# Supplementary Materials: Communication, Expectations and Trust: an Experiment with Three Media*

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## 1. Experimental Instructions

### 1.1. Part 1 Instructions (ALL)

**Introduction**

Welcome to the experiment. This is an experiment funded by a research foundation to study decision making. For showing up on time, you will be paid a $5 show-up fee. You may receive additional earnings based on your and others decisions. All payoffs will be in "computer dollars".

This experiment is composed of several parts. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly pick a part for which you will get paid for. We will pay you in cash an amount equal to $1.00 for every computer dollar that you earn.

Today's session will take about an hour and a half. Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment.

Click CONTINUE when you are ready to go on.

**Decisions and payoffs**

In this part of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with another person. You and the person you are matched with will receive ane endowment of 10 computers dollars each. One of you will be randomly assigned as Person A and the other will be assigned as Person B. Person A will have the opportunity to send some, all or none of their endowment to B. Each computer dollar sent to B will be tripled. B will then decide how much money to send back to A. B can send back some, all or none of what they received from A.

Click CONTINUE when you are ready to go on.

**Examples**

To help you determine the potential payoff you and the other person you are matched with can make, you will have access to the Calculator on the left at all times. This allows you to explore hypothetical situations before actually making decisions.

Let's try it now.

EXAMPLE 1:

A decides to send 6 computer dollars, B sends back 4 computer dollars

A's payoff = 8 computer dollars = 10 computer dollars endowment – 6 computer dollars sent to B + 4 computer dollars sent back by B

B's payoff = 24 computer dollars = 10 computer dollars endowment + 3*(6 computer dollars sent by A) – 4 computer dollars sent back to A

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EXAMPLE 2:

A sends 3 computer dollars, B sends back 8 computer dollars

A's payoff = 15 computer dollars = 10 computer dollars endowment − 3 computer dollars sent to B + 8 computer dollars sent back by B

B's payoff = 11 computer dollars = 10 computer dollars endowment + 3*(3 computer dollars sent by A) − 8 computer dollars sent back to A

Feel free to experiment with the calculator now. Enter any number between 0 and 10 under "How much A sends to B" and any number between 0 and the amount received from A under "How much B sends to A" to explore how the earnings change. Feel to experiment as many times as you like.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

Click NEXT when you're done.

**Entering Decisions for A**
Your computer screen will display your type (A or B) and your ID number. Your type and ID number will be the same for the entire experiment.

If you are assigned as Person A, you will decide how much of your endowment to send to Person B.

While Person A is making their decision, Person B will be asked how much they expect A to send to them. Person B will receive a $1 bonus if their expectation exactly matches A's decision and the bonus will decrease as B's expectation gets further away from A's decision. The lowest value for the bonus is $0.

Please practice entering A's decision in the top left box and B's expectation in the bottom left box now. This is for practice and it will not affect your payoff in the actual experiment.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

**Entering Decisions for B**
After Person A has made their decision, if you are assigned as Person B, you will be informed how much you received from A and you will decide how much of that amount you would like to send back.

While Person B is making their decision, Person A will be asked how much they expect B to send back to them. Person A will receive a $1 bonus if their expectation exactly matches B's decision and the bonus will decrease as A's expectation gets further away from B's decision. The lowest value for the bonus is $0.

Please practice entering B's decision in the top left box and A's expectation in the bottom left box now. This is for practice, and it will not affect your payoff in the actual experiment.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

Click CONTINUE when you are ready for a review.

*1.2. Review Questions*

Use the calculator on the left to answer the following questions.

Suppose Person A sent 7 computer dollars and Person B sent back 11 computer dollars. What is:

1. Person A's payoff:

2. Person B's payoff:

Once the experimenter has checked your work, press NEXT.

Results will not be shown until the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be informed of your decision, the decision of the person you were matched with, and your payoff.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

Click CONTINUE when you are ready to go on.

### 1.3. Part 2 Instructions (FTF)

In this part of the experiment, you will participate in the same experiment as before, with a different person. In some previous experiments, participants found it beneficial to communicate with each other. We will now give you an opportunity to communicate in person. After the communication time is over, you will participate in the same experiment as before, with one of the people you just communicated with.

You will have an opportunity to communicate in groups of four people. You will be facing the other people in your group. The people in your discussion group are picked at random from all of the experiment participants and do not necessarily include the person that you were matched with in Part 1 of the experiment. Your discussion group does include the person you will be matched with in Part 2.

The experimenter will direct you to your discussion group now. Please do not start communication until the experimenter says so.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

Has everyone joined the group now? You will now be given 10 minutes to communicate with the people in your group.

Please start communication now.

[PAUSE]

The communication time is now over. Please stop talking and return to your computer terminals.

You will now participate in the same experiment as before, with one of the people you just communicated with.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

### 1.4. Part 2 Instructions (FB)

In this part of the experiment, you will participate in the same experiment as before, with a different person. In some previous experiments, participants found it beneficial to communicate with each other. We will now give you an opportunity to communicate through a Facebook group. After the communication time is over, you will participate in the same experiment as before, with one of the people you just communicated with.

In your screens please enter your email address that is connected to your Facebook account. When you're done entering your email address, please press OK.

Please give the experimenter a few minutes to invite your email addresses to a Facebook group. The experiment will invite you to join a Facebook group. In the email address that you have provided us earlier, you will find a message from Facebook inviting you to a group. You will have an opportunity to communicate in groups of four people. The people in your discussion group are picked at random from all of the experiment participants and do not necessarily include the person that you were matched with in Part 1 of the experiment. Your discussion group does include the person you will be matched with in Part 2. Prior to starting communication, we will give you a few minutes to log in to your Facebook account and join the group. Please do not start communication until the experimenter says so.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

Please raise your hand if you cannot find the invitation in your email, or if you need help joining the Facebook group. On the next page, you will find step-by- step instructions on how to join the group, communicate with the other people in your group, and delete your Facebook account.

[PAUSE]

Has everyone joined the group now? You will now be given 10 minutes to communicate with the people in the group via Facebook posts.

Please start communication now.

[PAUSE]

The communication time is now over. Please log off your Facebook accounts and close the web browser. The experimenter will remove you from the discussion group momentarily.

You will now participate in the same experiment as before, with one of the people you just communicated with.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

*1.5. Part 2 Instructions (C)*

In this part of the experiment, you will participate in the same experiment as before, with a different person. In some previous experiments, participants found it beneficial to communicate with each other. We will now give you an opportunity to communicate via computer. After the communication time is over, you will participate in the same experiment as before, with one of the people you just communicated with.

You will have an opportunity to communicate in groups of four people. You will be communicating by sending and receiving text messages to and from the other people in your group. The people in your discussion group are picked at random from all of the experiment participants and do not necessarily include the person you were matched with in Part 1 of the experiment. Your discussion group does include the person you will be matched with in Part 2.

In your screens, you will see a chat box where you can type messages to people in your group. Please do not start communication until the experimenter says so.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

You will now be given 10 minutes to communicate with the people in your group via text messages.

Please start communication now.

[PAUSE]

The communication time is now over.

You will now participate in the same experiment as before, with one of the people you just communicated with.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

*1.6. Part 2 Instructions (NC)*

In this part of the experiment, you will participate in the same experiment as before, with a different person. The person you will be matched with is picked at random from all of the experiment participants and is not necessarily the person that you were matched with in the first part of the experiment.

We will need a few minutes to set up your new matches. During this time you may use the web browser to surf the net or check your email or Facebook account if you want. Please do not close the z-Leaf program if you decide go to the web browser.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

[PAUSE]

The setup time is now over. Please close the web browsers. You will now participate in the same experiment as before, with a different person. ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

## 2. Exit Questionnaire

**Feedback**

| | |
|---|---|
| Your ID number is: | 1 |

What is your gender?
    ○ MALE
    ○ FEMALE

What is your major at UH?
[                                                                          ]

What type of student are you?
    ○ Freshman Undergraduate
    ○ Sophomore Undergraduate
    ○ Junior Undergraduate
    ○ Senior Undergraduate
    ○ Graduate
    ○ Other

Have you participated in an Economics Experiment before?
    ○ Yes
    ○ No

Have you participated in a Psychology Experiment before?
    ○ Yes
    ○ No

Do you have a Facebook account?
    ○ Yes
    ○ No

How often do you use it?
    ○ Every Day
    ○ Once or Twice a Week
    ○ Not that Often
    ○ Not Applicable

How may Facebook friends do you have?
    ○ Less than 10
    ○ 10 to 50
    ○ 50 to 100
    ○ More than 100
    ○ Not Applicable

[ END ]

## 3. Additional Tables

**Table S1.** Summary of Experimental Sessions.

| Session | Location | Treatment | # Subjects | Average pay, $ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | UH Manoa | FB | 8 | 17.25 |
| 2 | UH Manoa | NC | 8 | 17.00 |
| 3 | UH Manoa | FB | 8 | 16.88 |
| 4 | UH Manoa | Chat | 8 | 18.25 |
| 5 | UH Manoa | FTF | 8 | 16.75 |
| 6 | UH Manoa | Chat | 8 | 18.63 |
| 7 | UH Manoa | NC | 8 | 18.75 |
| 8 | UH Manoa | FTF | 8 | 17.13 |
| 9 | UH Manoa | FB | 8 | 14.75 |
| 10 | UH Manoa | Chat | 8 | 17.88 |
| 11 | UH Manoa | FTF | 8 | 18.63 |
| 12 | UH Manoa | NC | 8 | 13.38 |

**Table S2.** Estimation of amount sent before communication.

| | Amount Sent, $ Linear regression | | Amount Sent, $ Tobit estimation | | Probability of Sending All Logit estimation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| expected return | 0.76 | | 1.47 | | 1.44 | |
| | (1.03) | | (1.35) | | (0.94) | |
| expect fair return | | 2.13* | | 3.59** | | 2.06** |
| | | (1.17) | | (1.64) | | (0.96) |
| FTF | -1.27 | -1.42 | -2.11 | -2.43 | -1.51 | -1.75 |
| | (1.33) | (1.28) | (1.76) | (1.69) | (1.04) | (1.07) |
| FB | -3.14** | -3.78** | -4.14** | -5.23*** | -1.53 | -2.23* |
| | (1.41) | (1.42) | (1.87) | (1.92) | (1.08) | (1.24) |
| Chat | -0.78 | -1.22 | -1.34 | -2.02 | -0.96 | -1.45 |
| | (1.34) | (1.32) | (1.79) | (1.77) | (0.95) | (1.07) |
| FB daily user, many friends | 0.77 | 0.45 | 0.89 | 0.38 | 0.14 | 0.05 |
| | (1.02) | (1.01) | (1.33) | (1.31) | (0.80) | (0.84) |
| male | 0.75 | 0.81 | 1.27 | 1.44 | 1.01 | 1.10 |
| | (0.98) | (0.94) | (1.28) | (1.24) | (0.75) | (0.80) |
| constant | 5.33*** | 6.41*** | 5.32** | 7.34*** | -2.69* | -0.75 |
| | (1.86) | (1.18) | (2.43) | (1.57) | (1.53) | (0.90) |
| sigma | | | 3.95*** | 3.80*** | | |
| | | | (0.54) | (0.52) | | |
| (Pseudo) R-squared | 0.1356 | 0.1919 | 0.0299 | 0.0476 | 0.1203 | 0.1632 |
| Number of observations | 46 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 46 |

*Notes:* */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.

**Table S3.** Estimation of receiver decisions before communication.

| | Amount Returned, $ Linear regression | | Share Returned Tobit estimation | | Probability of Fair Return Logit estimation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| receiver expectation | | 0.81*** | | 0.06*** | | 0.25* |
| | | (0.28) | | (0.01) | | (0.14) |
| amount sent | 1.45*** | 1.80*** | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.21 | -0.12 |
| | (0.48) | (0.46) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.22) | (0.23) |
| sent all | -0.16 | -2.14 | 0.01 | -0.13 | 2.26 | 1.82 |
| | (3.17) | (2.98) | (0.16) | (0.14) | (1.47) | (1.52) |
| FTF | 0.79 | 0.39 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.39 | -0.53 |
| | (2.26) | (2.07) | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.97) | (1.01) |
| FB | -1.01 | 0.50 | -0.06 | 0.05 | -1.45 | -1.06 |
| | (2.30) | (2.16) | (0.12) | (0.10) | (1.02) | (1.07) |
| Chat | 0.73 | 0.58 | -0.04 | -0.05 | -1.02 | -1.15 |
| | (2.17) | (1.99) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.95) | (1.02) |
| FB daily user, many friends | 0.02 | -0.37 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.44 | -0.54 |
| | (1.74) | (1.60) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.76) | (0.80) |
| male | -0.78 | -1.11 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.48 | -0.62 |
| | (1.56) | (1.43) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.70) | (0.73) |
| constant | 1.14 | -4.84 | 0.64*** | 0.22 | 1.37 | -0.47 |
| | (3.50) | (3.80) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (1.55) | (1.89) |
| (Pseudo) R-squared | 0.4373 | 0.6134 | -0.1389 | 0.2244 | 0.0955 | 0.1493 |
| Number of observations | 46 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 46 |

*Notes:* Share returned is out of tripled amount sent. Fair return indicates returning twice the amount sent. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.

## 4. Additional Figures



**AOFFER NC Part 1**

Frequency — aoffer[part == 1 & treatmentid == 0]

**AOFFER NC Part 3**

Frequency — aoffer[part == 3 & treatmentid == 0]

**AOFFER FTF Part 1**

Frequency — aoffer[part == 1 & treatmentid == 1]

**AOFFER FTF Part 3**

Frequency — aoffer[part == 3 & treatmentid == 1]

**Figure S1.** No Communication and Face-to-Face: Amount Sent

## AOFFER FB Part 1

## AOFFER FB Part 3

## AOFFER C Part 1

## AOFFER C Part 3

**Figure S2.** Facebook and Chat: Amount Sent

**BOFFER NC Part 1**



boffer[part == 1 & treatmentid == 0]

**BOFFER NC Part 3**



boffer[part == 3 & treatmentid == 0]

**BOFFER FTF Part 1**



boffer[part == 1 & treatmentid == 1]

**BOFFER FTF Part 3**



boffer[part == 3 & treatmentid == 1]

**Figure S3.** No Communication and Face-to-Face: Amount Returned

**BOFFER FB Part 1**

**BOFFER FB Part 3**

**BOFFER C Part 1**

**BOFFER C Part 3**

**Figure S4.** Facebook and Chat: Amount Returned

## 5. Classification Categories for Contents Analysis

| Contents Code | Message Content |
|---|---|
| 0 | empty comment |
| **Social Talk** | |
| 10 | general/other |
| 11 | hello |
| 12 | breaking ice |
| 13 | small talk |
| 14 | good bye |
| 15 | sharing feelings |
| 16 | talk about media (calculator, comm media) |
| 17 | thank you/sorry |
| 18 | TALK ABOUT EXPERIMENTERS/experiment |
| 19 | personal info/friends |
| **Norms and goals discussion** | |
| 20 | general norms discussion |
| 21 | equal split /fair |
| 22 | maximize money payoff |
| 23 | max payoff and equal split |
| 24 | sharing with others, empathy |
| 25 | we win |
| 26 | most beneficial for all |
| **Strategy: Division and payoffs (What to do, how much will get)** | |
| 30 | call for strategy proposal |
| 31 | send 5 |
| 32 | send 5 / return 10 |
| 33 | send 10 |
| 34 | send 10 / return 20 |
| 35 | send low |
| 36 | send 10 / return 15 |
| 37 | send any/return half triples |
| 38 | send any/return same amount |
| 39 | send any/return half |
| **Strategy: Implementation (How to make sure everyone follows)** | |
| 40 | general/other |
| 41 | swear/commit |
| 42 | do not cheat/not be greedy |
| 43 | empathy/generocity |
| 44 | trust |
| 45 | everyone needs to be on board/work together |
| **Payoff / game discussion** | |
| 50 | Earning money general |
| 51 | money from guessiong |
| 52 | number of people/matching |
| 53 | play with THIS discussion group |
| 54 | time to discuss |
| 55 | we are being recorded |
| 56 | what the computer shows |
| 57 | last round |
| **Personal game-related discussion** | |
| 61 | My/your Role |
| 62 | i/you send |
| 63 | i/you return |

## 6. Sample Communication Logs

*6.1. FTF Treatment*

**Table S4.** FTF Group 4.

| Group | Subject ID | Communication Log |
|:---:|:---:|:---|
| 4 | | All right, so I think the best way to do it is you send a full 10 and then that will bring up the most amount of money and then you have to trust ... |
| 4 | | That's for type A, because they're the ones who ... |
| 4 | | Yes. |
| 4 | | C benefits more. |
| 4 | | No, C ... it's type A since they're full 10. |
| 4 | | Yeah, they get ... |
| 4 | | Type B is going to get more total. |
| 4 | | More, and then they can actually send more back. |
| 4 | | They're going to get 30 from that and the original 10, so what they send back is 20 and then we both get the most amount of money that we can actually make because that's the most it can add up to so ... |
| 4 | | Did you try ... |
| 4 | | Oh, no, I had economics before so I understand it so basically we just have to be able to trust B. |
| 4 | | Then you can send ... |
| 4 | | You've got to trust B to send back. |
| 4 | | So, yeah, okay. I'm A. |
| 4 | | I'm A. |
| 4 | | I'm B. |
| 4 | | Yeah, okay. |
| 4 | | So you guys send me the full construct and I send ... |

**Table S5.** FTF Group 5.

| Group | Subject ID | Communication Log |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | | whether you're A or B |
| 5 | | you put 10 for the first one so that way it maximizes |
| 5 | | uh-huh |
| 5 | | so for the first one you always put 10 |
| 5 | | yes |
| 5 | | and for the second one you always put 20 |
| 5 | | do you want to practice? |
| 5 | | ok |
| 5 | | do you want to be A or B? |
| 5 | | I think I want to be A |
| 5 | | A? Ok. So I'm B and I'm gonna guess, I think you're gonna give me 10. How much are you actually gonna give me? |
| 5 | | haha, like 10? |
| 5 | | Ok, now you have to guess. How much do you think I'm gonna give you back? |
| 5 | | If you're 10? |
| 5 | | If I'm B, how much do you think I'm gonna give you back? |
| 5 | | the same thing, right? |
| 5 | | because now I have the 10 dollars I started with, so now I have 30 more, so I have 40 dollars in total |
| 5 | | so how much do you think, of that money, how much do you think I'm gonna give back to you? |
| 5 | | 20? |
| 5 | | good. And I'm gonna give you 20 |
| 5 | | do we really have 10 minutes? |
| 5 | | you wanna practice? |
| 5 | | ok. So what if I'm A. If I'm A, how much do you think I'm gonna give you? |
| 5 | | 10? |
| 5 | | Ok. So I'm gonna give you 10. And I think that you are gonna give me 20 |
| 5 | | Ok, how much do you give me? |
| 5 | | 20? |

*6.2. Facebook*

**Table S6.** Facebook Group 2.

| Group | Subject ID | Communication Log |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 1506 | Check this out. Whatever person A sends gets multiplied by 3, so there is more money being generated than actually put in. So we can take advantage of that by having person A send in the money and to keep it fair, person B will multiply that by 3 and return half of it. Win win |
| 2 | 1507 | agreed!! |
| 2 | 1508 | That's what I was thinking also. |
| 2 | 1506 | for example, if person A and B start of with $10 ea, person A sends in all 10, then person B will get 3*10=30 and person B will return 15. Then they both have 25 in the end |
| 2 | 1505 | Of course, if A sends all 10, who's to say B won't try to be greedy. We don't know who we're sending the money to. |
| 2 | 1506 | but in order for this to work, EVERYONE has to be on board. we can all benefit if we all work together, or think selfishly and get lesser results |
| 2 | 1507 | I agree to be in on the plan if everyone else does |
| 2 | 1506 | that's true, but he said that the people we are going to exchange with is in THIS group |
| 2 | 1508 | Person B will have $40 if Person A sends all $10. So the maximum pay out is $20 for each person. If we're being fair of course. |

**Table S7.** Facebook Group 3.

| Group | Subject ID | Communication Log |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | 1902 | I was playing with the calculator a bit and noticed that If A sends 10$, then B gets 30$ plus the 10$ they already had, so 40$ total for B. |
| 3 | 1904 | ya so you would send 20 back to A |
| 3 | 1901 | so then its 20/20 |
| 3 | 1902 | Yeah, sounds good |
| 3 | 1904 | Sounds good to me |
| 3 | 1904 | Is there anyway to payoff more? |
| 3 | 1902 | not without A losing money |
| 3 | 1904 | good idea |
| 3 | 1904 | Like if you all agree |
| 3 | 1903 | yuuup so hopefully no one is like that..haha |

*6.3. Chat*

**Table S8.** Chat Group 1.

| Group | Subject ID | Communication Log |
|:---:|:---:|---|
| 1 | 8 | so who wants to split it equally?? |
| 1 | 2 | ME! |
| 1 | 5 | I do! |
| 1 | 3 | im down for splitting equally |
| 1 | 2 | alright awesome! |
| 1 | 8 | well i found that if type A gives 5 and type be then gives 11 you both get 15 |
| 1 | 8 | |
| 1 | 3 | does anyone know how much equal is |
| 1 | 8 | *B |
| 1 | 3 | ok awesome |
| 1 | 2 | really? |
| 1 | 8 | if you know a greater amount equally im done |
| 1 | 5 | Wouldn't type b have to give 10 back? |
| 1 | 8 | *down for it sorry |
| 1 | 8 | typo |
| 1 | 2 | so whoever is A gives 5 |
| 1 | 2 | whoever is B gives back 11? |
| 1 | 3 | what if A gave 10... |
| 1 | 8 | yeah...lol idk thats what i did for the 1st part lol |
| 1 | 5 | Then B would give back 20, right? |
| 1 | 2 | and B gave $15? |
| 1 | 3 | yea B would give back 20 |
| 1 | 2 | I wish we had the calculator here |
| 1 | 8 | i know me too lol |
| 1 | 5 | How about we do that then? A sends 10, and B sends 20 back |
| 1 | 3 | i just handwrote it out |
| 1 | 5 | I'm too confused to handwrite it out lol |
| 1 | 3 | A gives 10, B recieves 30 then equalling 40, so B sends back 20 |
| 1 | 8 | what does that equal? 10? |
| 1 | 3 | then they both get 20 |
| 1 | 8 | ohhhh but i thought you will have type A you get 0$ if you give B all of your 0 |
| 1 | 8 | *10 |
| 1 | 3 | wait can B even send 20?...... |
| 1 | 5 | Yeah, they can since they'll have 40 total after A sends 10 |
| 1 | 8 | so B will have 30 and then you give 20 to A...you will have 10 and A will have 20? |
| 1 | 2 | yupp really wish we had the calculators I think we're all confusing ourselves now lol |
| 1 | 5 | Yeeeeah, I'm so lost without that calculator :P |
| 1 | 3 | no B will have 40 cuz its 30 plus the original 10 |
| 1 | 8 | lol wait really quickly if type A gives there money to B doesnt he.she lose it? |
| 1 | 8 | so then A will have ) |
| 1 | 3 | not if B sends back 20 |
| 1 | 8 | 0 |
| 1 | 3 | then they both get 20 |
| 1 | 8 | OHHHHH ok i like that BEETTTEERR |
| 1 | 2 | I t thought that when A gives the money they completely lose it from their pay off |
| 1 | 3 | yea they do but B can give the money back |
| 1 | 5 | They do, but then if B sends back 20, they'll receive 20 |
| 1 | 8 | smart so type A gives 10 and then B you give 20 back |

**Table S9.** Chat Group 4.

| Group | Subject ID | Communication Log |
|:---:|:---:|:---|
| 4 | 5 | A send 10 |
| 4 | 3 | A sends 10, b sends 20 back |
| 4 | 5 | b sends back 20 |
| 4 | 3 | all agree? |
| 4 | 8 | send 10, return 20, everybody wins |
| 4 | 2 | deal |
| 4 | 5 | each come out with 20 |
| 4 | 3 | kk |
| 4 | 5 | glad everyoe figured it out |