The Prospects for the Recognition of the International Legal Personality of Artificial Intelligence

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Abstract: This research aims to identify the prospects for recognizing the international legal personality of artificial intelligence, taking into account the practice of international organizations. The article describes a new idea based on the research of the existing practice of international organizations and the application of the author’s concept of international legal personality of legal entities, enabling the identification of the main directions of recognizing the international legal personality of artificial intelligence. Using the problematic-theoretical, formal-legal, logical, systemic-structural methods and methods of synthesis, analysis, and comparison, the author revealed two solutions to the problem of recognizing the international legal personality of artificial intelligence. The first way to resolve the problem is that states may grant the legal entity rights to artificial intelligence, gradually developing an international custom. The second way is that states may conclude that artificial intelligence will be granted a legal entity’s rights or sui generis by participating in discussions organized by various international organizations. The results of the study can be used for international unification.

Keywords: international legal personality; artificial intelligence; public international law; the international legal personality of legal entities; the legal personality of artificial intelligence

1. Introduction

The development of technologies in the 21st century has led to new objects, which the author conditionally calls information and communication systems: big data, neural networks, distributed registries, and artificial intelligence. New technologies as new objects of international information relations have led to the need for theoretical developments in the field of international law, primarily related to issues of the proper legal regulation of information and communication systems.

One of the key problems in developing approaches to the international legal regulation of information and communication systems is the problem of recognizing the international legal personality of artificial intelligence.

The issue of recognition of the international legal personality of artificial intelligence from an abstract idea passes into the applied sphere due to the activities of international organizations at the universal level in the regulation of the use of artificial intelligence in the interests of all mankind. Because of this, the author draws attention to the results of the activities of international organizations at the universal level about the regulation of artificial intelligence.

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The International Telecommunication Union has always been a leader in solving the problems of legal regulation of international information relations. Previously, he held World Summits on the Information Society, which made a significant contribution to regulating information and communication technologies. Since 2017, the ITU has created a new discussion platform—the AI for Good Global Summit, which develops topical issues of using artificial intelligence.

At the end of 2021, UNESCO plans to adopt a resolution on the ethical aspects of artificial intelligence. A group of UNESCO experts, which has already prepared a detailed...
preliminary report on ethics in the use of artificial intelligence and submitted it to UNESCO, is working on the text of the resolution.

Since 2019, the World Intellectual Property Organization has organized a broad public discussion on IP and AI. Currently, a second version of the concept document on the protection of intellectual property in connection with the use of artificial intelligence has been prepared, including the following issues: patents; copyright and related rights; further rights concerning data; the authorship and ownership of designs; trademarks; trade secrets; and capacity building.

The elaboration of several working documents by international organizations at the universal level necessitates searching for a solution to the theoretical problem of recognizing the international legal personality of artificial intelligence.

In order to identify tendencies and prospects for the recognition of the international legal personality of artificial intelligence, in this article, the author draws a parallel between artificial intelligence and non-state actors in international relations. In connection with the issue of legal personality, artificial intelligence can be considered a legal fiction, a conditional subject. The closest analog to artificial intelligence in international law is a legal entity.

Thus, the author of this study put forward a hypothesis about applying the concept of international legal personality of legal entities to artificial intelligence, which is proven in the study.

For testing this hypothesis, the following research tasks are consistently solved: (1) the analysis of the phenomenon of artificial intelligence from the standpoint of international law; (2) the generalization of approaches to the international legal personality of legal entities and the development of the author’s approach and its application to the international legal personality of artificial intelligence.

The study examines in detail a particular problem—the recognition of the international legal personality of artificial intelligence, as part of a more general problem—the use and regulation of artificial intelligence for the benefit of all mankind, analyzed in real works of Simon Chesterman (2021), Nathalie Rebe (2021), and Shin-Yi Peng, Ching-Fu Lin, Thomas Streinz (Peng et al. 2021).

The author’s contribution to the development of the scientific problem of the recognition of the international legal personality of artificial intelligence is to determine the prospects for such recognition in the practice of states and international organizations and to propose a solution to the problem in the gradual acquisition of the status of an indigénat to artificial intelligence.

2. The Concept of Artificial Intelligence and Scientific Discussion on the Matter of Its Legal Personality

2.1. The Definition of Artificial Intelligence as an Object of International Legal Regulation

For determining the prospects for the recognition of the international legal personality of artificial intelligence, it is necessary to consider the approaches of international organizations to artificial intelligence.

The WIPO Revised Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence provides that “artificial intelligence (AI)” is “a discipline of computer science that is aimed at developing machines and systems that can carry out tasks considered to require human intelligence, with limited or no human intervention” (World Intellectual Property Organization 2020). This document identifies two components of artificial intelligence: machine learning and deep learning. WIPO notes that currently, artificial intelligence can solve only narrow, specific tasks and is not a system for solving a wide range of tasks that the human brain can solve. The definition of artificial intelligence was introduced by WIPO for broad public discussion and has not yet been included in the definition of terms in the resolutions of the WIPO bodies.

Currently, the WIPO Revised Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence does not raise and solve a significant question for international legal regulation: what legal protection should be provided to artificial intelligence at the universal level? If
we draw an analogy with a “simple” computer program, there are two possible alternatives for artificial intelligence: copyright or patent protection.

The patent protection of computer programs began to be applied in the United States in the 1960s of the XX century when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in several decisions, formulated conclusions about the patentability of computer programs as new and useful objects.

Faced with the legal protection of artificial intelligence in the 21st century, the US courts applied the same approach previously applied to the legal protection of computer programs and made conclusions about the patentability of artificial intelligence. The practice of the US courts on the legal protection of artificial intelligence has been summarized by Mizuki Hashiguchi (Hashiguchi 2017).

At the universal level, there is a copyright regime for the protection of computer programs, which is reflected in international treaties.

The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) of 1996, a special agreement to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886, provided the legal protection of computer programs as literary works, taking into account the norms of the Berne Convention. This approach is reflected in Agreed Statements concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty.

Article 11 of TRIPS also proceeds from the concept of copyright protection of computer programs and provides for the right to rent computer programs.

In our opinion, artificial intelligence is not a “simple” computer program if we consider the definitions of computer programs given in international legal documents.


While comparing the definitions of a computer program and artificial intelligence in international documents, it can be noted that these are different objects of legal regulation. The WIPO Copyright Treaty, TRIPS, Directive 2009/24/EC of The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2009) on the legal protection of computer programs (codified version) of 23 April 2009 cannot provide legal protection of artificial intelligence without changing their content following the procedure established in international law.

In the discussion about artificial intelligence features, Dinesh Harkut and Kashmira Kasat indicate that artificial intelligence is a problem solved by a program or machine, an alternative to human capabilities for using intelligence to solve such problems. It is a technology that enables machines to demonstrate intelligence, especially visual perception, speech reproduction, decision making, and language translation similar to a human. It synthesizes human intellectual processes by machines, especially computer systems (Harkut and Kasat 2019). These features are essential for legal regulation. It is not artificial intelligence that is subject to legal regulation but the human perception of artificial intelligence and the social relations where artificial intelligence is used.

Our research is guided by our author’s definition of artificial intelligence as an information and communication system that can synthesize creative activities in the literary, artistic, and industrial fields.

2.2. The Statement of the Problem of the International Legal Personality of Artificial Intelligence

The legal personality of artificial intelligence is discussed from the standpoint of the general theory of law. This issue is related closely to the problem of responsibility for actions performed using artificial intelligence.

In the legal doctrine, we find various points of view regarding the legal personality of artificial intelligence, and unity of opinion has not been achieved. The range of concepts
differs from recognizing the legal personality of artificial intelligence to its complete denial. Below are examples of several original holistic concepts demonstrating different approaches to the legal personality of artificial intelligence.

Considering the criminal responsibility of artificial intelligence, Abbott and Sarch (2019) propose resolving the responsibility of artificial intelligence by introducing legal fiction. In legal doctrine, we also find the idea of non-personal subjects of law and its application to artificial intelligence (Kurki and Pietrzykowski 2017).

Sthifano Bruno and Santos Divino proposed the idea of an electronic personality, “analysis from the point of view of objective responsibility brings important considerations since it dispenses with the faulty analysis. Preference is given to this institute rather than its subjective mode. However, in order to avoid solipsistic embarrassments in certain judgments, it is proposed to create an electronic personality, translated into the hypothesis of legal insertion of an incision in the role of objective responsibility . . . ” (Divino and Bruno 2020).

Mindaugas Naucius considered the essence of the discussion about the legal capacity of artificial intelligence very carefully. This author notes the lack of consensus among professors on issues of morality and consciousness concerning artificial intelligence. Some professors believe that since artificial intelligence is not inherent in morality or consciousness, it cannot be recognized as a legal personality. Others believe that improving the ability of artificial intelligence to solve mental problems should lead to the recognition of the legal competence of artificial intelligence (Naucius 2018).

Kara Kilicarslan, in her research, also covered the essence of the discussions about the legal personality of artificial intelligence (Kilicarslan 2019).

Pin Lean Lau considered the essence of the debate at the European Parliament (Lau Pin 2019).

Without belittling the role and significance of the scientific discussion related to recognizing the legal personality of artificial intelligence in states’ legal systems, one should note that international legal personality has its specifics. This is due to the features of the system of international relations and the role of states in the development of international law provisions. The state is the main subject of public international law and a non-main subject of private international law. International legal personality, as a category of public international law, can be given to another subject by states only by including the relevant provisions into an international treaty or establishing an international custom. As a result, the prospects for recognizing the international legal personality of artificial intelligence should be considered because of the international legal personality of non-state actors, especially legal entities. Given the variety of theories of international legal personality that Roland Portmann classified and analyzed in his work (the ‘state-only’ conception, the ‘recognition conception’, the ‘individualistic conception’, the ‘formal conception’, and the ‘actor conception’) (Portmann 2010), the ‘recognition conception’ will be used for this paper, as it is the prospects for the recognition by states of the international legal personality of artificial intelligence that are explored.

2.3. Methods/Materials

Whereas the purpose of the study is to identify the prospects for recognizing the international legal personality of artificial intelligence at the universal level, the working materials of international organizations operating at the universal level were used to prepare the study.

Currently, actual material for international legal research in artificial intelligence regulation has been accumulated in the practice and activities of international organizations (UN, ITU, UNESCO, EU). Since 2017, some international organizations have included the issues of regulating artificial intelligence in their agenda. The work of international organizations is carried out in the form of creating expert groups and organizing discussions. The discussion platform is the AI for Good Global Summit. For this study, the working documents of international organizations, in which approaches to the concept
and responsibility of artificial intelligence are developed and closely related to the legal personality of artificial intelligence, were of particular importance.

Formal logical and problem-theoretical research methods are used in the analysis of the regulation of artificial intelligence. At the same time, comparative jurisprudence is used to analyze the emerging systems of artificial intelligence regulation to establish similar features and differences in the corresponding systems and the prospects for recognizing the international legal personality of artificial intelligence at the universal level.

The problem-theoretical method played a key role in conducting the research. At the beginning of the study, the author revealed that the legal personality of artificial intelligence is dealt with by specialists in domestic law, mainly criminal law, in connection with the issues of criminal liability for actions committed using artificial intelligence. Doctrinal approaches to the international legal personality of artificial intelligence have not been developed. The author analyzed the approaches to the international legal personality of legal entities that have developed in the international law doctrine and have applied the theory of international legal indigénat to the international legal personality of legal entities. Furthermore, based on the theory of international legal indigénat, the author researched the prospects of its application to artificial intelligence, taking into account the existing practice of international organizations.

The conventional approach to the formation of international customs shows that the activities of international organizations have a significant impact on the emergence of relevant state practice and the assumption by states of obligations under international law. Considering the complexity and duration of the development of conventional norms regulating artificial intelligence, the author focused on the formation mechanisms of international customs. The recognition of the international legal personality of artificial intelligence depends on the formation of states practice and relevant national legislation. International organizations can speed up this process by adopting harmonization documents.

3. The Concept of the International Legal Personality of Legal Entities and the Prospects for Its Application to Artificial Intelligence

3.1. The Concept of a Legal Entity and the Problem of the International Legal Personality of Legal Entities

The international legal personality of artificial intelligence can be solved by considering the doctrine and practice related to the issues of international legal personality of legal entities. A legal entity is a historically established legal fiction with its legal personality, which differs from the legal personality of the participants of the legal entity. Solving the problem of the international legal personality of artificial intelligence using established approaches to the international legal personality of legal entities is more optimal than the development of completely new approaches. It should also be taken into account that there are very significant scientific developments on the international legal personality of legal entities.

At present, the trend for the participation of legal entities in international relations of a public nature has manifested itself. For example, legal entities apply to the European Court of Human Rights, mainly on property protection issues. The participation of legal persons is not limited exclusively to international relations of a powerless nature; they participate in international relations, which are understood in a broad sense as relations between states, relations with the participation of states and non-state actors, and relations between non-state actors in the international arena. The discussion of the international legal personality of legal entities, which will be considered below, has already started in the legal doctrine.

It should be noted that there is no unified concept of legal entities (juridical persons) in private international law. Numerous international treaties operate with the concept of a legal entity without disclosing its meaning.

An exception is the provisions of the Inter-American Convention on Personality and Capacity of Juridical Persons in Private International Law of 24 May 1984 (from now on referred to as the 1984 Inter-American Convention). According to Article 1 of
the 1984 Inter-American Convention (Department of International Law 1984), “juridical
person being understood to mean any entity having its existence and being responsible
for its actions, separately and distinctly from those of its members or organizers, and
classified as a juridical person following the law of the place of its organization.” Thus,
the Convention named two vital signs of a juridical person, which are: (1) operation in
business independently and on its behalf; (2) independent responsibility for its obligations.

It can be seen that in the adoption of the 1984 Inter-American Convention, states could
not unify the concept of juridical persons completely without reference to national law for
defining this category.

It is no coincidence that states often avoid any definitions of legal entities in interna-
tional treaties. The issue of the concept of a legal entity and of attributing certain entities to
this category is at the discretion of national law because differences in the understanding
of a legal entity and the definition of the circle of legal entities make it impossible at this
stage to develop a unified concept of a legal entity at the international level.

In Great Britain, the theory of the legal entity began to take shape in the 19th century.
A classic example is the Salomon v. Salomon case in 1897 (Dine and Koutsias 2007). The
essence of the case is that an entrepreneur named Salomon transferred his family business
to a limited liability company. When the company was liquidated, the question arose
whether Salomon was liable to creditors. In connection with this case, the point of view of
Lord Macnaghten is cited, according to which the company has a separate legal personality,
and the founders should not be liable for its debts unless otherwise provided by law.

The variety of legislative approaches to the concept of a legal entity has created
significant difficulties in unifying this concept in international law. Each state defines the
circle of legal entities in its way. In some states, legal entities include certain sets of property,
i.e., objects of law.

What are the features of this domestic institution? Considering the content of the 1984
Inter-American Convention, the CIS MCC, and national legislation, there is no doubt that
legal entities have an independent legal personality, i.e., they enter into legal relations on
their behalf. A legal entity is an independent participant in both domestic and international
relations. Their legal personality is separated from the legal person’s founders, members,
and employees; the above legal entity acts as an independent law subject.

Therefore, a legal entity should be understood as a domestic institution that enters
into legal relations on its behalf and is independently liable for its obligations. As a
domestic institution with the above-mentioned signs, a legal entity comprises various
entities, including business companies, public organizations, foundations, and institutions.
In certain cases, state bodies may be vested with the rights of a legal entity. For this paper, the
category of a legal entity also considers the delimitation from other subjects of international
law, as it is determined that a legal entity is an exclusively domestic institution.

The legal status of legal entities in international private law is not a subject of discus-
sion. Legal entities are traditionally recognized as the main subjects of private international
law, and their legal personality is not questioned.

However, currently, a trend has appeared to recognize the legal personality of legal
entities in public international law. This issue is already being discussed intensively in
the legal doctrine. In particular, V. Lowe argued that, along with states, legal entities are
subjects of public international law (Lowe 2004). In support of his thought, he named
four areas where legal entities are regulated in the framework of public international law,
namely, human rights, state liability, diplomatic protection, and jurisdiction.

It should be noted that this position is not devoid of some justification. As international
public law develops, it is not limited to the regulation of the activities of states. However, it
contains provisions aimed at regulating relations with the participation of other actors. For
legal entities, the situation has developed in the same way as for individuals. There are
separate provisions in certain sectors and institutions of public international law that grant
certain rights to legal entities in international relations. These provisions are developed
and implemented by states.
It should be noted that concerning legal entities, there is a trend of granting certain rights to them and a trend of imposing duties on them. As regards, for example, the institution of human rights protection in public international law, legal entities are not just users of certain rights, but the effort has been made to impose legal obligations on them in the field of human rights. An example is the Global Compact.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan called on world business leaders to adopt and implement the Global Compact (United Nations 1999).

The Global Compact is not a legally binding document. It is based on the voluntary implementation of its provisions.

If the Global Compact were a binding document, the supporters’ position of recognizing the legal personality of legal entities in international public law would become much stronger.


Wladyslaw Czapliński does not recognize the international legal personality of groups of individuals (Czaplinski 2016).

The issue of the legal personality of legal persons is discussed intensively in the Polish legal doctrine. The essence of this discussion is outlined in the monograph by Karol Karski (2009). Karol Karski pointed out that in Poland, W. Góralczyk was a firm supporter of recognizing individuals and legal persons of domestic law as subjects of international law. Other authors, including Z. Czachur, S. Sawicki, and J. Tyranowsky, shared the same views. W. Góralczyk and S. Sawicki relied on the definition. The subject of international law is the one who has the rights and obligations arising directly from international law. K. Karski also adopted this definition. At the same time, he pointed out that legal persons as subjects of international law are secondary to the will of states. The states establish them or give them a certain status (Karski 2009).

It should be noted that researchers who support the concept of the international legal personality of legal entities do so with certain reservations. Namely, they recognize either a partial legal personality (for certain branches of international law) or a secondary legal personality (legal persons are vested with international rights and obligations at the will of states).

Researchers have a similar approach to the international legal personality of individuals (Gallant 2010; Barbara 2008).

The international legal personality of transnational corporations is considered separately (Nowrot 2006; Muhvic 2017).

In our opinion, recognizing the legal personality of a legal entity in international public law is not essential. Regardless of whether legal entities are subjects of international public law, their existence has already created some problems for international public law. The status of a legal entity in public international law can be explained from the standpoint of the theory of indigénat. According to this theory, individuals do not have rights in international cooperation but may only enjoy the state’s benefits.

The same is also true for legal entities. They act as users of the rights that are granted under international public law. In any case, the rules addressed to legal persons are developed by states. In particular, states have imposed certain environmental liability for legal persons, established rules on appeals to some international courts, exercised their diplomatic protection, settled the status of private security companies in international humanitarian law, etc. Thus, states establish the rules of conduct for legal persons in the system of international relations. Based on the above, one may assert that a legal entity is not subject to public international law but is indigénat to certain provisions of public international law.

3.2. The Prospects for the Application of the Concept of International Legal Personality of Legal Entities to the Legal Personality of Artificial Intelligence

It should be noted that artificial intelligence is not an autonomous information and communication system, and machine learning is impossible without human involvement.
The issue of the international legal personality can only be considered concerning the autonomous ‘general’ artificial intelligence.

The absence of an autonomous ‘general’ artificial intelligence explains why international law experts scarcely address the problem of artificial intelligence. Researchers in the field of international law mainly consider public-legal aspects related to artificial intelligence: the use of artificial intelligence for military purposes and the problems of international law that arise in this regard; the impact of artificial intelligence on the global world order; and the protection of human rights when using artificial intelligence.

At the same time, the problem of the legal personality of artificial intelligence may arise in the activities of UNESCO, which has started work on an international document on the ethical aspects of the use of artificial intelligence.

Prospects for the recognition of the international legal personality of artificial intelligence can be determined, taking into account the establishment of the subject responsible for actions committed using artificial intelligence. UNESCO offers a definite solution to the issue of responsibility.

The first draft of the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (outcome document) contains a provision that the ethical component is characteristic of all stages of AI system life cycle, from research, design, and development to deployment and use, including maintenance, operation, trade, financing, monitoring and evaluation, validation, end-of-use, disassembly, and termination. The concept of actors in the AI system life cycle is introduced as follows: “any actor involved in at least one stage of the AI life cycle, and can refer both to natural and legal persons, such as researchers, programmers, engineers, data scientists, end-users, large technology companies, small and medium enterprises, startups, universities, public entities, among others.” Thus, the responsibility extends to all subjects related to the development and use of artificial intelligence.

The content of the responsibility of actors in the AI system life cycle differs in certain specifics. The First draft of the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (outcome document) covers two categories: values and principles. The values are close to the goals of legal regulation. The draft recommendation formulation of the principles that must be observed when using artificial intelligence is directly related to such regulation.

Some principles play a key role in forming the mechanism of the responsibility of actors in the AI system life cycle. For example, the content of the safety and security principle includes the following provision: “Unwanted harms (safety risks) and vulnerabilities to attacks (security risks) should be avoided throughout the life cycle of AI systems to ensure human and environmental and ecosystem safety and security. Safe and secure AI will be enabled by the development of sustainable, privacy-protective data access frameworks that foster better training of AI models utilizing quality data.”

In general, the First draft of the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (outcome document) imposes responsibility on each actor involved in any stage of the AI system life cycle, depending on the nature of the violation committed by a certain actor. Actors in the AI system life cycle are understood as legal entities and individuals. This document does not offer a legal fiction regarding artificial intelligence, the conditional subject of law.

If the international legal personality of artificial intelligence is brought up for discussion in the future, there will be two possible options for its solution.

The first option is that states that grant the rights of legal entities to certain objects of civil rights in their civil law may grant the rights of a legal entity to artificial intelligence. In this case, the legal personality of artificial intelligence will be recognized in private international law. The international legal personality of artificial intelligence can be recognized only at the level of international public law and only by states through an international treaty or an international custom. At the same time, the practice of states that is a generally recognized norm of international law makes it possible to establish a certain international custom.
Following the second option, states may conclude that artificial intelligence will be granted the rights of a legal entity or rights sui generis, a new legal fiction, by participating in discussions organized by various international organizations. Given the difficulties in developing and agreeing on an international treaty, the consensus of states can be stated in a UNESCO or UN act. In the future, states may implement the resolution of an international organization into their legal systems.

4. Conclusions

The main findings of the present study are as follows:

The international legal personality of non-state actors can be recognized only in public international law and only by states through an international treaty or an international custom. In the international law doctrine, there is a discussion about the issues of the international legal personality of non-state actors, primarily individuals and legal entities; scholars recognize either a partial legal personality (for certain branches) or a secondary legal personality (legal persons are vested with international rights and obligations at the will of states). The author adheres to the concept of indigénat in international law. Individuals and legal persons are not subjects of international public law but are indigénat of certain provisions of public international law.

The issue of the international legal personality can only be considered about the autonomous ‘general’ artificial intelligence. This issue can be resolved given the experience of participation in international relations of legal entities and approaches to the international legal personality of legal entities. The first option for resolving the issue is that states that grant a legal entity the rights to certain objects of civil rights in their civil law may grant the rights of a legal entity to artificial intelligence, which will gradually lead to the development of an international custom. In the second option, states may conclude that artificial intelligence will be granted a legal entity’s rights or sui generis by participating in discussions organized by various international organizations. The consensus of states can be stated in a UNESCO or UN act.

In comparison with other studies in the field of legal personality of artificial intelligence, this study is aimed at a special category of legal personality—international legal personality as a special institute of public international law. The mechanism of recognizing the international legal personality of non-state actors differs significantly from establishing their legal personality in domestic law. It should be noted that specialists of certain branches of domestic law have studied the issues of the legal personality of artificial intelligence very carefully. The international legal personality of artificial intelligence has not been sufficiently researched.

Research findings imply the practice of international organizations on the regulation of artificial intelligence and can contribute to broad public discussions announced by ITU, UNESCO, and WIPO. With the emergence of ‘general’ artificial intelligence, the conclusions of this study can be used to solve the problem of international legal personality of artificial intelligence by applying the theory of international legal indigénat.

The strength of the research lies in the development of a long-term scientific forecast of possible ways to recognize the international legal personality of artificial intelligence, taking into account the approaches developed in public international law to the closest analog—a legal entity. However, the current practice of international organizations forms an approach to artificial intelligence as an object of legal regulation, and the status of a legal entity is not recognized for it.

The present study becomes importantly relevant when, with the development of scientific and technological progress, artificial intelligence, capable of synthesizing the entire spectrum of human creative activity, and not just particular functions of the human brain, will appear. Therefore, as the line of future research, it is necessary to constantly monitor the achievements of scientific and technological progress and the practice of international organizations to opportunely propose the mechanism for the international legal regulation of ‘general’ artificial intelligence.
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