy that you're back.

PAUL MAGEE: An end to the exile?

PAUL COLLIS: We are temporary people. You're only a kid for a short time. If you're an elder, if you live long enough, you're an elder for a long time. Hopefully those elders live for a long time. We've got elders now who are 40 years old. They're grandparents, sometimes they're double grandparents, by the time they're 40—way too young. But they're taking care of things—not the traditional stuff, but other things. If we're living in town, we can't really look after the country the way we'd like to. A lot of us don't know those traditional things. But there are still enough people, enough elders who are around, taking adults and kids out into the bush and teaching them how to cut trees, how to do carvings.

I wanted to do that about 20 years ago. I wanted to get a stonemason and somebody who could do carvings in the trees and take them out to Bourke, because we weren't doing it anymore. I thought, once those trees are gone, and a lot of them did go in the last drought. Up around Moree and Gunnedah, those trees were well over 120 years old. They were so dry, once the water was gone, there was nothing to keep them from falling over. I was worried about what would happen, once all of that was gone. We know where there's still

some scar trees.[9] But most of those scar trees were cut down by white people, because they didn't want any evidence that blacks were there.

I had a student two years ago, talking about Aboriginal presence. She said, "I didn't know there were Aboriginal people where I came from".

I said, "What do you think happened to them?"

"I don't know, I just thought they went away".

So we're kind of invisible. But we're highly visible in a place like Bourke. Bourke's got the highest number of cops per citizen anywhere in the country.

Why?

Notes

1   Cobham Youth Justice Centre, in Western Sydney, is the principal remand centre for juveniles in New South Wales and was opened in 1980. Paul is referring to an earlier institution on the site. Mittagong Training School for Boys, in the mountains to the south west of Sydney, functioned from 1943 to 1976.

2   Reserves were government-controlled parcels of land, set aside ("reserved") for Aboriginal people to live on, with the aim of reducing, and otherwise regulating, indigenous interactions with whites. The reserve system began in the mid 1820′s, spreading through the country into the early 1900′s and lasted through to the late 1960′s.

3   A "Certificate of Exemption" granted its bearer the right *not* to be subject to the provisions of the legislation governing indigenous people in the state or territory granting that exemption. Exemption allowed for greater freedom in employment, movement through areas where Aboriginal people were not allowed, and the purchasing and drinking of alcohol. In most jurisdictions, the exempt were required as the price of their certification to sever ties with all other indigenous people. Exemption could also be revoked. The system came to an end after the 1967 referendum, which determined that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders were to be counted as part of the Australian population, and so could be subject to Commonwealth laws, which served to override the State and Territory acts to which exemptions applied.

4   The Barkindji are one of the over 250 Aboriginal nations, each with their own language and culture, represented on the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS) Map of Indigenous Australia: https://aiatsis.gov.au/explore/map-indigenous-australia (accessed on 8 January 2022).

5   See, relatedly, https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/bourke-tops-list-more-dangerous-than-any-country-in-the-world-20130201-2dq3y.html (accessed on 8 January 2022).

6   The drought ran from 2017–2019.

7   See further, https://redroompoetry.org/poets/paul-collis/ (accessed on 8 January 2022).

8   i.e., went through initiation.

9   The exposed sapwood of trees that have had bark removed for practical or ceremonial processes dries out and dies, forming a distinctive type of elongated scarring. Such scar trees provide rich evidence of Aboriginal habitation and culture and are found in rural and urban settings alike. There is one at the University of Canberra, just south of the library.

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