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Knowledge and Causality in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *Book of Giving*, and the Buddhist Notion of Dependent Origination

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Abstract: This paper introduces the otherwise unstudied Arabic treatise on knowledge, the *Book of Giving*, penned by the influential Muslim mystic, Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 1240). It presents a critical edition, English translation, and initial analysis of this short yet original work. It authenticates this work, situates it in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s career, and analyzes its content. Combining textual scholarship and intellectual history with a comparative perspective, it discusses some outstanding features of the *Book of Giving* in light of Buddhism in order to provide an initial philosophical bridge between the two intellectual traditions. It argues that knowledge is presented in the *Book of Giving* as a causal relationship constructed in the mind. Ibn al-‘Arabī’s approach to causality is one of philosophical idealism, and it contains significant parallels with the notion of dependent origination in Buddhism.

Keywords: epistemology; causality; Islam; Buddhism; Sufism; Ibn Arabi; process philosophy; Islamic manuscripts



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1. The Work: Authenticity and Date of Composition

With its rhyming title, the *Book of Giving for the Aspirant for Receiving* [*Kitāb al-Ifāda li-man Arāda al-Istifāda*] is a short work composed of around 1200 words in Arabic penned by one of the most influential Muslim scholars in history, Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 1240). We are sure about its authenticity, which is proven in multiple ways. First, the title appears in the *List of Writings* [*Fihris al-Mu‘allafāt*] compiled by Ibn al-‘Arabī himself. This *List* not only authenticates the *Book of Giving* but also helps us with dating it. The earliest extant manuscript copy of the *List of Writings*, MS Yusuf Ağa 7838, was written by the hand of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s stepson and leading student, Saḍr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274), who studied the *List* with him in January 1230 CE (Ṣafar 627 AH) in Damascus (Elmore 1997, p. 165; Clark and Hirtenstein 2012, p. 19). This marks the latest possible date of composition, that is, terminus ad quem, for the *Book of Giving*. Another piece of evidence that simultaneously establishes the authenticity of the *Book of Giving* and its date of composition is an internal reference to a poem in another work of the author, called “the Bezels” [*al-Fuṣūṣ*]. This is an explicit reference to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *Bezels of Wisdom*, suggesting that he wrote the *Book of Giving* afterwards. The *Bezels of Wisdom* was penned upon the vision that Ibn al-‘Arabī experienced in Damascus in late November, 1229 CE (early Muḥarram of 627 AH). Thus, the latest possible date of composition, that is, terminus post quem for the *Book of Giving*, is the last couple of months in 1229, which leaves a remarkably narrow window for the composition. It seems that the *Book of Giving* was composed in December 1229 in Damascus, quickly after the composition of the *Bezels of Wisdom* and before the *List of Writings*. Thus, the *Book of Giving* also provides possibly the earliest reference to the monumental *Bezels of Wisdom*, which must have been completed in less than a month after the vision in late November, 1229, whereby the Prophet gave the book to him.

Brockelmann (2016, vol. 1: p. 503, no. 33) mentioned only the MS Berlin copy of the *Book of Giving*—a copy known to scholarship at least since 1891.¹ Our archival research

reveals many copies: the work survives in at least thirteen manuscripts. Reflecting the preface of the work, three of these copies are titled the *Mothers of Intimate Sciences* [*Ummahāt al-Ma'ārif*] or the *Mothers of Sciences* [*Ummahāt al-'Ulūm*]. As Osman Yahya notes, the same work, under the title, the *Mothers of Intimate Sciences*, was attributed to Ibn al-'Arabī's prominent follower, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī (d. ca. 1412) as well (Yahya 1964, pp. 303–4). Yet, this is certainly a misattribution that emerged solely in a single manuscript copy in Egypt, Azhariyya 964, more than three hundred years after the original composition (Zaydān 1419/1998, p. 78; Yahya 1964, pp. 303–4). We have robust manuscript evidence that predates al-Jīlī, and all copies are otherwise unanimously and correctly attributed to Ibn al-'Arabī. The earliest copy of the *Book of Giving* that survives today is dated to the year 664 AH/1265–6 CE, preserved in the precious Manisa 1183 codex composed of the corpus of Ibn al-'Arabī.² The scribe, Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Qādir Ibn 'Abd al-Khāliq al-Anṣārī (d. 1276), was a direct disciple of Ibn al-'Arabī. Together with his two brothers, he appears many times in the early audition sessions of Ibn al-'Arabī's works, such as the *Book of Pre-Temporality* [*Kitāb al-Azal*] and the *Meccan Openings* [*al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiya*] (e.g., Yahya 1964, pp. 177–78, 217, 220–31; Ibn al-'Arabī 1428/2007a, pp. 217–31.). In addition to the Manisa 1183 that he copied directly from Ibn al-'Arabī's autograph in 1265–6, al-Anṣārī is also the scribe of another important collection of Ibn al-'Arabī's works; he copied them in 637 AH/1239–40 CE in Damascus when Ibn al-'Arabī was still alive (see MS Private 1 2021).

In addition to this material evidence of authenticity, the *Book of Giving* also contains major overlap with other writings of Ibn al-'Arabī. These parallels are often uniquely found in his works. For example, the idea that there are a limited number of mothers, or matrices, of sciences, who give birth to infinite sciences, is found in the *Meccan Openings* (e.g., Ibn al-'Arabī 1431/2010, vol. 2, pp. 534–35). The claim that every entity has direct knowledge of the divine through the “private face,” and indirect, mediated knowledge through the world and its secondary causes is also well-developed in various works of Ibn al-'Arabī. This is a particularly important point for Ibn al-'Arabī, who criticizes those who turn their back on natural sciences to praise metaphysics and dismiss scientific knowledge in defense of mystical unveiling (e.g., Ibn al-'Arabī 1425/2004, p. 28). Rather, he depicts all forms of knowledge that we acquire as essentially divine (e.g., Ibn al-'Arabī 1946, Ch.10, p. 109; Ibn al-'Arabī 2015a, Ch.10, p. 76). Thus, the sciences of the world are also of major significance for contemplation [*i' tibār*] and practice. Furthermore, the references in the *Book of Giving* to the classical Sufi work of Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 996) and the Andalusian scholar Ibn al-Sīd al-Baṭalyawsī (d. 1127) strongly resonate with Ibn al-'Arabī's other writings, which consistently evoke these two figures in the same contexts. Finally, the Qur'ānic references and their interpretations put forward in the *Book of Giving* are almost directly found in other writings of Ibn al-'Arabī, the *Meccan Openings* in particular. These clear textual and interpretive parallels indicate that the *Book of Giving* was written after the completion of the more famous works of Ibn al-'Arabī—the *Bezels of Wisdom* and the first draft of the *Meccan Openings*—as a short original treatise that illuminates the highly important yet complex topic of knowledge, its branches, and its connections with Truth.

This paper aims to introduce this short treatise of Ibn al-'Arabī. Below, we will start with a discussion on the outstanding philosophical features and claims of the treatise, using its title as a springboard to delve into the content. We will argue that the approach to causality, metaphysics, and epistemology that we encounter in the *Book of Giving* bears some distinct parallels with various schools of Buddhism. We will devote a separate section to exploring these parallels and to constructing a philosophical bridge to encourage future comparative studies between the two intellectual traditions. An original Arabic critical edition and English translation of the *Book of Giving* will be given at the end of the analysis, following a short description of the extant manuscripts that we could locate in our archival survey.

2. The Title: *Ifāda* and *Istifāda*

The title of the work, the *Book of Ifāda for the Aspirant for Istifāda*, relies on a rhyming word-play between two words that originate from the same radicals. This three-lettered root, *fā-yā-dāl*, has a wide semantic range, meaning to moisten, depart, pass away, or accrue. The primary infinitive form (I), however, is rarely used, compared to the causative version of the verb, which is the form [*wazn*] *af ala* (IV). This common form of the verb, *ifāda*, means to benefit, give, avail, inform, and help. The other common use of the root is in the requestive form, *istaf ala* (X). *Istifāda* means to acquire, receive, learn, gain, or utilize. It is important to remember that the “form X (*istaf ala*) was originally the reflexive or passive of form IV (*af ala*)” (Watson 2002, p. 140). The form X, thus, can be considered a derivative of form IV. This grammatical derivation of *istifāda* from *ifāda* indicates an ontological hierarchy between the two forms for Ibn al-‘Arabī. Earlier Sufis, like Hujvīrī (d. ca. 1077), and Ibn al-‘Arabī’s contemporaries like ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī (d. 1234) made divisions between the cognate terms, “Sufi” [*Ṣūfī*] and “would-be Sufi” [*mutaṣawwif*], putting them into a hierarchy in terms of their distance from the original root of being “pure” [*ṣāf*]. Hujvīrī wrote as follows:

The perfect, then, among them are called “Sufi,” and the inferior seekers among them are called would-be Sufi; for Sufism [*taṣawwuf*] belongs to the form “*tafa‘ul*,” and is a branch of the original root. “Purity is a sainthood with a sign and a relation, and Sufism is an uncomplaining imitation of Purity”. Purity, then, is a resplendent and manifest idea, and Sufism is an imitation of that idea. Its followers in this degree are of three kinds: the Sufi, the would-be Sufi, and the counterfeit Sufi [*mustaṣvif*]. (al-Suhrawardī 2021, p. 140)

Ibn al-‘Arabī’s use of the terms *ifāda* and its derivative, *istifāda*, relies on a similar spiritual grammar. The title of the book, *Ifāda for the Aspirant for Istifāda*, thus, suggests an act of giving benevolently. The one who seeks knowledge is looking for something derivative (*istifāda*), while Ibn al-‘Arabī provides its root cause, *ifāda*, which is the original well-spring of the *istifāda*. Receiving *ifāda* while pursuing *istifāda*, the seeker encounters a pedagogy of kindness through the book.³

It is also within the context of teaching and learning that his leading pupil, al-Qūnawī, uses the word-pair *ifāda* and *istifāda*. In the opening of his most voluminous work, al-Qūnawī mentions “the science of *ifāda* and *istifāda*” as one of the universal principles [*qawā‘ id kulliyya*] that constitute the backbone of his hermeneutics. He elaborates on this science in his discussion on knowledge as a form of apprehension [*idrāk*]. If the readers can grasp his theory of knowledge acquisition, al-Qūnawī writes, they will also “grasp the secret of origination, limitation, and absolution [*al-ijād wa al-taqyīd wa al-iṭlāq*], *ifāda* and *istifāda*, together with other deep secrets” (al-Qūnawī 2001, p. 15). Al-Qūnawī’s use of the terms *ifāda* and *istifāda* reflects the content of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s book, which focuses on knowledge.

The title of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s book, thus, could be legitimately rendered into English as the *Book of Instruction for the Aspirant for Education*, which would also preserve the original rhyme to some extent. On the other hand, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s own use of this word-pair suggests a broader relationship of giving and receiving that goes beyond the specific relationship of bequeathing or acquiring knowledge. This is a section in the *Meccan Openings* where Ibn al-‘Arabī discusses the innate dependence of the human being on God:

... (Human being) receives [*istifāda*] his existence from God. Thus, he is innately dispositioned towards receiving, rather than giving [*al-istifāda lā ‘alā al-ifāda*]. Therefore, his truth does not require him to give alms. When he gives alms, this demonstrates that he is sheltered from the stinginess of his ego upon which God made his temperament. This is why He said, “almsgiving is a demonstration”. (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1431/2010, vol. 2: pp. 52–53)

Other occasions in the *Meccan Openings*, where Ibn al-‘Arabī uses the word-pair *ifāda* and *istifāda*, have the same general meaning. When explaining the relationship between

God and creation, he similarly writes that “it is God Who gives (its existence) to the universe, instead of receiving” [*fa-huwa alladhī yufid al-‘ālam wa-lā yastafid*] (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1431/2010, vol. 2: p. 176. Also see Ibn al-‘Arabī 1431/2010, vol. 1: p. 302, vol. 2: p. 183). These cases are consistently referring to an existentiating, benevolent, and beneficial act of giving, and a reception that is profitable for the receiver. In order to reflect this broader sense of the word-pair that Ibn al-‘Arabī employs, we adopted a more literal approach, and chose the translation, the *Book of Giving for the Aspirant for Receiving*. This choice, we hope, preserves the broad sense of a beneficent relationship of giving and receiving beyond the focus on knowledge.

3. Giving and Receiving: Interrelationality and Equivalence

We could not identify any explicit reference to, or discussion on, the *Book of Giving* in the later tradition. Many claims of the work, however, will be familiar to the informed reader, insofar as they can be found in the major writings of Ibn al-‘Arabī and his followers that circulated widely. A key argument of the work is that knowledge is a causal relation [*nisba*] between the knower and the known. Through this relation, the subject reaches a ruling [*ḥukm*] about its object. Relations, on the other hand, are grasped by the mind [*dhihn*]; they do not exist in the physical world. The mind naturally dictates causality to the relations that it grasps, by determining a cause and an effect in the relationship. Causality, then, qualifies the otherwise obscure relationality, and exists mentally as an attachment to the mental existence of the relation. As we read in the *Book of Giving*:

Causes are relations, and relations are intelligible in mind even if they are absent in the physical world. The causes are attached to the mind. That is, they are not intellected except through the mind. So the causes have some share from (the attribution of) existence to relations as the ruling of the relations stops short (without the causes). (also see Ibn al-‘Arabī 1946, Ch.1, pp. 51–52; Ibn al-‘Arabī 2015a, Ch.1, pp. 20–21; Ibn al-‘Arabī in Chittick 1989, p. 36)

In brief, Ibn al-‘Arabī attributes to relations only a mental existence, and depicts causality as a mental construction dictated upon the relations that are grasped through this cognitive qualification. This approach resonates not only with the Ash‘arite theory of causality, but also with Immanuel Kant’s (d. 1804) transcendental idealism in response to David Hume’s (d. 1776) causal skepticism (see De Pierris and Friedman 2018), and particularly with various schools of Buddhism, as we will elaborate in the next section.

Ibn al-‘Arabī proceeds from this cognitive theory of causality into a few logical conclusions. First, knowledge is a relation of a cognizant subject with various physical or intellectual objects, which are infinitely rich manifestations of the unitary, divine source. Thus, knowledge is a divine donation, and all forms of knowledge are eventually connections with God, whether directly through His ubiquitous “private face” in every entity, or indirectly, through intermediary phenomena, which are His manifestations. All knowledge ultimately relates to God, whether the knower realizes it or not. The *Book of Giving* does not have the otherwise common concept of “reprehensible knowledge” that Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) detailed classification of the sciences popularized. If every entity is a unique manifestation of the divine, how can knowledge about anything be reprehensible?

Second, as a relationship between the knower and the known, knowledge is by definition delimited and determined by the apparently passive component of the relationship, the known. This is Ibn al-‘Arabī’s oft-repeated principle that “knowledge is subject to the known” (see e.g., Aladdin 2011). We read in the *Book of Giving*:

Knowledge depends on the object of knowledge, rather than the object of knowledge depending on knowledge. Thus, knowledge does not have a ruling about its object except through the object itself. Knowledge does not give anything about its object except from the object (see below).

This is a phenomenological approach in the sense that knowledge of an object is possible to the extent that the object allows itself to be known, and shows itself to the

knower. In this regard, it is pure donation. In the *Book of Giving*, Ibn al-ʿArabī carries this phenomenological principle of “knowledge is subject to the known” to its limit. It depicts causality as a mental construct dictated upon a given relation; the “cause” and the “effect” emerge in mind simultaneously as interdependent components of an otherwise ontic unity. To put it simply, nothing can be called a “subject” without the presence of an “object,” and the two are dependent on each other. Throughout the *Book of Giving* Ibn al-ʿArabī gives multiple examples, ranging from Arabic grammar to ontology, to drive the point home: while we might assume the “tyranny of the subject” to act freely, it is, in fact, dependent on the object to create the relationship in the first place, whereby it can become a subject proper. Reminiscent of Antonio Gramsci’s definition of hegemony, the subject and object of a sentence are thus interdependent. The active and the passive, the knower and the known, the creator and the created, the giver and the receiver, the cause and the effect, the worshipper and the worshipped, and the lord and the servant are all two sides of the same coin: they arise interdependently.

This interdependence functions on two levels. First, the “self-opening” of the incomprehensible divine singularity, starting with what Ibn al-ʿArabī calls the holiest emanation [*al-fayḍ al-aqdas*] and continuing with the holy emanation [*al-fayḍ al-muqaddas*], is simultaneously the emergence of a relationship within divine unity, as a self-mirroring of the one with the one. In simpler terms, the divine attributes necessitate the presence of objects, which are only their loci of manifestations. The divine attributes “creator,” “worshipped,” or “lord” can only emerge together with the attributes “created,” “worshipper,” and “servant”.⁴ The mind divides between the creator and the created, while ontologically they are inseparable. The *Book of Giving* thus recalls the ontological interdependence between the creator and the created, which was mentioned in various chapters of the *Bezels of Wisdom*, and became the key reason for Ibn al-ʿArabī’s criticism of the rationalists, who argued that God can be known simply through logical reasoning. Logic can prove only an abstract principle, while godhead is relational, and it can be known only through the relation with objects:

Some philosophers and Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] claimed that God can be known without observing the universe. This is a fault. Indeed, an eternal, pre-existing ipseity can be known; but, that this is god [*ilāh*] can be known only after knowing that which depends on it [*al-maʿlūh*], which is its evidence [*dalīl*]. (See Ibn al-ʿArabī 1946, Ch.5, p. 81; Ibn al-ʿArabī 2015a, Ch.5, p. 51)

The first dimension of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s ontology of interdependent origination, then, emphasizes the interrelationship between God and universe, subject and object, active and passive, creator and created, knower and known, and so on. The second dimension is about the interrelationship among entities in the universe. They are devoid of any inherent existence or self-subsistence, and they emerge through receiving existence from a singular divine source, and manifesting it in infinite variations. This not only means that everything is a manifestation (or “face”) of the divine, but they are also essentially and permanently dependent on each other. As we read below in a key passage in the *Book of Giving*:

Everything is needy rather than self-subsistent, and this is because of the interrelationality among things. The neediness of the passive for its subject has no primacy over the neediness of the active for the object to manifest its ruling and sovereignty over it, the majesty in the neediness of the active notwithstanding. (see below; cf. Ibn al-ʿArabī in Chittick 1989, p. xxi.)

Ibn al-ʿArabī developed his principle of interdependence on the basis of close familiarity with earlier Muslim mystics and pietists. Most notably, he repeatedly quotes the influential and respected Basran mystic Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 896) as the eloquent revealer of the interdependence between the lord and the servant—the “secret of lordship” [*sirr al-rubūbiyya*].⁵ Still, it became one of the most fiercely debated teachings associated with Ibn al-ʿArabī. Of particular significance was his South Asian follower and leading scholar, Muḥibb Allāh Ilāhābādī (d. 1648), who wrote a separate treatise on this topic, titled the *Equivalence between Giving and Accepting* [*al-Taswīya bayna al-Ifāda wa-l-Qabūl*] that ex-

tensively quoted Ibn al-‘Arabī. The “equivalence” in Ilāhābādī’s work was precisely the “interrelationality” in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *Book of Giving*. Ilāhābādī argued for the equivalence of the receiver and the giver in a relationship, including God’s giving existence to creation. Relying on the *Bezels*, he joined Ibn al-‘Arabī’s logical criticism of rationalist theology, notably omitting the name of al-Ghazālī:

the rationalists’ assertion that “the existentiating Giver (*mūjjid mufīd*) of existence – and, hence, the Giver of everything – must be existent (*maḥjūd*), as opposed to that which receives existence (*qābil*)” is to be rejected. Just as [we would ask] of a thing which doesn’t exist: “how could it possibly give (*yufīd*) anything?,” likewise, how can that which does not exist actually receive anything? The reception of a thing requires that the accepting receiver [already] be existent, just as granting and giving that thing requires that the granting giver [already] be existent. (Muḥibb Allāh Ilāhābādī in Nair 2021, pp. 131–32.)

Closely following Ibn al-‘Arabī, Ilāhābādī claims that the divine names emerge through the relationship with, and in the form of, the universe. Thus, the divine name “form-giver” [*al-muṣawwir*] is equivalent with “the one given form” [*al-mutaṣawwar*], the worshipped with the worshipper, and so on. Hence the title of Ilāhābādī’s treatise:

... The giver and the receiver –with respect to both qualification (*ittiṣāf*) by existence and non-qualification by it– are equivalent (*sawā*). And so, I have named this treatise the *Equivalence between Giving and Accepting*.⁶

Unlike Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *Book of Giving*, Ilāhābādī’s *Equivalence* became widely known. It attracted the attention of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), who asked Ilāhābādī’s disciples to explain it, and occasioned at least sixteen commentaries and refutations. Ilāhābādī’s *Equivalence between Giving and Accepting* only cites the *Bezels of Wisdom*, and is unaware of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *Book of Giving*. A piece of evidence for this unfamiliarity is the choice of the word-pair *ifāda* and *qabūl*, rather than *ifāda* and *istifāda*, to explore the equivalence, or interdependence, between the giver and the receiver. The word-pair of *ifāda* and *istifāda* in the *Book of Giving* serves Ilāhābādī’s purposes much better than *ifāda* and *qabūl* that we find in the *Bezels of Wisdom* and the *Equivalence*. For, coming from the same root as *ifāda*, *istifāda* expresses not only the equivalence, but also its monistic ontological basis; the receiver is not only interdependent with the giver, but also a derivative of the same singular reality, rather than having a separate existence. The *Equivalence between Ifāda and Istifāda* would be arguably an ontologically more appropriate title for Ilāhābādī’s influential treatise, which closely follows Ibn al-‘Arabī’s writings.

4. Interrelationality: Comparative Insights

For students of comparative religion, the most direct intellectual parallel of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s principle of interrelationality is found in the famous Buddhist notion known as “dependent origination,” “dependent co-arising” “interdependent arising,” or “co-dependent origination” (*pratītyasamutpāda* in Sanskrit, and *paṭiccasamuppāda* in Pāli). Appearing in the Pāli Canon, which was collected by the first century CE, it became central to the two major schools of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana. As a central teaching in early Buddhism, dependent origination was a subject of the *Connected Discourses of the Buddha* [*Samyutta Nikāya*]. Here, the teaching was introduced to describe the origins of suffering (or bondage) [*dukkha*], which emerges through an entirely mental chain of events.⁷ Typically composed of twelve links [*niḍānas*], this chain entails the specific conditionality of the emergence of various mental, impermanent constructions that are causally connected to each other (Bhikkhu 2000, p. 551; Ronkin 2005, pp. 200–1). It is through the realization of the impermanence of these links, including that of consciousness and the self, that one achieves liberation. We read in the *Connected Discourses* in the Pāli Canon:

The instructed noble disciple attends carefully and closely to dependent origination itself thus: “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation

of this, that ceases. That is, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness . . . Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness . . . Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering". (Bhikkhu 2000, pp. 575–76. Also see Analayo 2021, pp. 1094–102)

The history of contact between Muslims and Buddhists is nearly as old as Islam itself (Perreira 2010, p. 248; Elverskog 2010; Berzin 2010). Yet, the typical categorization of Islam as a monotheistic, "Abrahamic" religion, and Buddhism as an "Eastern," non-Abrahamic religion has long created a dissociative academic atmosphere that discourages comparative thinking on their intellectual heritage (Yusuf 2013, pp. 360–75). As a result, their intellectual commonalities have been explored mainly within the context of interfaith dialogue (see e.g., Ikeda and Tehranian 2003; Habito 2010), the universalist discourse of the phenomenology of religion (see e.g., Shah-Kazemi 2010; Massoudi 2009), or a combination of both, rather than more analytical philosophical inquiries. However, despite historical, practical, and popular doctrinal differences between the two religions, Ibn al-ʿArabī's "interrelationality" in the *Book of Giving* and the Buddhist "dependent origination" have some outstanding analytical similarities worth acknowledging. Both concepts are principles of relationality that have a major impact on the respective approaches towards not only epistemology, but also causality and the key ethical issue of human salvation. In what follows, we will build a rudimentary bridge between these two concepts to provide a comparative philosophical framework for further studies.⁸ We will succinctly analyze these two converging concepts through the lens of their key philosophical implications on causality, metaphysics, enlightenment, interconnectedness, and epistemology.

Idealist Causality and Process Metaphysics. The Buddhist principle of dependent origination is essentially on causality, and how mental constructions causally connect to suffering through twelve links. Indeed, dependent origination is the main subject of the Book of Causation [Nidānavagga] among the Connected Discourses. Together with the principle of ethical causation known as karma, dependent origination can be considered one of the key models of causality in Buddhism, as it "accounts for the conditioned flux of phenomenal existence" (Skorupski 2016).

In the Brahmanical context wherein Buddhism emerged, the concept of "karma," which literally means "action" or "deed," indicated the principle that "every action produces a fitting result" (Ronkin 2005, p. 199; Skorupski 2016). The Buddha revised this Brahmanic principle of causality, and added an ethical layer. His redefinition entailed the expansion of karma from a causal law of physical action to an act of intention, or mental volition (*cetanā*), from which all bodily, verbal, and mental acts stem. Thus, the twelve links of causal conditioning leading to suffering started with the mind for the Buddha. As the description of the causal relatedness of the chain of events that emerge in the mind, dependent origination "addresses the workings of the mind alone" (Analayo 2021, p. 1096; Cho 2014, pp. 428–29). The Buddha's statements on dependent origination were related only to mental conditioning; he was "saying absolutely nothing about existence per se" (Analayo 2021, p. 1096).⁹

We observe that the traditional Buddhist readings of dependent origination and Ibn al-ʿArabī's writings converge on a form of transcendental idealist approach to causality, where the mind plays a constitutive role, and constructs the relationship. As we saw, the *Book of Giving* depicts causality as a form of relationship where the mind naturally divides the otherwise interdependent constituents into the dualism of a "cause" and an "effect". This process gives the false impression of a one-sided influence, while the cause and effect are in fact interdependent as they co-emerge through this relationship with each other. The knower and the known are constructed within the relationship of knowledge, or the process of knowing, in the same way a subject and an object co-emerge in a meaningful sentence. As we read below, the *Book of Giving* claims that this interdependency can be

understood by those who “recognize God through His godhead, His messenger through his messengerhood, and the faithful through their faithfulness—not through their ipseities, but rather through the ruling of these conditions and relations” (see below). Fully in alignment with Ibn al-‘Arabī’s above-mentioned criticism of al-Ghazālī, the *Book of Giving* endorses a metaphysics of relationality, or process metaphysics. As opposed to substance metaphysics, where each object has a static essence or ipseity [*dhāt*], the *Book of Giving* adopts a process metaphysics, where relations have priority over isolated essences. The godhead of God, the messengerhood of the messenger, and the faithfulness of the faithful—the defining, essential qualities that are supposed to exist in them statically—can be understood only in a process metaphysics, where the primacy is given to the relationship.

The process metaphysics of the *Book of Giving* resonates with the prominent Buddhist readings of dependent origination. The most immediate evidence can be found in the *Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, which describes the principle of dependent origination in connection with the twelve links:

Aging-and-death . . . is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation. Birth is impermanent . . . Existence is impermanent . . . Clinging is impermanent . . . Craving is impermanent . . . Feeling is impermanent . . . Contact is impermanent . . . The six sense bases are impermanent . . . Name-and-form is impermanent . . . Consciousness is impermanent . . . Volitional formations are impermanent . . . Ignorance is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation. These . . . are called the dependently arisen phenomena. (Bhikkhu 2000, p. 551; Ronkin 2005, pp. 200–1)

These twelve links of dependent origination are composed of impermanent processes, instead of relations of substances (Ronkin 2005, pp. 198–205; Cho 2014). Thus, it marks a chain of causal relations that are primarily processes rather than immutable substances. These relations arise interdependently as mental processes, very much like the emergence of supposedly independent substances within mentally constructed relations in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *Book of Giving*.

Prominent Buddhist schools and scholars in the later tradition shared these two notions of an idealist theory of causation and a process metaphysics. Within Mahayana Buddhism, we can turn to the Yogacara interpretation of dependent origination formulated by Asanga (fl. 4th CE) and Vasubandhu (fl. 5th CE), or the Madhyamaka interpretation of Nagarjuna (fl. 2nd–3rd CE). In these influential readings of Buddhism, dependent origination “refers to the realization of the fundamental unity of all phenomena as empty and as interdependently arising out of the activity of the mind” (Laumakis 2008, p. 113). We observe the emergence of complex ontological differences, manifested in the Buddhist “emptiness” [*śūnyatā*], and the “oneness of being” [*waḥdat al-wujūd*] or simply “unicity” [*tawḥīd*] in the school of Ibn al-‘Arabī. Ontological differences will become more evident when we look at Theravada Buddhism, which, unlike Yogacara or Ibn al-‘Arabī, adopted more materialist ontologies.¹⁰ Still, they converged when it comes to the interpretation of dependent origination as an idealist theory of causality accompanied by process metaphysics. For, according to the mainstream Theravada interpretation of dependent origination:

there are not two metaphysically distinct kinds of beings called a “cause” and an “effect” (i.e., fire and smoke, and a cue ball and the eight ball), but that there are causally interrelated or “dependently arising” processes, events, or happenings conventionally designated as “fire” and “smoke” or “cue ball” and “eight ball”. There are not separate, metaphysically distinct “things” or “beings” that actually exist independently and in isolation from one another. Instead, what really exists is a giant net or complex causal network of constantly changing and causally interacting happenings or events or processes. (Laumakis 2008, p. 110)

The depiction of causality as a mental relation, and the prioritization of a process metaphysics are, thus, two convergences that we observe in the teachings of Ibn al-‘Arabī

and various schools of Buddhism. On the other hand, as Ronkin (2005, p. 205) reminds us, process metaphysics is a broad umbrella with diverse approaches, and this diversity should be respected not only in the comparison of Islam and Buddhism, but also within these traditions. This diversity will be particularly pertinent when it comes to the ontologies that relate to these approaches to causality and process metaphysics.

Self-Essences and Enlightenment. In the ontology that Ibn al-‘Arabī shared with the Muslim Ash‘arite theologians, existence is only an accident for engendered entities; they may or may not come into physical existence. As we read in the *Book of Giving*, “not all contingent things are actualized” (see below). At least in this sense, the universe in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s view shares the Buddhist notion of emptiness of self-essences. Notions of the independent self are artificially constructed by the mind, while everything in existence is rather one. Beyond the “veil” of the independent self, the universe is the colorful, temporal manifestation of a colorless, timeless unity—hence the doctrine of the oneness of being in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s school. While phenomena are the conditioned manifestations of the unconditioned reality for Ibn al-‘Arabī, the marked emphasis on the emptiness of fixed self-essences did not simply negate their reality in Buddhist thought. Various schools of Buddhism had different readings of emptiness, some of which seem to align with Ibn al-‘Arabī. Japanese Shin Buddhism (Jōdo Shinshū) founded by Shinran Shonin (d. 1263), for example, combines a non-dualistic ontology, where phenomena lack self-essence, with the identity of the conditioned reality [*saṃsāra*] and the unconditioned reality [*nirvāṇa*] beyond the dichotomous workings of the mind.¹¹ In their dependent origination and essential emptiness, all phenomena are thus filled with unconditioned reality, like Ibn al-‘Arabī’s conception of the self and the universe.

The converging criticisms of independent self-essences lead us to pay closer attention to the shared psychological concern of these concepts of interdependence. The cessation of ignorance, and hence suffering, lies in the acknowledgement of the artificiality of the notion of the independent self as a mental construct. In the case of early Buddhism, the liberation from the predicament of suffering was essential to the notion of dependent origination, so much so that the Buddha was quoted as saying “one who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma, and one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination”.¹² The *Book of Giving*, like the entire corpus of Ibn al-‘Arabī, also challenges the notion of an independent self, identifying the universe with an essential neediness, non-existence, and continuous (inter)dependence. The independent, self-sufficient self is an illusion constructed by the mind, and it is a decisive veil to be lifted by the seekers of truth. Once this illusion of independent self is dismantled, one will acknowledge the true self, which is a unique relationship with the singular divine reality, as in the equivalence of the giver and receiver, or in the prophetic dictum, “whoever knows himself knows his Lord” (e.g., Ibn al-‘Arabī 1946, Ch.5, p. 81, Ch.27, p. 215; Ibn al-‘Arabī 2015a, Ch.5, p. 51, Ch.27, pp. 172–73). This rejection of a reified self, or ego-centeredness, in favor of a locus of divine manifestation is key not only to the corpus of Ibn al-‘Arabī, but Muslim pietists and mystics in general, their nuanced differences notwithstanding.

Interconnectedness. Beyond this psychological reading in terms of enlightenment and happiness, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s interrelationality also entails the acknowledgment of the inherent connectedness and interdependence of things to each other. This principle is mentioned not only in the *Book of Giving*, but also the major works of Ibn al-‘Arabī, such as the *Meccan Openings*, where he writes as follows:

In its root, the existence of the cosmos is tied to the Being who is Necessary through Himself. Hence each part of the cosmos is tied to every other part, and each is an interconnecting link on a chain. When man begins to consider the science of the cosmos, he is taken from one thing to another because of the interrelationships. (Ibn al-‘Arabī in Chittick 1989, p. xxi)

In depicting the principle of interrelationality as a form of cosmic interdependence, later Buddhist masters, in particular, converge to Ibn al-‘Arabī and his school. As we saw above, dependent origination was initially concerned pragmatically with the identification

of the causes of bondage and suffering, and thus, paving the path to their cessation. The metaphysical notion of interconnectedness, “according to which all phenomena relate to each other in one way or another,” emerged in later Buddhism (Analayo 2021, p. 1095). Most notably, the Huayan School of Mahayana Buddhism that became influential in China during the seventh century moved to interpret dependent origination through the lens of interconnectedness, *par* Ibn al-‘Arabī. The Huayan’s system

at its core is a holistic vision of the universe as a dynamic web of causal interrelationships, in which each and every thing and event is related to everything else as they interpenetrate without any obstruction. The Huayan depiction of reality is an ingenious reworking of the central Buddhist doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) . . . It postulates that each phenomenon is determined by the totality of all phenomena of which it is a part, while the totality is determined by each of the phenomena that comprise it. Therefore, each phenomenon is determining every other phenomenon, while it is also in turn being determined by each and every other phenomenon. All phenomena are thus interdependent . . . Every phenomenon conditions the existence of every other phenomenon and vice versa. Accordingly, nothing exists by itself, but requires everything else to be what it truly is. (Mario Poleski in Analayo 2021, p. 1099)

This cosmological interpretation of dependent origination came to “represent the universe as universally correlative, generally interdependent, and mutually originating, and it states that no single being exists independently” (Suwanvarangkul 2015). Such an interpretation has been recently adopted to address various modern challenges, as in the ecological ethics of Buddhist scholars such as Thich Nhat Hanh and Joanna Macy (see e.g., Scheid 2016, Ch.9).

This Buddhist reading of dependent origination directly resonates with Ibn al-‘Arabī’s teaching of the cosmic interdependence of every entity to each other in their essential non-existence and neediness. The *Book of Giving*, in this sense, mirrors other writings of Ibn al-‘Arabī, such as the *Meccan Openings* quoted above. Just to give another example, he writes in the *Bezels of Wisdom*:

All is dependent, naught is independent,
This is the pure truth, we speak it out plainly.
If I mention One, Self-sufficient, Independent,
You will know to Whom I refer.
All is bound up with all, there is no escaping
This bond, so consider carefully what I say. (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1946, Ch.1, p. 56; Ibn al-‘Arabī 2015a, Ch.1, p. 24; Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, Ch.1, p. 57)

Ibn al-‘Arabī’s followers also widely adopted this teaching. For example, the Ottoman Sufi master active primarily in Anatolia, Niyāzī-yi Mısrī (d. 1694), wrote along the same lines, now in Turkish:

every entity needs each other; the lofty to the lowly and the lowly to the lofty.
... So all should know that everything has a face that is connected with the Real.
The need is to Him through that face, not to something else. Yet they should not hold anything in contempt. They should worship God through all of these faces, so that they achieve “whithersoever you turn, there is God’s countenance” [Q.2:115].¹³

Double Reorientation in Epistemology. Finally, the Buddhist notions of dependent origination have decisive implications on epistemology. The ontic fact that all formations arise interdependently reorients knowledge. In the case of the Yogacara theory of knowledge in Mahayana Buddhism, very much like that of Ibn al-‘Arabī, the division between the knower and the known is attributed to a cognitive process as opposed to a dualistic ontology. As Laumakis observes in the Yogacara epistemology,

there is no dualistic distinction between the knower and the known or the perceiving subject and the perceived object. On this view of “things,” it is the mind or consciousness and its operations that serve as the foundation for the interdependent arising of both our “selves” and the “things” we experience. Unenlightened beings falsely believe that there is a real metaphysical distinction between themselves as knowers and the objects of their knowledge. (Laumakis 2008, pp. 146–47)

In addition to this ontological reorientation in the pursuit of knowledge, the relationship with the objects of knowledge becomes destabilized and unfixed, insofar as they are all “ultimately impermanent” (Laumakis 2008, p. 132; cf. Bhikkhu 2000, pp. 1843–47). Impermanence is one of the three marks of existence, together with bondage and emptiness of self-essences. Impermanence makes its mark on true knowledge, which, essentially, is about the four noble truths: about the realization that “whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation” (Bhikkhu 2000, p. 1846). We further read on true knowledge, that is, on the four noble truths, in the *Connected Discourses of the Buddha*:

Knowledge of suffering, knowledge of the origin of suffering, knowledge of the cessation of suffering, knowledge of the way leading to the cessation of suffering: this is called true knowledge, . . . and it is in this way that one has arrived at true knowledge. (Bhikkhu 2000, p. 1851)

This principle of impermanence that determines the relationship of knowledge sits well with Ash‘arite occasionalism and Ibn al-‘Arabī’s own epistemology. The *Book of Giving*, as we find below, alludes to an epistemological principle of Ibn al-‘Arabī that is closely connected to his notion of interrelationality:

for every individual entity in the entire world, there is a (direct) connection to God in terms of His private face towards them that they find from Him irrespective of the efficient cause or source. *None of these (connections) delimit knowledge about Him, insofar as the perpetual creation is not delimited with the intelligible and the sensible* (see below).

In this passage of the *Book of Giving*, Ibn al-‘Arabī simply mentions the name of a key principle, “perpetual creation” [*al-ijād ‘alā al-dawām*]. Insofar as existence is only an accident of the otherwise non-existent entities, every entity is directly renewed in every instance through receiving existence from God. These divine self-disclosures are non-repetitive and fresh in every breath. The passage in the *Book of Giving* states that this perpetual ontological renewal in every entity in the universe, which has no independent existence, makes all relations of knowledge infinite and always new. The relationship with Truth is in permanent flux, because both the relationship with the phenomena and the relationship with the direct, existentiating, “private face” of the Real in every knower, are renewed in each moment. Every encounter is new, every inspiration is unique, and every reading is pregnant with fresh interpretations. The person “whose understanding is identical in two successive recitations is losing,” and the person “whose understanding is new in each recitation is winning” (Chodkiewicz 1993, pp. 25–27; Almond 2004, p. 72. Cf. Ibn al-‘Arabī 2017, p. 133 (English translation), 38 (Arabic text). Also see Ibn al-‘Arabī 1428/2007b, p. 308). Not just the objects of knowledge, but also the self [*nafs*] is renewed in every instance or breath [*nafas*], and hence, encounter.

Summary. To summarize, the notion of interrelationality introduced in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *Book of Giving* is a very fertile concept for comparative thinking on the intellectual heritage of Islam and Buddhism. Like the famous Buddhist teaching of dependent origination, it embodies an idealist theory of causality. It attributes causality to the nature of the mind, which dictates the cause-effect distinction to relational unities, qualifies them, and creates an illusory sense of an independently existing self. It is this artificial notion of self that is the foundational veil obliterating human happiness or enlightenment. The fundamental metaphysics at the ground of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s notion of interrelationality prioritizes process over substance. Thus, it transcends not only the binary between God and universe, giver

and receiver, and worshipped and worshipper, but also between entities that are essentially non-existent and interdependent to each other as diverse manifestations of the singular reality. The notion also endorses an epistemology of impermanence, where relations of knowledge and existence are replenished in every moment. Many of these teachings, arguably, find direct reverberations in various schools of Buddhism, creating a fruitful comparative perspective built by bridging two concepts: “interrelationality” in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *Book of Giving* and “dependent origination” in Buddhism.

5. Edition and Manuscripts

Below, in Table 1, we give a short chronological list of the extant manuscripts of the *Book of Giving* that we could locate in the archives. We could access the seven codices with an asterisk (*) below, which were also consulted in producing the critical edition and an English translation below. The edition uses MS Manisa as the base text. While written clearly, this copy lacks the first hundred words, where we relied primarily on MS Ayasofya.¹⁴ The critical apparatus comprises six early copies that we could access, and excludes the late copy of MS Beyazıt.

Table 1. List of Manuscripts.

	Library	Location	Codex	Folios	Date
1	Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi	Manisa, Turkey	* Manisa 1183	114a–117b	664/1265–6
2	Ayasofya Koleksiyonu, Süleymaniye Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi	Istanbul, Turkey	* Ayasofya 4875	200b–202a	ca. 755/1354
3	İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Atatürk Kitaplığı	Istanbul, Turkey	* Atatürk 1289	80b–82b	9th/15th CE
4	Al-Maktaba al-Zāhiriyya	Damascus, Syria	Zāhiriyya 6824 (Karabulut 1422/2001 , vol. 2: p. 1562)	17–18	934/1527–8
5	Fatih Koleksiyonu, Süleymaniye Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi	Istanbul, Turkey	* Fatih 5322	95a–95b	ca. 937/1531
6	Halet Efendi Koleksiyonu, Süleymaniye Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi	Istanbul, Turkey	* Halet Efendi 245	367b–371b	af. 950/1543
7	Ziya Bey Kütüphanesi	Sivas, Turkey	Ziya Bey 9022 (Göztepe and Çınar 2018 , p. 26)	1b–19a	1036/1627
8	Veliyyüddin Efendi Koleksiyonu, Süleymaniye Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi	Istanbul, Turkey	Veliyyüddin 1794 (Karabulut 1422/2001 , vol. 2: p. 1562; here the number is given as 1686 rather than 1794)	87a–88b	ca. 1128/1716
9	Beyazıt Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi	Istanbul, Turkey	* Beyazıt 8011	279b–281b	1266/1849–1850
10	Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin	Berlin, Germany	Berlin 2937 we 1633 (Yahya 1964 , pp. 303–4)	56a–61a	undated
11	Kastamonu İl Halk Kütüphanesi	Kastamonu, Turkey	* Kastamonu 2011/2	39b–41a	undated
12	Al-Maktaba al-Zāhiriyya	Damascus, Syria	Zāhiriyya 5570 (Karabulut 1422/2001 , vol. 2: p.1562)	135b–137b	undated
13	Al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya	Cairo, Egypt	Azhariyya 964 (Yahya 1964 , pp. 303–4)	1–3	undated

6. Critical Edition and English Translation

This is *The Book of Giving for the Aspirant for Receiving*.

هذا كتاب الإفادة لمن أراد الاستفادة¹⁵

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful. May God's peace and greetings be upon our Chief, Muḥammad, his household, and his companions.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم¹⁶

Thus spoke the one firmly rooted in knowledge,¹⁷ the master and leader, the reviver of the religion, Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī al-'Arabī, al-Ḥātimī, al-Ṭā'ī, may God be pleased with him and please him: this is the *Treatise of Giving for the Aspirant for Receiving* on enumerating the mothers of the intimate sciences, and the innumerable off-springs among their resulting outcomes.

قال الشيخ الإمام العالم الراسخ¹⁸ محيي الدين أبو عبد الله محمد بن عليّ العربي¹⁹ الحاتمي الطائي رضي الله عنه وأرضاه: هذه رسالة الإفادة لمن أراد الاستفادة في²⁰ حصر²¹ أمّهات المعارف وعدم حصر ما²² ينتهي إليه المولدات من العوارف.

God—Exalted is He—ordered His prophet, peace and greetings be upon him, to say: “oh my Lord, increase me in knowledge”²³ always and forever. Yet he had already comprehended the mothers of the knowledge of God and the engendered things. No knowledge to receive remains for the one who comprehends the mothers of the sciences, as one may fancy. Indeed, we have seen those who say this, which is ignorance on their part.

أمر الله تعالى نبيه²⁴ صلى الله عليه وسلم²⁵ أن يقول (رَبِّ زِدْنِي عِلْمًا) [طه: ١١٤] دائمًا أبدًا²⁶ بعد ما كان قد حصل من العلم بالله²⁷ وبالأكوان أمّهاته ويتخيل أن²⁸ من حصل أمّهات العلوم أنه ما بقي له علم يستفيده وقد رأينا من يقول بذلك وهو جهل من قائله.

The mothers of the sciences are three:

1. knowledge about God, exalted and glorious is He, in terms of His being “beyond the need of the worlds,”²⁹
2. knowledge about the world in terms of its being intelligible, and
3. knowledge about the world in terms of its being sensible as natural body, and as elemental (body).

The mothers of what we have mentioned among the sciences are finite. The intimate sciences, which are given birth by these mothers, are infinite, and in them one seeks the increase.

وأمّهات العلوم ثلاثة:
علم³⁰ يتعلّق بالله عزّ وجلّ³² من حيث ما هو³³ (غنيّ عن العالمين)³⁴ [آل عمران: ٩٧]. وعلم يتعلّق بالعالم من حيث ما هو معقول وعلم³⁵ يتعلّق بالعالم³⁶ من حيث ما هو محسوس ذو جسم طبيعيّ وعنصريّ.
وأمّهات ما ذكرناه³⁷ من العلوم متناهية وما يتولّد عن³⁸ هذه الأمّهات من المعارف لا نهاية لها ومنها تطلب³⁹ الزيادة من أمرها.⁴⁰

There are forty-five mothers of the knowledge about Him in terms of His being “beyond the need of the worlds”. There are 450 mothers of the

وأمّهات⁴² العلم بالله من حيث ما هو غنيّ عن العالمين⁴³ خمسة وأربعون علمًا. وأمّهات

knowledge about the world in terms of its being intelligible. As for the mothers of the knowledge about the world in terms of its being sensible as natural body, and as elemental (body): there are 4500 of them for the natural body, and 45,000 of them for the elemental body. All mothers of sciences are thus as we have mentioned. No exception: there are 49,995 (mothers of) sciences.⁴¹

Infinite sciences branch out of these mothers, such as the knowledge of God in terms of His being the creator of the world and its director, as, Exalted is He, stated: “He directs the affair, expounding the signs,”⁵⁴ and “He directs the affairs from heaven unto earth.”⁵⁵

As for the world in terms of its being intelligible unto earth, and in terms of its being sensible as natural body, and as elemental (body): there is branching out for that (knowledge) which is about the world in terms of its being intelligible to itself. There is also branching out for that (knowledge) which is about the natural and elemental, sensible world in terms of its specificity. There is neither limitation nor individuation for these connections and branchings.

The other branching out is a knowledge that some of these sciences intertwine with one another *ad infinitum*. For, the world has a connection to God in terms of existing by Him, and God has a connection to the world in terms of giving it its existence. The intelligible world has a connection to the sensible world in terms of being its emanator, and the sensible world has a connection to the intelligible world in terms of being derived from it.

Also, for every individual entity in the entire world, there is a (direct) connection to God in terms of His private face towards them that they find from Him irrespective of the efficient cause or source. None of these (connections) delimit knowledge about Him, insofar as the perpetual creation is not delimited with the intelligible and the sensible.⁷⁴ Know that!

علم⁴⁴ ما يتعلّق بالعالم⁴⁵ من حيث⁴⁶ ما هو معقول أربع مائة علم وخمسون علمًا.⁴⁷ وأمّهات علم⁴⁸ ما يتعلّق بالعالم من حيث ما هو محسوس ذو جسم طبيعيّ وعنصريّ فللجسم⁴⁹ الطبيعيّ منها أربعة آلاف وخمس مائة علم⁵⁰ وما يتعلّق بالجسم العنصريّ⁵¹ منها خمسة وأربعون ألفًا فجميع أمّهات العلوم على ما ذكرناه وما هو إلّا ما ذكرناه⁵² تسعة وأربعون ألف علم وتسع مائة⁵³ علم وخمسة وتسعون علمًا.

ثم يتفرّع عن هذه الأمّهات علوم لا نهاية لها من العلم بالله⁵⁶ من حيث ما هو خالق العالم ومدبّره كما قال تعالى⁵⁷ ﴿يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ يُفَصِّلُ الْآيَاتِ﴾ [الرعد: ٢] و﴿يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ إِلَى الْأَرْضِ﴾ [السجدة: ٥].⁵⁸

ممّا⁵⁹ يتعلّق بالعالم⁶⁰ من حيث ما هو معقول إلى الأرض ممّا⁶² يتعلّق بالعالم من حيث ما هو محسوس ذو جسم طبيعيّ وعنصريّ وتفرّع ما يتعلّق بالعالم من حيث ما هو معقول لنفسه⁶³ وتفرّع ما يتعلّق بالعالم المحسوس الطبيعيّ و⁶⁴العنصريّ من حيث عينه، ولا يتناهى ولا شخص⁶⁵ هذه التعلّقات والتفريعات.⁶⁶

والتفريع الآخر علم تداخل هذه⁶⁷ العلوم⁶⁸ بعضها في بعض⁶⁹ إلى غير نهاية فإنّ للعالم تعلّقًا بالله من حيث ما هو موجود به. والله⁷⁰ تعلّقًا⁷¹ بالعالم من حيث ما هو موجود له وللعلم المعقول تعلّقًا بالعالم المحسوس من حيث ما هو مفيض عليه وللعلم المحسوس تعلّق بالعالم المعقول من حيث⁷³ ما هو مستمدّ منه.

ولكلّ شخص من العالم كلّ تعلّق بالله⁷⁵ من حيث وجهه الخاصّ به الذي عنه وجد من غير نظر إلى سببه الأقوى⁷⁶ وعلّته وكلّ هذا لا ينحصر العلم به⁷⁷ فإنّ الإيجاد⁷⁸ على الدوام لا ينحصر في المعقول والمحسوس، فاعلم ذلك.⁷⁹

Section: Also know that the connection of the divine knowledge to the world has two types:

1. connection to the world in terms of the private face irrespective of its causes and sources,
2. connection to the world in terms of its causes, sources, and private faces that belong to God, exalted is He, in these causes and sources.

Thereby, the entire sciences of the world are connected to God, in terms of His divine, private face, and in terms of their causes and sources. Thereby, also the knowledge of the intelligible world is connected to that of the sensible world, and knowledge of the sensible world to that of the intelligible world, in accordance with these types that we have mentioned.

Section: Also know that the intellects never give birth to anything from the physical world save the sciences that emanate from them in terms of their thoughts and witnessing. As for the physical world: the intelligible world gives birth to a plethora of breaths. Through its motions, breaths, and actions, the sensible world ceaselessly manifests intelligible spirits that have existential essences, which are reminders of goodness if they emanate from a praised self, and seeking His refuge if they emanate from a reprehensible self. The intelligible spirits are entirely good; thus, nothing but goodness emerges from those generated by it (the intellect). Indeed, it is essentially from the world of sanctification and purification.

This is the comprehension of sciences and known things that is realized only through unveiling and tasting, or via faith in them. Thus, the faithful (in these sciences) will not be deprived of their goodness. Even if one does not witness them here and now, one will surely witness them when departing this abode for the other abode and the next genesis.¹⁰² This is the one to whom “will appear from God what one never reckoned with”¹⁰³ and this is one of them.

Section: If you have learnt this, also know that every subject noun is connected to things only through its exigency to manifest its effects on them, as in the case of (proper) nouns. Every object noun is connected (to things) only in terms of its need for them, insofar as it has no subsistence in its essence without them. Thus, it exists by

فصل: 80 واعلم أن تعلّق العلم الإلهي بالعالم على قسمين:

1. يتعلّق به من حيث الوجه الخاص من غير نظر إلى أسبابه وعلاته⁸¹
2. ويتعلّق به أيضًا من حيث أسبابه وعلاته⁸² والوجوه⁸³ الخاصة التي في أسبابه وعلاته⁸⁴ لله تعالى.⁸⁵

وكذلك تعلّق علم العالم كلّه بالله⁸⁶ يتعلّق⁸⁷ من حيث وجهه الخاص به⁸⁸ الإلهي ويتعلّق به من حيث سببه وعلاته⁸⁹ وكذلك تعلّق العالم المعقول بالعالم المحسوس وتعلّق⁹⁰ العالم المحسوس بالعالم المعقول على ما ذكرناه⁹¹ من الأقسام.

فصل: 92 ثمّ اعلم أنّ العقول لا يتولّد عنها من عالم الأجسام شيء أصلاً سوى ما يفيض عنها⁹³ من العلوم من حيث أفكارها ومشاهدتها وأما عالم الأجسام: فيتولّد عنها من العالم المعقول كثير من الأنفاس، والعالم المحسوس بحر كاته وأنفاسه وأعماله لا يزال يظهر عنه أرواح معقولة لها أعيان وجودية⁹⁴ مذكرة⁹⁵ الخير إن كانت عن نفس محمود⁹⁶ وتستغفر له إن كانت عن نفس مذموم⁹⁷ فإنها⁹⁸ خير كلّها⁹⁹ فلا¹⁰⁰ يصدر عنها في حق¹⁰¹ من وجدت عنه إلّا خير فإنّه بالذات من عالم التقديس والتطهير.

وهذه مدارك من العلوم والمعلومات لا تترك إلّا كشفًا وذوقًا أو¹⁰⁴ بالإيمان بها فإنّ المؤمن بها لا يحرم خيرها وإن لم يشهد هاهنا فلا بدّ من شهودها إذا خرج من هذه¹⁰⁵ الدار إلى الدار الأخرى و﴿النّساء الآخرة﴾ [العنكبوت: ٢٠] وهو الذي يبدو¹⁰⁷ له من الله¹⁰⁸ ما لم يكن¹⁰⁹ يحتسب¹¹⁰ وهذا منه.¹¹¹

فصل: 112 وإذا علمت هذا فاعلم أنّ كلّ متعلّق اسم فاعل بشيء¹¹³ لا يتعلّق إلّا عن افتقار إليه لظهور آثاره فيه كالأسماء وكلّ متعلّق به¹¹⁴ اسم مفعول فلا يتعلّق إلّا من حيث فقره إليه لأنّه لا بقاء له في عينه دونه إذ به يكون ومنه يستمدّوا إليه¹¹⁵ يستمدّ¹¹⁶ كما أنّ الفاعل يحتاج

them, and is derived from them in the same way the active needs the passive for the continuation of its rule over it. Without an object, the subject is not entified, really or virtually. For the intelligible subject, the nouns and relations are like the tools and faculties of the sensible subject that are indispensable for its comprehension of things.

God made an intelligent, wise, and purposeful organization of the world. He could do otherwise if He willed, but it is His will that was actualized. "There is no alteration in God's words,"¹²⁰ and "there is no alteration in His creation"¹²¹ either by Him or by the world. Not all contingent things are actualized. Therefore, contingency is not affirmed absolutely and without any condition, while the necessary and impossible (things) are affirmed. There is no other way around it.

Section; *a comfort for those who seek rest*, whereby "a decisive proof"¹³⁰ is affirmed for God over His creation. That is, knowledge depends on the object of knowledge, rather than the object of knowledge depending on knowledge. Thus, knowledge does not have a ruling about its object except through the object itself. Knowledge does not give anything about its object except from the object. Knowledge does not seek anything other than the object. Thus, the proof is that of God over His creation in every face and in every vision.

This is one of the clearest yet most obscure sciences. Intellects stop short of discourse, despite being unable to deny it. They stop short of accepting it due to delusions' dominance upon them through their sovereignty. The sovereignty of delusion is initially more powerful especially in the unquestioning believers, who receive their knowledge neither through divine unveiling nor intellectual vision, which purifies and dissociates from anthropomorphism.¹⁴⁴ It is not beyond God's might to coat the pure gold with copper to remove its impurity so that it enters His path and the method of His realization. Thereby, He makes it achieve the wishes that it needs for the journey, which requires this embrocation.

God does not do anything without a cause, either hidden or apparent. Causes are relations, and relations are intelligible in mind even if they are absent in the physical world. The causes are attached

إلى المفعول لبقاء حكمه عليه فإنّ دونه لا يتعيّن فعلاً وتقديرًا، والأسماء والنسب في الفاعل المعقول¹¹⁷ كالآلات للفاعل¹¹⁸ المحسوس والقوى التي¹¹⁹ فيه لإدراك الأمور لا بدّ منها.

فرتّب¹²² الله¹²³ العالم ترتيبًا عقليًا حكميًا إراديًا ولو شاء لشاء ولكن لا يشاء إلا ما وقع، و﴿لَا تَبْدِيلَ لِكَلِمَاتِ اللَّهِ﴾ [يونس: ٦٤] ﴿لَا تَبْدِيلَ لِخَلْقِ اللَّهِ﴾ [الروم: ٣٠] لا¹²⁴ من الله¹²⁵ ولا من العالم وما¹²⁶ كلّ ممكن واقع ولذلك لا ثبت¹²⁷ الإمكان مطلقًا من غير تقييد وثبت¹²⁸ الواجب والمحال فما ثمّ إلا هذا.¹²⁹

فصل:¹³¹ مريح¹³² لمن أراد¹³³ أن يستريح به ثبت¹³⁴ الحجّة البالغة¹³⁵ لله¹³⁶ على خلقه وذلك أنّ العلم¹³⁷ تابع للمعلوم ما¹³⁸ هو المعلوم تابع للعلم فما حكم عليه إلا به ولا¹³⁹ أعطاه¹⁴⁰ إلاّ منه ولا أراد منه إلا ما¹⁴¹ هو عليه فمن¹⁴² كلّ وجه وبكلّ نظر الحجّة لله¹⁴³ على خلقه.

وهذا من أوضح العلوم وأغمضها ومّا تتوقّف¹⁴⁵ العقول عن القول بها مع أنّها لا تقدر على إنكار ذلك وتقف¹⁴⁶ عن قبوله¹⁴⁷ لغلبة الأوهام عليها¹⁴⁸ بسلطانها¹⁴⁹ فإنّ سلطان الوهم في الحال أقوى ولا¹⁵⁰ سيّما في المؤمن المقدّد الذي¹⁵¹ لم يأخذ علمه عن كشف إلهي ولا عن نظر عقليّ نزيه عن الشبه¹⁵² قاطع به وما ذلك على الله بعزّيز أن يكسو النحاس حلّة الذهب الإبريز بازالة مرضه وردّه¹⁵³ إلى طريقه ومنهج تحقيقه¹⁵⁴ ليبلغه أمنّيته¹⁵⁵ التي أوجته¹⁵⁶ إلى السلوك الذي أوجهه إلى الدلوک.¹⁵⁷

وما فعل الله¹⁵⁹ شيئًا من الأشياء إلا بسبب¹⁶⁰ خفيّ أو جليّ والأسباب نسب والنسب معقولة في الذهن¹⁶¹ وإن كانت مفقودة في العين وأسبابها من تضاف إليه أي لا تعقل إلا به

to the mind. That is, they are not intellected except through the mind. So, the causes have some share from (the attribution of) existence to relations as the ruling of the relations stops short (without the causes). This is what we mentioned in poetry in *The Bezels*.¹⁵⁸

So, everything is needy rather than self-subsistent, and this is because of the interrelationality among things. The neediness of the passive for its subject has no primacy over the neediness of the active for the object to manifest its ruling and sovereignty over it, the majesty in the neediness of the active notwithstanding. Therefore, Exalted is He, God connects the willpower to Himself, as He states, “if He willed,”¹⁶⁴ and “should He will”. The neediness of the passive is accompanied by a subordination due to the absence of the willpower in it. It is the willpower that bequeaths majesty,¹⁶⁵ and that is why we ascribe authority and “majesty unto God”.¹⁶⁶

This is also what Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī meant with, “the willpower is the throne of the ipseity”¹⁸³ of this majesty; the willpower requires majesty. Thus, the majesty is for the ipseity and by the ipseity, for God, and “for His messenger, and the faithful”¹⁸⁴ at differing relations. It is recognized by those who recognize God through His godhead, His messenger through his messengership,¹⁸⁵ and the faithful through their faithfulness—not through their ipseities, but rather through the ruling of these conditions and relations that we have indicated.

“Yet the hypocrites do not know”.²⁰⁰ So, they lack knowledge insofar as they have two faces, and each face veils the hypocrite from its owner in its vision.²⁰¹ Similarly, “the hypocrites do not comprehend” that “unto God belong the treasures of the heavens”²⁰² in the world of spirits, “and of the earth” in the world of forms.²⁰³ All are His treasures; “and We send it not down but in a known measure”.²⁰⁴ As for His “dispatching the fertilizing winds”²⁰⁵ for the harvest: they are like the aspirations of intellects and the longings for divine knowledge. They are (His) favors/countenances and providence; know that.

فلها¹⁶² ضرب¹⁶³ من نسبة الوجود إليها لتوقف حكمها عليه وهو الذي ذكرناه في نظم لنا في الفصوص.

والكل¹⁶⁷ مفتقر ما الكل¹⁶⁸ مستغني وذلك لتعلق الأمور بعضها ببعض فليس افتقار المفعول¹⁶⁹ إلى من هو¹⁷⁰ مفعول عنه بأولى من افتقار الفاعل إلى من هو¹⁷¹ منفعل¹⁷² عنه لظهور حكمه فيه وسلطانه غير أنه في الفاعل فيه عزّة¹⁷³ ولذلك ربط الله سبحانه¹⁷⁴ المشيئة به فقال¹⁷⁵ لو شاء¹⁷⁶ وإن¹⁷⁷ يشاء¹⁷⁸ وهو في¹⁷⁹ المفعول يصحبه ذلّة لزوال المشيئة عنه والمشيئة تورث العزّة¹⁸⁰ ولذلك سقنا¹⁸¹ الاقتدار والعزّة لله¹⁸².

وهذا¹⁸⁶ معنى¹⁸⁷ قول¹⁸⁸ أبي طالب¹⁸⁹ المكي¹⁹⁰ أن المشيئة هي¹⁹¹ عرش¹⁹² الذات لهذه العزّة التي تطالبها والعزّة للذات بالذات والله¹⁹³ ﴿وَلِرَسُولِهِ وَلِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ﴾ [المنافقون: ٨] بنسب¹⁹⁴ مختلفة يعرفها من يعرف الله من¹⁹⁵ ألوهيته والرسول من رسالته¹⁹⁶ والمؤمنين من إيمانهم لا من ذواتهم بل من¹⁹⁷ حكم هذه الأمور ونسبتها¹⁹⁸ إلى من¹⁹⁹ ذكرناه.

﴿وَلَكِنَّ الْمُنَافِقِينَ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ﴾ [المنافقون: ٨] فنفى²⁰⁶ عنهم العلم²⁰⁷ لأن لهم وجهين يحجبهم كل وجه عن صاحبه²⁰⁸ بالنظر إليه كما أن ﴿الْمُنَافِقِينَ لَا يَفْقَهُونَ﴾ ما لله²⁰⁹ من الخزائن في السماوات [المنافقون: ٧] في عالم الأرواح وفي الأرض²¹⁰ في عالم الصور والكل²¹¹ خزانته ﴿وَمَا نُنَزِّلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدَرٍ مَّعْلُومٍ﴾ [الحجر: ٢١] ولكن بإرسال الرياح اللواقح²¹² لإنتاج التي هي كالهمم للعقول والإرادات في العلم الإلهي وهي التوجهات والتصرف²¹³ فاعلم ذلك.

Section: Also know that restricting oneself to the knowledge of God in terms of His essence²¹⁴ decreases the sciences of the knower. On the contrary, if one has the vision of God in terms of the relation of His most beautiful names, the knower is expanded in sciences, and they multiply. His relationship with the most beautiful names is not known except through their effects, and these effects exist only in temporal things. Thus, whoever looks at the effective cause of the multiplicity of the sciences of the world will talk about the distance and veil from the Desired. Whoever looks at the final destination, where this intimate knowledge returns, will talk about divine intimacy, even if one's sciences multiply. Ibn al-Sīd al-Baṭalyawsī was not mistaken about what we have pointed out and detailed, when he stated in one of his speeches about intimate knowledge and knowers: “the knower of God decreases in sciences”.²¹⁵ This is precisely what we have mentioned. The issue is how we have detailed and expounded it.

فصل: 216: واعلم 217 أن المقتصر على العلم بالله 218 من حيث عينه 219 تقل 220 علومه وأتمما يتسع العالم في العلوم 221 وتكثر علومه إذا نظر في الله 222 من حيث نسبة الأسماء الحسنى 223 إليه ولا تعرف نسبة الأسماء الحسنى إليه 224 إلا 225 من آثارها ولا تكون آثارها إلا في المحدثات فمن نظر إلى السبب الموجب لكثرة علوم العالم قال بالبعد والحجاب عن المطلوب ومن نظر إلى الغاية المرجوع إليها 226 من هذه المعرفة قال بالقرب الإلهي وإن كثرت علومه ولم يعتز 227 ابن السيد البطليوسي 228 على ما أشرنا إليه من ذلك 229 وفصلناه 230 فإنه قال في بعض كلامه في المعرفة والعارف أن العارف بالله 231 تقل علومه وليس 232 إلا ما ذكرناه والأمر 233 كما فصلناه وشرحناه.

God has made this discourse eloquent for us. To Him is the praise for all of His graces, and to Him is the praise in all circumstances. May God's peace be upon Muḥammad and his entire household.

والله 234 قد أفصح لنا في المقال 235 فله الحمد على عموم الأفضال 236 كما له الحمد 237 على كل حال 238 وصلى الله على محمد وعلى آله أجمعين. 240

[This has been copied from the original in the hand of the leading master and the author, may God sanctify his secret, in the year 664/1265-6.]

[نقل من أصل بخط الشيخ الإمام المنشئ له قدس الله سرّه. سنة ٦٦٤/٢٤١]

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Appendix A




Figure A1. The colophon of the MS Manisa 1183, f.117b.

Notes

- ¹ Brockelman also mentions the title *Ummahāt al-Ma‘ārif* among the works of Ibn al-‘Arabī in the index, but the entry itself is written incorrectly as “Ummahāt al-Baghdādī b. al-Narsī”; see Brockelmann (2016, Supp. 1, p. 801, 832, no. 185).
- ² See Figure A1 in the Appendix A.
- ³ Ibn al-‘Arabī applies the same word-play and spiritual grammar with another Arabic root, at the beginning of another section of the *Book of Giving*, titled *a comfort for those who seek rest* (see below).
- ⁴ “In the same way He is identical with the worshipper in the case of every worshipper . . . Hence nothing becomes manifest in the worshipper and the worshipped except His He-ness (*huwiyya*). Therefore the wisdom, occasion, and cause are nothing but He, while the result and that which is occasioned are nothing but He. So He alone worships and is worshipped” (Ibn al-‘Arabī in Emirahmetoglu 2021, p. 78.).
- ⁵ “Know that the (entity) called God is one with respect to essence and all with respect to names. Each existent has from God only a single lord, and it is inconceivable for it to have all the lords. As for God’s Unity, no single entity enters it, for one cannot call part of it a thing and another a thing, for it does not admit division. However, His Unity is the totality of His attributes in potentiality. The happy person is the one whose Lord is pleased with him, and there is none but that who is pleasing in the eyes of his Lord, because Lordship applies to everyone, hence the Lord finds everyone pleasing, and so everyone is happy. For this reason Sahl said: ‘Lordship has a mystery—and it is you,’ ergo Sahl’s saying refers to every entity—if it had disappeared, the Lordship would also have been cancelled. The words ‘if it had disappeared’ signify the impossibility of the impossibility, for the condition will not appear and hence the Lordship will not be annulled, because an entity is existent only through its lord. Since an entity is always existent, its Lordship will never be cancelled” (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1946, Ch.7, pp. 90–91; Ibn al-‘Arabī 2015a, Ch.7, p. 59.).
- ⁶ Ilāhābādī in Nair 2021, p. 137 (with a minor modification in the English translation of *qabūl* as “accepting” for the sake of consistency and clarity).
- ⁷ “And what . . . is dependent origination? With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. This . . . is called dependent origination” (Bhikkhu 2000, p. 533).
- ⁸ For a recent comparative analysis that utilizes the Muslim concept of *taqwā* (God-consciousness) and the Buddhist concept of *satipaṭṭhāna* (mindfulness), see Yusuf (2021, pp. 173–90). The special issue of *The Muslim World* (volume 100, issue 2–3) also contains a variety of useful comparative studies on Islam and Buddhism. Pereira (2010) focuses on the dictum “die before you die” to develop a comparative account of death meditation as a spiritual technology of the self. Habito (2010) invites her readers to put the Muslim notion of “Muḥammadan Reality,” which is also quite central to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thinking, into conversation with “Buddha-nature” in Mahayana Buddhism. Mayer (2010) analyzes the six principles of yoga in light of Kubrawī Sufi approaches to spiritual practice and visions.
- ⁹ “The Buddhist construal of causal conditioning, then, is concerned with the workings of the mind rather than with the mechanics of the world: the emphasis is on how certain kinds of mentality that condition the ways in which one thinks, talks and behaves, shape and determine one’s course of life and one’s relation to the environment” (Ronkin 2005, p. 200.).
- ¹⁰ On reading matter and mind as phenomenological terms, instead of philosophical binaries, see Cho (2014, p. 424).
- ¹¹ “Nirvana is called extinction of passions, the uncreated, peaceful happiness, eternal bliss, true reality, dharma-body, dharma-nature, suchness, oneness, and Buddha-nature. Buddha-nature is none other than *Tathāgata*. This *Tathāgata* pervades the countless worlds; it fills the hearts and minds of the ocean of all beings. Thus, plants, trees, and land all attain Buddhahood” (Shonin in Emirahmetoglu 2021, p. 81, p. 92. Also see Cho 2014, p. 430.).
- ¹² Bodhi in Bhikkhu (2000, p. 517; Ronkin 2005, p. 199).
- ¹³ Niyāzī-yi Mīṣrī in Kars (2019, p. 208) (with a minor modification in translation for the sake of consistency).
- ¹⁴ See Figure A2 in the Appendix A.
- ¹⁵ هذا كتاب الإفادة لمن أراد الاستفادة (ح)؛ كتاب الإفادة للشيخ الكبير سلام الله عليه (ف)؛ لا يوجد في (أ).
- ¹⁶ وصحبه وسلم؛ لا يوجد في (أ)؛ بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وبه نستعين (ح)؛ وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم؛ لا يوجد في (ف)؛ بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وبه نستعين. الحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله أجمعين (أ).
- ¹⁷ Cf. Q.3:7.
- ¹⁸ انظر إلى القرآن [آل عمران: ٧].
- ¹⁹ المغربي: زيادة في (أ).
- ²⁰ قال الشيخ . . . لمن أراد الاستفادة في: لا يوجد في (ق، ف)؛ الحمد لله رب العالمين وحده والصلوة والسلام على من لا نبي بعده وبعد فهذه رسالة مختصرة من كلام الشيخ محيي الملة والدين شيخ الشيوخ الأكبر والمسك الأثر محمد بن علي بن محمد العربي (ح).
- ²¹ حصر: حضرة (ف).
- ²² حصر ما: حصره (ح).
- ²³ Q.20:114.
- ²⁴ نبيه: بنيه (ح، أ).
- ²⁵ صلى الله عليه وسلم؛ صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم (ح)، عليه السلام (أ).
- ²⁶ دائماً أبداً: أبداً دائماً (ح).

27. تعالى: زيادة في (أت).
28. أن: لا يوجد في (أ، ح، أت).
29. Q.3:97.
30. ما: زيادة في (ق).
31. يتعلّق: لا يوجد في (أت).
32. بالله عزّ وجلّ: لا يوجد في (ف).
33. عزّ وجلّ من حيث ما هو: لا يوجد في (أ).
34. علم يتعلّق بالله ... العالمين: علم بالله غنيّ عن العالمين (أت).
35. ما: زيادة في (ح).
36. بالعالم: لا يوجد في (ح).
37. ذكرناه: ذكرنا (ح).
38. عن: من (أ).
39. تطلب: يطلب (آ، ح)، لطلب (أت).
40. من بداية الرسالة إلى «من أمرها» سقط من (م)؛ أمرها: أمر بها (ح، أت).
41. For the explanation of the all-comprehensiveness of these numbers, see Beneito and Hirtenstein (2021, pp. 81–82).
42. وأمّهات: فأمّهات (أ، أت).
43. علم يتعلّق بالعالم من حيث ما هو معقول... العالمين: لا يوجد في (ف).
44. علم: لا يوجد في (ق).
45. بالعالم: بالله (ف).
46. من حيث: من حيث ما حيث (ح).
47. ... علمًا: لا يوجد في (أ)، وأمّهات علم ما يتعلّق بالعالم من حيث هو معقول خمسون (أت). وأمّهات علم
48. علم: لا يوجد في (ق، ف).
49. فللجسم: فالجسم (أ، أت).
50. علم: لا يوجد في (أ، أت).
51. العنصريّ: لا يوجد في (ق).
52. ذكرناه: ذكره (ق).
53. تسع مائة: خمس مائة (آ)، لا يوجد في (أت).
54. Q.13:2.
55. Q.32:5.
56. عزّ وجلّ: زيادة في (ف).
57. تعالى: تبارك وتعالى (ح)؛ عزّ وجلّ (ف)، الله تعالى (أت).
58. إلى الأرض: لا يوجد في (أ، ق، ح، أت).
59. ممّا: بما (أ، أت).
60. بالعالم: العالم (أ، أت).
61. هو: لا يوجد في (أ).
62. ممّا: بما (أ)، فما (ق)، وبما (أت).
63. وتقرّيع ما يتعلّق ... لنفسه: لا يوجد في (أ، ف، أت).
64. و: لا يوجد في (أت).
65. شخّص: ينحصر (أ، أت)، تشخّص (ح).
66. التقرّيعات: التفرّعات (ح).
67. هذه: هذا (أت).
68. العلوم: الأمور (أ، أت).
69. في بعض: ببعض (أت).
70. تعالى: زيادة في (ح).
71. تعلّقًا: يعلّق (أت).
72. موجود: موجود (أ، ق، ف، أت).
73. حيث: لا يوجد في (أ).
74. The principle of the perpetual creation, thus, applies to the personal encounter with the private face as well; both the divine self-manifestation and the soul, which acts as a mirror, are fresh and unique in every instant. Cf. Ibn al-‘Arabī (2017, p. 133).
75. تعالى: زيادة في (أ، ح، ف، أت).
76. الأقوى: الأقرب (أ)، الأقرب (ق، ح، ف، أت).
77. به: لا يوجد في (أ، أت).
78. الإيجاد: الإتحاد (أ).
79. فاعلم ذلك: لا يوجد في (ف).
80. فصل: لا يوجد في (أ، أت).
81. علّاته: علّله (أ، ق، أت).
82. علّاته: علّله (أ، أت).
83. والوجوه: فالوجوه (ق، ح، ف).
84. والوجوه الخاصة التي في أسبابه وعلّاته: لا يوجد في (أ).
85. تعالى: عزّ وجلّ (ف).
86. بالله: بالله تعالى (أ).
87. يتعلّق: يتعلّق به (أ، ح).
88. به: لا يوجد في (أ).

89. وكذلك تَعْلَقُ علم العالم ... وعلته: لا يوجد في (أ).
90. تَعْلَقُ: يَتَعْلَقُ (أ).
91. ذكرناه: ذكرنا (ف).
92. فصل: لا يوجد في (أ، أ).
93. عنها: عليها (ق، ح، ف).
94. وجودية: موجودة (أ).
95. مذكّرة: تذكر (ق)، بذكره (أ).
96. محمود: محمود (ق، ح).
97. مذموم: مذمومة (ق، ح، أ).
98. غير: زيادة في (ح).
99. كلها: لا يوجد في (أ).
100. ولا: فلا (ف).
101. حق: حق كل (أ).
102. Cf. Q.29:20; Q.53:47.
103. Cf. Q.39:47.
104. أو: و (ق، ح، ف).
105. من هذه: في (أ).
106. انظر إلى القرآن [النجم: ٤٧].
107. يبدو: يبدأ (أ، أ).
108. الله: الله تعالى (أ، ح، ف).
109. يكن: يكونوا (أ).
110. انظر إلى القرآن [الزمر: ٤٧].
111. وهذا منه: هذا منه (أ، أ)، ولا يوجد في (ف).
112. فصل: لا يوجد في (أ، أ).
113. بشيء: نسبي (ف).
114. به: لا يوجد في (أ، أ).
115. يستمدوا إليه: لا يوجد في (ق، ح)، يستمد: (ف).
116. يستمد: يستند (أ).
117. المعقول: المفعول (ق)، والمفعول (ف، أ).
118. عن: زيادة في (ق).
119. التي: لا يوجد في (أ، أ).
120. Q.10:64.
121. Q.30:30.
122. فرتب: ورتب (ف).
123. الله: لا يوجد في (ق)، الله تعالى: (أ).
124. لا: إلا (ف).
125. تعالى: زيادة في (ح).
126. وما: فما (ق).
127. ثبت: يثبت (ق، ح، أ).
128. ثبت: يثبت (ق، ح).
129. إلا هذا: لا يوجد في (ح).
130. Cf. Q.6:149.
131. فصل: لا يوجد في (أ).
132. مريح: ربح (ف)، يربح (أ).
133. أراد: يريد (ف).
134. ثبت: ثبت (ق، ح).
135. البالغة: لا يوجد في (ق). انظر إلى القرآن [الأنعام: ١٤٩].
136. لله: لله تعالى (أ، ح، أ).
137. العلم: العالم (ح).
138. ما: وما (أ).
139. ولا: و (أ).
140. ولا أعطاه: ولأعطاه (ح).
141. ما: لا يوجد في (أ).
142. فمن: من (أ).
143. لله: لله تعالى (أ، أ).
144. Cf. Chittick 1989, p. 110.
145. ممّا تتوقّف: ما يتوقّف (ف)، ممّا يتوقّف (أ).
146. وتقف: وما تقف (ق).
147. إلا: زيادة في (ق، ف، أ)؛ وأنما توقّف العقول عن قبولها (ح).
148. بل: زيادة في (أ).
149. بسلطانها: بل لسلطانها (أ).
150. ولا: لا (أ).
151. الذي: لا يوجد في (أ).

152. الشبه: التشبيه (ق، ف).
 153. وردّه: فردّه الله تعالى (ح).
 154. تحقيقه: بحقيقة (أت).
 155. أمنيته: أمثلة (أت).
 156. أحوجته: أخرجته (أت).
 157. أي الغروب: أضيف في الهامش.

158. This is possibly the poem at the end of the section where he mentions the principle that knowledge follows the object of knowledge, and criticizes Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī for defending purely intellectual proofs of God's godhead without looking at its objects—the universe and particularly God's manifestation on the self:

He praises me and I praise Him
 He worships me and I worship Him
 In (my) state (of existence) I affirm Him
 but regarding the (fixed) entities I deny Him
 He knows me and I do not
 and I know Him and witness Him
 How can He be independent while
 I help Him and make Him happy
 For this reason, the Real created me
 for I make Him know and thus bring Him into existence
 A tradition tells us this
 and in me His aim is realized. (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1946, Ch.5, p. 83; Ibn al-‘Arabī 2015a, Ch.5, p. 53.)

159. الله: الله تعالى (أ).
 160. بسبب: لسبب (ق).
 161. الذهن: لا يوجد في (ح).
 162. فلها: فلها (ق، ح، ف).
 163. من نفسه: زيادة في (ق).
 164. Q.6:149.
 165. Cf. Q.3:26; Q.7:128.
 166. Q.10:65.
 167. والكلّ: فالكلّ (آ، ق، ف، أت).
 168. ما الكلّ: بما للكلّ (ق)، فالكلّ (أت).
 169. المفعول: الشيء (أ، أت).
 170. من هو: صحّح من (أ، ح)، ما هو (ق، ف)؛ من (أصل).
 171. من هو: صحّح من (أ، ق، ف)، من (أصل).
 172. منفعل: متفعل (أت).
 173. عزّة: غيره (ف، أت).
 174. سبحانه: تعالى (ح)، سبحانه وتعالى (ف).
 175. فقال: وقال (ف).
 176. انظر إلى القرآن [الألّعام: ١٤٩].
 177. وإن: فإن (ق).
 178. يشاء: شاء (ح، أت).
 179. في: لا يوجد في (ح).
 180. انظر إلى القرآن [آل عمران: ٢٦] و [الأعراف: ١٢٨].
 181. سقنا: نسبنا (أت).
 182. سبحانه وتعالى: زيادة في (ح)، سبحانه: زيادة في (ف). انظر إلى القرآن [يونس: ٦٥].
 183. Ibn al-‘Arabī (1946, Ch.17, p. 165); al-Makkī (1426/2005, vol. 1: p. 313).
 184. Q.63:8.
 185. Literally, “message”, See the third and fourth sections for a discussion on this sentence.
 186. وهذا: هذا (آ، أت).
 187. معنى: لا يوجد في (ف).
 188. معنى قول: يعني (أ، أت).
 189. أبي طالب: قطب (ف).
 190. رضي الله عنه: زيادة في (أ، ح، أت).
 191. هي: لا يوجد في (أ، أت).
 192. عرش: عين (أت).
 193. والله: لله (ح).
 194. بنسب: نسبة (أت).
 195. حيث: زيادة في (أ، أت).
 196. والرسول من رسالته: والرسول من رسالتهم (ف).
 197. من: عن (ف).
 198. نسبته: نسبها (ق، ح، ف).
 199. من: ما (أت).

200. Q.63:8.
201. Ibn al-‘Arabī (1431/2010, vol. 1: p. 163; Ibn al-‘Arabī 1428/2007b, pp. 308–9). Everything has two aspects, or faces. “Hypocrite,” then, is the person who denies what they see with both faces: one directly, through their inner self, and one through the manifestations as objects. For example:
I have two faces, He and I
but He has no “I” through me
In me He is manifest
and we are for Him as vessels. (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1946, Ch.5, p. 84; Ibn al-‘Arabī 2015a, Ch.5, p. 53).
202. Q.63:7.
203. Ibn al-‘Arabī 2015b, pp. 121–22.
204. Q.15:21.
205. Q.15:22.
206. فنفى: فبقى (أ، ت).
207. العلم: لا يوجد في (أ، ت).
208. صاحبه: صاحبهم (ح، ف).
209. ما لله: ما لله تعالى (أ)، بالله تعالى (أ، ت).
210. الأرض: الصور (أ، ت).
211. والكل: فالكل (أ، ت).
212. انظر إلى القرآن [الحجر: ٢٢].
213. التصرف: التصريفات (أ، ت).
214. Q.52:48.
215. Cf. al-Baṭalyawī (1408/1988, Ch.10, p. 110).
216. فصل: لا يوجد في (أ).
217. واعلم: لا يوجد في (ف).
218. تعالى: زيادة في (ح، ف، ت).
219. عينه: علمه (ق، ف).
220. نقل: يقل (أ، ت).
221. العلوم: المعلوم (ح، ف).
222. تعالى: زيادة في (ف، ت).
223. الحسنى: لا يوجد في (أ، ت).
224. ولا تعرف نسبة الأسماء الحسنى إليه: لا يوجد في (أ)، ولا يعرف نسبه إليه (ف).
225. إلا: لا (أ، ت).
226. إليها: إليه (ق، ح، ف).
227. يعتز: يعتز (أ، ت).
228. البطليوسي: البطلموسي (أ، ت).
229. من ذلك: لا يوجد في (أ، ت).
230. فصلناه: حصلناه (ح).
231. تعالى: زيادة في (ح، ف، ت).
232. الأمر: زيادة في (أ، ت).
233. والأمر: فالأمر (أ، ت).
234. تعالى: زيادة في (أ، ح، ت).
235. في المقال: بالمقال (أ، ت).
236. فله الحمد على عموم الأفضال: فله الحمد على الاتصال عموم الحمد (ح)، فله الحمد على عموم الأفضال (ف).
237. الحمد: لا يوجد في (ح)، الحمد لله: (ف).
238. تمت الرسالة المسماة بالإفادة لمن أراد الاستفادة والحمد لله رب العالمين: هذه هي الجملة الأخيرة في (ق)؛ تمت الرسالة بحمد الله تعالى وصلوته على محمد وآله وصحبه أجمعين: هذه هي الجملة الأخيرة في (ح)؛ الحمد لله: هذه هي الجملة الأخيرة في (ف)؛ تمت رسالة أمهات العلوم للشيخ العربي بعون الله: هذه هي الجملة الأخيرة في (أ، ت).
239. سيدنا: زيادة في (أ، ت).
240. أجمعين: خير آل (أ، ت).
241. هذه هي الجملة الأخيرة في الأصل (م).

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