Russian World and Ukrainian Autocephaly: Religious Narratives in Anti-Colonial Nationalism of Ukraine

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Abstract: The paper examines the role of religious narratives in the on-going Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The literature on religious nationalism offers several ways in which religion plays a role in national identity narratives. The strong connection between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Russian state have been well-known. The narrative of the “chosen” nation and “third Rome” have fueled Russian neo-imperial national discourse of Russkii Mir (Russian World) which shapes Russian Foreign Policy in the “near abroad”. The Church is used as tool to shape and disseminate these narratives, as a means for justification of Russian aggression in Ukraine. This paper seeks to analyze the role of the religious narratives of Russia neo-colonial and post-colonial nationalism in Ukraine. It argues that Ukrainian religious nationalism, should it develop, will do so in response to the Russian actions driven by the ideological religious narrative. President Poroshenko’s decision to support the recognition of an autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2018 was a valiant effort to aid in the construction of Ukraine’s anti-colonial religious national narrative. Prior to the Russian invasion, there seemed to be relatively weak public support for the religious nationalist narrative in Ukraine. The evidence shows that commitment to religious pluralism continues to be prevalent in Ukrainian society.

Keywords: religious nationalism; Russian imperialism; anti-colonial nationalism; Ukraine; Ukrainian Autocephaly; Russian Orthodox Church; Russian World

1. Introduction

On 21 February Russian President Putin delivered a televised address in which he explained the decision to recognize the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. This speech became a precursor to the 24 February address where Putin declared the start of the “special operation” in Ukraine. The two speeches together were in a fact a declaration of full-scale war in Ukraine.

During his speech on 21 February, Putin made references to Russian-Ukrainian history claiming Russian ownership of Ukraine. Ukraine to Russia is an “inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space”, said Putin. “Since time immemorial, the people living in the south-west of what has historically been Russian land have called themselves Russians and Orthodox Christians” (Address by the President of the Russian Federation 2022).

Religion plays an important role in Vladimir Putin’s worldview and justification for his actions in Ukraine. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) with its head Patriarch Kirill (Gundyaev) proves a powerful ally in shaping the current ideological inclinations of the Russian President and Russian society. Patriarch Kirill shows support for the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine and the attempt to bring Ukraine into the political and spiritual fold of Russia. The creation of the Ukrainian autocephalous Church in 2018 was a severe blow to the Russian ambitions in Ukraine. Thus, the current imperial “special operation” in Ukraine has potent theological roots.

The relationship between Russia and Ukraine has been receiving increasing attention in western scholarship. However, as Taras Kuzio (2018) observed, few discussions truly
nail the reasons behind the growing tension between the two nations. The conflict is often presented through the lens of a post-communist divorce and ethno-linguistic tensions. Anatol Lieven (1999) once called this relationship a “fraternal rivalry”, yet, in more recent years some scholars point out the colonial and post-colonial nature in the relations between the two (Wanner 2014). The post-soviet lens in many ways has underplayed or ignored the role of religion in the Russian-Ukrainian tensions, focusing instead on the economic and geopolitical fallout in the wake of the collapsed communist state.

This paper sides with literature attributing the conflict to post- and neo-colonial tensions between the Russian Federation, as a former empire, and Ukraine, as a former colony, and provides an overview of the importance of the religious narrative in the modern post-colonial relationship between Kyiv and Moscow. The paper has three main goals. First, it argues that the creation of a religious nationalist narrative in Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea is a response to Russian religious nationalism. Second, it investigates the nature of the attempted religious nationalism in Ukraine, as exemplified by the adoption of autocephaly in 2018. Finally, it explores the ongoing tension within a Ukrainian society caught between conflicting religious narratives in the struggle to create a post-colonial narrative of national identity.

The literature on religious nationalism (Van der Veer 1994; Juergensmeyer 1993, 1996, 2001, 2019; Rieffer 2003) highlights that religion can play a number of roles in a national narrative, from full integration of the two narratives to an instrumental role of religion. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Russian and Ukrainian societies have undergone a number of important changes including the newly established relationships between state and church. Drawing on the vast literature on the subject, this paper shows, that the Russian narrative of Russkii Mir (Russian World) presents a careful blend of religious, nationalistic, and imperial narratives, which are used to justify the authoritarian government domestically as well as expansionist and messianic policies abroad. Russian World paints Putin as a rescuer and a redeemer of Russian culture and faith world over by offering military and state protection everywhere where the Russian World extends.

The strong connection between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Russian state have been well documented (Blitt 2011; Suslov 2014). The narrative “Third Rome” and Russian World have fueled Russian neo-imperial national discourse, which shapes Russian Foreign Policy in the “near abroad”. ROC and its affiliate Ukrainian Orthodox Church -Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) in Ukraine have been used to shape and disseminate these narratives in Ukraine as a means for justification of Russian aggression, post-Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity in 2014.

The decision of the President Poroshenko to pursue recognition of an independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2018 was a valiant effort to aid in the construction of Ukraine’s anti-colonial religious national narrative, which arguably is missing in Ukraine. Yet, the evidence shows that prior to the invasion there was a lack of public support for any religious nationalist narrative in Ukraine. The public appears to be committed more to secularism, pluralism, and freedom of consciousness, than religious nationalism. This of course might change as a result of the Russian war.

It is important to note that this paper concerns itself with the narratives of the Orthodox churches. It is very important to acknowledge, however, the role of Muslim and Jewish religions in the national religious narratives as related to Russian-Ukrainian relations. These narratives deserve attention on their own merit and are not part of the analysis presented here.

2. Religious Narratives in Russian-Ukrainian Relations Post 2014

2014 was a pivotal year in modern Russo-Ukrainian relations. The violent confrontations between government forces and anti-government protests in 2013–2014, the events to which Ukrainians refer as the Revolution of Dignity, ousted the pro-Russian corrupt president Viktor Yanukovich. In early 2014, Russian President Putin seized the opportunity of civil unrest in Ukraine. As he admitted since, Putin himself coordinated a military
operation that resulted in the illegal annexation of Crimea. Following the annexation, the Russian Federation also supported the “separatist” movements in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Russian support for the self-proclaimed republics of Luhansk and Donetsk is ongoing.

These events have put the two countries into the situation of a hybrid war. While the Russian Federation claimed that it did not have any active military personnel on the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainian government produced evidence to the contrary. The tension has continued to rise since 2014, with a large Russian military presence on Ukrainian borders in 2021 and a full invasion in 2022.

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia is also a battle of competing religious narratives. In 2014 several studies identified Russian religious nationalism as key to understanding the invasion of Ukrainian territories. Mara Kozelsky (2014) presents an excellent analysis of the religious reasons behind Russian territorial claims in Ukraine as “cradles of Christianity”. She further outlines the imperial nature of these claims as couched in the doctrine of the Russkii Mir (Russian World). Kozelsky argues that it was Russian religious nationalism that was at the heart of what she refers to as the “Ukrainian crisis” of 2014. The ROC claimed Kyiv and Crimea to be a part of the religious and historical legacy of Russian Orthodoxy, thus extending what it deemed a legitimate spiritual claim over these territories as inherently Russian. This ongoing religious narrative presents an existential threat to Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty.

15 December 2018 marked the creation of the unified Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which combined the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). On 6 January 2019, the Metropolitan Epifaniy (Dumenko) received an official recognition, a Tomos, of autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. Thus began a new chapter of the Ukrainian unified autocephalous church. The post-Revolutionary Ukrainian government, more specifically the fifth president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, fully and enthusiastically supported this process. The role of the state in the religious matters was an unprecedented moment in modern Ukrainian history. Much attention from the scholastic community seemed to be concerned with the progress of democracy and the rise of nationalism in Ukraine.

Yet, it seems that the reasons for the adoption of autocephaly are rather misrepresented in the literature. For instance, drawing on the theoretical framework of Rieffer (2003), Shestopalets argues that the move toward autocephaly is a form of “instrumental pious nationalism”, when “political leaders attempt to use religious and national sentiments and attachments to rally the population and shore up support when the political, economic, military or social institutions are failing to provide for the needs of the people” (Shestopalets 2020). In this line of reasoning, it would seem that autocephaly was nothing but a political tool for a weak and illegitimate government. The argument presented here disagrees with this conclusion. Rather, I argue, that the reason behind the need for the creation of the “new paradigm” is a response to the present danger of the colonial narrative presented by the ROC’s Russian World and the Russian state. In his analysis, Shestopalets acknowledges that the Moscow Patriarchate and Russian Orthodox Church were often portrayed as the “other” in the speeches made by Petro Poroshenko. Yet, the importance of the perceived existential threat to Ukrainian nationhood as coming from both the Russian state and the nationalist religious narrative espoused by the ROC have not been investigated.

In his foundational study, Juergensmeyer (1996) introduces three types of religious nationalism: ethnic religious nationalism, ideological religious nationalism, and ethno-ideological religious nationalism. It seems that the Russian messianic version of the Russian World is verging on the manifestation of the third variety. I argue that Ukraine’s response to this threatening policy from its neighbor was an attempt at creating a version of ethnic religious nationalism, where religious autonomy is linked to the post-imperial attempt to “establish a political identity of their own, usually in a geographical region” (Juergensmeyer 1996).
3. Russkii Mir (Russian World)

The annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the Russian-supported separatists war in Ukraine’s eastern region of Donbas in 2014, put a spotlight on the concept of Russkii Mir (Russian World). The use of this terminology appeared prior to 2014 as a policy of the Russian government. In 2007 President Putin created a Russian World Foundation, which was charged with the promotion of the Russian language and culture worldwide. However, this terminology also possesses a very strong religious component, which was later articulated by the head of the ROC, Patriarch Kirill (Gundiaev).

According to Kozelsky (2014), the Russian World foundation is a source of many nationalist projects of the Russian government. During the Russian World Assembly of 2009 Patriarch Kirill, who appeared as the main speaker, gave “spiritual legs” to the project, as well as an “older imperial” connotation (Kozelsky 2014). Kozelsky’s analysis of the rhetoric behind the Russian World suggests that it is a revival of the pre-1917 notions of the Russian Empire. This conclusion is also shared by Aleksandr Verkhovsky (2002). In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Russian World became a manifestation of the Russian religious imperial nationalism. To use Juergensmeyer’s (1996) typology Russian World is an example of ethno-ideological religious nationalism. On the one hand, it manifests the religious narrative of the ROC, and on the other, it encompasses the messianic mission of the foreign policy of the Russian state in its immediate neighborhood, or in Russian terminology the “near abroad”. The latter is justified by the former and this potent mixture poses a reason for concern to Ukraine, because it is perceived as an integral part of the Russian World.

Mikhail Suslov (2014) explored the so-called myth of “Holy Russia” which is highly promoted by Patriarch Kirill. In Suslov’s excellent examination the term of “Holy Russia” is exposed as a powerful myth with a potent geopolitical neo-colonial aspiration. Suslov explores “Kirill’s modernist philosophy of history, based on Messianic meta-narrations of enslavement and subsequent liberation”, which took the shape of the new concept of Russikiy Mir (Russian World). Suslov (2014) and Kozelsky (2014) show that the notion of the Russian World rests on historical revisionism, where the ROC exerts spiritual jurisdiction over the geographic areas and the people who subscribe to Orthodoxy. This ideology empowers the Russian state as the protector of these areas and peoples from foreign ownership or influence.

One such narrative is that of the “cradles of Orthodoxy”. According to Kozelsky (2014), this narrative is built on the medieval story of Kyiv Prince Vladimir/Volodymyr’s conversion to Christianity in 988. She argues that during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–55) Russian scholars built on the work of celebrated Russian historian Nikolay Karamzin (1766–1726) and created a myth of Russian spiritual identity where Kyiv and Crimea played central roles as the “cradles” of Russian Christianity and Russian statehood. This narrative is built upon the Chronicles of Nestor, a medieval monk who describes the origins of the Kyivan Rus and the subsequent baptism of its ruler Prince Volodymyr, who then imposed Christianity on his domain. With the center in Kyiv, Orthodoxy spread across the territories of modern Russia and Ukraine.

Russian historians have come to argue that the story of Rus is the foundational story of Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian state, thus giving legitimacy to the Russian Empire. Kyiv as “the mother of Russian cities” and Crimea, where Prince Volodymyr was baptized in the city of Chersonesos, thus became central to the narrative of the Russian religious nationalism. Ukrainian scholars have argued that the story described in the Chronicles is Ukrainian, because Moscow did not exist at the time of its writing (Kozelsky 2014).

Kozelsky (2014) argues that the narrative of the 19th century was once again revived by the ROC in the 1990s. However, I would suggest that this interpretation of history has long roots in a Russian national mythos and was also used and further elaborated upon during the Soviet era. For instance, Denysenko (2020a) points out that the narrative of Russian spiritual, social, and political dominance remained in the period of the USSR. The opposing narratives on church and national history continued throughout the twentieth
century. According to him, the Ukrainian diaspora opposed the official ROC line, which delegitimated the existence of Ukrainian political and church independence. Instead, these narratives highlighted the colonization of Ukrainian people by Moscow and the ROC dating back to the seventeenth century.

It is remarkable that medieval history is at the core of the security crisis in Europe in the twenty-first century. However, we can see the myths of the “cradles” in Vladimir Putin’s own interpretation of history. In his essay “On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians” published on the Kremlin’s website on 12 July 2021 Putin refers to “Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians” as “descendants of Ancient Rus” (Putin 2021). Thus, claiming that as one single people they should also be united under single political and spiritual authority—the Moscow authority. Suslov (2014) shows that Patriarch Kirill shares this view. When Kirill visited Kyiv in 2009 for the anniversary of Prince Volodymyr’s baptism he called Kyiv “the southern capital of Holy Russia” (Suslov 2014). Later during the same celebration, visiting Crimea, Kirill referred to it as the “‘hearth’ of ‘Holy Russia’” (Suslov 2014).

The annexation of Crimea was celebrated by the ROC. The act was portrayed as morally and spiritually acceptable and as Russia’s “divine right” (Mulford 2016). The Russian World provided a perfect justification for the annexation. The mythology behind the Russkiy Mir is both metaphysical and geographic. On the one hand, the narrative highlights the boundless expansion of Russian culture everywhere where the Russian language is spoken. On the other, the myth pointedly highlights the sovereign right of the Russian state and Russian Church over the relics of Russian Orthodoxy, like the site of Chersonesos in Crimea, which were located in other sovereign countries.

The notion of the Russian World highlights the tragedy behind the incongruence between Russian cultural and spiritual spheres and the sovereign territorial borders of the modern Russian state. As such, the neo-colonial nature of the Russian World suggests the re-unification of these geographic areas and the “Holy Russia”. Furthermore, the Russian World points to the potential for colonial subjugation by virtue of the Russian language. This is a potent policy that has been applied in Ukraine, where Russia recognizes Russian speakers as people belonging to Russia’s cultural and sovereign domains, or, in other words, as Russians.

Thus, the notion of the Russian World introduces a strong ethno-linguistic element in this version of Russian religious nationalism. The notion of a borderless “Holy Russia” presents a neo-imperial notion, where belonging to Russian culture is based on the use of the Russian language. Furthermore, Russian culture is viewed in terms of a whole civilization. Zhukova (2013) argues that in the matter of Russian national identity Orthodoxy plays a very important role. She argues that Orthodoxy is portrayed as running deep in Russian self-identification, the so-called “mysterious Russian soul”. Religion in this case is not a matter of personal freedom, but a civilizational determinism.

She points out that the ROC offers the Russian state a “national cause”, a “cement” that holds society together (Zhukova 2013, p. 170). According to Zhukova (2013, p. 167), the ROC has an “exclusive relationship with the state” and enters “into joint operational agreements with the various ministries” including the Ministry of Defense. Thus, the influence of the ROC on Russian foreign policy should not be surprising.

In his analysis of the ROC Verkhovsky (2002) argues that already in the late 1990s and early 2000s the ROC increasingly exhibited fundamentalist attitudes. He highlights the anti-democratic, xenophobic, and imperialistic rhetoric of ROC leadership, including those of Kirill (a Metropolitan then). In his analysis, Verkhovsky further illustrates the connection between the ROC and the Russian state, showing the political manifestations of the ROC principles in state policies, both domestically and abroad. Verkhovsky concludes that the ROC’s sentiments go beyond nationalism, but constitute fundamentalism, or what in Juergensmeyer’s typology (Juergensmeyer 1996) is referred to as “ideological religious nationalism”. In her examination of the relationship between the ROC and modern Russian
state Zhukova (2013) comes to the conclusion that the ROC provides the state with religion in place of ideology.

Maria Engström (2014) explores this ideology, by highlighting the messianic nature of Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. She invokes the image of Katechon, or a “shield’ against the apocalyptic forces of chaos” to describe the conceptual framework of Russian ideology and Foreign policy, particularly after the 2012 Presidential election. By examining the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013, she highlights the positioning of Russia as a new civilizational pole and a defense from Western liberalism. Orthodoxy, she argues, plays an important role as part of this civilizational shield, which provides spiritual guidance and grounding in light of the chaos and secularization of liberalism. This point is also supported by Suslov (2014) who explores the alternative civilizational choice offered by Russian Orthodoxy to the secular “Western values”.

Thus, an emerging picture of Russian foreign policy toward Ukraine must be viewed in light of Russian ethno-ideological religious nationalism. Annexing Crimea, support for the “separatists” in Donbas, militant opposition to Ukraine’s joining Western institutions like NATO and the EU are all part of a broader civilizational project inspired by the union of the ROC and Russian state–Russian World.

The Church of the Armed Forces is a physical manifestation of Russian ethno-ideational religious nationalism. The cathedral was built in Patriot Park, a military-themed park, not far from Moscow. The project was conceived by the Russian defense minister, Sergey Shoigu. Construction began in 2018. The massive church in khaki color celebrates Russian military might. The dedication of the church was to coincide with the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the USSR’s victory over the Nazis in May of 2020, but due to pandemic considerations was officially opened in June.

The Church is a colossus of militarism filled with symbolic meaning. The Belltower is 75 m tall, to represent the 75th anniversary of the end of what Russians refer to as the Great Patriotic War (WWII). The diameter of the dome is 19.45 m signifying the end of the war. The smaller dome is 14.18 m representing the 1418 days of the war. Trophy weapons are melted into the cathedral floor, so that each step is a blow to the defeated Nazis. The frescos inside the church combine images of celestial and earthly forces defending the Holy Mother Russia.

There were two planned frescos that have undergone some criticism and are purportedly being changed. One of them included the image of Joseph Stalin. The other depicted the celebration of the Crimean occupation with the words “Crimea is Ours” and “Forever with Russia” appearing on the banner held by jubilant people (Coynash 2020). Controversially, Vladimir Putin, Sergey Shoigu, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov appeared in the earlier versions of these frescos. However, the mosaic was removed, reportedly on the wishes of Vladimir Putin, who felt that it was “too early to celebrate Russia’s current leadership” (Russia Removes Vladimir Putin Mosaic from Military Church 2020). In light of the current war in Ukraine, these words take on a whole new malevolent meaning.

The grand opening of the church in June of 2020 featured Patriarch Kirill alongside Defense Minister Shoigu and other top officials. The ceremony was also attended by “hundreds of members of the Armed Forces” (Russia Consecrates Grandiose Armed Forces Cathedral 2020). Delivering the first liturgy in the church Patriarch Kirill said the cathedral “holds the hope that future generations will pick up the spiritual baton from past generations and save the Fatherland from internal and external enemies” (Russia Consecrates Grandiose Armed Forces Cathedral 2020).

The rethinking of Ukrainian national and religious narratives has to be understood in light of Russian religious nationalism and its application toward Ukraine.

4. Religious Narratives in Ukraine

4.1. The role of Moscow Patriarchate

According to Novikova (2015), religion has a complicated place in the Ukrainian national idea. The rich tradition of Christianity in Ukraine is rather old, and one can find
Religious overtones in the liberation and nationalist movements all throughout Ukrainian history. At the same time as a post-soviet state, Ukraine is also a “post-atheistic” state. This, she suggests, leads to certain levels of ambivalence or even confusion toward religion on the part of Ukrainian society. Wanner (2014) reports making similar conclusions and suggests that religiosity in Ukraine is fluid. These assertions are supported empirically. According to the report by the Razumkov Center, Ukrainians often are not completely sure about their own Church affinity and a large number of Orthodox Ukrainians identify simply as Orthodox.

The purported ambivalence can be explained by a number of reasons. On the one hand, religious historians of Ukraine outline the pluralism of the religious space in Ukraine. In addition to Orthodoxy, Ukraine is home to a number of different religions, however, as mentioned before, this paper concerns itself only with Orthodoxy. In Ukraine, Orthodoxy is also not monolithic. After the collapse of the USSR among the main Churches in Ukraine were the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (AUOC), and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), which retains Orthodox rites but recognizes the authority of the Pope (Bremer 2017). The UOC-KP claimed its independence from the Moscow patriarchate in 1992, however, it is not recognized by the international Orthodox community. This plurality has a significant impact on Ukrainian politics and society.

As Denysenko (2020b) highlighted, while religion plays an important political role in Ukrainian history, to date there is no successful effort of creating a state or national church. President Poroshenko’s efforts to reconcile different Orthodox churches into a unified Ukrainian church have been similarly unsuccessful. As Denysenko argues, Ukrainian churches remain “fiercely loyal to their particular missions” Denysenko (2020b, p. 514). Moreover, the existing Orthodox churches in Ukraine continue to have disputes over jurisdiction and holy sites. Druzenko (2012) provides ample evidence of disagreements among the churches in Ukraine. The UOC-KP, for instance, has been suspicious of the UOC-MP trying to seize control over the church assets. However, this particular suspiciousness goes beyond the inter-church squabbles.

The role of religion in the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity attracted a fair amount of scholarly attention. However, what is interesting is the diversity in responses between Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. UOC-KP sided with the Revolution of Dignity. The St. Michael’s Cathedral in Kyiv provided refuge and protection to the protesters from the government forces in the winter of 2013-14. After the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas, Patriarch Filaret of the Kyiv Patriarchate supported Ukrainian soldiers participating in the Anti-Terrorist Operations (ATO) in Donbas and lobbied with international partners for military assistance to Ukraine (Mulford 2016).

During and after the Revolution of Dignity and annexation of Crimea the UOC-MP took an approach of neutrality and called for fraternal reconciliation between the Russian and Ukrainian people. Yet, this position of neutrality has tarnished the perception of UOC-MP. The church was criticized for not taking a firmer pro-Ukrainian stance. Moreover, not all parishes and clerics remained neutral. Several clerics in Crimea purportedly supported the annexation. While some in the Donbas area gave blessings to anti-Ukrainian “rebels” (UOC (MP) Metropolitan Blesses a Priest to Provide Spiritual Guidance for DPR Fighters 2015). As the war in Donbas continued the position of the UOC-MP was further called into question, when clerics of the church refused the burial rites of the Ukrainian soldiers involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operations (ATO) and accused them of engaging in fratricide (Voni Vykonuut Svou Funksiu 2016).

Victoria Hudson (2018) explores the role of the UOC-MP as a tool of Russian manipulation in Ukraine. Similar to Maria Engström (2014), Hudson explores the extent of Russian “soft power” as exercised through the Church. The concept of “soft power” follows the work of Joseph Nye (1990) and presume the ability to exercise power not by coercion but through attraction, or to use another terminology, an influence over hearts and minds.
Hudson argues that Russian policy reflects the usefulness of this terminology. Siting a number of studies Hudson shows that Russia has been proactive in increasing its cultural influence internationally (Saari 2014; Kiseleva 2015; Feklyunina 2016). As I have shown above, the concept of the Russian World is a driving force behind this messianic policy.

In post-soviet Ukraine, the UOC-MP has enjoyed a close connection to the governments which pursued a more pro-Russian policy (Hudson 2018). However, as Hudson argues structurally the UOC-MP has enough autonomy not to fall in line with the pro-Kremlin ROC, though individual clerics have chosen to do so. Hudson, shows generational and regional differences between these responses. Yet, overall the actions of the UOC-MP in Ukraine have raised serious questions about its role as an agent of the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine.

In his exploration of non-state actors involved in the Russo-Ukrainian War, Mulford (2016) points to UOC-MP as an important agent of Russki Mir. The suspiciousness toward the Moscow Patriarchy is also present among Ukrainian citizens. In 2014, 22.4 percent of Ukrainians declared loyalty to the UOC-KP—up from 18.3 percent just a year earlier. The number of parishioners loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate dropped in 2013–2014 from 19.6 percent to 17.4 percent. This highlights that the parishioners of Ukraine were showing their political preferences by turning away from Moscow and pledging loyalty to the Kyiv Patriarchate, even if it was not officially recognized (Trach 2015).

The calls for autocephaly in Ukraine, thus, came to the fore in the midst of the social and ecclesiastical divisions sparked by the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in Donbas. As Mulford (2016) argued, the Orthodox church has had the potential to unite Ukrainian society. Petro Poroshenko’s decision to support the creation of an autocephalous church for Ukraine must be seen in the context of the existential threat to Ukraine posed by the Russian World narrative from outside and within Ukraine.

4.2. Tomos 2018

On 15 December 2018 a decision to combine the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) established the unified Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). On 6 January 2019 Metropolitan Epifanii (Dumenko) received an official recognition, a Tomos, of autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.

Shestopalets (2020) is absolutely correct that the adoption of Tomos was a watershed moment in Ukrainian modern history aimed at the creation of the new paradigm uniting religious and national narratives in Ukraine. However, the decision of the government of Petro Poroshenko was not an act of weak illegitimate government grasping at straws. The creation of the “new paradigm” was a response to the present and very real danger of the colonial narrative of the Russian World.

By the time the autocephaly was granted Crimea was already occupied. The war in the east has claimed thousands of lives. Some of the heaviest fighting between the Ukrainian army and Russian forces have left the world in awe. The defense of the Donetsk Airport in May of 2014 created a legend of Ukrainian “cyborgs”—indestructible fighters (Shevchenko 2014). In Ilovaisk on 29 August 2014, 400 Ukrainian lives were lost and the Ukrainian army provided evidence of Russian military presence in the battle, a claim denied by the Russian Federation (Sharamovych 2019). Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17/MAS17) was shot down on 17 July 2014, an act now linked by international investigators to Russian/pro-Russian military forces in the East of Ukraine (Government of Netherlands 2022). In Debaltseve, a town in Donetsk Oblast, in February of 2015, the Ukrainian army faced “regular and irregular units of the Russian military, including battle-hardened mercenaries from the Wagner private military outfit”, the same outfit that made itself (in)famous in Syria (Raczkiewycz 2019). In all, by 2018 the war with the Russian World has claimed thousands of lives on Ukrainian soil.

Poroshenko’s speeches of the time show his deep understanding of the necessity of the autocephalous church for Ukraine as part of an anti-colonial national self-determination.
In 2018 Poroshenko reportedly said that the decision to grant autocephaly to Ukraine “dispelled the imperial illusions and chauvinistic fantasies of Moscow” (Poroshenko Calls Ukrainians to Pray for Autocephaly at Soviivska Square 2018). After the presentation of the autocephaly to Ukrainian representatives in Istanbul in January of 2019, Poroshenko said:

“... the Tomos for us is actually another act of proclaiming Ukraine’s independence. It will complete the assertion of the independence of the Ukrainian state, strengthen religious freedom and interconfessional peace”. (Presidential Administration of Ukraine 2019)

As Denysenko (2020b) argues, autocephaly that reconciles the spiritual and geographic boundary of the nation-state is not unprecedented in European history. “The churches of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Poland all received autocephaly when nation-states with sizable Orthodox populations emerged from imperial collapse” (Denysenko 2020b). Thus, Ukraine’s autocephaly is not unique among post-colonial experiences in Europe, albeit this event took place in the twenty-first century.

The role of Russian ethno-ideological nationalism in the decision to pursue autocephaly by the Ukrainian government is also evident in Poroshenko’s own statements and assessments. During his unsuccessful reelection campaign in the Spring of 2019, Poroshenko made Faith (read autocephaly) a part of the three pillars along with Army and Language, on which he placed the anti-imperial struggle against Russia. Thus, making the issues of autocephaly not merely a matter of freedom of consciousness but also a matter of national security. He further positioned himself as the only candidate in the Ukrainian presidential elections who could stand up to Russian President Putin.

Thus, Tomos, is best interpreted as an anti-imperial post-colonial policy by the government engaged in a very real war for independence. In Juergensmeyer’s (1996) typology this form of joining of religious and national boundaries and narratives falls into the category of ethnic anti-imperial religious nationalism. The lack of success of the autocephaly to secure re-election for Poroshenko in 2019 highlights the complicated nature of religion in the national narrative of Ukraine. A topic to which we now turn.

5. Public Opinion and Ukrainian Religious Nationalism

Denysenko (2020a) provides evidence that Orthodox plurality in Ukraine “endured since the fall of the tsarist regime”. Moreover, the history of churches in Ukraine, according to Denysenko, shows that politicians have long regarded religion as a useful political instrument. Yet, to date, all efforts have been unsuccessful. Sergei Mudrov (2019) argues that Tomos brought a new line of division in Ukrainian society. However, the evidence really points out to added confusion rather than division.

According to the survey analysis conducted by the Razumkov Center in 2021, 60% of Ukrainians identify with Orthodoxy. In 2020 there were 26.8% of respondents (of the total population) who described themselves as simply Orthodox, without any Church affiliation. That translates into 43% of all those who claim to be Orthodox. This is a significant number attesting to the ambivalence with which Ukrainians treat religion.

The number of Ukrainians claiming to be religious has declined since 2014, when it was at the highest at 76%, to 68% in 2020. According to the same survey, 58% of the respondents said that in their opinion “a person can be a believer and not profess any particular religion”.

Is the ambivalence to matters of the church affiliation detrimental to Ukrainian society? Probably not. One can argue that this ambivalence and fluidity has hurt the Russian World campaign in the spiritual considerations of Ukrainians. If anything, the emphasis on the religious narrative might have pushed more Ukrainians away from the Moscow Patriarchy immediately following the annexation of Crimea, as discussed earlier. According to the survey data collected by the Razumkov Center in 2020 in Ukraine, 53% of the respondents believed that Ukrainian Church should not remain under the Moscow Patriarchy. According to the same survey data, the numbers of UOC-MP parishioners has steadily declined.
from 24% in 2010 to 12% in 2018. This is a significant number, showing perhaps that the war for “hearts and minds” has been lost in Ukraine by the Kremlin and the ROC.

So what about autocephaly and religious nationalism in Ukraine? According to the Razumkov Center, 33% of respondents supported autocephaly, 17% were against, while 50% reported to be indifferent. This is a very telling statistic showing that the idea of merging religious and national narratives did not land on a receptive public. As a matter of fact, the same survey asked Ukrainians to weigh in on the national orientation of the Church. In 2000 only 29% of Ukrainians supported the national orientation of the Church, ethno-religious nationalism. This number, however, has increased to 32% in 2020 and 39% in 2021. It is also interesting to note that the number opposing the idea of religious nationalism for Ukraine declined from 53% in 2000 to 44.5% in 2021. Thus, the gap between the two groups is narrowing. This trend might suggest some contemplation of the Ukrainian national narrative.

The story of autocephaly and religious nationalism in Ukraine is further complicated by ongoing disagreements between the churches. In May of 2019 Patriarch Filaret, the head of the OUC-KP, revoked his signature from the document establishing the OUC and announced the restoration of the UOC-KP. According to the 2021 report of the Razumkov Center, this “confused many believers in terms of their church affiliation”. Yet, according to the same report most believers have interpreted this decision as a political struggle for power and this “conflict in identities” resulted in declining numbers of followers of the UOC-KP and increased those of the OCU.

According to the Razumkov Center the percent of respondents who explain Church disputes in Ukraine as political increased from 20% to 40% between 2000 and 2020. Similarly, there is an increase in the number of respondents who believe that a “national idea” is at the core of Church disputes, from 11% to 19%. Additionally, Ukrainians are not receptive to the idea of the state-sponsored Church, the percentage of those responding supporting this idea declined from 20% in 2000 to 11% in 2020. These numbers suggest that the efforts of the administration of Petro Poroshenko to bring religion into the national narrative of Ukraine so far have yielded modest results at best. Moreover, since 2000 there seems to be an increase in the number of Ukrainians who support the separation between church and state as an important element of democracy and preservation of human rights, from 36% to 49% in 2021. 58% of Ukrainians do not support the institution of a state church. This opposition stems from the argument that such an institution would be a violation of the freedom of consciousness of the citizens of a multi-religious democratic society like Ukraine.

It is important to note that religiosity in general does not link with strong pro-democratic stances. Yet, the data seem to suggest that Orthodoxy in Ukraine and Russia might have different implications when it comes to democratic values. Balakireva and Sereda (2013) in their survey of Orthodox Christians in Russia and Ukraine, find that there are weak links between religiosity and support for democracy. Although they find a “weak correlation between religiosity and support for democracy in Ukraine” in 1999, they also find that devout Orthodox people in Russia are more likely to support authoritarianism and justify corruption, unlike their Ukrainian counterparts.

6. Conclusions

The Russian war in Ukraine is a horrific and unjust action. The Russian Federation, as a former empire, is attempting to punish Ukraine, a former colony, and bring it into the fold. Russian religious nationalism, the Russian World, has been revealed in this new bright light. During the Sunday sermon delivered before the Great Lent, Patriarch Kirill justified this Holy War. “We have entered into a struggle that has not a physical, but a metaphysical significance”, he said (Smith 2022). This essay has sought to provide an overview of the importance of the religious narratives in the modern post-colonial relationship between Kyiv and Moscow.
The argument contained three main components. First, the analysis suggests that the creation of a religious nationalist narrative in Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea is a response to Russian religious nationalism. Second, religious nationalism in Ukraine, as exemplified by the adoption of autocephaly in 2018, is an example of post-colonial religious nationalism aimed at spiritual as well as political sovereignty from the empire. Finally, the empirical data shows weak public support for any religious narrative in Ukraine prior to full scale invasion.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Russian and Ukrainian societies have undergone a number of important changes including the newly established relationships between state and church. The literature on religious nationalism (Van der Veer 1994; Juergensmeyer 1993, 1996, 2001, 2019; Rieffer 2003) highlights that religion can play a number of roles in national narratives from full integration of the two narratives to an instrumental role of religion. In line with Juergensmeyer’s typology, I have argued that the Russian narrative of Russkii Mir (Russian World) presents an example of ethno-ideological religious nationalism. It seems to be a careful blend of religious, nationalistic, and imperial narratives, which are used to justify the authoritarian government domestically as well as messianic expansionist policies abroad. This blend of civilizational spiritual argument mixed with geopolitics presents an existential threat to countries in Russian “near abroad”. In Ukraine, religious plurality allows for the continued function of the Orthodox Church loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate, which prescribes to Russian World view.

In light of the existential threat presented by the Russian World to Ukraine, the fifth president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, tried to establish the religious national narrative by advocating the adoption of Tomos of autocephaly for Ukraine. This step was an attempt to create a post-colonial religious nationalism, where Ukrainian nationhood and Ukrainian Orthodoxy would coincide within the same geographic borders. Yet, unlike Russian ethno-ideological nationalism, Ukraine still seems to lack a unified Ukrainian national religious narrative. Some might perceive this as a vulnerability. The evidence points to ambivalence to religion in Ukraine, or the fluidity with which Ukrainians approach religion (Wanner 2014), which might make Ukrainians more vulnerable to religious narratives of imperial belonging propagated by the ROC.

Yet, when examined more carefully, the evidence shows weak public support for any religious nationalist narrative in Ukraine. The public appears to be committed more to secularism, pluralism, and freedom of consciousness, than religious nationalism. Moreover, the Vladimir Zelensky government elected in 2019 seems to have abandoned the necessity of supporting religious narratives in Ukraine in favor of economic and defense matters. Religious autonomy seemed to be relatively low on the list of priorities for Ukrainian public.

Since 24 February 2022, the world can witness Russian World on full display. Ukrainian church leaders have condemned the war, as evidence of Russian war crimes piles on. Numerous bishops in Ukraine started to distance themselves from the Moscow Patriarchate. The resolve of Ukrainian defenders has already earned them a place in history. There is anecdotal evidence that Russian-speaking Ukrainians are abandoning the Russian language and switching to Ukrainian. A strong Ukrainian identity is being forged before our eyes. It is very possible that this war will be the catharsis for the unification of Ukrainian Churches.

Note on Data: The nationwide study was conducted in November 2021 by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine and included a nationwide survey of Ukrainian citizens with a sample representing the adult population of government-controlled territories of Ukraine (that is, excluding the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and some areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), as well as online focus groups.

A representative survey of the population was conducted on 12–19 November 2021 involving 2018 respondents aged 18+. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

Overall, 5 focus group discussions were held with a total of 46 participants. The focus groups involved residents of all macro-regions of Ukraine, women, and men aged 25 to 65,
both faithful of the three largest churches in Ukraine (OCU, UOC-MP, UGCC) and those who do not belong to any creed.


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