

Article

The Integrity of the Religious Person as a Criterion for the Truth of Religion

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Abstract

This article addresses the problem of the truth of religion from a personalist perspective, moving beyond classical propositional conceptions of truth. The starting point is the claim that, in Christianity, truth has a personal character and is fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ, which leads to a shift from truth understood as the correspondence of judgment and reality to truthfulness as the existential integrity of the human person. Methodologically, the study is located at the intersection of fundamental and systematic theology. It employs conceptual analysis, theological hermeneutics, and systematic argumentation in order to reconstruct, from within Christian personalism, a criterion of religious truthfulness. It is argued that the truth of religion cannot be reduced to doctrinal coherence, but is manifested in the degree to which religion fosters personal integration, relational capacity, and participation in communion. Particular attention is given to the role of the liturgy, especially the Eucharist, understood as a space of personal integration and transformation, in which the human person is drawn into relationship with God and the ecclesial community. The analysis further suggests that this criterion may have heuristic value in comparative theology, provided that the distinction between Christian claims to fullness and analogical participation in truthfulness is carefully maintained. In conclusion, a religion is true insofar as it makes the human person true, that is, integrated, relational, and capable of participation in communion. Such truthfulness has an ontological and personalist character, rather than being merely functional or pragmatic.

Keywords: truth; truthfulness; personalism; religion; personal integration; theological anthropology; Eucharist; liturgy; communion; Christian theology



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1. Introduction

This article addresses the question of what it means to say that a religion is “true” if truth is not reduced solely to the logical or propositional level. Such an understanding corresponds to contemporary theological approaches, which emphasize that the mission of religion—especially Christianity—encompasses the whole human person and all dimensions of life, rather than being limited to the doctrinal level ([Chmielewski 2025](#), pp. 2–3). The point of departure is the intuition that, within Christianity, there is a shift in the understanding of truth toward a personalist-ontological dimension; consequently, the criterion of the “truthfulness” of religion cannot be confined to the coherence of propositions.

The argument proceeds by examining how the personalization of truth in Christianity transforms the understanding of “truthfulness,” and subsequently demonstrates that the

liturgy—particularly the Eucharist—realizes the “integrative” function of religion, leading to the integration of the person, the community, and mission. The adopted perspective assumes that, from a Christian standpoint, religion is “true” not only in the sense of the correspondence of its claims with reality, but to the extent that it introduces the human person into communion with Personal Truth and thereby makes the person “true,” that is, existentially integrated and capable of *communio* and *co-munus*, concepts that will be further elaborated in the subsequent parts of this study.

Methodologically, this article is situated at the intersection of fundamental theology and systematic theology, with a strong personalist and theological-anthropological orientation. It does not attempt to formulate a religiously neutral theory of truth, nor does it offer a comparative philosophy of religion in the strict sense. Rather, it reconstructs, from within the Christian tradition, a personalist criterion of religious truthfulness and asks whether this criterion may possess broader heuristic value. Conceptual analysis is used to clarify the transition from truth to truthfulness; theological hermeneutics is employed to interpret Christological, sacramental, and ecclesiological sources; and systematic argumentation is used to relate the ontological foundation of religion to its existential and formative effects. The transition from “truth” to “truthfulness” is therefore not presented as a logical derivation from classical theories of truth, but as a theological-interpretative model grounded in Christian personalism.

Among the many definitions of truth present in common discourse, one of the most influential is the classical definition, originating with Aristotle, transmitted in the Latin tradition by Boethius, and further developed by Thomas Aquinas, according to which truth is “the conformity of the intellect to reality” (*veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*) (Aquinas 1888, I, q. 16, a. 1). In Aquinas, however, truth is not exhausted by the propositional level. As a transcendental property of being, truth is rooted in the intelligibility of reality itself and in its relation to intellect. This is significant for the present argument, because it prevents the transition from truth to truthfulness from being understood as a merely subjective or psychological shift. If truth is grounded in being, then the existential truthfulness of the person may be interpreted as participation in an ontological order rather than as a purely functional effect. The person becomes “true” not simply by achieving inner coherence, but by being conformed to a reality that precedes and transcends the subject. Aristotle states that “truth is saying of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that it is not” (Aristotle 1924, 1011b25–27).

In contrast, G. W. F. Hegel and F. H. Bradley understood truth as the coherence of a given proposition with an entire system of beliefs; thus, what is true is that which fits within a consistent whole of knowledge (Bradley 1916, pp. 180–85, 470–80; Hegel 1977, sect. 20). This position is known as the coherence theory of truth. Another approach, the pragmatic theory, maintains that what is true is what proves itself in practice and “works” (James 1975, pp. 200–22), with William James and Charles Sanders Peirce as its principal representatives.

In attempts to define truth, one also encounters the semantic theory developed by Alfred Tarski: “the sentence ‘snow is falling’ is true if and only if snow is falling” (Tarski 1933, p. 5). Another position, represented by Frank Ramsey and Paul Horwich—the deflationary, or minimalist, theory—holds that the concept of “truth” does not describe any property but functions merely as a linguistic device (Ramsey 1931, pp. 142–57; Horwich 1990, pp. 1–20).

This brief overview of the principal theories of truth—necessary even in such a concise outline in order to avoid the charge of reductionism or lack of representativeness—is completed by Jürgen Habermas’s consensual theory, according to which truth is what would

be accepted in an ideal speech situation, that is, what would emerge from rational dialogue within an ideal community (Habermas 1984, pp. 287–312).

If—by analogy and in a consciously interpretative manner—we attempt to transfer the above conceptions of truth from the level of propositions to the existential level, that is, from the noun “truth” to the adjective “true,” we obtain a range of possible accounts of the “truthfulness” of the human person. This, however, is not a direct consequence of the theories discussed, but rather a hermeneutical proposal that allows us to grasp the existential dimension of truth.

Thus, according to the Boethian or Aristotelian definition, a “true” person would be one whose words—and prior to them, thoughts—correspond to the actual state of affairs. According to the coherence theory, by contrast, a “true” person is one whose beliefs, words, and actions form a consistent whole. Pragmatists would claim that a “true” person is one whose beliefs and actions prove effective in practice, that is, someone who is practically reliable and can be trusted.

The semantic theory, originally formulated with regard to propositions, when analogically extended to the level of persons, would suggest that a “true” person is one of whom statements attributing particular characteristics are themselves true. The deflationary theory, it seems, would refrain from taking a position on defining the “truthfulness” of a person, since a “true person” is simply a person, and the adjective “true” merely reinforces the statement without adding a new property.

According to the consensual theory, in turn, a “true” person is one who would be recognized as credible within an ideal communicative community—that is, someone trustworthy in discourse and acknowledged by others under conditions of ideal dialogue. From a broader perspective, a “true person” may therefore be understood as someone who corresponds to reality (that is, speaks truthfully), is internally coherent (that is, non-contradictory), or is reliable in action and relationships.

It can be observed that the further we move away from the classical theory of truth, the less emphasis is placed on correspondence with facts, while increasing importance is given to relational aspects such as coherence, usefulness, credibility, and social recognition. The transition from the concept of “truth” to “truthfulness” is therefore not merely linguistic, but hermeneutical: it involves transferring the category of truth from the level of judgments to the level of existence.

A distinctive feature of the Christian understanding of truth is its identification with the person of Jesus Christ. Jesus of Nazareth not only proclaimed the truth, but also said of himself: “I am the Truth” (John 14:6). Hence, since the adjective “true” derives from the noun “truth,” within the Christian conception of truth—or rather Truth, understood as the Person of Jesus Christ—a “true” person would be one who is similar to Him. This, however, is not a philosophical claim in a neutral sense, but a theological confession of faith that requires interpretation within this tradition.

If, moreover, “Truth” is the whole Person, and not merely His views, system of thought, or spoken words, then the “truthfulness” of one who is similar to this Person cannot be limited to the level of beliefs or statements, but becomes a criterion that evaluates the person in a holistic manner. This Christian conception may be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile both the classical understanding of truth and those approaches that emphasize relationality. On the one hand, it does not abandon a criterion of truthfulness valued from the classical perspective; on the other hand, it does not reduce it to syllogistic reasoning.

In Christianity, a criterion of truthfulness does exist and is undeniable; however, it is not the criterion of a “proposition,” but of a Person. When this understanding is complemented by a Trinitarian perspective, it becomes clear that the Person who constitutes this criterion of truthfulness is who He is insofar as He exists in an inseparable commu-

nion of Persons, namely, the Trinity confessed by Christians: one God in three Persons. Consequently, it is within relationships that the truthfulness or untruthfulness of a human person becomes manifest—that is, the person’s likeness or unlikeness to the Person whose relational life is itself the reality from which we discern His identity, style, and the expression of His “spirit” in a holistic sense.

Thus, this personalist conception of truth, characteristic of Christianity, is revealed in relationships and is therefore thoroughly relational, thereby extending the relatively narrow, “propositional” conception of the classical theory.

The truthfulness of a way of life, the coherence of the person, and the expression of this coherence in the consistency of the relationships one forms are aims shared by many religious traditions. At this point, we arrive at the central concern of the present analysis: the question of what it means for a given religion to be or not to be “true.”

2. From Truth to Truthfulness: The Personalist Shift

In this section, a key consequence for the entire argument will be clarified: if truth is understood in personalist terms, then “truthfulness” is shifted from the level of the correctness of judgments to the level of the coherence of life. Understood in this way, “truthfulness” finds its confirmation in the analysis of the person as a subject of action, in which the act constitutes the privileged locus of the manifestation of the person.

The person not only “is,” but also “becomes” through conscious and free actions, in which the person experiences himself or herself as an agent and, at the same time, constitutes himself or herself. In this sense, the coherence of the person is not merely declarative, but is realized in the unity of life expressed in acts (Wojtyła 1969, pp. 68–72).

This means that the criterion of the truthfulness of religion is not exclusively epistemic, but has an ontological and personalist dimension.

At this point, one further clarification is necessary. As stated above, the “truthfulness” of a human person consists of his or her likeness to Personal Truth, that is, to Jesus Christ, which in turn implies the coherence of that person. This likeness, however, does not occur by way of simple imitation, but rather through what theology refers to as *sequela Christi* (the following of Christ). It is therefore not merely a matter of accepting the teaching of Jesus and acknowledging as true what He proclaimed, but something much deeper: a conformity of one’s entire life to the person of Jesus Christ.

This includes one’s way of thinking, moral decisions, relationships with others, and a style of life marked by love, self-giving, and humility. Such following, therefore, is not achieved through the external copying of behaviors, but through an inner transformation of the person—a conformity of the whole person to the Person of Christ (John Paul II 1993, nn. 19–24; Zadykowicz 2011, pp. 214–25, 307–14). The essence of this process, and the only thing that makes such conformity possible, is a profound communion with Him.

Any attempts to achieve this likeness solely through *imitatio* not only prove ineffective, but also carry within themselves a false image of God and religion—a false theology marked by the presence of what Pope Francis has called the “subtle enemy of holiness,” namely the heresy of Pelagianism. In this context, he emphasizes its particular contemporary relevance, noting that Pelagianism is not merely a historical heresy, but also takes on modern forms.

In the apostolic exhortation *Gaudete et exsultate*, he points out that today Pelagianism manifests itself in the belief that a person can attain perfection by one’s own efforts, through self-discipline, moral exertion, or meticulous observance of norms. In such an understanding, the relationship with God is reduced to a project of self-perfection, and grace ceases to be understood as a gift, becoming merely an addition to human action.

Meanwhile, as the Pope emphasizes, true holiness does not arise from self-sufficiency, but from the prevenient and sustaining grace of God, which enables the human person to enter into communion with Christ. Pelagianism—also in its subtle, contemporary form—thus remains a denial of *sequela Christi*, because it replaces the logic of relationship and gift with the logic of achievement and merit (Francis 2018, nn. 47–62).

As Benedict XVI previously observed, “being Christian is not the result of an ethical choice or a lofty idea, but the encounter with an event, a person, which gives life a new horizon and a decisive direction.” (Benedict XVI 2005, n. 1). It is realized along the already mentioned path of remaining in communion with this Person.

This communion with Christ, as noted above, also contains the dimension of *co-munus*, that is, cooperation with Him, above all in His great unifying mission, expressed in the words *instaurare omnia in Christo*, signifying the great movement of recapitulation—that is, literally, the “restoration of the head” to all that, without Christ, is deprived of it, and therefore manifests not harmonious unity but rather a senseless chaos.

Thus, this Personal Truth, which is Jesus, not only integrates and recapitulates individual persons, making them “true,” but also integrates and recapitulates, in turn, the Church, humanity, and ultimately the whole of creation. This unity, therefore, in light of what has been stated above, constitutes a profound truth about the human person as well as about the world—a truth that the Personal Truth, Jesus Christ, reveals and brings forth. This recapitulative movement may be further illuminated by the cosmic Christology of Maximus the Confessor. In Maximus, the Logos is not merely one element within creation, but the one in whom the many logoi of created beings find their unity and meaning. The integration of the human person is therefore not an isolated anthropological event, but participates in a wider movement of cosmic unification. This strengthens the claim that religious truthfulness cannot be reduced to psychological coherence: it concerns the restoration of the human person, the Church, and creation to their proper relation to the Logos (Maximus the Confessor 1985; Blowers 2016).

However, within the above proposal to understand the “truthfulness” of religion as rooted in the transformation of the person and in existential coherence, significant reservations emerge that require careful consideration.

The first objection concerns the risk of reducing truth to an anthropological effect. If a religion is “true” insofar as it makes the human person “true,” it may give the impression that truth is reduced to a functional outcome—namely, to what works, integrates, or produces existential benefit. In such an account, the criterion of truth appears to approach pragmatism and thereby risks losing its objective character.

This objection is valid if one assumes that the relationship between truth and “truthfulness” is purely instrumental. However, in the proposed perspective, this relationship is ontological rather than pragmatic. The point is not that religion is true because it works, but that it works because it participates in truth understood as reality. This understanding also corresponds to the concept of integral evangelization, in which the proclamation of truth is not limited to doctrinal transmission, but encompasses the transformation of the whole human life and its social relations (Chmielewski 2025, pp. 2–3). The existential coherence of the person is not here a criterion that replaces truth, but rather its fruit and manifestation.

This approach is consistent with a broader vision of the integral development of the person, in which human transformation is not confined to the cognitive sphere, but encompasses all dimensions of existence—spiritual, moral, intellectual, and social. In this perspective, truth does not function merely as an object of knowledge, but as a reality that shapes the entire life of the person and his or her relationships, leading to the gradual integration of personal identity (Chmielewski 2025, pp. 1–2).

This can also be formulated in negative terms: the lack of personal integration manifests itself in the experience of loneliness, which—as pedagogical analyses indicate—may lead to alienation, relational disorders, and developmental crises. In this sense, loneliness is not merely a psychological state, but a manifestation of the disintegration of the person (Kalisz 2024, pp. 52–53).

Within this perspective, the personalist understanding of truth remains consistent with the classical vision of education, sometimes referred to as perennialist, which assumes the existence of enduring and objective values—such as truth, goodness, and beauty—that constitute the foundation of personal development. Education, in this view, is not understood primarily as the transmission of information or the formation of competencies, but as the introduction of the human person into a pre-existing axiological and ontological order, which is not constructed by the individual, but gradually discovered and appropriated as one's own (Gutek 2003, pp. 281–93).

This process corresponds to what personalist pedagogy describes as the “process of personalization,” in which the human being becomes a person through integrating actions, choices, and relationships around the recognized truth (Nowak 2003, pp. 232–47). In this sense, “truthfulness” does not merely denote subjective coherence, but the capacity of the person to live in reference to values that transcend the individual and constitute a normative point of reference for personal development.

Thus, truth does not appear merely as an object of knowledge, but as a reality in which the human person participates with his or her entire existence, integrating the cognitive, moral, and relational dimensions (Nowak 2003, pp. 234–36).

The second objection points to the possibility of false integration. This tension is also evident in the history of Christianity, where tendencies have appeared to emphasize selectively certain dimensions of human life. Some currents of spirituality have stressed the primacy of the interior life at the expense of corporeality, relationality, or social engagement, which could lead to a reduction in the integral development of the person.

From a personalist perspective, this does not entail the rejection of these traditions, but rather the need to reinterpret them in light of the fullness of humanity, in which all dimensions of the person remain in mutual relation and are ordered toward truth understood as the unity of life. History shows, moreover, that ideological or religious systems may lead to a strong internal coherence of individuals or communities while at the same time remaining detached from truth. Psychological or social integration does not in itself guarantee truthfulness in the ontological sense.

This objection, too, requires clarification. In the proposed approach, “truthfulness” does not denote any form of integration, but only that which opens the person to relationship, transcends egoism, and leads to communion. Integration that is closed, excludes others, or absolutizes one's own identity does not meet this criterion, since it remains contrary to the relational nature of Personal Truth. Thus, not every form of coherence is a sign of truth, but only that which has a communal character.

The third objection concerns the danger of blurring the distinction between religion and non-religious structures. If the criterion of “integration” of the human person is taken as decisive, it can be observed that similar functions are also performed by secular systems: ideologies, political communities, or cultural projects. Addressing this objection requires indicating that, in the case of religion—at least from a Christian perspective—integration is not merely an immanent process, but is oriented toward a transcendent source. While non-religious structures may integrate the human person at the psychological or social level, religion claims to introduce the person into a relationship with ultimate reality. Thus, its “integrative” function does not exhaust itself at the functional level, but has an ontological character.

Finally, the fourth objection concerns the tension between the proposed approach and the classical understanding of truth as the correspondence of judgment with reality. One may ask whether the shift in emphasis from truth to “truthfulness” leads to a weakening of the cognitive dimension of religion. In response, it should be emphasized that the proposed perspective does not abolish the classical understanding of truth, but rather expands it. The correspondence of judgment with reality remains necessary, but is not sufficient for grasping the fullness of truth when truth is understood in personalist terms. In this sense, “truthfulness” does not replace truth, but reveals its existential and relational dimension.

It may therefore be concluded that the objections presented do not so much undermine the proposed thesis as lead to its clarification: the “truthfulness” of religion does not consist in arbitrary effectiveness, but in participation in truth, which manifests itself as the capacity for communion, integration, and self-transcendence.

3. Personalist Anthropology and the Truthfulness of the Human Person

The personalist understanding of the person, developed in philosophical and pedagogical reflection, makes it possible to further specify the theological intuition presented above. If truthfulness is understood not only as the correctness of propositions, but as the integrity of the person, it becomes necessary to briefly clarify this notion from an anthropological perspective.

In this sense, truth is not exhausted in the logical dimension as the correspondence of knowledge with reality, but refers to the way in which the human person participates in reality and understands it (Nowak 1999, p. 190).

Personalist philosophy and pedagogy emphasize that the human person is not merely an individual subject, but a relational being whose identity develops through freedom, rationality, and participation in community. From this perspective, the truthfulness of the person cannot be reduced to the coherence of beliefs or the sincerity of declarations; rather, it concerns the integration of the whole person—its cognitive, moral, and relational dimensions. Such an understanding is confirmed in pedagogical reflection, which emphasizes that truth has both a personal and a cognitive character, engaging the whole human person and giving meaning to both knowledge and action (Nowak 1999, pp. 191–92). The relational character of the person is not merely of secondary or functional significance, but belongs to its very essence. As Jacques Maritain observes, the person needs others because “a solitary life is not a human life.” The human being requires community not only because of one’s limitations as an individual, but also because of one’s spiritual richness as a person, which calls for communication, self-gift, and participation in relationships.

This means that the integration of the person—and thus his or her “truthfulness”—is realized not in isolation, but within the relational structure of life, in which the human person transcends himself or herself toward others (Evans 1952, pp. 170–71). The development of the person presupposes active engagement, expressed in making choices through which the human being concretizes his or her own development and assumes responsibility for it. The ultimate aim of this process is a mature personality capable of communication and participation in social relationships, which confirms the relational character of human integrity (Nowak 1999, p. 290).

A helpful point of reference here is the classical personalist distinction between the individual and the person. As Jacques Maritain observes, the human being is both an individual and a person, yet these two dimensions are not identical. As an individual, the human being functions within the material and social order, whereas as a person, he or she transcends this order through reason and freedom, being capable of knowing truth and of love. The person is not an isolated being, but an open reality that is realized through relationship and communication with others. This means that the truthfulness of the person

cannot be understood merely as internal coherence, but rather as a dynamic capacity for self-transcendence and participation in a reality that surpasses the individual. In this sense, the person not only exists in relationships, but is constituted through them, which allows one to understand personal development as a process of integration oriented toward truth and communion (Evans 1952, pp. 169–70).

Personalist thought interprets human development as a process of becoming a person through the realization of reason, freedom, and openness to others and to transcendence. This approach is consistent with classical personalist reflection, which emphasizes that the person is not fulfilled in isolation, but through engagement and relationship with others. In this sense, personal development does not consist merely in the perfection of internal dispositions, but in going out toward the world and other persons, which constitutes the condition for authentic integrity and for overcoming an individualistic reduction in the human being (Mounier 1970).

This perspective finds further deepening in the analysis of the person as a subject of action, in which the act constitutes the privileged locus of the manifestation of the person. The human person not only is, but also becomes through conscious and free actions. He or she experiences himself or herself as an agent and, through the act, realizes self-determination, shaping himself or herself as a person (Wojtyła 1969, pp. 68–73).

From the perspective of pedagogy, a consequence of such an understanding of subjectivity is the so-called personalist norm, according to which the person is regarded as the highest good and the fundamental point of reference of the educational process. This implies the necessity of affirming human dignity in every educational relationship (Nowak 1999, p. 289). Such development presupposes the harmonious cooperation of all dimensions of human life, leading to the integration of the person as a unity of knowledge, freedom, and relationships (Wojtyła 1969; Maritain 1966; Chmielewski 2025).

Within this anthropological framework, religion may be understood not only as a system of doctrines, but as a space in which the unity of the human person is gradually formed and revealed. In this sense, dialogue not only expresses a relationship, but also constitutes it, creating a reality “between us” that becomes the proper space for the manifestation of the person and his or her truth (Tischner 2012, p. 19).

In the personalist perspective, culture remains inseparable from the person as a subject of action. As John Paul II emphasizes, human beings both create culture and express themselves through it. Culture therefore becomes a space in which personal identity, values, and relationships are articulated and developed, revealing the subjective dimension of human existence (John Paul II 1980; Gładkowski 2024, p. 77).

Education, understood as a process of leading the person toward the fullness of humanity, aims not merely at transmitting knowledge but at supporting the formation of personal identity and responsible participation in communal life. In this sense, maturity may be described as existential coherence or “truthfulness.” Such development presupposes encounter with others, since personal growth does not occur in isolation but through relationships that make integral maturation possible (Kalisz 2024, p. 52).

Personalist anthropology remains consistent with classical approaches in the philosophy of education, which assume the existence of enduring values that orient personal development (Gutek 2003, pp. 281–93). In the personalist perspective, the person is a dynamic reality that develops through freedom, rationality, and relationships. Consequently, truthfulness is understood as a process of integration rather than a fixed state. Since the person is always an end in itself and never merely a means, educational, social, and religious processes must be evaluated according to whether they foster or hinder the full realization of the person (Nowak 2003, pp. 232–47).

This approach is also reflected in the concept of integral education, which seeks the harmonious development of the physical, intellectual, and spiritual dimensions of the person (Kalisz 2020, pp. 205–14). Integral education thus supports the unity of knowledge, love, and action, enabling the person to develop as a coherent and responsible subject (Dziewiecki 2010, pp. 11–15; Nowak 1999, p. 290).

The anthropological considerations developed above do not constitute an autonomous pedagogical theory but provide the personalist framework necessary for the theological argument developed in the following sections. In conclusion, it may be stated that the personalist understanding of the truthfulness of the person constitutes a key point of reference for evaluating the truthfulness of religion, insofar as that religion leads to the integration of the person and the realization of his or her fullness.

4. Religio as Integration: Liturgy and Eucharist as the Place of Integration

This section marks a transition from criterion to mechanism: if “truthfulness” is understood as the coherence of the person, it becomes necessary to indicate how and where this coherence is formed in the human being. Accordingly, the integrative function of religion will be developed as a multi-layered reality, and the liturgy will be identified as the space in which the human person is integrated—not only through discipline, but above all through grace.

To begin with, it is necessary to examine the fundamental functions of religion. Although the etymology of the Latin term *religio* remains disputed, it may be interpreted—at the hermeneutical level—as an integrative reality, that is, one that integrates the human person and the community. This process, however, is not single-level but multi-layered.

In its original and basic sense, religion had an integrative function consisting in assembling people into a cultic gathering, an *ecclesia*—that is, a convocation—whose purpose was to render worship to a deity understood in various ways, according to a given system of beliefs. Undoubtedly, such a liturgical function is also fulfilled by the major religions of the world today, beginning with the Abrahamic religions, namely Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Thus, the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy *Sacrosanctum Concilium* of the Second Vatican Council states: “Rightly, then, the liturgy is considered as an exercise of the priestly office of Jesus Christ; in it the sanctification of man is signified by signs perceptible to the senses, and is effected in a way proper to each of these signs; in it full public worship is performed by the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, that is, by the Head and His members” (Second Vatican Council 1963, n. 7).

Thus, this convocation, according to the conciliar formulation, contains and realizes within itself all that Christianity is called to be. This point can be deepened through Henri de Lubac’s analysis of the relationship between the Eucharist and the Church. In *Corpus Mysticum*, de Lubac showed that the Eucharist does not merely nourish individual believers, but constitutes the Church as the Body of Christ. The Eucharistic gathering is therefore not an accidental social consequence of worship, but belongs to the very logic of the sacrament: the body received sacramentally forms the ecclesial body. This insight is crucial for the present argument, because it shows that the integrative function of liturgy is not primarily psychological or sociological, but ecclesiological and ontological (de Lubac 2006). Such a claim, however, requires further clarification. If left without comment, the assertion that the entirety of Christianity is realized in worship could lead to the misconception that, in order to be a disciple of Christ—someone “true,” that is, conformed to Personal Truth—it is sufficient merely to perform certain rites from time to time, even the most sacred ones. Such a claim, however, is untenable.

This is because the central element of Christian worship—the Eucharist—while being the making-present of Christ’s sacrifice and a banquet in which His disciples partake of the fruits of that sacrifice, is also a memorial, that is, a rite whose purpose includes a lasting remembrance of Jesus Christ that extends beyond the boundaries of the liturgy itself. This distinguishes Christian and Jewish liturgy from pagan rituals: in certain forms of ritual religiosity, the emphasis falls on appeasing a deity and securing well-being, whereas in the biblical tradition, liturgy is oriented toward a lasting relationship with God. It should be noted, however, that this is a synthetic account that does not exhaust the complexity of religious phenomena.

The aim of Christian and Jewish liturgy is to enable the person who celebrates or participates in it not to forget God in the time between one rite and another, that is, within the context of everyday life. When this memorial function is considered together with the sacrificial and communal dimensions, it becomes clear that such remembrance does not have a merely disciplinary character—of the type “be careful, remember, God sees and judges you”—but is above all a remembrance of His gracious presence.

Christian worship is, above all, an experience of grace. For when we speak of “divine service,” as liturgy is sometimes called, it is important to recognize that liturgy is a space in which, when a person comes with the intention of serving God, he or she experiences a certain astonishment upon discovering that it is God who first serves the human person.

In Jesus Christ, God becomes for the human person one who is, as it were, like a servant: He gives Himself entirely in the Eucharist into human hands, without imposing conditions on His presence and without making His gift dependent on human perfection. He allows Himself to be “brought down” upon the altar in the simple signs of bread and wine, entrusting Himself to human weakness, fragility, and unfaithfulness—like one who consciously takes the risk in order simply to be close.

He comes at every call; He allows Himself to be received even when the heart is not fully prepared, and, when rejected, He does not cease to remain ready for return and reconciliation, without reproach or accusation. He not only gives His gifts to the human person, but gives Himself, making Himself, as it were, “dependent,” placed at the human person’s disposal, remaining present for as long as the person is willing to receive that presence.

Finally, He does not cease to serve the human person also beyond the liturgy, accompanying him or her in everyday life through grace, which quietly yet truly transforms thought, perception, and action, so that the person may increasingly become conformed to the One whom he or she has received (Godlewski 2021, p. 15).

This experience, therefore, enables the one who participates in the liturgy to perceive personally the difference about which Pope Francis has written: the difference between how good it is to be close to Jesus and how painful it is to be far from Him. The “memory” that arises from the liturgy is thus, first and foremost, a remembrance of this very difference.

However, it is not the case that a person is sent to confront his or her sinfulness and the temptations of the world equipped only with some intellectual or emotional experience of memory. This liturgical memory is also a gift by means of which the person can continually recall that, having participated in the liturgy—that is, having partaken in the fruits of the Paschal sacrifice at the Lord’s banquet—he or she has received sacramental grace, sufficiently effective to enable thinking, perceiving, speaking, and acting in the very way in which Jesus Christ Himself would act, whom he or she has received under the Eucharistic species.

At this point, we arrive at another layer of the integrative function of religion: religion integrates the human person in such a way that the person becomes “one”—the same person both when, in the liturgy, entering the sphere of the so-called *sacrum*, he or she

stands before God, and when living out the complexity of everyday life in the space conventionally referred to as *profanum*. A person thus integrated becomes, in the entirety of life, conformed to his or her Lord, Jesus Christ, and therefore becomes “true.”

In this context, it is worth noting that, also from a pedagogical perspective, the overcoming of personal fragmentation occurs through the experience of relationship and presence. It is emphasized that a key factor of development is being noticed and accepted by another, which makes possible the formation of a coherent identity (Kalisz 2021, pp. 42–44; Kalisz 2024, pp. 51–62).

It may be said that in this experience there takes place what personalism describes as the integration of the person within the tension between nature, culture, and transcendence—an integration that is not solely the result of human effort, but an event that transcends the human person and opens him or her to the fullness of being (Nowak 2003, pp. 242–43).

5. Ecclesial “We” and Mission: *Communio* as *Co-Munus*

At this point, the argument calls for further clarification: the integration of the person is not the ultimate goal, but is essentially relational. Since God is a communion of Persons, the “truthfulness” of the human person also has a communal dimension. Therefore, the transition will be developed from the liturgical “convocation” to the ecclesial “we,” and further to mission, in which *communio* is revealed as *co-munus*.

A further point, however, requires clarification with regard to the claim that liturgy and worship exhaust the entirety of Christianity’s purpose. This is because the concept of the sanctification of the person participating in worship, as presented above, constitutes only half of the path toward becoming what the human person is called to be: the “image and likeness of God”—yet of a God who is Trinity, a communion of Persons.

For believers do not gather in the liturgy in order that each might, individually and in an individualistic manner, become conformed to God—Truth. Individualism in faith is, in fact, a contradiction of this likeness, given the triune—and therefore communal—nature of God. If, therefore, the convocation of the faithful in the liturgy does not have a merely practical purpose—if it is not simply a matter of assembling a greater number of people in order to “distribute” sacramental gifts for their individual sanctification—then it is necessary to ask what further purposes this convocation serves.

If the aim of religion is to lead the human person to become the “likeness of the Triune God,” then this is likewise the aim of the “convocation.” Thus, it may be said that people are not only “called together” in order to celebrate the liturgy, but that, by celebrating the liturgy, they become a true “convocation,” an ecclesia—not merely a collection of individual believers, but an ecclesial “we,” a community.

Therefore, if the goal of the liturgy is conformity to the Triune God, then this “we” to which the liturgy leads constitutes a criterion of its proper enactment.

In this sense, education oriented toward the person also presupposes a communal dimension, since relationships grounded in presence, respect, and care constitute an essential environment for personal development (Kalisz 2020, p. 211).

It may even be stated that a person’s readiness to form a “we” with others constitutes a *sine qua non* condition for affirming that, through the liturgy, this person has become a “we” with God—that is, has attained what the liturgy is meant to bring about—according to the principle drawn from 1 John 4:20: “whoever does not love a brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not seen.”

This horizontal “we,” however, is not limited only to those with whom we form a liturgical community. True worship is, in fact, an event that sets one in motion toward mission. This is well expressed in the etymology of the Latin word **communio**, which primarily denotes the community or “communion” into which God introduces us through sacra-

mental and liturgical rites that make Him present. The term may also be read through the lens of **co-munus**, that is, as a community oriented toward a shared (**co**) task or mission (**munus**).

From this it follows that there is yet another *sine qua non* condition of the truthfulness of communion with God to which worship leads: namely, the readiness to enter into a shared mission with Him and with all His people—a mission consisting in passing on the gifts received, so as to include in this “we,” formed both vertically and horizontally through the liturgy, all people, and indeed the whole cosmos.

This is well illustrated by the exegesis of the accounts of the Last Supper left to us by the four Evangelists. In the Synoptic Gospels, we see Jesus taking bread and wine, identifying them as His Body and Blood, and giving them to His disciples, instructing them to “do this in remembrance of me” (Matt 26:17–30; Mark 14:12–26; Luke 22:7–38). In John’s Gospel (John 13), however, there is no mention of bread and wine, but rather of Jesus who girds himself with a towel and performs the gesture of a servant: He washes the disciples’ feet (Society of Saint Francis 2003).

This difference—bearing, in a certain sense, the mark of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit—reveals something essential: we, moved by the humility of Jesus, who in the Eucharist serves us and nourishes us with Himself under the humble forms of Bread and Wine, are sent to bring this same Jesus to others under the “form” of the washing of feet—that is, through gestures and acts of love and mercy, which can be “shaped in a thousand ways” (Francis 2016, n. 20).

Moreover, this is a “form” of the Lord’s presence that is accessible and acceptable to those who, for various reasons, do not receive Him under the forms of Bread and Wine—for example, because they are non-believers, belong to another religious tradition, or live in a way that does not permit them to receive sacramental communion (Godlewski 2025, pp. 127–29).

In this sense, action is not merely an external manifestation of religious life, but constitutes a space in which the person realizes himself or herself through self-gift and responsibility for others. The act thus reveals the person as a subject capable of self-transcendence and of entering into relationship, which constitutes the foundation of both community and mission (Wojtyła 1969; Second Vatican Council 1965b, n. 24).

To this exegesis it is worth adding a reflection offered by Pope Francis in one of his Lenten messages (Francis 2019), where, reflecting on Saint Paul’s statement from the Letter to the Romans that “creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God,” he points to the cosmic dimension of the liturgy as it is lived by us. This reveals our priestly function with regard to the created world. What is at stake here is an almost cosmic dimension of prayer: I pray, that is, I encounter God, and each time He breathes His Spirit. This Spirit assures me—just as in the case of Jesus at the waters of the Jordan—that I am His beloved child.

At the same time, “creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God”: those who do not participate with me in prayer or in the liturgy—not only other human beings, but also the created world—await from me the fruits of that prayer. I am sent to them to manifest myself in relation to them as a “child of God,” that is, as someone like Jesus—one who does not exploit, but serves and cares with attentiveness.

Those who encounter in me this Christ-like attitude will, in turn, “increase the glory of God through their thanksgiving” for the good I do to them, prompted by the liturgy or by prayer. This “increased glory of God” becomes their participation in the liturgy from which I received the strength to act in a way that awakens thanksgiving in them: their “praise of God through my lips.”

At the beginning, this participation will be—using the language of Rahner—“anonymous” (Rahner 1987, pp. 240–62), yet the love carried to them from prayer and liturgy will ultimately always be “a drop that hollows out the rock” and “does not return to God empty” (Isa 55:10–11).

This gradual inclusion of others—those who do not glorify God *expressis verbis*—into Eucharistic praise in the manner described above constitutes an argument for the effectiveness of the communiogenic function of this “communion under the form of the washing of feet.”

6. Truthfulness Beyond Christianity: A Comparative-Theological Clarification

At this point, the argument must be explicitly situated within comparative theology. The aim is not to dissolve the Christian claim concerning the fullness of truth in Christ, but to ask whether the personalist criterion developed above may function heuristically in the interpretation of other religious traditions. Since we are asking about the “truthfulness” of religion, and it has already been noted that a liturgical function is also fulfilled by the major religions of the world, it becomes necessary to ask whether—and in what sense—the integrative dynamic of religion can also be recognized beyond Christianity (Second Vatican Council 1965a, n. 11; 1965c, nn. 1–2; John Paul II 1990, n. 28).

In light of the conciliar intuition that the Church is “as it were a sacrament” (that is, a sign and instrument of unity), the point is neither to dismiss all forms of human “integration” in other religions as merely apparent, nor to identify them automatically with the fullness of what Christianity understands as *communio* with Personal Truth. Rather, it is a matter of carefully distinguishing between fullness and participation, between source and signs, between ontological fulfillment and the fragmentary “disclosure” of that which in the human person calls for unity (Second Vatican Council 1964, nn. 1, 8; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2000, nn. 4–8; de Lubac 1947).

Since, in the course of the present analysis, the truthfulness of religion acquires an ontological and personalist meaning, the question of the truthfulness of other religions should be formulated not in terms of a simple dispute of propositions, but rather in terms of whether—and to what extent—a given religious experience integrates the human person toward unity, leads him or her out of fragmentation, enables the overcoming of egoism, the entering into relationships, and the assumption of responsibility and mission—that is, toward what has here been described as the transition from *communio* to *co-munus* (Second Vatican Council 1965b, nn. 22, 24; John Paul II 1998, nn. 1–3; Wojtyła 1969).

From a personalist perspective, this means asking whether a given form of religiosity fosters the process of personalization, that is, whether it leads to the development of the person as a free, rational, and relational being, capable of self-transcendence and of entering into authentic relationships (Nowak 2003, pp. 244–46).

In this sense, it may be said that the “truthfulness” of religion—recognized through the “truthfulness” of the human person—also possesses a verifiable dimension: if religion serves as an instrument of personal integration, if it overcomes the division between *sacrum* and *profanum*, if it gives rise to a readiness for “we” rather than an isolated “I,” if it sets the human person in motion toward self-gift, then it manifests something of the function here described as “integrative.” From a Christian perspective, this does not yet determine a full identification with Personal Truth, but it allows one to recognize that the process of disclosing the truth about the human person and the world—a process later termed *apokalypsis*, understood as “unveiling”—may also bear certain signs and anticipations beyond the visible boundaries of the Church (Second Vatican Council 1965b, n. 24; John Paul II 2001, n. 43; Benedict XVI 2005, n. 1).

Thus, we arrive at an important clarification: the recognition that Christianity understands itself as the true religion by virtue of its unity with Personal Truth does not entail the negation of all manifestations of “truthfulness,” understood as the integration of the person, in other traditions. On the contrary, if the criterion of truthfulness is personalist, then wherever the human person is truly integrated toward unity, we are dealing with something that calls for theological reflection rather than mere polemical negation.

This process of personal integration may be described not only in terms of participation, but also in terms of disclosure. Religious traditions differ profoundly in their doctrinal content and ultimate claims; nevertheless, many of them seek to overcome fragmentation and to orient the human person toward a more unified form of existence. From a Christian perspective, such developments may be interpreted as signs of an ongoing unveiling of the truth about the human person and the world. In this sense, the process possesses both an apocalyptic and an epiphanic dimension: truth is not merely affirmed but gradually disclosed and manifested in personal and communal life.

At the same time, since in Christianity Truth is a Person and not merely a path of human integration, the Christian understanding of the fullness of “truthfulness” remains irreducible to a purely functional description. The integrative function is not self-sufficient, but is rooted in the ontology of communion with the One who is Truth (Second Vatican Council 1965a, n. 11; 1965c, n. 2; Rahner 1976).

From this perspective, it also becomes clear why, within Christianity itself, one cannot remain at the level of cultic practice understood as something merely “external.” If the liturgy does not give rise to a “we,” if it does not set one in motion toward mission, if it does not enable *communio* as *co-munus*, then it remains, at best, a form of ritualism that does not lead to what in this study has been called “truthfulness.” And since the criterion remains the same—truthfulness discerned through the truthfulness of the human person—it applies both ad intra and ad extra (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2000, nn. 4–6; Benedict XVI 2005, n. 1; Ratzinger 2006; Second Vatican Council 1963, n. 10; Second Vatican Council 1964, n. 9; Francis 2013, nn. 178–179).

7. Truthfulness and the Formation of the Person in Judaism: A Comparative Note

The understanding of religious truthfulness proposed above—as the capacity of religion to integrate the human person and introduce him or her into communion—has been formulated within the framework of Christian reflection. This raises the question of whether such a criterion possesses significance exclusively within Christianity or whether it may also have a broader hermeneutical value. As a preliminary response, it is worth turning to Judaism, which, although differing from Christianity in its understanding of the ultimate source and fullness of truth, has developed a profound reflection on the relationship between memory, community, fidelity, and the formation of the human person.

In the Jewish tradition, truth is not understood primarily as an abstract property of propositions but remains closely connected with the reality of the covenant. Of particular importance is the concept of *emunah*, which signifies not only faith but also faithfulness, reliability, and steadfastness in relationship (Buber 2004, pp. 7–18; Stern 1992, pp. 388–90). A believing person is therefore evaluated not merely according to the correctness of his or her convictions, but also according to the capacity to remain faithful to God and to the covenantal community.

This intuition is further developed by Abraham Joshua Heschel, who emphasized that Judaism is not primarily an attempt to know God as an object of reflection but rather a response to the divine call manifested in history (Heschel 1955, pp. 136–52; Heschel 1951a, pp. 75–96). Religion is thus not confined to the cognitive sphere but encompasses the

whole of human existence, shaping one's perception of the world, interpersonal relationships, and responsibility toward others.

A particularly illuminating example is the Jewish understanding of liturgical memory. In the celebration of Passover, the remembrance of Israel's exodus from Egypt does not merely consist in recalling a historical event. Classical Jewish tradition emphasizes that every participant should regard himself or herself as one who personally came out of Egypt (Mishnah Pesachim 10:5). Memory therefore fulfills not only a cognitive but also a formative function. Liturgy does not simply recall the past; it renders it existentially present and enables the participant to discover his or her identity within the history of salvation (Yerushalmi 1982, pp. 44–49).

A similar function is fulfilled by the Sabbath. Heschel famously described it as a “palace in time,” thereby indicating that its significance extends far beyond the commandment of rest (Heschel 1951b, pp. 11–24). The Sabbath restores the proper order of human life by reorienting the person toward God, family, community, and spiritual reality. This perspective is further developed in the idea of *tikkun olam*, present in many contemporary currents of Judaism, according to which human beings participate in the “repair of the world.” Religious life is thus manifested not only in worship but also in the task of contributing to a more just and humane social order.

This dynamic becomes particularly visible in the Hebrew concept of *emet* (אמת). In the biblical tradition, *emet* signifies not only truthfulness in speech but also permanence, reliability, fidelity, and trustworthiness (Ringgren 1974, pp. 292–300). Truth is associated with that upon which one can rely, that which does not fail, and that which remains faithful to its commitments. For this reason, one of the most frequent biblical contexts in which *emet* appears concerns the activity of God Himself. God is the “God of truth” not primarily because He communicates correct information, but because He remains faithful to the covenant, fulfills His promises, and does not abandon His people (Deut. 32:4; Ps. 31:6; Isa. 65:16; von Rad 1962, pp. 370–76).

This perspective is closely connected with the aforementioned concept of *emunah*, which signifies both faith and faithfulness. A believer is therefore not primarily someone who accepts a particular set of propositions, but someone who responds to divine fidelity with personal fidelity (Buber 2004, pp. 7–26). At this point, a profound affinity emerges between the biblical understanding of *emet* and the category of “truthfulness” proposed in the present article. In both cases, truth transcends the merely propositional level and embraces the whole of human existence (Westermann 1997, pp. 116–21; Kittel and Friedrich 1964, pp. 232–51). A truthful person is not merely someone who utters true statements but someone whose life becomes coherent, reliable, and worthy of trust.

Christianity develops this intuition in a radical manner by identifying truth with the person of Jesus Christ and interpreting participation in truth as participation in His life (John 14:6; Ratzinger 2006, pp. 117–23). Nevertheless, the comparison with Judaism makes it possible to recognize that the transition from “truth” to “truthfulness” represents a development of a dynamic already present within the biblical understanding of truth as a relational, faithful, and formative reality. In this sense, the criterion proposed in this article may possess a broader comparative-theological significance, while preserving the specifically Christian conviction that the fullness of truth is revealed in the person of Christ.

8. Conclusions

In conclusion, the argument may be brought together in a synthetic form, returning to the question posed in the introduction: what does the “truthfulness” of religion mean if truth is understood in a personalist sense?

From this perspective, the authentic aim of religion becomes clear, as does the inadequacy of certain views that are incompatible with such a vision of Christianity. If the orientation of Jesus Christ is understood not as a tendency to negate or condemn what has been disintegrated by sin, but rather as a movement toward universal recapitulation, then the meaning of the term *apokalypsis* must also be reconsidered. In its original Greek sense, *apokalypsis* signifies “unveiling.” It thus refers to a process of disclosing the deeper truth of the human person and the world, bringing it to light rather than destroying it.

This process, which will reach its fulfillment in eschatological time, is already underway, though it unfolds within the tension between the divine “already”—that which God has accomplished—and the human “not yet”—that which remains to be realized by human freedom. Its final stage, therefore, should not be understood as annihilation or destruction, but rather as the definitive manifestation of what is eternal within the temporal: Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

If this final stage is sometimes described as the “end of the world,” this can be understood only in the sense found in the writings of John the Apostle, where “the world” denotes a reality opposed to God and not reconciled with Him. In this light, it becomes untenable to interpret religion as a refuge in which the human person merely waits out a corrupted temporal order, anticipating its destruction and the emergence of a “new world” established independently of human participation.

On the contrary, from a Christian perspective, religion is an instrument of this “convocation,” ultimately effected by the Holy Spirit, who gathers and sends. As described in Acts 2, this gathering is not an end in itself, but a beginning: those who are gathered are also sent forth on a path (*hodos*) (Leo XIV 2025a). Through religious experience, the Spirit—according to Saint Paul (Rom 5:5)—“pours the love of God into human hearts,” and this love gives rise to a hope that does not disappoint.

Such hope does not lead to withdrawal, but to engagement: to cooperation with God in the ongoing *apokalypsis*, the unveiling awaited by “creation groaning in labor pains” (Leo XIV 2025b). In this way, the process described throughout this study may once again be expressed as the transition from *communio* to *co-munus*: from participation in communion to participation in mission.

The preceding reflections lead to a conclusion concerning how the liturgy fulfills the entirety of Christianity’s purpose. As the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church teaches, the Church is “as it were a sacrament of the unity of the human race with God and of the unity of human beings among themselves.” In this light, the liturgy, by bringing about the union of the human person with God and subsequently setting him or her in motion toward communion—first *ad intra* within the Church, and then *ad extra* with all brothers and sisters and with the whole of creation—realizes this ecclesial mission, which is identical with the very purpose of Christianity.

A profound religious truth about the human person lies not so much in who one currently is, but in how one is seen by God, and thus also in who one is called to become. In this context, the truth about the human person consists of being the “image and likeness of the Triune God,” a reality that unfolds in dialogue: one becomes an “I” to the extent that one stands before a “you” of another person, who helps reveal dimensions of oneself that would otherwise remain unseen.

The process described throughout this article may also be understood as an epiphanic process. If truth is personal rather than merely propositional, then it is not simply possessed but disclosed. The human person does not create truth but gradually participates in it, and this participation becomes visible in the transformation of life. Religious truthfulness is therefore epiphanic: it manifests itself in the emergence of a person capable of communion, responsibility, and self-gift.

Such manifestation does not abolish difference, tension, or plurality. Rather, it enables them to become places of mutual disclosure. The other person is not merely someone who stands opposite me, but someone through whom dimensions of reality become visible that would otherwise remain hidden. In this sense, personal truthfulness is not achieved in isolation but in encounter.

Religion is therefore true not merely because it communicates truth, but because it allows truth to become visible in human existence. The integrated person becomes, as it were, an epiphany of the truth in which he or she participates. This epiphanic character of truthfulness provides the anthropological and relational foundation for the movement from *communio* to *co-munus* developed throughout this study.

In conclusion, from a Christian perspective, a religion is true insofar as it makes the human person “true,” that is, internally integrated. This does not imply any priority of the functional dimension of religion over its ontological foundation. As indicated in the paradigm of the *sequela Christi*, only that which is grounded in ontology can function in a truly authentic way.

The aim of the present analysis has therefore not been to reduce religion to its functional aspect, but to show that the truthfulness of religion is an ontological-personalist reality rather than a merely logical or syllogistic one. Christianity understands itself as a true religion not primarily because of the logical coherence of its doctrinal or catechetical propositions, but because it is a religion of communion with Personal Truth. The coherence of its doctrines does not produce this truthfulness, but rather manifests it, gradually unfolding in proportion to the depth of their interpretation.

Such coherence is not static, but dynamic, since it is guided by Personal *Dynamis*: the Spirit of Truth, who “guides into all truth” (John 16:13). This “all” should not be understood in a quantitative sense, as if God revealed a complete set of answers to all possible questions, but in a qualitative sense: God reveals Himself as One who is whole and coherent. Although never fully knowable in a quantitative manner, He gives certainty that whatever is revealed will remain consistent with the fundamental hermeneutical key expressed in 1 John 4:16: “God is love.”

It is this “whole” Truth that gradually leads the human person who receives it toward becoming likewise “whole”—that is, increasingly integrated in truth and in love. This process belongs properly to God, and, from a Christian perspective, the human person is not capable of accomplishing it without divine grace.

The truthfulness of religion may therefore be discerned through the “truthfulness” of the one who professes it. As the foregoing analysis has sought to demonstrate, this claim does not imply a superficial functionalism, but rather presupposes a deeper ontological foundation, which constitutes a *sine qua non* condition for the human person to become authentically “true.” In this sense, the truth about the human person is revealed not in an isolated act of cognition, but in the totality of one’s life, which becomes the space of its realization (Nowak 2003, pp. 232–33).

The proposed understanding of the “truthfulness” of religion should be interpreted as a theological-interpretative model. It does not replace classical theories of truth, but seeks to articulate their existential unfolding within a personalist perspective. Its aim is not to redefine truth in a philosophical sense, but to show how truth—understood as a personal reality—can be lived and actualized in the life of the human person and of the community.

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